6

Nonstate Actors: NGOs, Networks, and Social Movements

Nonstate Actors in Action

Take One: Nonstate Actors as Initiators of Policy Change

By the early-1990s, the tobacco market was changing; sales in developed countries were dropping due to increased government regulations and lawsuits that exposed the tobacco companies' knowledge of the dangerous effects of smoking. One result was a consolidation of tobacco companies; by 2000, 70 percent of cigarettes sold around the world came from just four firms. To compensate for the decline in developed-country markets, tobacco companies adopted a strategy to target consumers in developing countries where knowledge of the effects of smoking and government regulations were thin. Thus, by the early 1990s the number of smokers in the developing world surpassed those in the developed world despite the high cost of cigarettes relative to income.

In 1993, law professor Allyn Taylor and retired public health professor Milton Roemer approached Judith MacKay, leader of an Asian anti-tobacco NGO with close ties to the World Health Organization. They discussed lobbying WHO staff to propose a new binding treaty on tobacco regulation (MacKay 2003). The idea centered on drafting a set of clear principles that could attract nearly universal support; later amendments could be added on particular issues such as advertising, taxation, and anti-tobacco education programs. Initially, WHO staff were skeptical, leading one to recommend scaling back the proposal in favor of a mere voluntary "code of conduct" for tobacco firms (Roemer, Taylor, and Lariviere 2005)

At NGO conferences around the world, momentum built for moving forward. Experts and advocates lobbied their respective governments as well as personnel at the WHO itself. In 1998 the new WHO director-general, Gro Harlem Brundtland, named tobacco regulation one of her top two priorities.

Meanwhile, tobacco companies worked to establish behind-the-scenes ties with WHO staff to dissuade them from supporting the initiative. They also applied pressure on developing-country governments to resist changes to the status quo in the name of free trade, and filed lawsuits at the World Trade Organization. Despite these efforts, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control came into effect in 2005. As of early 2015, the treaty had been ratified by 180 states covering 95 percent of the world's population. While some governments have lagged behind in enforcement, NGOs continue to perform an important monitoring role and lobby their respective governments to implement and enforce the treaty's provisions. Tobacco companies continue to press developing countries to resist tightening regulations.

Take Two: The Dark Side of Nonstate Actors

Nonstate actors are no more likely than states to promote good causes, be altruistic, or be more cooperative. Indeed, opening borders between states has allowed not just do-gooders but also evil-doers to move more freely. Transnational nonstate actors such as terrorist groups, organized crime groups, and human traffickers have taken advantage of lower barriers to trade and travel. The 9/11 terrorists were able to obtain visas for entry into the United States at the US consulate in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by posing an tourists, although one was denied for being on a watch list. Human traffickers are generally able to enter Western countries with little difficulty, bringing their human products in tow. This is especially true in Western Europe, due to the 1995 Schengen Agreement, which largely eliminated border checks for those who gain entry into EU member states.

Human traffickers, terrorists, along with groups such as the Mafia, drug traffickers, pirates, and militias and paramilitary forces, are not new actors in international politics. What is new is the degree to which these groups have formed networks. Al-Qaeda is perhaps the best illustration of this dark side, with its networked character and many branches and affiliates, from al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Arabian peninsula to al-Shabab in Somalia, Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Islamic State spin-off. Both states and the international community, through formal and informal international organizations such as Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization), the UN, and the Financial Action Task Force, have waged war on this and other networks to fight crime, trafficking, and terrorism. The networks are decentralized and often skilled in using new technologies, take advantage of economic globalization for moving funds, and are able to adjust rapidly to new conditions, all of which makes them difficult to defeat. Our challenge is to understand the diverse character of these dark-side actors, the roles they play, the strategies they employ, and the ways in which their activities are reshaping international and domestic politics, as well as global governance.

The Range of Nonstate Actors

Although 193 sovereign states are the major constituents of the international system, thousands of other actors are also part of global governance. These nonstate actors (NSAs) must work within the state-centric framework, although they are not sovereign and do not have the same kind of power resources as do states, nor in most cases do they have a territorial base (Islamic State being a prominent exception). NGOs (the acronym commonly used even for groups that are international) are the most common type of nonstate actors, but a variety of other terms are used to describe different types of NSAs. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, for example, was a loose, transnational network of numerous NGOs from different parts of the world that did not even establish an address, bank account, and formal organizational identity until it was awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. The campaign against the OECD draft Multilateral Investment Agreement to regulate multinational corporations (MNCs) was also a loose, transnational network of NGOs. Al-Qaeda may be variously described as a network of terrorist (nongovernmental) organizations, a civil society network among a committed group of Muslim believers, or a multinational enterprise generating revenue to finance its political goals and organized in a cluster of subsidiaries. Thus we need to examine the nature, activities, and roles of these nonstate actors. Figure 6.1 provides summary definitions of key terms used to describe different types of NSAs.

Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs are generally the most visible of the NSAs and participate as key members in coalitions and networks. As defined in Chapter 1, NGOs are voluntary organizations formed by individuals to achieve a common purpose, often oriented beyond themselves or to the public good. NGOs neither have a mandate from government nor want to share government power (Heins 2008: 17–18). There are differences of opinion, however, on whether those common purposes of NGOs must be in support of the public good (the UN criteria) or whether common purposes are sufficient in themselves, meaning that groups of the "dark side" should also be included. In this book, the emphasis is on the former.

Many NGOs are organized around a specific issue area, while others are organized to address broad issues such as human rights, peace, or the environment (Amnesty International, the Nature Conservancy). Some provide services, such as humanitarian aid (Catholic Relief Services) or development assistance (Grameen Bank), while many do both. Other NGOs are using information-gathering and information-disseminating bodies (Transparency International). Millions of small local NGOs are active at the grassroots levels, while others operate nationally and internationally. Most international NGOs are headquartered in Northern and Western developed countries (Amnesty International in London; Oxfam in Oxford, UK; the Nature

Figure 6.1 Types of Nonstate Actors

- **NGOs/INGOs**
Voluntary organizations formed and organized by private individuals, operating at the local, national, or international level, pursuing common purposes and policy positions; debate over whether activities need to be in support of a public good (e.g., Oxfam, Rotary, Doctors Without Borders).

- **Transnational Networks and Coalitions**
Informal and formal linkages among NGOs and ad hoc groups on behalf of a certain issue (e.g., Third World Network, Landmine Survivors Network). Transnational advocacy networks are dedicated to promoting a specific cause (e.g., International Campaign to Ban Landmines).

- **Experts, Epistemic Communities**
Experts drawn from governments, research institutes, international organizations, and nongovernmental community (e.g., experts on Mediterranean Sea or global climate change).

- **Multinational Corporations**
Private actors doing business in three or more states whose goal is to make a profit (e.g., Nike, Shell Oil Company, Sony).

- **Social Movements**
Large, generally informal coalitions of mass publics, individuals, and organizations dedicated to major social change (e.g., international human rights movement, women's movement).

- **Foundations and Global Think Tanks**
Nonprofit organization funded by individuals, families, or corporations, established for charitable or community purposes (e.g., Ford Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust). Global think tanks provide research, analysis, and policy advice to governments and the public (e.g., Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

- **Terrorist, Criminal, and Trafficking Groups and Networks**
Transnational entities, often connected in networks that engage in crime, trafficking of drugs, arms, and people, as well as terrorism (e.g., Mafia, al-Qaeda).

Conservancy in Washington, DC) and receive funding from private donors and increasingly from governments and IGOs. Others have roots in the developing countries of the South, but receive some funding for local programs or training from international groups (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era [DAWN]; Tostan, an NGO that addresses female genital mutilation in Africa). Some operate independently, while others are linked to counterpart groups through transnational networks or federations.

Yet NGOs are unique organizational entities. They, like multinational corporations, are subject to the laws and rules of the nation-state in which they operate. Thus, some states ban NGOs; today, numerous states, includ-

---

ing the People's Republic of China, Russia, and states of Central Asia, impose strict governmental regulations. In Japan, NGOs operated under major legal and financial constraints until the 1990s. Still other countries, such as Bangladesh, Haiti, and Thailand, are known for having large and vigorous NGO communities with few restrictions. Under traditional international law, NGOs, unlike states and IGOs, have no independent international legal personality. Yet over time, they have been awarded responsibility for enforcing international rules in a few cases, and the right to bring cases in selected adjudicatory settings.

The variety of NGOs, the differences in their respective relationships to governments, and their funding sources have given rise to a variety of acronyms: GONGO (government-organized NGO), BINGO (business or industry NGO), and DONGO (donor-dominated NGO).

Among the internationally oriented NGOs, federations and networking are two important ways that NGOs are linked. The Vietnam Veterans of America, which was a key player in the 1990s campaign to ban landmines, illustrates a national NGO operating only within the United States for many of its goals, but linked to a global network to further the landmine campaign. In contrast, the Red Cross is officially the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland—a federation of national chapters. Oxfam International has been transformed from a British NGO into a transnational federation, with member chapters in Belgium, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others. These large, federated NGOs—Oxfam, World Wildlife Fund, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children—have shared overall goals, but leave most fundraising and activities to the individual country chapters. They differ in how much control they can exercise over chapters and how much they try to coordinate activities. Individual chapters, in many cases, may choose their own special interest. Most NGOs, whether federations of national organizations or not, maintain a secretariat that serves their members in different countries. How NGOs are organized makes a difference. Wendy Wong (2012), for example, finds that large grassroots human rights organizations with strong central leadership but decentralized implementation mechanisms are most effective.

Large numbers of NGOs are involved in humanitarian relief, from large, international NGOs to small, locally based groups. The Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, the International Rescue Committee, and Oxfam are among the hundreds of international humanitarian relief organizations involved in complex emergencies such as the conflicts in Somalia, Congo, and Syria, the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur, and natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and 2015 earthquake in Nepal.

