Critical
Security Studies
and World Politics

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Asia by Jan Jindy Pettman (Chapter 7). While avoiding the overt violence that characterizes the identity politics of some situations (such as Northern Ireland; see Chapter 10), the relationship between Australia and Asia illustrates some of the roles identity can play in a complex regional setting. The designation of the politically relevant *we* in this context has been a prize struggled over by states and nations, ethnic groups, and cultural traditions, the forces of history, and the dynamics of contemporary world politics.

Pettman's chapter develops three main themes in relation to her exploration of the development of Australian national identity in the context of its European history and Asian geography. First, there is the claim that mainstream security studies and state practice are shaped by ideas of elite security and privilege and that it is the task of critical approaches to challenge the orthodoxies that ensue. Second, it is argued that community and other referents are neither inevitable nor fixed but are sites of political contestation and the outcomes of power struggles. And third, realist-speak is said to have silenced—while deploying—racialized and other understandings of identity. Pettman argues that immigration into Australia has become reracialized and foreign policy remilitarized, not least in the context of the U.S.-led war on terror. Readers will immediately recognize parallels between this situation and others across the world.

Part 2 begins with Linklater emphasizing the relationship between security and political community; it ends with Pettman emphasizing the complexities of developing political community when state practices are dominated by ideas of elite security and privilege, with the interests of the rest being marginalized. It is in this familiar top-down world that the need for emancipatory politics for those whose lives are determined by elite oppression are all the greater. This theme links directly with the concerns of Part 3, on emancipation.

Notes

1. The standard reference is Williams, *Keywords*.
2. See Carrithers, *Why Humans Have Cultures*, pp. 12–13.
3. Andrew Linklater has done the most relevant work on political community in international relations. See in particular, his *Transformation of Political Community*.

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Political Community and Human Security

Andrew Linklater

Refugees repeatedly express the wish to make a new life for themselves in another state that is free from the devastation and violence from which they have fled, and admission into another society is often the simplest solution to their immediate problem of insecurity. In this way, they can avoid the acts of violence that may have existed in their original societies, and they can escape the squalor and agonies of the refugee camps. The right to reside in another place can meet their most urgent needs, but it may not end all their insecurities. Racial threats, acts of violence and discrimination, and poor opportunities for advancement are some of the hardships that refugees often encounter in their new land. Entry into another society can bring an end to direct and immediate threats to their security, but the mere right of residence may simply mean that one form of tyranny is exchanged for another. Refugees need more than the right to inhabit another society without fear of eviction: they have to be granted all the legal, political, and social rights that citizens enjoy. Without these endowments, they cannot be at home in their new society.[1]

The plight of refugees is a simple reminder that security is inextricably linked with membership of a political community in which all members respect one another and in which all of them have some say in shaping a form of life that they regard as their own. Some may wish to go further by suggesting that the predicament of the refugee is a fine illustration of the timeless wisdom of political realism. From this vantage point, the viable state remains the chief guarantor of security. What is more, the stateless person usually wants to belong to a secure state more than anything else, since this is the prerequisite for living a decent life, and peoples without states invariably strive to establish their own sovereign communities rather than celebrate their avant-garde status as harbingers and heralds of the forthcoming neomedieval or post-Westphalian international order. For realists, there is a short step from acknowledging these truths to recognizing

that states, which are the main containers and providers of security, are surrounded by other states and, increasingly, by the architects of transnational crime and private violence that threaten their citizens. If they are to survive in this contest, states must monitor the strength of neighboring or threatening powers and make sure that the requisite counterweights are in place as quickly as possible. They must prepare for war, realizing that a neighbor's capacity to destroy or inflict damage may soon be succeeded by the intention to cause violent harm, and they must take part in an ongoing war against drugs, terrorism, and crime. To secure the community in the face of internal and external challenges and threats, the state must have long-term investments in the politics of strategic action: in outwitting or outmaneuvering, in weakening or eliminating, actual or potential adversaries.[2]

Deep controversies now surround the contention that the merits of political realism can be illustrated by recalling the plight and predicament of the world's refugees. Proponents of critical security studies have challenged the realist's belief that the state is the main container of security and that strategic action is the rational response to the security dilemma.[3] They have provided radically new answers to the question of whose security is being advanced (but also endangered) by strategic action. They have identified other subjects or referents of security, and they have explored means of providing security that break with the pessimism of political realism, including the contention that anarchy in itself compels states to participate in geopolitical competition and prepare for war.[4]

In the course of making these claims, the critics stress the ambiguities of the state since it is often a source of, as well as a threat to, human security.[5] The brief discussion of refugees above suggests they are right to do so. The critics recognize the connection between security and community while casting doubt on the contention that even viable sovereign states are adequate forms of political community; they also treat the proposition that security is best provided by strategic orientations toward outsiders with deep suspicion. From this vantage point, there is no doubt that security is inextricably linked with community and emancipation.[6] From the perspective of the realist critics, however, these developments should be resisted. Critical security theorists stretch the notion of security too far; they confuse it with concepts, such as emancipation, with which it has no obvious or even helpful links; and they operate at a level of generality that empties the discussion of security of useful policy relevance.[7]

The following sections explore the relationship between security and community and consider the extent to which the concept of emancipation either hinders or advances efforts to develop a critical security agenda. Some comments on the intricate connections between human security and political community begin the discussion, and particular attention is paid to the respects in which improved forms of political community are required

to overcome the moral deficits of modern sovereign states. Quite how far such an approach is too remote from the concerns of policymakers to make any sensible contribution to security studies is an issue that cannot be escaped, as was emphasized in an academic controversy in Britain in the 1990s.[8] The response to this question is that political realism, which was long thought to have a special relationship with, and sympathy for, the problems facing policymakers, has tended to prioritize strategic over communicative action in world affairs. This formulation acknowledges that realism has not entirely neglected the importance of communicative action, although it has been inclined to maintain that its labors are confined to a narrow domain and are always in danger of being consumed by the sphere of strategic interaction. Whether this is correct is one issue that has been central to critical approaches.

