

ARISTOTLE'S POETICS:
THE ARGUMENT

BY

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*UNIVERSITATIBUS HARVARDIANAE · IOWENSI ·
ILLI ALMAE MATRI · CARIS AMBABUS ·
QUARUM ALTERA ME IUUIT LONGUM OPUS INGREDIENTEM
ALTERA PERFICIENTEM
ΣΥΝΔΙΚΟΝ*

PREFACE

Of the writing of commentaries there is no end, and of commentaries on the *Poetics* in particular there would seem to have been a sufficient number in the last hundred years : those of Vahlen, Susemihl, Butcher,¹ Bywater, Margoliouth, Rostagni, Hardy, Gudeman, Sykutris, to mention only the most distinguished. Every student of Aristotle's treatise owes a profound debt to these scholars, above all to Johannes Vahlen, whose immortal *Beiträge*² tower above the rest *quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi*. Nevertheless, even Vahlen did not finish the job. For one thing, the *Beiträge* were written on a steadily expanding scale, with the result that the all-important early chapters of Aristotle's work received less than their due share of exegesis; for another, Vahlen in subsequent works, including his editions of the text, abandoned or modified some of his most penetrating insights. And since his time, strange to say, the task has not been resumed. We have had many able commentaries but, with one recent exception to be noted below, no real attempt at a close, line-by-line analysis of Aristotle's argument.

The *Poetics* is an extraordinarily crabbed, difficult piece of writing. Many of its interpreters seem to have been content to let it remain a jungle of twisting paths intersected by an occasional clearing. Some have even embraced the premise — though seldom in so many words — that Aristotle was not a particularly logical or orderly *Kopf* and real coherence is not to be expected of him. The present book starts from the very different conviction, which has grown upon me steadily over the years, that in its main lines the *Poetics* is a single, coherent piece of argument. If this is so, a patient, complete analysis of that argument is still a pressing need. Friedrich Solmsen called for such a study a generation ago :³ "... eine Analyse des Gedankengangs, der Argumentation und Deduktion, der Einteilungs- und Abstraktionsmethoden..." If the present book is not quite so wholeheartedly given over to questions of methodology as the one desiderated by Solmsen, the reason lies partly in my own tastes and inclinations, partly in my belief that the content of the *Poetics* is even more important than its method, and that signi-

¹ His essays in *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (see the select bibliography below, p. 655) partly, though not wholly, take the place of a commentary.

² See the bibliography, p. 656.

³ *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 402, in his review of Rostagni's first edition. See also Olof Gigon's call for new commentaries on Aristotle, *Mus. Helv.* 9 (1952) 101-103; cf. *Diogenes* 3 (Summer 1953) 101-111.

ficant discoveries still remain to be made with respect to its content. Aristotle's ideas still have a commanding interest for people both in and outside the classical field: a circumstance which only throws into stronger relief the deplorable fact that in many cases we have attained no real agreement as to what his ideas were. It will suffice to remind the reader of the endless and bootless controversy over the tragic catharsis — a controversy which has somewhat abated in recent years, not because anything has been settled but simply out of weariness, because every conceivable solution seemed to have been tried and refuted in turn — or of the failure of all efforts to construct a plausible early history of tragedy out of the phrases ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον and διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν. These two *causes célèbres*, along with many others which have never attained such great notoriety, have one significant trait in common. On the one hand the various parties to the controversy tend to differ *loto caelo* on the application of Aristotle's words to literary theory or history, while on the other hand they tend to agree implicitly on the interpretation of the words themselves. Yet in a disturbing number of cases this tacit agreement does not rest on a thorough scrutiny of Aristotle's argument but simply on mechanical acceptance of a *fable convenue*: the passage must mean such-and-such because everyone has always agreed that it did. If we are to break out of the dead center in which the interpretation of the *Poetics* is becalmed at present, we must stop repeating what has been said before, simply because it has been said before, and concentrate again, soberly and without preconceptions, on what Aristotle himself says. In many important passages this has not really been done since the Renaissance. The only recent book that attempts to do so is Daniel de Montmollin's *La Poétique d'Aristote: texte primitif et additions ultérieures*;⁴ and although I disagree with many of Montmollin's findings and believe that he also is too often guided by *a priori* assumptions, I gladly acknowledge the keenness of his scrutiny of Aristotle's text.

A book with such an orientation as the present one is necessarily long. An argument can only be recaptured by argument in turn, and an intricate, overlaid, or otherwise obscured argument only by a correspondingly painstaking process of explication. Irresponsible suggestions as to Aristotle's meaning can be thrown out in a moment, and rejected as quickly. I have tried to achieve demonstration, or at least

⁴ See the bibliography, p. 656.

a sharp definition of the limits of possibility or probability in each case. Often, where the track is overgrown or it seems to me that the accepted interpretation is wide of the mark, this means proceeding at a snail's pace. On the other hand, given a determined focus upon the text rather than upon what has been said about it, one cannot possibly discuss or even mention all of the scholarly literature on the *Poetics*.⁵ A complete *Auseinandersetzung* with it would have smothered the argument and swollen an already thick volume into ten.

Long as it is, the book does not cover the whole of the *Poetics*. Five and one-half chapters of the latter, namely 16 (the techniques of recognition), 19 second half — 22 ("diction" and style), and 25 ("Homeric problems"), have been omitted. My justification is that all these chapters are technical, can easily be separated from their surroundings, and contribute little or nothing to understanding the main core of the work. Moreover all of them except chapter 16 bristle with special difficulties of text and interpretation which would swell any careful treatment of them — did in fact swell Vahlen's treatment of them — out of all proportion to its value for the whole.⁶

With these exceptions, the book analyzes the whole of the *Poetics*, chapter by chapter and line by line (the chapter numbering is that of the *Poetics* itself). Its plan is simple. A section or "lemma" of Greek text, of convenient though variable length, is followed by a translation thereof (on the character of the translation see the note following the preface) and a detailed analysis. The reader should bear in mind, however, that in each case *the Greek text anticipates the following analysis*, i. e., embodies the textual changes which emerge from the analysis as necessary or desirable, whereas *the analysis itself takes as its point of departure the standard or accepted text*. The one I have adopted for this purpose is that of Rostagni's second edition (1945).⁷ If this procedure seems irksome or confusing, it was the only practicable way to avoid printing each lemma, and its accompanying translation, twice.

⁵ It is of course enormous. See the Cooper-Gudeman bibliography (Lane Cooper and Alfred Gudeman, *A Bibliography of the Poetics of Aristotle*, Cornell Studies in English, XI, New Haven, 1928), the supplement thereto by Marvin T. Herrick, *AJP* 52 (1931) 168-174, and my "A Survey of Work on Aristotle's *Poetics*, 1940-1954," *CW* 48 (1954-55) 73-82.

⁶ An analysis of chapter 25 is written and I hope to publish it elsewhere. Meanwhile the reader may wish to consult Montmollin's extremely thorough and useful survey of the problem, *op. cit.*, n. 197, pp. 306-322.

⁷ All departures from Rostagni's text, except utter *quisquilliae*, are argued and justified at some point in the analysis. See the *Index Emendationum*, p. 670.

The reader must further keep steadily in mind that this is neither a commentary in the usual sense (I have not felt it my duty to annotate every name, fact, and circumstance mentioned by Aristotle, but only those that bear on the interpretation of his argument) nor an edition of the *Poetics*. A new critical edition — a consummation devoutly to be wished, in spite of the great series of editions in the last hundred years — must be based on a complete re-survey of the manuscript evidence and the history of the text. Ideally, perhaps, such a survey should have preceded rather than followed my study of the argument. But one cannot do everything at once, and for better or worse I have begun the other way round. Moreover it is by no means certain that the *Textgeschichte* of the *Poetics* can ever be established so firmly as to give us a series of palmary readings. Probably conjecture, or at least a choice based on one's understanding of the inner logic of the work, will always be necessary. There may be advantages, then, in a study of the argument which is kept relatively independent of textual questions *per se*. Naturally I have taken the variant manuscript readings, so far as they have been reported, into account wherever they make a difference for the exegesis. A Fulbright research grant to Italy during the present academic year (1956-57) has enabled me to begin a complete re-collation of the Greek manuscripts of the *Poetics*, as a first step towards re-examining the complicated and controversial question of the history of the text.⁸

The present book suggests fundamental reinterpretations of a number of major terms and concepts in the *Poetics*. A brief check-list of the more important of these, with references to the chief places where they are discussed (see further the *Index Rerum*, pp. 661 ff.), may be useful to the reader:

1. Aristotle's idea of 'imitation', and its relationship to the idea of creativity : pp. 12-13, 96-101, 320-322.
2. The conception of a musicless poetry : pp. 37-38, 60-61.
3. Aristotle's " history " of poetry before Aeschylus a logical construction rather than a genuine history : pp. 126-127, 145, 148-149, 152-157, 161-162.
4. Aristotle's views on comedy and the Dorian claim to its invention : pp. 103-123, 184-189, 195-202.
5. The so-called " unity of time " : pp. 207-219, 287-289.

⁸ The work of Franceschini and Minio-Paluello on the medieval Latin version (see the bibliography, p. 655) is very recent and appears to be definitive. Whether the same can be said for the vast work of Tkatsch (completed by Gudeman; see the bibliography, p. 656) on the Arabic version is not certain.

6. The six "parts of tragedy" as moments in the art and process of tragic composition rather than parts of the poem : pp. 233, 237, 246-249, 262-263, 279-280.

7. 'Catharsis' a feature of the structure of tragedy rather than an emotional end-effect upon the spectator : pp. 224-232, 423-450.

8. The interrelations of catharsis, *hamartia*, and recognition : the structural concept of tragedy : pp. 349-354, 378-385, 436-443.

9. The "perceptions that necessarily attend upon the poetic art" : pp. 483, 487-495, 559.

10. The four kinds of tragedy : pp. 523-537. }
 }
 }
 }

11. The definition of the epic, and Aristotle's view of Homer : pp. 571-575, 581-586, 599-600, 620-621, 647-650.

No one is more conscious than I how desirable it would have been to draw all these threads together and expound Aristotle's doctrine, as enucleated here, in a systematic order, by topics.⁹ But again one cannot do everything at once. Such an exposition will have to await another time. And this is not necessarily a bad thing. Radically new interpretations have to be argued and debated separately, in their own right, before they can safely be incorporated into a new systematic exposition. Many of the findings presented here will provoke lively criticism, and it will do no harm to await the outcome of that debate before proceeding further.

Three other points of general interest deserve mention here. First, in a number of places I have argued for a distinction between the basic text and subsequent *additions* to it by Aristotle himself;¹⁰ for a list of these passages see the *Index Supplementorum*, pp. 667. Second, new evidence is presented for a thesis which has been put forward in the past (more often in the last century than in this) but never satisfactorily established, namely that the *Poetics* text has a certain number of later *interpolations*; see the *Index Interpolationum*, pp. 668. Their date and provenience remain to be established — if they can be established — in connection with the general study of the text tradition mentioned above. Finally, evidence — not conclusive, but suggestive — is presented which tends to show that the basic stock of the *Poetics* text is early rather than late, i.e., belongs to the Assos-Mytilene period (347-342), or even to the time before Plato's death (347), rather than to Aristotle's last period in Athens (after 335).

⁹ As Butcher did in his essays (see note 1 above).

¹⁰ Cf. Montmollin's "additions ultérieures" (note 4 above). For the differences between his findings and mine the reader will have to consult the individual passages.

P R E F A C E

It remains to thank the many people whose aid and encouragement have made this book possible. It was my revered master, the late Carl Newell Jackson, whose teaching first showed me what it is to penetrate through a text into the author's mind and spirit. The idea of a book on the *Poetics* germinated almost twenty years ago, when he turned over to me his course in ancient literary criticism. Thanks to the Department of Classics and the Joseph M. Clark Fund of Harvard University I was freed from teaching duties during the first semester of 1941-42 and enabled to spend four months in studies looking towards this book. A draft of some chapters was written then but fortunately suppressed, on the advice of prudent friends. After the war the work was resumed slowly and on a larger scale. The "break-through" came in the second semester of 1953-54, when the award of a Research Professorship by the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa made it possible to finish the text and the notes. For this priceless aid, and for the subsequent grant of a very substantial subsidy towards the cost of publication, I am profoundly indebted to President Virgil M. Hancher and Provost Harvey H. Davis of the State University of Iowa, and above all to Dean Walter F. Loehwing of the Graduate College. His warm interest and encouragement in still other ways, including assistance in the enormous task of typing the manuscript, have been a second inspiration to me. I owe further grateful thanks to Professor Ralph E. Ellsworth, Director of the State University of Iowa Libraries, and his ever cheerful and coöperative staff; to Professors William Chase Greene of Harvard University, Whitney J. Oates of Princeton University, G. M. A. Grube of the University of Toronto, Edward L. Bassett of the University of Chicago, and David Sachs, formerly of SUI and now of Cornell University, for aid and assistance of various kinds at various stages, including the reading and criticism of portions of the manuscript (it goes without saying that none of them is to be held responsible for any errors or persistent heresies that remain); to my research assistant at the State University of Iowa, Miss Donna M. Hagelberger, for checking of references; to Mrs. Margaret Sibley for a superb piece of work in typing the manuscript; to members of the Harvard University Press editorial staff for their consideration and helpfulness at all stages; and to the printer, M. E. De Meester of Wetteren, Belgium, for the speed and accuracy with which he has executed a long and difficult job. And, finally, to Martha, who endured it all — years of it — without letting it cloud her love.

American Academy in Rome, 14 February 1957

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ARISTOTLE'S POETICS: THE ARGUMENT

The version which follows each text lemma is intended solely as a handmaid to my analysis of Aristotle's argument. That is, it is not meant to be read by itself, as a 'translation' of the *Poetics*. I have tried on the one hand to be rigidly literal, to the extent of preserving not only the length and original structure of Aristotle's sentences but their exact twists and turns. On the other hand the rendering is full to the point of being profuse. Words and phrases are 'translated out' to the full extent of their connotations—over-translated, it may be—while their relative weight and bearing upon each other is left undisturbed so far as possible. I hope that in this process nothing extraneous has crept in. Again, I have attempted some consistency in the rendering of key terms, but not to the point of mechanical repetition. Aristotle himself maintains a healthy freedom in such matters, and a translator may claim a like privilege.

Congruence with the partial renderings occasionally given in the course of the analysis itself has not been attempted. Those are 'working versions'; they aim at even greater grammatical precision, including the spelling out of every ellipsis, and the result is a complication which would be intolerable even in a version so literal as this.

Sigla used in the text and translations:

- [] An addition by Aristotle to his own text.
- [] An interpolation, not by Aristotle.
- < > A word or words not preserved in our Greek MSS, but presumed here to have been in Aristotle's autograph.
- () (in the translations). Around one or two words, indicates an explanation or amplification of a term by the translator; otherwise, a parenthesis by Aristotle himself.

CHAPTER 1

1447a8-18

Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἦν τινα
 δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους
 10 | εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἔξειν ἢ ποιήσῃς, ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων
 ἐστὶ μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς
 ἐστὶ μεθόδου, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ
 τῶν πρώτων.

ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ κωμω-
 15 δία<ς>, καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ, καὶ τῆς | αὐλητικῆς ἢ
 πλειστή καὶ κιθαριστικῆς, πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὐσαι μιμή-
 σεως τὸ σύνολον. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισὶν · ἢ γὰρ
 τῶ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμῆσθαι, ἢ τῶ ἕτερα, ἢ τῶ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

47a8

Concerning the poetic art as a whole and its species, the
 particular capacities of each; how the plots should be con-
 10 structed | if the poetic process is to be artistically satisfactory,
 and further how many and what kind of parts it has; and
 all the other questions that belong to the same branch of
 study—let us discuss all this, beginning in the natural order
 with first principles.

Now the writing of epic and of tragedy, also <of> comedy,
 15 and the art of composing dithyrambs, and most of the | art
 of flute and lyre—all these are in point of fact forms of
 imitation, by and large. They differ from one another in three
 respects: viz. in the fact that the imitating has (1) different
 media, (2) different objects, or (3) different modes or methods.

The most notable feature of these opening lines is how directly and rapidly Aristotle begins. A summary indication of the subject and its major sub-topics,¹ an equally summary list (representative rather than

¹ The enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive, and anyhow ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτλ. is sufficiently elastic. Inferences as to topics which are 'missing' in the outline are quite beside the point.

complete)² of the 'kinds' of poetry and their uniting and differentiating principles, and we are ready to embark (a18) on the first stage of classification. The preliminaries are over in ten lines. It is true that the whole *Poetics* is uncomfortably compressed and rapid. Nevertheless a special impression of abruptness remains here. Nothing is said about the purpose of the discussion, what Aristotle hopes to accomplish by it; next to nothing about method, or the views of others on poetry. But above all we miss something that stands as preface to every major work of Aristotle's maturity (*De Anima*, *Parts of Animals*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Politics*, *Rhetoric*), namely some general statement by way of orientation, showing how this field of study is related to the other kinds and levels of knowledge, at least those closely connected with the matter in hand. Such orientations are more than a literary ornament; they reflect Aristotle's ripe awareness, as a teacher, that the student needs to get some notion of the forest before he settles down in one corner to study the trees.

Not only is no orientation given here for the prospective student; something even more essential is missing. The word *ποιητική* in itself ('constructive' or 'productive,' sc. 'art') is highly general and can refer to any kind of 'making': the production of ships, buildings, knives, clothing, etc., etc. How is *ποιητική*, the 'poetic' art in the special sense, related to this broad field of the productive arts, to *ποιητική* in general? Elsewhere Aristotle gives scattered hints at a general classification of human activity into 'theoretical,' 'practical,' and 'poetic,' or knowing (i.e., knowing for its own sake), doing, and making.³ But it is notorious that he never achieves a thoroughly consistent use of these terms and that he has not left us any over-all 'system' even of his own works.⁴ It is therefore questionable whether there is such a thing as a general 'Kunstlehre' in Aristotle.⁵ Nevertheless *ποιητική* raises general ques-

² The nome is not explicitly mentioned but is obviously thought of as included (*κιθαριστική*; cf. b26); the music of the shepherd's pipe, as well as "others of that kind," is added in a25; mimes and Socratic dialogues appear at b10. On dancing, see below on a18-20, 26-28.

³ *Metaph.* E1. 1025b25; see Ross (with diagram); *E.N.* 6. 4. 1140a2; see J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, London, 1900, xx-xxiv; *Top.* 6. 6. 145a15.

⁴ Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* 2. 2.³⁻⁴ 176-185.

⁵ Such as those reconstructed by Telchmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 2 (see the 'Bibliography of Works Frequently Cited,' pp. 654-656); J. H. Reinken, *Aristoteles über Kunst, besonders über Tragödie*, Vienna, 1870; A. Döring, *Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles*, Jena, 1876; K. Svoboda, *L'Esthétique d'Aristote*, Brno (Brunn), 1927.

ions which one might expect him at least to glance at.⁶ Not a word of it: ποιητικῆ is assumed in its special, colloquially given sense of 'poetic art,' and we plunge immediately into the discussion.

It could be argued that this *insouciance* belongs to the genre of the *Poetics*: that this is not a standard lecture-treatise but a set of private notes meant for Aristotle's eye alone;⁷ or that the requisite theoretical 'placing' of the poetic art in its larger context was given elsewhere, for example in the dialogue *On Poets*.⁸ But neither of these solutions is wholly satisfactory. Is it not also possible that when Aristotle wrote the first words of the *Poetics* the question had not yet occurred to him, at least as a serious theoretical problem? The self-confidence of αὐτῆς seems to point in this direction. Strictly, ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς ought to mean "the productive art as such, in general," as against special varieties like poetic production. Thus the phrase raises the question how the species ('poetic') is related to the genus ('making'). But clearly Aristotle is not thinking along such lines. The poetic art itself is the genus here, and the species are its species.

It will not do to evade the difficulty either by straining or by watering down the meaning of αὐτῆς.⁹ The collocation αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς makes it clear that αὐτῆς means 'in itself,' i.e., 'generically,' as opposed to the species.¹⁰ But we are entirely within the particular sphere of the 'poetic'; these are *its* species, and there is no question of its relation to the whole art of 'making.' Thus αὐτῆς, referring to an art which itself, under any comprehensive view, is only a species, seems to indicate how untroubled Aristotle was by 'systematic' considerations when he began to write.

The subject of the *Poetics*, then, is "the art of poetry, both generically and in its species." We must insist on 'art,' as against any

⁶ All the more so because the sister-arts of painting and sculpture appear almost at once, a18-20, and recur constantly throughout the *Poetics*. We shall see below how much of a clue is given us by the comparison ὡσπερ γὰρ κτλ., a18.

⁷ Montmollin's thesis; see his p. 171.

⁸ So Rostagni, 'Il dialogo aristotelico *Περὶ ποιητῶν*,' *Riv. di Fil.* 54 (1926), esp. 440-441, 451-453.

⁹ Gudeman objects that 'über die Dichtkunst selbst' is intolerable; but that is only one of the many indications of philosophical obtuseness with which Rostagni rightly charges him, *Gnomon* 11 (1935) 230. On the other hand questions of 'essence' are not raised here, as Rostagni thinks; see below.

¹⁰ So Bywater, "the art in general"; Menardos - Sykutris, γενικῶς; see Albergiani 59.

temptation to translate *ποιητικῆς* merely by 'poetry.'¹¹ 'Poetry' is a slippery and unreliable word in English. Apart from the innumerable and well-known differences of opinion as to what *is* poetic, 'poetry' has two general strands of meaning, one subjective and evaluative, the other objective and historical. If I opine that "there is more poetry in one short piece of Eliot than in all of Wordsworth," I am judging Eliot and Wordsworth by tacit appeal to something called 'poetry,' a spirit or tone or essence of some kind which I feel to be "in" the one but not the other.¹² In this sense we can—and unfortunately do—speak of 'poetry' in a painting, a natural scene, a piece of music, a religious service, etc., etc. Quite different but equally well understood is the statistical or collective sense in which we speak of "the poetry of Milton" or "Greek lyric poetry," meaning simply the aggregate of the poems written by Milton, Greek lyric poets, or whatever.

'Poetry,' in either sense, will not do for *ποιητικῆς*. Aristotle does not mean either a floating spirit or an aggregate, but very precisely an art. They order these things better in France, where Hardy begins quite naturally "Nous allons parler de l'art poétique," and in other countries;¹³ and of course many English translators have kept the word 'art.' Nevertheless we in the Anglo-Saxon tradition are on the whole too far gone in individualism to think of 'poetry' as actually *made* by an Art of poetry. Yet that is what Aristotle, if honestly read, requires us to do. His treatise is not a discussion of 'poetry' in either, or any, sense of the English term; it is, in all sadness and sobriety, an analysis of the nature and functioning of the *art* of poetry and of its species.

Of the art "itself," generically, and of the species; for both genus and species subsist and function in Aristotle's theory. It looks at first glance as though the generic art disappears at once, as soon as the

¹¹ Butcher: "I propose to treat of Poetry in itself"—a sentence to which one might well raise Gudeman's objection, that "es gibt keinen erträglichen Sinn."

¹² Perhaps the best-known recent essay on the subject is A. E. Housman's *The Name and Nature of Poetry*, London and New York, 1933, which evokes but does not capture the elusive spirit (we do learn that Housman's way of recognizing its presence is a bristling of the beard while shaving). Cf. C. Brooks and A. Warren, *Understanding Poetry*, New York, 1950, xlix, where a poem is tentatively defined as "a piece of writing which gives us a certain effect in which, we discover, the 'poetry' inheres." I take it that the "Poetry" of the title includes both meanings, the poem and the effect. See further R. S. Crane, introd. to *Critics and Criticism*, Chicago 1952, p. 14.

¹³ "Dichtkunst," "poetica" (sc. "arte poetica"), etc.

analysis of its species begins (a16), and plays no further role in his argument. Actually, however, it continues to exist and operate *through* the species. Their differentiations are its *differentiae* and have an organic connection with its generic nature, a connection which emerges into the open once more in Aristotle's historical sketch (chapter 4), and the critical characteristics of tragedy are in good part derived from and defined by the essential nature of the genus (chapter 6),¹⁴ while on the other hand 'tragedy' (that is, the *art of making* tragedy) actualizes and represents that generic nature *par excellence*.

Aristotle conceives of an art as "a certain disposition (settled capacity) which is productive in association with reason" (*ἐξίς τις, μετὰ λόγου ποιητική*),¹⁵ and he adds, "dealing with that which is capable of being changed." Naturally such a disposition exists only in human brains and thoughts, not 'by itself' like a Platonic Idea: it is put in operation by the artist. But again, when we say 'artist' we tend to think of Whitman's "simple, separate person," an individual differing from all others and operating out of the plenitude of a capacity which is all *his* — in short, the artist as an autonomous, self-expressing individual. Aristotle's attitude is very different. For all his unbounded, even idolatrous worship of Homer, which will meet us again and again, and his great admiration for Sophocles, there is not a word anywhere in the *Poetics* about the persons Homer and Sophocles.¹⁶ The artist does not produce *qua* man, person, individual, but *qua* artist; or as Aristotle says, with his special brand of vividness, "it is accidental to the sculptor that he is Polyclitus."¹⁷

Although the artist is the proximate efficient cause of the productive process, the ulterior or true efficient cause is the art (the art *in* him): a truth which Aristotle reduces to the pregnant formula *ἡ τέχνη ἀρχή* (*μεταβολῆς*) *ἐν ἄλλῳ*, "art is a beginning (of change) in something else."¹⁸

¹⁴ See below on β. 49b31, 50a10-12.

¹⁵ *E.N.* 6. 4. 1140a7. The whole passage, a6-23, is especially significant for Aristotle's concept of art. Cf. also *Metaph.* E1. 1025b22, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἡ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις.

¹⁶ The nearest to it—apparently—is the remark quoted from Sophocles in 25. 60b33. But precisely there the rule is proved, for Sophocles' remark is about his art, not himself.

¹⁷ *Phys.* 2. 3. 195a34.

¹⁸ *Metaph.* A3. 1070a7: see Ross's commentary *ad loc.*; E1. 1025b22: ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή. Where the distinction does not particularly matter, Aristotle

The poetic art is the cause of poetic production generically, and its species (of which it itself is the ultimate cause) are the causes of poetic production specifically. For the species, which are alluded to in the first line (*τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς*), and to whose analysis most of the *Poetics* is devoted, are also species of the poetic art, not of 'poetry.' In *ἐποποιία* Aristotle had a term ready to hand to indicate this.¹⁸ *Τραγωδία*, *κωμῳδία*, *διθύραμβος*, on the other hand, were potentially ambiguous. *Τραγωδία*, for example, could mean 'a tragedy,' i.e., a single play,¹⁹ and probably also 'tragedy' in the collective sense in which we customarily speak of "Greek tragedy." That is precisely why, in the inductive list, a13 ff., Aristotle writes *τῆς τραγωδίας ποιήσις*, *διθύραμβοποιήτικῆ* (cf. *τῶν διθύραμβικῶν ποιήσις*, b26).²⁰ Naturally he does not drag these cumbersome phrases into the further discussion; but wherever he writes *τραγωδία* in the *Poetics*, unless the context clearly demands another meaning, we are to read it as 'the tragic art.' This is an important point, not only for its general implications but for specific interpretation: thus we shall find in chapter 6 that the six so-called 'parts of tragedy' are not parts of the poem, or of the collective entity 'tragedy' (i.e., the aggregate of all poems so called), but specifically of the art or composition of tragedy.

To return to *αὐτῆς*, it designates, as we said, the poetic art generically, as against the species. But we also pointed out that it does not raise any implication as to the relation between *ποιητικῆ*, 'art of composing poetry,' and the still larger concept of *ποιητικῆ* as 'art of making' in general: that systematic considerations of this sort seem not to have been in Aristotle's mind when he began writing. Neither does *αὐτῆς* carry any implication as to *autonomy* of the poetic art (the art 'by itself,' apart from others such as ethics, politics, rhetoric);²¹ nor finally

speaks of the artist himself as the *ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς*, e.g., *Phys.* 2. 3. 195a23 (= *Metaph.* A2. 1013b24); but 195b21-25 emphasizes that one should always search for the ultimate cause, and that in the arts this is the *τέχνη*.

¹⁸ Also in *ἀθλητικῆ* and *κιθαριστικῆ* (sc. *τέχνη*).

¹⁹ Especially in the plural; see below on 6. 50a7, 25.

²¹ Hence I have ventured the suggestion *κωμῳδία<ς>* in a14. *Κωμῳδία* is the only term in the list which does not carry any explicit reference to an art or 'making.' *Κωμῳδίας* may be implied by the Arabic version ("sequimur aut encomium aut convicium" Tkatsch, making no distinction in construction between *τραγωδίας* and *κωμῳδία*).

²² See F. Solmsen, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 410. Gudeman's notion that it denotes the *ars* as against the *artifex* and thus indicates that Aristotle's work follows the well-known Hellenistic *Dispositionsschema* (chaps. 1-12, *ars*; 13-25, *artifex*; see his *In-*

does it mean that the art exists by itself apart from particulars, like a Platonic Idea. Nevertheless the use of *αὐτῆς* to denote the genus as against the species, implying as it does some degree of centrality or special attention to the one as against the other, is a Platonic inheritance. Compare for example *Republic* 4. 437e (in an explicitly 'dialectical' passage): there are different varieties and degrees of thirst, *αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διψῆν οὐ μὴ ποτε ἄλλον γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ οὕπερ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ πάματος*.²³ It is true that *αὐτός* is used specially by Plato to denote the Idea 'in itself,' as against its 'particulars,' for example in the famous passage of the *Phaedo*, 75c: *περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίζ ὄμεθα τὸ "αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστι."* The 'seal' that Plato refers to here became in fact such a standing formula that Aristotle cites it in the technical form (obviously belonging to the common jargon of the Academy) *αὐτοάνθρωπος, αὐτοζῶον*, etc., or, in general, *αὐτοέκαστον*.²⁴ Thus *αὐτός* (*αὐτό*) became a sign, even a synonym, for the Ideas.²⁵ Nevertheless in itself it had not originally signified a metaphysical transcendence or *χωρισμός* of the Ideas, but simply the self-identity or definition of a class as against the manifold differentiations of its species:²⁶ in short, just the distinction Aristotle has in mind here.²⁷ Thus the parallel and the link with Plato is significant.

hallsoverzeichniss, pp. vii-viii) is entirely arbitrary; see below, c. 13, n. 2. On the other hand, Rostagni's "*in se stessa*," cioè nella sua *essenza*, che si vedrà essere la *minesi*," is over-sharp.

²³ Cf. the conclusion, 438c, *ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν...*, *ἐπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιῶν τινος καὶ τινός*; *Phileb.* 12d: Socrates has pointed out that pleasure is *ποικίλον*, i.e., there are different kinds and degrees of pleasure, for example those of the foolish and the sensible man; but Protarchus replies, *ibid.*, d, *εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονῆ γε ἡδονῆ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἶη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων*;

²⁴ See Bonitz, *Index* 123b46 ff.; cf. *ibid.* 125a6-14.

²⁵ *Rep.* 6. 511a, *αὐτὰ ἐκείνα ... ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος ἴδοι τις ἢ τῆ διανοίᾳ*; *ibid.*, b, *εἶδεν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά*. On the further development by which *αὐτά* is made absolute ("themselves," i.e., the Ideas) see Jaeger, *Aristotle* 91 n. 2. Aristotle himself used this absolute language in the *Protrepticus*: e.g., *αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ θεατής* (sc. the philosopher).

²⁶ What are often called the 'particulars' (as against the unity of the Idea) are usually in fact *species* of thing, behavior, value, etc.: see my essay on "The Terminology of the Ideas," *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.* 47 (1936) 36; cf. *ibid.*, 25-26.

²⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 1. 1. 1355a8, *περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὁμοίως ἅπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἣ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ μέρος τινός*.

The same is true of *δύναμιν* in the second line. In his developed terminology Aristotle sometimes identifies or associates *τέχνη* and *δύναμις*,²⁸ sometimes appears to distinguish them.²⁹ But our passage does not seem to have anything in common with either the identification or the distinction (certainly it does not in any way evoke the 'Aristotelian' distinction *ἐνέργεια-δύναμις*, as in the passage quoted from the *Ethics* just above [note 28]). Rather it casts back to the sort of untechnical use we find in Plato (e.g., *Gorgias* 447c, *τίς ἢ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός*; cf. *ibid.* 456a, c; *Phaedrus* 268a): that is, the 'power' or 'capability' of the art, what it can do. Under the circumstances it is natural to associate *δύναμιν* in our passage with the *ἔργον* or 'job' of tragedy,³⁰ and thus with the concept of tragic pleasure and or catharsis; but that remains to be seen. In any case the phrase *ἦν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει* serves notice that the poetic art and its branches are not going to be investigated simply "in themselves" (whatever that might mean), but from the point of view of their functioning, what they can do when put in operation.

In the next clause (*καὶ πῶς δεῖ ... ἢ ποιήσεις*) it has often been remarked how abruptly and prematurely Aristotle drags in the *μῦθος* when he has not yet mentioned the kinds of poetry, much less said anything about them. There is some justification for this sense of shock, since Aristotle himself later makes the *μῦθος* one 'part,' i.e., one constitutive element, of tragedy (and epic), whereas here we are supposed to be talking about "first things" (a13). But the *μῦθος* is much more than one part among others; it is really "the starting-point (or, foundation) and as it were the soul of tragedy" (6. 50a38). The poet is a maker, but he is to be a maker of plots rather than of verses, 9. 51b27. Thus the construction of a plot is not an incidental duty, it is the critical, the essential, part of the poet's 'making.' The

²⁸ E.g. *E. N.* 7. 13. 1153a24, *οὐδέ γάρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως*, where *δύναμις* seems to mean much the same as *ἐξίς* in the definition of art quoted above, n. 15; cf. *Pol.* 2. 8. 1268b36; 8. 1. 1337a19; *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1358a6. Rhetoric is defined as a *δύναμις*, *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1355b26; cf. 1355a15, *τῆς αὐτῆς ... δυνάμεως (= τέχνης)*; 1356a33; rhetoric and dialectic are *δυνάμεις* *τινές τοῦ ποιεῖν λόγους* (Aristotle continues, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν...*: an expression which is even closer to that in the *Poetics*).

²⁹ E.g. *Metaph.* E1. 1025b22 (cf. Ross *ad loc.*; M. T. Cardini in *Studi di filologia greca*, Bari 1950, 287n.); see also Cope on *Rhet.* 1. 4. 1359b13 (E. M. Cope, *The Rhet. of Aristotle*, Cambridge, 1877, 1. 61).

³⁰ 6. 50a31; 13. 52b29; cf. 26. 62b13.

word *ποίησις* is meant to convey this active meaning, yet the translators almost unanimously miss it and translate *ποίησις* "poem" (e.g., Bywater: "of the structure of plot required for a good poem").³¹ Later in the *Poetics* *ποίησις* once or twice verges on the sense 'poem'; but in general, and particularly here, it keeps its full active sense: *ποίη-σις*, mak-ing, com-posi-tion.³² The *ποίησις*, the making or constructing of the poem, is in fact the poetic art itself at work. It represents the shaping process as it guides the poet's mind, the *ἀρχή* which will eventuate later in the finished poem.³³ *Art is an activity*, and Aristotle's treatise is concerned primarily with that activity, only secondarily with its product, the poem.

It follows from this, since the subject of the next clause is still *ἡ ποίησις* (representing now, at a slightly more 'actual' level, *ποιητική* itself), that the 'parts' (*μέρη*) are parts of the productive activity, not of the poem; and this distinction, though it may seem academic here, will turn out to have great concrete importance when we come to Aristotle's derivation of the 'parts' of tragedy in chapter 6.

Finally we note the Platonic-Aristotelian, intellectualist bias in *ἀρχάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων*. Clearly Aristotle means by "first things" here the abstract structure of *genus* and *differentiae*, i.e., the discussion into which he plunges with *ἐποποιία δὴ κτλ.*, not anything of a historical or genetic kind nor yet any of the multifarious concrete details (particulars) of poetic 'making.' We are beginning with the art and its species, not with poets or poems or actual poetic practice: with the *πρῶτα (πρότερα) φύσει*, not the *πρῶτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς*.³⁴

³¹ Hardy is an exception: "Si on veut que la composition poétique soit belle."

³² *Ποιεῖν* likewise is a thoroughly active and positive word throughout the *Poetics*, as we shall have occasion to notice repeatedly. It is too bad that we have nothing for it in English but the used-up native word 'make' and the still more colorless borrowings 'compose,' 'construct.' German *schaffen* is much more expressive. Again, 'composition' has suffered the fate of most of the -tion words: it has tended to lose its verbal connotation, so that it suggests the product rather than the production ('production' itself has gone the same way: cf. Hollywood's "super-productions").

³³ Vahlen, *Beiträge* 1 (1. 266): "Allein der *μῦθος*, der neben anderen Teilen des Gedichts [read: der Dichtung !], wie Sprache und Gedanken, das stoffliche Element bezeichnet, ist doch auch das poetische Gebilde, wie es in der Seele des Dichters sich gestaltet, und als solches dem fertigen *ποίημα*, in welchem sich Teile unterscheiden lassen, vorausliegt." See also his note *ad loc.*, p. 236 (1. 295), to which we will return later.

³⁴ On the distinction see esp. *An. Post.* 1. 2. 72a1-7; *Metaph.* Δ11. 1018b9 ff.;

The *πρῶτα φύσει* are the universal or general as against the particular, the intelligible as against the sensible, the cause as against the caused. Thus in saying "let us begin with the first things" Aristotle is saying "let us begin with the *causes* of poetic production,³⁶ its universal, generic elements." The point of view, then, under which we approach the subject is *art as cause*.

The self-confident locution *λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων* reappears, with some variations, in several other works.³⁶ Particularly interesting are *Sophistic Refutations*, *init.* (1. 164a20-22)³⁷ and *Parts of Animals* 1 *fin.* (1. 5. 646a1-4), *καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ τρόπου τῆς μεθόδου τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω· τὰς δ' αἰτίαις πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν περὶ τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀρξάμενοι καθάπερ διωρίσαμεν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων*. Although conventionally printed as the end of book 1, the sentence is really an introduction to book 2. The reference in *καθάπερ διωρίσαμεν κτλ.* is not, as it might seem, to the question which is brought up several times in Book 1,³⁸ whether one should begin with the individual species or with the features common (*κοινά*) to them all,³⁹ but to the still more important question which kind of cause, the final or the efficient,⁴⁰ should be dealt with first. This issue is broached at 1. 1. 639b11-14 and leads to a long discussion, of which the upshot is (640a33-b4) that the final cause (which is better

Phys. 1. 1 *init.*; *ibid.* 7. 189b-31, *ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπόντας σὺν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἰδία θεωρεῖν*.

³⁶ Cf. the emphasis on the causes, *Phys. loc. cit.*

³⁷ Cf. *Meteor.* 1. 1. 339a9; *De Sensu* 1. 436a5; *Hist. An.* 5. 1. 539a2; *Rhet.* 2. 22. 1396b22; cf. 3. 1. 1403b18; and see Gudeman *ad loc.*

³⁸ The whole beginning of the *Sophistici Elenchi* breathes a spirit similar to that of the *Poetics*: see esp. 1. 165a34, *καὶ ἐκ πόσεων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ δύναμις αὐτῆ [see above, n. 28, on δύναμις = τέχνη] συνέστηκε, καὶ πόσα μέρη τυγχάνει τῆς πραγματείας ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συντελούντων εἰς τὴν τέχνην ταύτην, ἧδη λέγωμεν*, and the precise and confident answers that follow: there are four kinds of *λόγοι*, five things aimed at by eristic, two species of refutation, etc.

³⁹ *De Part. An.* 1. 1. 639a16-b5; 4. 644a23-29; 5. 645b1-14.

⁴⁰ Aristotle's solution (not stated too clearly, 644b1-8) is that we should describe first the characteristics which are common to large groups, such as 'fishes' and 'birds,' then those limited to particular species, such as 'man.' This solution is presupposed in *περὶ τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων*: what we do will be done for both the common features and the specific ones (in that order). *What* we are going to do is another matter: it is the specification of causes.

⁴¹ Aristotle refers to "several" kinds of cause, but mentions only these two just here. The formal cause is hardly necessary in a treatise on nature, and the material cause is explicitly demoted to a purely secondary role, 640b4-29.

represented by the creature's mature state, what it "is," than by the process of its generation and growth) should be stated first, or as close an approximation to it as we can get. And in fact Book 2 does proceed, after introducing the concepts of 'elements' and of 'uniform' and 'non-uniform' parts, to show *why* the non-uniform parts must be made out of the uniform and the uniform out of the elements; and the demonstration is made by reference to the final cause (2. 1. 646a25 ff.).

Ingemar Düring has shown pretty convincingly⁴¹ that Books 2-4 of the *Parts of Animals* are a comparatively early work, dating from the Assos-Lesbos period, while Book 1 is later, written in Macedonia or at Athens soon after Aristotle's return.⁴² If so, our little introductory passage, ἀρχόμενοι κτλ., surely belongs to the same period, that is, before 343/2. Other parts of Book 1 may well belong there also: so far as it is concerned Düring's criteria for dating are mainly negative, and the question is not yet closed.⁴³ In any case we see that ἀρχόμενοι ... πρώτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων refers to the discussion of causes, and particularly of the final cause. It is the same in the *Poetics*: we shall see that the generic character of the poetic art, i.e., imitation, is also its final cause, and that the first five chapters are in fact a discussion of the causes of ποιητικῆ. As for the question of date, the coincidence between *De Part. An.* 1 *fin.* and our phrase is only a small straw in the wind; we shall find a number of others which also tend to suggest that the *Poetics*, or at least the main body of it, including all the early chapters, is early.⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium: Critical and Literary Commentaries*, Göteborg 1943, 21-35, esp. 26, 30, 34. See also F. Nuyens, *L'Évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, Louvain 1948 (translation of his *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles*, Amsterdam 1939), 159-160, 198-201.

⁴² Except chapters 2 and 3, which D. dates to Assos: *op. cit.* 34.

⁴³ I do not even feel sure that the famous passage in chapter 5, 644b22-645a36, which Jaeger, *Aristotle*³ 337-339, quotes as the "program" of the Lyceum after Aristotle opened it (accepted by Düring, *loc. cit.*; but see Nuyens, *op. cit.* 202-204), is necessarily late. Its style is as lofty and incongruous in its surroundings as the style of those quotations from the *Protrepticus* which Jaeger himself pointed out in the *Metaphysics* (*op. cit.*, e.g. 68-69), and the enthusiasm for the new study of nature is at least as appropriate in the first flush of Aristotle's absorption in biology as it is years later at Athens. One part of the passage (645a10-13) will interest us especially later: see below on 4. 48b10-12.