Many humanitarian relief organizations, such as Oxfam, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, World Vision, and Doctors Without Borders, now integrate developmental components into relief work, focusing on agriculture, reforestation, and primary health care. Oxfam, for example, not only provides emergency relief in food crises, but also works at long-term development, helping Asian fishermen manage water resources. Doctors Without Borders has played a major role in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 2014 Ebola outbreak as well as helping to rebuild health infrastructure in conflict areas. Other NGOs concentrate exclusively on development, including thousands of small grassroots organizations along with larger organizations like the Grameen Bank, which provides microcredit loans to the poor.

In a few unusual cases, NGOs take the place of states, either performing services that an inept or corrupt government is not providing, or stepping in for a failed state. For many years, Bangladesh hosted the largest NGO sector in the world (more than 20,000 by one count), responding to what one Bangladeshi describes as "the failure of government to provide public goods and look after the poor, and the failure of the private sector to provide enough gainful employment opportunities" (quoted in Waldman 2003: A8). NGOs have taken on roles in education, health, agriculture, and microcredit, all of which originally were government functions. Some attribute the decline in Bangladesh's poverty rate since 1971, from 70 percent to 43 percent, to this nonstate sector. Increasingly, the government of Bangladesh has improved its capacity to take over the functions of some NGOs. While Bangladesh may be a unique case, the failed state of Somalia also witnessed an explosion of NGOs performing vital economic functions in the absence of a central government. And even though Somalia now has a partially functioning government, for more than two decades it has illustrated how nonstate actors (warlords, the Union of Islamic Courts, pirates) from the "dark side" flourish in the absence of an effective government.

NGOs engaged in advocacy are often more visible and vocal than the humanitarian relief and development providers. Whatever their focus, advocacy groups have become an important part of global governance. Often, they seek to change the policies and behavior of both governments and IGOs.

Transnational Networks and Coalitions

NGOs seldom work alone for very long. The communications revolution, especially the advent of the Internet and social media such as Facebook and Twitter, has linked NGOs together with each other—sometimes formally, more often informally—and with states to block or promote shared goals,

Thus, transnational networks and coalitions create multilevel linkages between different organizations that each retain their separate organizational character and memberships, but through their linkages enhance power, information-sharing, and reach. International NGOs often are not in a position to work effectively with local people and groups. Grassroots groups need the help of other groups within their own country and often from transnational groups to have an impact on their own government or in addressing needs. This is where coalitions or networks become valuable. Anna Ohanyan (2012: 377–378) argues that NGOs "have used networks to increase their funding, expand issue areas of engagement, enhance their mobility worldwide, and improve their overall performance." Most important, she adds, through networks "NGOs have elevated their institutional position in local and/or global governance structures."

NGOs are remarkably flexible with respect to how they apply pressure to states and are willing to act directly through lobbying as well as through transnational NGO coalitions and networks (Willetts 2010). Transnational networks of NSAs are often supplemented by transgovernmental networks of substate actors, such as provincial and regional officials, mayors, judges, police, and local representatives of national governments, with the result that policy coordination may take place without the direct engagement of the central government—and sometimes without its knowledge (Slaughter 2004).

We can illustrate the differences in how NGO coalitions organize by examining two coalitions that have formed around the issue of protecting the elephant and banning trade in ivory. One coalition includes several of the major environmental and conservation international NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund (a branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF]), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), and Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC). Most of the member organizations are based in the North, where they raise funds, conduct research, educate the public, and work with IGOs such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the secretariat of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). This particular coalition is highly integrated; its member organizations have large, professional staffs of scientists and program specialists who have a presence in countries with large elephant populations, such as Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. They work with governments to manage protected areas, monitor wildlife population changes, engage in research, and fund special projects. They also work with major ivory consumers such as Japan, China, and Hong Kong. Their funding comes from governments, foundations, corporations, as well as individual members.

In contrast to this coalition of highly professional NGOs, another coalition formed in the 1980s to push for a ban on ivory trade was loosely composed of preservation and animal rights organizations, such as Friends of the Animals, Greenpeace, the Humane Society, and Amnistie pour les Éléphants. It was primarily geared toward raising public awareness and thereby influencing governmental decisions. Through a major media campaign in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was instrumental in achieving a worldwide ban on ivory trade in 1989. Funding came almost exclusively from members, and there was no organizational structure to aid in implementing long-term solutions. It was not geared to work with governments of both ivory-consuming and elephant-host countries to promote an overall conservation strategy that would address underlying causes of elephant population decline (Princen 1995). As poaching and trafficking of ivory have mushroomed since 2008, due in part to both demand in Asia and the involvement of international criminal groups, many new groups have formed to press for new action on the problem. How CITES itself is implemented through TRAFFIC is discussed in detail in Chapter 11.

The second coalition just described illustrates a special type of network or coalition, often more visible and vocal, namely a transnational advocacy network (TAN). TANs bring new ideas into policy debates, along with new ways of framing issues to make them comprehensible and to attract support, new information, and resources. Although they come in all shades, organizational formats, sizes, and approaches, they share "the centrality of values or principled ideas, the belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment . . . of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). These campaigns focus advocacy efforts, target resources, and win public support typically with a topical focus, such as elephants, whales, the Amazon, or Africa's Great Lakes. Human rights campaigns have focused either on specific rights abuses such as torture, violence against women, child soldiers, and slavery, or on specific countries such as Argentina and South Africa. Peace groups have long focused on banning a particular type of weapon (nuclear weapons, landmines, small armaments, cluster munitions) and opposing wars (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Israel/Hamas).

Key to the functioning of advocacy networks are the formal and informal connections among participating groups. Individuals, information, and funds move back and forth among them. Larger NGOs provide money and various kinds of services, such as help with organization building and training, to smaller NGOs. Small grassroots groups provide information about human rights violations or pending environmental disasters to NGOs, often including stories told by those whose lives have been adversely affected. By framing issues for broader appeal, advocacy networks seek to change

the policies and behavior of *both* governments and IGOs, to secure changes in international and national laws, and to make a difference.

Over time, TANs have learned from each other (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998). Close relationships between key players in women's rights and human rights groups led to the mainstreaming of women's rights into the human rights movement in the 1990s. Environmentalists seeking protection of public spaces used the language of human rights. The Cluster Munition Coalition has worked in tandem with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and adopted many of its strategies.

The "dark side" networks, however, stand in contrast to the advocacy networks. Transnational criminal and terrorist networks have adapted networked business models of transnational enterprises. Goods produced in low-risk areas are trafficked to high-income areas through strategic alliances, subcontracting, and joint ventures. Their networks are ordered, self-repairing (branches can be easily replaced), and resilient. What is trafficked can be easily changed (drugs to human beings to organs to arms or ivory). The ties between different parts of a criminal network may be based on blood, neighborhood, past participation, ethnicity, or language (Madsen 2014: 401). Not surprisingly, global crime governance is also organized through a public-private network on the grounds that "it takes a network to defeat a network" (Madsen 2014: 404).

Experts and Epistemic Communities

Experts on different subjects, drawn from government agencies, research institutes, private industry, and universities, are important actors in many global governance issues and often are drawn together into so-called epistemic communities. The sharing of knowledge by experts through transnational networks is critical to understanding the problems themselves, framing issues for collective debates, and proposing specific solutions. Epistemic communities, therefore, are networks of knowledge-based experts—professionals with competence in a particular issue domain. Although they may come from a variety of academic disciplines and backgrounds, they share normative beliefs, understanding about the causes of particular problems, criteria for weighing conflicting evidence, and a commitment to seeking policy solutions (Haas 1992: 3).

Epistemic communities are particularly important in addressing complex scientific, environmental, and health issues, but in principle could be influential in shaping policy outcomes in any issue area where shared knowledge is critical. For example, in the 1980s, amid growing concern that the Mediterranean Sea was dying, all eighteen governments in the region participated in negotiating the Med Plan under UNEP auspices. Critical to bringing together the states and securing agreement, however, was

the network of ecologists in UNEP, the FAO, and several governments. They shared a common concern about the Mediterranean's health and the necessity of multilateral policies to regulate pollutants. Drawing on the expertise of regional marine scientists, they drafted the Barcelona Convention and Land-Based Sources Protocol to deal with land-based and marine-based sources of pollution. They pressed governments to regulate pollutants other than oil, including those transported by rivers. They encouraged governments to enforce policies for pollution control and to adopt more comprehensive measures. Not surprisingly, the strongest measures for pollution control were taken in countries where members of the epistemic community were entrenched in government agencies and influential (P. Haas 1990). The Med Plan became the model for arrangements for nine other regional seas.

Other examples of epistemic communities can be found among the scientific experts on whaling (cetologists), stratospheric ozone, and global climate change (e.g., the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, discussed in Chapter 11). They can be found also among experts on nuclear proliferation and intellectual property as well as many other issues. Several epistemic communities are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Foundations and Global Think Tanks

Private foundations, which are legal entities in most developed countries, are nonprofit organizations that serve charitable or community purposes. They are funded by individuals, families, or corporations, but they serve public purposes. With a philanthropic tradition and favorable tax provisions, foundations have a long history in the United States. Foundations such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Turner Foundation have played a key role in funding various international programs, from international peace to population control programs and health research. The Gates Foundation, for example, with resources of $60 billion, gives about $1 billion a year largely to international health programs such as childhood immunization programs, AIDS research, fighting the Ebola epidemic, and strengthening health delivery systems, making it the largest single donor to international health. The Gates Foundation and many others, including Britain's Wellcome Trust, often participate as multistakeholder actors in global governance, mobilizing financial resources, social capital, and expertise. Increasingly, foundations now work with MNCs and private enterprises.