Almost all critical approaches argue that the prospects for reforming world politics and its constituent sovereign parts are much greater than realists allow. This is not to envisage a future world order in which communicative action banishes strategic action entirely. Doubtless the two realms will continue to coexist in a state of tension, and progress toward a world in which strategic action plays a lesser role in world politics will continue to come up against the unyielding barriers of distrust between many communities. The point, however, is not to regard a world order that revolves around strategic action as somehow embodying permanent truths about international politics or the human condition, but rather to regard such a world as the defacement and disfigurement of the human potential to enlarge the social realm that can be governed by dialogue and trust.[9] When characterizing the current debate between critical security analysts and their opponents, it is useful to recall Immanuel Kant's efforts to preserve the strengths of realism in his ethical vision of a universal kingdom of ends and in his related comments about how this ideal can influence the world of policy and practice. Kant's belief that orientations toward communicative action are the prerequisites for radical global reform is central to debates surrounding critical theories of world politics in general and the more specific domain of security studies.

Security and Community

The need to consider security and community together is a central theme in Niccolò Machiavelli's writings in which at least one definition of security smacks of patriarchy and possessive individualism: a man would only feel secure, Machiavelli argued, when he could regard his possessions without anxiety, live without fear for the honor of his wives and children, and conduct his everyday business without being afraid for himself.[10] A simpler and more straightforward approach would be to regard security as involv-

ing the "absence of threats."[11] But however one chooses to define security, there can be no doubt that it has to be underpinned by the appropriate form of political community. Hermits can be secure only in communities that are happy to leave them alone. Moving from the meaning of security to how it might be realized, Machiavelli argued that human beings could be secure in monarchical regimes, but they would be more secure under democratic governments in which they are involved in decisions about their collective life. This stress on dialogue and deliberation identifies the crucial link between political community and human security.

Though not entirely absent from political realism, the elements of dialogue and deliberation have usually been subordinate to the dictates of strategic action for exponents of this perspective. As noted earlier, and as stated in considerable detail elsewhere, realism assumes that the state is the safe haven that protects citizens from the intrusions of anarchy and disorder.[12] Cold War realists presumed that some states were more secure than others and that Western democracy was clearly superior to Soviet totalitarianism, but what has usually been emphasized in interpretations of realism is its more general claim that states provide security for their citizens and render each other insecure in the process by unstintingly preparing for war. Whether this assessment is entirely fair to realism, others must decide.[13] Perhaps it applies more readily to neorealism, although it is immediately important to add that structural realists are well aware that sovereign states are simultaneously a pillar of, and danger to, human security. In an important passage, Barry Buzan notes that "the security of individuals is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by the state" and continues: "Individuals can be threatened by their own state in a variety of ways, and they can also be threatened through their state as a result of its interactions with other states in the international system."[14] Working through the implications of these remarks has been a central preoccupation of critical security studies.[15]

Leaving aside important respects in which states provide security, one might consider three respects in which states are a source of insecurity.[16] First, they are a source of insecurity where migrants, gypsies, minority nations, and indigenous peoples, among others, do not enjoy the protection of the rule of the law or are barred from enjoying the political and other rights that full members of the community already enjoy. Second, they are a source of insecurity for their own citizens where they have recourse to reckless or aggressive foreign policy behavior, where they miscalculate in their dealings with other states or cause them to miscalculate in ways that lead the parties into war. Third, as this last point indicates, and as realists have long argued, states are also a source of insecurity to one another, often accidentally rather than intentionally as they cope with security dilemmas. Conventional strategic studies focused on the second and third of these

phenomena, regarding the first as the business of political science rather than international relations and assuming that states will have to deal with international threats and dangers long after they have removed any threats they may pose to their own citizens. (Critics of conventional approaches dispute the value of this division of labor, and rightly for reasons to be considered later.) Traditional studies of national security have been concerned with the respects in which reckless foreign policy can endanger the state and its citizens, and they developed studies of crisis management in this context.[17] But above all else, realists are associated with the belief that the security dilemma is inescapable in the context of anarchy, that states are condemned to engage in balance-of-power politics, and that the tragic consequence of their defensive efforts to provide for their security is a general condition of insecurity that is the breeding ground for war.