⁴⁴ The other works which show parallels (above, n. 36) are also early, either certainly or probably. The *Meteorology* belongs to the series which begins with the *Physics*, and the basic stock of the *Physics* is one of Aristotle's oldest works, pro-

Aristotle now lists in rapid survey (a13-16) the chief species of ποιητική: epic, ⁴⁵dithyramb, tragedy, comedy, and most of auletic and kitharistic. We have already emphasized that the list is not intended to be exhaustive, but representative, and that the items in it are not branches of 'poetry' but of the poetic art.⁴⁶ What we are interested in now is the way in which Aristotle introduces the master-concept of 'imitation.' "Well then, the composition of epic and tragedy ... all happen to be (are actually) processes of imitation so far as their aggregate character (τὸ σύνολον) is concerned." Μιμήσεις, like ποιήσεις above, is verbal and active in sense: not "imitations" or even "modes of imitation," with the translators, but "processes of imitation," "imitatings." The mimetic process is the activity of ποιητική (either 'itself' or its species, e.g., τραγωδίας ποιήσεις). Its locus is not in the performance or presentation, where the poet's work finally reaches an audience, nor even in the linguistic composition of the poem in words and verses, but specifically in *the drafting of the plot*,⁴⁷ the 'making' of the over-all form of the action: that is, in the stage already designated by πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι ... ἢ ποιήσεις above.

There can be no doubt that Aristotle took this concept of μίμησις as the common character of ποιητική from Plato.⁴⁸ How he changed it,

bably going back even to the end of his Academy period: see Ross's edition of the *Physics*, pp. 8-10. Our *De Sensu* seems to belong to the second Athenian period, along with the *De Anima*: Nuyens, *op. cit.* 250-251; but it may well contain older material reworked: Düring, *op. cit.* 29. The *Hist. An.* certainly dates from Assos-Lesbos, although it was a continuing enterprise: *ibid.* 26, 29; Nuyens 147-149; H. D. P. Lee, *CQ* 42 (1948) 61-67; P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'A.*, Louvain 1951, 339. The first draft of the *Rhetoric* dates from 355-350: F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Neue Philol. Unters. 4)* Berlin, 1929, 209-218. The *Sophistici Elenchi* is an integral part of the *Topics*, and the *Topics* is a very early, Platonizing work: *ibid.* 39-50; Nuyens, *op. cit.* 115 ff.

⁴⁵ The attempt of S. M. Pitcher, *AJP* 65 (1944) 340-353, to make ἐποποιία δῆ mean "Epic, as I here define it," viz., 'word-poetry,' *Wortdichtung*, was answered by F. W. Householder, Jr., *AJP* 66 (1945) 266-278. 'Ἐποποιία has its proper, in fact strict, meaning here: "making of epic(s)"; and δῆ is connective or "progressive": "now," "well then"; see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, Oxford 1934, 236-240, esp. 239 (Platonic examples). Denniston emphasizes how rapidly the connective use of δῆ gains ground in the fourth century: e.g., of 25 instances in the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* 1-3, all are connective.

⁴⁶ Hence my proposal κωμωδία<ς> (sc. ποιήσεις). See n. 21 above.

⁴⁷ See below on 6. 50a3-4; 17. 55a34-b1.

⁴⁸ Finsler 11-28; Rostagni, *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N.S. 2 (1922) 4 and n. 1; U. Galli, *ibid.* 4 (1926) 285, 314, 323. Gudeman's attempt (p. 80) to deny this evident

to what extent it becomes in his hands a really new idea, having little more than the name in common with Plato, are matters which will have to emerge in the course of our interpretation of the text. An attempt to discuss them here would be hopelessly premature, not to mention the disproportionate amount of space it would take. Nevertheless we ought to notice even at this stage that there is a potential discrepancy, or at least an ambiguity, between the concepts of the poetic art as 'making' and as 'imitating.' The two terms glance past each other; and this asymmetry is grounded in their history, since *ποιεῖν* originally referred to the verses or the poem,⁴⁹ that is, the thing that the poet actually produces (*ποίημα*, thing made), while *μιμεῖσθαι* inherently referred to what was represented in or by the product. The one seems to assign the dominant role to the *poet*, the other to his *object*. We need not stretch the antinomy to the degree suggested by the terms 'creation' and 'copying.' But it does seem a mild paradox to define *ποίησις* as *μίμησις* without further ado;⁵⁰ and in fact Aristotle does not quite do so in formal terms just here. The expression *πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὕσαι μιμήσεις*—which has been neglected by the commentators—seems to me significant in this regard. Is the phrase no more than a stylistic variant for *εἰσί*, or does it suggest a tacit suppression of a theoretical problem? Aristotle seems here to be leaving the theoretical question of the essence of *ποιητική* to one side and getting on with the more practical task of reminding the student which arts he (and, presumably, any Greek-speaking person) would in fact recognize as branches of imitation.

A further hint of the summary nature of Aristotle's procedure is *τὸ σύνολον*. The phrase has exercised the commentators just because of its vagueness. Certainly it has not the technical meaning which it takes on in Aristotle's later terminology: a 'compound whole,' i.e., an individual made up of form and matter.⁵¹ But neither is Vahlen's interpretation⁵² quite convincing: "das allen Künsten insgesamt Ge-

connection is the product of his fierce but misguided determination to defend Aristotle against the epithet 'Plagiator' by any and all means.

⁴⁹ On Aristotle's impatience with this historical fact see below on 47b13-16.

⁵⁰ On Valgimigli's attempt (Introduction, pp. 9-12, 24-29; cf. W. F. Trench, *Hermathena*, 23, no. 48 [1933] 1-24) to make *μίμησις* in itself mean 'artistic creation' see Galli, *op. cit.* 314 n. 1.

⁵¹ Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 239-240 († 1. 298-299, n. 2 to p. 2).

⁵² *Ibid.* Tkatsch, 2. 162, loses himself in grammatical subtleties.

meinsame." Teichmüller's exegesis⁵³ seems preferable, that τὸ σύνολον serves to mitigate the apparent strictness of πᾶσαι, since Aristotle just indicated that not all instrumental music is to be included and we shall find other imitative arts mentioned below. Thus the phrase signifies, somewhat vaguely, "in general, on the whole."⁵⁴

Thus our philosopher seems not to be proceeding after all in quite the strict apodictic fashion that we expected. The fact is that if he had attempted to give a systematic logical derivation of the species of 'poetic,' at least at this stage, some formidable difficulties would have erupted into the open. The non-'poetic' varieties of ποιητικὴ—knife-making, housebuilding, etc.—would have had to be accounted for on the one hand, and the imitative arts which were not generally accounted 'poetic,' such as acting (as we shall see, it is alluded to below, at a20), on the other. Again, Aristotle himself does not admit that all 'poets' are genuine poets, i.e., makers: witness Empedocles (47b18). But this exclusion is incorporated into a footnote (47b13-20) to a particular group of 'poetic' arts, instead of being treated here at the beginning as part of a general question.

These unresolved difficulties lend plausibility to Rostagni's suggestion⁵⁵ that the basic theoretical questions connected with μίμησις were discussed in the dialogue *On Poets*. And indeed we shall see that what Aristotle does have to say on the subject here (47b13-20) is certainly connected with things he had said in the dialogue. But that does not suffice to prove that he had traversed *all* the theoretical ground we have indicated. Such a systematic delimitation of the area of ποιητικὴ might or might not have seemed to him appropriate in a literary work aimed at the general public. It is at least equally probable that Aristotle began in the dialogue at the same point as he does in our treatise, with the group of 'poetic' arts as they were generally accepted and had been dealt with by Plato, and only touched on the relation between ποίησις and μίμησις incidentally, as he does below, by way of correcting certain popular misunderstandings.

Neither can it be said that Aristotle *clearly* delimits poetry from music, either in the present passage or later. "Most of auletic and kitharistic" is a vague phrase. But the untidiness is general in Greek

⁵³ *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 1-4.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Hist. An.* 8. 18. 601a25, ὅγλιται καὶ νόσοι ... τοῖς ἑτερογενέσιν ἕτεροι καὶ τὸ σύνολον ("in general") οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ πᾶσιν; and see Bonitz, *Index* 732a23-29.

⁵⁵ *Riv. di Filol.* 54 (1926) 441.

practice (*μουσική* = both 'literature' and 'music'), and Aristotle cannot rightly be blamed for it.

Either our philosopher was not yet fully conscious of these dilemmas, in the systematic form suggested by his ultimate scheme of *θεωρητική*, *πρακτική*, and *ποιητική*, or he has decided to cut through them in a more or less rough-and-ready fashion, following (though with corrections) the lead of normal Greek usage and making as little difficulty as possible about the marginal cases.⁶⁶

This procedure has a considerable similarity to that recommended by Aristotle, after some hesitation, in the *Parts of Animals*, 1. 4. 644b1-7: "So far as concerns the attributes of those groups which have been correctly marked off by popular usage—groups which possess one common nature apiece and contain in themselves species not far removed from one another, I mean Birds and Fishes...—to describe the attributes of each of these by itself" (Peck's translation). In both places Aristotle is putting his trust in a popular classification as at least an initial guide to analysis.⁶⁷ In itself, as must be obvious, this attitude represents a reaction against the Platonic insistence on formally correct derivation of species from genus as the preliminary to any sound discussion.⁶⁸

This parallel between the two works leads us directly to another, in connection with the *διαφορά* of the poetic arts, a16-18. Solmsen has called attention⁶⁹ to the Platonic, 'diaeretic' character of Aristotle's classification in the first three chapters of the *Poetics*. And it is quite true:

⁶⁶ In short, there is nothing particularly philosophical about either the components of Aristotle's list or their order. If you had stopped any Athenian on the street in the middle of the fourth century and asked him to name the chief kinds of 'poetry,' he would have scratched his head and said, "Well, let me see, there's epic, of course [he would be thinking chiefly of Homer], and tragedy and comedy, and the dithyramb [Sappho and Pindar would hardly come into his mind], and, oh yes, maybe flute and lyre music—at least most of it...."

⁶⁷ Later (47b13-20) Aristotle has occasion to quarrel with one aspect of the popular classification, but that does not destroy its relative accuracy so far as the main classes are concerned: epic, tragedy, etc.

⁶⁸ Cf., e.g., *Phaedrus* 263b, οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ἐητορικήν μετιέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῶ διηρηθῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἶδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή. The procedure for "getting the (defining) mark of each species" is then specified in the well-known passage on 'diacresis,' 265d-266a, on which see J. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, Oxford, 1940, 96, 149-150. Cf. also *Phaedr.* 270b ff.

⁶⁹ *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 402 and n. 1; *CQ* 29 (1935) 196.

as we shall see in detail, Plato's diaeretic method supplies the procedure. But Aristotle does not *begin* diaeretically, dividing the whole body of poetic arts into two halves, then subdividing one of them again, and so on down to the 'indivisible species.'⁶⁰ Instead he begins with three independent *differentiae*, based on quite different criteria, and surveys the whole field in turn under each of them. Now this is precisely the method which he advocates in the *Parts of Animals*, I. 2-3. After a searching and detailed criticism of the diaeretic method, he concludes, 643b9-13: "And generally, the same thing inevitably happens whatever one single line of differentiation is taken for the division. The proper course is to endeavour to take the animals according to their groups, following the lead of the bulk of mankind, who have marked off the group of Birds and the group of Fishes. *The marking off of each of these groups has been arrived at by several lines of differentiation, and not by dichotomy*" (Peck's translation, my italics). This explicit attack on the diaeretic method is not duplicated in the *Poetics*, but the effect is the same. Poetry is to be classified by the interaction of three different criteria, not the successive application of a single one. By the same token Aristotle's discussion does not present itself as wholly new. It will follow the general lead of the popular classification; but within that framework it will refine and distinguish, showing more clearly than the man in the street could do just what the three *differentiae* are and how they operate, extending the range of the system and correcting it where it needs correction (as in the case of Empedocles).

Within the tripartite division, however—and perhaps this is the most significant point after all—Aristotle does proceed diaeretically. Under the heading of the 'medium' (*ἐν οἷς μιμοῦνται*)⁶¹ we shall find two groups of arts, musical and non-musical, with a third, mixed class alongside them;⁶² under that of the object of imitation, imitations of *σπουδαῖοι* and *φασῦλοι*; under that of the mode of imitation, narrative and dramatic and again a mixed class. In this part of his work Aristotle is still, in effect, a Platonist,⁶³ though an enlightened one.

⁶⁰ See Stenzel, *loc. cit.*

⁶¹ For the question of the reading *τῶ γενεῖ ἑτέροις* or *τῶ ἐν* (or *γ' ἐν*) *ἑτέροις*, a17, see the elaborate discussions by Vahlen, *Sitzungsber.* Berlin 1897, 626-630 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 2. 477-481) and Tkatsch, 2. 160-162. I think that *ἐν* is right (cf. a22 and elsewhere) and have printed it above; but I cannot believe that *γενεῖ* would be a serious blemish to Aristotle's argument.

⁶² See the chart at the end of the chapter, below, p. 67.

⁶³ Cf. Düring, *op. cit.* 114.

- ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται
 20 τινες ἀπεικάζοντες, οἱ μὲν | διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας,
 ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω κἀν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις
 ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ
 ἀρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένους· ὅσον ἀρμονία
 μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἢ τε ἀνλητικῆ καὶ ἢ καθα-
 25 ριστικῆ κἀν εἴ τινες | ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν οὔσαι τοιαῦται
 τὴν δύναμιν, ὅσον ἢ τῶν συρίγγων [αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ
 [μιμοῦνται] χωρὶς ἀρμονίας ἢ τῶν ὄρχηστῶν· καὶ γὰρ
 οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἤθη
 καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις], ἢ δὲ [ἐποποιία] μόνον τοῖς λόγοις
 29 | b8 ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, καὶ τοῦ|τοις εἴτε μιγνῶσα μετ' ἀλ-
 λήλων εἶθ' ἐνὶ τινὶ γένει χρωμένῃ τῶν μέτρων, <ἀνόνο-
 μος> τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν.

- First, in the same way that certain people also imitate
 many things by making images of them with colors and
 20 shapes—some [through art, some through habit and routine—
 whereas others do it with the voice, so in the case of the
 above-mentioned arts they all perform the imitation in rhythm,
 speech, and melody, but using the latter (two) either sepa-
 rately or mixed together: flute- and lyre-playing, for example,
 25 and whatever | other arts there may be of that kind, such
 as that of the Pan-pipes, using melody and rhythm alone
 [and that of the dancers [imitates] (using) its rhythm alone,
 without melody; for they too, through their rhythms incor-
 porated in dance-figures, imitate both characters and ex-
 periences and actions], and the other [epic] using only prose
 29|b8 or verses unaccompanied, and in the latter | case either mix-
 ing the verses together or using some one particular kind: (an
 art) which happens to be <nameless> up to the present time.

Aristotle begins his analysis at the lower end of the scale, with the element which is most material and farthest removed from the essence of the poetic art: the media of imitation. Thus the order of treatment in the first three chapters is hierarchical, beginning with the least significant element and ending with the most significant.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ There is a parallel in chapter 6, where *ἄνυξ* leads off the list of the 'parts' of tragedy; see below on 6. 49b31-33.

The differentiation according to media is introduced by a comparison which has hardly served to clarify Aristotle's meaning. "For just as certain people imitate many things by means of both⁶⁵ colors and shapes, making images (of them)—some through art, some through habit—while others (do it) with the voice, so also in the aforementioned arts..." Interpretation has been mildly baffled by this analogy.⁶⁶ In spite of its ostensible straightforwardness, it is far from clear just what arts Aristotle has in mind in *ὡσπερ... φωνῆς* and just how the distinction between them is meant to apply to "the aforementioned arts." For, whereas he seems here to be stating a simple, bilateral division between arts of color and form on the one hand and an art of the voice on the other, in a21 ff. we find a complex tangle of three media (rhythm, melody, and speech) and at least four different and overlapping modes of combination of them. We will attack this latter problem in its due place; meanwhile we must look more closely at a18-20. Two questions in particular claim our attention: (1) exactly which arts is Aristotle talking about? and (2) what is the meaning of the parenthesis⁶⁷ *οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας*?

It is obvious from *χρώμασι* (and *ἀπεικάζοντες*) that we have to do with painting here, and Gudeman rightly adds sculpture: both arts are meant, since in Greece at least both of them used both media.⁶⁸ But the interpreters are not agreed what Aristotle means by *διὰ τῆς φωνῆς*. The difficulty is that if *φωνή* is taken in its natural sense (the human voice) it seems to overlap the musical-poetic arts, so that Ari-

⁶⁵ The first *καί* may be the pleonastic *καί* of which Aristotle is notably fond in comparisons, cf. 4. 48b33; *Rhet.* 1. 13. 1374a17; but in this case it is perhaps more likely to go with *χρώμασι* (the pleonastic *καί* would be ambiguous here), emphasizing a possible separation of the media: "they can imitate with colors and also with shapes."

⁶⁶ The most recent careful discussion of the passage is in Tkatsch, 2. 98-100, which clears up certain points but still does not achieve clarity for the comparison as a whole.

⁶⁷ That it is a parenthesis I take as established: see Tkatsch, *loc. cit.* 99.

⁶⁸ Gudeman *ad loc.*, p. 81. The parallel in *De Part. An.* 1. 5. 645a10-13 is especially cogent. Greek sculpture used colors, and conversely Greek painting dealt in forms to a greater extent than most modern painting until the development of abstractionism. A good part of all Greek vase-'painting' is actually a sketching of forms, to which color is added for purposes of emphasis or contrast: see, e.g., Mary Swindler, *Ancient Painting*, New Haven, 1929, chap. VI *passim*, esp. pp. 160, 167, 175, 184-187, 190, and cf. pp. 205 (Polygnotus), 227 (use of shading to model forms, in the later fifth century), 233 (Parrhasius).

stotle's analogy is contaminated by having the same item on both sides of the equation.⁶⁹

The first step towards a solution lies, I think, in some general considerations. An unprejudiced inspection of the *ὡσπερ*-clause will show that all the qualifications of its first member except *χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι* are to be supplied in the second member also; in other words, that those who use the voice also imitate many things (*πολλὰ μιμοῦνται*), that they make 'images' or reproductions (*ἀπεικάζοντες*), and that some of them do this through art, others only through habit or experience. It is apparent that when we read the sentence in this way the perspective broadens out. What we are dealing with is not merely two arts, or sets of arts, but a whole realm of mimetic activities covering a broad front. Again, *ἕτεροι* has been too little noticed, or tacitly fobbed off as no more than a stylistic variant for *ἄλλοι* or *οἱ* (*δέ*). But the whole sentence stands as an exemplification of the first *differentia*: that is the sense of *γάρ*. Hence *ἕτεροι* is a direct echo of *ἐν ἑτέροισι μμεῖσθαι*, a17, and denotes people who are not merely "other" but *different* from those who imitate with colors and forms. Aristotle's analogy is a *παράδειγμα* or 'example,'⁷⁰ and the *παράδειγμα* is a variety of induction which brings out the meaning of a thing by comparing it with one or more other things which are like it *but clearer or better known*.⁷¹ We can see, then, what Aristotle is doing, or at least trying to do. In the complex of the poetic-musical arts, as represented for example in the presentation of a tragedy or a dithyramb, or even the recitation of an epic, the media—rhythm, melody, and speech—are mixed up together so that their real or potential distinctness, and the differentiations that rest on that distinctness, are not immediately perceptible. In order to cast light on the question Aristotle cites a case in which a comparable distinction can be seen more clearly because it is embodied not merely in different media but in *different people*. Those who imitate with the voice are a distinct group or tribe from those who imitate with colors and shapes.

⁶⁹ See Tkatsch, *loc. cit.*; Montmollin 19-20 and n. 27 (p. 274). Vahlen, *Poet.* 88, thought that Aristotle was speaking "de vulgari varia per vocem imitandi artificio, in quo nec ῥυθμός nec ἄρμονία nec λόγος aut est aut esse debet." Tkatsch is right in opposing this attempt to cut off the 'vocal' art from all connection with the arts that follow; but his own interpretation (so also Sykutris and others), that *φωνῆς* here means *any* tone or sound, is off the track in the other direction.

⁷⁰ See *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1356b3-16, 1357b26-36.

⁷¹ *Loc. cit.* b29, *ὅταν δμῶ μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατέρον.*

Who are the imitators with the voice? They are the race of rhapsodes, reciters, actors, and singers, all those whose specific artistic medium is the human voice. Every Greek knew these gentry well, and knew how distinct they were from the painters and sculptors:⁷² Aristotle is appealing to something *γνωριμώτερον*. In the *Rhetoric*, 3. 1. 1403b20 fl., he devotes some attention to the art of 'acting' or delivery, *ὑπόκρισις* or *ὑποκριτική*, and in terms which are strongly reminiscent of our passage.⁷³ Aristotle does not actually treat the subject in the *Rhetoric*; he merely points out its importance for the orator (a purely factitious importance, as he hastens to emphasize, 1404a1-8). Naturally the rhetorical *ὑπόκρισις* was not mimetic in the same direct sense as tragic or comic acting. But even there the speaker had ample scope for direct mimicry (sounding the organ notes of patriotism when he imagines his country, personified, addressing the assemblage or the court, counterfeiting the whining tones of an opponent, etc.), and we need not necessarily exclude him here. In fact Aristotle emphasizes in the same passage (1403b21-24, 35) how recent the development of *ὑπόκρισις* is, in both rhetoric and poetry, and that even now no technical treatise (*τέχνη*) exists on the subject: remarks which it seems to me supply the best possible commentary on our phrase *οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειας*.⁷⁴ There are actors, reciters, and speakers who use the voice artistically, but most of them follow (as in former times, presumably, all of them did) custom or experience, 'routine.'⁷⁵

⁷² We do not in fact hear of actors or rhapsodes who were also painters or sculptors. Even a phenomenon like the boxer Apollogenes, who won repeated victories as a *τραγωδός* in the third century (J. B. O'Connor, *Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece*, Chicago, 1908, "Prosopographia Histrionum," no. 40, p. 80), has no counterpart in the classical period.

⁷³ 1403b27, *ἔστιν δὲ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ*; *ibid.* 1404a21, *τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἔστιν, ὑπῆρξεν δὲ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῶν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι ἢ τε ἄμφωδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γ.* Here *ἄμφωδία* is distinguished from *ὑποκριτικὴ*; but in the *Poetics*, 26. 62a5-7, *ὑποκριτικὴ* covers epic recitation also (*καὶ ἄμφωδοῦντα*), and dithyrambic recitals besides (*καὶ διᾶδοντα*). Aristotle would hardly have called the rhapsode an *ὑποκριτής* outright, but his art is a branch of *ὑποκριτικὴ*.

⁷⁴ In saying that no *τέχνη* has yet been *written* (*σύνκειται*) about "them" (viz., the actors in the drama and the *ὑποκριτικοί* in the field of speech, b33-35), Aristotle does not mean to deny that an art of 'acting' exists. It has not yet been given systematic, theoretical treatment, that is all.

⁷⁵ As Bywater remarks, p. 102, *συνήθεια* is much the same as *ἐμπειρία*.—The epithet *πίθρκος* (or, according to Gudeman, *καλλίας*) which Mynniscus bestowed on Callippides, *Poet.* 26. 61b34, may perhaps originally have been meant as a re-

It is not difficult to carry the same distinction over into the graphic and plastic arts. Aristotle may be thinking, for example, of Polyclitus' 'Canon' and its epoch-making influence,⁷⁶ which in a sense first made sculpture an art.⁷⁷ Or he may be thinking simply of the fact that Greece was full of stonemasons and journeyman painters, who worked chiefly from experience and routine ideas,⁷⁸ alongside the much smaller number of real artists. In either case there were plenty of phenomena to warrant his distinction. It is harder to say why he brings it in at all just here, since he does not carry it over to the poetical and musical arts. I can think of no plausible reason except a desire to vindicate some claim to *τέχνη* for the graphic, plastic, and 'hypocritical' arts, against Plato. Plato had had hard things to say about the indiscriminate mimicking of all possible human and natural phenomena by actors and reciters⁷⁹—which incidentally lends point to Aristotle's *πολλὰ μιμοῦνται*—and in developing his hierarchy of makers and imitators in *Republic* 10, in which the painter (along with the poet) comes to rest at the bottom, "three removes from reality," was led to deny that the painter knew how to do anything but represent appearances: in other words, that he was really an artist at all.⁸⁰ Such Olympian scorn blurred the distinctions of real life: Phidias and the humblest stone-cutter stood together as "mere imitators." Aristotle perhaps felt that

reflection on the latter's lack of art: he 'imitated' his roles like an ape, i.e., by nature or habit, not *τέχνη*.

⁷⁶ G. M. A. Richter, *The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks*², New Haven, 1950, 248-249; Ch. Picard, *Manuel d'archéologie grecque*, 2. 1, Paris, 1939, 258-262, 279-281, 285-286. Cf. the monograph by Ictinus on the Parthenon (Vitruv. 7 pref. 12), and Sophocles' (Aristotle's ideal of *τέχνη*!) book on the chorus (Suidas s.v. Σοφοκλής). It is curious, possibly significant, that we hear of no such work from a painter: Agatharchus' monograph on scene-painting (Vitruv. *ibid.* 11) must have been a technical treatise on perspective and such matters, like those of Democritus and Anaxagoras mentioned in the same passage of Vitruvius (Democritus also wrote *On Painting*: Diog. Laert. 9. 48).

⁷⁷ H. Brunn, *Geschichte der griechischen Künstler*², Leipzig, 1888-89, 1. 163, 216; 2. 178.

⁷⁸ Aristotle is Platonic enough to retain Plato's conviction that *ἐμπειρία* becomes *τέχνη* only when it attains a clear consciousness of its own guiding principles. Art is a *rational* capacity for production, *E. N.* 6. 4. 1140a4.

⁷⁹ *Rep.* 3. 395e-396b, 397a.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 598b-d, 601c ff. He does not even have true opinion about the object that he paints, as the maker of the material reins or bit does, 602a; Plato concludes, 602b, that *μίμησις* is "a form of play, not to be taken seriously" (Cornford). That means that it is not an art at all.

if his analogy was to carry any weight at all it had to be guarded against Plato's implicit denial of *τέχνη* to the mimetic arts.

It is tempting to extend the boundaries of *χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι μιμοῦνται* still farther, to include not only painters and sculptors but dancers, pantomimes, and the like, who also imitated "many things" with the colors of their costumes and the postures (*σχήματα*)⁸¹ of their bodies. The first objection to this, that dancing is mentioned below (a26-28), among the poetic-musical arts, may not necessarily hold, since we shall see that that passage is open to suspicion. Nor would it be cogent to say that a Greek would not have spoken of dancing, painting, and sculpture in the same breath. The connection between dancing and sculpture in particular was so close that Lucian (*On Dancing*, 35) makes the dancer imitate the grace of paintings and statues, while Athenaeus on the other hand says that the classical statues could be called "relics of the ancient dance."⁸² In a curious passage in the *Laws*,⁸³ in the middle of his discussion of *χορεία*, Plato shows essentially the same attitude. He attributes the excellence and marvelous stability of Egyptian art to the preservation of the right models in the temples, which the painters and "all others who produce shapes (*σχήματα*) and likenesses"⁸⁴ are bound to follow. This certainly includes the sculptors and probably also the poets and musicians, and the whole passage is on the theme "correct imitation of moral states through *χορεία*:" Egypt is a model for the proper integral relation of the arts to one

⁸¹ *Σχήματα* is notoriously a technical term in Greek dancing: e.g., *passim* in *Laws* 2. 654e-672e, in Plato's discussion of *χορεία*; *ibid.*, 7. 815e-816a; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 9. 15, p. 748; see L. B. Lawler, *TAPA* 85 (1954) 150-155, 158. In Xenophon, *Symposium*, 2. 15-19, Socrates is represented as an *aficionado* of the dance; he would like the Syracusan who is master of the little troupe of dancers and entertainers to teach him the *σχήματα* he has just been witnessing.

⁸² Athen. 14. 629b. The remark very probably stems or derives from Aristoxenus: its sense is ethical (cf. the following lines), in fact very close to that of the passage from the *Laws* cited just below (next note), and there are a number of explicit quotations from him in the preceding and immediately following pages. If so it comes from his *II. χορῶν* or *II. τραγικῆς ἀρχαίαιος* (most of the extant fragments of the work—or works—are from this book of Athenaeus: see F. Wehrli, *Aristoxenos* [*Die Schule des Aristoteles*, 2], Basel, 1945, frags. 103-112, pp. 34-36). Cf. Aristides Quintilianus, *De Mus.* 2. 10, p. 86 Meibom (p. 53, 10 Jahn).

⁸³ 656d-657b.

⁸⁴ *ὅποι' ἄρτα* MSS; Apelt proposed *ὁμοιώματα*, which seems necessary if the *μέλη*, which were mentioned just above, are to be included: see E. B. England, *The Laws of Plato*, Manchester, 1921, 1. 286. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* 8. 5. 1340a18-21: rhythms and songs have to a special degree *ὁμοιώματα* of moral states.

another. Thus Aristotle would have had warrant in his own day for positing a close connection between dancing and the graphic and plastic arts. Moreover dancing and pantomime were already highly, not to say startlingly, mimetic in his time;⁸⁵ and we must add the indications of a high development of pantomimic ability on the part of the ordinary wandering *θαυματοποιοί*, the jugglers and conjurers, who were already popular entertainers in Athens.⁸⁶ Plato mentions their booths and their tricks,⁸⁷ and takes special delight in diagnosing the sophist as one of them⁸⁸ (which at least pays a tribute to their skill).⁸⁹

Here too—considering the mimetic gifts of the normal Greek and the teeming occasions for mimicry in Greek social and religious life, at the festivals, at banquets, in the *κῶμος*, etc., etc.—one could easily add to the professional artist (*διὰ τέχνης*) the citizen-amateur (*διὰ συνηθείας*). By the same token the choreutae of the drama might be drawn within the ambit of Aristotle's comparison, to match their professional brethren the actors. But such extensions of the analogy, tempting though they are, have no direct warrant in the sentence and

⁸⁵ Cf. Plato, *Laws* 7. 815a-816a, where imitation is described as the main business of all kinds of dancing and is even said (816a) to have produced the entire art of the dance; Xenophon, *Symp.* 8, where Callias' party ends with a kind of erotic ballet (Dionysus and Ariadne) so overpoweringly realistic that the bachelors present swear they will get married at once, while the married men leap to horse and gallop home to their wives. The old notion that 'pantomime' was invented in Rome by Bathyllus and Pylades in A.D. 22 (Athen. 1. 20d) has been exploded. On the contrary, its roots go back to the earliest phases of Greek culture: see F. Weege, *Der Tanz in der Antike*, Halle/Saale, 1926, 104-105, 155-157; L. Robert, *Hermes* 65 (1930) 109-110; E. Wüst, *PW* 18. 2. 834, s.v. 'Pantomimus.'

⁸⁶ Aristotle knew them: see his reference, fr. 83 Rose, to people who spent all day at the jugglers' shows, and cf. the (not Aristotelian, but early Peripatetic) *Oeconomica*, 2. 1346b21, and the *Problems*, 18. 6. 917a8.

⁸⁷ *Rep.* 7. 514b, in the Cave-parable, which in fact represents a kind of conjurer's or puppet show, so far as the underground arrangements are concerned; *ibid.*, 10. 602d; *Laws* 2. 658b-c, where the jugglers are part of the company of showmen who may be expected to turn up at a festival. Here their presentations are mentioned directly alongside those of tragedy, comedy, and epic, hence are surely dramatic. They will be greeted with delight by the children: a Greek Punch and Judy.

⁸⁸ *Soph.* 235b (cf. *ibid.* a, γοήτων ... τῆς), 268d. The generic point in common between sophist and *θαυματοποιός* is that they are both imitators.

⁸⁹ On the jugglers, clowns, and kindred gentry, and their conscious professionalism, see Allardyce Nicoll, *Masks Mimes and Miracles*, New York and London, 1930 (1931), pp. 35-36; Hugo Blümner, "Fahrendes Volk im Altertum," *Sitzungsber.* Munich 1918, no. 6.

probably should be put aside.⁹⁰ It is enough to have defined the "imitators with the voice" and established the distinction between them and the practitioners with form and color.

Why has this simple and natural interpretation of *διὰ τῆς φωνῆς* not been put forward before and generally accepted? Undoubtedly because of the presence of *λόγος* on the other side of the comparison, which seemed to make it necessary to find a meaning for *φωνή* which would avoid a conflict or an overlapping of the two concepts. But there is no real conflict and only an apparent overlapping. *Φωνή* is the vehicle of *λόγος* (or also of *μέλος*), but it is not the same thing. 'Voice' is a noise which signifies something, hence animals have it as well as men; but they do not have *λόγος*, because *λόγος* serves for the communication of specifically human (that is rational) ideas such as justice and injustice.⁹¹ In men *φωνή* is the carrier of *λόγος*, the physical or material mechanism by which *λόγος* is uttered.⁹² By the same token it is on a different level from *λόγος*, for *λόγος* is properly an event in the soul, not the body.⁹³ Moreover—and this is still more

⁹⁰ One passage in Plato's *Sophist* is so close to our sentence in wording as to make the temptation very strong: 267a, *ἔταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμα τίς τῶ ἐαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωτὴν φωνῆ φαίνεσθαι ποιῆ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληται πον.* In saying that this procedure particularly deserves the name *μίμησις*, Plato is clearly thinking of the kind of 'imitation' he had discussed in *Rep.* 3. 392d ff., viz., dramatic impersonation. But there seems to be no direct road across from this passage to ours.

⁹¹ *De Anima* 2. 8. 420b29, *οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῶον ψόφος φωνή, ... ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐμφυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τέπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σηματοτικός γὰρ δὴ τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἢ φωνή; Pol.* 1. 2. 1253a9-15, *λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῶων. ἢ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις ... ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.* The examples cited by Tkatsch, 2. 99b, to prove that *φωνή* can denote mechanical sounds such as the "voice of the flute," are from spurious (i.e., later Peripatetic) works (*De Audibilibus; Problems* 19) or dubious passages (*Hist. An.* 2. 1. 501a32: cf. *Aristoteles Tierkunde*, ed. Aubert-Wimmer, Leipzig, 1868, *ad loc.*). See *De Anima* 2. 8. 420b5, *τῶν γὰρ ἀγύχων οὐθέν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα* (i.e., metaphorically) *λέγεται φωνεῖν, οἶον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα κτλ.* On Aristotle's view of language see Ch. Steinthal, *Gesch. d. Sprachwiss. bei den Griechen u. Römern*, Berlin, 1863, 181-265 (on *φωνή*, 247-254); R. McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of Language," *CP* 41 (1946) 193-206, 42 (1947) 21-50 (reprinted in *Critics and Criticism*, ed. R. S. Crane, Chicago, 1952, 176-231).

⁹² On the mechanism, *De Anima*, *loc. cit.* (2. 8. 420b5-421a6); cf. *De Gen. An.* 5. 7. 786b21, *τοῦ δὲ λόγον ἔλθην ... τὴν φωνήν.*

⁹³ In origin, of course, this is a Platonic doctrine: cf., e.g., *Phaedrus* 276e, the

pertinent to our purpose here—*λόγος* can be embodied in writing as well as in 'voice.' Aristotle did not share Plato's well-known scorn for writing in comparison with speech.⁹⁴ On the contrary, as we shall see repeatedly in the *Poetics* itself, he insists that what the poet writes can be judged just as well as it is, through reading, as through hearing the words spoken. The poetic *λόγος*, then, is something prior to and essentially independent of the voice; being recited is accidental to it. Hence in considering the art of poetry we shall be considering *λόγος* in its 'prior' sense, as *the text shaped by the poet*, antecedent to any recitation or performance. Conversely, although the rhapsode or actor may project the poet's words, in his own character and function he stands here with the painters and sculptors, as a practitioner in a directly sensuous medium: the artist of the voice.

Aristotle describes the graphic and plastic imitators as making "images" or portraits of their objects: *ἀπεικάζοντες*.⁹⁵ Can this be said of the actor or the rhapsode also?⁹⁶ Yes, presumably; they produce an image in sound just as directly as the painter produces one in colors and forms. Plato gives the actors of his day the best certificate for "orthophonic" realism,⁹⁷ just as he is never weary of insisting how minutely the painters try to reproduce the exact look of their subject.⁹⁸ Plato himself occasionally applies *ἀπεικασία* to music and

planting of *λόγοι* in the soul. *Λόγος* as the dialogue of the soul with itself, *Theaet.* 189e; on the problems this raises and Plato's attempts to solve the relation between *λόγος*, *διάνοια*, and *δόξα* see J. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, Oxford, 1940, 113-119 and ff. Aristotle does not retain the specific idea of an internal dialogue (even for Plato it was only a stopping-point or tentative solution in his search for a definition of thought). But he remains faithful to the conviction that thought is inward, of the soul; the enormous range and extension of the meanings of *λόγος* in his terminology (definition, notion, concept, reasoning, argument, etc., etc.) is based on it. Cf. *Anal. Post.* 1. 10. 76b24, *οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.*

⁹⁴ *Phaedrus* 277d ff.

⁹⁵ It is a mistake to pass over *ἀπεικάζοντες*, as most of the translators and interpreters do, or to take it simply as a doublet of *μιμῶνται* (e.g., "imitate and represent," Butcher). The word is a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* in Aristotle, according to Bonitz, *Index*, and presumably is used here for a special purpose.

⁹⁶ We said above, p. 19, that all the qualifications of the first clause, except *χρῶμασι καὶ σχήμασι*, are to be understood with *ἕτεροι δὲ κτλ.* as well.

⁹⁷ *Rep.* 3, cited above, n. 79.

⁹⁸ *Esp. Rep.* 10. 598b, *σμικρὸν τι ἐκάστου ἐφάπτεται, καὶ τοῦτο εἰδῶλον [= εἰκὼν].*

poetry in his last works,⁹⁹ but normally limits it to portraiture or the production of visual images,¹⁰⁰ or uses it in the common extended sense of 'image, comparison, metaphor.' If, however, one surveys the whole word-family *εἰκέναι, εἰκόν, εἰκάζειν, εἰκαστική*, and related terms like *εἶδωλον*, it becomes apparent that in Plato's usage they cover a vast range of relationships, only some of which are directly visual: physical object and shadow or reflection (in glass or water),¹⁰¹ object and portrait (picture or statue),¹⁰² ideal (Idea) and realization (in any concrete form),¹⁰³ concept and name,¹⁰⁴ speech and writing,¹⁰⁵ meaning and 'likeness' (simile, metaphor, parable, comparison),¹⁰⁶ or a com-

⁹⁹ E.g., *Laws* 2. 668b-c: all poems are *μίμησις τε καὶ ἀπεικασία*; but cf. below, d: *εἶσιν δὲ ποῦ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἡμῖν ἀπεικασίαι μυρίαί*; *Crit.* 107b, *μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπεικασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ἐξηθέντα χρεῶν που γενέσθαι*; but cf. *ibid.*, d, *σώματα ἀπεικάζειν*; e, *θνητὰ ἀπεικάζειν*.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., *Crat.* 432b, and examples in previous note.

¹⁰¹ Normally called *εἰκόν*, *Phaedo* 99d; *Rep.* 6. 510a, e; *Soph.* 240b; *εἶδωλον*, *ibid.*, 239d. A word like *ἀπεικάζειν*, implying the *making* of an image, might not seem appropriate in such a context; but the Sophist is an *εἰδωλοποιός*, a maker of (unreal or deceitful) images, *ibid.* Similarly in the *Republic*, 7. 515a ff. (parable of the Cave), a conscious production of images—i.e., shadows—is posited, and cf. 10. 596d: anybody can be his own image-'maker' by turning a mirror this way and that. The whole spirit of Plato's image-reality pattern is such that one sense passes into another and often defies classification.

¹⁰² *Εἰκόν*, *Crat.* 432b; *Rep.* 3. 401b; *Laws* 2. 655b; *εἰδέξω*, *Crat.* *loc. cit.*; *εἰκαστική*, *Soph.* 236b, 264c, 266d (in the *Sophist* *εἰκαστική* is given the special meaning, as distinguished from *φανταστική*, of an art which reproduces its original truly; but this is not maintained in other dialogues and belongs to the tentative, "for-instance" character of the *διαίρεσεις* in the *Sophist*).

¹⁰³ *Εἰκόνες* of the virtues, *Rep.* 3. 402c (*ibid.*, 401b, the poet is to "build the image [*εἰκόνα*] of the good character into his poems"); *Phaedr.* 250b (cf. *εἰκασθέντος, ὁμοιώμασιν*, *ibid.*). *Εἰκάζειν* of the relation of Thing to Idea, *Parm.* 132d (also *εἰκόν, εἰκε, ὅμοιον, ὁμοίωμα, ἀφομοιοῦσθαι*); *Tim.* 29b, 92c (the created universe an *εἰκόν* of the Ideas; cf. *ἀγάλμα*, 27c; the Demurge's activity an *ἀπεικάζειν*, 29b, 39e), 38d (Time the moving *εἰκόν* of eternity). This is in fact the late, 'paradigmatic' conception of the relation of Ideas to things: Sir David Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford, 1951, 228-230, gives a collection of examples. The same notion is operative in passages where our terms do not happen to appear, e.g., *Rep.* 6. 500e ff.

¹⁰⁴ This locution abounds in the *Cratylus*, e.g., 402d, 414a, 419c, d, 420d, e, 421b, 426e, and esp. 431d, 432b. Whether Plato accepted the onomatopoeic theory of language does not affect the usage as such.

¹⁰⁵ *Phaedr.* 276a, *τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον...*, *οὗ δ' γεγραμμένος εἶδωλον ἂν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως*; cf. *Ar. De Interp.* 1. 1. 16a3.