Global think tanks are often thought of primarily as research institutions that produce scholarly-like work on policy problems both domestic and international. Some, however, have become global institutions utilizing local staff and scholars in offices on two or more continents and providing advice to both governments and international institutions. A few have also

taken on other tasks. The International Peace Institute, for example, trains military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping; the Brookings Institution's project on internally displaced persons has played a major role in drawing attention to the growing problem of IDPs and working to help these populations in partnership with the London School of Economics (McGann 2014).

Multinational Corporations

Multinational corporations are a special type of nongovernmental actor engaged in for-profit business transactions and operations across national borders. MNCs exist in various forms and are an important part of the global economy, as described in Chapters 8 and 9. As key actors, they have been for many years targets of international and state efforts to regulate their behavior. NGOs have linked labor violations with MNC behavior and pollution with MNC practices, targeting companies such as Nike, McDonald's, Starbucks, Walmart, Shell, and Apple and using the power of consumers to boycott the products of a given corporation, mobilizing campaigns to raise awareness, or initiating legal action to stop oil exploration in the case of Conoco and the Ecuadorean rainforest. In the competitive environment of today's global markets, a boycott is likely to lead the targeted corporation to terminate or modify its practices.

As a result of NGO-led campaigns to end sweatshops and child labor, protect rainforests, boycott blood diamonds, and prevent the scuttling of a North Sea oil rig, major corporations have responded by implementing codes of conduct, certifications that certain standards have been met, and monitoring mechanisms, all under the rubric of corporate social responsibility. Under pressure from NGO-led grassroots campaigns, these codes of conduct have had to be continually strengthened, with corporations making concessions that would have been unthinkable in the past.

The 1999 UN-sponsored Global Compact invites corporations around the world to commit to adopting a series of steps to minimize human rights and labor violations in connection with their economic activities. Participating firms are expected to submit annual reports on their progress in implementing the program and are permitted to use the Global Compact logo in their marketing. Direct enforcement is nonexistent; only when a firm has failed to report for four years in a row is it "de-listed." MNCs are among the nonstate actors that have increasingly been brought into the broader global governance framework, working in partnerships with other actors, including the UN, as discussed in Chapter 9.

Partnerships

Partnerships among actors bring together those interested in or affected by an issue, including government agencies, IGOs, MNCs, professional

groups, NGOs, private foundations, religious groups, and individuals in both formal and informal settings. They can take various forms and have sometimes been referred to as global policy networks or multistakeholder actors. As one analyst notes regarding the value of multiple stakeholders, they "can sort through conflicting perspectives, help hammer out a consensus, and translate that consensus into actions its members will be more inclined to support and implement" (Reinicke 1999–2000: 47). The short-lived World Commission on Dams (WCD) illustrates this phenomenon. This special independent body, representing the supporters and opponents of big dams, was created in 1998 and conducted a global review of the effectiveness of large dams. Its work concluded in 2000 with the establishment of internationally accepted criteria for dam construction.

Other examples of partnerships include the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, which was launched in 1998 by the WHO, UNICEF, the UNDP, and the World Bank, and later joined by NEPAD, the G-8, Japan (a major bilateral donor), private companies, African states and communities, and NGOs. Drawing on an innovative process developed by a Japanese company to make cheap and effective insecticide-treated nets, various actors funded the purchase of these life-saving nets; states and groups promoted their use, and the technology was transferred to an African company for domestic production. ExxonMobil has donated chemical components, and nets are distributed through gas stations in areas where malaria is endemic. These nets have also been promoted by NGOs like Doctors Without Borders, among others. The Roll Back Malaria Partnership is an excellent example of a partnership among a variety of actors participating in global governance activities.

Such partnerships between the UN and businesses now constitute a "vast and expanding" universe, including "virtually every global development issue" (Gregoratti 2014: 310). Some 1,500 partnerships were listed on the business.un.org database in 2012, with more than 300 others listed by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted in Chapter 1, they have had a major impact on thinking about development and how to deliver it. Partnerships include financial and in-kind donations as well as mobilization of market expertise, marketing developing-country handicrafts, conducting workshops, and convincing corporations to sign to principles of conduct.

Social Movements

Social movements represent a looser mass-based association of individuals and groups dedicated to changing the status quo. Such movements may form around major social cleavages such as class, gender, religion, region, language, or ethnicity, or around progressive goals such as the environment, human rights, and development, or around conservative goals such as oppo-

sition to abortion, family planning, and immigration. Although NGOs often play key roles in social movements, helping to frame issues to make them resonate with the public and helping to mobilize the necessary structures and resources, social movements usually involve sustained public activities such as mass meetings, rallies and demonstrations, as well as use of the public media to engage individuals. Movements may even help to forge new identities—as constructivists assert—among women, indigenous peoples, victims of human rights violations, and the poor. Social movements vary enormously in the types of formal or informal structures they use to mobilize support—from activist networks to national and transnational social actions; they also vary in their repertoires, staying power, and effectiveness (Tilly 2004). The women's movement is discussed in Chapters 9 and 10, the human rights movement in Chapter 10, and the antiglobalization movement in Chapter 8.

The world witnessed the power of social movements beginning in December 2010 when a Tunisian produce vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself to death in protest of the harassment he was subjected to by the authorities. His death was communicated around the country and the region and quickly became a rallying point for disgruntled young people across the Arab world. Massive rallies were organized, mostly through social media, in capitals and other cities in Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen that led to the downfall of several regimes. The movement has been described as "leaderless," with many groups taking it upon themselves to announce events, encourage participation, and even provide training on how to thwart efforts by the police to repress the protesters, sometimes with help from foreign civil rights activists and Western governments.

Sometimes the UN has been accused of co-opting or "taming" social movements by bringing them into a state-dominated, mainstream institution, and while this may happen sometimes, IGOs also provide important resources for social movements. They help them gain access to state actors, NGOs, and IGO staff members, thereby increasing their chances of influencing policy debates (Smith and Wiest 2012: chap. 5). For example, as described in Chapter 10, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community has reframed the debate over gay rights in terms of international human rights.

A Global Civil Society?

There is a common tendency to equate NGOs with civil society, but the latter is really a broader concept, encompassing all organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market (i.e., government and business). It includes not just the kinds of advocacy groups discussed here, but also associations of professionals (doctors, lawyers, scientists, journal-

ists), labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious groups, ethnic associations, sporting associations, and political parties. Most critically, civil society links individual citizens. In Paul Wapner's words (1996: 5), it is an arena in which "people engage in spontaneous, customary and nonlegalistic forms of association" to pursue common goals. As a result, individuals establish relationships and shared frames or understandings that govern future behavior.

Have individuals and groups connected across nations to a sufficient extent to suggest that we now have a global civil society? Do individuals have an associational life beyond the state? Are the norms and values that individuals hold shared transnationally? Is there a nascent global civil society that is democratizing global governance? Many are enthusiasts. They see the growing universalization of democratic values, better accountability, and more inclusiveness with an expanding civil sphere that is separate from the Westphalian state system. Still others are critics. To them, the so-called global civil society is unrepresentative; rather than challenging the power of states, it is joining them (Dryzek 2012). Marxists and neo-Marxists, for example, are particularly critical, viewing NGOs and other NSAs as actual instruments of hegemonic states. They do not see democratization of governance, but rather continued concentration of power in hegemonic states (Heins 2008: 101–102). Yet all agree that non-state actors have grown in both numbers and importance.

The Growth of Nonstate Actors

There is no disputing that the number of NGOs has increased exponentially since the mid-1970s, as Figure 3.1 illustrates; currently there are over 8,500 international NGOs and several million national and indigenous NGOs. The growth has been exponential particularly since World War II and in certain issue areas such as human rights and the environment. One explanation focuses on bottom-up societal changes—advances in communication and transportation and growing secular trends to address the needs of "the other" (Heins 2008: 44–45). Another sees proliferation of NGOs as a top-down phenomenon. As Kim Reimann (2006: 48) explains, "Just as the emergence of the nation-state and periods of state-building at the national level stimulated the growth of new forms of citizen activism and organization in the industrialized West, the creation of new international institutions and their rapid growth in the postwar period have stimulated NGO growth worldwide by providing new political opportunities and incentives to organize." Yet NGOs are not just a late-twentieth-century phenomenon; they have also played roles in developing international law and organization for more than two centuries.

A Historical Perspective on the Growth of NGO Influence

The anti-slavery campaign was the earliest NGO-initiated effort to organize transnationally to ban a morally unacceptable social and economic practice. Its genesis lay in the establishment in 1787 and 1788 of societies dedicated to the abolition of slavery in Pennsylvania, England, and France. The history of this campaign, spanning much of the nineteenth century, is examined in Chapter 10.

In Europe and in the United States, peace societies also began appearing during the nineteenth century. A group of peace societies convened their first congress in 1849, developing the first plan for what later became the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Peace societies joined in supporting many of the ideas emerging from the Hague Conferences at the end of the century, including the commitment to finding noncoercive means for dispute resolution. By 1900, there were 425 peace societies throughout the world (Charnovitz 1997).

The nineteenth century also saw the establishment of transnational labor unions, NGOs promoting free trade, and groups dedicated to the strengthening of international law. In 1910, NGOs convened the World Congress of International Associations, with 132 groups participating, and from this emerged the Union of International Associations, which still today serves as the international organization documenting the landscape of international organizations. NGOs were heavily involved in promoting intergovernmental cooperation and regime creation during the nineteenth century in functional areas such as transportation, workers' rights, conservation of species, and sanitation.

Among the NGOs founded in the nineteenth century was the highly influential International Committee of the Red Cross. Founded during the 1860s by Swiss national Henry Dunant and other individuals concerned with protecting those wounded during war, several conferences were organized to elucidate principles governing care of wounded individuals, rights of prisoners of war, and neutrality of medical personnel. The ICRC and its national affiliates became the neutral intermediaries for protecting wounded individuals during war, and the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field laid the foundation for international humanitarian law. The unique role and special responsibilities of the ICRC are examined later.