Realist approaches to national security have a special interest in how states can mitigate the worst effects of international anarchy. Exercises in self-help that include efforts to outmaneuver, contain, or eradicate adversaries are available to states, as are more cooperative ventures to preserve the balance of military power or to accommodate conflicting interests. Strategic action is often taken to be the essence of realist praxis, although a more balanced interpretation highlights its stress "on the need for military preparedness supplemented by negotiation."[18] Illustrations of this latter theme abound, ranging from Hans Morgenthau's emphasis on the necessity for diplomatic efforts to accommodate equally legitimate strategic interests to Henry Kissinger's stress on the need for adversaries to negotiate mutually acceptable levels of security and insecurity.[19] Realism possesses its own hermeneutic commitment exemplified by its hostility to ideological approaches to foreign policy that demonize the other instead of appreciating that states would probably behave in much the same way as their adversaries if strategic positions were reversed.[20] Classical realists stress the importance of empathy as well as control and emphasize the value of communicative as well as strategic action even in relations between adversaries.

Realists are nevertheless deeply suspicious of optimistic claims that cooperation can extend very far, or last particularly long, in the context of anarchy. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz go farther by arguing that strategic action is the norm in world politics, and communicative action is the precarious exception to this more persistent trend. In consequence, high levels of cooperation in Western Europe were thought to depend ultimately on strategic equilibrium between the superpowers.[21] The collapse of bipolarity did not release potentials for greater communicative action from the constraints of superpower rivalry but unleashed new and more violent forms of strategic action spearheaded by aggressively nationalistic movements in various parts of the former socialist bloc. The logic of anarchy

was not halted by efforts to widen the European security community or to lay the foundations for a bold new experiment in transnational democracy. Strategic orientations reasserted themselves as societal security dilemmas replaced the more familiar dilemmas that bedevil nation-states.[22]

Critical analysts and their realist or neorealist opponents disagree about how far security communities can develop or endure in world politics. Realists do not rule out the possibility that robust security communities can develop. Morgenthau clearly thought that the main challenge in world politics was to develop such arrangements, as did E. H. Carr, whose relationship with political realism is undoubtedly complex.[23] Waltz concedes that there is something to be said for the concept of the liberal zone of peace, although he is quick to add that the more significant point to remember in the unipolar era is that unbridled or unchecked power brings its own dangers.[24] Security communities will in any event last only as long as they enjoy the support of the dominant powers, and they can always be destroyed by hostile forces.

For their part, critical theorists do not underestimate the obstacles to global political reform; nor do they subscribe to any notion of inevitable and irreversible progress. They argue there is nothing in international anarchy that makes competition and conflict permanent features of world politics. The qualities of anarchy, especially as neorealism characterizes that condition, are at heart the attributes of the dominant powers. This is why critical theory can start with the Kantian proposition that everything hinges on how political community is constructed, particularly in the most powerful regions. From this vantage point, it is a profound mistake to ignore the respects in which states threaten their own citizens so that the study of international relations is free to develop its specific focus on the ways in which states interact with and threaten each other. The important point is that societies that are quick to resort to strategic action in their internal relations are improbable advocates of communicative action in world politics, unless foreign policy pragmatism suggests that commitments to dialogue will produce national advantages; conversely, societies that have standing commitments to communicative action domestically already have the potential to bring similar orientations to bear on relations with outsiders. Consequently, critical theory does not begin with how independent political communities conduct their external relations but with the deeper question of how they are constituted in the first place.

Transforming Political Community

Conventional security studies is concerned with how states interact with one another, not with the ways in which they treat their national citizens. The billiard-ball model started with the assumption that the inside of the

state is of little import unless, of course, despotic rule creates hardships for other states (e.g., by forcing them to bear the burden of coping with the rapid influx of significant numbers of refugees). In such cases, however, the domestic realm is captured only in the lens of conventional security studies because of its consequences for international order and stability. The rejection of reductionist, inside-out analysis—which is central to neorealism—is part of a larger challenge to liberal and socialist accounts of the possibility of internally generated processes of global change. The most important statement of the competing position is to be found in the writings of Kant and in restatements of liberal political theory that argue that the transformation of political communities is the key to developing lasting international security arrangements.

Kant has been portrayed as a second-image analyst of war whose belief that popular checks on executive power would bring an end to war neglected the desperate logic of international anarchy.[25] His position was more complex. Kant did have enormous faith in the pacifying tendencies of republican regimes in which executive and legislative power were clearly separated, but this idea was linked with the belief that their progressive role was anchored in a commitment to the politics of publicity and consent and in their moral belief that all human beings, and not only fellow-citizens, deserve recognition as ends in and of themselves. Michael Doyle's claim that liberal states are ill disposed to coerce other liberal states that are equally committed to organizing their societies consensually captures part of the central point. The deeper truth is that such societies must be uneasy about using coercive power at all whether they deal with liberal or illiberal states.[26] They can never comfortably purchase their own security by imposing insecurity and heteronomy on others, and they cannot happily punish unrepresented peoples for the sins and misdemeanors of despotic regimes.[27] Put differently, good liberals must be deeply uncomfortable with an international system in which strategic action thwarts the possibility of generalized commitments to communicative action.

Inside-out analysis works in liberal international political theory by arguing that the way in which states treat national citizens is not simply a domestic matter that can be ignored in accounts of external affairs. If strategic action prevails in domestic politics, then the commitment to communicative action is unlikely to shape that state's foreign policy, other than—as noted earlier—for pragmatic and self-interested reasons. But if communicative action is central to the domestic political order, then the prospects for transcending purely strategic concerns in foreign policy will be significantly enlarged.[28] These are the considerations that underpin Kantian and more contemporary liberal analyses of the relationship between the transformation of political community and the advancement of human security.