¹⁰⁶ *Ἀπεικάζειν*, *Phaedo* 92b (soul ~ lyre); *Symp.* 221c, d (Socrates ~ a silen

bination of two or more of these.¹⁰⁷ Plato's preoccupation with images—the visual slant of his imagination¹⁰⁸—is so pronounced as to amount almost to an obsession. More and more, in his later years, he tended to see the relation of Being to Becoming, or of the One to the Many, as that of original to image or copy: the world itself as a work of art fashioned by the divine artist (*Timaeus*), the lawgiver as poet of the "true tragedy"¹⁰⁹—*alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis*. It is only to be expected, then, that Plato regards poetry and music also as makers of images.¹¹⁰

Aristotle inherited his master's problems and some of his attitudes, but he did not, so far as I can see, inherit this special tendency to 'imagistic' thinking—or the special problems which it created for Plato himself. In particular, there is no evidence that Aristotle regarded poems as images or the poet as an image-maker. It can hardly be an accident that *ἀπεικάζειν* appears only here, in direct connection with the visual and vocal arts, and that neither *εἰκών* nor any word like it is ever used in the *Poetics* to describe any aspect of the poet's work.¹¹¹ In the *De Memoria*, 1. 450b20-25, it is suggested that a memory image is a picture (*εἰκών*), i.e., a reproduction of the thing originally seen; but that has nothing directly to do with poetry. Again, in a famous

or satyr), *Laws* 10. 898b (thought ~ sphere; cf. *εἰκόνων*, *ibid.*). *Εἰκάζειν*, *Phaedo* 99e (*λόγοι* ~ reflections); *Meno* 80c (Socrates ~ the sting-ray); *Rep.* 6. 488a (the 'Ship'; cf. *εἰκόν*, *ibid.*). *Εἰκόν* also *Rep.* 9. 588b-c (the tyrant ~ a monster); *Laws* 1. 644c. This usage remains or becomes standard in rhetoric: cf. *Ar. Rhet.* 3. 4. 1406b-1407a14 on the *εἰκών*, its uses, and the distinction between it and metaphor.

¹⁰⁷ As was pointed out above, the various meanings tend to pass into each other. It will suffice here to remind the reader that the parables of the Divided Line and the Cave, in the *Republic*, are built upon the basic dualism of shadow, or image, and real object; that at each stage what was a real thing in relation to the level below it becomes an image in relation to the level next above (see esp. 6. 510b); and that the whole figure is itself only an image (*7 init.*, *ἀπεικάζουσιν*: "construct the following image in your mind").

¹⁰⁸ See J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford, 1909, Part II ("The Doctrine of Ideas as Expressing Aesthetic Experience"), esp. 140-151, 166-172.

¹⁰⁹ *Laws* 7. 817b.

¹¹⁰ *Laws* 2. 669a, *περὶ ἐκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ*; *ibid.*, b (the whole passage 668d ff. is significant).

¹¹¹ *Εἰκών* is limited to its literal or primary sense, i.e., pictures or statues (*portraits*): 4. 48b11, 15; 6. 50b3; *εἰκάζειν* is used of painting only, 2. 48a6; and the *εἰκονογράφοι* are portrait-painters, 15. 54b9 (cf. *Theophr. Char.* 2. 12). *Εἰκονοποιός*, 25. 60b9, seems an exception.

passage of the *Politics* we are told that rhythms and melodies have in them to a special degree 'likenesses,' *ὁμοιώματα*, of moral and emotional states.¹¹² But a likeness is not an image, at least for Aristotle; and indeed it is obvious that a melody or a rhythm cannot be a *picture* of courage or anger in any direct sense.¹¹³ In the *Poetics*, where imitation is a representation of universals, it is doubly clear that there be no question of direct 'images'; and in any case the heart and soul of the poetic imitation is the plot, while music stands next to the bottom in the list of its 'parts.'

The indicated conclusion from all this evidence is that *ἀπεικάζοντες* in our passage is intended to denote a specific trait, and thereby a limitation, of the arts of form, color, and voice as against those of music and 'the word.'¹¹⁴ The limitation does not exclude an analogy between the two realms; it does exclude any identification of them. We shall see that the poetic media, in particular the *λόγος*, are implicitly thought of as standing on a higher level than the sensory.

To sum up: Aristotle's analogy covers a broad range of activities, some artistic, some not, but all involving direct reproduction of the sensory qualities of the thing imitated. Actual colors and shapes are reproduced by painted colors and drawn or carved shapes; the voice is mimicked by the voice. In the musical-poetic arts we shall not expect to find this direct relationship; 'imitation' will necessarily be something less literal. We shall, however, expect to find in the musical-poetic realm something comparable to the distinction between colors-shapes on the one hand and voice on the other; for that distinction was

¹¹² *Pol.* 8. 5. 1340a18-20; cf. *ibid.*, 29, 39 (*μιμήματα*); *E. N.* 8. 12. 1160b22; 10. 8. 1178b27.

¹¹³ Butcher's summary is wrong: "It [sc. music] is a direct image, a copy of character" (*Aristotle's Theory*, 129). So also Ernest Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Oxford, 1946, 343: "images of states of character." The error goes back to Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 2. 145-155 (section entitled "Die Kunstwerke sind Ebenbilder der in der Phantasie gegebenen Wirklichkeit"). Actually the relation is one of analogy: the motions of the soul have a kinship with those of music, *Pol.* 8. 6. 1340b17, so that it is moved in a manner *corresponding* to the original states of which the song is an 'imitation.' — The distinction between *ὁμοιώματα* and *εἰκόν* is underlined, not undermined, by *Pol.*, *loc. cit.* 25-27, where *εἰκόνα* denotes strictly and only a picture or statue, as usual.

¹¹⁴ Tkatsch, 2. 100a, correctly observes that there is no break after *τέχναις*. Hence the construction of the *ὥστερ*-clause does not carry over to the main clause and one is *not* to understand *ἀπεικάζοντες* (any more than *οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας*) with *ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν*, a21.

after all the main point of Aristotle's analogy (*ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ~ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμῆσθαι*).

As we push on to the main sentence, a21 ff., we do not at first glance find such a clean distinction. Instead the text offers us a multiplicity of media and combinations of media: melody and rhythm (instrumental music), rhythm alone (dancing), speech and rhythm (*λόγοι* and *μέτρα*), and, at some distance (47b24-29), all three media combined in different ways (lyric and drama). This apparent discrepancy deserves close attention.

It had better be said at once that a21 (*οὕτω κἄν*) - b9 (*μέχρι τοῦ κἄν*) is one symmetrical sentence and that the key to the difficulty is given by its structure: *ἅπασαι μὲν...*, *τούτοις δ'...*, *οἷον ἁρμονία μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῶ χρώμεναι μόνον...*, *ἢ δὲ μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις*. Our first business will be to establish the existence of this symmetry, which has been obscured by intrusions and textual corruptions in a26-28, a29, and b9; and for this purpose we shall have to begin at the end of the sentence and work backward.

Überweg's athetesis of *ἐποποιία* in a29, and Bernays' brilliant restoration of *ἀνώνυμος* in b9, have been almost universally accepted, especially since the Arabic version was found to confirm them both.¹¹⁵ As to the construction of the passage, however, most of the modern editors assume—without argument, so far as I can see—that *ἢ δέ* is the beginning of a new sentence.¹¹⁶ Coördinate with this, whether as cause or effect, is the general acceptance of Suckow's emendation *τυγχάνω<ει> οὔσα* in b9, which is necessary in order to give the new sentence a verb. *Τυγχάνουσα* is, however, the unanimous reading of the manuscripts, including apparently the Arabic version,¹¹⁷ and should not be

¹¹⁵ See Tkatsch 2. 155-157; Gudeman *ad loc.* On S. M. Pitcher's attempt to save *ἐποποιία* by making it mean 'verbal composition' (*Worldichtung*) in general, and its refutation by Householder, see above, n. 45. But Pitcher was quite correct in maintaining that the structure of the passage is bilateral. Vahlen too defended *ἐποποιία* pertinaciously, even at the end of his life: *Sitzungsber.* Berlin, 1910, 958-959 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 2. 849-850).

¹¹⁶ So Bywater, Rostagni, Hardy, Gudeman, Sykutris. Butcher prints a semicolon before *ἢ δέ* in the Greek text, but begins a new sentence, in fact a new paragraph, here in his translation. — For a grammatical interpretation of the sentence which is very close to mine see C. Gallavotti, *Riv. di Fil.* N. S. 8 (1930) 75.

¹¹⁷ "*Quae est sine appellatione*," Tkatsch; see *ibid.*, 1. 166a, on the frequency of such relative clauses in the translation, as a rendering of Greek participles. Tkatsch himself (2. 158) would retain *τυγχάνουσα*, arguing that *μιμῆται* can be mentally supplied with *ἢ δέ* from *μιμῆται ... ἢ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* in a26, with *τυγχάνουσα* as

cast aside unless necessity requires it. Not only textual conservatism but a consideration of Aristotle's argument speaks for its retention; for the namelessness of the art in question, much though he dwells on it in the following lines, cannot be the main point of his sentence. The main point has to do with the media which the art employs, and the distinction which this constitutes between it and other musical and poetic arts.

Actually we do not need to put a new main verb into the text, nor to supply one (*μιμείται*) from the immediately preceding lines (a26-28). The clause is an integral part of the sentence which began at a21, and its construction is indicated by *ἁρμονία μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῶν χρωμαί μόνον...*, a23; after which *ἢ δὲ μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς* (sc. *χρωμένῃ*; cf. *χρωμένῃ*, b8) *ἢ τοῖς μέτροις κτλ.* follows in parallel. In short, *ἢ δὲ μόνον κτλ.* depends on *ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν*, a21-22, in exactly the same way as *ἁρμονία μὲν κτλ.*: the two clauses describe two arts or groups of arts which "make their imitation" in different media. *Τυγχάνουσα* then is a further dependent participle, like *μινῦσα* and *χρωμένη* before it: "happening (to be) nameless up to now."¹¹⁸ The parallel in construction is clinched by *μόνον*, which has precisely the same emphatic function in both places: auletic and kitharistic, etc., use *only* melody and rhythm—i.e., not speech—and the other, nameless art uses *only* speech (and rhythm)¹¹⁹—i.e., not melody.

The symmetry goes farther. In a23 the emphasized word is *ἁρμονία*, followed by *μὲν*; in a29 it is *λόγοις*, which would stand in corresponding position if Aristotle had a name for the "nameless" art: *τοῖς δὲ λόγοις μόνον... ἢ δεῖνα...* The two clauses mark the use of *melody* and the use of *speech* as the specific *differentia* between the two arts or groups of arts. In the second clause, to make this confrontation doubly clear, Aristotle reinforces *μόνον τοῖς λόγοις* by *ψιλοῖς*; and this word too is predicative, like *μόνον*, not attributive as most of the interpreters

an ellipsis in the main clause. Menardos-Sykutris appear to interpret the construction in the same way: their translation runs *Ἡ δὲ ἄλλη (μιμείται) μόνον κτλ.*

¹¹⁸ *Τυγχάνουσα*, with ellipsis of *εἶναι*, is perfectly acceptable. Ellipsis of participles of *εἶναι* is common in Aristotle even with finite forms of *τυγχάνω* (Bonitz, *Index* 778b4-11), and all the more natural when the full form would be a jingle like *τυγχάνουσα οὔσα*. — Or, if Aristotle did by chance write the double participle, the omission of *οὔσα* in copying would be particularly easy.

¹¹⁹ See below, n. 126.

and translators make it.¹²⁰ *Ἡ δὲ μόνον τοῖς λόγοις φιλοῖς (χρωμένη),* "while the other (makes its imitation) (using) only λόγοι, bare"—i.e., without music.¹²¹ (*Ψιλοῖς* is to be understood with μέτροις also: verses too can be employed with melody, as in the dithyramb, or without, as in the epic.)¹²²

Thus the instrumental arts and the nameless art are set over against each other: the arts which use melody but not speech over against the art which uses speech or verse but not melody. It springs to the eye that this is an exemplification of the principle stated in a22-23, *τούτοις δὲ χωρίζε;* for we could well define the instrumental arts as those which use melody and rhythm *χωρὶς λόγον* and the nameless art as the one that uses speech or verse *χωρὶς ἀρμονίας*.¹²³ But it might be argued that both classes fall instead under the heading *μεμιγμένοις* (instrumental music = melody and rhythm "mixed," nameless art = speech and rhythm "mixed"). We must take a closer look at Aristotle's division and this time include rhythm in the reckoning.

Ἀπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῶ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις. It looks at first glance as though each of the three media could be employed alone, *χωρὶς*, then mixtures of two each, and finally a mixture of all three. The scheme would be:

1. *χωρὶς*
 - a. rhythm alone
 - b. speech alone
 - c. melody alone
2. *μεμιγμένοις*, by twos
 - a. rhythm - speech
 - b. rhythm - melody
 - c. speech - melody
3. *μεμιγμένοις*, all three: rhythm-speech-melody.

¹²⁰ Rostagni, "la nuda parola"; Menardos-Sykutris, *μέ τούς ἀπλοῦς λόγους*; Gomperz, "der blossen ... Rede." But the predicate position of *φιλοῖς* leaves no doubt about the matter, especially as we have seen that we are to supply *χρωμένη*. Bywater has it correctly: "by language alone, without harmony."

¹²¹ For the meaning of *φιλοῖς* cf. Pl. *Laws* 2. 669d, *διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρὶς, λόγους φιλοῦς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες*; *Phaedr.* 278c, *ποίησιν φιλήν ἢ ἐν ᾧδῃ*; *Menex.* 239c; *Ar. Pol.* 8. 5. 1339b20, *μουσικὴν ... καὶ φιλήν οὔσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας*.

¹²² See below, p. 38.

¹²³ *Μόνον*, a24, = *χωρὶς λόγον*; *μόνον ... φιλοῖς*, a29, = *χωρὶς ἀρμονίας*.

But although this tidy scheme is attractive at first glance,¹²⁴ it is completely arbitrary and has nothing to do with either the facts of Greek music and poetry or Aristotle's classification here.¹²⁵ *Categories 1b, 1c, and 2c, that is, the modes which lack rhythm, did not exist in Greek art-forms and have no place in Aristotle's scheme.¹²⁶ Rhythm is used by all the poetic-musical arts. Hence *χωρίς* is useless if we try to apply it to melody or speech alone, and one is forced to ask whether Aristotle was not aware of this elementary fact or whether he meant something else by the word.*

I believe that careful reading of a23 will show that he did indeed mean something else. In the list of the three media *ῥυθμῶ* stands first. On the other hand, when Aristotle begins his dichotomy (at *οἶον*), *ἁρμονία* comes first, and is the word specially qualified by *μόνον*—just as in a29 *μόνον* points specially to *λόγοις*. Is it not evident that *μόνον* here has taken the place of *χωρίς*?¹²⁷ If so, *χωρίς* was meant to begin with in the sense that melody and speech could appear *without each other*, but not in the sense that either could appear without rhythm.¹²⁸ *Μεμιγμένοις* would then refer, not to the combina-

¹²⁴ Montmollin offers it, in somewhat different form, pp. 16-17 (cf. n. 19, p. 273); but in order to make it fit the *Poetics* he has to insist that the *λόγοι ψιλοί* of a29 are not only without melody but without rhythm, which flies in the face of everything we know about Greek artistic prose: see F. Blass, *Die Rhythmen der attischen Kunstprosa*, Leipzig, 1901, esp. 9-14, 18-19.

¹²⁵ Aristides Quintilianus presents it, 1. 13, p. 32 Meibom (p. 21 Jahn), but under the rubric *ῥυθμική*, not as a general scheme of classification for the poetic and musical arts. He fills up the list of seven categories with some highly abstract and irrelevant examples: scales (*διαγράμματα*) and vocalizings (*ἄτακτοι μελωδίαι*) for melody alone, *κεχτυμένα ᾠσματα* (songs of Oriental origin? see R. Schäfke, *Ar. Quint. Von der Musik*, Berlin, 1937, 211 n. 6) for speech and melody without rhythm. The general scheme of the passage (the three carriers of rhythm: speech, melody, and bodily movement) comes from Aristoxenus; whether the details do also is another question. The whole problem of the relation of Aristoxenus to Aristotle in this matter deserves further investigation.

¹²⁶ Even prose is rhythmical. *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b30 demands that artistic speech have rhythm, though not regular meter. But speech not only should have rhythm, it does have it. *Poet.* 4. 49a24-28: the trimeter was adopted finally in tragedy because it is nearest to the natural speech-rhythm, which is iambic; cf. *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b32. On the native iambic character of Greek see Schmid 1. 1. 45, 337.

¹²⁷ See above, n. 123.

¹²⁸ *Τούτοις*, then, refers to the second and third members of the triad, not to all three. Cf. a29-b8, where *τούτοις* refers to *μέτροις* only (= "the latter").

tions melody-rhythm and speech-rhythm—in which the rhythmical element is ignored or unemphasized and attention is centered on the antithesis between melody and speech—but solely to the “mixture” of the two elements, melody and speech (47b24 ff., where again rhythm as such does not constitute a separate, ‘species-making’ criterion).

Thus our revised scheme will look like this:

1. *χωρίς*
 - a. rhythm only
 - b. melody and rhythm only
 - c. speech and rhythm only
2. *μεμιγμένοις*—speech, melody, and rhythm.

So far, in tracing the structure and argument of the passage, we have ignored the section on dancing, a26-28. Vahlen¹²⁹ was struck by the fact that dancing was not mentioned in the original list of mimetic arts, a14-16, and thought that a26-28 was a later addition by Aristotle. Montmollin¹³⁰ disputes this on the ground that (1) dancing *is* mentioned in 2. 48a9, with an implied reference to the present passage, and (2) it is required by Aristotle’s over-all scheme, which calls for each of the three media to appear separately (*χωρίς*) and in combination. We have already seen what this second argument amounts to: there is no such arbitrary scheme, and Aristotle does not in fact report a separate activity for each of the other two media. Hence the separate listing for rhythm is anomalous, strictly speaking, and an objection to the passage, if based on other grounds, could still be entertained. (We will discuss Montmollin’s other argument, based on chapter 2, in a moment.)

Certainly there are objections, and serious ones. First, textual difficulties. The *μιμοῦνται ... οἱ* of the manuscripts cannot possibly be right—that is, cannot have been written by Aristotle—and *μιμεῖται... ἡ* (Parisinus 2038)¹³¹ is not really any better. Either verb estab-

¹²⁹ *Beiträge* 3, 6 (l. 267, 270-271).

¹³⁰ *Loc. cit.*

¹³¹ There is no reason to consider these readings anything but emendations. Parisinus 2038 is already a humanist MS (15th cent.) and has other emendations, e.g., *καὶ δ.* 3. 48a25 (*om. cell.*). On the character of its text (i.e., its freedom in conjecture and emendation) see Bywater xli-xliv. The Arabic version has something which Tkatsch renders by *usurpat*. Tkatsch himself, 2. 101a, insists that this represents *μιμεῖται*, which—he claims—is thereby legitimated as the reading of Σ; but it is at least as likely to be a gloss suggested by *χρῶμεναι* above. See G. Bergsträsser, rev. of Tkatsch’s first volume, *Der Islam* 20 (1932) 52.

lishes a new construction, breaking through Aristotle's chain of principles (*χρώμεναι*, [*χρωμένη*], *μυγνῦσα*, *χρωμένη*, *τυγχάνουσα*) and thereby stamping the whole of a26-28 as foreign to the original text. If on the other hand we suppress the verb altogether, as several recent editors have done, the construction appears to be healed¹³³ but the real inconsistency remains: dancing stands between two arts or groups of arts which are intended as opposites, without having any strict relation to either. In a mere list it might have its place; but Aristotle is not giving us a list but an antithesis.

The appearance of dancing here is anomalous in still another way. When Aristotle speaks of auletic and kitharistic as using melody and rhythm alone, without speech, he is thinking of solos on the respective instruments (auletic and kitharistic *nómos*),¹³⁴ not of their use for accompaniments in dithyramb, kitharodic and aulodic *nómos*, and drama (these fall under the 'mixed' species, 47b24 ff.); just as the "nameless" art is an art that actually employs speech (and rhythm) alone, without music, and not merely a component of the more elaborate arts which use both. Similarly dancing ought to be meant here as dancing *alone*, without any music; and indeed that seems to be the intent of *ἀὐτῷ τῷ ῥυθμῷ χωρὶς ἀρμονίας*. But was there such a form of dancing in Aristotle's time, a *ψιλλὴ ὄρχησις*¹³⁵ without any musical accompaniment? It is extremely doubtful;¹³⁶ normally, at any rate, music and dancing went together, so that it becomes very uncertain what *χωρὶς ἀρμονίας* means.¹³⁶

It is not clear just what *ἀὐτῷ τῷ ῥυθμῷ* means either. Certainly rhythm in dancing is not simply identical with rhythm in verse or music, so that it could be found by reduction (stripping away the

¹³³ We can supply *χρωμένη*, as we have done in a29.

¹³⁴ H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, London, 1900, lxi-lxli.

¹³⁵ The phrase is from Libanius, *Orat.* 64. 58, but is used by him simply to distinguish orchestric from moral questions.

¹³⁶ See E. Wüst, PW 18. 2. 854, s.v. 'Pantomimus.' Lucian, *De Salt.* 63, tells of the dancer who danced the whole tale of Ares and Aphrodite without accompaniment, to convince a skeptic that his art did not depend on flutes, pipes, and cymbals (cf. Liban. *op. cit.* 113). Obviously the point of the story depends on the stunt being unusual. In the "ballet" of Dionysius and Ariadne in Xenophon's *Symposium* (see above, n. 85) there was flute music.

¹³⁶ See R. Westphal, *Aristoxenus von Tarent: Melik und Rhythmik*, 1, Leipzig, 1883, 8: "Orchestik ohne Musik kann immer nur eine untergeordnete Kunstgattung gewesen sein." Most editors and interpreters of the *Poetics* have assumed, on the other hand, that *all* dancing is meant, but without explaining *χωρὶς ἀρμονίας*.

language and musical tones). It works through an independent element of its own, *bodily movement*. Aristoxenus recognized this state of affairs in his famous distinction of rhythm and the three *ῥυθμιζόμενα*, viz., bodily movement, language, and musical tone;¹³⁷ and the closest parallel to our passage is the one already cited from Aristides Quintilianus,¹³⁸ which is based on the triad *κίνησις σωματική, μελωδία, λέξις*, and is therefore probably Aristoxenian in origin: note especially *ῥυθμός δὲ καθ' αὐτόν μὲν ἐπὶ ψιλῆς ὀρχήσεως*. Aristides' list is schematic and arbitrary, and gives us no guarantee that a 'bare' dancing actually existed; but the possible connection with Aristoxenus may be significant.

Finally, the second clause (*καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι κτλ.*) has a mildly polemical or apologetic tone which does not seem very much in place here. Surely Aristotle had no need to insist that dancers too were imitators. And *καὶ ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*, though its meaning is clear enough, is not notably Aristotelian: *πράξεις* ought to stand first, and in Aristotle's own theory *πάθος* is a part of the plot, not an object of imitation coördinate with action.

All these arguments tend to throw suspicion on a26-28. Some of them, however, may be cavilling, and none is decisive enough to force an athetesis. Moreover *ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ ἀλλήσει κτλ.* stands in chapter 2, practically guaranteeing the genuineness of our passage unless we bring very strong counter-evidence.¹³⁹ Hence we will not bracket it as an interpolation. But, for reasons already indicated, we cannot accept it as an integral part of the text either. If Aristotle wrote the lines, he wrote them as a footnote.¹⁴⁰ More specifically, they must have been written as a footnote to *κἂν εἴ τινας κτλ.*; for the expression seems influenced by *ἡ τῶν σφελύγων*. The purpose would then be supplementary: to bring dancing into the classification *under ἁρμονία μὲν*

¹³⁷ Westphal (-Saran), *op. cit.* 2, Leipzig, 1893, 79 (p. 411 Marquard); Bacchius II, p. 313 v. Jan.

¹³⁸ Above, n. 125.

¹³⁹ Such as that *τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* seems to be used here in the same way as in Libanius 64 (*Πρὸς Ἀριστοῖδην ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*), referring to a definite professional group. If so, it would be a point against Aristotelian authorship, for the "dancers" were hardly a distinct professional group so early. But of course this is no proof of anything.

¹⁴⁰ That is, I am proposing to accept Vahlen's original suggestion, but on a firmer basis than he gave to it.

καὶ ῥυθμῶν, as a further subdivision on the speechless side of the ledger. As for the text, although we cannot be sure, if Aristotle wrote it he probably used no verb, while an interpolator would be more likely to write μιμείται.¹⁴¹

We can now make out at last the over-all structure and purport of Aristotle's analogy. As (A) imitators with colors and shapes are to (B) imitators with the voice, so is (C) instrumental music, i.e., melody without speech, to (D) poetry 'bare', i.e., imitation through speech without melody.

The proportion is exact and symmetrical after all, and its second member (C:D), like the first, is not a mere list but an antithesis. We recall ἕτεροι, *different* people. So here speech and melody (each in combination with rhythm, of course) are different media, and the arts that use them, auletic and kitharistic on the one side and the nameless art on the other, differ by virtue of using them: which is what Aristotle set out to show (a17, διαφέρουσι... τῶ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμῆσθαι).

Once the antithesis 'speech-melody' is disengaged from the surrounding jungle of footnotes and interpolations, one begins to see that both formally and substantively it is the key to the chapter.¹⁴² Formally, because we see Aristotle still essentially a Platonist, operating diaeretically; but substantively as well, because the diaeretic procedure also expresses certain basic convictions about the media of poetry. These can best be gotten at by concentrating on the rather anomalous concept of the "other," the nameless, art.¹⁴³ Aristotle appears to be

¹⁴¹ Before we go on I cannot repress a last suggestion looking the other way. As we said, μιμοῦνται... οἱ is impossible—for Aristotle. *Oi* is particularly fantastic and usually assumed to have no possible meaning. But if the author is *not* Aristotle may not οἱ be what he wrote, meaning ῥυθμοί? "Those (viz., the rhythms) of the dancers imitate by the rhythm itself, without melody." Such a play on ῥυθμός-ῥυθμοί is not impossible; it is even rather neat, and under the Aristoxenian theory of rhythm it could have a meaning. Rhythm is the universal, the active, element which impresses its form or forms on the three ῥυθμιζόμενα ('Ρυθμ. στοιχ. β' 4-5, pp. 77-78 Westphal-Saran): this is σχηματίζεσθαι. The meaning here would be, then, that the formed *rhythms* imitate by means of the *rhythm*, the active or defining element in them, and without music.

¹⁴² See above, n. 45, on the Pitcher-Householder controversy over the structure of chapter 1.

¹⁴³ Ἡ δέ, "and the other one by (using) speeches..." Withdrawing the illusory main verb τυγχάνει οὔσα shifts ἡ from definite article with (χρωμένη), μιν οὔσα, and χρωμένη to pronoun (still with the participles, but they are now complementary, not attributive). The apparent availability of the parti-

so convinced of its existence that he subsumes a whole series of varieties under it (b9-22); yet what is it, and is it one art? It would seem more properly to be a cluster of arts having only one negative trait in common, the absence of music. Nevertheless ἡ δέ expresses a real conviction, which will begin to take on shape and substance as we analyze the next section.

What Aristotle has done here is something of no small moment: *he has established for the first time in classical Greece a partial distinction between poetry and music.* For Plato, even in the *Laws*, they are still essentially one: μουσική is still the whole, with song, spoken verse, and instrumental music as its subdivisions. Moreover he still regarded song, the union of melody, speech, and rhythm, as the norm, and 'bare' speech and 'bare' music as secondary varieties.¹⁴⁴ Aristotle's view is very different, though outwardly it appears much the same. For him, the mimetic activity which is the business of poetry is carried forward primarily by *speech* ("verses used bare"); melody is a 'sweetening,' nothing more.¹⁴⁵ The lyric mode has no real separate status in his theory. It cannot really figure as the matrix of all poetry (in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary in chapter 4),¹⁴⁶ but only as a particular kind of mixture of separate and independent elements. These two elements, melody and speech (rhythm being assumed as accompanying both), appear in Aristotle's scheme as *instrumental music* and *spoken verse* (or rhythmical prose) respectively. As we said, these two modes represent *music* and *poetry*, which appear here for the first time in Greek thinking as antitheses.¹⁴⁷ The impiety toward the ancient unity of μουσική is shocking, but necessary. By the same token we see why Aristotle speaks not of a cluster of arts that imitate through spoken words or verses, but of one.

principles for the definition of ἡ has prevented most of the modern commentators from seeing the problem, which is precisely the identity of "the other" art. Conversely, before *τυγχάνει οἴσα* had been thought of, it was the lack of definition for ἡ that led to the interpolation of *ἐποποιία*—in spite of the warning presence of *ἀνώνυμος*.

¹⁴⁴ *Laws* 2. 669d-670a.

¹⁴⁵ 6. 50b16.

¹⁴⁶ In spite of Aristotle's thesis that tragedy originated from the dithyramb, it is precisely the musical side of the history that remains least clear and satisfactory, while the development of speech is the main thread: see below on 4. 49a9-28.

¹⁴⁷ The novelty is masked for us by the fact that to most people nowadays 'music' connotes primarily instrumental music, whereas the Greek thought first and foremost of singing (the work of the Muses: cf. *Laws*, *loc. cit.*).

Undefined and misty as the "other" art appears to be, it is an essential postulate for him because it does—pending clarifications and extensions—represent poetry itself. The proof is that it is just here, under the rubric of the nameless art, and not later, that Aristotle takes occasion to distinguish the essence of poetry from its medium.

Thus Aristotle's thought is highly un-Platonic in one way, yet very Platonic in another. He wishes to distinguish poetry from music, which Plato had not done, or not done satisfactorily; but he can do it only through the awkward form of a Platonic diaeresis followed by a mixed or composite category.

Compared with these larger implications, the internal economy of Aristotle's comparison is not of urgent importance. Nevertheless, for what it is worth, we can see a progressive rise in level (graphic and plastic media are to voice as instrumental music is to poetry) and corresponding cross-connections (graphic and plastic media: instrumental music = voice: speech).

To continue. We have pointed out that *φιλοῖς* in a29 is a predicate adjective, depending on *χρωμένη* understood. Hence, although *φιλόσ (-οῖ) λόγος (-οι)* is already a standing phrase by Aristotle's time, meaning "bare speech," i.e., prose,¹⁴⁸ we have to read *τοῖς λόγοις φιλοῖς* as meaning that the *λόγοι* in question are used "bare" *by this art*, not that they are necessarily so in themselves. Similarly *τοῖς μέτροις (φιλοῖς)*¹⁴⁹ will mean, not that all *μέτρα* are "bare," but that we are dealing here only with *μέτρα* which are so used. Nevertheless there is a connection between *μέτρα* and 'bareness.' *Μέτρα* in Aristotle is far from including everything that we lump under 'verse' or 'meter' nowadays. We will go into the question in detail later;¹⁵⁰ here it is sufficient to say that the word covers in Aristotle, as in his predecessors, *only a limited number of stichic verses*, and that these verses were also those which were normally spoken, not sung. Thus *τοῖς λόγοις φιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις* does not actually cover the whole range of "prose and poetry," but only a prose which itself is rhythmical and a certain number of regular verses used stichically. What these two kinds of media have in common is (a) the absence of music, (b) the presence of rhythm. What distinguishes them from each other is simply a difference in the regularity and determinacy of the rhythm: not a very

¹⁴⁸ E.g., Pl. *Laws* 2. 669d; *Symp.* 215c; Ar. *Rhet.* 3. 2. 1404b14, 33.

¹⁴⁹ The adjective has to be supplied over again.

¹⁵⁰ See below on 47b22 (*ἐξ πάντων τῶν μέτρων*).

significant difference when held against the two common factors. Again, within the whole class of poetry which uses μέτρα Aristotle makes a further distinction: (a) mixture of the verses with each other, (b) use of a single kind of verse throughout. Formally, we can see in this procedure another sign of Aristotle the Platonist: the classification is diaeretic, and "from the right."¹⁵¹

47b9-23

- (οὐδέ[ν] γὰρ ἂν | ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρο-
νος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους ·
οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων, ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν
τῶν τοιούτων, ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν—πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε
15 συναπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς, τοὺς δὲ
ἐποιοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς | κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιη-
τὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορευόντες · καὶ
γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικὸν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν,
οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν ἐστὶν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ
Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον
20 καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιη|τὴν—ὁμοίως δὲ
κἂν εἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν,
καθάπερ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυρον [μικτὴν ἑραφωδίαν]
ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων.) [καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευ-
τέον.]

47b9

- 10 (In fact | we have not <even> a common name we could
give to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the So-
cratic dialogues; nor if someone should produce his imitation
in trimeters, or elegiacs or some of the other verses of that
kind—except that people of course attach the word 'making'
to the kind of verse and speak of 'elegiac poets' ('elegiac-
makers'), and of others as 'epic poets' ('epic-verse-makers'),
15 not on the basis of | their being 'poets' by virtue of their
imitation, but applying the term lump-fashion by reason of
their verse; and in fact if they put out some medical or
scientific work in verses, people customarily give them that

¹⁵¹ That is, the second of the two 'halves' to be mentioned, the one which naturally stands on the right if you diagram them, is the one to be halved in the next stage. Any diaeresis in the *Sophist* or *Politicus* will serve for illustration: e.g., *Soph.* 223c ff.

name, and yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their verse, hence the proper thing is to call the one a poet, the other a scientific writer rather than
 20 | a poet—and in the same way if he should produce the imitation in a mixture of all the verses together, as Chaere-mon composed a *Centaur* [a mixed epic work] out of all the verses.) [He too to be called a poet.]

Again the passage is one sentence and one sequence. But it is not on the same level as the preceding and does not carry Aristotle's main classification forward (that is resumed in b23). Instead it is a footnote to *ἀνώνομος τυγχάνουσα*. Within this footnote there is a secondary note (*πλήν... ποιητήν*, b13-20); and it is further obscured by an interpolation (*καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον*, b22). It is no wonder that interpretations have spread in all directions here.

First of all, by way of orientation (the proof will have to come from the success of our interpretation as a whole), let us outline the structure of the passage. It consists of three clauses: (A) *οὐδέ[ν] γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν...*, (B) *οὐδέ εἴ τις...*, (C) *ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν εἴ τις...*¹⁵² This structure is broken into in turn by a comment on B (really on the section as a whole), *πλήν... ποιητήν*, which we will designate as B1.¹⁵³ The main line of thought is, then: "There is no common name for ..., nor for ..., or likewise for"

¹⁵² The justification for this analysis will be given in detail under each clause.

¹⁵³ Montmollin gives a subtle and in many respects correct analysis of the passage. Thus he rightly calls the whole of b9-22 a digression; diagnoses B1 (his C) as a digression on B; and holds fast to the organic connection between B and C (his E). But he wrongly separates the second part of B1 (*καὶ γὰρ ἂν ... ποιητήν*; his D) from the first, and refuses to recognize the interpolation at the end (*καὶ ... προσαγορευτέον*). So far as general principles are concerned, Montmollin's treatment of the passage—and of the whole *Poetics*—is vitiated by his unwillingness to recognize digressions or parentheses as such. He insists, p. 12 and n. 4, on the specious argument that except where digressions can easily be perceived in reading it is not permissible to mark them with an "arbitrary" modern typographical device like parentheses. But it is a fact, verifiable wherever one turns, that Aristotle's works bristle with parentheses, most of which would be footnotes in a modern book: see, e.g., I. Düring, *Aristoteles De Partibus Animalium*, Göteborg, 1944, 74, 118, 154, 170; W. J. Verdenius and J. H. Waszink, *Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing Away (Philos. Ant. 1)*, Leiden, 1946, 69-71. Thus Montmollin's principle that any alleged parenthesis which cannot easily be taken in at a glance must be a later addition to the text is entirely fallacious—especially if, as he maintains (p. 172), the *Poetics* is a collection of jottings by Aristotle for his own use. Aristotle presumably knew how to guide his own eye.

Thus the center of interest is not the existence of the "other" art, but the namelessness of it and/or its subdivisions.

"We could not <even> give a common name to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues." Here we have two well-known fragments of the dialogue *On Poets* to go on. Athenaeus quotes Aristotle as follows:¹⁵⁴ οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους <δντας>¹⁵⁵ τοὺς καλουμένους Σώφρονος μίμους μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις, ἢ¹⁵⁶ τοὺς Ἀλεξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τηλίου τοὺς πρώτους¹⁵⁷ γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν λόγων; The text is not entirely certain, but the sense is tolerably clear: "Are we then to deny that the so-called 'mimes' of Sophron, which are not even in (regular) verses, are dialogues¹⁵⁸ and imitations, or (or also, as also?) the dialogues of Alexamenus of Teos, the first of the Socratic dialogues (which were) written?" The predicate is double: λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις; and the point is whether this common predicate shall be accorded to (a) the μῖμοι of Sophron (καλουμένους calls attention to their name, which therefore has something to do with the case) and (b) the λόγοι of Alexamenus. The λόγοι are obviously λόγοι, the μῖμοι are obviously μιμήσεις. But the question is: are not the λόγοι also μιμήσεις (i.e., by Aristotle's criterion, poetry) and the μῖμοι also λόγοι? On what ground can we refuse both predicates to both genres? Both are 'dialogue—or prose—imitations,' μιμήσεις in the form of λόγοι. But this real affinity is masked by the accidental assignment of terms in Greek usage, whereby one kind of λόγοι-μιμήσεις is called λόγοι, the other μῖμοι. There is no common, generic term for the two genres which could convey both ideas at once, namely the concept of a μιμητικὴ τέχνη τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς χρωμένη.

Thus the class of '(dialogue) imitations in prose' had no common name. And it is clear that the dialogue *On Poets* did not actually suggest such a name, any more than the *Poetics* does. All it could offer was the descriptive phrase λόγοι καὶ μιμήσεις. In short, Aristotle pointed up the 'namelessness' of *this branch* of the nameless art in the dialogue exactly as he does in the treatise. Λόγοι καὶ μιμήσεις is not a name, it is at best an indication of what ought to be in the

¹⁵⁴ 11. 505c = Ar. fr. 72 Rose.

¹⁵⁵ Add. Kaibel.

¹⁵⁶ ἢ καὶ? ἢ καί?

¹⁵⁷ Πρωτίωνος Meineke (supplying μίμους after Ἀλ. τοῦ Τ.).

¹⁵⁸ As usual, the ambiguities of λόγος defy exact translation. Λόγους suggests talk, discussion, dialogue; also prose as against verse. But the sense is defined by the context.

name, and neither of its components carries the full meaning. *Μῖμοι* says nothing about the medium, and *λόγοι* says nothing decisive about what is done in the medium (*λόγοι* can be tales, discussions, arguments, speeches, etc., etc.: there is no necessary reference to 'imitation'). As a matter of fact there is no reason to think that Aristotle tried very hard to find an actual name.¹⁵⁹ What he was interested in was the existence of the class, whether or not a name could be found for it.

It is impossible to imagine Aristotle writing about Socratic *λόγοι* without thinking of Plato, and yet he does not mention him in either passage. We can fill this gap from other evidence. The quotation from his dialogue comes in the middle of a long diatribe by Athenaeus against Plato. The immediate burden of the attack is twofold: (1) Plato, who had expelled the poets from his *Republic*, had written his own dialogues *μιμητικῶς*, and (2) he was not even the inventor of this literary form. The remark from Aristotle's dialogue is quoted to support the second charge. The philosopher is called to witness that Alexamenus wrote dialogues before Plato, and the terms in which Athenaeus summarizes his testimony leave little doubt that Aristotle had mentioned Plato by name, though not in the sentence actually quoted.¹⁶⁰ But in what sense did he mention him? As a poet? And did he liken him to Sophron?

On the first of these questions we have what appears to be another piece of testimony, Diogenes Laertius 3. 37 (= Aristotle fr. 73 Rose): *φησὶ δ' Ἀ. τὴν τῶν λόγων ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ [sc. Πλάτωνος] μεταξὺ ποιήματος εἶναι καὶ πεζοῦ λόγου.* But this does not really speak to the same point at all: it has to do with Plato's *style*.¹⁶¹ *Ποίημα* is said here in the same way as in the *Rhetoric*, 3. 8. 1408b30, where Aristotle

¹⁵⁹ Aristotle very often calls attention to the namelessness of a class (Bonitz, *Index* 69b2-26; cf. Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 244-245 [1. 304 n. 6]), but seldom in order to propose a name for it. The purpose is rather to warn us not to let the absence of a name mislead us into thinking that the class does not exist.

¹⁶⁰ Ἀντικρὺς φάσκων ὁ πολυμαθέστατος Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους γεγραφέναι τὸν Ἀλεξαμένον. The other mention of Alexamenus (Diog. Laert. 3. 48) seems to imply the same thing: it too is in a passage on Plato.

¹⁶¹ See Finsler 34-35. *Ἰδέα(ι) λόγων* is a standing term, in Isocrates especially, for 'style(s) of discourse': see esp. Isoc. 10. 15; 13. 16, 17; 15. 11, 183; A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Oxford, 1911, 201-202, esp. 205-206. The usage establishes the context—chronological as well as ideological—in which the remark about Plato should be read; for the dialogue was almost certainly written in the 350's, when Aristotle's preoccupation with Isocrates was most intense: F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung d. Ar. Logik und Rhetorik (Neue Philol. Unters. 4)*, Berlin, 1929, 204-221.

warns the speaker not to use regular verses: *ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται*. The word connotes primarily the linguistic garb or expression, the poem as a finished product couched in a certain kind of language;¹⁶² it has little to do with its structure, and nothing necessarily to do with whether it 'imitates' or not.¹⁶³ In recognizing the style of Plato's dialogues as half-poetic, Aristotle was not necessarily saying anything about their status as *πολίησις*, that is, as imitation; the remark would even be consistent with denying Plato the title of poet.

The reference to Alexamenus, on the other hand, does help to clarify Aristotle's meaning in one important way. Obscure though that worthy is to us, we can be sure of one thing: his Socratic *λόγοι* did not present Platonic philosophy, there was nothing among them like the *Republic*, not to mention the *Sophist* or the *Timaeus*. In this context, the priority which Aristotle conferred on him can only mean a priority in writing *imitations of Socrates*, Socratic conversations, vignettes of the Socratic life. In other words the mimetic element is the common denominator between Alexamenus and Plato.¹⁶⁴ That would be clear, if from nothing else, from the implicit identification of dialogues with mimes (in the *Poetics*); but it is also obvious in itself when one stops to think about it. In so far as Aristotle recognizes Plato as a poet, we are not to think of the later 'dialogues' (many of which only pretend to be such, or almost give up the pretense), with their overload of systematic interests in the direction of epistemology, higher dialectic, psychology,

¹⁶² *Ποίημα* is used sparingly in the *Poetics*, and only of epics or quasi-epics: 4. 48b29; 8. 51a21; 24. 59b14, 28; 26. 62b10. In these passages *ποίημα* has a neutral sense, very much like our 'poem.' Thus the *Poetics* offers no direct parallel to the Hellenistic '*partitio poetica*,' which takes up subject-matter and arrangement under the heading *ποίησις* and style under *ποίημα* (see Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio*, Turin, 1930, Introd. LXXIV-LXXVII; C. Jensen, *Philodemos Über die Gedichte, Fünftes Buch*, Berlin, 1923, 102-105). Yet that scheme is certainly Peripatetic and, in origin, Aristotelian. Rostagni assigns it to the early Lyceum, perhaps Theophrastus: *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N.S. 2 (1922) 117-118; but it is also possible that it goes back to Aristotle's dialogue *On Poets*.