In the twentieth century, peace groups such as the League to Enforce Peace and the League of Nations Society of London developed the ideas that shaped the League of Nations and later the United Nations. The League of Nations Covenant contained one provision dealing with NGOs, calling upon members "to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having

as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world" (Article 25). The League of Nations also invited NGOs to participate in other meetings, such as the 1920 Financial Conference in Brussels, the League's Maritime Committee, the 1927 World Economic Conference, and the 1932 Disarmament Conference. Many specific NGO proposals were incorporated into draft treaties. NGOs were actively involved in the League's work on minority rights, particularly in submitting petitions. In 1920, Jeglantyne Jebb, founder of Save the Children International Union, drafted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which was approved by the League Assembly in 1924. Save the Children and other NGOs were represented on the League's Child Welfare Committee, and women's groups were represented on the League's Committee on Traffic in Women and Children. In both cases, NGO representatives were considered full members of the committees, except that they lacked the right to vote. Many NGOs established offices in Geneva to facilitate contacts with the League (and have remained there, since Geneva is the European headquarters of the UN).

Between 1930 and 1945, NGOs' influence diminished, in large part because governments were preoccupied with rising security threats and economic crisis, and the League's role declined. As planning for the postwar order proceeded after 1943, NGOs again became important sources of ideas in shaping the UN Charter and other post–World War II steps. Indeed, there were representatives of 1,200 voluntary organizations at the San Francisco founding conference of the UN. They were largely responsible for both the wording, "We the peoples of the United Nations" and the specific provisions for NGO consultative status with ECOSOC, as discussed later. In 1948 there were 41 formally accredited groups; in 2014 there were 3,900. Since our purpose here is not to provide a systematic history of NGO development, we shall leap ahead to analyze the proliferation of NGOs that began in the 1970s and the intensification of their involvement in global governance.

Explaining the Accelerated Growth of Nonstate Actors' Participation

What has spurred the accelerating growth of NGOs, networks and coalitions, and social movements and their influence on global governance since the 1970s? With globalization, an increasing number of interdependence issues have required transnational and intergovernmental cooperation. NGOs, with their ability to collect and disseminate information, mobilize key constituencies, and target resources on particular goals, have developed to fulfill these needs. The Cold War's end and the spread of democratic political systems and norms in the 1980s and 1990s also explain the growth of NSAs' participation. As social, economic, and cultural issues attract

more attention, more NGOs and civil society groups are formed, empowering individuals to become more active politically. In addition to these two broad trends, discussed in Chapter 1, two other developments have played a role in the growth of NGOs: UN-sponsored global conferences and the communications revolution.

UN-sponsored global conferences. UN-sponsored ad hoc and global conferences in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 4, involved increasing participation by NGOs, as shown in Table 6.1. Since the early 1970s, NGOs, networks, and coalitions have sought opportunities to participate in agenda-setting and negotiations. What is somewhat less clear, however, is the degree to which participation in these conferences actually increased NGO access to various parts of the UN system and their influence.

Beginning with the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm, NGOs organized a parallel forum, with almost 250 NGOs participating, a pattern that was repeated at each subsequent conference, with steadily growing numbers. At the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, some 1,400 NGOs were represented in the NGO forum. First, the conferences were intended to draw attention to select global issues and to mobilize the international community to take steps to address the issues. Hence, they put issues on the map that NGOs were often far better equipped to address than were many governments. Second, they created opportunities for NGO influence throughout the conference preparatory processes and follow-up. The final document of the Rio Conference, Agenda 21, assigned a key role to NGOs in implementation of conference outcomes, calling for IGOs to utilize the expertise and views of NGOs in all phases of the policy process. Third, the parallel NGO

Table 6.1 Participation at Selected UN-Sponsored Global Conferences and Summits

Conference/Summit Focus	Number of States	Number of NGOs[a]
Environment (1972)	114	250
Children (1990)	159	45
Environment and development (1992)	172	1,400
Human rights (1993)	171	800
Population and development (1994)	179	1,500
Social development (1995)	186	811
Women (1995)	189	2,100
Human settlements (1996)	171	2,400
Sustainable development (2002)	191	3,200
Sustainable development (2012)	192	737

Note: a. Figures vary considerably among different sources.

forums spurred networking among participating groups by bringing them together from around the world for several days of intensive interactions. Those links have enabled NGOs to play an important role in monitoring follow-up activities.

Each conference has been free to adopt its own rules for NGO participation. For example, the NGOs present in Stockholm were permitted to make formal statements to the conference with no limits. At the 1980 Second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen, NGO representatives were granted only fifteen minutes of total speaking time. At the 1985 conclusion of the Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances, no NGOs were present; in 1987, NGOs were permitted to speak at the Montreal conference; and in 1989, there were ninety NGOs in active attendance at the London Conference on Saving the Ozone Layer. Thereafter, environmental NGOs were intimately involved in the preparations for the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development and in the negotiations on conventions for biodiversity and climate change. At the Habitat II conference in 1996, NGO representatives were allowed to sit with governments and to introduce amendments to texts. In contrast, the 1993 human rights conference excluded NGOs from the official process, in large part because many Asian and Arab states lobbied to restrict NGO access. Not all issue areas are equally populated with NGOs, and in any case the nature of NGO participation varies widely. Yet according to a recent study of NGOs' interactions with UN agencies, neither the explosion of NGOs nor their participation in the large UN global conferences have contributed to their increased access to IGOs, including the UN, or to the "emergence, spread, and consolidation" of the norm of NGO participation (Tallberg et al. 2013: 241).

Since 2000 and because of the limitations on conferences discussed in Chapter 4, there have been fewer gatherings, and the rules for access have become more restricted. Yet the global conferences have provided a critical symbolic and practical opportunity for NGOs to flourish and forge valuable networks for advancing their causes in states and international bodies.

The communications revolution. Although NGOs have benefited enormously from the face-to-face gatherings at global conferences, the communications revolution has made it possible to link individuals and groups without such contacts. The fax and, most important, the Internet and e-mail have made cohesion not tied to location possible.

Craig Warkentin (2001) identifies six ways in which NGOs have used the Internet: to facilitate internal communication and communications with partner organizations, to shape public perception, to enhance member services, to disseminate information, to encourage political participation, and

to realize innovative ideas. E-mail and fax also greatly increased the volume and speed of interactions in the 1990s. Websites enable NGOs to widely disseminate a particular picture of themselves and their work, recruit new members, communicate with existing members, make a large amount of information publicly available, solicit contributions, and encourage people to participate politically in specific and often electronic ways. Thus the number of actors who matter increases, and the number who have authority is reduced (Mathews 1997: 50–51).

The Arab Spring has often been mentioned as a model of how social media can translate general discontent into revolution. Soon-to-be-deposed governments across North Africa felt that Twitter and Facebook were enough of a threat that they actively interfered with their operation or shut off access to the Internet in the case of Egypt. Major anti-regime demonstrations were often preceded by very high activity on Twitter and Facebook (Howard et al. 2011; Simmons 2011). Many political parties dramatically increased their website content to take advantage of increased traffic. Likewise, virtual communities sometimes became face-to-face associations as relationships moved from Facebook to Tahrir Square and international media outlets broadcast videos filmed by people in the streets and relied on bloggers for updates. These messages were heard in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, and beyond. Of course, none of this would have happened without the very high levels of Internet and social media access among young, educated people who were already exasperated by authoritarian governments and poor government policies that produced high food prices and high unemployment.

NGOs that care deeply about specific issues link with each other in order to achieve their goals. Global conferences and the communications revolution have facilitated the growth and the networking process. What is inescapable now are the density, size, and professionalism of these networks that have emerged as prime movers, framing issues and agendas, mobilizing constituencies in targeted campaigns, and monitoring compliance. As Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: x) point out: "Transnational networks multiply the voices that are heard in international and domestic politics. These voices argue, persuade, strategize, document, lobby, pressure, and complain. The multiplication of voices is imperfect and selective—for every voice that is amplified, many others are ignored—but in a world where the voices of states have predominated, these networks open channels for bringing alternative visions and information into international debate."

NGO Roles

The various general roles that nonstate actors, and particularly NGOs, play in global governance are summarized in Figure 6.2. NGOs can seek the best

---

Figure 6.2 NGO Governance Functions

- Gather and publicize information
- Frame issues for public consumption
- Create and mobilize networks
- Enhance public participation
- Advocate changes in policies and governance
- Promote new norms
- Monitor human rights and environmental norms
- Participate in global conferences:
    Raise issues
    Submit position papers
    Lobby for viewpoint
- Perform functions of governance in the absence of state authority

---

venues to present issues and to apply pressure. They can provide new ideas and draft texts for multilateral treaties; they can help government negotiators understand the science behind environmental issues they are trying to address. Development and relief groups often have the advantage of being "on the ground," neutral, and able to "make the impossible possible by doing what governments [and sometimes IGOs] cannot or will not" (Simmons 1998: 87).

Since the end of the Cold War, NGOs have played a particularly critical role in what Michael Barnett (2011) has called the age of "liberal humanitarianism." States, IGOs, and especially NGOs are heavily engaged in emergency relief work and nation-building activities with the aim of consolidating democracy and economic openness. Tens of thousands of NGO workers have fanned out across the globe, perhaps as many as 200,000 individuals working to provide basic services with governments, private donors, as well as international agencies contracting with NGOs to carry out this work. For example, International Relief and Development received $2.4 billion from the US Agency for International Development between 2007 and 2013 for its work in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, donors pledged $10 billion in aid, nearly all of which was to go to the local and international NGOs tasked with carrying out relief and reconstruction.