The liberal approach to security and community therefore generates an emancipatory politics that is designed to enlarge the realm of human inter-action that is governed by publicity, dialogue, and consent, but whether its concept of emancipation goes far enough is the crucial question. Socialists in the nineteenth century regarded classical liberalism as flawed because it privileged negative liberty and property rights over the values of communi-ty, solidarity, and equality. Defenders of the rights of minority nations and indigenous peoples have suggested that the liberal-individualistic claim that all citizens should have exactly the same rights ignores the need for group-specific rights that ensure due respect for cultural differences within society.[29] Feminists have also protested against the ways in which the seemingly benign liberal account of the equal rights of all citizens allows patriarchy to go untouched.[30] For such reasons, critical theorists have argued that the emancipatory project must transcend liberal horizons.

The issue of how far liberalism has been, and can be, modified to meet these criticisms is too complex a task to undertake here. Suffice it to note that the vision of social arrangements that are governed by publicity, dia-logue, and consent requires an emancipatory politics with the following three ambitions: first, the development of social arrangements that do not rest on morally irrelevant or problematical differences between individuals (including differences of ethnicity, class, religion, gender, and race and the distinction between citizens and aliens)[31]; second, the transformation of societies so that they are more respectful of the cultural differences between human beings; and third, the reduction of material inequalities that mean the underprivileged are barred from effective participation in public affairs notwithstanding the juridical truth that they possess the same legal and political rights and entitlements as the more privileged members of society. These are the ingredients of an emancipatory politics that is geared toward developing forms of political community that promote not only national but also human security. The task is twofold: to promote political frameworks in which communicative action will be free to develop; and to secure the material and other conditions that will ensure that larger num-bers of the human race (and particularly the weakest and most vulnerable members) can determine their fate within dialogic arrangements.

Earlier, it was suggested that dialogue and deliberation form the link between community and security: the previous discussion indicates how the idea of emancipation strenghens this link, but considerable unease sur-rounds the concept of emancipation within critical approaches to interna-tional relations, as well as within the wider branches of social theory from which they so freely draw. In some quarters, emancipation immediately conjures up images of revolutionary political movements that are all too willing to force others to be free. In his comments, Jürgen Habermas expresses a preference for using the concept of understanding rather than

emancipation, as well as for using the latter term to refer to changes within the self rather than the broad movement of society and history.[32] An alter-native approach, which is endorsed here, is Karl-Otto Apel's claim that emancipation refers to advances in "nonrepressive deliberation."[33] This for-mulation has the double merit of staying clear of untenable historical meta-narratives while supporting moves toward domination-free communication that run through much contemporary critical theory.[34] Whether this way of conceptualizing emancipation meets all the objections to notions of eman-cipation raised within critical debates will long be disputed; but what is clear is that some realists think that the flirtation with notions of critique and emancipation has had a corrupting influence on security studies.

Two themes stand out in realist responses to the critical turn in security studies and to the wider domain of critical international theory. The first is that efforts to link security with emancipation are dangerously naive because they invite every ethnic group in the third world to exercise the right of self-determination with potentially destructive consequences for domestic stability.[35] However relevant it may be to Western Europe, the linkage between security and emancipation courts disaster when applied to the majority of third world states, where civil order is often precarious.[36] The second contention—which features in an attempt to set out the ethical dimensions of classical realism—is that notions of critique and emancipa-tion are notoriously vague and devoid of any direct relevance to substantial issues of international affairs.[37] This objection runs parallel to the objection that much critical theory, and especially postmodernism, prefers theoretical obscurantism and self-indulgence to the more urgent political task of tack-ling critical issues of policy and practice that burden decisionmakers.[38]

Regarding the first of these criticisms, emancipation understood as the progress of nonrepressive deliberation does not invite every ethnic group to exercise the right of national self-determination without any regard for the other members of society. Support for emancipation does not give groups or individuals the green light to defend their interests or express their iden-tities in ways that may prove harmful to their neighbors; it urges these groups or individuals to remake, but not to shed their identities, in the light of the dialogic imperative, and to engage those who stand to be harmed by their actions as moral equals in open dialogue.[39] This is why dialogue and emancipation are essential to any improved account of human security: they take issue with essentialist accounts of political community that sup-pose that identities and interests provide their own justification and are free from the obligation of answerability to those who are adversely affected by the actions that follow from them.[40] These sentiments are common to the different tendencies within current critical theory, and, as previously noted, they form part of the ethical content of classical political realism.

Regarding the second criticism, which is that critical perspectives

invariably lack serious policy relevance, it is useful to begin by noting that many of the ethical concerns of classical realism are reaffirmed and taken further in contemporary critical theory. George F. Kennan's argument is that the state should "concede the same legitimacy to the security needs of others that it claims for its own"[41] and urges empathetic orientations toward others that critical-theoretical accounts of dialogue are equally at pains to defend. Parallels exist between the realist case for "avoiding . . . the alienation of others by the arbitrary imposition of one's own particular values,"[42] and one central claim of the discourse theory of morality, which is that subjects must resort to dialogue since none can claim any special access to ethical and political truths.[43] There are parallels between the claim that realism has a special interest in promoting "mutual understandings," particularly in the context of "divergent value systems,"[44] and a range of critical approaches that take respect for the difference of the other as their ethical starting point.[45] There are similarities, too, between the realist argument that consent should govern the affairs of states wherever practicable and the normative aspirations of critical theory—although, at least since Michel Foucault, critical theorists have been keen to stress that consensual arrangements may well rest on, and be intertwined with, subtle exclusionary practices and intricate matrices of power.[46]