¹⁶³ It is essentially a popular use. Then as now, most people saw the distinguishing mark of poetry not so much in its subjects or its structure as in its use of language.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 16. 1417a21. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* 2. 1³, Leipzig, 1922, 571 n. 2, contrasts "das Mimische, die Schilderung der Persönlichkeit," which he assumes to have been the main thing for Alexamenus, with the exposition of doctrine which is the main concern in Plato and Xenophon. But the antithesis is false or at least skewed. Plato also, in the earlier dialogues, is an 'imitator' of Socrates.

etc., etc., but the dramatic presentation of the *Σωκρατικὸς βίος* in the early works. The poetic element is, in short, not the specifically philosophical element—philosophy in itself is not dramatic in Aristotle's eyes—but rather its opposite; though the drama is the drama of a philosopher.¹⁶⁵ By the same token we must banish from our minds what we are accustomed to thinking of as *the* poetic part of Plato's literary creation: his 'myths' (which are not real stories, *μῦθοι* in Aristotle's sense, but expanded and dramatized allegories).¹⁶⁶ Imitation for Aristotle means imitation of men, and men in action. Hence in aligning the Socratic *λόγοι* with the mimes we can be sure that he has in mind the *Apology*, the *Ion*, the *Protagoras*, the *Symposium*, perhaps even the *Gorgias*, but not the *Republic* or any subsequent dialogue.¹⁶⁷ Within these rather strict limits, we may allow that Aristotle implies his master was a poet.

Just what relation Aristotle meant to establish between Plato and Sophron is not clear—except that it exists and yet has been overlooked by the public, which therefore has not given the two men's works any common name. It is easy enough to call dialogues like the *Ion*, the *Lesser Hippias*, or the *Euthydemus* 'mimes,' or to recall Plato's notorious interest in Sophron;¹⁶⁸ but we cannot tell whether that interest accounts for some of the 'mimic' traits in the dialogues, particularly the early ones¹⁶⁹ (though Aristotle may have thought it

¹⁶⁵ See Susemihl, 159 n. 10; Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 106-110; *id.*, "Aristotle's Verses in Praise of Plato," *CQ* 21 (1927) 13-17, esp. 16-17: "Here, as in the Dialogue *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, Plato is for Aristotle the prophet, the founder of a new religion, preaching the divinity of the Good and its power to bring release and happiness... *Plato is the founder of a definite βίος* [italics mine] and of a philosophical doctrine."

¹⁶⁶ Thus for example Aristotle nowhere recognizes the *Timaeus*, in which Plato's concept of imitation finds its ripest embodiment (the world an image of the divine reality, and the 'dialogue' itself a "likely story" [29d], a secondary reflection of that image in words), as a cosmic drama or even an imitation. If he had, he might not have been so sure that the creation in the *Timaeus* was to be taken literally (see Zeller, *op. cit.*, 792 n. 1; H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 1, Baltimore, 1944, 414-431, esp. 421).

¹⁶⁷ The *Phaedrus* certainly is brilliant, moving, graceful, 'poetic' in the highest degree; but what is it an imitation of? "Ein glücklicher Sommertag" (Wilamowitz)?

¹⁶⁸ *Testimonia* in H. Reich, *Der Mimus*, Berlin, 1903, 1. 1. 381-382. There is one undoubted reference to Sophron, *Rep.* 5. 451c (*μετὰ ἀνδρείον δ ῥ ἄ μ α ... τὸ γυναικείον αὐ περιβαίνειν*, referring to the division of Sophron's mimes into 'men's' and 'women's'): *ibid.*, 383-386.

¹⁶⁹ *Vita Plat.* (In *Προλ. τῆς Πλ. φιλοσ.*), vol. 3, pp. 198-199 Hermann; Reich, *op. cit.*, 390-404, on "Das mimische Element bei Plato," especially in the *Euthy-*

did). Further, if Sophron wrote in rhythmical prose, it is possible that Aristotle's appraisal of Plato's style¹⁷⁰ as "halfway between poetry and prose" referred specifically to this trait as one which he shared with Sophron; but the idea remains uncertain and unverifiable.¹⁷¹

Clearly the literary mime¹⁷² and the Socratic dialogue figure in Aristotle's discussion as examples of *ἡ τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς (χρώμενη)*; the next clause (*οὐδέ εἴ τις κτλ.*) will correspondingly represent *τοῖς μέτροις*. But now the question arises whether we are to understand Aristotle as pursuing his point subspecies by subspecies or for the whole "nameless" art at once. That is to say, is he remarking that there is no common term for prose imitations (mimes and dialogues), and also none (*οὐδέ*) for imitations in straight verses, etc., or does he mean that there is no over-all term for the whole lot? The latter of course is what we expect after the singular in b9 (*ἀνόνομος τυγχάνουσα*). Nevertheless there are several indications in b9-23 that Aristotle is in fact pointing not to the absence of one blanket term but to the absence of a term *within* each subdivision. In the first place it is hard to imagine what single word Aristotle could possibly expect as a covering term for *all* varieties of imitation in speech (and rhythm) without music.¹⁷³ Again, the structure of the first clause is such (*ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς... μίμους καὶ τοὺς... λόγους*) as to focus attention on the two genres, mime and dialogue, to the exclusion of others, while *οὐδέ* at the beginning of the second clause seems to point to a new series of objects; and finally, the second clause likewise turns out on close inspection to involve a confrontation of two categories rather than a continuous list of examples.

demus (but he rejects, 405-412, the idea that it came from imitating Sophron): John M. S. McDonald, *Character-Portraiture in Epicharmus, Sophron, and Plato* (Columbia diss.), Sewanee, Tenn., 1931, esp. 142-158 ("The Platonic Dialogues as Philosophical Mimes"); F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, Cambridge, 1914, 161. But it is also possible that Sophron is meant to represent *μίμησις ψαλλῶν* and the Socratic dialogue *μίμησις σπουδαίων*; see below, on 3. 48a20.

¹⁷⁰ Quoted above, p. 42.

¹⁷¹ Norden's attempt, *Kunstprosa* 1. 46 ff., to colometrize some of the fragments of Sophron was rejected by Wilamowitz; but Schmid, 1. 1. 656-657, seems inclined to accept the report (Schol. Greg. Naz.: *CGF* 153, *test.* 9). It is not incredible in itself.

¹⁷² It may be worth emphasizing that Aristotle is not talking about the popular, improvisational mime, but about its literary offshoot as practiced by Sophron and his son.

¹⁷³ Certainly not *ποίησις*; see below, n. 191.

For these reasons (which of course remain to be tested in detail) I have proposed to begin the whole sentence with οὐδέ instead of οὐδέν.¹⁷⁴ I believe that in b9-23, instead of trying to prove the namelessness of the master-art directly, Aristotle sets out to do so indirectly and inferentially by showing that *not even its subspecies have agreed-on names*: "For we could not even suggest a common name for the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues; nor (could we do so) if...."

But where is there an antithesis in the second clause to match the pair 'mimes-dialogues'? None is visible at first glance: trimeters, elegiacs, and "such verses" seem to run on seriatim and without a break. Actually there is another problem that appears more urgent when one first studies the clause, namely that the epic must be included here and does put in an appearance belatedly and indirectly (b14, ἐποποιούσης), but is passed over in the first enumeration, b12. Its absence there has often been remarked and has led to several proposed emendations.¹⁷⁵ But there is nothing wrong with the text. The reason why the hexameter is not mentioned is just that it is so much in Aristotle's mind: it is the point of departure.

For some reason it has not been noticed that Aristotle's clause is in future-less-vivid construction: "if one *should* make the imitation by means of trimeters," etc. The fact is—and this has not been noticed either—that *Greek literature down to Aristotle's time has few mimetic works to show in any purely spoken verse medium except the hexameter*. 'What else was there besides the epic? 'Elegy' could offer very little except Antimachus' *Lyde* and perhaps its predecessor, Mimnermus' *Nanno*;¹⁷⁶ Archilochus' iambics would barely be mimetic in Aristotle's eyes, and only at the most primitive level;¹⁷⁷ Solon, like Theognis,

¹⁷⁴ Οὐδέ is at least as acceptable as the pronoun with the construction *ἔχειν* + infinitive. The infinitive itself supplies an object for *ἔχειν*, so that a further one is not required. But my interpretation does not depend on οὐδέ.

¹⁷⁵ Notably *ἑξαμέτρων* (Überweg). Gudeman's *διὰ [τρι]μέτρων ἢ <τῶν ἐπῶν ἢ τῶν> ἐλεγείων* is wholly unsatisfactory. *Μέτρων* (L. M. Valla: see Gudeman, appar. crit.) is an emendation, and *tetrimena* in the medieval Latin version (wrongly reported by Gudeman as *tetrametra*: see Franc.-Minlo-Pal., appar. crit.) a mere corruption.

¹⁷⁶ The *Nanno*, though no doubt not a continuous narrative, contained love stories and had considerable influence, e.g., on Asius and Panyassis: Schmid 1. 1. 295 n. 3, 298-299, 362-363; and on Antimachus and Apollonius: Kalbel, *Hermes* 22 (1887) 510.

¹⁷⁷ F. Lasserre, *Les Épodes d'Archilochus*, Paris, 1950, esp. 300-303, shows how

would not count at all;¹⁷⁸ and naturally the Attic drama cannot figure here, since it appears at the end of the chapter under the 'mixed' forms. There is in fact just one regular mimetic genre besides the epic which used spoken verses only, i.e., had no chorus: Dorian comedy.¹⁷⁹ Attic comedy never quite reached this stage; but the growing practice in the fourth century of marking the choral parts simply by χοροῦ—i.e., of omitting them from the written text (though not from the performance)¹⁸⁰—brought it very close. Aristotle himself testifies to the existence of comic choruses in his time.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless his predilection for Dorian comedy (see below on 3. 48a29-b2), and his observation of the progressive withering of the chorus in Attic comedy, might well suggest to him the possibility of a chorusless drama.¹⁸²

"If one should compose his imitation by means of trimeters or elegiacs or some of the other verses of that kind." What verses "of that kind" does Aristotle mean? Generally (and tacitly) it is assumed that he means simply other spoken verses like trimeters and elegiacs.¹⁸³ But we shall see, à propos of b20-22, that Aristotle recognizes only three regular μέτρα: hexameter, trimeter, and tetrameter; whereas τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν clearly implies that there are at least several other varieties beside the two just mentioned. Furthermore, we must remember that ψιλοῖς was a predicate in a29: Aristotle is not talking about "bare verses" here, but about "using verses bare." Hence τῶν

Arch. progressively objectified his invectives into narrative and then into lyric-dramatic form. But Aristotle had little use for Archilochus. He mentioned him as an elegiac poet (fr. 676 Rose), but we shall see that he utterly ignores his lambics in his history of poetry; cf. Lasserre, *op. cit.*, 15 (Aristotle more interested in Arch.'s tetrameters).

¹⁷⁸ In spite of Aristotle's admiration and interest in Solon's verses as a political source (in the *Ath. Pol.*, if that is A's. work).

¹⁷⁹ Schmid l. 1. 639 n. 14. Naturally a chorus might be specially introduced if the action of the play called for it, say at a wedding or a festival; but it is not a standing perquisite and we find no 'choral meters' (i.e., rhythms) comparable to those of Aristophanes. Epicharmus uses mainly (trochaic) tetrameters and (iambic) trimeters. The occasional anapaests, e.g., fr. 109 Kalbel, seem to be tetrameters.

¹⁸⁰ On the whole question see A. Körte, *Hermes* 43 (1908) 39-42, 299-306; *id.*, *PW* 11. 1258-1260; G. Norwood, *Greek Comedy*, London, 1931, 54, 58-59; K. J. Maidment, *CQ* 29 (1935) 1-24.

¹⁸¹ By his assignment of comedy to the mixed class, 47b27; and cf. *Pol.* 3. 3. 1276b5; *E. N.* 4. 6. 1123a23; Aeschin. *In Tim.* 157.

¹⁸² Cf. below on 47b21 (Chaerephon's *Centaur*).

¹⁸³ I.e., that τῶν τοιοῦτων refers to both terms.

τοιούτων ought to refer to some other quality which is inherent in the verses mentioned, or in at least one of them. I suggest that the reference is to *ἐλεγείων* and its character as a mixed or 'epodic' verse;¹⁶⁴ the "other verses of that kind" would then be any of the epodic forms introduced into literature by Archilochus. If the suggestion is correct, b11-13 covers *both* the subdivisions of *τοῖς μέτροις ψιλοῖς χρωμένῃ* which were indicated in 47a8-9, viz. (1) *ἐνὶ τινὶ γένει χρωμένῃ τῶν μέτρων* (trimeters), and (2) *μυγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων* (elegiacs and other regular verses of the same 'epodic' type, consisting of two different verses in alternation). B20-22 then follows as a kind of appendix, covering the special case of a mixture of "all the verses."¹⁶⁵ In either case, whether b11-13 covers both 'straight' and mixed verses or only the former, the principle of *ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις* (a23) is still at work within Aristotle's classification.

Thus Aristotle seems to have in mind a possible use of straight and mixed verses, perhaps in a new form of drama. But he also has in mind the epic. That is certain from *ἐποποιούς*, b14, and from the mention of Homer in b18—even though, as we shall see, those lines are a parenthesis to the main argument. What, then, is the point of the clause as a whole? The term *ἐποποιία* (-ός) existed, and there were others made on its model, such as *ἐλεγειοποιία* (-ός). But there was no common term to embrace epic composition *and* other kinds of mimetic composition in spoken verses only, *if such compositions should be made*.¹⁶⁶ Thus Aristotle's point is similar to that in b9-11. There he calls attention to the lack of a common name for *μῆμοι* and *Σιωκρατικοὶ λόγοι*; here, to the lack of common name for epic and other kinds of imitation in 'bare' verse. His procedure is still bilateral, 'diaeretic.'

At this point, having mentioned or implied the chief varieties of spoken verse which were or could be used for imitation, Aristotle has

¹⁶⁴ The designation of the second line of the elegiac couplet as a 'pentameter,' which implies that it is a different kind of verse from the hexameter, goes back at least to Heraclides Ponticus (see H. Schultz, *Hermes* 35 [1900] 310) and, if the whole of fr. 676 Rose is from Aristotle (see L. Alfonsi, *Riv. di Filol.*, N.S. 20 [1942] 193-194), to Aristotle himself.

¹⁶⁵ Namely the three regular *μέτρα*. See below *ad loc.*

¹⁶⁶ Bywater suggests, p. 108, that mime and dialogue are still the subjects of discourse in b11 ff.; even if *they* were written in various kinds of verse there would still be no common name for them. But *τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς* indicates too definitely that the epic belongs in the reckoning, and indeed it is hard to see how Aristotle could ignore it.

essentially completed the prospectus which he outlined in a29-b9, including prose and verse and both varieties (uniform and mixed) of the latter. We shall find a third clause which belongs to the same sequence (b20-22, *ὁμοίως δὲ... μέτρων*), but it brings nothing new in principle. We also pointed out earlier that the "nameless" art, thanks to the order of treatment Aristotle has adopted, for the moment represents the poetic art. Whether for that reason or not, he chooses to interrupt himself just here for an important digression; for it is precisely here, in connection with epic, elegiac, and other kinds of verse-composition, that the inadequacy of existing terminology was actually dangerous. No Greek was in danger of mistaking the meaning and boundaries of 'poetry' from observation of Plato or (probably) Sophron. But people did generally tack the suffix *-ποιία* or *-ποιός* on to the name of any verse¹⁸⁷ and speak of "elegiac poets" ("elegiac-makers"),¹⁸⁸ "epic poets" ("epic-[verse-]makers"), and so on. This, says Aristotle, rests on a false premise, namely that poets are so (i.e., are 'makers') not with reference to their imitation but with reference to their verses—or, as we can restore his meaning by appeal to another passage,¹⁸⁹ that the poet is called 'poet' because he is a *verse-maker*.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ That is pretty clearly what *συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν* means (so Bywater, Butcher, Rostagni, *al.*), rather than the mere mental association of the two things (Sykutris).

¹⁸⁸ Tkatsch argues, 2. 136-137, that the Arabic version implies the fuller reading *τοὺς μὲν ἐλεγείοποιούς*. But it does not seem certain that he has proved his case so far as the reading itself is concerned; and *ἐλεγείοποιούς* without *τοὺς μὲν* fits exactly with our interpretation of the passage above. The epic has not been mentioned, it is only in the back of Aristotle's mind, so that when he gets to *ἐλεγείοποιούς* there is no antithesis to call forth a *μὲν - δέ* construction. But once the word has been written it draws out the lurking counterpart: "and the others epic poets." Hence the parallels offered by Vahlen, *Poet.* 91, are relevant in spite of Tkatsch's denials.

¹⁸⁹ *ἢ* 51b27-28, *μᾶλλον τῶν μέθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων*, which is a protest against the same assumption as here.

¹⁹⁰ Gudeman brings an objection here which deserves some notice. He insists that Aristotle was wrong in his diagnosis of the popular usage. The original meaning of *ἐλεγείοποιός* and *ἐποποιός*, he says, was not 'maker of elegiacs,' 'maker of hexameters,' or the like, but 'writer of elegies,' 'writer of epics'; i.e., the terms originally denoted the genre, not the verse-form. Hence *ἐποποιός* was exactly like *τραγωδοποιός*, 'maker, writer of tragedies,' and Aristotle had no particular right to object to it. But Gudeman is probably wrong: see H. Weil, *Études sur l'antiquité grecque*, Paris, 1900, 237-244 (*ποιητής* originally meant 'maker, composer of verses'). However that may be, for Aristotle's own time we ought to be able

In this procedure Aristotle sees a double error: (1) the true generic trait of all poetry, i.e., imitation, is ignored, and (2) a false generic character, namely composition in verses, is set up in its place.¹⁹¹ And this has a twofold unfortunate consequence, one half of which is mentioned here, the other not: (1) imitative works which happen not to be in verse (e.g., Sophron, Plato?) are not recognized as 'poetry,' and (2) non-imitative works which happen to be in verse (e.g., Empedocles) are recognized as poetry.

In emphasizing the word 'common' (*κοινῆ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον*) Aristotle points to a logical as well as a substantive error in the popular attitude; for in this case a specific *differentia* (and representing only one out of the three criteria of classification)¹⁹² has erroneously been made to serve as a generic trait.

The following lines (b16-20) apply these remarks to a specific case of non-mimetic subject matter: Empedocles.¹⁹³ Aristotle might have chosen any number of other didactic or reflective poets for the purpose, for example, Solon, whom he himself quotes freely for his moral and political ideas. Why has he chosen Empedocles? Just because of Empedocles' great qualities, in order to illustrate the point as drastically as possible. It is evident in a number of ways that Aristotle was especially familiar with Empedocles, in fact especially fond of him.¹⁹⁴

to rely on his report that when people said *ἐποποιός* they felt it to mean 'maker of epic verses.' And anyhow, since in the case of epic, elegy, and iambic (as Gudeman himself points out) genre-name and verse-name were identical, the former could not connote anything that was not in the latter. That is, it contained nothing to correct the notion that epic composition is "writing a poem in hexameters."

¹⁹¹ *Κοινῆ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον*. In forming the terms *ἐλεγειο-ποιός*, *ἐπο-ποιός*, people are adding a suffix indicating 'maker' to a series of words *ἐλεγείον* (-α), *ἔπος* (-η)—each of which designates, in their minds at least (see preceding note), a kind of verse. Verse, then, is the common element on which their formation of terms is based, and 'poet' (*ποιητής*, = -ποιός generalized) will equal 'maker of verses' (*μέτρων*, = *ἐλεγειο-ἔπο*, etc., generalized).

¹⁹² See once more the sharp observations on classification by means of one *differentia* only, *De Part. An.* 1. 2-3, esp. 643b9 ff.

¹⁹³ I do not understand how Montmollin can believe b16-20 (his D: pp. 21-24) to be a later addition, when it is so organic a part of Aristotle's argument. Without it we might not understand the point at all. Actually, M.'s reason seems to be that he sees no other way of saving *καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (b23), which he insists on regarding as genuine.

¹⁹⁴ A crude but striking gauge is the amount of reference to him by A., as compared to other writers listed in Bonitz's *Index*: Empedocles 133 lines of references, Homer 125 (but many more individual references), Euripides 52, Sophocles 27, Hesiod 20,

In the dialogue *On Poets*¹⁹⁵ he gave him a ringing tribute: καὶ Ὀμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικὸς τ' ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος. This seems to contradict what Aristotle says about Homer and Empedocles in our passage, that they have nothing in common but τὸ μέτρον. Attempts have of course been made to explain away the discrepancy, but without notable success.¹⁹⁶ Actually the case is simple. So far as *style and language* are concerned, Aristotle gives Empedocles the palm of Ὀμηρικὸς; and οὐδὲν κοινὸν ... πλὴν τὸ μέτρον says the same thing from the negative side. Μέτρον means concretely 'verse' and denotes the whole linguistic side of the poet's task, not merely his versification: the verse is what he shapes out of language (λέξεις, the "composition of the verses," 6. 49b34).¹⁹⁷ Thus there is no contradiction at all. The two passages agree in considering Empedocles Homeric in language, style, figures, versification; and on the other hand we may be sure that the dialogue, if Aristotle's own view was expressed in it, made it plain that he was *not* Homeric in the essential thing, which is imitation.

But this still leaves us dissatisfied. Empedocles is more than a great stylist or a Homeric hand with a metaphor. In his poem *On Nature*, fragmentary though it is, we can sense a grandiose poetic imagination at work, shaping the outlines and heightening the episodes of a cosmic drama; just as in the *Purifications* we can feel the tragic-joyous rhythm of the soul's pilgrimage through the world from hell to heaven.¹⁹⁸ I am afraid it is just here that we can mark the limitations of Aristotle's philosophy and aesthetic capacity. For him a cosmic *drama* could not exist, any more than it could for Plato. The order of the cosmos is eternal, beyond the reach of change. Poetry is of men and men's actions; there is no room for an imitation of gods (and for Em-

Epicharmus 11, Aeschylus 9, Pindar 4, Archilochus 4, Sappho 3, Alcaeus 2; for philosophers: Plato 217, Pythagoras and Pythagoreans 109, Heraclitus 33, Parmenides 20, Xenophanes 14. Thus Empedocles is referred to oftener than anyone else, poet or philosopher, except Plato and Homer. This frequency is not simply a reflection of E.'s objective importance; it is a sign of special interest.

¹⁹⁵ Dlog. Laert. 8. 57, = fr. 70 Rose.

¹⁹⁶ Gudeman's vague and inconsistent suggestions, p. 92, are no help at all.

¹⁹⁷ See below *ad loc.* and on 50b13-15.

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., William Ellery Leonard, *The Fragments of Empedocles*, Chicago, 1908, 9-12; W. Kranz, *Empedokles*, Zurich, 1949, 69-72; F. M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*, Cambridge, 1952, 121-124.

pedocles both elements and men—some men—were gods) in Aristotle's scheme of things. To him Empedocles' imaginings could only appear as fumbling attempts to reach the Aristotelian physics. Moreover Aristotle seems to have been almost impervious to the specific effect that we refer to vaguely as the "magic of words." He was keen enough to know that it existed—the praise of Empedocles in the dialogue is sufficient evidence for that—but it hardly spoke to his own inward ear or made his beard bristle.¹⁹⁹ When all is said and done, Aristotle's real conviction about words and word-magic was that they were a necessary evil, "all imagination and there for the sake of the listener."²⁰⁰

But it would be highly unfair to Aristotle to make his exclusion of Empedocles rest merely on insensitivity. His verdict can be assessed more sympathetically, as a reaction against the verbalism which perennially afflicted Greek literature; and especially it can be welcomed as a necessary and long overdue protest against the other Greek literary vice, didacticism. It requires some effort for us to remember that before Aristotle the Greeks had no explicit criterion for what an epic should contain, and that they were almost violently addicted to works of edification, moral or otherwise. They did indeed have enough taste to put the *Iliad* above a Hesiodic catalogue. But they might say, if questioned, that they rated it so for its moral or technical instructiveness,²⁰¹ and they could not have given you a criterion which would exclude anything at all—*Works and Days*, *Heracleid*, *On Nature*, or *Persika*—from the category of 'epic,' provided it was written in hexameters. Plato himself, in spite of his profound literary sense and taste, did not really provide any such criterion either, or only an ethical or metaphysical one.²⁰² So it was left for Aristotle to state explicitly what his countrymen were vague about or had forgotten:

¹⁹⁹ Housman's test for the presence of 'poetry'; see above, n. 12.

²⁰⁰ *Rhet.* 3. 1. 1404a11.

²⁰¹ The attitude represented by Ion in Plato's little satire on the rhapsodes.

²⁰² The definition of the subject-matter of poetry which he gives in the *Ion*, 531c—war, the associations of men and gods with themselves and one another, the events that take place in hell and heaven, the births of gods and heroes—does credit to the breadth of his spirit, but only emphasizes the lack of a criterion. If Plato had tied his concept of imitation up securely with this inventory of subjects, it would have become clear that some of them did not belong in the list, or at least that some were more central than others. As it is he leaves to the epic, by implication, any subject-matter which is metaphysically true and morally healthful: a useless criterion because it may include almost anything, if the poet knows the truth, or exclude almost everything, if he does not.

that philosophy or history versified are not poetry, that literature is essentially *stories*.²⁰³

We can now see that b16-20 is the natural complement to b13-16 (πλήν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε κτλ.), and that both together constitute a digression within the main digression (which began at b9), or a footnote within the footnote. But we will resist the temptation to label them, in Montmollin's manner, an "addition ultérieure."²⁰⁴ The *caveat* which Aristotle enters in these lines grows integrally out of the thought of the main passage, that there is no generic name for the art which imitates in prose or verse without music. When he gets to the verse-imitations Aristotle is naturally led to remark that most people take verse-composition in itself for the all-sufficient mark of 'poetry.' Thus it is that he comes to speak of the essence of poetry in the midst of a discussion of that part (the medium) which has least to do with the essence: because people in general do mistake the one for the other. B13-20 are on the one hand a digression from the immediate subject, and on the other hand an integral part of the subject as a whole. Hence it will not do to diagnose the lines, or any part of them, as an incidental note tacked on later by Aristotle.²⁰⁵ The cluster of parallels from the dialogue *On Poets* (mimes and Socratic dialogues; concept of 'poetry'; Homer and Empedocles) reinforces this conclusion. The dialogue was probably written before the *Poetics*, certainly not later,²⁰⁶ and attests Aristotle's interest in just these questions at a relatively early date.

²⁰³ In this book, or at least at this stage of it, we cannot possibly go into the complications and ramifications of what Aristotle meant by *μίμησις* ('representation,' 'portrayal,' 'fiction,' etc.). But the confrontation of Homer and Empedocles gives a first rough indication of what it includes (*stories* about *men*) and what it does not (exposition, *argument* about elements, principles, or things). We may remember that the first hint to this effect was the apparition of *μύθος* in the second line of the *Poetics*.

²⁰⁴ Actually, of course, he does this only for b16-20 (his D).

²⁰⁵ Certain features of the phrasing of b20-22 seem to confirm this. That clause as a whole is clearly and consciously parallel to b11-13 in idea and construction (see below); but it also seems to take account of the presence of b13-20, being fuller than it would need to be if following directly upon b13. But for the intervening matter, Aristotle could have written simply *ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν ἅπαντα μὲνύων, καθάπερ Χαιρήμων κτλ.*, omitting *εἰ τις, τὰ μέτρα, and ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν*.

²⁰⁶ Rostagni, *Introd.* xxii-xxiv. Montmollin, although he vigorously contests Rostagni's reconstruction of the dialogue and its relation to the *Poetics* (pp. 193-203), still dates it before the latter (p. 205).

We come to b20 ff., *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄν κτλ.* Interpretation of this clause has long been divided between two sharply opposed views:²⁰⁷ (1) that it is parallel with *οὐδὲ εἴ τις κτλ.*, b11, and depends like it on *οὐδέ[ν] γὰρ ἄν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινόν*, b9-10: "and similarly (we should not be able to assign a common name) if someone should make his imitation by mixing all the verses..."; and (2) that the sense of *ὁμοίως* is defined by the immediately preceding passage (b16-20): "and similarly (i.e., by the same argument), if someone should make his imitation by mixing all the verses..., he too should be called a poet." It is apparent at once that the second interpretation depends integrally on the phrase *καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* at the end of the sentence. We will inspect those words in a moment; meantime it will be worth our while to consider what Aristotle is supposed to be saying under interpretation no. 2.

"By the same argument, if a man should write a poem like Chaeremon's *Centaur*, he too should be called a poet." Does Aristotle approve of the argument? Presumably not. Under this reading the interjection of Chaeremon has no visible point except to reinforce the ban against Empedocles: "If you wish to call Empedocles a poet, then by the same token you ought to call Chaeremon one—but you can't, because poems like Chaeremon's are not imitations." But this supplement, which we are required to make in thought, is not supported by the text. There is no indication that the *Centaur* was not a mimetic poem;²⁰⁸ all that is said about it and the class of 'poems' being considered here is that the poet has "mixed all the metres." Thus the text offers no ground for Aristotle's presumed disapproval. More than that, this interpretation stultifies Aristotle by making him imply that *nobody would have thought of calling Chaeremon a poet until the possibility was pointed out here*, whereas obviously no Greek would have thought of calling him anything else.

Thus the second interpretation of the passage appears to be absurd in itself. But the real nub of the difficulty is *καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον*, which has no possible construction except as apodosis to

²⁰⁷ Useful survey in Tkatsch, 2. 137-138—though, as so often, Tkatsch's own solution is unsatisfactory.

²⁰⁸ That is, nothing is said or implied to make Chaeremon's poem a didactic or scientific work (*ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικὸν τι*), although Gudeman tries by wild conjectures to make out that it was one. And even if it was, that could not be a necessary consequence of "mixing all the meters," and so could not be attached to other attempts of that variety, except accidentally.

εἴ τις ... ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν.²⁰⁹ Here we notice first that τοῦτον, though found only in two inferior manuscripts and perhaps²¹⁰ implied by the Arabic version, is absolutely necessary to make sense of the phrase under any interpretation; and second (this does not seem to have been noticed by any commentator), that the construction is that of implied indirect discourse (accusatives and infinitive, καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον, sc. εἶναι). But what possible reason could Aristotle have had for putting the clause in indirect discourse? On the other hand an annotator, seeking to clarify the construction for his own understanding of Aristotle's argument—in other words, trying to do the same thing we are doing—would have the best reason in the world for it: "(he [i.e., Aristotle] means)²¹¹ that this one too should be called a poet."

Thus I believe that Vahlen was right²¹² in taking καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον as a gloss called forth by the apparent lack of an apodosis for ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν εἴ τις κτλ. But we should notice very carefully that *is it not an attempt to interpolate something into the text.* That is proved conclusively by the construction: if it were meant as part of the text it would have been καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν δεῖοι ἂν προσαγορεύειν or something of the sort.

The way is now clear to interpret Aristotle's own sentence. Ὅμοίως δὲ κἄν εἴ τις κτλ. stands in exact parallel with οὐδὲ εἴ τις κτλ., as a third protasis²¹³ to οὐδέ[ν] ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινόν. "We have no common designation for mimes and dialogues, for imitations in hexameters and other verses, or for imitations in 'all the metres'." Now is the third protasis really independent or is it merely a supplement to the second? Several considerations make it seem likely that it is the latter: (1) Imitations in "all the metres" are hardly numerous enough to constitute a class by themselves, especially as Aristotle re-

²⁰⁹ Tkatsch, *loc. cit.*, emphasizes the absurdity of Vahlen's third and final attempt at a solution (*Poet.* 92-93), which was to make ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν κτλ. share the same predicate as the preceding clauses (i.e., οὐδέ[ν] ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινόν) and leave καὶ τοῦτον κτλ. as some kind of general apodosis to the sentence as a whole.

²¹⁰ Not necessarily: see Tkatsch, *loc. cit.*

²¹¹ Understanding φησίν. Or, alternatively, σημείωσον, "note that..."

²¹² In the *Beiträge*, that is: 4 (1. 269). His later attempt to defend the phrase (see above) was, as Tkatsch says, another unfortunate result of his blind worship of the Parisinus.

²¹³ The first being implied in τοὺς ... λόγους, b10-11.

peats his future-less-vivid construction (the citation of the *Centaur* rather strengthens than weakens this impression: one senses how sparse the possible examples were). (2) More to the point, the new category has no division within it, as the other two did. This changes the context. In the other cases Aristotle was noting the lack of a common name for two fairly distinct kinds of thing within the same category, not simply for a number of different cases answering the same description. (3) "All the metres" makes sense only as a climax, which presupposes that lesser or partial mixtures have already been mentioned.

For these reasons it seems probable that *ὁμοίως δὲ κτλ.* is not intended as a new protasis but only as a supplement or extension to the previous one. The necessitates our accepting the idea—already put forward tentatively above²¹⁴—that b11-13 covered both divisions under the category of verse: i.e., uniform and mixed. Under this reading, trimeters and hexameters represented the uniform verses, and elegiacs and "some of the others of that kind" the mixed category; and *ὁμοίως δὲ κτλ.* is now seen to be a supplement²¹⁵ extending that principle to its logical limit, for the sake of completeness. The content of Aristotle's scheme, and its bilateral character, are unchanged.

So far we have simply quoted the adventurous phrase "all the metres" without comment. Naturally it has always seemed a wild exaggeration, and one observes a tendency to tone it down: "all sorts of metres," Butcher; "allerlei Versmasse," Gudeman.²¹⁶ But *ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα*²¹⁷ is forthright enough, and it is repeated. Aristotle himself gives us the clue to his meaning in 24. 59b32-60a2, where he refers to Chaeremon again. There it transpires that the poet had actually used only *three μέτρα*: dactylic hexameters, iambic trimeters, and trochaic tetrameters.²¹⁸ Again, in the *Rhetoric*, 3. 9. 1408b32 ff., in discussing the suitability of the various rhythms for prose speeches, Aristotle says (1409a7) that the other rhythms (viz. dactylic, iambic, and trochaic)

²¹⁴ P. 48.

²¹⁵ Possibly a later one; but there is no evidence.

²¹⁶ Gudeman, with his usual bull-in-the-china-shop honesty, at least takes notice of the problem, which he believes can be solved by reference to 25. 61a19 (hyperbolic use of πάντες = πολλοί).

²¹⁷ Rostagni omits τὰ μέτρα in his text, apparently by inadvertence, since he mentions no reason for suppressing it.

²¹⁸ *Ἐἰ μὲν γινώσκεις αὐτὰ*, b2; and only hexameter, trimeter, and tetrameter have been mentioned. Gudeman points this out but does not see the implications for the meaning of μέτρα in Aristotle's usage.

are to be eschewed, among other reasons because they are *μετρικοί*, while the pæan²¹⁹ is suitable: ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ἑτηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, "for from it alone of the rhythms (just) mentioned there is no (regular) verse." Again we find the same three μέτρα, and the cretic is explicitly said to give rise to none: that is, what we nowadays call 'cretic verses' were not μέτρα in Aristotle's eyes, because they were not used stichically in regular sequences.

It is time that we recognized this limitation of the term μέτρα to three or four²²⁰ kinds of verse, not only in the *Poetics* but in Aristotle and the classical period generally.²²¹ Μέτρα (plural) in Aristotle always has this concrete, specific, and limited meaning,²²² which also appears in Aristophanes²²³ and Plato.²²⁴

It is clear enough from this evidence what Aristotle's apparently

²¹⁹ Or pæon. See Liddell and Scott⁹, s.v. Παιάν, on the spellings.

²²⁰ As we have already seen, Aristotle seems to have regarded elegiacs as a mixture of two verses, both belonging to the same rhythmical species (1: 1, γένος ἴσον). He does not mention them separately in chapter 24, and yet it is hard to imagine an experiment as bold as Chaeremon's not including elegiacs. Anapaests are not mentioned in the *Poetics* except in the spurious chapter 12 (see below *ad loc.*), and there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle reckoned the anapaestic dimeter as a μέτρον.

²²¹ Fr. Blass, *Die Rhythmen der attischen Kunstprosa*, Leipzig, 1901, 9: "Ἐπῶν ἑξαμέτρων καὶ τριμέτρων καὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων heisst es in der Stelle der Gesetze (810E); wir fügen Tetrameter und Pentameter hinzu, und sind damit wirklich fertig: denn was es sonst an 'Versmassen' nach unsrer und bereits alexandrinischer Bezeichnung noch giebt, heisst nach klassischer vielmehr ῥυθμοί"; *id.*, *Hermathena* 13 (1905) 163; R. Westphal, *Die Metrik d. Griechen*², Leipzig, 1867, I. 32. Unfortunately modern metrical theory has shown little interest in determining what the classical usage was with respect to a word like μέτρον. E. Graf, *Rhythmus und Metrum*, Marburg, 1891, is confused and unsatisfactory; and constructive metricians use *metron* each in his own fashion: e.g., Wilamowitz, *Gr. Verskunst*, Berlin, 1921, 103.

²²² So *Poet.* 1. 47b17, 20, 22; 4. 48b21; 6. 49b30, 35; 9. 51b2, 3-4, 28; 24. 59b35. For the singular see below on 47b25.

²²³ In the well-known passage *Clouds* 636 ff., the fun is in the fact that Socrates is talking about μέτρα, verses, while Strepsiades the incorrigible farmer keeps turning the conversation off onto μέτρα, measures (pecks, quarts, etc.). The common denominator of the two usages is that they both refer to *concrete, measured entities* (verses as uniform *quanta* of rhythmized speech, 'measures' as uniform *quanta* of grain or oil), not to abstract patterns. In short, μέτρα is not 'meters' but 'verses.'

²²⁴ *Laws* 7. 810e (quoted by Blass; see n. 221 above), 809b, 810b; 2. 669d; 10. 886c; *Lys.* 205a; *Symp.* 187d, 205c; *Soph.* 237a.

wild and irresponsible remark means: simply that Chaereon's *Centaur* was in hexameters, trimeters, and tetrameters (and, perhaps, elegiacs). Now, what kind of poem was it? The commentators usually assume, mainly on the strength of *μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν*, that it was some kind of epic. Athenaeus, however, in quoting one of the two actual fragments of it that we possess,²²⁵ calls the work a *δρᾶμα πολύμετρον*, and the reference stands in the middle of a long series of quotations from Chaereon, all from plays (and all, as it happens, in trimeters).²²⁶ Moreover Chaereon is known to us otherwise, and notably from Aristotle himself, as a dramatist.²²⁷ Thus the *Rhetoric* cites a trimeter line about Pentheus, 2. 23. 1400b26.²²⁸ Another passage in the same work, 3. 12. 1413b13, classes Chaereon among the *ἀναγνωστικοί* (those whose work is more effective when read than when heard), obviously as the representative of tragedy. It is clear that there is some connection between this and the *Centaur*. Chaereon's plays may not have been closet-dramas in the technical sense, but they must have relied chiefly on their dialogue and made very little of the chorus or the musical element.²²⁹ It would appear that at one point in his career the poet hit on the idea of making up for this loss of visual and musical variety by extra *ποικιλία* in his verses: in short, by writing a *δρᾶμα πολύμετρον*.

All this, of course, flies in the face of *μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν*. But that phrase is suspicious in its own right. It was bracketed long ago by Tyrwhitt,²³⁰ and the Arabic version translates it strangely if at all.²³¹ Moreover if *ῥαψωδίαν* were from Aristotle it would apparently have

²²⁵ Athen. 13. 608e (= fr. 10 Nauck).

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 608a-e. Eight fragments are quoted (frags. 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 Nauck), from as many different plays.

²²⁷ Cf. Dieterich, PW 3. 2025. Suidas makes him a comic poet and cites eight titles of *δράματα*.

²²⁸ Another in the *Problems*, 3. 16. 873a25.

²²⁹ T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 302, suggests that the anonymous papyrus fragment of an *Oeneus* (see D. L. Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* 1, Cambridge-London, 1942 [Loeb], no. 28) may belong to Chaereon. It contains the notation *χοροῦ μέλος*; i.e., the choruses were not written out.

²³⁰ Gomperz athetizes the whole of *μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων*.

²³¹ "*Lusum saltationis*," Tkatsch. Tkatsch himself argues, 2. 142b—unconvincingly, it seems to me—that *μικτὴν* was in Σ , even though the Arabic shows no trace of it, and that "*lusum saltationis*" represents *ῥαψωδίαν*. Gudeman rejects T.'s argument for *μικτὴν* (*Kritischer Anhang*, p. 461) and proposes in his *Corrigenda*, p. 496, to bracket the word. See Bergsträsser, *op. cit.* (n. 131 above) 54.

to mean 'recitation,'²²³ which is not only irrelevant but highly inappropriate if Chaeremon was indeed ἀναγνωστικός. Clearly the word is intended here in the sense of 'rhapsody,' that is, a short epic or part of an epic (the work itself, not its recitation or performance); but that seems to be a late use.²²⁴ In short, there is every reason to athetize μικτήν ῥαψωδίαν as a note of late origin which has gotten into the text.²²⁴

Thus the overwhelming probability is that the *Centaur* was a drama:²²⁵ possibly a tragedy, somewhat more probably a satyr-play.²²⁶ Its form was unconventional enough to make classification a little difficult; in fact, if it lacked a chorus,²²⁷ it may indeed have looked at first glance more like an epic than a drama.²²⁸ One would give a good deal to know

²²³ So in the only other place where the word is certainly used by Aristotle: *Rhet.* 3. 1. 1404a23 (in 1403b23 καὶ ῥαψωδίαν was suspected by Spengel of being an interpolation). Cf. Pl. *Ion* 533b; *Tim.* 21b; *Laws* 2. 658b.

²²⁴ 'Ραψωδία = μέρος ποιήματος: Hesych.; Schol. Dion. Thr. p. 315 Hilgard; cf. Lucian, *Charon* 7; *Dial. Mort.* 20. 2.

²²⁵ The two words will have to stand or fall together. Μικτήν is the weaker so far as external evidence goes; but ῥαψωδίαν is not likely to have been written without it. As for ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων, the words could be but are not necessarily a part of the interpolation. Since there is no clear index against them, I have left them in the text. — I see no reason to suppose that the note transmits any grammatical knowledge. It seems rather to be merely an interpretation based on the author's reading of the text. Like many modern scholars, he took the clause as a direct sequel to b16-20 and therefore—again like his modern confrères—assumed that Chaeremon must be an epic poet like Homer and Empedocles. We saw above that the same assumption lay behind καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον. Undoubtedly the same man is responsible for both notes.