Many of these NGO workers are driven not only by altruism but also by a sense of purpose guided by their professional training. Nurses, accountants, lawyers, engineers, and others answer not just to their respective agencies and clients but also to professional organizations with standards of training and conduct, knowing they will be held accountable for their performance long after the assignment is over. As more and more such professionals join agencies engaged in humanitarian work, for example, other NGOs must compete to recruit them and professionalize existing staff

---

in order to be taken seriously by donors. Some NGOs such as Bioforce train would-be humanitarian workers with specialized courses culminating in certificates and licenses. Humanitarian workers have also organized professional associations. The World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine, for example, tends to multiple NGO tasks, applying knowledge learned from data collected through qualitative and quantitative research and developing strategies aimed at achieving specific objectives within their area of expertise, in this case human health.

NGOs' Relationships to IGOs

In order for nonstate actors to play roles in global governance, they need access to the places where decisions are made, where states endeavor to achieve consensus on norms and principles, hammer out the texts of the treaties and conventions that codify rules, coordinate their policies, resolve their disputes, and allocate resources to implement programs and activities, and where international bureaucrats do their work. To exercise influence over governments' positions and IGO policies and programs, NGOs need access and recognition of their right to be consulted, lobby, participate, provide data, and even vote.

Some IGOs have provisions in their charters for participation of nonstate actors; others have gradually established informal procedures for consultation or participation; some organizations have done little or nothing to accommodate demands from NGOs for greater voice. Although the early history of NGO and governmental interactions showed that established procedures were not essential, recent efforts by states to exclude NGO participation in global conferences shows the benefits of constitutional provisions. We see five types of NGO activities in IGOs: (1) consultation in regime creation and implementation, (2) lobbying, (3) surveillance of governmental activities, (4) involvement in international program implementation, and (5) participation in decisionmaking. The pressures on the UN and other IGOs to accommodate and collaborate with NGOs come from NGOs themselves, as well as from donor governments that favor grassroots participation; these pressures have increased dramatically since the mid-1980s.

Jonas Tallberg and colleagues (2013) have conducted the first empirical study of participation of transnational nonstate actors in IGOs. It includes access not only for NGOs, but also for foundations, religious organizations, labor unions, for-profit MNCs, and business associations. The dataset includes fifty IGOs, a stratified random sample from 182 IGOs, and almost 300 suborganizational bodies between 1950 and 2010. Some of the empirical findings are consistent with anecdotal generalizations. The study found, for example, that IGOs have opened up with "deeper, broader, more permanent, and more codified access rules, but also an increase in the num-

ber of access arrangements per body" (70). Although access is being granted for monitoring and enforcement functions, there is less access in decisionmaking bodies. Access is most favorable for human rights, trade, environment, and development NSAs, while finance and security groups have the least-favorable arrangements. Only the larger economic IGOs such as the IMF and World Bank have opened up to maintain their own legitimacy in the face of strategic pressures. Indeed, most IGOs operate well out of the public eye, which makes the trend of increasing access over the last twenty years surprising.

Why do IGOs grant access to NGOs? Based on their empirical data, Tallberg and colleagues. (2013: 22) draw on institutional design theories to suggest three theoretical logics. First, IGOs may permit access for functions that they themselves are less able to perform. Second, IGOs may open up to transnational activities and NGOs in order to quell public opposition, opposition that endangers the IGOs' own legitimacy and authority. Finally, IGOs may grant access as a way to promote the norm of participatory democracy. Not only may different IGOs have different motivations, but different sub-bodies within an IGO may have their own reasons. Tallberg and colleagues (2013: 139) did find that diffusion of IGO access has contributed to the spread of access, as decisionmakers are influenced by the adoption of access rules in other bodies. We look here in more detail at NGO access in the UN system.

The United Nations

Although the UN's members are states, the organization has long recognized the importance of nongovernmental organizations. Article 71 of the Charter authorized ECOSOC (but not the General Assembly) to grant consultative status to NGOs. Resolution 1296, adopted in 1968, formalized the arrangements for NGO accreditation. Their influence occurred primarily within ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies, and most especially within the Commissions on Human Rights, Status of Women, and Population.

To accommodate growing NGO activism, ECOSOC Resolution 31, in 1996, granted access to national-level NGOs and amended the existing roster system. As noted earlier, 3,900 NGOs enjoyed consultative status in 2014. NGOs having general status have the broadest access to UN bodies; they may consult with officials from the Secretariat, place items on agendas in ECOSOC and functional commissions and other subsidiary bodies, attend meetings, submit statements, and make oral presentations with permission. NGOs having special status enjoy many of the same privileges, but they may not suggest items for ECOSOC's agenda. Roster organizations' access is more limited; they can attend meetings within their field of expertise and submit statements, but only at the invitation of the Secretary-General or ECOSOC.

There are UN NGO liaison offices in Geneva and New York and dozens of other specific offices for NGO activities are tied to various UN specialized agencies. The UN buildings, despite their tighter security regulations since 9/11, have become places for informal interactions among NGOs, state representatives, and Secretariat personnel. Information and expertise are shared, activities and issues promoted, and UN programs monitored.

Since the late 1980s, NGOs have not only had access to ECOSOC and the Secretariat, but also gained access to several committees of the General Assembly, including the Third Committee (Humanitarian and Cultural) and the Second Committee (Economic and Financial). Four NGOs—the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC, the Interparliamentary Union, and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta—have special privileges and participate as observers in General Assembly sessions.

The Security Council has also initiated selective consultations with NGOs, particularly in relationship to humanitarian crises. In 1997, for the first time, the Security Council permitted representatives from Oxfam, CARE, and Doctors Without Borders to speak on the crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Since then, key humanitarian NGOs have participated in Security Council discussions on a number of issues, including HIV/AIDS as a security issue (2000) and the 2014 Ebola outbreak. In 1995, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council was formed, organized by Amnesty International, the Global Policy Forum, EarthAction, and the World Council of Churches, among others. It now numbers some thirty NGOs with strong interest in the work of the Security Council. The Security Council president and UN officials meet with them periodically, as do various permanent representatives from the Security Council. These meetings are off-the-record and in private, with the expectation that such informal consultation can help maintain strong ties, be an avenue of policy input, and provide another way to enhance the transparency of the Security Council (Alger 2002: 100–103).

NGOs continue to lobby for greater participation rights through the Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (CoNGO). In particular, CoNGO has lobbied for standardized procedures for determining access to conferences. The 2003 Cardoso Report called for enhanced relationships between the UN and all relevant partners in civil society, with the UN serving as a convener of multiple constituencies, facilitating rather than undertaking operations. Although NGOs became core participants, both formally and informally, the report itself did not acknowledge the multiple ways NGOs already took part in UN activities, nor did it differentiate among various sectors of civil society (Willetts 2006).

There are deep divisions among member states, NGOs themselves, and the UN Secretariat itself over NGO participation. Many governments have mixed or even negative feelings about NGOs. For example, governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America often feel threatened by the pressures of human rights NGOs; G-7 governments do not always welcome NGO pressure for economic justice; and the Non-Aligned Movement opposes expanded NGO access to the General Assembly. "Delegations feared changes that might weaken or even eventually sweep away nation-states' monopoly of global decision-making" (Paul 1999: 2). NGOs, too, are divided. Some major international groups worry about their influence being diluted by an influx of new, smaller NGOs. The latter tend to view the older NGOs as a privileged elite, while the UN Secretariat is cognizant of the need to control finances and streamline procedures (Alger 2002).

UN Agencies

The UN's nineteen specialized agencies, each with its own member states, secretariat, headquarters, and budget, provide additional access points for NGOs. In some cases, they have a longer history of involving NGOs. In the ILO, for example, representation of labor groups was institutionalized in the unique tripartite system from the very beginning, as discussed in Chapter 3. UNESCO's constitution calls for "consultation and cooperation with NGOs," and its scientific, educational, and cultural interchanges involve over 300 international NGOs. In general, NGO participation depends on the aims of the agency. The broader its functions in the social areas, the broader and deeper the NGO participation; the narrower and more technical its tasks, the fewer the number of NGOs involved.

Most UN agencies with field programs and offices, particularly in the areas of humanitarian relief and economic development, now contract with NGOs to provide services and frequently involve NGOs in decisionmaking. Their involvement has been particularly apparent in the activities of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees since the early 1990s in the many complex emergencies from Somalia and Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, and South Sudan. Services, including food and medicine, are purchased by the UNHCR and the World Food Programme and delivered to the local population by CARE, Doctors Without Borders, and Oxfam, among others. The WFP, for example, maintains a working relationship with over 2,800 NGOs.

The main coalitions of humanitarian NGOs—InterAction, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, along with the ICRC and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—serve with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. This committee is chaired by the Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination,

who, together with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, also meets regularly in New York and Geneva with the main operational NGOs in the field (CARE, the International Rescue Committee, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam, etc.), because they depend on the talent, resources, and flexibility of the major NGOs to address crises. These same organizations have become sufficiently important that they command ready access to the UN Secretary-General as well.

In the area of humanitarian assistance the ICRC plays a unique role due to its responsibilities as guarantor of international humanitarian principles. Most critical to understanding this culture is the commitment to neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The organization takes no position on conflicts in which help is given. Because the ICRC maintains neutrality, aid can be delivered in an impartial and independent way. Thus the duty of the ICRC is to act and aid all parties, protecting those injured in war and prisoners of war and providing emergency aid to civilian victims of war. Generally, the ICRC, unlike other NGOs, works quietly, refusing to publicly condemn or call attention to violations of humanitarian law. Occasionally, however, individuals in the ICRC have exposed abuses, such as in Bosnia and Iraq, through leaks to other NGOs or to the press. In the 2009 conflict in Gaza, however, the ICRC took the unusual step of publicly criticizing the Israeli military for failing to meet its obligations to wounded civilians. In 2010 it called the Israeli blockade of Gaza a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and in 2014 it denounced the killing of civilians, including two Red Cross workers, and the Israeli bombing of a hospital. Even though the largest proportion of ICRC funding (80–90 percent) comes directly from a few key states, all contributing states agree not to attach conditions to these funds, and no funds are earmarked for specific causes (Forsythe 2005).