If these parallels do exist, then it is mysterious to learn that realism has a special relationship with the world of everyday practice while critical theory remains disturbingly aloof and disengaged from the challenges of current politics. The mystery deepens when it is suggested, from within a subaltern realist perspective, that security studies should move beyond the classical focus upon relations between states to deal with the domestic insecurities of multiethnic third world states.[47] All the moral considerations that classical realism commends to adversaries (empathy, efforts to reach an understanding, and to proceed by mutual consent) are as relevant to efforts to improve the relations between mutually suspicious ethnic or national groups involved in a bitter struggle to control the state's monopoly powers as they are to attempts to reduce tensions between states. The resources of communicative as opposed to strategic action are at least as relevant to the world of societal security and insecurity as they are to relations between viable nation-states.[48] If classical realism is especially attuned to the substantial issues of world politics, then critical theorists have every right to claim at least the same status. Empathy, understanding, dialogue, and consent are—and to an even greater extent than is the case with realism—the basic tools of their trade.

It has been suggested that critical security studies fails to recognize that the security of the state is key to order and stability in the multiethnic societies of the third world.[49] On this analysis, many of those societies are still in the early stages of state formation, when the territorial concentration

of state power is urgently needed to prevent civil unrest and societal breakdown. Eroding the state's monopoly powers by devolving some responsibilities to substate authorities while others are conferred upon transnational organizations may be appropriate in the more secure and prosperous regions of Western Europe, but such practices inevitably court disaster where state-building is in its infancy. Critical security studies therefore stands accused of ethnocentrism and irrelevance to the plight of many states in the third world.[50]

It is important to examine this belief that realism has a special relationship with the substantial issues of world politics, as well as to show that critical approaches have a greater claim to be relevant to the immediate questions of security. Statism, as defended in subaltern realism, masquerades as a strategy that can provide security for all, but the reality is that the monopolization and concentration of state power often comprise the principal threats to various subaltern groups including ethnic minorities. Their security is more likely to be enhanced by devolving power to democratically elected representatives and by ensuring that existing political elites are answerable to global agencies with responsibility for the international protection of human rights than by preserving and consolidating territorial concentrations of power. Suggesting instead that third world societies should seek to replicate the state-building project that characterized European history for three and a half centuries is the more obvious case of ethnocentrism. Subaltern realism highlights the plight of the weaker states of the third world but has had remarkably little to say about subaltern people and territories such as Tibet, or East Timor prior to its detachment from Indonesia.[51] For those who live in those regions, the problem of security is intimately connected with the project of transforming political community so that territorial concentrations of power are checked by the devolution of political responsibilities and the international protection of human rights.[52] Efforts to build confederal political arrangements rather than to persevere with unitary sovereign states may be the most effective ways of attempting to solve, or at least dampen, ethnic rivalries.[53] Critical theory, which contests the modern fusion of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship, and nationalism with all its destructive consequences, need not defer to subaltern realism in the sphere of policy relevance.[54]

A Kantian Approach to Human Security

Critical theory links the discussion of security with the wider analysis of community and emancipation in the belief that advances in communicative action can often play a vital role in solving or reducing human conflicts. To some extent, the supposition that critical theory has an overriding interest in identifying the sources of structural change, in providing normative

visions of alternative world orders, and in offering ways of assessing the merits of current forms of political practice has obscured its problem-solving dimension.[55] This has encouraged the skeptics in their belief that critical theory may be strong on vision but has nothing profound to say about the strategies of transition that would lead to a new world order or about the stubborn issues of world affairs that confront policymakers.[56]

There is no political theory, realism included, that offers an instruction manual for dealing with the most intractable forms of ethnic or ethnoreligious communal conflict. There are no conflict resolution kits that explain how intersocietal estrangement can be replaced by confidence and trust, or that show how deeply ingrained habits of resorting to strategic action can be cured by advances in communicative action and discourse ethics.[57] Revising political structures and constitutional arrangements may ease social tensions even in the most intractable cases, but lasting solutions invariably require profound cultural changes and parallel modifications in individual psychologies that can only take place over many generations.[58] Efforts to solve ethnic conflict are a permanent reminder of the truth of Max Weber's observation that politics is the slow boring of hard boards. Progress from essentially strategic to communicative responses to such conflict is the normative goal of critical theory, which also finds muted expression in classical political realism. However, what may be described as the Kantian project in international relations surpasses realism by combining problem-solving and critical concerns in an analysis that begins with the prospects for radical breakthroughs in communicative action across world society as a whole. Notions of empathy and understanding exist in realism, but they often illustrate a limited problem-solving orientation that leaves the basic structure of world politics untouched.

Analyses of Kant's writings stress his vision of a future world order in which the citizens of sovereign states regard themselves as colegislators within a universal kingdom of ends, and they note how this vision informed his critique of the barbaric freedom of the modern territorial state. Kant was much more than a normative theorist, however. He recognized that violence would long remain an essential feature of world politics and that force might never be eradicated entirely from the world of states. His writings recognized that there was a role for strategic action while this condition prevailed, and they did not rule out violence where adversaries preferred coercion to communication. But at the heart of Kant's project is the fundamental question of how the realm of strategic action can be pushed back gradually over time by stronger commitments to communicative action.