²²⁶ The allusion to it in 24. 60a2, to which we have already referred, is far from proving that it was an epic. For a similar reference to drama in the midst of Aristotle's discussion of the epic cf. the same chapter, 60a29-32; and see below on 24. 60a2.

²²⁷ So Victor Steffen, *Satyrographorum Graecorum Reliquiae*, Posnan, 1935, 195-196. At least two of the nine titles we have from Chaeremon are of satyr-plays: Dieterich, *op. cit.*; Steffen, pp. xxii-xxiii, thinks they all are except two. Κένταυρος also appears as a title of comedies by Apollonophanes, Aristophanes (*Δράματα ἢ Κένταυρος*, probably produced in 426; see Schmid 1. 4. 184, 194 n. 8), Lynceus, Nicochares, Ophellon, Theognetus, and Timocles: Kock, *CAF* 3. 698 (add *Χείρων* and *Χείρωνες*, *ibid.*, 709).

²²⁸ Steffen, *loc. cit.*: "Dramata satyrica sine satyris."

²²⁹ It is in fact also possible that there was a mixture of method as well as meter: e.g., a narrative prologue in hexameters followed by dramatic scenes in trimeters and/or tetrameters. Such a scheme, though surprising and confusing, would not really be such a violent innovation either. The narrative, epic character of the Euripidean prologues and messengers' speeches has often been remarked (see

more about this curious and original work, and about Aristotle's opinion of it. Why does he go out of his way to mention such an eccentric and apparently isolated experiment just here? The question has to be considered in conjunction with what we have observed about the earlier parts of Aristotle's long footnote. There also he betrayed a significant interest in the *drama* (taking that word in a broad sense, including mimes and dialogues as well as Dorian comedy). And to this we must add another interest or attitude of which there are many signs in the *Poetics*. The regular Attic drama came equipped, so to speak, with music and dancing: it was an operatic genre.²³⁹ Aristotle dutifully records this as an advantage when he wants to swell the list of superiorities of tragedy over epic (26. 62a16). But he was really not much interested in the musical element: he rates it next to last in order of importance among the 'parts' of tragedy and would obviously bear its loss with composure.²⁴⁰ Moreover he is constantly harping on the idea that the drama can "do its work," produce all its essential effects, through reading; and reading would tend to slight the chorus, if not to cut it out altogether.

These facts seem adequate to sustain the following hypothesis: *In his long note, 47b9-22, Aristotle has something more in mind than proving the namelessness of the "nameless" art. He is also interested in the possibility (ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν) of a musicless drama, and views the experiments or beginnings that have been made in that direction—Dorian mime and comedy, Socratic dialogues, Chaerephon's Centaur, and perhaps other works—with good will. He would perhaps like to see these activities extended and consolidated. There would still be no common name to cover them all and at the same time distinguish them from dramatic forms with music. Nevertheless the very fact that Aristotle speaks of the "nameless" art in the singular and not the plural indicates, I think, that it has some character and distinctness in his mind. At the very*

Schmid, 1. 3. 771-778), and this would be a logical corollary to draw from it. There is a parallel in the Timothean nome, with ἀρχά in hexameters (fr. 13, the first line of the *Persians*) followed by other meters (in the *Persians* mainly iambic: Wilamowitz, *Timotheos Die Perser*, Leipzig, 1903, 89-98, 109).

²³⁹ And not only in origin. The operatic impression is actually enhanced in Euripides' later and last period by the massive use of arias and κομμοί: see Schmid, 1. 3. 779.

²⁴⁰ What is said about the chorus in 18. 56a25-32 is not really a counter-indication. So long as you have a chorus you ought to use it to good effect. A drama entirely without a chorus would be a different matter.

least it is certain that to Aristotle's way of thinking *ποίησις* is primarily incorporated in spoken verses, not in song, and that its destiny and 'nature' is to become drama.

We see that in the economy of b9-22 the last clause (*ὁμοίως δὲ κτλ.*) does not represent a real addition of something new. It is a supplement to the second clause, thrown in to complete the category of mixed verses (*μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων*, b8).²⁴¹ The bilateral structure of the classification (uniform verses—mixed verses, including mixtures of "all the verses") is not impaired.

It may be well to point out before we go on that we have already found three interpolations (a29, *ἐποποιία*; b22, *μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν*; b23, *καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον*) and one possible one (a26-28, *αὐτῶ... πράξεις*) in less than forty lines.

47b23-29

- περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσι
 25 δέ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρη|μένοις, λέγω δὲ οἶον
 ῥυθμῶ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἢ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν
 ποιήσις καὶ ἢ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἢ τε τραγωδία καὶ ἢ κωμω-
 δία· διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.
 ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν αἷς
 ποιῶνται τὴν μίμησιν.

47b23

- Well then, for these arts let this be our division. But there
 25 are some which use all the aforesaid | media, I mean such
 as rhythm, song, and verse; for example the art of composing
 dithyrambic poems and nomos, and the arts of both tragedy
 and comedy; but they differ in that the ones use them all
 at the same time, the others section by section.

These then are what I mean by the *differentiae* in which
 the arts perform the imitation.

One half of our master pattern, the *χωρίζ* (a23), has now been disposed of; the other half, the *μεμιγμένοις*, remains. But here we find again what we found in b11-13, that the pattern *χωρίζ - μεμιγμένοις* operates within the divisions of the scheme as well as between them. There the line ran between the use of various spoken verses singly

²⁴¹ Hence *ὁμοίως δὲ* instead of *οὐδέ*, which would be in order if the clause introduced a really new class.

and their use combined. Here it runs between lyric and drama—just how, remains to be determined.

Near the beginning of the passage a shift in terminology takes place which has never quite been satisfactorily explained: μέλος is substituted for ἁρμονία and μέτρον for λόγος. It is well known, and adequately set forth by the commentators, that μέλος means 'song' and includes words as well as tune (λόγος) and rhythm, and that μέτρον similarly means 'verse,' including speech and rhythm. The anomaly is that the element of rhythm is included in these terms but also stands alongside them as a third member of the triad. And there are other difficulties. But to solve them, or at least mitigate them, we will take the long way round and look first at the distinction Aristotle makes between lyric and drama in their use of the media.

Αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. Teichmüller pointed out²⁴² that the antithesis is not between πᾶσιν and κατὰ μέρος (since πᾶσι χρῆσθαι is the common trait of all these arts, b24), but between ἅμα (πᾶσι) and κατὰ μέρος (πᾶσι): using them all at the same time and using them all, but in alternation; and secondly that it corresponds to our old friend, the major division χωρὶς (~ κατὰ μέρος) - μεμιγμένοις (~ ἅμα). He also cites the obvious parallels in chapter 6, 49b25-26: χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, and 29-31: τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι (sc. λέγω) τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἕνια μόνον περαινέσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. In the case of tragedy the two media divide cleanly: μέτρα is the dialogue, μέλος is the choral odes.²⁴³ But in chapter 6 these are presented as species of speech, λόγος.²⁴⁴ This is what has happened in our passage also. Μέλει and μέτρον are not simply offered as synonyms for ἁρμονία and λόγος respectively, as Bywater, Rostagni, and others say. To be sure they have particular reference to those terms; but back of that is the basic fact that 'song' and 'verse' are both species of λόγος.²⁴⁵

The fact is that our bilateral scheme of classification has shifted its base since Aristotle began. The original division was between speech

²⁴² *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 21.

²⁴³ In the *Poetics* Aristotle ignores the κομμοί and ἀπὸ τῆς σκηρῆς (on the spurious chapter 12 see below *ad loc.*).

²⁴⁴ I.e., of "sweetened" speech, ἡδυσμένος λόγος. Song is the "greatest of the sweetenings," 50b16.

²⁴⁵ Hence μέτρον, though more abstract and generalized than τὰ μέτρα, which are the actual verses, is still 'verse,' not 'meter': it still means a measured segment of rhythmical speech. See below on 4. 48b21.

'bare' and mere melody. But mere tune, i.e., instrumental music, although the symmetry of Aristotle's scheme called for it to begin with, is not really poetry. The real differentiation within the field of *poetic* media is not between (musicless) speech and (speechless) music, but between *speech with and speech without music*: i.e., between the second and third of Aristotle's divisions rather than the first and second. And this brings with it a new application of the *χωρίς - μεμιγμένοις* principle. Whereas before speech and music appeared *χωρίς* in different works, *now the two species of speech itself* (one of which includes music) *will so appear*, but in the same work.

This shift in the center of gravity of Aristotle's scheme really leaves no room for *ῥυθμός* as a separate element. It is now included in each of the others and ought by rights to disappear, leaving us a dyad to work with instead of a triad.²⁴⁶ But such an overt desertion of the triad would call for explanation, and Aristotle tries instead to make the best of both worlds.²⁴⁷ But his partial substitution of terms unavoidably results in ambiguity, not only for *ῥυθμῶ* but also for *μέτρον*. We have already said that Aristotle recognizes only three or four *μέτρα*. In the drama the situation is relatively clear: the dialogue is in uniform *μέτρα* (trimeters, occasionally tetrameters) and the odes are not. Here *μέτρον* (-α) and *μέλος* are conveniently antithetical: each excludes the other. But they are not true antitheses and for that very reason cannot be brought into a position of exact congruence for the 'mixed' state. The trouble is that all of the dithyramb and nome was *μέλος*, but most of their 'meters,' as we call them, were not *μέτρα* in the same strict sense as those of tragedy.

Μέλος meant originally a 'limb' or 'member.'²⁴⁸ The application of the word to song must refer in some way to its division into members²⁴⁹—most probably that into stanzas or strophes, for we can assume with some confidence that the earliest Greek singing was stanzaic.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ That is in effect what happens from chapter 6 on; see below on 6. 49b28.

²⁴⁷ This interpretation is preferable to making *ῥυθμῶ* stand for a distinct part of the whole here, viz., dancing (so Fostagnl *et al.*). I cannot believe that Aristotle is thinking of dancing at all, now that he has reached the poetic arts.

²⁴⁸ I.e., the "two words *μέλος*," as they are sometimes called, are the same word: Boisacq, *Dict. étym. de la l. grecque*, s.v.; cf. J. B. Hofmann, *Etymol. Wörterbuch des Griechischen*, Munich, 1949 (but see also s.v. *μέλω*). Cf. English 'piece,' which can mean a musical or a poetic composition.

²⁴⁹ H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, London, 1900, xviii.

²⁵⁰ Schmid, 1. 1. 42-43.

Thus in origin the word has nothing in particular to do with the musical side of the 'piece.' In the course of time, however, and especially as a result of the repeated contrast with *ἔπη* (spoken words or verses), *μέλος* came to connote specifically words sung to *music*.²⁵¹ Meanwhile *μέτρον* also began by referring to a time-division or relation between the parts and the whole, but at a somewhat later stage or different place in the development. Somewhere, somehow, one began to tie down and regulate the onward flow of rhythm in a piece by measuring it out in uniform *quanta* of rhythmically equivalent units. These *quanta* were the *μέτρα*.²⁵² The names of the verses themselves indicate the size of the 'measures': a single dactyl (or spondee) in the hexameter, a double foot (dīamb or ditrochee) in trimeter and tetrameter. These are the measures of their respective verse-genres because in each poem they are all the same length and every verse consists of the same number of them. Then, either because the verses are measures in turn for the poem as a whole, or simply by generalization of the suffix *-μετρον*²⁵³ (in *ἑξάμετρον*, *τρίμετρον*, *τετράμετρον*), the verses themselves came to be called collectively *μέτρα*.

This development took place just in those verses which came to be—if they had not always been—recited instead of sung: i.e., the hexameter, the elegiac couplet, the trimeter, and the tetrameter; and it was *not* extended to the progressively more elaborate and complex rhythms of melic, especially choral melic.²⁵⁴ Hence the state of things

²⁵¹ E.g., Pl. *Rep.* 2. 379a, *ἔάντε τις αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Θεόν) ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῆ ἔάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἔάντε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ*; 10. 607a, *ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν*; *Laws* 2. 656c, *ῥυθμοῦ ἢ μέλους ἢ ῥήματος*.

²⁵² Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* (above, n. 221) 101, asserts that the whole verse, e.g., the hexameter, is the original *μέτρον*. But how can the measure itself be called a "six-measure"? The 'hexameter' (not a very early or common term, by the way) is a *ἑξάμετρον* exactly as the three-legged stool is a *τρίπους*: because it has six 'measures' in it. The collective designation *μέτρα*, meaning the verses themselves, comes later; see below.

²⁵³ The latter is suggested by the collocation *περὶ τῶν μέτρων ... κάλλιστον μέτρον ... τὸ τρίμετρον ἢ τὸ τετράμετρον*, Aristoph. *Clouds* 638-642; cf. Pl. *Laws* 7. 810e, *ποιηταὶ... ἐπῶν ἑξαμέτρων... καὶ τρίμετρων καὶ πάντων δὴ τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων*.

²⁵⁴ The *μετρικοί*, i.e., the grammarians, who took up metrical questions as a part of their general treatment of language (Aristotle refers to them in *Poet.* 20. 56b34, 38; *De Part. An.* 2. 16. 660a8), dealt mainly with the hexameter and other simple recitative verses. They did not attempt real *μέλη* in complex rhythms: see Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* 79; T. D. Goodell, *Chapters on Greek Metric*, New York, 1901, 27-29, 46. (The whole antithesis *μετρικοί-ῥυθμικοί*, with which Goodell's

we find indicated at the beginning of the *Poetics*: μέτρον, which originally had had nothing to do with the mode of delivery, now tending to connote spoken verses as against song.²⁵⁵ Thus μέλος - μέτρον looks like an exclusive antithesis; but it is not. The two words were neither mutually exclusive nor completely coextensive, since a 'song' could be in regular 'verses' and regular verses could be sung. Thanks to the development of Greek poetry the two terms had come close to full contrariety, but had remained essentially skewed towards each other, μέλος referring primarily to the musical factor, μέτρον to the rhythmical.

When Aristotle deals with the drama, the virtual contrariety of this pair of terms can be given full play without serious ambiguity: a drama alternates between μέτρα and μέλη.²⁵⁶ But one cannot simply transpose the equation and allege that μέτρα and μέλη coincide in dithyramb or nome. It is true that both genres had close associations with certain μέτρα, particularly in their early periods, and might still use such verses even in the fourth century.²⁵⁷ But we cannot be sure how conscious Aristotle was of this, and in any case a use of hexameters in one section of a poem would not justify ἅμα πᾶσιν. The simplest way out would have been to say that the lyric used μέλος alone, since the term μέλος already embraced speech and rhythm as well as melody. But that would have meant breaking the symmetry of Aristotle's

chapter deals, goes back to this preoccupation of the early grammarians, who were also the first μετρικοί, with spoken verses, whereas the approach of Aristoxenus and the ῥυθμικοί was musical.)

²⁵⁵ E.g., Pl. *Lys.* 205a, οὐδὲ τι τῶν μέτρων... οὐδὲ μέλος. But in the *Poetics* this is only a connotation, not a denotation as Gomperz tries to make out (*Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 9 [= *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 549-550]). *Τοῖς μέτροις (ψιλοῖς)*, a29, proves that μέτρα could also be sung.

²⁵⁶ Leaving aside questions like the status of anapaests or the occasional melic use of hexameters, as in *Soph. Phil.* 839-842, *Eur. Androm.* 117-141—phenomena which Aristotle ignores.

²⁵⁷ The dithyramb was originally antistrophic, with a single rhythm and meter throughout: [*Ar.*] *Probl.* 19. 15. 918b18-26. No doubt the meters varied, but the hexameter was certainly one of them. The dithyrambs of Lamprocles (*Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Gr.* 2^a. 123-124) included at least some hexameter lines, and Praxilla's (*ibid.*, 129-130) seem to have been largely in hexameters. Terpander invented the kitharodic nome by setting Homeric hexameters, or his own, to music: *Heraclid. Pont. ap. [Plut.] De Mus.* 4; see H. W. Smyth, *op. cit.* lxiii; *Wilam. Tim. Die Perser* 89-95. Fragment 13 of Timotheus, a hexameter, is from the beginning of the *Persians*, but most of the poem, the part found in papyrus, is in an irregular mixture of verses, mostly iambic, none of them quite μέτρα in the sense we have been arguing: *ibid.*, 97-98, 109 (other fragments, viz. 2, 3, 11, 22, reveal traces or possible traces of regular μέτρα).

pattern. Hence μέτρον must turn up here too, among the media that are 'mixed' in nome and dithyramb. But in this case it cannot be assigned a clear, separate meaning (any more than ῥυθμός, which is also included in μέλος).²⁹⁸ Certainly we cannot take it to mean the abstract *metrical pattern* ('metre');²⁹⁹ and neither can we seriously suppose that Aristotle means to give up his strict limitation of the μέτρα, since it reappears in full vigor later in the *Poetics*. All we can do with the word is to translate it 'verses' and bear in mind that it applies very imprecisely, if at all, to the lines of a poem like the *Persians*.

As a purely incidental matter, but one which may prove interesting later, we may observe that Aristotle shows no sign here of having a generic term for either the lyric or the drama.

"Well then, these are the *differentiae* of the arts in which they make their imitation(s)." Vettori's conjecture ἐν οἷς is unanimously printed in the modern editions in place of the ἐν αἷς which is the unanimous reading of the manuscripts.³⁰⁰ But is it really necessary? For Aristotle the *differentiae* are as real as the species, indeed the species consist of, are made of, the genus and the *differentiae*.³⁰¹ Hence it is perfectly possible to speak of the species (here the poetic and related arts) as operating "in" the *differentiae*. In 2. 48a16 tragedy is said to differ or stand "in" the *differentia* itself as towards comedy, the *differentia* being βελτίους μιμῆσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν, or, more precisely, just βελτίους. That is, the 'better sort' whom tragedy imitates are or constitute the *differentia* (μιμῆσθαι being the genus). Just so here rhythm, speech, and melody, and their combinations, the ones we

²⁹⁸ The parallel in the *Gorgias*, 502c, τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, which is often cited, is not in point. Μέλος there = ἀρμονία, one of the elements of song, whereas in our passage (cf. the unmistakable parallel in chap. 6) it means 'song,' the compound of the three elements.

²⁹⁹ The singular μέτρον appears 18 times elsewhere in the *Poetics*. One of these, 26. 62b7, involves an entirely different meaning; nine (1. 47b13, 18; 4. 48b31, 32, 49a24; 22. 58b16; 24. 59b31, 33; 26. 62a15) place the word in a definite context so that it refers to a particular kind of verse, e.g., the hexameter, the trimeter; and seven (1. 47b15; 4. 49a21; 5. 49b9, 11; 9. 51b3; 23. 59a17; 24. 59b18) refer to 'verse' in general. Nowhere does it mean what we call 'meter,' i.e., the abstract pattern of longs and shorts which constitutes the structure of the verse. That is ῥυθμός, not μέτρον. See below on 4. 48b21.

³⁰⁰ Also, in all probability, of Σ: Tkatsch, 2. 61a.

³⁰¹ *Metaph.* 17. 1057b7; *Top.* 6. 6. 143b8, 19. The *differentiae* are essential, not accidental, determinations, *ibid.*, 144a24; they belong to the category of substance, *ibid.*, 8. 2. 153a17. See further Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics* (Eng. transl. of *Phil. d. Gr.* 2. 2, London, 1897), 1. 215 f., n. 1.

CHAPTER 2

48a1-9

ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ
 τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἦθη σχεδὸν
 αἰεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις) [κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ
 ἦθη διαφέρουσι πάντες], ἦτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς; ἢ χεί-
 5 ρονας <μιμοῦνται> | [ἢ καὶ τοιούτους] ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς.
 Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους [Διο-
 νύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους] εἵκαζεν, δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν
 ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἐξει τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἔσται
 ἕτερα τῷ ἕτερα μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

48a1

And since the imitators imitate men in action, and such
 persons are necessarily men of either high or low character
 —because they, and they alone, almost always develop de-
finite characters [for all men differ in badness and goodness
 of character] — <they imitate> men either above or below
 5 the average | [or also men like (it?)], as the painters do.
 For Polygnotus used to paint men better than the average
 and Pauson men who were worse [and Dionysius represent-
 ative ones], and it is evident that each of the forms of imita-
 tion mentioned above also will have these differentiations
 within it and will be different by virtue of imitating different
 objects in this way.

Although in proceeding from the media to the objects of imitation we are moving up the scale of value or significance, Aristotle's method will remain essentially the same: that is, bilateral division. But in this case also the principle has been obscured by interpolations in the text. The general course of thought is: as in painting, so also in the arts that concern us there are certain possible objects of imitation. The parallel with chapter 1 (analogy between poetic and graphic arts) is evident. But the difficulties of interpretation are at least as formidable as they were there. This first passage in particular is a thicket full of blind paths. The three chief problems are:

1. What is the syntax of the passage? Is it all one sentence, and if so where is the main clause?

2. What is the relation, in grammar and in thought, between *ἤτοι βελτίονας κτλ.* and the preceding *ἀνάγκη ... ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι*?

3. What is the status of the third class of objects, the *τοιούτοι* or *δμοιοι*?

These three questions are closely interconnected and we shall have to wind a devious way among them. It will be most efficient, however, to begin with the second.

Why is the division into *σπουδαῖοι* and *φαῦλοι*, as stated in the second clause, a necessary one (*ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους*)? Butcher's translation will serve to illustrate the usual understanding of how the argument runs: "Since the objects of imitation are men in action, and these men must be either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral differences), it follows that..."¹ The general idea of this is clear. Poetry imitates men; men in general fall into two classes, better and worse (higher and lower); hence poetry imitates men who are better or worse.... This reading (which, as I indicated, is representative) makes *ἀνάγκη δὲ κτλ.* depend in thought on the two clauses that follow (*τὰ γὰρ ἤθη κτλ.* and *κακία γὰρ κτλ.*). The link between it and them is *τούτοις*, α3, which is taken as referring to the *idea of differentiation* expressed in *ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους* ("these divisions")—an idea which is then restated in *κακία καὶ ἀρετῆ διαφέρουσι πάντες*.

This alleged train of thought will not bear inspection. Its primary fault, aside from the strained interpretation of *τούτοις*, is that it ignores the key word *πράττοντας*. In so doing it misses the whole nexus of the argument. Aristotle is not simply making some general statements about *men*, he is stating a deduction from the concept of men *acting*.² *Τούτους* refers to *πράττοντας* in this sense: "and (since) they (that is, men *acting*) must necessarily be either *σπουδαῖοι* or *φαῦλοι*"; and *τούτοις* does so once again: "for (distinct) characters

¹ I have purposely omitted the rest in order to keep the tripartite-bipartite difficulty from intruding immediately.

² Cf. below on 6. 49b31 ff., where the commentators have missed an equally strict and equally important series of deductions from the same concept, but in heightened form: men acting, i.e., men *enacting their own action*.

almost always attend on (attach themselves to)³ them (i.e., men who act) alone." In short, both pronouns refer to the concept of action embodied in *πράττοντας*, but concretely (persons acting); not to the abstract principle of division implied in *ἡ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους*.

This connection of thought has been effectively veiled by the presence of the next clause, *κακία γὰρ ... πάντες*, which we, following Gudeman,⁴ will diagnose as an interpolated note. It is in fact a paraphrase of *τὰ γὰρ ἦθη ... μόνοις*. Its author found the latter a dark saying and could only interpret it as an involved way of stating the division of all mankind into good and bad.⁵ With his annotation removed, Aristotle's central idea emerges in full clarity.

[But is it true that men acting, and only they, pretty much always develop clearly defined characters?⁶ Yes, the fundamental principle of Aristotle's theory of character-development is that *we become what we do*, that our acts harden into character.⁷ Moreover acts of the same class, performed in a different spirit or a different way, lead to *opposite* states of character: "It is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest.... This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing [*πράττοντας*] the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust.... Some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances."⁸]

³ For the expression cf. *De Sensu* 1. 436b13; *Hist. An.* 8. 1. 590a15; *De Gen. An.* 4. 1. 764a28; *Pol.* 4. 8. 1293b37; *E. E.* 2. 8. 1224b31; other refs. in Bonitz, *Index*, s. v. ἀκολουθεῖν.

⁴ *Krit. Anhang*, p. 461. All the more credit is due to Gudeman for recognizing the interpolation because he had no idea of Aristotle's meaning and did not see what the athetesis does to clarify the argument.

⁵ I.e., he too missed the point of *πράττοντας*, like the modern interpreters whom he has helped to mislead.

⁶ Tkatsch, 2, 41: "Denn aus dem Umstande, dass Handelnde Objekt der Darstellung sind..., folgt nicht, dass diese Handelnde *σπουδαῖοι* oder *φαῦλοι* sind," misses the link which the third clause provides between the other two.

⁷ *E. N.* 2. 1. 1103a31: "But the virtues we get by first exercising them [*ἐνεργήσαντες*]... We become just by doing [*πράττοντες*] just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts" (Ross's translation).

⁸ *Ibid.*, b8-21; cf. 2. 1104a20-b3. Notice the close ideological and verbal parallel between the summary, b22-23 (*διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι · κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τοῦτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις*) and our passage in the *Poetics*. It should be noticed that the same ideas appear

That is why, as Aristotle emphasizes in the same passage, it is so important what cast is given to the activities of the young: because they will inevitably turn out either good or bad as a result of them.⁹ (No allowance is made, we notice, for the character turning out neither good nor bad but middling.) ?

There can be no doubt, then, that in Aristotle's ethical theory action and action alone shapes character. But it may be objected that it is not the purpose of literature—at least of Greek literature—to portray the shaping of character;¹⁰ that the short time that normally elapses in a play or a poem would not permit it; and that in any case Aristotle firmly excludes any primary interest in character.¹¹ All this is quite true. Aristotle does not believe that literature exists for the display of character, any more than life itself does. But character goes with action in literature even more than it does in life. It is possible for a man in real life to perform a 'grammatical action,' but not 'grammatically';¹² in poetry, which deals with the universal tendencies of human character,¹³ it is a question whether such a laxity is permissible. Still, Aristotle himself remarks (6. 50a24) that most of the tragedies of his own day were "characterless," and we cannot press any interpretation which threatens to shift the emphasis from action to character.

What we need is something that will establish a direct dependence of 'characters'—that is, the existence of diametrically opposed characters like *σπουδαῖος* and *φαῦλος*—on action; and for that purpose we need to define the special attributes of human action. There is no great difficulty about this. Aristotle is fond of opposing action, *πρᾶξις*, to speculation (*θεωρία*) on the one hand and production (*ποι-*

in the *Eudemian Ethics*, 2. 1. 1220a22-34, and so cannot be put down simply as a late development in Aristotle's thinking.

⁹ *E. N.* 3. 7. 1114a3-21 emphasizes the fatality of the process still more. A choice is open at the beginning, but the confirmed cheat or drunkard cannot change his ways: *γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι* (sc. *ἀδίκους, ἀκολάστοις*, etc.).

¹⁰ No doubt the *Telemachia* can be appreciated as a *Bildungsroman* (see Jaeger's analysis in the first volume of *Paideia*, pp. 20-39), and Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes* visibly undergoes an educational experience. But these are exceptions.

¹¹ 6. 50a20: the persons of the drama are not there to reveal their characters, but "include" the characters (for the meaning of *συμπεριλαμβάνουσι* see below *ad loc.*) for the sake of their actions.

¹² *E. N.* 2. 3. 1105a22-26.

¹³ 9. 51b6. The universal is explicitly defined in the next line as speech or action as determined by character.

ησις) on the other.¹⁴ For our purpose, however, we can ignore the distinction between 'doing' and 'making,' which is real enough but secondary,¹⁵ and consider only the larger antithesis which exists between them both and the speculative reason.¹⁶ 'Speculative' and 'practical,' then, refer to two entirely different kinds of knowledge, one certain and precise (scientific, ἐπιστημονικόν), the other uncertain and inexact ('calculative,' λογιστικόν or δοξαστικόν), and concurrently to two different kinds of object, the one eternal and necessary, the other contingent and variable (ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, capable of being otherwise).¹⁷ Both terms denote activities, ἐνέργειαι; but the activity of θεωρία is to be distinguished sharply from that of πράττειν (and ποιεῖν).¹⁸ Contemplation is continuous, pure, unvarying, unwearied, self-sufficient, divine, being the activity of the divine in us.¹⁹ In that untroubled sphere the moral virtues—and vices—have no place: there is nothing they could be exercised on, no excuse for them, so to speak.²⁰ Similarly it is only in connection with the arts and the moral virtues, not the intellectual virtues, that Aristotle points out the paradoxical capacity of rational powers to do either of two contrary things or develop in either of two contrary directions.²¹ In other words the potentiality of becoming either good or bad, and the consequent fact that some people *are* (have become) good and others bad, is limited to the practical

¹⁴ For this tripartite division see *Top.* 6. 6. 145a15; *Metaph.* E1. 1025b25; Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* 2. 2. 177-178 (Eng. transl. 182-183).

¹⁵ *E. N.* 6. 4. 1140a2-17; 5. 1140b20-25; Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 2. 40-62.

¹⁶ Teichmüller, *op. cit.* 11-22.

¹⁷ *Anal. Post.* 1. 33. 88b30-89a10; *E. N.* 6. 2. 1139a6-15; G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle*, Oxford, 1932, 129; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*² 215-218; E. E. Spicer, *Aristotle's Conception of the Soul*, London, 1934, 190-198.

¹⁸ *E. N.* 10. 8. 1178b20. Θεωρία is pursued for its own sake, practical thinking for the sake of something else; see Teichmüller, *loc. cit.*, esp. 15, 22-23.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 7. 1177a19-b31.

²⁰ Aristotle illustrates this by the famous hypothetical question what need the gods would have of justice, courage, generosity, etc.: *ibid.* 8. 1178b7-23. Jaeger, pp. 73-74, has shown that this originally stood in the *Protrepticus* and is even better represented by Cicero *ap.* Augustin. *De Trinitate* (= *Ar. fr.* 58 Rose, 12 Walzer). Thus it is an early idea in Aristotle.

²¹ *E. N.* 2. 1, referred to above, n.8; *Metaph.* Θ2. 1046a36-b24; see the commentaries of Bonitz and Ross on the latter. The ambivalence of rational powers rests on the fact that they are λόγοι, and the λόγος of a thing views both the thing and its contrary. But not in the same sense; for the λόγος applies to the thing by virtue of the thing's own nature, καθ' αὐτό, but to its contrary only accidentally.

(and productive) sphere; it appertains to men so far as they are *πράττοντες*, not so far as they rise into the divine sphere of pure thought.

With this we have achieved the right point of vantage for interpreting our passage. *Μιμούνται πρᾶττοντας* does in fact signify more than that the persons imitated happen to be in action during the time they are being imitated. It refers to a status, a way of living, and not merely to a momentary state of activity. Poetry imitates men who *live at the level of action*, for whom action is the goal and the principle of life: "men in action," but also "men of action." It is evident that this provides a foundation for the inference that follows: "and they (such men) are necessarily either *σπουδαῖοι* or *φαῦλοι*, for (clearly defined, distinctive) characters nearly always attach to them (and to them) alone."

The limitation of the objects of imitation is important in another way also, outside the immediate context. Again and again we shall find it useful, in interpreting other passages, to remember that poetry imitates only men of action and has nothing to do with the life of thought as such;²² that if it is 'philosophical' it must be so in another sense; and that because poetry is a portrayal of the life of action the closest affinities with the *Poetics* will turn up in the other works that deal with the 'practical' sphere: the *Rhetoric*, the *Politics*, and especially the *Ethics*.²³

Aristotle, then, regards the antithesis *σπουδαῖοι - φαῦλοι* as derived or derivable from the concept of 'action' or 'life of action.' It remains to be determined what the two words mean, and whether they are exclusively moral terms. The antithesis is common in both of Aristotle's major ethical treatises and has all the earmarks of an habitual distinction;²⁴ it is also carried, without appreciable difference in meaning,

²² The Socrates of the Socratic dialogues (see above, c. I, n. 164) is a borderline case, because Socrates also lived and acted and did not merely think. See Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 96-97, 431-432, on the new type of philosopher, like Anaxagoras or Parmenides, who tended to replace Socrates as the idealized projection of the Academic way of life in Plato's later years—a type so purely abstracted and theoretical that there could not be and was not any real *μίμησις* of it in the form of 'Socratic' dialogue.

²³ *Eudemian* or *Nicomachean*, both or either.

²⁴ *Σπουδαῖος - φαῦλος* (more often plural than singular): *E. E.* 2. 1. 19 (=1219) b18-25; 4. 21b32-33; 7. 2. 38b3, 10-13; 7. 41a25; implied in 2. 11. 28a7 (cf. 14); 3. 5. 32b7; 7. 2. 37a16-17, b13; *E. N.* 3. 6. 13(=1113)a25; 7. 2. 45b8-10; 7. 3. 46a13-16; 7. 9. 51a27-28; 7. 15. 54a31-b2; implied, or stated wholly or partly in other terms, in 3. 6. 13a32-34; 3. 7. 13b14, 14b19-20; 4. 15. 28b21-25; 5. 7. 32a2-3; 7. 6.

by a number of other terms (*ἀγαθοί, ἐπιεικεῖς, χαρίεντες; κακοί, μοχθηροί, πονηροί, φορτικοί, οἱ πολλοί*).²⁵ The distinction is moral, but it is not merely or narrowly moral, if we can judge from passages later in the *Poetics* which—not in the sense of drastic revisions of the basic theory, but as supplements to it—make it clear that the hero of tragedy is to be good but not a saint and the hero of comedy 'bad' but not a villain.²⁶ Thus if we are not to set Aristotle down as a fool we must consider whether his original disjunction is in fact simply a moral division.

At first glance the antithesis looks Platonic, and indeed in a sense it is.²⁷ Plato is fond of setting the good or noble Few over against the feeble or ignorant or intemperate or vicious Many. He is even fond of sharpening the dichotomy to "the One-man-who-knows [i.e., Socrates] against the Many."²⁸ But this very practice tips Plato's hand and shows that his meaning is fundamentally different from Aristotle's. Plato's Few are the philosophers,²⁹ and philosophers are just the men whom Aristotle has tacitly excluded here. His *σπουδαῖοι* fall within the class of the *πράττοντες*, men of action. Hence in spite of the undoubted affinities between Plato's disjunction and Aristotle's, to find the real roots of the latter we have to go back beyond Plato to the old aristocratic but non-intellectual tradition of Homer, Theognis, and

48a23-b4; 7. 11. 52a21-24; 7. 12. 52b20; 8. 5. 57a17-19; 9. 2. 65a6-10; 9. 8. 68a31-33, 69a11-18, a35-b2; 9. 9. 70a8-15; 10. 6. 76b19-27; *Pol.* 3. 11. 1281b1, 10, 17. Naturally this list does not pretend to be exhaustive or definitive. The antithesis we are dealing with is so pervasive, and so Protean in its terminology, that it would be impossible to do it justice by statistical methods. Still, the references may serve to indicate how widely it ranges and how constantly *σπουδαῖος* alternates with other terms. See also Vahlen, *Beitrag*³ 267-268 (2. 164-165, n. 13 on chap. 15).

²⁵ Greek, like most languages, is richer in terms of abuse than terms of praise.

²⁶ 13. 53a7-9 for tragedy; see below *ad loc.*; 5. 49a32-37 for comedy. In the latter case the repetition of *φαῦλος* (*φαιλοτέρων*), and the transition which Aristotle manages between it and *γελοῖον*, show his desire to present the one as an aspect or 'part' of the other. It is an old question, of course, whether Aristotle begins with a purely moral division in chapter 2 and moves on towards a more broadly 'aesthetic' orientation, e.g., in chapter 13: see for example Butcher's judicious but not altogether satisfactory remarks, pp. 228-235.

²⁷ Even to the verbal parallel *σπουδαῖος-φαῦλος*, e.g., [*Ale.* 110e;] *Rep.* 4. 423d; 7. 519d; 10. 603c; *Phaedr.* 261b; *Laus* 6. 757a; 7. 814e.

²⁸ See, e.g., *Gorg.* 474a; *Symp.* 216b; *Phaedo* 65a.

²⁹ The antithesis between them and the Many rises to a special height and intensity in the picture of the philosopher against the world, *Rep.* 6. 492a-496e; *Theat.* 174b-176a.

Pindar. The dichotomy is mostly taken for granted in Homer: there are not many occasions when the heaven-wide gulf between heroes and commoners even has to be mentioned.³⁰ In the 'time of troubles' of the seventh and sixth centuries, on the other hand, the antithesis grows common. In Theognis it amounts to an obsession,³¹ and Solon, without being taken in by it, uses it as an objective, "going" designation for the two contending classes in Athens.³² There is no need to embroider on such a well-known fact. Greek thinking begins with and for a long time holds to the proposition that mankind is divided into 'good' and 'bad,' and these terms are quite as much social, political, and economic as they are moral. What interests us is two things: (1) the absoluteness of the dichotomy, and (2) the evidence of Aristotle's interest in it and sympathy with it.

The dichotomy is absolute and exclusive for a simple reason: it began as the aristocrats' view of society and reflects their idea of the gulf between themselves and the "others." In the minds of a comparatively small and close-knit group like the Greek aristocracy there are only two kinds of people, "we" and "they"; and of course "we" are the good people, the proper, decent, good-looking, right-thinking ones, while "they" are the rascals, the poltroons, the good-for-nothings—in short, everyone else. It is inherent in the idea and the terminology of the division that there cannot be any third class.³³

We know from two independent but interlocking pieces of evidence that Aristotle knew and sympathized with this older aristocratic, 'practical' ideal, not as superior to the contemplative, but at least as next best to it. It is the second of the 'three lives' to which he alludes

³⁰ Still, one finds 'good' (*εὐθλοί*) and 'bad' (*κακοί*) explicitly contrasted a fair number of times: B366, Z489, I319, Ω530, ζ189, θ553, σ488, ρ66, υ86, χ415.

³¹ *Ἀγαθῶν ... κακοῖσι*, 28-31, and *passim*. See Jaeger, *Paideia* I², 198 and n. 31; T. A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought*, London, 1951 (1952), 25. Aristotle quotes Theognis with approval on *συχῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*, *E. N.* 9. 9. 1170a11.

³² Fr. 23. 21 Diehl.

³³ And in fact we do not find any serious development of the idea of a middle class until the late fifth century, e.g., in *Eur. Suppl.* 238-245, although Phocylides had uttered the wish *μέσος ἐν πόλει εἶναι* (fr. 12 D.; cited by Aristotle himself, with approval, *Pol.* 4. 11. 1295b34) and Aeschylus had made God grant power to "everything middling" (*Eum.* 529). That the dichotomy goes deep and represents something basic in classical culture and the classical conception of man is eloquently argued in Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis* (Eng. transl. W. R. Trask, Princeton, 1953): see esp. pp. 21-22, 31-33, 41-49, on what Auerbach calls the "separation of styles."

in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,³⁴ but which are more clearly defined in the *Eudemian Ethics*³⁵ and, as Jaeger has shown,³⁶ go back to his early work the *Protrepticus*. These are the lives of contemplation, 'virtue,' and pleasure, or the philosophical, the political, and the apolaustic respectively. 'Virtue,' as the master-aim of the second life,³⁷ can be identified with the moral virtues in Aristotle's dichotomy 'intellectual-moral.' But its identification with the old heroic, aristocratic code of conduct is still more significant, even for Aristotle himself. Perhaps the best places to see this are the passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on the proud or 'great-souled' man³⁸ and on the necessity and right concept of self-love;³⁹ especially the latter, where the very essence of true self-love is reaching out for the ideal (*ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ*, 1169a5). Jaeger has defined this idea once for all in the thematic first chapter of his *Paideia* ("Nobility and Areté");⁴⁰ and he draws his material mainly from Aristotle, as the best conscious expositor of the old ideal of *aretê*. One remark of Jaeger's in particular demands quotation:⁴¹ "In many respects Aristotle, like the Greeks of all ages, has his gaze fixed on Homer's characters, and he develops his ideals after the heroic patterns."

The other piece of evidence for Aristotle's genuine devotion to the Homeric and aristocratic ideal of *aretê* is the famous fragment of his hymn in praise of Hermias, which again has been interpreted and set in its proper philosophical context by Jaeger.⁴² Here too *aretê*

³⁴ *E. N.* 1. 3. 1095b14-1096a5.

³⁵ *E. E.* 1. 4. 1215a25-b14.

³⁶ *Aristotle*³ 97-98, 235-236.

³⁷ *Ἄρετή* appears as the key term in the earlier version, *E. E.* 1215a34; in the later, *E. N.* 1095b23, it is replaced by *τιμῆ*, and *ἀρετή* (*ibid.* 29) is the ground or reason for the honor. This is a sophistication of the original scheme, where *ἀρετή* had the double meaning 'excellence' and 'reputation' or 'honor'—an ambiguity which is inherent in the old aristocratic ideal itself: see most recently Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer, Oxford, 1953, 158-160.

³⁸ *E. N.* 4. 7-9. 1123a34-1125a35. Here too, 1123b20, honor is made the key concept. Aristotle's special interest in and weakness for the *μεγαλόψυχος* is well known.

³⁹ *E. N.* 9. 8. 1168a28-1169b2.

⁴⁰ *Paideia* 1², 3-14. The whole chapter should be read.

⁴¹ P. 12. Cf. *id.*, "Der Grossgesinnte," *Die Antike* 7 (1931) 97-105, esp. 104.

⁴² *Aristotle*³ 118-319. The Greek text in Athen. 15. 696b-d; Diog. Laert. 5. 7; Didymus on Demosthenes. The most recent discussion of the "hymn," by C. M. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry*, Oxford, 1953, 138-150, though useful in defining its genre, does not contribute anything in particular for our question.

appears not as a state of character, a *ἕξις*, to use Aristotle's later terminology, but as an ideal, toilsome but much sought after, the fairest prize in life: Ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ, θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ. And the exemplars he cites are not Pythagoras and Socrates but the great heroes of poetry: Heracles, the Dioscuri, Achilles, Ajax. Again we must quote Jaeger: "Aristotle does not intend to deck out his friend in the pathetic paraphernalia of Homer's heroes. On the contrary, all Hellenic heroism ... appeared to him as the expression of *one single attitude towards life* [italics mine], an attitude which scales the heights of life only when it overcomes it."⁴³

These parallels and affiliations are sufficient, I think, to establish the meaning and bearing of ἡ σπουδαίου; ἡ φαύλου;. For clarity let us number the points:

1. The dichotomy is moral, but not in the Platonic, much less in a Christian sense.

2. It denotes, not virtue and vice as states, but two different attitudes toward virtue. The *σπουδαῖοι* are those who strive for it,⁴⁴ who spend their lives, and if necessary lose them, for the prize of *aretē*. The *φαῦλοι* are those who do not. They are not the vicious but the 'no-account,'⁴⁵ those who spend their lives making money, or "having fun," or both.