There are often major tensions, however, in UN-NGO efforts to deal with the chaos of complex humanitarian emergencies. They bring different mandates and competencies to the relief efforts; they compete with each other for scarce donor government resources; they serve different constituencies; and they measure success in different ways. NGOs work with fewer inhibitions about state sovereignty, governmental approval, and strategic coherence than do UN agencies that depend on governmental support. UN agencies, however, lack grassroots links and sufficient staff to carry out operations in remote areas, hence the recent efforts to enhance operational coordination.

Similar involvement with NGOs occurs in development. Since the UN Development Programme adopted a focus on sustainable development in 1989, participatory community development, an essential part of that agenda, has utilized NGOs as conduits to local communities, drawing on them for assessments of local needs and subcontracting with them to deliver services. Actual results, measured by contacts with community

associations and indigenous NGOs, have varied from country to country and program to program.

One extensive study of NGOs in the FAO (McKeon 2009) reminds us that NGOs do not speak as a united group. There are conflicts between NGOs and not-for-profit groups like agribusiness associations, between larger and local NGOs, and between traditional NGOs and growing social movements. The study also finds that while NGOs have played a key role in helping to frame food as a basic human right, their presence in technical committees and commissions, where the bulk of decisionmaking takes place, is "scanty and discontinuous" (McKeon 2009: 30). This has led one civil society participant to question: "We are being listened to but are we being heard?" (quoted in McKeon 2009: 132).

The Major Economic Institutions

The explosion of NGO activity and the pressure for access are particularly well publicized in the major international economic organizations within the UN system. None of the Bretton Woods institutions, when established, included any provisions for NGO participation, not even for any advisory role. Over time, however, changes in rules and practices pushed by the NGOs themselves have contributed to greater involvement of NGOs, networks, and actors in partnerships.

Some economic organizations have been more open than others, especially in particular policy fields. In the late 1970s, women's and environmental NGOs began to lobby the World Bank, pushing for a women-in-development agenda and a procedure to conduct environmental impact assessments on prospective projects. The Bank responded by establishing the post of adviser on women in 1977 and an environment department in 1987. Environmental groups have targeted campaigns against specific Bank projects such as big dams; they have cultivated formal and informal contacts with Bank staff; they have honed their research and hence the expertise they bring to discussions of environmental issues; and they have utilized national and international networks in their efforts to achieve Bank reform (O'Brien et al. 2000: 128–130). The NGO task became easier when the Bank itself increased public access to its documents through the NGO-created Bank Information Center and a joint NGO-Bank committee that facilitates access to senior Bank staff.

Since 1994, when the World Bank shifted emphasis to participatory development approaches, it has provided legitimacy to NGO involvement, seeing collaboration with NGOs as a way to improve its efficiency as a development agency, as described in Chapter 9. The shift in the Bank's approach was part of a broader shift toward civil society empowerment among multilateral development agencies in the 1980s that NGOs helped bring about. The reason, as one observer noted, is that NGOs "are per-

ceived to be able to do something that national governments cannot or will not do" (quoted in Stiles 1998: 201). The regional development banks, also described in Chapter 9, have tended to follow the World Bank's lead with respect to NGO links. One result of the banks' opening to NGO participation, however, is that they now face escalating demands for more NGO participation in policymaking, since NGOs claim they better represent grassroots movements and organizations, even in countries with elected governments (Casaburi et al. 2000).

In contrast, the IMF has been very slow to provide formal access for NGOs, since its specialized focus on monetary policy does not lend itself easily to NGO input and finance is generally considered to be a more sovereignty-sensitive area. Yet during the 1990s, under intense pressure resulting from the debt crisis, the IMF expanded relations with civil society groups, including business associations, academic institutes, trade unions, NGOs, and religious groups. The success of Jubilee 2000, a popular movement in the 1990s that advocated debt cancellation, in getting the IMF and other lenders to support debt reduction for the most heavily indebted developing countries, was illustrative of the shift.

Outside the UN system at present, but crucial to many environmental NGOs, labor unions, NGOs concerned with economic justice, and activists involved in governance and of intense concern to many environmental NGOs, labor the backlash against globalization, is the World Trade Organization. GATT, the WTO's predecessor, did not establish any formal links with NGOs, and a "culture of secrecy" dominated multilateral trade negotiations. The 1995 agreement establishing the WTO, however, did empower the General Council to "make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with nongovernmental organisations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO" (Article v.2). Likewise, Article 13.2 permitted dispute settlement panels to seek information from "any relevant source" and to consult experts.

As a result of these constitutional provisions and a 1996 decision, the WTO Secretariat has primary responsibility for relations with NGOs. This has been pursued thus far in two ways: through regular secretariat briefings for NGOs and through symposia with NGO representatives. In addition, the WTO's General Council agreed to provide information on WTO policymaking and to circulate most documents as unrestricted. What the WTO has not done, however, is to grant NGOs any form of consultative status, and this has been one reason for the confrontational relationship with NGOs described in Chapter 8. The WTO's ambivalence regarding NGO participation was exacerbated by what officials perceived as the lawlessness surrounding the Seattle trade meetings in 1999, when thousands of protesters were able to directly confront delegates. The next ministerial meeting was held in Qatar, an autocratic state located on the Arabian peninsula where

protests could be contained. Another explanation is that the most vocal NGOs espouse ideas that challenge liberal economic theory. Hence, what they seek is not just participation in the WTO (and other major economic organizations) or greater accountability procedures, but sometimes radical changes in institutional structures, policies, and programs. Because of the resurgence of economic liberalism in the 1990s, the WTO and other economic institutions have resisted major changes in approach, fueling antiglobalization sentiments. Chapter 8 describes in detail the accommodations that have been made. Despite this ambivalence regarding NGO participation, many have contributed to setting the WTO's agenda, especially with respect to topics of importance to developing countries that receive relatively little attention (Murphy 2010).

NGO Participation in UN-Sponsored Global Conferences

How NGOs participate in global conferences has expanded over time, with a general pattern emerging. Before most conferences begin, NGOs undertake considerable publicity and agenda-setting activities. For example, prior to the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, NGOs organized meetings and activities, especially through churches, to engage the public in debate; they published materials to increase public awareness of disarmament issues; some groups initiated protest activities in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan to pressure governments; and a Washington, DC–based network of forty US groups tried to influence US policy by meeting with government officials and members of Congress, knowing how important US leadership would be. NGOs promoted transnational networking by convening the International NGO Conference on Disarmament in the spring of 1978, prior to the intergovernmental conference itself, with 500 representatives of eighty-five different international NGOs and over 200 national NGOs from forty-six different countries (Atwood 1997). Women's NGOs followed a similar strategy leading up to each of the four global women's conferences (1975, 1980, 1985, 1995). NGOs convened local, subregional, national, regional, and international meetings to discuss the issues, using the occasions to pressure national delegations and develop a global strategy. Such meetings formed a critical link with grassroots constituencies.

A variety of NGO activities have also taken place during the actual global conferences. For example, during the disarmament conferences, representatives from the NGO community organized sessions with official delegates; provided information in informal briefings to those who were not acquainted with the issues, particularly delegates from small and poor countries; and organized joint activities at the conferences. NGOs lobbied governments and also provided a variety of parallel activities for NGOs themselves, aimed at mobilizing public awareness about disarmament, establishing and strengthening NGO networks, and providing information

and services to NGO participants. Although there was no parallel NGO forum during the 1978 disarmament conference, parallel conferences became the norm for conferences during the 1990s.

The activity of NGOs in the disarmament discussions established precedents that were followed in the subsequent women's conferences and those on human rights and the environment. NGO activity proved particularly significant in connection with the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro; the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo; and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing. Sometimes, individuals from NGOs have been included on government delegations to a conference. In some cases, this was done with the understanding that the individual's role was to advise the government, but not to conduct negotiations without government instruction; in other cases, individuals were free to represent their NGO and to conduct negotiations. For the 1994 Cairo Conference, for example, governments were urged to include NGOs on their delegations. Many would argue that this NGO activity represents the "democratization" of international relations by promoting the involvement of ordinary people in addressing global issues and the nascence of a global civil society.

The impact of NGOs on the substantive outcomes of global conferences is difficult to measure. One comparative study of six global conferences during the 1990s found that the relative impact of the NGOs depended on whether the conference agenda was linked to sovereignty issues, noting that "the more states link conference topics to sovereignty issues, the less ready states were to permit the open contestation and mutual accountability at the UN conferences" (Friedman, Hochstetler, and Clark 2005: 130). At three of the conferences (1992, Environment and Development; 1993, Human Rights; 1995, Women), states were less willing to relinquish autonomy and sovereign control to societal actors like NGOs. At three other conferences (1994, Population and Development; 1995, Social Development; 1996, Human Settlements), NGO participation did not threaten state sovereignty and hence states permitted a greater role for NGOs. In general, the research found that "states only provisionally accepted NGOs' contributions to UN conference processes. They stood firm on their claims to ultimate sovereignty over the issues that most affect their ability to control the distribution of power and resources, whether at home or abroad. When NGOs sought to engage states, many states seemed to respond by calculating their interests rather than by cultivating an intimate and ongoing relationship with NGOs" (Friedman, Hochstetler, and Clark 2005: 162).

Analyzing formal nonstate access to IGOs does not answer some critical questions. Do these actors actually participate? Which actors are most effective in influencing policy and in their other roles? Why? Not all NGOs

are created equal: they vary as widely as states in their size, capabilities, experience, and interests. And, as with world politics itself, NGOs based in the global North tend to be more active and potentially influential than those from the global South.

NGO Influence and Effectiveness

Social scientists face a major challenge in tracing, substantiating, and measuring the influence and effectiveness of NGOs and other nonstate actors. The sheer numbers and diversity of groups pose challenges for systematic data-gathering and for evaluating influence and effectiveness. There is also the normative challenge of maintaining distance from the views of NGOs themselves, which often claim greater influence than may in fact be the case.