His answer blended realism with more utopian concerns.[59] Kant advocated several transitional strategies that were divided into two main groups: those that were immediately binding on political subjects (such as ensuring the ethical conduct of war), and those that could only be realized gradually,

conceivably over centuries, as estrangement and suspicion yielded to mutual respect and trust (such as abolishing standing armies). Kant's inventory is obviously dated, but his act of dividing strategies of transition into two main groups has more contemporary illustrations. Approaches that distinguish between immediately binding duties to promote confidence-building measures and the longer-term goal of negotiated demilitarization rest on the same dichotomy.[60] The key point behind this distinction is that common interests may permit limited experiments in transparency and reciprocity from which more radical commitments to publicity, dialogue, and consent may develop in time.[61] Problem-solving responses to conditions of insecurity should be informed then by the longer-term ethical aspirations of critical theory; these are also the means by which the more demanding normative aspirations of critical theory can be embedded in political institutions and practice.

The Kantian project transcended the stark opposition between problem-solving and critical theories by withholding support from short-term measures that hindered or failed to encourage respect for a universal kingdom of ends.[62] Responses to immediate security problems and longer-term ethical goals were locked in a dialectical relationship. The approach was far from silent on specific courses of action, but it avoided an essentially instrumental approach to political life that assumes that human affairs can be guided by some instruction manual or recipe book.[63] Like realism, Kantian critical theory was at odds with rationalism in politics in the Oakeshottian sense of applying abstract moral and political principles without regard for the nuances of social contexts. It was less concerned with recommending specific courses of action than with highlighting the cognitive changes that they should bring about. As noted, it agreed with the classical realists that deep and lasting solutions to conflict required greater empathy and understanding, but it parted company with realism by assuming that the opportunities for enlarging the sphere that is governed by consent as well as empathy and understanding are far greater than most realists have supposed.[64] The belief that realism is gripped by an unwarranted pessimism has meant that critical theory in the Kantian mode has been especially interested in the much-neglected areas of culture, communication, and possible extensions of the moral boundaries of existing forms of life.

Uppermost in Kant's normative international theory was the possibility of transforming the conceptual framework that human beings apply to conflicts of interest and identity. Kant stressed the importance of developing conceptual systems that gave expression to the human capacity for living in accordance with moral universals. Critical theory in the Kantian mode insists that these universals do not require the dissemination of any specific form of life or particular conception of the good. Nor do they require that separate individuals scrutinize their actions to ascertain whether or not the

maxims that underlie them can be universalized in principle. What is required is a willingness to engage those who may be harmed by one's actions in an open dialogue in which all human differences are treated with respect and in which no prior assumptions are made about where the dialogue will lead or about how, ideally, it should end.[65] This is what separates communicative action that is concerned with reaching mutual understanding from communicative or discourse ethics concerned that agreements are as free from all known forms of power and coercion as is possible. Actors who acquire these psychological qualities enter what Habermas calls the "domain of postconventional morality."[66] Such actors do not abandon their particularity—which is impossible in any case—but they recognize that demeaning representations of others are always possible in the context of plurality and diversity and that the resultant challenge is to reach agreements in which each actor has attempted to take the place of all others and to understand radically different political positions.[67] Postconventional ethics requires a reflective orientation toward the forms of unjust exclusion that subjects have created in the process of pursuing interests and protecting valued differences. Additionally, it involves the desire to engage the unjustly excluded in an open dialogue in which the latter can protest against the systematic neglect of their legitimate concerns. Forms of political community with these attachments to communicative as opposed to strategic action are the true foundations of human security.

Conclusion

In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch coined the phrase the "security community" to describe those regions in which a sense of "we-feeling" had softened the edges of national differences and in which the desire for peaceful change had abolished the use of force.[68] His analysis neatly captured the basic truth that security ultimately requires a shift from strategic to communicative orientations toward others. Elements of this approach exist within classical political realism, although they have not been developed very far because of a pessimistic analysis of world politics that assumes that communicative action might ease tensions between adversaries but cannot solve the intractable security problems in world politics. Critical theory takes these themes more seriously in the belief there are no systemic or ontological barriers to breakthroughs in communicative action and discourse ethics across world society as a whole. To put this differently, realism regards empathy and understanding as important ways of mitigating the worst effects of international anarchy, but it is disinclined to believe that they could ever provide the foundations of an alternative world order; critical theory maintains that empathy and understanding can provide the bridge to

a world order that revolves around the principles of publicity, dialogue, and consent (without assuming that the condition of permanent peace is ever likely to be achieved and recognizing that progress toward this end requires the support of states, especially the great powers).

From the critical perspective, security requires the development of forms of political community in which the constraints on actors are, as far as possible, the constraints they willingly impose on themselves.[69] It requires the establishment of political structures that guarantee effective participation in dialogic arrangements (either directly or indirectly through democratically elected representatives). It involves the willingness to extend these arrangements across both domestic and international politics. An ideal security community will take the form of an unlimited speech or communication community in which the right to participate in dialogue is possessed by one and all. Progress toward this ideal cannot take place without the prior transformation of political community. The emergence of more dialogic forms of life is the key to advancing the Kantian ideal of a "cosmopolitan condition of general political security."[70]

Notes

1. The main themes of this paragraph are drawn from Michael Walzer's account of the distribution of membership in Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, chap. 2.

2. Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 78 describes strategic action as action that is governed by the subject's concern with personal success whereas communicative action involves the search for agreement and understanding. For further discussion see Johnson, "Habermas." We shall return to this distinction later.

3. Wheeler and Booth, "The Security Dilemma" in Baylis and Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics*.

4. For an astute discussion of these themes, see Mutimer, "Beyond Strategy."

5. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, p. 364.

6. Booth, "Security in Anarchy" and "Security and Self."

7. Ayoob, "Defining Security."

8. Wallace, "Truth and Power"; Booth, "A Reply to Wallace"; and Smith, "Power and Truth."

9. The question of trust has been strangely ignored in the study of international relations. See Rengger, "The Ethics of Trust in World Politics."

10. Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 28.

11. Booth, "Security in Anarchy," p. 319.

12. Krause and Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, p. ix.

13. See Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*.

14. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, p. 364.

15. Mutimer, "Beyond Strategy."

16. The argument that is developed here does not deny that states may be the containers of security for their citizens but shifts the emphasis onto how their moral deficits can be reduced and advances in human security achieved.

17. But some approaches were also quick to stress the "rationality of irra-

tionality" especially but not only in the context of nuclear deterrence. For a critical discussion, see Midgley, *The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations*, chap. 12, pt. 1.

18. Mutimer, "Beyond Strategy," p. 73.

19. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, chap. 32; and Kissinger, *The White House Years*.

20. For a detailed discussion of philosophical hermeneutics and international politics, see Shapcott, *Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations*.

21. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 71.

22. See Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration*.

23. Booth, "Security in Anarchy"; and Linklater, "The Transformation of Political Community."

24. Waltz, "America as a Model for the World?" pp. 667–670.

25. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War."

26. Michael Doyle argues that liberal states tend not to go to war with one another, but are less inhibited when dealing with regimes that lack any commitment to the politics of consent. See Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80: 1151–1168. MacMillan, "A Kantian Protest" and *On Liberal Peace*, develops the bolder argument that liberal states must proceed in a consensual fashion in all their external relations if they are to remain true to their deepest moral convictions.

27. MacMillan, "A Kantian Protest" and *On Liberal Peace*, argues that liberal states may well behave in this way, but in so doing they allow their liberal sentiments to be overpowered by nonliberal convictions in government or society.

28. The skeptic may want greater precision about the extent to which domestic political change makes a measurable difference to foreign policy behavior. This is not a question that can be answered here. A larger study of these themes would also need to make further progress on the conceptual front. A society that combines investments in communicative action with an ethnic conception of citizenship is unlikely to behave in the same way as a society in which communicative action is linked with a civic conception of citizenship. (I am grateful to Don MacIver from Staffordshire University for highlighting this point.) The link between the inside and the outside, between domestic structures and communicative action in foreign affairs, will presumably be stronger if citizenship is thought to embody universal or cosmopolitan commitments. The belief that there may be good reasons for treating insiders and outsiders differently but not for subjecting them to different forms of politics (to the politics of communicative action in the case of citizens, to the politics of strategic action in the case of aliens) is crucial here.

29. Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community, and Culture*.

30. Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, chap. 1.

31. Abolishing forms of politics that rest upon morally irrelevant distinctions between insiders and outsiders (citizens and aliens) is a crucial extension of this process. This is not to argue that national loyalties are incompatible with a cosmopolitan community, or to suggest that duties to humanity must always override duties to other citizens and to the state. But it is to suggest that the differences between insiders and outsiders are not so profound as to justify confining the politics of communicative action to the domestic sphere. Put another way, the similarities between insiders and outsiders are such as to require efforts to enlarge the speech community or to promote an unlimited or universal communication community. See Lyotard, "The Other's Rights," in Shute and Hurley (eds.), *On Human*

Rights; Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*; and Habermas, *Justification and Application*. Moral agents must become troubled by the fact that "the idea of an ideally extended communication community is paradoxical in that every known community is limited and distinguishes members from nonmembers through rules of inclusion" (Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 54). Concern about the harm that may be caused to outsiders requires measures to solve this paradox by creating a more inclusive speech community. For further discussion, see Linklater, *Transformation of Political Community*, chap. 6.

32. Habermas, *The Past as Future*, p. 104.

33. Apel, "The Conflicts of Our Time," pp. 98–99.

34. See Linklater, *Transformation of Political Community*, chap. 3. The notion of domination-free communication can be found in Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 68.

35. Ayoob, "Defining Security," p. 127.

36. Ibid. Ayoob takes issue with Booth's claim that "emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (quoted by Ayoob, "Defining Security," p. 126). With this definition in mind, Ayoob argues that endorsing the right of self-determination for ethnic groups ("which can be considered a major manifestation of emancipation") will "increase disorder in the Third World because of the multiethnic character of almost all Third World countries" (Ayoob, "Defining Security," p. 128). An alternative way of reflecting on these matters is suggested in the next paragraph of this chapter.

37. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, pp. 202–203.

38. Wallace, "Truth and Power." For responses to this argument, see Booth, "A Reply to Wallace," and Smith, "Power and Truth."

39. Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 58, argues that ideal argumentation "leaves the identity of the participants . . . untouched. The moral point of view calls for the extension and reversibility of interpretive structures so that alternative viewpoints and interest structures and differences in individual self-understandings and worldviews are not effaced but are given full play in discourse." Parallels with Gadamer's notion of the fusion of horizons are considered in Habermas, *Justification and Application*, pp. 104–105. For further comments on harm and discourse, see Linklater, "Citizenship, Humanity and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions," *International Political Science Review* 22: 261–278.

40. This is why it still makes sense to think in terms of the "emancipatory potential of moral universalism." See Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 125 and also p. 24.

41. Quoted by Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 123.

42. Ibid., p. 8.

43. On the importance of moral fallibilism for classical realism, see ibid., pp. 119–120. See Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 164, for a statement of the fallibilist theme in the discourse theory of morality.

44. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 8.

45. Campbell, "The Deterritorialisation of Responsibility," *Alternatives* 19: 455–484.

46. Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 132, highlights the importance of consent for Butterfield, who many would regard as a member of the English School. For further discussion, see Dunne, *Inventing International Society*.

47. Ayoob, "Defining Security," pp. 121–124.

48. Works that bear on these themes include Vayrynen, "Phenomenology and Conflict Analysis"; Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation?*; and Murithi, *Moral Development*.

49. Ayoob, "Defining Security."

50. Ibid.

51. This is to endorse the claim that the allegations that critical theory fails to address the real world problems of the policymaking community wrongly privilege the interests of state managers over the interests of groups in civil society. See Booth, "A Reply to Wallace," p. 375; and Smith, "Power and Truth," p. 510.

52. For the background to this claim, see Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State," *European Journal of International Relations* 2: 77–103. For a discussion of its relevance outside the European context, see Booth and Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity," in Krause and Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, pp. 349–352. For an account of its relevance for the remaking of Europe, see Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe*.

53. Communitarians such as Michael Walzer are right to argue that confederalism, and even secession itself with the appropriate safeguards for minorities, are often the best means of promoting the security of subaltern ethnic or national groups. See Walzer, "Notes on The New Tribalism," in Brown (ed.), *Political Restructuring in Europe*.

54. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, remains one of the best accounts of these destructive consequences.

55. On this distinction, see Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory."

56. On the contention that critical theory has very little to say about strategies of transition, see Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 185.

57. Whereas communicative action refers to efforts to reach an agreement or understanding, discourse or communicative ethics refers to the specific moral principles that subjects bring to this project. Discourse ethics is "a reflective form of communicative action" since it urges everyone to "act with an orientation to mutual understanding and allow everyone the communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims." See Habermas, *Justification and Application*, pp. 1 and 66. Another way of highlighting the differences between communicative action and communicative or discourse ethics is suggested by the claim that "we cannot rationally *convince* anyone, not even ourselves, of something if we do not accept as our common point of departure that all voices that are at all relevant should be heard, that the best arguments available given the current state of our knowledge should be expressed, and that only the unforced force of the better argument should determine the 'yes' and 'no' responses of participants" (Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 145, italics in original). Communicative action that is concerned with reaching an understanding or agreement may not involve this effort to purify relations of the effects of power inequalities. For further discussion of the differences between communicative action and discourse or discourse ethics, see Johnson, "Habermas."

58. See Murithi, *Moral Development*, chap. 7, on the importance of generational change.

59. See Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence, Volume 2: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, chap. 11; and Booth, "Security and Emancipation."

60. An intriguing example is Kenny, *The Logic of Deterrence*.

61. These are crucial themes in neoliberal studies of cooperation under anarchy and in English School accounts of international societies. The transition from a system to a society of states, as members of the English School argue, involves the increased importance of communicative as opposed to strategic action.

62. It is worth noting Kant's somewhat consequentialist argument that action should be judged by the extent to which it hampers or promotes the development of a universal kingdom of ends. See Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, p. 117. For an illustration of this approach in connection with responses to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, see Linklater, "Unnecessary Suffering," in Booth and Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision*.

63. This is echoed in the more recent contention that participants themselves must choose their path to liberation. See Habermas, *Justification and Application*, pp. 175–176. It is worth adding that early peace research was inclined to regard conflict as the medical profession regards disease. See Lawler, *A Question of Values*, pp. 56–60.

64. Habermas (*Justification and Application*, p. 174) argues that "empathy," which is "the ability to project oneself across cultural distances into alien and at first sight incomprehensible conditions of life . . . is an emotional prerequisite for ideal role taking, which requires everyone to take the perspective of all others." Universal communication, as Habermas understands it, requires this ability to understand the position taken by all others (see also Habermas, *Justification and Application*, p. 154).

65. This approach is indebted to Seyla Benhabib's distinction between ethics that deal with the specific, and ethics that deal with the generalized other—and with the related distinction between substitutionalist and interactive universalism. See Benhabib and Cornell, (eds.), *Feminism as Critique*, chap. 4. See also her account of postconventional contextualism in Benhabib, *Situating the Self*. Linklater, *Transformation of Political Community*, chaps. 2–3, discusses these issues in more detail.

66. Habermas, *Justification and Application*, chap. 3.

67. Ibid., p. 154.

68. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*.

69. The theme is Rousseau's.

70. On the cosmopolitan condition of general political security, see Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings*, p. 49.