3. Thus the *σπουδαῖοι* are those who take themselves and life seriously and therefore can be taken seriously; the *φαῦλοι* are those who do not and cannot.⁴⁶

4. The dichotomy is, by the nature of the case, absolute and comprehensive. All men *who act*—i.e., all men engaged in the practical life—are necessarily either *σπουδαῖοι* or *φαῦλοι*; there is no room for a third class.⁴⁷

⁴³ *Loc. cit.* What we know about Aristotle and Alexander points in the same direction. "Lernte Alexander nicht als einer der ersten das Gedicht kennen...? Stand demnach Aretē nicht auch vor Alexanders Augen als ein Unsterblichkeitsgut, das besser sei als aller Besitz und hohe Geburt?... Wenn ihn später seine schöpferischen Intuitionen überfielen,... immer war es in der Tat auch die nämliche Sehnsucht, welche schon Aristoteles gezeichnet hatte, die Sehnsucht nach Aretē": F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse*, Graz-Salzburg-Vienna, 1949, 70.

⁴⁴ Σπουδαῖος is the adjective specifically coordinated with ἀρετή in Aristotle: *Categ.* 8. 10b7; cf. *Top.* 5. 3. 131b2.

⁴⁵ The Southern phrase is the nearest thing we have in English to an adequate translation of φαῦλος.

⁴⁶ Cf. *E. N.* 10. 6. 1176b27-1177a11.

⁴⁷ In spite of *Categ.* 10. 12a16, οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἦτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖα ἐστίν.

5. By the same token it expresses an absolute and irremediable difference in value.⁴⁸ The *σπουδαῖοι* are worthwhile, the *φαῦλοι* are 'no-account,' and never the twain shall meet; so likewise their respective representations in poetry.

6. Aristotle has particularly and consciously in mind the characters of Homer and tragedy on the one side and of parody and comedy on the other. That is, his two categories are not first established on abstract grounds and then tailored to fit literature, but are essentially derived from the latter to begin with. Or let us say rather, from the ideals of Greek life as they were embodied in literature. The *σπουδαῖοι* are the *heroes*,⁴⁹ the *φαῦλοι* are *οἱ πολλοί*, the great mass of ordinary earthlings.

7. A corollary of this in turn: The dichotomy *σπουδαῖοι - φαῦλοι*, though very Platonic in one sense, in another sense represents a revolt against Plato. Aristotle proposes to take seriously a kind of men, namely the heroes of poetry, whom Plato refused to take seriously.

The *Poetics* will follow the pattern of this *diaeresis*: tragedy and epic will be treated first, then 'iambic' and comedy. It will also show repeated apparent modifications of the key terms. But after what has just been said we can be prepared to find most of these not very serious. Aristotle's antithesis is not merely moral, in any narrow sense of the word. Political, social, and aesthetic elements are in it from the beginning, and it need not surprise us if they emerge more clearly later on.

The tripartite division which now appears, in 48a4-5 (*ἤτοι βελτίονας κτλ.*), is a different matter. Without warning, and without any justification except the analogy from painting, we are presented with three categories instead of two. Moreover this is the place where the syntactical problem (no. 1 above) confronts us. Is *ἤτοι βελτίονας κτλ.* the main clause of the sentence, with *μιμῶνται* or the equivalent to be restored or supplied, or is it simply a restatement in appositional form of *ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι*, with the main clause postponed until b7 (*δῆλον δέ*)? Montmollin, who surveys the grammatical problem

—The concept of the Mean, which Rostagni tries (bottom of p. 9) to identify with the *τοιούτοι*, has nothing to do with the case. If any group here represented the Mean, it would have to be the *σπουδαῖοι*.

⁴⁸ Cf. Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 2. 170, 181-184.

⁴⁹ Theophrastus knew what he was doing when he substituted *ἡρωικός* for Aristotle's *σπουδαῖος*: *τραγωδία ἐστὶν ἡρωικῆς τύχης περίστασις*, *Diomed. de Poemat.* 8. 1, p. 487 Kell (= CGF 57). For *σπουδαῖοι* = the heroes see Ed. Friedrichs, *Philol.* 29 (1870) 716-723.

with care, rightly points out⁵⁰ that such a tripartition is not prepared for in the preceding lines, and that it is inconsistent with the rest of the *Poetics*. His solution is to brand the whole of b4-6, *ἤτοι βελτιόνας ... εἰκαζεν*, a subsequent addition and make the main clause begin at b7.

This solution, although based on a correct premise, is unnecessarily radical. The tripartite division is indeed unprepared for and inconsistent with the rest of the *Poetics*.⁵¹ On the other hand the terms *βελτιόνας* (*ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς*) and *χείρονας* not only are unexceptionable but are needed here. They are echoed twice in this same chapter and several times elsewhere in the work,⁵² and this seems the most natural place for their initial appearance. Likewise the comparison with painting not only is not suspicious but seems very much *de rigueur* here, considering the pattern Aristotle followed in chapter 1. And finally *καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν μιμήσεων* calls imperatively for an immediately preceding mention of some other mimetic art or arts.⁵³

The only real difficulty in a4-7 is the third class, the *τοιούτοι* or *ὄμοιοι*. We have seen how strictly bilateral Aristotle's original division was, and why. If a third category appears here, it has been added, either by Aristotle himself or by somebody else.⁵⁴ That it has been added is also suggested by its position in both lists (at the end, not in the middle), and by the adverb *καί* (*ἢ καὶ τοιούτους*). It is relatively easy therefore to screen out *ἢ καὶ τοιούτους* and *Διονύσιος δὲ ὄμοιους* as additions to Aristotle's original text. The question is, who added them, and why? The starting-point, undoubtedly, was *βελτιόνας* (*χείρονας*) *ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς*. "Better than average," "worse than average," seem to imply the average as an independent category. Our question then becomes more specific: was it Aristotle or somebody

⁵⁰ Pp. 25-29.

⁵¹ Even with the passage which seems at first glance to support it: 15.54b8-14. There is no third *γένος* in Aristotle's historical sketch either (c.4), except possibly in the highly dubious passage on the *σατυρικόν*, 49a20; see below *ad loc.*

⁵² 48a11-14, 17-18 (this is a particularly clear case, *αὐτῇ τῇ διαφορᾷ* being, as we shall see, a direct allusion to the present passage; Montmollin, in accordance with his general theory, has to make that sentence also a subsequent addition); 13. 53a16-17, 33; 15. 54b9; cf. also 26. 61b28.

⁵³ It is not merely a question of *καί*. Even without it, the whole structure of Aristotle's sentence makes some comparison between poetry and other arts necessary.

⁵⁴ Sykutris' suggestion that the bipartite division is analytical and the tripartite synthetic is interesting but not convincing.

else who drew this inference and expressed it in *ἢ καὶ τοιοῦτους?* There are two ways of answering the question, one abstract, by analysis of the idea implied in *τοιοῦτοι* (*ὁμοιοι*), the other concrete, by consideration of the evidence for Dionysius the painter.

Τοιοῦτοι and *ὁμοιοι* can refer to either of two very different things: (1) a separate class of objects of imitation (people who are like us), or (2) a separate way of representing the objects (pictures that look like us).⁵⁵

In the first case we are dealing with a characteristic of the people who are imitated, in the second case with a characteristic of the imitation. Now from everything we have said it is obvious that Aristotle ought to intend the first of these two meanings, namely that the *τοιοῦτοι* are a third class of people alongside the *βελτιότες* and the *χείρονας*; for without such an objectively given category his scheme of the differentiations of poetry collapses. But an unprejudiced reading of the passage will show, I think, that the phrases we are considering have the other meaning.⁵⁶ *Ἡ καὶ τοιοῦτους* may be doubtful, but *Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμολους* seems pretty clearly to mean that Dionysius produced portraits 'like' us,⁵⁷ i.e., realistic ones. The authentic Aristotelian view on this subject is in chapter 15, 54b10-13, *ὁμολους ποιούσιντες ... τοιοῦτους ὄντας*: the poet's portraits are to be more beautiful but also 'like.' *Ὅμοιος*, then, in Aristotle's usage, refers to a quality of the representation, a quality which is a factor of the artist's skill and is not correlated with any single class of *imitandi*. In our passage, on the other hand, if that is all that *ὁμολους* means, the writer has not noticed the inconsistency of setting this alongside the other two categories as if it were a class comparable with them. But in that case the writer cannot be Aristotle.

This inference is strengthened when we consider the known facts about "Dionysius." Generally, and perforce, it is assumed that he is the Dionysius mentioned by Aelian⁵⁸ as a contemporary of Polygnotus,

⁵⁵ The modern editors and translators lean now to the one (e.g., Bywater: "the agents represented must be either above our own level... or just such as we are"), now to the other (e.g., Butcher: "we must represent men either as better than in real life,... or as they are"; Hardy, "Ils les représentent ou meilleurs que nous..."), but without—it seems to me—being clear about the difference.

⁵⁶ Not so the references to the other two categories. There is no reason to doubt that the *κρείττονας* of Polygnotus, for example, are intended in the same sense as *σπουδαίους* above, namely that Polygnotus imitated the heroes—as indeed we know he did.

⁵⁷ Cf. Theophr. *Char.* 2, 12, *καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ὁμοίαν* (absolutely: "like").

⁵⁸ *Var. Hist.* 4, 3.

who imitated the latter's work with respect to "precision," *pathos* and *ethos*, the use of figures (*σχημάτων*: perhaps 'postures'), refinement of drapery, etc.: in everything, in fact, "except its grandeur" (*πλήν τοῦ μεγέθους*). But it is highly improbable that a contemporary of Polygnotus, and one whose art was modeled so closely on his, took as his subjects an entirely different kind of people.⁵⁹ On the contrary, everything points to Dionysius having painted the same heroic subjects, but without the grandeur appropriate to them.⁶⁰ If this is the man, then, *ὁμοίους* will refer to his *style* of painting and is not in place here.

But it is at least equally possible that he is not the man. Pliny⁶¹ tells us of a Dionysius who was a busy and fashionable portrait-painter at Rome during Varro's youth, that is, around 100 B.C.—adding that the picture-galleries were still full of his work in his (Pliny's) time. This Dionysius, moreover, is almost certainly to be identified with the one mentioned elsewhere by Pliny,⁶² who "painted nothing but human beings [i.e., was exclusively a portrait-painter] and for that reason got the sobriquet '*anthropographos*.'" Here we have a man who really did paint only a certain class of objects, viz., *ἀνθρώποι* (= "like us").⁶³ The appropriateness to our context is obvious. It is also obvious that if this is the Dionysius meant in a6, the reference not only is spurious but post-dates the year 100 B.C.

We cannot be sure which Dionysius is meant, but the facts we have recited should at least establish some plausibility for the argument that it was not Aristotle who mentioned him.⁶⁴

I conclude that *ἡ καὶ τοιούτους* and *Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους* are interpolations. We can now consider the construction of the clause and the sentence. There is nothing inherently impossible about delaying the main clause until *δῆλον δὲ κετλ.*, a7,⁶⁵ if a satisfactory construction

⁵⁹ See H. Brunn, *Gesch. d. gr. Künstler*², Stuttgart, 1889, 2. 34 n. 1.

⁶⁰ Plutarch, *Timol.* 36, speaks of the sense of strain or effort that one got from his work: no doubt from his trying so hard to keep up to the heroic level.

⁶¹ *N. H.* 35. 148.

⁶² *Ibid.* 113. For the identification see Brunn, *loc. cit.* and p. 205.

⁶³ Pliny makes his remark by way of contrasting D. with Serapion, who was also an excellent stage—or scene—painter.

⁶⁴ An additional consideration, though not a very strong one in itself, is that Aristotle mentions Polygnotus and Pauson together in the *Politics* also (8. 5. 1340a36), and in the same sense as here (Polygnotus *ἡθικὸς* and suitable for the young, Pauson not; cf. also *Poet.* 6. 50a28), but says nothing about Dionysius.

⁶⁵ For examples of Aristotle's fondness for long sentences, esp. ones beginning with *ἐπεὶ*, see below on 6. 49b36-50a10; 7. 50b34-51a6; and cf., e.g., *E. N.* 1. 6. 1098a7-18. And anyhow our atheteses shorten the subordinate part considerably.

can be found for everything that precedes. But it seems to me impossible merely to supply *μιμῶνται* in a4 (with *ἦτοι βελτίονας κτλ.*) from a1,⁶⁶ after the constructions that have intervened (*ἀνάγκη δὲ ... εἶναι; τὰ γὰρ ἦθη ... ἀκολουθεῖ*), and especially to make the further clause *ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς* depend on it. Under these conditions the verb ought actually to be restated, and our athetesis of *ἦ καὶ τοιούτους* suggests a plausible reason for restoring it to the text: that Aristotle wrote it but it was crowded out by the interpolation. Hence I propose *ἦ χείρονας <μιμῶνται>*.⁶⁷ This in turn gives us a symmetrical sentence ending with *ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς*, and another one (*Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ ..., δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ...*) to conclude the passage. The second sentence is chiasmic to the first: (1) the poets necessarily imitate two different kinds of men, as the painters do; (2) for Polygnotus and Pauson represented different types, and the same division will naturally appear in the poetic arts also.

48a9-18

- καὶ γὰρ ἐν [ὄρχήσει καὶ] ἀυλῆσει καὶ | καθαρίσει ἔστι
γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας · καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους
δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, [Κλεο-
φῶν δὲ ὁμοίους,] Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος ὁ τὰς παρωδίας
ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλιάδα χείρους.
15 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς | νό-
μους · ὥσπερ γὰρ Κέκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος μι-
μήσαιτο ἂν τις. ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγωδία
πρὸς τὴν κωμῶδιαν διέστηκεν · ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἢ δὲ
βελτίους μιμῆσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

48a9

- And in fact it is possible for these dissimilarities to appear
10 in [dancing and] flute- and | lyre-playing, and in connection
with prose works and unaccompanied verses: Homer for
example better men [and Cleophon representative ones] and
Hegemon of Thasos, the first composer of 'parodies,' and
Nicochares, the author of the *Deiliad*, worse ones. And the
15 same way with dithyrambs and with | nomos also: for one
can imitate the way Timotheus and Philoxenus did (their)
Cyclopes. Tragedy too follows the very line of demarcation,

⁶⁶ See Tkatsch 2. 40b, against Vahlen.

⁶⁷ Hardy also inserts *μιμῶνται*, but before *ἦ χείρονας*, where there is no visible reason for its having been lost.

in relation to comedy; for the latter tends naturally to imitate men worse, the former to imitate men better, than the average.

The "aforementioned imitations" (a7) were of course the poetic and allied arts mentioned in the previous chapter. Aristotle does not assert that they themselves are defined by differences in the object, but that such differences will appear *within* them (*ἐξει... τὰς διαφοράς*): in other words, that the differentiation according to object establishes potential subspecies within the species outlined in chapter 1. In only one case—tragedy and comedy—does the new division coincide with a recognized genre distinction, and this case is not really different from the others, since tragedy and comedy are really subspecies also and were named in chapter 1 only because their species (the drama) had no recognized name. As we shall see, this is the exception that proves the rule: Aristotle has taken a distinction which was actually embodied in one genre-division and shown that it exists at least potentially within other species as well. In so far as it does exist there, the other species will have distinct⁶⁸ potential subspecies also: so for dancing,⁶⁹ flute-playing, etc. The examples reach as far as a15, *περὶ τοὺς νόμους*. Thus *περὶ τοὺς λόγους κτλ.*, a10-14, and *ὁμοίως δὲ κτλ.*, a14-15, both depend on *ἔστι γενέσθαι*, a10.⁷⁰

After this sentence, the arts of (dancing and) instrumental music are forgotten, and so are the prose imitations (*λόγοι*).⁷¹ In spite of the open-mindedness of chapter 1, Aristotle really intends to deal only with the conventional major genres of 'poetry' after all. It is therefore a question whether the *λόγοι* are exemplified even here. So far as we can see they are not, except possibly in the case of Cleophon.⁷² But this question is overshadowed by another: whether the first set

⁶⁸ *Ἐτέρα*, b8, has its full meaning. See above on *ἐτέροις*, I, 47a17.

⁶⁹ Holding to the principle accepted above, p. 35, that *ὀρχήσει* here must stand or fall with 47a26-28, I have indicated it too as a subsequent addition by Aristotle. But I do not feel sure that it might not have been written in the original draft, even if dancing was not mentioned in chapter 1. Aristotle might well have remembered the imitative dancing over which Plato raised his eyebrows in the *Laws*, 7. 815c: that which portrayed drunken nymphs and satyrs, etc. A *φαύλων μιμητικὴ ὀρχησις* is also implied in 26. 62a8.

⁷⁰ The general resemblance to *οὐδέ[ν] γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι ..., οὐδέ εἰ τις ..., ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τις*, I. 47b9-20, is noticeable.

⁷¹ See Montmoulin 29.

⁷² Gudeman's suggestion that *λόγους* refers to poetry here, *καί* being epexegetic ("tales and works in spoken verse" ?), is unfortunate, as is also his reference to *τριλογία* and *τετραλογία*.

of examples is authentic at all. There is a considerable list of objections to *οἶον Ὅμηρος ... χείρους*. Perhaps it will be most convenient to list them serially:

1. There is no construction for these nouns. Naturally we can supply *ἐμιμείτο*, or perhaps, because of the similarity in phrasing,⁷³ *εἶκαζεν* (from 26). But whatever verb it is, the construction conflicts rather obtrusively with the governing *ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας*.

2. In the rest of the sentence, and indeed throughout this part of the *Poetics*, it is a question of *arts*, not of individual authors.⁷⁴

3. Homer figures here as imitator of 'better' men only. Not a word is said about the *Margites* and the other comic works on which Aristotle insists so much in chapter 4. Yet they would have served his purpose at least as well as Hegemon or Nicochares, perhaps even better, since his point is that the differentiation in question can turn up within a single form of imitation.

4. It is a little strange to find a writer of *παρῳδία* subsumed under *ψιλομετρία*. But this is not very serious. Hegemon had been a rhapsode himself⁷⁵ and undoubtedly developed the new genre after discovering through the regular recitations that he had comic talent (Victor Borge and Alec Templeton would be modern parallels in the field of *ψιλή κιθάρισις*). Hence *παρῳδός* may have begun as a nonce-designation of Hegesias himself ('parode' instead of 'rhapsode'), carrying no more implication of singing than its original did at that time.⁷⁶

⁷³ Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσιων δὲ χείρους ~ Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους κτλ.

⁷⁴ It is true that Timotheus and Philoxenus are mentioned in the next clause. But we shall see that that mention is attuned to Aristotle's syntax and idea: it is possible (*μιμήσαιο ἄν τις ~ ἔστι γενέσθαι κτλ.*) to imitate high and low types within the same over-all genre, *in the way T. and P. did it: ὡσπερ (sc. ἐμιμήσαντο) μιμήσαιο ἄν τις*. Here, on the other hand, the author has gone out of his way to specify people, e.g., "Hegemon, the first who wrote parodies," where a reference to the genre itself would have been sufficient and more proper; and the syntax conflicts directly with the governing construction.

⁷⁵ See lines 9-10 of the fragment preserved by Athenaeus, 15. 698c ff., and cf. P. Brandt, *Parodorum Epicorum Graecorum... Reliquiae*, Leipzig, 1888, 38.

⁷⁶ There is no evidence that Hegesias used any verses except hexameters (a *Gigantomachia*, Athen. 669a) and trimeters. The story preserved by a paroemlographer (*Paroem. Gr.* 1. 406 Leutsch-Schneidewin), that when he got stuck in reciting he would throw in *καὶ τὸ Πέρδικος σκέλος*, would indicate that his habitual meter, at least at Athens, was the trimeter. Rostagni's notion that the *Gigant.* must have had a musical-dramatic character, because it was presented in the

5. The only Nicochares otherwise known to us was a comic poet (CAF 1. 770), and it is perhaps unlikely that a comic poet would produce a hexameter parody (as a *Deiliad* or *Deliad* surely would be). But our conclusions about Chaeremon and the *Centaur* should warn us not to dogmatize about the limits of originality in the fourth century, and anyhow this may be a different Nicochares.

6. Cleophon is the puzzle of puzzles. First, as to the genre he wrote in. Aristotle mentions Cleophon⁷⁷ three times elsewhere, twice with reference to his style. In *Poetics* 22. 58a20 it is described as "low" (ταπεινή) and made up of common words, like that of Sthenelus. In the *Rhetoric*, on the other hand (3. 7. 1408a14), Aristotle derides Cleophon's fondness for attaching an inappropriate ornamental or pretentious epithet (κόσμος) to a "cheap" word (εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι), "as if one should say, 'Lady Fig-tree'." Suidas also cites a Cleophon, a tragic poet, and gives a list of play-titles; but we cannot tell where Suidas got his information and the list is perhaps suspicious.⁷⁸ There is nothing in either Aristotelian passage to identify Cleophon as necessarily a tragic poet;⁷⁹ he may have written epic poetry, or at least something in epic verse. But the mention of him here presupposes notoriety or distinction of some kind, viz., that Cleophon in some memorable way portrayed a middle kind of people between the *βελτίονες* and the *χείρονες*. And not only have we no other evidence for his having done

'thymelic' contests, is not at all cogent. See Aly, PW 6A. 701.--F. W. Householder, Jr., CP 39 (1944) 8, dates the coinage of *παρφόδος* earlier but conceives of it as happening in the way suggested here.

⁷⁷ Surely, one has to assume, the same man.

⁷⁸ It is almost identical with that given (also by Suidas) for Iophon: see Bywater, JP 12 (1883) 17-30. But Schmid suggests, 1. 2. 513 n. 10, that the attribution to Cleophon is more plausible, because under his name the titles are in alphabetical order.

⁷⁹ Sthenelus was one: see Aristoph. *Wasps* 1313 and Gudeman *ad loc.*, p. 370. But Aristotle may have wished to cite examples of low diction from both tragedy and epic: certainly both are treated in chaps. 20-22. The phrase which Aristotle cites to illustrate inappropriateness in style, viz. *πότνια σικίη*, is a hexameter tag so far as its rhythm goes; the inappropriateness is not in its being used in hexameters but in *πότνια* being attached to a word for "fig-tree." In 22. 59a14, *κόσμος* (of which *πότνια* is presumably an example) is said to be among the verbal effects which are especially appropriate to iambic verse. But it is also among those useful in heroic verse: *ibid.* 11, where *ἅπαντα τὰ εἰρημμένα* refers to the lists in 58a22, 32. Lane Cooper studies the term *κόσμος* in *Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of Edward Kennard Rand*, New York, 1938, 61-77; most of his Greek examples are from Homer, i.e., the epic.

anything so outstanding, but the passage in the *Rhetoric*, the only one that gives any hint of his subjects, seems pretty clearly to imply that they were as vulgar as his language.⁸⁰ The third Aristotelian reference to him, finally, *Sophistic Refutations* 15. 174b27, appears to prove nothing one way or the other, since Bywater is generally agreed to have demonstrated⁸¹ that the *Mandrobulus* was a dialogue by Speusippus and Cleophon was a speaker in it, not the author.⁸²

Thus the reference to Cleophon seems weak and suspicious even above the others; yet there is nothing absolutely decisive against it except the fact that it presupposes the tripartite division in a4-6 and must therefore be spurious on that ground.⁸³ As for the objections we have listed against the rest of the examples, none of them is overwhelming, and I think we shall have to declare *ολον* "Ομηρος ... χειρους, except for the three words *Κλεοφών δὲ ὁμοίους*, suspicious but not proved spurious.

The next two lines, a14-16, might serve on the other hand as a textbook example of the harm that can be done to a text by the determination to read into it something that is not there: in this case the tripartite division. Interpretation and emendation have centered around the obviously corrupt *ὡσπερ γὰρ κυκλωπᾶς*, and have been guided almost always by the explicit or tacit assumption that Aristotle wrote three poets' names, representing three varieties of object, one of which has been lost.⁸⁴ The most perennially popular emendation has been

⁸⁰ *Τὸ δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐλόγων ἀποκαθόλου λέγεται μήτε περὶ εὐτελεῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὄνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος. Σουκῆ* is precisely a "vulgar word," and *πότνια* is precisely an ornamental epithet. It would seem that Cleophon's style was in general low, but set off now and then by a pretentious epithet.

⁸¹ *Loc. cit.*

⁸² Incidentally, this helps to dispose of the notion—not very plausible anyhow—that Cleophon figures in our passage as a writer of dialogues (*λόγοι*).

⁸³ I cannot make any suggestion how the note originated, except a very hesitant one. The anonymous paraphrast on the *Soph. El.* (ed. Hayduck, *Comm. in Ar. Graeca*, 23. 4, Berlin, 1885), who furnished Bywater with one important link in his solution of the *Mandrobulus* problem, just possibly did think that Cleophon was the author of the dialogue: *ibid.*, p. 40, 14, *ὡσπερ Κλ. ποιῆ ἐν τῷ Μ. τῷ Πλατωνικῷ διαλόγῳ*; cf. 22 ff., *ὅπερ ὁ Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστὴς πεποίηκε... καὶ ὁ Ἰσοκράτης... καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ*. If this idea of Cleophon as a writer of Platonic dialogues did exist, it may have encouraged our annotator to cite him (he might have hesitated to classify Plato so) as a *μιμητὴς ὁμοίων*.

⁸⁴ Sykutris is an exception among recent editors: see his note *ad loc.* But although he holds correctly to the dichotomy, he resorts to an unnecessary conjecture (*ὡσπερ ἐραστάς*).

Castelvetro's Ἄργαῖς (ὥσπερ <Ἄρ>γαῖς Κύκλωπας <καί>⁸⁶ Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος), though some have preferred the even obscurer Oenopas or Oenonas.⁸⁶ Either solution leaves serious difficulties. *Μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις* goes poorly with *περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους κτλ.* and has in fact been athetized by several editors as a superfluous gloss;⁸⁷ and the syntactical relation between this supposed main clause and ὥσπερ Ἄργαῖς ... Φιλόξενος (*sc. ἐμίμησαντο*) is obscure, to say the least. Nor do the three names apportion themselves satisfactorily among the supposed three kinds of object. Timotheus almost certainly stands for *μιμῆσθαι βελτίονας*; but which poet gets the doubtful honor of representing the *χειρόνες*? Usually the award goes to the little-known Argas, who seems to have been a feeble poetaster. Actually, however, we do not even know whether he wrote a *Cyclops* (or *Cyclopes*), or how he treated the subject if he did.⁸⁸

The general determination to find three varieties of object here has prevented acceptance of the simplest and best of all the solutions, Vahlen's emendation of γὰς to γάρ.⁸⁹ The main clause is *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς νόμους* (*sc. ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας*), to which ὥσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας Τ. καὶ Φ. (*sc. ἐμίμησαντο*) *μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις* is added by way of explanation and justification: "that is, one can imitate the way Timotheus and Philoxenus (imitated) Cyclopes."

What Aristotle is saying is not that two entirely different kinds of dithyramb or nome actually exist, but that a differentiation according to the two kinds of object is possible (*ἔστι γενέσθαι*) within the genres and was foreshadowed in the two very different representations of

⁸⁶ With a third poet's name before *Κύκλωπας*, Rostagni's *καί* seems unavoidable.

⁸⁶ Rostagni *ad loc.*

⁸⁷ Supposedly suggested by or anticipating *μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις*, a20; but the supposition is not convincing.

⁸⁸ The judgment of Phaenias of Eresus (Athen. 14. 638c), that Argas was a *ποιητῆς μοχθηρῶν νόμων*, seems to refer to the quality of his work, not to the moral level of his characters. The fragment of Alexis which refers to him (*ibid.*) seems in fact to imply a high and solemn cast to his subjects, by putting his poems in the same class—though a day's journey behind them—with the *σεμνὰ πάντα ᾄσματα* of Telenicus. It is not clear that Oenopas represents a real difference of object (from Philoxenus) either.

⁸⁹ *Sitzungsber.* Berlin 1897, 630-634 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 2. 481-486). Vahlen's philological sense is shown by the fact that his acceptance of the tripartite scheme for the chapter as a whole did not prevent him from explaining the sentence and Aristotle's meaning correctly in every essential detail.

Polyphemus (for it is he) by Timotheus and Philoxenus respectively. The allocation of the two poets then makes no difficulty: Timotheus unquestionably represents the higher mode, Philoxenus the lower.⁹⁰ Whether Aristotle also wished to cite representatives of both genres of lyric, dithyramb and nome, we cannot tell for sure, but it seems likely enough.⁹¹

The bilateral division here, once recognized, is a powerful argument for our athetesis of the third class of objects above, in a4-6; for Aristotle shows no sign of having heard of three classes when he wrote these lines.⁹² A still more cogent proof is the last clause, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ κτλ. Here αὐτῇ has been harried by generations of emenders, Casaubon's ταύτῃ being the most popular correction. But αὐτῇ is perfectly sound and refers squarely to the dichotomy βελτίονες - χείρονες. In the lyric the division could be discerned only as a tendency, in the treatment of figures such as the two Polyphemuses. It is found in

⁹⁰ Timotheus' σεμνότης is well known, and we hear of no major parodistic or unheroic portrayals by him (minor characters are perhaps another matter: Willamowitz, *Tim. Die Perser* 60, calls the representation of the Phrygian in lines 162-173 a μμείσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον in the sense of our chapter). We may guess that his Cyclops had some of the noble traits which are already suggested in the *Odyssey*, but more clearly—and more sentimentally—developed. Philoxenus' poem, on the other hand, was notoriously satirical, with the Cyclops = Dionysius I and Galatea = his mistress (Phaenias *ap. Athen.* 1. 6e; Hermesianax, *ibid.* 13. 598e; Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.* 290). It is well known that Polyphemus in love especially tickled the fancy of the Alexandrians; see A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus*, Cambridge, 1950, 2. 118 (on Theoc. 6). Since Philoxenus himself figured in his own poem, as Odysseus, the μίμησις χείρωνων presumably extended only to the title role, and on the face of it *Κύκλωπας* includes only the Polyphemus of each poem. Thus it is doubly clear that Aristotle is speaking of a tendency, which appeared here in two conveniently contrasting title-figures, rather than of an established character appertaining to whole poems.

⁹¹ Philoxenus's poem was certainly a dithyramb; cf. Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.* 290 (no ancient authority except Polybius, 4. 20. 8, speaks of P. having written nomes). Timotheus was best known as a writer of nomes, but also composed dithyrambes (Suidas). The *Scylla* was a dithyramb (*Poet.* 15. 54a31; 26. 61b32; *Rhet.* 3. 14. 1415a11; references to others in Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca* 3^a, London and Cambridge, 1940 [Loeb], 299-301). The order in Aristotle's sentence (dithyramb, nome; Timotheus, Philoxenus) may be intended as chiasmic; cf. the next sentence.

⁹² Against any attempt to argue that the dichotomy in a14-16 harks back exclusively to the beginning of the first sentence (ἡ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους) and so leaves room for an independent tripartition in a4-6, it is sufficient to point out that the terminology in the present sentence very clearly echoes a4-6 (βελτίους... χείρους, a11-14; χείρους... βελτίους, a17-18).

the drama also,⁹³ but this time as an actual division between full-fledged genres.⁹⁴ Thus the drama brings Aristotle's examples to a climactic but natural close.

In this connection the expression βούλεται μιμῆσθαι deserves special notice. Aristotle often uses βούλεται, especially βούλεται εἶναι, to denote the inherent tendency of a species to attain or express its real nature.⁹⁵ The tendency to imitate two different kinds of men, present but somewhat diffused or obscured in other genres, is realized clearly in the drama and there constitutes a real generic διαφορά, not a mere velleity of individual poets.⁹⁶ Thus the dichotomy is maintained, in fact emphasized, at the end. We shall see that its special embodiment in the drama is important as a clue to Aristotle's account of the development of poetry. In the light of this it is worth noticing that chapter 2 shows no trace of a μέσον γένος between tragedy and comedy. Chapter 1 had room for a third category, a mixture of verse and song; and we shall find the same thing in chapter 3 (narrative method, dramatic method, mixed method). Would a mixed category be possible with respect to the objects also? We think of satyr-play⁹⁷ (Shakespearean drama, with its concurrent sets of high and low characters, is of course a better example); all the more interesting that Aristotle drops no hint of it here. The τοιοῦτοι of a5, as we saw, were not a real third category either, but represented the intrusion of another idea. Thus the dichotomy remains strict. Mitigations of the basic polarity are possible,⁹⁸ but no genuine third category of objects and no third class of imitations formed by mixture of the other two.

⁹³ Καί is a little oblique, but I take it to mean that the differentiation tragedy-comedy is another instance of our master division. Καί applies to both dramatic genres, ἡ τραγωδία πρὸς τὴν κωμωδίαν διέστηκεν being equivalent to ἡ τραγωδία καὶ ἡ κωμωδία διαφέρουσιν.

⁹⁴ The perfect διέστηκεν perhaps emphasizes its solidity. It has come fully into the open here.

⁹⁵ See Bonitz, *Index* 140b41-51; cf. ἡ φύσις βούλεται τι ποιεῖν, *ibid.* 51 ff.

⁹⁶ Rostagni: "Qui dunque non sono più gli autori, ma le due forme poetiche, Tragedia e Commedia, che hanno, o vogliono per loro natura avere (βούλεται), diverso carattere morale."

⁹⁷ Such a conception of satyr-play did exist in antiquity. See Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio*, Turin, 1930, *Introd.* LV-LVI and p. 64 (on A.P. 220 ff.), and cf. the late prolegomena on comedy, esp. Tzetzes, *CGF* 21, lines 51 and 65; 34, 8 (cf. 30, 179); 36, 53; 38, 113.

⁹⁸ Represented by the principle of the ὁμοίον in chaps. 13 and 15; see below on 13. 53a5; 15. 54a24, b11.

CHAPTER 3

48a19-24

20 ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων |
 μιμῆσαιτο ἂν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μι-
 μῆσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα <ὅτε δ' ἤθός τι εἰσά-
 γοντα> [ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον], ὥσπερ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ,
 ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράτ-
 τοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.

48a19

20 Further, a third differentiation of these arts is the way |
 one can imitate each class of these objects. In fact it is
 possible to imitate in the same media, and the same objects,
 (1) by narrating at times <and then again bringing on some
 dramatic character> [or, becoming something different], the
 way Homer composes, or (2) with the same person doing
 the imitating throughout, with no change, or (3) with all
the imitators doing their work in and through action.

The second *differentia* operated within generic lines roughly laid down by the first. The third *differentia*¹ is independent of the second, but operates in a general way along or within the same generic lines. This is indicated by the way Aristotle begins (*ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς*). Thus for example we might begin with the "nameless" art of chapter 1, and with its subdivision which works in prose. Within those lines one could imitate either worthwhile or 'no-account' people (possibly Socratic dialogues and Sophronic mimes were meant to represent these two varieties; see above on 1. 47b10-11). And one could imitate the same worthwhile or worthless people either dramatically or through narrative or by a mixture of the two.² Or in dithyramb or nome one could carry on imitation of the better sort of men in straight narrative, as we seem to find it in the larger fragments of Pindar's dithyrambs;³ in pure

¹ The first τούτων, a19, like λεχθεισῶν, a7, refers to the arts distinguished in chapter 1 (the "aforesaid imitations") and just enumerated over again in chapter 2; not, with Vahlen, *Poet.*² 96, to the three *differentiae* themselves.

² Plato approximates all these methods: e.g., *Protagoras*, narrative; *Philebus*, dramatic; *Symposium*, mixed.

³ Frags. 86, 91 Turyn.

dialogue, as in the so-called *Thesets* of Bacchylides (Bacch. 17); or mixed, as in the same poet's *Hithēoi* (16). It turns out, then, that there are many possible varieties, each lying within the divisions established by chapters 1 and 2. Hence one cannot simply identify the *dramatic mode* with the *drama*, since the former may appear outside of the latter, or the mixed mode with either epic or lyric, since it may appear in either.⁴ The *differentiae* do not simply run with the established genre-divisions or with each other; they cut across each other and so bring out significant differences. From one point of view, therefore, one might say that 'drama' is anything that uses the dramatic method; but a more correct definition will draw on the *differentia* of medium as well and distinguish two actual dramatic genres, tragedy and comedy.

The disagreement over the modal division itself is notorious and of long standing.⁵ Again we have to decide whether we have here a bipartite or a tripartite structure. Unfortunately there is a widespread agreement on labeling the tripartite scheme 'Platonic' and the bipartite 'Aristotelian.' We shall have to abandon these labels, because Aristotle's scheme is tripartite but also thoroughly Aristotelian.

The controversy is, to begin with, grammatical. Everybody agrees that *ἡ ὡς ... μεταβάλλοντα* refers somehow to the straight narrative method and *ἡ πάντα ... μιμουμένους* to the dramatic; the disagree-

⁴ R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, Leipzig, 1895, I. 12-13: "Den dramatischen Charakter hat in diesen [sc. the Homeric poems] bereits Aristoteles wahrgenommen.... Es ist dies kein Ueberschreiten der besonderen der epischen Dichtgattung gezogenen Grenzen. Vielmehr hat jede poetische Darstellung auf den verschiedensten Gebieten der Literatur,... die Neigung dramatisch zu werden, weil gerade in dieser besonderen Art der Dichtkunst jenes allgemeine Ziel am vollkommensten erreicht wird. Daher, wie das Drama der Gipfel der Dichtkunst ist, auch jede andere Art derselben in dem Maasse, als sie der eigenen Vollendung näher kommt, dem Drama sich nähert." Montmollin, p. 30, gives three possible diagrams for the modes of imitation; he chooses the third. But all are vitiated alike by the assumption that genre can be identified one-to-one with mode. A proper diagram would be a further refinement of the one given above at the end of chap. I. Under each of the four effective divisions there (prose, 'bare' verse, lyric, drama) one would distinguish two kinds of imitation, *βελτιόντων* and *χειρόνων*, and under or beside each of these, three modes. The lack of an actual instance for a particular sub-subdivision would not be fatal to the scheme; what counts is the possibility.

⁵ Surveys of the question by Gudeman and Montmollin (*loc. cit.*); but both distort the issue, G. by the terms 'Platonic' and 'Aristotelian,' M. by identifying the modes too readily with genres.

ment is over ἢ ἕτερόν τι ... ποιεῖ and its relation to ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα. The rival interpretations are as follows:

Bipartite:

1. ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα,
 - a. ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὡσπερ "Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ,
 - b. ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα,
2. ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας ... τοὺς μιμουμένους.

Tripartite:

1. ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὡσπερ "Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ,
2. ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα,
3. ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας ... τοὺς μιμουμένους.

The grammatical *crux* for both schools of interpretation is that ὅτε μὲν has to be correlated with one or another of the ἢ's; and in spite of determined efforts nobody has produced a convincing example of such a correlation.⁶ For the bipartists the difficulty arises in connection with the last ἢ (ἢ πάντας, a23), for the tripartists in connection with the first one (ἢ ἕτερόν τι). Hence some editors, according to their inclination toward one side or the other, have flirted with ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι⁷ or ὅτε δὲ πάντας.⁸ But the effect of emendation is quite different in the two cases. Ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα, ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον at least gives a recognizable description of a mixed or alternating method—if we can accept ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον as denoting the dramatic part of it. But ὅτε δὲ (or καὶ) πάντας κτλ. does not really make sense; for the straight dramatic method, in the drama itself, cannot properly be described as alternating with the narrative method as used somewhere else. Moreover, under any constitution of the text the bipartite interpretation involves the inherent absurdity of subsuming a *dramatic* method (ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον) under the heading of *narrative* (ἀπαγγέλλοντα): i.e., of saying that one can narrate either by narrating or by not narrating.

⁶ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 426 (¶1. 305, n. 8 to p. 272).

⁷ Reiz and Zeller; commended by Butcher in his apparatus, though not printed in his text. Bywater gives up (†ἢ† ἕτερόν τι).

⁸ Rostagni: Aristotle meant to write ὅτε δὲ but substituted ἢ. Gudeman prints καὶ πάντας, supposedly on the basis of the Arabic version (see his 'Conspectus Lectionum' in Tkatsch, 2. 225); but Tkatsch himself, 1. 175a, ascribes the apparent reading to a confusion (fairly frequent, according to him) between the Arabic characters for 'and' and 'or.'

So far the tripartite interpretation seems to be ahead. But since its validity depends almost entirely on our view of *ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*, we must look at these words closely. Some mild dissatisfaction has been felt with the neuter *τι*,⁹ but so far as I can see the phrase as a whole has never been questioned. It says on the face of it "becoming something different," and this is taken on all hands and by tacit consent to mean that Homer at times "becomes," passes into, makes as if he were, Agamemnon and Achilles and the rest. The unanimity of this understanding of the passage is due, of course, to the fact that *ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον* is so obvious an echo of the phrase *ὡς τις ἄλλος ὢν* and others in the *Republic*.¹⁰ There also it is Homer who is being discussed, and Plato characterizes the dramatic part of his method as a form of impersonation: Homer pretends to be Agamemnon, etc., and does his best to make us believe the deception. Plato objects strongly to such impersonations, because of the probable effects on his young Guardians: they will catch the idea all too easily and begin impersonating any and every kind of people.

Now it seems certain that *ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον* means impersonation; what else could it mean? But then it is also certain that Aristotle cannot have written it, because his concept of imitation is wholly different from Plato's and has nothing to do with impersonation. We see his conception most plainly in 24, 60a5-11, where he refers to Homer's method again. There is no question of the poet impersonating or pretending to be somebody else; on the contrary, his business—which Homer understood as no other poet has—is to get out of the way of his characters as much as possible, after a brief word of introduction.¹¹ Aristotle contrasts this procedure sharply with the self-consciousness and self-exploitation of the other poets. In so far as a poet is an imitator he must forget himself and "bring on" (*εἰσάγειν*)¹² his characters.

⁹ Ulrich proposed *τινα*, Zeller and Spengel bracketed *τι* — neither suggestion followed by any important editor in this century.

¹⁰ 3. 393c; cf. *ibid.* a, *ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός*; 398a, *ἄνδρα δὴ, ... δυνάμενον ἐπὶ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μιμῆσθαι πάντα χρέματα*.

¹¹ Vahlen states this clearly enough, *Beiträge*³ 173 (13. 293): "nicht der Dichter selbst soll durch das Ganze der ἀπαγγέλλων sein, sondern, indem er selbst nur den verknüpfenden Faden der Erzählung hält [i.e., *ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα!*], soll er unter den verschiedenen von ihm in Rede und Gegenrede eingeführten Personen verschwinden" (Italics mine). But V. does not apply this insight to our passage.