NGO Influence

Nonstate actors lack the types of power traditionally associated with influence in international politics. They do not have military or police forces, and they tend to have only limited economic resources unlike governments and MNCs. Instead, they must rely on soft power and moral authority that enable them to get governments, business leaders, and publics to listen, recalculate their interests, and act. For advocacy groups, key resources are credible information, expertise, and the willingness of states and international bureaucrats to grant them access. For operational or service groups, this means having organizational resources such as flexibility to move staff rapidly to crisis areas and strong donor bases, or links with grassroots groups that enable them to operate effectively in often remote regions of developing countries. For all types of NGOs, influence depends a great deal on their flexibility in employing a variety of tactics and strategies. In short, to be influential, NGOs must think strategically about how they operate, their choice of venue and strategy, the coalitions they form, the networks to which they are attached, the issues they pursue, and their use of resources. Figure 6.3 illustrates the multiple routes for NGO influence. Yet measuring influence is always problematic. NGO influence can be systematically traced in particular organizational settings. Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell (2008), for example, present an analytical framework for assessing the influence of NGO diplomats in international environmental organizations. Did NGOs influence the negotiation of a text? Were they able to change agendas? What did NGOs do to influence the position of key actors? What role did they play in influencing the negotiating outcome in terms of procedures or substance? Focusing on NGO roles in negotiations, however, does not answer other key questions. Did NGOs' actions result in a change in governmental policy? A change in IGO pro-

grams? A change in the actual behavior of states, international institutions, and corporations? Since NGOs are active in many different arenas, this makes measuring their influence all the more difficult to chart. There may be many explanations for changes in policy and behavior besides the influence of nonstate actors.

NGOs' influence can be measured in part by the expansion of the scope of activities and by the increase in numbers of NGOs. These trends vastly expand the potential reach of transnational networks, the mobilization potential of advocacy campaigns, and the monitoring and implementation capabilities of NGOs. Another measure of certain NGO and other NSA influence is their increasing international recognition, as exemplified by the Nobel Peace Prize. Over the past century, the Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to nonstate actors on eleven occasions: the Institut de Droit International (1904), the Red Cross (1917, 1944, 1963), Amnesty International (1977), International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (1985), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (1997), Doctors Without Borders (1999), Wangari Maathai for the Green Belt Movement (2004),


Figure 6.3   Multiple Routes for NGO Influence

Source: Adapted from Willetts 2010: 133.

Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank (2006), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). The prize brings critical attention to the organization and its cause more generally.

There is also the possibility that NGO influence may be cyclical and time-dependent. During the period between 1850 and 1914, NGO roles in global governance continuously increased, then fell during World War I, only to rise significantly during the 1920s, and decline again in the 1930s and early 1940s. Their influence in global governance rose again after World War II, leveled off in the 1950s, began to rise in the 1960s, and surged in the 1990s. There is no assurance, however, that this influence will continue this upward trajectory. One study suggests that there are two key variables influencing the cycle: the needs of governments and the capabilities of NGOs (Charnovitz 1997: 268–270).

Finally, in analyzing NGO influence, it may be important to consider the questions of whose influence is at play, what is influenced, and whether NGO participation is inherently good. Charlotte Dany (2014: 425) charts what she terms the "Janus-faced" nature of NGO participation—that is, its good and bad effects. Focusing on the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which took place in two phases, in 2003 and 2005, her research shows that NGO influence was limited to issues that were less relevant to them and to a few well-organized actors from the global North; they were able to influence draft documents only in earlier phases of the negotiating process; and more participation was not necessarily better. The findings are traced to the specific conditions of NGO participation at the WSIS and internal and external constraints placed on what was, in fact, record-high NGO participation. But contrary to the positive spin on networks, Dany concludes that "networking reproduces existing power relations among and inequalities between NGO actors" (433).

NGO Effectiveness

As in the analysis of power and influence of other global governance actors, including states and IGOs, determining the effectiveness of NGOs involves identifying what is being attempted, characteristics of the targets, the strategies being used, managerial and leadership skills, and the resources applied. What makes this process particularly complex is its transnational, multilevel character. That is, data and analysis are required on both domestic and international institutional contexts, in addition to the capabilities and strategies of the NGOs themselves. In effect, this means analyzing three levels of political games.

The analysis of advocacy groups' effectiveness differs significantly from that of operational and service groups, where the focus is on measurable changes in the conditions toward which aid is directed. Advocacy groups' effectiveness in targeting individual countries depends a great deal

on the "characteristics of the targets and especially their vulnerability to both material and moral leverage" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 207). If a country cares a great deal about its international image, it may be sensitive to external or transnational pressure. The openness of domestic institutions in countries targeted by advocacy campaigns will affect NGOs' leverage, channels for exercising influence, and potential effectiveness, as will the strength of domestic civil society. It was harder, for example, for NGOs to halt construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China, where civil society is weak, than the Narmada Dam in India, where civil society is strong. Likewise, as we have seen earlier, the openness of IGOs to NGO access and participation will be a significant variable in their ability to exercise influence.

Most critically, NGOs' effectiveness must be measured by their impact on people and problems over the long term. It is not enough to get declarations approved, plans adopted, organizations formed, or treaties signed, although those can be major accomplishments. The ultimate measures of NGOs' effectiveness and influence lie in the difference they have been shown to make in the problems they claim to address. Was a humanitarian crisis alleviated? Did development aid channeled through NGOs improve the well-being of individuals? Have the efforts of climate change proponents been successful in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions? These are some of the questions addressed in subsequent chapters, where both the influence and the effectiveness of IGOs and NGOs are examined.

Limits on NGO Influence and Effectiveness

In terms of size, resources, power, and legitimacy, NGOs clearly cannot and should not replace states and IGOs. There are at least four significant limits on NGOs' influence and effectiveness. The first set of limits arises from the size and diversity of the NGO community. NGOs have no single agenda; those working within the same issue may have divergent, even competing agendas. During the 1980s, for example, the nuclear freeze movement was quite splintered. The US-based Nuclear Weapon Freeze Campaign focused on stopping the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, emphasizing that both sides should take action. In contrast, the European counterparts were most concerned with the planned deployment of weapons in Europe. They advocated unilateral action to prevent deployment. The failure of these groups to unite is one explanation for their limited impact during the 1980s (Cortright and Pagnucco 1997). During the women's conferences of the 1990s, NGOs pushing for women's rights faced pressures from religious groups or other NGOs supporting traditional family values and opposing birth control. Such pressures can, under certain circumstances, cancel each other out. Groups concerned with human trafficking have not succeeded in forming an effective network, unlike those groups focusing on violence against women. The

fact is that groups can be found on almost any side of every issue, resulting in countervailing pressures, competition for influence, and decreased effectiveness.

The second set of limits arises out of the multilevel games in which NGOs must be effective to be successful. Whether they are working from the bottom up, from the grassroots level to the national, transnational, and global levels, or top down from lobbying IGOs to national and local constituencies, NGOs may fail to persuade key people at any one of these levels and find their influence limited. NGOs are especially restricted by governments that can impose unreasonable registration and reporting requirements. For NGOs operating in zones of conflict, the problems may be particularly acute. In the Syrian civil war, for example, both the government and the rebel groups have significantly hampered the delivery of humanitarian relief by the UNHCR, other international agencies, and NGOs. Failure to provide security and restrictions on NGO movement are both major impediments to NGO influence and effectiveness, with numerous NGO workers killed or abducted in the course of their duties.

Lack of funding is a third and significant limit on NGO influence and effectiveness. NGOs do not have the option of collecting taxes like states. If they take money from corporations or governments, they risk compromising their independence, their very identity as an organization, and their ability to "bite the hands that feed them" (Spiro 1996: 966). When 80 per cent of CARE's funding comes from the US government, there are clear incentives for following government mandates. As the US government and other governments and IGOs have channeled more development and humanitarian assistance to NGOs, the latter have become much more dependent on this funding. Not only can public funding weaken NGO independence, but so also can private funding when external restrictions and conditions are imposed.

A fourth danger limiting NGOs is that they may become overly bureaucratized. While many NGOs began as loosely organized structures run by volunteer staff, they often now have professional staff. Both public and private donors increasingly want standardized procedures and templates to account for resources and to evaluate how efficiently projects have been carried out. Yet the very professionalization and standardization of NGO management may have unintended consequences, undermining flexibility, innovation, and responsiveness to the conditions on the ground, or causing NGOs to conceal information and engage in rent-seeking, to the exclusion of humanitarian principles or other normative concerns (Goodhand 2006: 144).

In short, for NGOs to have influence and be effective, they must be credible; they must take steps to ensure that they are believed. Failure to achieve credibility will diminish NGOs' influence and effectiveness. Peter

Gourevitch and David Lake (2012) propose a number of strategies for increasing credibility. These include promoting shared values, adopting autonomous governance structures, increasing transparency, and becoming more professional. They recommend that NGOs whose purpose is fact-checking and monitoring can actually enhance their credibility over time as NGO officials learn to work with multiple audiences.

NGOs: A Love Affair Cooling?

The explosion in the number, activities, and success of nonstate actors, particularly NGOs, has led scholars to assert that the trend is "one of the most profound changes in global governance over recent decades" (Tallberg et al. 2013: 235). But Paul Wapner (2007: 85–86) and others question whether this love affair has started to wane.

The answer is yes. Volker Heins (2008: 41) describes NSAs as "benign parasites" that are "much like other political actors. They are self-interested entities engaged in advancing their own agendas. They are often nondemocratic, hierarchical groups concerned with their own financial and publicly perceived longevity. Most are self-appointed, rather than representative, political agents."