¹² The word is of course a theater term; see below *ad loc.*

The proof that Aristotle did indeed think of the dramatic method in this entirely objective way is given by the last clause of our own sentence, ἢ πάντας κτλ. The older commentators were baffled by τοὺς μιμουμένους and tried by various means to get it out of the way.¹³ More recently the correct insight has been gaining ground, that the participle has its usual active sense and means the *dramatic characters*.¹⁴ These are not the poet in disguise, indeed they are sharply contrasted with him as presenting the imitation through action, whereas (it is implied) if he were on stage he would have to do so through narration.¹⁵ Thus ὡς πράττοντας is used to *exclude* the poet. Reduced to formula, the dramatic method is "action with the characters themselves enacting it" (as against the poet narrating it): δρώντων καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀπαγγέλλαν, 6. 49b26.

There is another indication that ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον does not belong in the text. The translators render ὡσπερ "Ὁμηρος ποιεῖ by "as Homer does" or the like ("comme fait Homère," "come fa Omero," "wie Homer dies thut"), taking ποιεῖ as a surrogate for γιγνόμενον. But ποιεῖ for γίγνεται is really very strange Greek, when one thinks of it. And anyhow ποιεῖ in the *Poetics* consistently has the positive, substantive meaning 'make, construct, compose':¹⁶ it is the verbal

¹³ Thus Tyrwhitt, contrary to all usage, tried to construe it as a passive; Butcher, following an early suggestion of Vahlen's which the latter subsequently withdrew, bracketed the two words; Friedrichs suggested [τοὺς] μιμούμενον; etc.

¹⁴ Not the poets (so, apparently, Gudeman); nor the actors (Bywater, Valgimigli, *et al.*). Rostagni says, "gli attori (cfr. VI, 49b32) o meglio ancora i personaggi del dramma." But it is not a question of "better still." Actors are secondary in Aristotle's conception; the dramatic characters are absolutely primary.

¹⁵ Πάντας (*sc.* μιμῆσθαι) ὡς πράττοντας ... τοὺς μιμουμένους, "for all the imitators (to carry on the imitation) as actors," whereas if the poet were also 'on stage' (ἀγωνίζονται, 24. 60a9) he would be there ὡς ἀπαγγέλλων (= ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν [*sc.* μιμούμενον]), not ὡς πράττων. Ὡς denotes the method as such: cf. ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιτο ἕν τις, a20. Unfortunately, English 'act,' 'actor,' 'acting,'—though not 'action'—are ambiguous when used in a dramatic context. Aristotle was luckier in having a wholly unrelated term for 'acting' (ἐποκρίνεσθαι), leaving πράττειν or δρᾶν free to denote the 'action' of the characters themselves.

¹⁶ E.g., 14. 53b29, Euripides "made" Medea killing her children (the story did not simply come that way, Euripides made or constructed it so: see Schmid 1.3. 357-358); 54a1; 15. 54a25 (not "making the character good," but "constructing it [as] good"); 18. 56a11 ("and not compose an epic mass [as] a tragedy"); 24. 59b27. See above, c. 1., n. 32, and below, pp. 298-299, on ἐποίησεν, 8. 51 a 25, and p. 321, on γενόμενα ποιεῖν, 9. 51b30.

counterpart of *ποίησις* and *ποιητής*. The translators have been misled partly by the intruded phrase (*ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*), partly by the specious analogy of the modern languages. Once *γιγνόμενον* is out of the way, it becomes clear that Aristotle is not talking about anything that happens to Homer's personality, but about a feature of his poetic art: "the way Homer composes."

There is no room in Aristotle's sentence for *ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*. It is an interpolation, a marginal or interlinear note which has gotten into the text. Without it we have *ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα* left as a description of Homer's method—obviously an incomplete one, though correct enough as far as it goes (~ 60a9, *ὀλίγα φροιμισάμενος*). It is conceivable that Aristotle left it standing so, as a kind of pregnant phrase which would naturally suggest another to complete it. But it is more probable that the second phrase was actually written and has been displaced by *ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*. I propose *ὅτε δ' ἦθος τι εἰσάγοντα*, which happens to have exactly the same number of letters, though I do not claim certainty for the phrasing. The main thing is that we have every right to assume a symmetrical characterization of the two sides of Homer's method.

The origin of the interpolation is not hard to divine. A reader—one who knew the *Republic*—has paraphrased Aristotle's *δέ*-clause in the margin, or more probably between the lines; and he has done so in a Platonic spirit. He could see that the division here is basically the same as Plato's in *Republic* 3, and so assumed that under the dramatic part of Homer's method Aristotle had the same thing in mind as Plato, namely a process of assimilation of the poet to the character (*ὥς τις ἄλλος ὦν*). There is no reason to accuse the annotator of deliberately falsifying his text: the substitution of his note for the original is undoubtedly a later event and a product of scribal error.¹⁷

We have now elucidated the first clause (mixed or Homeric method) and the third (dramatic method). The middle clause remains: *ἢ ὥς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα*. No one doubts that it refers to the straight narrative method; but we still need to see exactly how it does so. With *ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον* in the text, it was only natural to take the next clause as stating the converse: *ἢ ὥς τὸν αὐτὸν (sc. ὄντα) καὶ*

¹⁷ *H* marks what follows as a *paraphrase* of *ἦθος τι εἰσάγοντα*. If this is the case, and bearing in mind *εἰσάγει ἄλλο τι ἦθος*, 24. 60a10, we can perhaps understand *ἕτερόν τι* (i.e., *ἕτερόν τι ἦθος*) and so explain the neuter, which otherwise remains a difficulty.

μη μεταβάλλοντα (i.e., μη ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον). But this interpretation involves an awkward little grammatical anomaly. It requires us to supply a participle like ὄντα or μένοντα;¹⁸ and yet such a participle, which cannot be supplied directly from the governing construction (as μιμούμενον or ἀπαγγέλλοντα could be), cannot simply be understood but would have to be stated.¹⁹

A possible alternative is to read ἢ ὡς αὐτόν, without τόν, as Bywater once thought of doing, leaving αὐτόν to be understood as modifying the accusative subject (itself understood) of μιμῆσθαι in a21. In this case presumably one supplies a μιμούμενον also, the complete construction being μιμῆσθαι ἔστιν ... ὡς αὐτόν (μιμούμενον) καὶ μη μεταβάλλοντα. So far as I know, no editor has adopted this version outright, although there are approximations to it.²⁰ It is preferable to the other so long as that reading is interpreted by ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον; for it at least establishes an opposition between the poet's doing the imitating "himself," in his own person (cf. αὐτοὶ ... ἀγωνίζονται, 60a8-9), and letting his characters do it. But the reshaping and reorientation which we have proposed in the first clause make it possible to keep the manuscript reading. Homer's method was to imitate by narrating some of the time and bringing on dramatic characters the rest of the time. The imitating personnel, the total cast, so to speak, consisted of the poet and the characters in alternation. We can now see that ὡς τόν αὐτόν (sc. μιμούμενον) καὶ μη μεταβάλλοντα is phrased with an eye to this alternation-method: "or (it is possible to carry on the imitation) in the sense that (in the way that) the same person (does the imitating), without changing." The key point is that μεταβάλλοντα refers to the *alternation in personnel and method* which is involved in the Homeric system (ὅτε μὲν κτλ., the poet narrating; ὅτε δὲ κτλ., the characters "energizing"),²¹ not to a shift

¹⁸ Implied by Bywater: "or one may remain the same throughout"; Menardos-Sykutris, ὡς τὰ εἶναι (πάντοτε) ὁ αὐτός; Hardy, "on garde sa personnalité."

¹⁹ Kühner-Gerth, 2^e. 2. 101-103, cite a number of examples of ellipsis of ὄν, but not in sentences where there is any ambiguity what participle is to be supplied.

²⁰ Bywater himself withdrew the athetesis of τόν, although his note *ad loc.* (p. 120) shows that he continued to be allured by it. Butcher prints τόν αὐτόν but appears to translate αὐτόν: "or [sc. he can] speak [λέγοντα, ἀπαγγέλλοντα ?] in his own person, unchanged." Pöschel has "or as one's self and not changing"; Pöschel: "or one can speak invariably in one's own person." Gomperz: "In eigener Person und als ein und derselbe"; and this is subsumed under ἀπαγγέλλοντα ("Einmal bedient sich der Dichter der erzählenden Form").

²¹ Cf. the frequent ἀπὸ τοῦ διηγηματικοῦ ἐπὶ (εἰς) τὸ μμητικὸν μετέβη (-βαί-

in the personality of the poet (from himself to Agamemnon to the priest to himself to Achilles, etc.).

Thus we can paraphrase Aristotle's account of the three categories like this:

A. Mixed (Homeric): poet narrating alternates with characters enacting.

B. Narrative: same person (viz., the poet) imitates throughout, without alternation of personnel and method as in A.

C. Dramatic: all the imitators do their work through action (no poet-narrator on stage).

The most important idea here is the curious one of the poet and his characters as rivals, sharing the stage in the mixed mode and having it to themselves (himself) in the others. Curious or not, it is one of the key concepts in Aristotle's poetic theory. The entire derivation of the six 'parts' of tragedy is based on the concept *δρώντων* (= *πραττόντων*) *καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας*.

What we have, then, is a tripartite division in so far as there are three actual modes, bipartite in so far as there are only two principles at work, narration and dramatic presentation. The scheme is like that in chapter 1: *ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις*. Moreover it is the same in outline as Plato's in *Republic* 3; in fact it is obvious that Aristotle has borrowed it from Plato. So far, Finsler and the others who have asserted his dependence are correct. But although Aristotle borrowed the scheme, he revised its inner meaning, and therewith its practical application, so decisively as to make it in effect a new theory. This drastic revision is in the concept of imitation itself. For both Plato and Aristotle the dramatic mode is imitation *par excellence*. For Plato it is so because imitation means to him a personal experience and a direct relationship. The poet "is" his characters—that is, he pretends or appears to be them, for the drama remains indefeasibly a mode of Appearance. But he who is or pretends to be another cannot be himself. Hence imitation, in the special sense of impersonation, must be *verboten* or very heavily safeguarded in an ideal commonwealth. The dramatic mode is the worst and most dangerous.²²

Aristotle is not legislating for a commonwealth, and he is not talking

πειν, -*βασικς*), *μετῆλθεν*, *μέτευσιν* in the Homeric scholia: [L.] Adam, *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos nach ihrer Entwicklung bei Griechen und Römern*, Wiesbaden, 1889, 38; and see below.

²² *Rep.* 3. 396e, 397d.

about psychic states in the poet. Plato had unconsciously and inevitably thought of the *actor* and his effect on an audience (for him the poet also was an actor); Aristotle is thinking of the *dramatic character* and his direct relation to the things that are being 'imitated.' Hence Aristotle puts highest what Plato put lowest. The dramatic mode, by the criterion of direct expression (objective expression) of human truth, is the highest form. It is the same scheme, but upside down. Aristotle even keeps Plato's order of treatment: mixed, narrative, dramatic.²³

Now that we have educed this pattern by analysis of the text alone, we can draw upon some valuable confirmatory evidence. Everywhere in later antiquity, in grammarians, rhetoricians, and scholiasts, both Greek and Roman, we find a persistent doctrine of three modes or 'characters' of poetry, or for that matter of all writing: narrative (*διηγηματικόν, ἀπαγγελτικόν*), dramatic (*δραματικόν, μιμητικόν*), and 'common' or mixed (*κοινόν, μικτόν*).²⁴ So for example Proclus in the scholia to Dionysius Thrax, p. 450 Hilgard: ποιήσεως χαρακτηῆρες τρεῖς, διηγηματικός, δραματικός, μικτός. διηγηματικός ἐστὶν ὁ κεχωρισμένος μὲν τῶν παρεισαγομένων [cf. εἰσάγει, *Poet.* 24. 60a10] προσώπων, ὑπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενος · δραματικός δὲ ὁ κεχωρισμένος τοῦ ποιητικοῦ προσώπου, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν παρεισαγομένων προσώπων λεγόμενος · μικτός δὲ ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συγκείμενος. Similarly the anonymous prolegomena to Hesiod, p. 5, 8 Gaisford: πᾶσα ποίησις τρεῖς ἔχει χαρακτηῆρας, διηγηματικόν, δραματικόν, καὶ μικτόν. καὶ διηγηματικόν μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ ὁ ποιητῆς μόνος φαίνεται φθεγγόμενος ... · δραματικόν δὲ ἐν ᾧ οὐδαμοῦ ὁ ποιητῆς φθέγγεται ... · μικτόν δὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ τε ποιητῆς διαλέγεται καὶ πρὸς ὡπα εἰς ἧ κ τ α ι διαλεγόμενα, οἷον ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι ἐμφαίνεται. 'Probus' on Vergil's *Georgics* and *Eclogues* has the same scheme, 3. 2, p. 329 Thilo-Hagen: *Omne carmen in tres characteres dividitur: dramaticon, in quo*

²³ Not the order of the first bare listing in the *Republic*, 3. 392d, but that of Plato's discussion and illustration, 392e-394c. The Homeric method is explained first, because (apparently) it is the hardest to grasp; then Socrates defines the other two by reference to it, 393c ff.

²⁴ The most complete survey of the material is in Johannes Kayser, *De veterum arte poetica quaestiones selectae*, Leipzig, 1906, 10-20, 52; see also Georg Kaibel, "Die Prolegomena *περὶ κομφοδίας*," *Abhandl. d. K. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, N. F. 2 (1898), esp. 28-30; Otto Immisch, "Beiträge zur chrestomathie des Proclus und zur poetik des altertums," *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Vienna, 1902, esp. 259-262; Rostagni, *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 2 (1922) 125-129.

personae tantummodo locuntur, diegematikon, in quo solus poeta, micron, ubi promiscue et poeta et persona.

It is not our business here to go into the details of this trichotomy or the difficulties of applying it; the only thing that interests us at the moment is its provenience. Kayser, following the lead of Kaibel and Immisch, and accepting without question the 'bipartist' interpretation of our passage in the *Poetics*, does not hesitate to label this omnipresent tradition "Platonic,"²⁵ as deriving straight from *Republic* 3. Against it he sets examples of an allegedly bipartite, and therefore "Aristotelian," system, e.g., in Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Π. Θουκυλίδου* 37 (l. 388, 15 Usener-Radermacher). But that passage, which deals with the Melian dialogue, merely remarks that Thucydides passes there from narrative to 'dramatic' presentation;²⁶ the work as a whole, then, will belong to the 'mixed' character, like the *Iliad*. The tradition is tripartist from one end to the other.

As we have seen, that does not necessarily make it Platonic. Aristotle also was a tripartist. We need not deny the Platonic influence, especially for a man like Proclus, and it is perhaps visible in the use of *διηγηματικόν* to denote the narrative mode. But other features are clearly Aristotelian: the term *δραματικόν* (not only the adjective *δραματικός* but the concept 'drama' is lacking in Plato), and above all the notion of the poet and his characters as rivals who may share the stage or occupy it separately.²⁷ We must recognize that this long and tenacious tradition is jointly Platonic-Aristotelian, fed partly by the *Republic* and partly by an Aristotelian work (almost certainly the dialogue *On Poets*), but that it has been shaped more decisively by Aristotle than by Plato.

This will have to do by way of a glance at the later history of our classification; the subject would be well worth fresh investigation²⁸ in

²⁵ Though he himself admits, p. 17, that some of its subdivisions are Peripatetic, Rostagni, on the other hand, thinks more plausibly of Theophrastus.

²⁶ What D. means is simply that beginning at 5. 88 or 5. 87 the connecting "they said"'s and so on are omitted and the speeches are designated as they would be in a play: *ΑΘ, ΜΗΛ*. The same thing is noted in the Homeric scholia, e.g., schol. A on *Iliad* 1685, O346, Ψ855; schol. B on *A16, Δ127, 303, Ζ46, Ψ855*: cf. Adam, *op. cit.*, and [Plut.] *On the Life and Poetry of Homer*, 57 (7. 364 Bernardakis).

²⁷ Nowhere in the tradition does the genuine Platonic idea appear, that the characters are really the poet in disguise, that all the modes are merely different modes of his narration.

²⁸ Especially the question whether the *Poetics* itself was known to any of the representatives of the tradition.

the light of our discoveries in the *Poetics*. To return to our proper business, the controversy over tripartite or bipartite division is now seen to be pointless. Aristotle's scheme is tripartite, and it is based on a Platonic *diaeresis*. The novelty is not in the pattern itself but, as we said, in the new meaning which Aristotle gives to the concept of 'imitation.' That new meaning is not expounded here but taken for granted; so completely taken for granted, in fact, that we have to assume he had explained it elsewhere.

There is another change also, namely in the application of the scheme to literary works. Plato had said vaguely that the straight narrative method was to be found chiefly in lyric (*μάλιστα που ἐν διθυράμβοις*, *Rep.* 394c), and the mixed method in epic and "many other places" (*ibid.*). The passage we have already quoted from chapter 24 makes it plain that Aristotle's view is quite different. Among epic poets, he clearly ascribes the mixed method to *Homer alone*.²⁹ All the others remain "on stage," calling attention to themselves, the whole time, and imitate (i.e., let the characters speak for themselves) very little. Most epics, then, will fall into the class of straight narrative. So also, presumably, will most lyrics, although poems with a strong admixture of direct speech, like some of Bacchylides' dithyrambs, might be adjudged mixed, and his "Theseus" even straight dramatic. The fact is, as we have already pointed out, that this criterion, in spite of its paramount importance, operates along the lines laid down by the other two, and can operate there in any subdivision. Hence, theoretically at least, we might find 'drama' with both varieties of possible subject and in every medium and combination of media.

Aristotle's scheme is abstract and arbitrary as compared with the realities of Greek literature. It provides for varieties that were not actually exemplified, and conversely some of the actual genres are not very clearly represented in it. This is especially true of the lyric, which as we have seen might turn up in all three divisions, but also of the epic, and even of tragedy and comedy themselves: for the choral parts are less directly mimetic,³⁰ so that strictly speaking the play as a whole ought to be classified under two different headings. Back of these inadequacies and inconcinnities lies the major fact that *all* Greek genres

²⁹ 24. 60a8, οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ἄλλον ἀγωνίζονται; cf. 4. 48b34 ff. (Homer alone composed dramatic imitations).

³⁰ [Ar.] *Probl.* 19. 15. 918b27, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτῆς ἀγωνιστῆς καὶ μιμητῆς, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἤττον μιμεῖται.

craved to be dramatic and partly succeeded.²¹ Only the mime and Dorian comedy were purely mimetic; but no genre was wholly unmimetic. Hence the right rubric for most Greek literature would be the mixed, and in the later tradition referred to above we do in fact see its domain extended to include practically everything except the formal drama.²² Clearly Aristotle gave the classifiers little help, and indeed his criterion was not objective and mechanical enough to serve as a useful basis for gross classification. For it is not just a question of direct or indirect speech, or of their alternation. What he found in Homer was a *dramatic use* of direct speech,²³ the poet setting the stage for his characters, then bringing them upon it to confront each other and enact their conflicts in the give-and-take of life. Thus the dramatic method is a qualitative affair, and Aristotle does not really define precisely how and where it is to be distinguished. The real sense and value of the division by method is inward. The series 'narrative-mixed-dramatic' is a *scala* of the purity of realization of *μίμησις*, reaching from lowest to highest. In other words this differentiation, like the others, reveals a hierarchy of values. But it comes even closer than they to the essence of poetry, which is imitation, being in effect the curve of imitation itself as it rises toward complete fulfilment. At the peak stands drama = pure imitation. In chapter 4 we shall see this curve plotted on a time-chart and transformed into a history of poetry; for the division by method is what gives the development of poetry its direction and meaning in Aristotle's eyes, beginning with the crudest genres and ending with full self-realization (*ἔσχε τὴν φύσιν*, 49a15) in the drama. The process is one of *increasing objectification and clarification of the mimetic impulse*, from hymns, encomia, and *psogoi* through Homer to tragedy and comedy.

²¹ See Wilamowitz, *Tim. Die Perser*, Leipzig, 1903, 104-105.

²² Bucolic poetry raised a particular problem of classification: see Kayser, *op. cit.* 10-11, 13-16. Sometimes it was said, e.g., *Anecdota Estense* (*ibid.* 11), to belong to all three 'characters.' Proclus lumps epic, elegy, iambic, and melic all under 'narrative and mixed,' while the prolegomena to Vergil put those four genres, plus (*epodoe*), *satira* and *bucolica*, under the mixed. See Kaibel, *op. cit.* 29-30; Immisch 263-265.

²³ What Rhys Carpenter for example means by 'dramatic': *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics* (*Sather Class. Lects.* 20), Berkeley, 1946, 78-85.

48a24-b3

- [ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἢ μίμησις ἐστίν, | ὡς εἰπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ α καὶ ὦς. ὥστε τῇ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη μιμητῆς Ὀμήρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μιμοῦνται γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας ἄμφω. ὅθεν καὶ δράματα καλεῖσθαι
- 30 τινες αὐτὰ φασιν, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας. διὸ καὶ | ἀντι-
ποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς κωμωδίας οἱ Δωρεῖς
(τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμωδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς οἱ τε ἐνταῦθα, ὡς ἐπὶ
τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης, καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας
[ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητῆς, πολλῶ πρότερος
ὢν Χιονίδου καὶ Μάγνητος], καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔτιοι
- 35 | τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ), ποιούμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα σημείων.
οὔτοι μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιουκίδας καλεῖν φασιν, Ἀθη-
ναῖοι δὲ δῆμους, ὡς κωμωδοὺς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν
λεχθέντας ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνῃ ἀτιμαζομένους ἐκ
- 38 | b1 τοῦ ἄστεως, | καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοὶ μὲν δρᾶν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ
πράττειν προσαγορεύειν.]
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν, καὶ πόσαι καὶ τίνες, τῆς
μμήσεως, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

48a24

- [Well then, the imitation is carried on in these three
- 25 *differentiae*, | as we said at the beginning: media, objects,
and method. Hence with respect to one of them Sophocles
would be the same imitator as Homer, since they both imi-
tate men of serious character, and with respect to another
the same as Aristophanes, since they both imitate men in
action. And in fact according to some that is the origin of
the name 'drama,' because they are imitating men acting
- 30 (*drōntas*). And in fact that is the basis on which | the
Dorians make a counter-claim to both tragedy and comedy
(comedy being claimed by the Megarians, both those from
here, on the ground that it originated in the period of their
democracy, and those in Sicily [for the poet Epicharmus
was from there, antedating Chionides and Magnes by a good
deal], and tragedy by some of the Peloponnesians), citing
- 35 the names as evidence. Namely, they | point out (1) that
they call their outlying localities *kōmai* (whereas the Athen-
ians call them *dēmoi*): the assumption being that 'comedians'

38 | b1 were so called not from their 'reveling' (*kómazein*) but from their roaming from one village (*kómē*) to another, being driven out of the city in contempt; | and (2) that for 'acting' or 'doing' they use the term *drân* while the Athenians use *prattein*.]

Let this suffice, then, as to the *differentiae* of imitation, their number and their identity.

The contrast between this and the part of the chapter we have just dealt with is striking. There, compression to the point of obscurity, and one name; here a comfortable prolixity, to the point of formlessness, and eleven names in as many lines. There Aristotle hardly had time to allude to major principles; here we are treated to a long, inconclusive discussion of a topic (the Dorian claim) which has no direct connection at all with the main argument. In fact the passage is at best a footnote, or a series of footnotes, suggested somewhat at random by the last diaeresis. Our task is to decide (1) whether it is genuine, and (2) what it proves or is meant to prove.⁸⁴

The discussion of the three *differentiae* is finished at a24 (*τοὺς μιμουμένους*). There follows a recapitulation of them (*ἐν τρισὶ ... καὶ ὧς*), followed in turn by the footnote or footnotes, followed by a second recapitulation (*περὶ μὲν οὖν ... εἰρήσθω ταῦτα*, b2-3), after which Aristotle goes on to sketch the causes and the historical development of poetry. The two recapitulations are complete and independent of each other; and they show some further traits which are very interesting. The first one leads directly into the following remarks⁸⁵ and in fact looks as though it had been written as an introduction to them. The second recapitulation, on the other hand, makes no reference to anything after a24, but is coördinated directly with the beginning of the next chapter (*περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν ... εἰρήσθω ταῦτα. εἰκόασι δὲ γεννηῆσαι μὲν ἄλλως τὴν ποιητικὴν κτλ.*⁸⁶ In other

⁸⁴ Montmollin's treatment of it is given pp. 11-14, as a first sample of his method. By a rapid—too rapid—analysis he finds two "additions ultérieures" (*τῆς μὲν γὰρ ... Πελοποννήσῳ* and *οἷτοι μὲν γὰρ ... ἄστωος*), and apparently considers that this solves the problem. Actually he hardly touches the real problems: for one thing because they are not such as to yield to a purely grammatical analysis, for another because he begins only with *θθεν καί*, a29.

⁸⁵ *Τῆ μὲν ... τῆ δέ*, referring specifically to the last two of "these three *differentiae*."

⁸⁶ The further clause which corresponds in turn to *γεννηῆσαι μὲν ἄλλως* is

words it is closely integrated with the main line of argument, while a24-25 is connected only with its immediate environment. It follows that if we find reason to set off a25-b2 as a footnote or subsequent addition to the text, a24-25 will go along with it.

We come to the first part of the intervening matter, a25-29. Each of these sentences, and the following one also, depends directly on the one preceding (*ὥστε, ὅθεν καί, διὸ καί*). It looks therefore as though the whole of our "footnote" may have been written as one close sequence—from which it would follow that the first sentences are there for the sake of the later ones, that is, for the sake of the *δρῶντες-δρᾶμα* etymology,³⁷ and it in turn for the sake of the Dorian claim to the drama which is based on it. More particularly, this would mean that the little essay at cross-classification, *ὥστε τῆ μὲν κτλ.*, was not devised for its own sake but in order to bring up the term *δρῶντας*, so that the Dorian claim could be mentioned in turn. This proleptic character of the passage, as we might call it, is worth some emphasis as a counter to the rather common idea that Aristotle wanders into these remarks about the Dorians purely by accident. There was no necessity for mentioning either the etymology or the claim here; the author has gone out of his way to do so.

The two sentences a25-29 (*ὥστε ... ἄμφω, ὅθεν ... δρῶντας*) show on close inspection a number of suspicious or disturbing features, which we can list serially:

1. It is doubtful whether Aristotle meant the three *differentiae* to be so free and co-equal as is implied here. Thus Sophocles is said to be the same (kind of) imitator as Homer, whereas the genuine Aristotelian view would seem to be that they hold *analogous*—not identical—positions under different classes of media: Sophocles imitates *σπουδαῖοι* within the category of drama (all media, used alternately) in the same way as Homer does within that of uniform 'bare' verses.³⁸

διασπάσθη δὲ κτλ., b24. From the differentiations we go to the generic causes of poetry and then back to the differentiations, but this time as historical events or factors.

³⁷ As Sykutris and Rostagni remark, the word *δρῶντας* itself is added (as a synonym of *πράττοντας*) to furnish a *point d'appui* for the etymology. B. Snell, *Philol. Suppl.* 20, 1 (1928) 16: "das *δρῶν* stellt sich immer etwas unbehaglich in diesen Zusammenhang ein, nur der etymologischen Beziehung wegen."

³⁸ In chapter 4 the differentiations by object and by method not only are distinct from each other but operate at different levels and in different ways. The former

2. Ὁ αὐτὸς ... μιμητής is a disturbingly crude expression for the idea that Homer and Sophocles belong to the same *class* of imitators.

3. There is no hint that Homer also imitated φαῦλοι (*Margites*, etc.: chapter 4). We noticed this discrepancy in 2. 48a11 also.

4. There is no hint that Homer's half-dramatic method would allow him also to be bracketed, in one sense or for one part, with Aristophanes.

5. Πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται καὶ θεῶντας ἄμφω is more than crude, it is downright inaccurate as a specific characterization of the dramatic method. All poets imitate πρᾶττοντας; the *differentia* of the dramatic method is that the characters themselves enact the action: ὡς πρᾶττοντες μιμοῦνται.³⁹

6. It may seem to be pushing skepticism to an unhealthy degree to suggest that the reference to Aristophanes is suspect in itself. But there is no other allusion to him in the *Poetics*, and only one other in all of Aristotle.⁴⁰ The sentence pretty clearly implies a canon (Homer, Sophocles, and Aristophanes as the acknowledged ἄκροισι in their respective genres),⁴¹ whereas, to put it as mildly as possible, it is by no means certain that Aristotle held such a view of Aristophanes.⁴²

The common factor in all these points, except the last, is the crudity and inaccuracy with which the sentence reflects Aristotle's genuine doctrine about the three *differentiae*. Similar infelicities appear in a29-30 also:

1. Αὐτὰ is very oblique and awkward, though of course we can under-

appears at the beginning and persists throughout; the latter gains momentum cumulatively and reaches a climax in the culmination of tragedy. Nowhere are they on a τῆ μὲν ... τῆ δέ basis.

³⁹ 6. 49b31, ἐπεὶ δὲ πρᾶττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

⁴⁰ *Rhet.* 3. 2. 1405b30, on a minor point of diction (use of diminutives). *Pol.* 2. 4. 1262b11 refers to the Platonic Aristophanes (in the *Symposium*).

⁴¹ Rostagni: "Sofocle ed Aristofane appaiono dunque considerati, a tempo di Arist., come i più classici rappresentanti dei rispettivi generi"; cf. Gudeman *ad loc.*

⁴² We unconsciously attribute to Aristotle not only our view of the general shape and size of Greek literary history, but also its special slants and focusings. See for example below, p. 148, on the discrepancy between the standard view of Archilochus and Aristotle's treatment—or rather lack of treatment—of him. Aristophanes may belong in the same category, as a representative of a kind of comedy (the 'iambic' Old Comedy) which Aristotle disliked and disapproved of; see below, on 9. 51b14. Lane Cooper's attempt to prove that Aristotle admired and valued Aristophanes highly (*An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, New York, 1922, 18-41) is special pleading and very unconvincing.

stand it. And is it the subject of *μυθοῦνται*? Probably not;⁴³ more likely we are to understand some vague extension of *Σοφοκλῆς ... Ἀριστοφάνει*: "the dramatic poets"—an assumption which does not improve the elegance of the syntax.

2. Why should Aristotle feel obliged to cite authority (*τινες*) for so obvious a truism as that plays are called *δράματα* because in them people are represented *δρῶντες*? Why else would they be called *δράματα*?⁴⁴

Some of these lapses and awkwardnesses are distressing, but it must be said at once that none of them is quite sufficient to disqualify the passage. The most we can say—and the rationale of a24-b2 as a whole will strengthen this impression—is that it was probably not written at the same time as Aristotle's main text.

A much more serious difficulty, which does not seem to have been noticed by anyone, is this: The context (*Σοφοκλῆς ... Ἀριστοφάνει*) requires *αὐτά* to refer to both tragedy and comedy. But *Attic* comedies seem not to have been called *δράματα* down to Aristotle's day, or for some time thereafter; so that the etymology would be accounting for something that did not exist. Certainly tragedies and satyr-plays could be so designated, at least on occasion;⁴⁵ and very probably the term was used for *Dorian* comedies, not only in Dorian territory⁴⁶

⁴³ If it were, we could declare the sentence spurious without much hesitation. See Kühner-Gerth 2.² 1. 64-66 on plural verb with neuter plural subject.

⁴⁴ Ritter 97: "Vide, auctor incertus haerebat an re vera *δράμα* dictum sit a *δρᾶν* et rem scilicet tam dubiam in medio relinquens aliorum hominum sententiam protulisse contentus est." The suggestion of Körte and Sykutris, that *δράμα* may simply = *ποίημα*, since *δρᾶν* = *ποιεῖν*, is obviously fallacious. *Δρᾶν* and *ποιεῖν* are not synonyms but only overlap partly: see Snell, *op. cit.* 11-12, 17-19. Actually *δράμα* designates a 'play' from a different point of view even from *πράξις*. The latter connotes the whole action as a completed sequence of events, while *δράμα* indicates only that something is being done at the moment by the persons. Its English equivalent is 'play' or (vaudeville) 'act.' Cf. τὰ *δρώμενα*, e.g., τὰ *δρώμενα Ἐλευσίνι*, Pausan. 8. 15. 1 (but there is no evidence that any special sacral or mystical connotation passed over to *δράμα*: Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 145 n. 1).

⁴⁵ E.g., Pl. *Apol.* 35b, τὰ *ἐλεῖνά* ταῦτα *δράματα*; *Symp.* 222d, *σατυρικὸν δ.* The evidence is collected and examined by Herbert Richards, *CR* 14 (1900) 388-393; see also Snell, *op. cit.*, esp. 1-7; though Snell is really interested in *δρᾶν*, not *δράμα*, and hardly considers comedy.

⁴⁶ Kaibel does not hesitate to designate Epicharmus' plays as *δράματα* (*CGF* 91; cf. *id.*, *PW* 6. 36; Wilamowitz, *Neue Jahrb. f. d. kl. Alt.* 29 [1912] 467 n. 3; *Platon*² 1. 252 n. 2; A. Körte, *Die gr. Komödie*, Leipzig and Berlin 1914, 7), even though the actual citations under that title are late: Athen. 3. 94f (cf. on Machon,

but also at Athens.⁴⁷ But there is no evidence for *δρᾶμα* as a term for Attic comedy, or comedy of Attic type, before Imperial times.⁴⁸ This is in fact the weak spot in the Dorian case, so far as the etymological claim goes. What the Dorians had to show by way of 'dramas' were undoubtedly comic, not tragic, in nature; yet Attic *κωμῳδία* was precisely the genre for which *δρᾶμα* was not a customary designation. As we shall see, this accounts for the double, unsymmetrical form of the etymological argument in the following lines: *δρᾶν* — *δρᾶμα* had to be supplemented by a special argument for *κωμῳδία*.

This awkwardness about the Dorian claim itself does not reflect at all on the genuineness of the passage: that is, it need not have made the claim suspicious in Aristotle's eyes. There is in fact, as we shall see, in spite of the incessantly repeated cliché about Aristotle's reserve or neutrality on the subject, not very much real doubt that he personally accepted, with some reservations, both the etymology and the Dorian claim; and the lexical detail that *δρᾶμα* was not used to denote Attic comedies need not have disturbed him. On the other side we have indications of a positive interest on his part in the words *δρᾶν* and *δρᾶμα*. Not only does he select *δρῶντων* as the key word in his definition of tragedy; he is fond of using *δρᾶμα* where the point to be emphasized is the concentration and economy of the dramatic form as such.⁴⁹ The same point is conveyed still more graphically by compounds of *δρᾶμα* which are almost surely new coinages by Aristotle himself: *δραματικός* (4. 48b35; 23. 59a19) and *δραματοποιέω* (4. 48b37). In all these cases the words designate an essential feature of the concept of drama as we have outlined it in connection with *ἡ πάντα*

n. 48 below); Hesych. s.v. *δρούα*; Hephaest. 25, 11 Consbr. But notice Wilamowitz's less dogmatic remark, *Eini.*² 55: "Wir wissen nicht, wie Epicharmos seine gedichte genannt hat; *κωμῳδία* sicher nicht."

⁴⁷ That seems to be the implication of the well-known fragment of Ecphantides, fr. 2 Kock, *ἀσχευόμενος τὸ δρᾶμα Μεγαρικὸν ποιεῖν* (on the text see Schmid 1. 4. 12 n. 3). That is, Ecphantides is using the Megarian term. Cf. Pick. Camb. *Dith.* 144 n. 3.

⁴⁸ Richards, *loc. cit.* The earliest example would be Machon (latter half of 3rd cent. B.C.), if the verse containing the word were genuine: Athen. 13. 579e. Athenaeus himself regularly uses *δρᾶμα* for Attic comedies (cf. his reference to Machon, 14. 664b); also Plutarch, Lucian, and the scholia and prolegomena on comedy: see the list of comic poets, CGF 10.

⁴⁹ *Ἐξω τοῦ δράματος*, 14. 53b32; 15. 54b3; *μὴ ἐν τῷ δράματι*, 24. 60a30; *ἐν τοῖς δράμασι*, 17. 55b15; 18. 56a15 (contrast between epic breadth and dramatic concentration). See below on 24. 59b22-27.

ὡς πρᾶττοντας κτλ. above: a concept which he himself had forged and which he regarded as crucial. It is certain, then, that Aristotle had a special interest in the word *δρᾶμα*, and more likely than not that he would have favored the claim of that part of the Greek world to which it appeared to be native. When we add that that part of the world also provided—except for Homer—the best models of true comedy, that is, of harmless humor (5. 49b5-9), the chain of evidence is almost complete. Finally, the mere length of the passage on *δρᾶμα* and the Dorian claim (fourteen lines, counting the preliminaries in a24-29) bespeaks some special interest or good will. A writer who is as pressed for time as Aristotle in the *Poetics* is not likely to go out of his way to comment at such length on a matter of literary history unless he regards it as having positive importance.⁵⁰

Thus in spite of the infelicities we have already mentioned, a24-29 may perfectly well be genuine and represent a positive commitment on Aristotle's part to a pro-Dorian point of view.⁵¹ The same will also be true, in general, of the following argument (a29-b2), to which we now turn.

There are two levels or layers (not necessarily chronological strata) of argument here: etymological and historical. These are by no means identical and may possibly have different sources and points of application. The historical claims, for example, are divided between Megarians and Peloponnesians, whereas the etymological arguments do not show any such cleavage: they are 'Dorian' in a general sense. Hence each of the two lines of argument will have to be examined both by itself *and* in relation to the other.

⁵⁰ Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 13 (= 553), against Wilamowitz: "Wenn der Stagtrif jenen Anspruch [sc. of the Megarians] 'verwirft,' warum lässt er uns dies nur zwischen den Zeilen lesen? Warum sagt er es nicht mit klaren Worten? Oder vielmehr, warum biegt er aus der geraden Bahn seiner Erörterung in einen Seitenpfad ab, um Ansprüche zu verzeichnen, denen er nicht die mindeste Berechtigung zuerkennt?"

⁵¹ I assume it is obvious that only a Dorian or pro-Dorian would have brought up the *δρᾶν* - *δρᾶμα* notion to begin with. Attic minds ran to *τραγωδία* - *κωμωδία*, not to *δρᾶν* - *δρᾶματα*. (Naturally this is independent of the question whether *δρᾶν* was a Doric word. The Dorians had better reasons for trying to exploit it, even if it did not belong to them exclusively).—As Gudeman says, *τινες* may refer to a single authority, as so often. In that case one thinks especially of Dicaearchus, not only for his research and writing in cultural and literary history (*Βίος Ἑλλάδος; Περὶ μουσικῶν ἀγώνων*) but because of his sturdy Dorian patriotism. See frags. 1 and 63 Wehrli (*Dikalarchos [Die Schule des Aristoteles]*, 1], Basel, 1944), and Wehrli's commentary, pp. 61, 65, and esp. 67; and cf. n. 105 below.

The historical arguments serve to peg down (at least apparently) and so confirm the etymologies; but they are not strictly necessary to them either in grammar or in sense. *Τῆς μὲν γὰρ ... Πελοποννήσῳ* is at the very least a parenthesis,⁶² after which the main argument resumes (*ποιούμενοι τὰ δνόματα σημεῖον κτλ.*). If it were not so, the *οὔτοι* of a35 would have to be the *ἐνιοὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, which is absurd since the latter lay claim only to tragedy, the former to comedy as well. As it is, *οὔτοι* will refer back to *οἱ Δωριεῖς*, a30, leaving it open, for the time being, exactly what relation we are to assume between these generalized "Dorians" and the Megarians and Peloponnesians of the parenthesis.

At least three groups are discernible among the latter: the Megarians of old Greece ("here"), the Megarians of Sicily, and "some of those in Peloponnese." The more one studies these three groups the clearer it becomes that they are quite distinct, and therefore that Aristotle—if he is our author—need not necessarily have taken the same attitude towards them all.

First, the Megarians of old Greece. There are two significant points about their claim, one mentioned here, the other not, but perhaps implied: namely (1) the Megarian democracy, and (2) Susarion. We will consider these in turn.

Ἐπὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας leaves a broad field open, for democracy raised its head in Megara as early as the tyranny of Theagenes, ca. 640-630 B.C.,⁶³ and several times again down to the Persian Wars. At least one such democratic upheaval is alluded to by Theognis in the well-known lines 53-68 ("Cyrnus, the city is still our city, but the people [i.e., the voting citizen-body] is different"); but the datings of Theognis himself—or themselves, in case there are two or more—still vary widely.⁶⁴ As Hudson-Williams points out, however,⁶⁵ the time most probably intended is early in the sixth century, the period

⁶² So printed by most modern editors. Gudeman's constitution of the text, bracketing *τῆς τραγωδίας ἐνιοὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* and *καὶ τὸ ποιῖν...προσαγορεύειν*, is a phantasmagoria which Montmollin properly disposes of. Montmollin's own objection to parentheses has been considered above, c. 1, n. 153.

⁶³ T. Hudson-Williams, *The Elegies of Theognis*, London, 1910, 6; Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3^e, Stuttgart, 1937, 583.

⁶⁴ Thus Meyer, *op. cit.* 584, dates him 570-550; Schmid, l. 1. 381, just before the Persian Wars (506-490); while Jacoby, *Sitzungsber.* Berlin 1931, 138-148, distinguishes two poets, one from each period.

⁶⁵ *Op. cit.* 7-8.

apparently of the best-known, because most radical, democracy at Megara.⁵⁶ It might well have been known later as "the democracy," somewhat as the revolution of 1789 is "*la Révolution*." But the clinching argument for an early date is connected with Susarion, and since the Megarian claim, wherever we meet it outside the *Poetics*, is made to rest on him,⁵⁷ we must consider him also.

The earliest certain reference to Susarion,⁵⁸ on the Parian Marble (264/3 B.C.),⁵⁹ does not explicitly call him an Athenian,⁶⁰ but does clearly imply that what he invented was *Affic* comedy. Clement of Alexandria makes him an Icarian, i.e., an Athenian; and the fullest version we have of the well-known story about the injured countrymen⁶¹ (the rustics who only dared to ventilate their grievances against certain townspeople by coming into town and denouncing them after dark; whereupon the magistrates or the other citizens, finding this public airing of wrongs a good thing, made them repeat it "in the theatre") presents him as working in Athens, and at least by implication as an Athenian.

Most of the sources which mention Susarion say nothing about his citizenship or place of origin; it is perhaps assumed to be Athens. His Megarian provenance, on the other hand, depends exclusively on the verse *υἱὸς Φιλίνου Μεγαρόθεν Τριποδίσκιος*, which we find in

⁵⁶ Plut. *Qu. Gr.* 18, 295C; Ar. *Pol.* 5. 3. 1302b31; *ibid.* 5. 1304b34-39; cf. 4. 15. 1300a17.