With so many NGOs seeking subcontracts for humanitarian and development projects, each is forced to compete vigorously against others for funding. In their scramble to win short-term projects, they cut corners to maximize efficiency, jeopardizing both long-term project viability and normative goals (Cooley and Ron 2002). NGOs may also "aggressively marker" themselves to be attractive to rich clients and patrons (Bob 2005). Worse yet, NGO field personnel have been accused of egregious misconduct. For example, over sixty-seven individuals from forty aid agencies were cited for distributing food in return for sexual favors in refugee camps during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The UNHCR and Save the Children, in turn, were accused of hiding the scope of the scandal (Smillie and Minear 2004: 38–41). In Haiti, an NGO was accused of kidnapping children and sending them out of the country for adoption, although it was later learned that many of the children were not orphaned. In short, NGOs sometimes behave (and misbehave) just like MNCs, IGOs, and states.

The activities of NSAs may lead to unintended results or even harmful outcomes (DeMars 2005). Peter Uvin (1998) makes the case that the development enterprise in Rwanda in the early 1990s, largely implemented by NGOs, had the unintended effect of establishing the structural conditions upon which the 1994 genocide was built. By ignoring the politics of the regime, NGOs were co-opted by the government, leading to devastating consequences. Following the genocide, the actions of the UNHCR and NGOs also had unintended and detrimental consequences. Fiona Terry

(2002: 2) reveals how the UN refugee camps run by NGOs, including Doctors Without Borders, actually protected many of the leaders and perpetrators of the genocide. Camp leaders were able to divert resources to finance further bloodshed. "In short, humanitarian aid, intended for the victims, strengthened the power of the very people who had caused the tragedy." Some NGOs, like the French chapter of Doctors Without Borders and the International Rescue Committee, withdrew their aid, contending that assistance could not be provided in such militarized conditions, while other NGOs, including other branches of Doctors Without Borders, decided to continue working in the camps to provide relief. The question is about what enhances long-term NGO viability—staying the course or withdrawing when humanitarian objectives are jeopardized.

The activities of NGOs may also lead to backlash in the policymaking community. The limits imposed on NGOs at the UN since 1998, the US-backed decision not to hold further global conferences, the opposition of many developing countries to hearing NGO representatives in UN human rights bodies, and the decision to hold the WTO 2001 ministerial meeting in Qatar, where NGO presence could be sharply limited, demonstrate that governments are skeptical about the motives and power of NGOs and that states retain the power to shut them out of international institutional decisionmaking forums, even if they have agreed to provide other types of access.

Still worse, backlash has arisen over NGOs taking over the role of states. In Haiti, for example, the government was pressured by donors to privatize many public activities following the 2010 earthquake, and NGOs moved in to provide such basic services as elementary education, emergency health services, and sanitation. As reported by analysts at the United States Institute of Peace, "the Haitian people have learned to look to NGOs, rather than the government, for provision of essential services. Funneling aid through NGOs perpetuated a cycle of low capacity, corruption and accountability among Haitian government institutions" (Kristoff and Panarelli 2010). The same concerns have been voiced about NGOs in Afghanistan.

NGOs increasingly work in conflict conditions, leading to the "NGO-ization of war" (DeMars 2005: 138). Warring states and parties such as militias and paramilitary groups include the operations of NGOs in their strategy. Thus, NGOs may be used as or have the unintended consequence of being "force multipliers" (Lischer 2007). Humanitarian NGOs are used to fulfill military and political goals by state funders, working in some cases along with soldiers, providing intelligence (such as in Afghanistan), or augmenting undermanned peacekeeping forces (such as in Darfur). The result, intended or not, is that humanitarian workers become military targets in need of security and, by being closely identified as surrogates, lose any semblance of neutrality or independence. NGOs, then, not only are dependent on the funds provided by governments, but also become identified with state policies.

Representation, Transparency, and Accountability

The love affair with NGOs is being replaced by key questions. Whom do NGOs represent? Frequently, they claim to represent the "true" voice of broad groups of people—the poor, women, the elderly, children, unemployed persons, peasants, immigrant workers, the oppressed. Representativeness is something that elected governments claim as the basis of their legitimacy. Yet how can we be sure these groups are indeed NGOs' constituents? Often in the case of transnational networks or large international NGOs, it is an elite group based in a large Northern city that claims to speak on behalf of poor, disadvantaged people in another part of the world. This criticism is less valid than in the past, as NGOs and grassroots groups have proliferated in developing countries and Northern NGOs have learned to treat the latter more as partners, but it is still relevant, as many NGOs in developing countries depend on their Northern partners for funding and other organizational resources, and Northern NGOs still tend to have more organizational resources and capabilities than those in the South. The key question is whether those claiming to be represented actually have a voice and how they participate.

A further aspect of the representativeness issue is the reality that a handful of large international (Northern-based) NGOs dominate most issue areas. Eight major NGO federations, including CARE, Oxfam, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, and Save the Children, control the majority of humanitarian relief funds. Since IGOs cannot be expected to grant consultative or participatory rights to all NGOs, how can the worth of a given NGO be determined? Should only the largest, most international, best-funded NGOs be chosen? What criteria, if any, should be used for selection on the basis of orientation or agenda? The UN's revised criteria permitting accreditation of local indigenous NGOs endeavor to respond to these questions and expand representativeness within the UN system.

Representativeness is one dimension of relative democratization; transparency is another. Openness of communication and information are key attributes of democratic institutions. Yet very few NGOs provide information about their personnel, operations, funding sources, and expenditures. Should NGOs, then, be subject to the types of pressures that have been placed on governments by the World Bank and IMF to make their economic and fiscal policies more transparent, for example, or on corporations by governments and IGOs to be more open about their operations? Governments can, of course, require NGOs to report on funding and expenditures as part of their licensing requirements and as conditions for contracts.

NGOs can also regulate themselves and become more transparent to increase their credibility as contributors to global governance.

Both representativeness and transparency link to the question of NGOs' general accountability. NGOs and their networks tend to serve narrow mandates. They do not usually face trade-offs among issues in the same ways that governments do. This is what gives them freedom to pursue a campaign against landmines or human rights violations or whaling. Their leaderships generally enjoy a great deal of discretion in deciding what policies to pursue and in what way. Yet what are the safeguards besides their own moral integrity and the knowledge that if they get it wrong they lower some of their credibility? Are NGOs truly accountable to their constituencies and the people they claim to represent? Only if nonstate actors can be made accountable can they be perceived as legitimate and thus help to narrow the democratic deficit of global governance.

For several years in the mid-2000s, the nongovernmental organization One World Trust published annual reports comparing accountability of IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs. In general, these reports showed that IGOs are more accountable and more transparent than NGOs, while NGOs are more representative than either IGOs or MNCs. In each category, specific IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs bucked the dominant trends. One World Trust in 2011 published *Pathways to Accountability II*, its sixth major revision of the Global Accountability Framework, a more nuanced template for evaluation. Unfortunately, no empirical studies using this revised framework had been published as of 2014.

Serving the Public Good?

Many NGOs do contribute positively to the global public good. The evidence lies in the success NGOs can claim in institutionalizing human rights norms, providing humanitarian relief, and promoting environmental protection and corporate good practices, as well as in alleviating poverty, disease, and malnutrition. Especially when compared to other types of service providers—firms, governments, and IGOs—NGOs and other private actors measure up fairly well. Most of the best-known NGOs do not expect payment from recipients (unlike firms); they do not allow ethnic/racial or gender bias to color their decisions (unlike many governments); and they are willing to work in almost any country under almost any conditions (unlike some IGOs that must abide by sanctions regimes). Not all are like Doctors Without Borders, whose volunteers are paid well below market rates, serve people suffering the most contagious diseases, and work in some of the most difficult conditions in the world. Yet we must be mindful of the dangers of broad generalization, both about the character of NGOs (not all "wear white hats") and about the scope of the problems they seek to alleviate. There are clear limits to their influence and effectiveness.

State Sovereignty and Nonstate Actors' Influence

The proliferation of nonstate actors and their expanding influence across issue areas potentially affects state sovereignty, although IR theorists disagree on the extent. Many liberals argue that nonstate actors have become increasingly important. Although NGOs may represent a variety of contending interests, some liberals conclude that state sovereignty is being compromised, challenged, or even usurped by a nascent global civil society. Constructivists, too, recognize the key role of ideas and norms for which NGOs and other nonstate actors may be important sources and transmitters. And since they believe that states' interests are not fixed, constructivists consider that states may be influenced by actions of nonstate actors. The frontier between what is domestic and what is international has become increasingly blurred. As a result, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 212) note: "Sovereignty is eroded only in clearly delimited circumstances"—in particular issue areas—and states retain the ability to reassert control, albeit at a high price in some circumstances.

Other scholars do not see the proliferation and increasing power of NGOs as undermining state sovereignty. To some political realists, since NGOs hardly appear as viable international actors, they pose no threat to state sovereignty. Heins (2008: 102–104) even makes the argument that NGOs not only do not undermine state sovereignty, but also contribute to its resilience. Barnett (2011) notes that humanitarian agencies can often be paternalistic, offering their own version of right and wrong without regard to local culture and public opinion and creating dependency on their services rather than promoting self-reliance.

Yet while state and nonstate actors may have differentiated responsibilities, ultimately authority rests with states, as discussed in Chapter 1, and this is the essence of sovereignty. States remain central to global governance, no matter how much political authority is decentralized and power diffused among nonstate actors. We now turn to issues of peace and security, an exploration of which makes clear that states working through IGOs retain authority, although nonstate actors both on the dark side and as initiators of policy change have become increasingly important to global governance.

Suggested Further Reading

Gourevitch, Peter A., and David A. Lake, eds. (2012) *The Credibility of Transnational NGOs: When Virtue Is Not Enough.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Joachim, Jutta, and Birgit Locher, eds. (2008) *Transnational Activism in the UN and EU: A Comparative Study.* London: Routledge.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.