⁵⁷ Bentley, *Opuscula* 1. 259, thought that Aristotle was tacitly referring to Susarion in our passage, and that by suppressing the name he was indicating his belief that there was not much substance in the claim. There is no way of proving or disproving this.

⁵⁸ The evidence is mustered by Kalbel, *CGF* 77, and discussed by Pickard-Cambridge, *Dith.* 275, 280-284; see also Körte, *PW* 4A, 973, s.v. 'Susarion.'

⁵⁹ Under epoch 39, for a year somewhere between 581 and 560 B.C.: ἀφ' οὗ ἐν Ἀθ[η]ναῖς κωμωιδῶν χο[ρ]ός ἐτέθη, [στη]σάν[των πρώ]των Ἰκαρίων, εὐρόντος Σουσαρίωνος. The conjectures are partly Boeck's, partly Munro's (see F. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium*, Berlin, 1904, 13, 105-106), and are not certain: e. g., χορός ἐτέθη.

⁶⁰ The wording is compatible with S.'s having come to Athens or Icaria from Megara, or possibly, at its farthest stretch, with his having done all his work at Megara and the Icarians having borrowed the invention from there. But the natural implication, especially in view of the notorious pro-Athenian and pro-Ionian bias of the Marble, would be that Susarion was an Athenian and a native of Icaria.

⁶¹ Schol. Dion. Thr., in *CGF*, pp. 12-14; see 12, 8: Ἀθ[η]νησι.

some of the late tractates on comedy, especially in Tzetzes.⁶² This line appears sometimes as part of a short sequence of iambic verses beginning ἀκούετε λεῶ · Σουσαρίων λέγει τάδε. Kaibel saw that it was an interpolation into a set of pure Attic verses which had themselves been forged in the name of Susarion: "itaque falsarius interpolatorem nactus est." What he did not see, or at least did not emphasize, was that the Megarian attempt, whenever it was made, was to annex Susarion as the inventor of the Attic Old Comedy.⁶³ The very line which denominates him a Megarian makes this plain: he is Μεγαροόθεν, "from Megara," and the other lines make it clear that he is thought of as making the pronouncement at Athens.⁶⁴ Moreover the verses themselves are on one of the standing satirical themes (κακὸν γυναῖκες; they may even have grown out of a reminiscence of the long 'legend of bad women' of Semonides),⁶⁵ and the situation is outspokenly 'iambic.' Tzetzes⁶⁶ explicitly calls Susarion the inventor of 'iambic' comedy, and one of the scholia on Dionysius Thrax makes him the inventor of iambic poetry überhaupt.⁶⁷

Thus the evidence for Susarion, late and wretched though it is, points to Athens. It would appear that the Megarians later made him a chief pawn in their game, but not as inventor or developer of comedy at Megara; his function was to have come from Megara. The traditions about Megarian farce are pertinent to the case, then, only insofar as the known existence of such farces at a relatively early date (fifth century or before) would make the assertion of Megarian provenance for Susarion more plausible. What has happened is clear enough in

⁶² Citations CGF 77-78, to which add John the Deacon on Hermogenes, published by Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 63 (1908) 149; discussion in Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 282-283. For the anonymous commentator on the *Ethics* see below, n. 73.

⁶³ So Schmid 1. 1. 637.

⁶⁴ Ὡ δημόται, "fellow-demesmen" (i. e., of Icaria?). Tzetzes adds, CGF 27, that the verses were delivered in the theater during the Dionysia. Thus the forger betrays his lateness or his naïveté or both: he cannot imagine Athens without a theater and a dramatic festival.

⁶⁵ Cf. Semon. 7. 96-97, Ζεὺς γὰρ μέγιστον τοῦτ' ἐποίησεν κακὸν, γυναῖκας. Semonides was well represented in the *florilegia* (better than Archilochus: Schmid 1. 1. 398); we owe all the longer pieces, including no. 7, to Stobaeus.

⁶⁶ Π. διαφορὰς ποιητῶν 80-81 (CGF 37).

⁶⁷ P. 475 Hilgard. But since only dramatists are mentioned, probably the same thing is meant. In other branches of the tradition, however, S. is credited with aiming at laughter only, and the comedy of νόγος comes later: Tzetzes 'Pa,' CGF 18; Diomedes *De Poemat.* 9. 4, *ibid.* 58.

its general outline. Susarion, whether a real person or a fiction (more likely the latter),⁶⁸ figured originally in the *Attic* succession, as the inventor or at least one of the earliest practitioners of *κωμῳδία*.⁶⁹ Some Megarian then arose⁷⁰ and claimed that Susarion was a Megarian, from the village Tripodiskos. No doubt he was relying on the unquestioned existence and primitive character of the Megarian farces;⁷¹ he may also, or alternatively, have connected Susarion's 'iambic' variety of comedy with the democracy at Megara. In any case the original sense of the claim must have been that Attic comedy really stemmed from Megara, in the person of Susarion.⁷²

The most tantalizing utterance on Susarion, because the most obviously connected in some way with our passage, is the remark of the anonymous commentator on the *Nicomachean Ethics*:⁷³ *διασύρονται γὰρ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται αὐτῆς ὡς παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐρεθείσης, εἴ γε καὶ Σουσαρίων ὁ κατάρξας κωμῳδίας Μεγαρεύς*. The verbal parallels here are surely too striking to be accidental. There are three possibilities:

1. The commentator is echoing the *Poetics*. But the *Poetics* does not mention Susarion; the commentator would have to have supplied his name (and the connection between it and the question raised in the *Poetics*) on his own initiative, which is perhaps not very likely.⁷⁴

⁶⁸ Körte, PW 11. 1222. *Σουσαρίων* does not look like an Attic name. But *Σου-* (for *Σωσ-*) is if anything Aeolic, cf. *σουργίρας* in Thessalian: Bechtel, *Die Griech. Dialekte*, 1, Berlin, 1921, 143 (cf. C. D. Buck, *Greek Dialects*, Chicago, 1955, 27, 29); certainly it is not Megarian, cf. Meg. *Σωσιγένης, σωτήριας*: Bechtel 2, Berlin, 1923, 173. *Σουσαρίων* has an interesting resemblance to *Ἀρίων*, the Lesbian kitharode who figures in the development of the dithyramb and so of tragedy; but of course the parallel may be purely accidental (Arion: tragedy ~ Susarion: comedy?).

⁶⁹ Localized particularly at Icaria, or connected with it, like Thespiis. This symmetry is one more reason for suspecting that the whole story of S. is a fiction—but not for doubting that it was originally an Athenian fiction.

⁷⁰ Possibly Dieuchidas, as Wilamowitz suggested, *Götting. gel. Anz.* 1906, 619 n. 1, but we really cannot tell. In fact we cannot even give a certain *terminus ante quem*, since Susarion may not be implied in the *Poetics* passage and in any case the latter may be spurious. Only one thing we can be fairly sure of: such literary-historical claims would hardly have occurred to anybody before the fourth century.

⁷¹ The *testimonia* on them CGF 75-76: discussion Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 274-280.

⁷² So Welcker, *Kleine Schriften*, 1, Bonn, 1844, 275.

⁷³ P. 186 Heylbut (*Comm. in Ar. Graeca*, 20), on E. N. 4. 6. 1123a24.

⁷⁴ But it does not necessarily follow that because the commentator mentions Susarion he *cannot* have used the *Poetics*. He or his source was capable of various

2. The *Poetics* passage echoes the commentator. Possible, if the passage is an interpolation, but not very likely; although the omission of Susarion this way is more plausible than his addition the other way.

3. Both passages derive from the same source, which mentioned Susarion, but the *Poetics* passage has dropped him. Notice that if the author of the *Poetics* passage is Aristotle this gives a solid fourth-century source for Susarion; and that source might even be, say, Aristotle's own dialogue *On Poets*. Unfortunately we have no basis for a sure choice among these three alternatives, and it must remain uncertain not only which relation exists between the *Poetics* and the anonymous commentator, but whether Aristotle ever mentioned the name of Susarion.⁷⁶

Non liquet, then, as to Aristotle's views on Susarion—even if, as seems possible, the latter had already been claimed for Megara by his time—or on the alleged origin of comedy at Megara. The only real evidence is negative, namely Aristotle's own statement, 5. 49a38 ff., that the beginnings of comedy were not known (i.e., to him or anybody else).⁷⁶

With Sicilian comedy we are on somewhat different ground. As Gudeman says, the Dorian claim undoubtedly owed its real strength to the acknowledged greatness of Epicharmus, not to shadow-men like Susarion. Moreover there was not much doubt about Epicharmus having been a Dorian,⁷⁷ and none about his having lived and written

learning: Myrtilus, a poet of the Old Comedy, is quoted just above, and Ephantides (see above, n. 47) just below.

⁷⁶ Gudeman's citation, p. 110—"Schol. Dionys. Thrac. p. 306 Hilg. ἀρξασθαι δὲ αὐτῆς (sc. κωμωδίας) Ἀριστοτέλης Σουσαρίωνα"—is in error, since the remark is in a passage about tragedy, not comedy; it is of course bracketed as spurious by Hilgard.

⁷⁶ A word on ἐνταῦθα may not be amiss before we leave the clause. Kostagni (Intro. XXI-XXII) and Montmollin (p. 164) have revived the old notion that the word proves that the *Poetics* was written in Athens, and have made it carry a good deal of the weight of their thesis that the work belongs to Aristotle's last period, somewhere around 330. But "here" need not be restricted so narrowly. Megara Nisaea would be "here," as opposed to Megara Hyblaea, to a person writing anywhere in the Aegean area, e.g., at Assos, Mytilene, or Pella. Cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 58b; Alcibiades in Thuc. 6. 91. 5: ἐνθάδε, said at Sparta but referring to Greece as opposed to Sicily, and specifically to the fortification of *Decetea*.

⁷⁷ The report mentioned by Suidas, that he was born in Samos, is a transparent attempt to link him directly with Pythagoras and the Pythagorean migration. The other birthplaces are all Dorian (Cos, Syracuse, Megara Hyblaea) except the Sikel town of Krastos; on the question see Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 359-361.

at least his most important works in Syracuse, and in Doric. The flaw in this claim was chronological, since the only solid references we have outside the present passage date Epicharmus to the reigns of Gelon and Hieron, i.e., between 490 and 470—just about the same time as the officially attested beginnings of Attic comedy.⁷⁸ The *Poetics* stands almost alone in its flat statement that Epicharmus was “much earlier than Chionides and Magnes.” The statement in fact creates a serious problem, and would have been set aside long ago if it had not been thought to have the authority of Aristotle behind it.⁷⁹ Moreover it is not merely quoted: the writer has assumed full responsibility for it by the nominatives πρότερος ὢν (unlike ὡς ... γενομένης just above).

We get additional light from 5. 49b5 ff., τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος]⁸⁰ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν κτλ., and a passage in Themistius, *Orat.* 27, p. 406 Dindorf: κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας, ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦσθην Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμος, κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη. The close verbal parallels between Themistius and chapter 5 on the one hand (ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας ~ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε; κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε ~ τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν) and chapter 3 on the other (ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦσθην Ἐπ. καὶ Φ. ~ ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπ.) leave no reasonable doubt that some kind of close relationship exists among the three

⁷⁸ So, for example, the Parian Marble, epoch 55; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 64; see Jacoby, *op. cit.* (above, n. 59) 181. Suidas dates E.'s dramatic activity to 486, precisely the year when comedy was officially admitted to the City Dionysia. On this synchronism and its relative solidity see Wilamowitz, *Götting. gel. Anz.* 1906, 620; Edward Capps, “The Introduction of Comedy into the City Dionysia,” *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, 1st ser. vol. 6, Chicago, 1904, 262-266. The 6th-century datings (E. one of the [Seven] Wise Men, Hippobotus *ap. Diog. Laert.* 1. 42; E. inventor of two letters of the alphabet, *Plin. N. H.* 7. 192), which Wilamowitz claims as traces of another Aristotelian tradition, are too vague to prove anything and do not remove the contradiction—which Wilamowitz himself emphasizes—between πολλῶ πρότερος ὢν Χιονίδου καὶ Μάγνητος and Suidas s.v. Μάγνης: ἐπιβάλλει Ἐπιχάρμω νέος πρεσβύτη. See F. Jacoby, *loc. cit.*; A. Olivieri, *Frammenti della commedia greca...*, Naples, 1930, 5. The chief *testimonia* are assembled in *CGF* 88-89.

⁷⁹ Ritter deals it some hearty blows, pp. 98-100, which have been discounted only because his whole interpolation theory has been rejected. Wilamowitz objected to the chronology also, *loc. cit.*, and Butcher at one time proposed to read <οῦ> πολλῶ πρότερος (1st ed. [1895]); approved by Gercke and Wilamowitz, but later withdrawn: see ed. 4 [1932] vii n. 1). Capps's discussion, *loc. cit.*, though circumspect and careful, glosses over the difficulty instead of solving it.

⁸⁰ For the brackets and the spelling Phormus(-os) see below *ad loc.*

passages. But none of the three seems to be copying directly from either of the others, since each has some details peculiar to itself. A common source is more likely; what could it be?

It is generally assumed—so far as any notice is taken of the problem—that Themistius is quoting from an exoteric work of Aristotle's, most probably the dialogue *On Poets*;⁸¹ and that is possible and likely enough. It would follow that Aristotle, in both chapter 3 and chapter 5, is quoting or paraphrasing himself: again a plausible enough idea, but refuted by an inspection of the word *ἐκεῖθεν*. In *Poetics* 3 it ought to refer to Megara Hyblaea, since the whole point of the passage is the Megarian claim. *Ἐκεῖθεν* would then mean either that Epicharmus was born in the Sicilian Megara or that he migrated to Syracuse from there.⁸² But Themistius shows us clearly the original and proper bearing of *ἐκεῖθεν*: *ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας, ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἤστην Ἐπ. καὶ Φ.*, where the adverb refers to Sicily as distinguished from Athens. And so it does here too: *ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπ. ... πρότερος ὢν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος*: i.e., the Sicilian poet is earlier than the earliest Athenian poets. But here the remark has been injected into a more specialized context, where it does not quite belong. That Epicharmus antedates any Athenian comic poet does not depend on his being from Megara; it would be equally true—if it is true—were he a Syracusan.

I infer from this that although the remark about Epicharmus may be Aristotelian in origin, it cannot be Aristotle who put it here. And this inference is greatly strengthened by the phrase *ὁ ποιητής*, which as Gudeman rightly says cannot possibly have been written by Aristotle. The man whom Plato⁸³ had ranked with Homer as *ἄκρος τῆς κωμωδίας*, and whom Aristotle himself cites at least nine times,⁸⁴ far oftener than any other comic poet—our philosopher cannot have felt called upon to identify him by a tag like "the poet." The phrase reeks of Byzantium, or at least of late antiquity.

It seems to me beyond doubt, then, that an annotator is responsible for *ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπιχάρμος ὁ ποιητής*—from which it follows that

⁸¹ So Gudeman *et al.* Bywater, p. 144, following Welcker, sees in Themistius a reminiscence of chapter 5; but that fails to account for his extra matter (*κάλλιον ... συνηυξήθη*) and necessitates a highly improbable rearrangement of the text there.

⁸² Schmid 1. 1. 637 n. 3.

⁸³ *Theaet.* 152e.

⁸⁴ Bonitz, *Index* 282b43-50.

he is also responsible for the participial phrase which depends on it, πολλῶ πρότερος ὢν κτλ. This confronts us in turn with a new question: is he paraphrasing Aristotle in this second part, as he seems to have been doing in the first? I see no certain way of answering this question. There is no other clue to Aristotle's dating of Epicharmus, unless it be the phrase ἐξ ἀρχῆς in the passages from chapter 5 and from Themistius, and that does not explicitly put him "much earlier" than Chionides and Magnes. Moreover, as we shall see in analyzing the passage in chapter 5, Aristotle recognized Epicharmus as the originator of comedy only in a carefully delimited sense, not in the blanket fashion of the claim that is implied here. In that specified sense, Epicharmus stands as the leading, in fact the key figure in the development of 'comedy' between Homer and Crates, and among the earliest *known* comic poets. In short, we cannot find any evidence that Aristotle regarded Epicharmus as the εὐρετής of comedy, as that word would ordinarily be understood. Still, he may well have dated him earlier than the accredited *official* beginnings of comedy in Athens, as represented by Chionides and Magnes. And to the extent that he recognized him as a key figure in the development of 'comedy' in the proper sense (as opposed to 'iambic'), and recognized no comedy in that sense at Athens before Crates (ca. 450), to that extent certainly he implied a recognition that comedy originated in Dorian rather than Ionian lands. For, even aside from the clause we have bracketed,⁸⁵ I think there can be no serious doubt that Aristotle traced the main line of descent of 'comedy' (always, 'comedy' as opposed to 'iambic') from Homer through Dorian rather than Attic channels. This theoretical prejudice, if it is one, need not have predisposed him to accept any particular Dorian claim, at least in the absolute sense in which these were normally put forward. But surely it would predispose him to be charitable to the general idea of a Dorian claim. Our analysis of the etymological side of the claim, which by its very nature is better fitted to sustain that general idea

⁸⁵ Which contains, be it noted, the only positive statement of a priority in the historical section of our passage. The claim of old Megara is merely quoted (ὡς ... εὐρεθείσης), and for the Peloponnesian claim to tragedy no proof is cited at all. As a final argument for bracketing, we can perhaps cite the almost universal confusion of the manuscripts over the name Chionides (Gudeman summarizes the variants as Χω[ο]ν[ων]ίδου; the Arabic version perhaps reflects the correct spelling: Tkatsch 2. 152-153), which is more plausible in a note (perhaps written in compendia: see below on 5. 49b6) than elsewhere.

than the varying, even conflicting, and shakily attested historical arguments, will tend to confirm this impression.

The last historical clause, *καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας κτλ.*, presents still another problem. Themistius says, immediately following the words quoted above on Epicharmus, *καὶ τραγωδίας εἰρεται μὲν Σικυώνιοι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ποιηταί*. This too is reminiscent of our passage in structure (*κωμῳδία ... καὶ τραγωδίας ~ τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμῳδίας ... καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας*), though again it is clear that Themistius is not quoting directly from the *Poetics* (nor the *Poetics* directly from Themistius). The Sicyonians are not explicitly mentioned in the *Poetics*; but it is highly probable that Sicyon is meant, along with Corinth—and perhaps Phlius.⁸⁶ Whether Aristotle is thinking of the shadowy Epigenes⁸⁷ we cannot tell, and it hardly matters. There is nothing impossible or implausible about the clause, in spite of its syntax⁸⁸ and the fact that it is omitted in the Arabic version.⁸⁹ Moreover, if Aristotle believed that tragedy had evolved from the dithyramb, he must have accepted the claim of “some of those in Peloponnese”—in one sense; for in one sense the whole history of serious poetry from the beginning is a history of tragedy, in another sense tragedy begins with Thespis.

Hence we may conclude that the parenthesis a29-35 is genuine, or at least that there is no reliable index against it (except the clause *ἐκεῖθεν ... Μάγνητος*). But there are reasons for thinking it a parenthesis added by Aristotle after the fact.⁹⁰ I mean the loose correlation *τῆς μὲν ... καί*, which it is hard to parallel in Aristotle; the fact that historical annotations are not required by the original scheme; and above all the clause *οὔτοι μὲν γὰρ κτλ.*, a35 ff., to which we now turn.

We have already referred to the fact that *τῆς μὲν γὰρ ... Πελοπον-*

⁸⁶ Not Sicyon alone, as Bywater and Rostagni seem to imply. Aristotle recognized Arion as inventor or ‘beginner’ of the dithyramb—obviously at Corinth: see Procl. *ap. Phot.* (= *Ar. fr.* 677 Rose)—and certainly in his eyes that constituted some sort of claim to tragedy. See below on 4. 49a10. Phlius would figure here, if at all, as the home of Pratinas; see Suidas *s. v.* *Πρατῖνας*.

⁸⁷ See Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.* 12-13; Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 138.

⁸⁸ Some difficulty has been made about *καί* in correlation with *τῆς μὲν*; but see Vahlen, *Beiträge* 342 (14. 427, n. 8).

⁸⁹ Gudeman's fancies based on this fact—see also Tkatsch, 2. 183-185—are disposed of by Montmollin, p. 12.

⁹⁰ So Montmollin 13. I cannot, however, follow M. in ascribing this and other notes to a ‘documentary’ or archival period of wholly different temper: *ibid.* 49-50

νήσω must be at least a parenthesis, because otherwise *οὔτοι* would naturally refer to *ἐνίοι τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ*, which is absurd. It is now time to notice that *οὔτοι* cannot refer to the particular Dorians mentioned in the parenthesis, either city by city or all together. Neither the Megarians of Greece nor those of Sicily nor the Sicyonians nor the Corinthians, nor any combination of them, can have formulated the etymological arguments, or rather argument, which is ascribed to the "Dorians" here, because that argument is double, covering the drama as such (tragedy and comedy jointly), whereas their claims were to tragedy or comedy. The two lines of argument are in fact unconnected, even incommensurable. One, the historical, is concrete, individualized, the other is abstract, generalized; and the latter cannot be derived from the former by simple addition.⁹¹

Hence we shall have to consider the etymological argument, with its two interdependent parts, separately from the historical claims, and try to determine (1) whether the writer accepts the argument, and (2) whether he is Aristotle.

The derivation of *κωμῳδία* from *κώμη* is notoriously wrong.⁹² That fact undoubtedly accounts for the almost universal (often tacit) assumption that Aristotle rejected it; for the text gives no such indication. The Dorian case involves two claims: (a) that *κωμῳδία* is from *κώμη*, not *κῶμος*, and (b) that *κώμη* is a Doric, not an Attic word. Hence we must ask our questions (1) and (2) separately for each of these claims:

(1) (a) Does the writer accept the derivation *κώμη* - *κωμῳδία*? The form of citation (*ὡς ... λεχθέντας κτλ.*) is technically non-committal. But the length and circumstantiality of the summary of the Dorian case ("because of their wandering through the villages, being driven out of the city in contempt") not only reveals a detailed knowledge of the argument but also suggests that the writer believes in the reality of the people, places, and incidents that are alluded to ("their wandering," "the villages," "the city"). Conclusion: the signs are for rather than against acceptance.

⁹¹ The etymological argument is not simply a composite, *κώμη* - *κωμῳδία* for example being contributed by the Megarians and *δρᾶν* - *δρᾶμα* by Corinth or Sicily. It is a unified, organic attack, undoubtedly conceived by a single brain, which begins with *δρᾶν* - *δρᾶμα* as its general *point d'appui* but supplements it with a special argument based on *κώμη* - *κωμῳδία*.

⁹² Schmid l. 1. 634 n. 1; Bolsacq, *Dict. étym. de la l. grecque*, Brussels, 1950, s. v. *κῶμος*.

(2) (a) Is this consistent with the writer being Aristotle? We know of no reason why it should not be, and there is one positive though minor indication: τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι, 5. 48a38-b1, seems to echo the same original idea as ἀτιμαζομένους. Conclusion: Aristotle could have written ὡς κωμωδοὺς κτλ., and in a favorable spirit.

(1) (b) Does the writer accept the Doric provenience of κώμη? Here we do seem to have positive evidence, in the nominative Ἀθηναῖοι ('Α. δὲ δῆμους), which indicates that he himself takes responsibility for the second—and crucial—half of the assertion. Practically all the modern editors have emended to Ἀθηναίους,⁸³ but on no better real ground than that Aristotle must be saved from approving a false etymology. Conclusion: the author of οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ κτλ. accepted the allegation that villages were called κῶμαι by the Dorians but not by the Athenians, who used δῆμοι instead.

(2) (b) Is this consistent with the writer being Aristotle? Again we know of no reason to the contrary, and we can perhaps find more positive evidence. When Aristotle deals with the concept 'village' in the abstract, he says κώμη;⁸⁴ but when he deals with Attic villages he says δῆμοι. Κώμη does not appear in the *Constitution of the Athenians*, only δῆμος. Moreover it seems clear from several expressions in that work that Aristotle thought of the δῆμοι as antedating the Clisthenian reform, that is, thought of δῆμος as being the original and proper term for an Attic village.⁸⁵ Actually, of course, δῆμος as

⁸³ So Susemihl, Christ, Butcher, Bywater, Hardy, Gudeman, Sykutris, all following Spengel and the Oxford edition of 1760.

⁸⁴ *Pol.* 1. 2. 1252b16, 17, 28; 2. 2. 1261a28; 3. 9. 1280b40.

⁸⁵ Thus *Ath. Pol.* 14. 4; 16. 5 (cf. 26. 3; 48. 5) speaks of δῆμοι in connection with events in Pisistratus' time (the 'deme' Palania; Pisistratus appointed circuit judges, δικάσταί οἱ κατὰ δῆμους); and Aristotle's language (if it is he) in 21. 4, καὶ δημότας ἐποίησεν ἀλλήλων (sc. Clisthenes) τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν δῆμων, implies that the δῆμοι were already in existence (*ibid.* 5, τοὺς δῆμους ἀντὶ τῶν ναυκραριῶν ἐποίησεν, does not necessarily mean that Cl. created the demes: Von Fritz and Kapp translate "replacing the naucraries by the demes"). Cf. Herod. 1. 60. 4; 62. 1; and see How and Wells 2. 37 (comm. on Herod. 5. 69. 2). Plato, *Laws* 5. 746d, and especially Isocrates, 7. 46, διελόμενοι τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατὰ κώμας, τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δῆμους (actually this is said of Solon and Clisthenes and the statesmen of "that time"), make it clear that in standard 4th-century Athenian usage κώμη was limited to the city ('quarters,' sections of town) and δῆμος to the country. That would be the usage Aristotle found around him. But our question is what he thought the pre-Clisthenian usage had been.—The genuineness of the *Ath. Pol.* has been questioned of late; see, e.g., C. Hignett, *A History of the*

a political term may date only from Clisthenes,⁹⁶ and Aristotle there is talking about the village from a political point of view. Nevertheless, in default of other evidence I think we are safe in concluding that he did regard *δήμος* as the original Attic name for 'village,' and therefore that he was capable of writing *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δήμους* on his own responsibility.

The indications are, then, that the writer of the passage was personally inclined toward the Dorianizing etymology, and that there is nothing to prevent Aristotle being that writer. Having said so much, we must take note of the possible connection between all this and the widespread tendency in later antiquity to derive *κωμωδία* from *κώμη*.⁹⁷ One parallel is in the *Estensis* of Aristophanes:⁹⁸ *τὴν κωμωδίαν ἠρόησθαι φασιν ὑπὸ Σουσαρίωνος · τὴν δὲ ὀνομασίαν ἔχειν οἱ μὲν ὅτι περὶ τὰς κώμας περιμόντες [cf. τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνη!] ἡδον καὶ ἐπεδείκνυντο, μήπω πόλεων οὐσῶν ἀλλ' ἐν κώμαις οἰκούντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων · οἱ δὲ ἀντιλέγοντες φασὶ μὴ κώμας καλεῖσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἀλλὰ δήμους, καὶ κωμωδίαν αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν ἐπεὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκώμαζον.* Here the same allegation as in the *Poetics*, namely that the Athenians call their villages *δήμοι*, not *κῶμαι*, is used for the opposite purpose: to disprove the *κώμη*-etymology and recommend the one from *κωμάζειν*. The exploitation of the material varies; the material itself is basically the same, and it points to a setting which was originally *Attic*.⁹⁹ So also with the story we have already referred to, about the countrymen who crept into town after nightfall to air their grievances against some of the townfolk. Wherever we can lay our hands on anything concrete in this story, it points to Attica.¹⁰⁰ And we cannot doubt that the same is true in the *Poetics*: that the *ἄστυ* originally meant was Athens itself and the villages were Attic vil-

Athenian Constitution, Oxford, 1952, 27-30. But H. does not deny that the work is from Aristotle's school.

⁹⁶ Not all the *δήμοι* he set up were necessarily actual villages, any more than a New England 'town' necessarily has a 'village' in it. See Wilamowitz, *Ar. und Athen*, Berlin, 1893, 2, 150.

⁹⁷ This is in fact the leading etymology in the late treatises and prolegomena, ranking well ahead of *κῶμα*, *κῶμος*, and *Κῶς*.

⁹⁸ *CGF* 6-7.

⁹⁹ The rebuttal (*ἀντιλέγοντες*) is pointless unless the situation the contestants are fighting over is Attic (*μὴ κώμας καλεῖσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίους*).

¹⁰⁰ *CGF* 12 (Schol. Dion. Thr. 747, 25, line 8), *Ἀθήνησι*; *ibid.*, II. τῆς κωμ. (right-hand column, line 3), *παρὰ τὸν δῆμον ἐκείνον*; 14, 57; 15, 60; 35, 26; etc.

lages.¹⁰¹ It is the same thing as with Susarion: an originally Attic situation has been invaded by others. We cannot tell exactly what the original form of the story was, nor whether there was more than one form, nor exactly what Aristotle's part was in spreading it. But τῆ κατὰ κώμας πλάνη ἀτιμαζομένων ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως seems to reveal his knowledge and acceptance of such a story (τῆ πλάνη, τοῦ ἄστεως), and in the Dorianizing sense. There is some connection with the versions that appear in the tractates, late and foolish though they are and little though we can trace the exact line of descent.

The second prong of the etymological argument, that δρᾶν is a Doric word, is as weak linguistically as the first. Richards and Snell¹⁰² have made it certain that δρᾶν is not exclusively Doric. It appears in Attic at all periods. Nevertheless it had become uncommon in Attic prose in the fourth century, except in Plato and Demosthenes,¹⁰³ and Aristotle might be excused for thinking it un-Attic. In any case I believe that he did so,¹⁰⁴ and that that is the point of the καί with which this whole exposition began (διὸ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται κτλ., "and in fact that is why the Dorians lay counter-claim to both tragedy and comedy; for they say ...").

Why is the etymological argument double (κώμη - κωμῳδία, δρᾶν - δρᾶμα)? Because, as we saw, Attic comedies were unfortunately not called δράματα. Hence a Dorian claim must have two prongs or it would not stick. Δρᾶν - δρᾶμα might do for tragedy (and satyr-play), but anyone who wished to claim the whole drama on linguistic grounds must also account for κωμῳδία. Thus the two arguments belong together, not inherently, but in the context in which they are offered

¹⁰¹ Steph.-Hase-Dindorf, *Thes. Graec. Ling.* 1. 2. 2275B-C: "Ἄστυ peculiare fecerunt Athenienses urbis suae nomen." Cf. Thuc. 2. 13. 7; Plat. *Rep.* 1. 327b; *Phaedr.* 230d; and the standing Attic antithesis ἐν ἄστυ - κατ' ἀγροῦς, e.g., in speaking of the Dionysia. Ἄστυ of Naxos: Ar. fr. 558 Rose. See also Georg Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde*², 1 (*Handb. d. Alt.-wiss.* 4. 1. 1). 154 n. 4; *id.*, *Gr. Gesch.* 3. 1, Gotha, 1897, 486 n. 5.

¹⁰² See above, n. 45.

¹⁰³ Richards, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁴ The argument which occasionally turns up (e.g., in Bywater *ad loc.*, p. 125), that Aristotle cannot have believed δρᾶν un-Attic because he uses it himself, betrays a curious view of Aristotle, as if he were as palpitating an Atticist as Aristides or Libanius. Such a conception is an anachronism in the fourth century B.C. The language that Aristotle writes is mainly Attic, of course, but it would hardly have occurred to him to think himself barred from using a word because it was Doric or primarily Doric in origin.

here, and must not be torn apart. This is in fact a strong indication that the etymological side of the Dorian claim (the historical side is, as we saw, a different matter) is the work of a single brain: i.e., that *οὔτοι*, a35, really covers a single person.

The conclusion which emerges for a29-b2 as a whole is that in spite of some weaknesses and suspicious points it is probably genuine—except *ἐκείθεν ... Μάγνητος*. But the looseness with which it is attached to the main argument of the *Poetics* makes it also probable that the whole passage (beginning at a24, since a24-29 is essentially a preface to the rest) is a note added to his own manuscript by Aristotle. This is made doubly probable by the fact that a24-25 and b2-3 are doublets, and that the latter is the transition which is integral to the main sequence. Within the passage, again, *τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμωδίας ... Πελοποννήσῳ* is a parenthesis, detachable from the main sentence, and perhaps written separately from it.

As to the intent and significance of the note as a whole, we have seen that in all probability it represents an approving gesture in the direction of the Dorian claims. First of all, and chiefly, this means an indication by Aristotle that he thought the antecedents of the drama—after Homer—lay in Dorian lands. It does not mean that he accepted any particular claim, such as that of the Megarians, which pretended to make definite statements about any period before Epicharmus (early fifth century). Aristotle's explicit statement (5. 49b1) that nothing was known about the beginnings of comedy makes it unlikely that he went so far. But, in the field of comedy in particular, the narrative in chapters 4 and 5 makes it very clear that Aristotle thought the main line ran through Dorian channels from Homer to Epicharmus to Crates, by-passing or ignoring Archilochus, Hipponax, and Cratinus. So far as tragedy is concerned we are on still firmer ground in recognizing a pro-Dorian attitude on Aristotle's part. The dithyramb of Arion at Corinth, and perhaps the *τραγικοὶ χοροὶ* at Sicyon, were certainly fixed items in his view of the development. In both cases these general attitudes are connected very intimately—this is especially clear in the case of comedy—with Aristotle's conception of the essence of the genre. Dorian comedy represented to him what comedy ought to be and really "was": namely, harmless humor instead of 'iambic' satire.

Thus it would be consistent with Aristotle's beliefs to give some approval, at least by inference, to Dorian claims. But the way these are formulated here, centering in the concept of *drama* as such (*δρά-*

ματα; ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρωῶντας), leads us to suggest that Aristotle's allusion was not prompted in the first instance by the ordinary claims of Megara or Corinth or Sicyon—claims to a particular genre on the basis of particular historical traditions—but by a “Dorian” claim of semi-abstract, philosophical nature. Any step beyond this is purest guesswork, but we will venture it and suggest that the stimulus came from Aristotle's own school, and in particular from one or both of two scholars who were independent enough and learned enough to command Aristotle's interest and respect and at the same time were sturdily Dorian in spirit. I mean of course Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus. Both of them wrote major works that covered the field of the drama,¹⁰⁶ and in all likelihood produced them just during Aristotle's last years.¹⁰⁶ Of the two men, Dicaearchus is the more likely candidate. I suggest, therefore, that a24-b2 is a jotting by Aristotle in his last period at Athens, summarizing the Dorian claims to the invention of the drama as they had been put forward by Dicaearchus or Aristoxenus, more probably the former.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Dicaearchus: *Bίος Ἑλλάδος* and *Περὶ μουσικῶν ἀγώνων*. The former contained the allegation that Euripides stole his *Medea* from Neophon of Sicyon, fr. 63 Wehrli (Hypoth. Eur. Med.); the latter (or *Π. Λιονυσιακῶν ἀγώνων*) dealt among other things with the pre-history (fr. 75, Arion) and early history (fr. 76, invention of the third actor) of tragedy. On D.'s Dorian sympathies see above, n. 51. Aristoxenus' *Π. χορῶν* or *Π. τραγικῆς ἀρχήσεως* (frags. 103-112 Wehrli) might just possibly qualify; on signs of pro-Dorianism see Wehrli's commentary, p. 83.

¹⁰⁶ Not earlier, since they were “pupils” of Aristotle together: Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 1. 18. 41; Suid. s. v. Ἀριστόξενος; but also not much later. Dicaearchus' ἀκμή cannot be put later than 310 (Martini, PW 5. 547), and Aristoxenus' is still earlier. He was not much younger than Aristotle himself, since he had considerable study before coming to the Lyceum.

¹⁰⁷ This hypothesis obviously has something in common with that of Montmolin. But his notion that Aristotle's “additions ultérieures” stem from an archival or ‘documentary’ period, betraying the direct influence of his studies in the ‘Fasti,’ does not exactly fit the present case. There are no archival facts here, only theories and allegations; but they are such as might have been elaborated by a scholar like Dicaearchus in connection with an over-all view of the development of drama, and subsequently noted by interest by his master. The parallel with a modern footnote, or rather with a supplement jotted down in a professor's lecture-notes, would then be especially close.

CHAPTER 4

48b4-24

- 5 εοίκασι δὲ γεννηῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι | δύο
 τινές, καὶ αὐταὶ φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμῆσθαι σύμφυτον
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδῶν ἐστί, [καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τῶν
 ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποι-
 10 εῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας] καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμή-
 μασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον | ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἔργων. ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρωμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς
 μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε
 μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. [αἷτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου
 15 ὅτι <τὸ> μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦ|σω αὐτοῦ.
 διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει
 θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον
 ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνο[ς]. ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχη προεωρακῶς, οὐχ ἢ
 μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν
 χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.]
 20 | κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμῆσθαι, καὶ τῆς ἁρμο-
 νίας καὶ τοῦ ἑυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ἑυθμῶν
 ἐστί φανερόν), ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς αὐτὰ μάλιστα,
 κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες, ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν
 αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων.

48b4

- As to the *general* origin of the poetic art, it stands to reason
 5 that two causes | gave birth to it, both of them natural:
 (1) Imitation is a part of men's nature from childhood, [and
 he differs from the other animals in the fact that he is es-
 pecially mimetic and learns his first lessons through imita-
 tion] as is the fact that they all get pleasure from works of
 10 imitation. An indication of the latter is what happens | in
 our experience. There are things we find painful to look at
 themselves, but of which we view the most accurate repro-
 ductions with pleasure: for example, replicas of the most
 unprepossessing animals, or of cadavers. [The reason for this

also is that learning is highly pleasurable not only to philosophers but to the rest of mankind in the same way, although
 15 their share [of it is limited. For that is why people enjoy seeing the reproductions: because in their viewing they find they are learning, inferring what class each object belongs to: for example that "this individual is a so-and-so." Because if the viewer happens not to have seen the object before, the copy will not produce the pleasure *qua* copy, but by virtue of its workmanship or its finish or some other cause of that kind.]

20 And since imitation is natural to us, and (2) melody and rhythm also (as for the various verses, it is evident that they are segments of the various rhythms), at the beginning those who were endowed in these respects, developing it for the most part little by little, gave birth to poetry out of the improvisational performances.

Our theme was to be the art of poetry, generically and in its species. So far all our attention has gone to the species, that is, to the differentiations that constitute them: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν ... εἰρήσθω ταῦτα*. Now we turn back to the art as a whole: *ἐόλκασι δὲ γεννήσαι μὲν ὁ λ ω ς τῆν ποίησιν κτλ*. *Δέ* here marks the new discussion (of the causes and history of poetry) as coördinate with the old. Moreover the two treatments cover essentially the same ground. What was treated analytically, in systematic form, in chapters 1-3, now comes to life and is seen synthetically, as a process of development, in chapter 4.¹ Becoming logically follows Being,² is in fact the coming-to-be of Being which reveals its pattern. So in the present case the history will show how the articulations of poetry came to be. This recognition, that chapter 4 offers the same basic principles as chapters 1-3, but in operation, is of first-class importance for the interpretation of details as well as the appraisal of the theory over-all.

The two causes are causes of the becoming of the poetic art *as a whole*:

¹ See my article "Aristotle and Satyr-Play. I," *TAPA* 70 (1939), esp. p. 149; Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 27-29 (p. 28: "es blieb nun die Aufgabe übrig, dieselben [sc. the 'Was,' the 'Wie,' and the 'Worin'] als Momente in die lebendige Entwicklung selbst mit aufzunehmen").

² *Phys.* 2. 1. 193b13, *ἡ φύσις ἢ λεγομένη γενέσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν; Metaph.* M2. 1077a26, *τὸ τῆ γενέσει ὕστερον τῆ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον*; other refs. in Bonitz, *Index* 148a32.

γεννησάι μὲν ὄλωσ τὴν ποίησιν. Over against them stands the principle that divides it down the middle according to its objects: *διεσπάσθη δέ*, in b24, corresponding to *γεννησάι μὲν*,³ will introduce the differentiations of poetry, which begin at that point and are progressively expanded, deepened, and refined. Thus the story falls into two parts, general (roots of the art) and specific (its differentiation and development). Of these our passage represents the first and the rest of the chapter (and most of chapter 5) the second.

"Now it stands to reason that two causes were responsible for the begetting of poetry..." *Ἐοίκασι* has a deceptively empirical look; what it really represents is theory, not observation.⁴ Aristotle's 'history' is in fact as much an *a priori* construction as anything in the preceding three chapters. Many a reader, taken in by the historical air of the narrative and perhaps bedazzled by the standing conception of "Aristotle the empiricist,"⁵ may be inclined even now to distinguish, as Wilamowitz did,⁶ between the "facts" Aristotle offers and the judgments he passes on them, in the sense that the facts are binding on us while the judgments are not. Such a distinction has nothing to recommend it but its modern, scientific air. The fact is that there are no facts in Aristotle's narrative before the time of Aeschylus at least. His sketch of the development derives from certain convictions about the nature of poetry, not from research. The recognition of this state of affairs has been surprisingly slow and hesitant; but nevertheless it has spread in recent years.⁷ We shall find it salutary to be clear that chapter 4 is

³ Vahlen, *Beiträge*³ 9, 11 (1. 274, 276).

⁴ Cf. 48b28, τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὀμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν]τοιούτων ποίημα, εἰ κ' ὁ ζ' δ' εἶναι πολλοὺς, where the confession that logic has taken the place of evidence is especially ingenuous. The *εἰκός* of *εἰκός ἢ ἀναγκαῖον* is a first cousin. For *εοίκασι* itself cf. *Pol.* 5. 9. 1309b3; *Eth. Eud.* 7. 4. 1239b38; *De Caelo* 1. 3. 270a20; *De Gen. et Corr.* 1. 7. 323b16; *De Sensu* 443a29. Bywater correctly: "It is clear...."

⁵ A notion whose application is favored here by the prevalent dating of the *Poetics* to Aristotle's last period in Athens, when his major efforts are presumed to have been going into research and his thinking to have been as its farthest reach from Plato: Jaeger, *Aristotle*⁸ 324-341, 401-404.

⁶ *Elnl.*⁸ 49.

⁷ M. P. Nilsson, *Neue Jahrb. f. d. kl. Alt.* 14 (1911) 613; Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 128; Schmid 1. 2. 38 n. 4, 775; Sykutris, *Εἰσαγωγή* 93*-99*; Montmollin 49; Tkatsch 2. 51a. The comparable recognition that Aristotle's 'history' of previous philosophy in book 1 of the *Metaphysics* is mainly construction has only been established in detail by Harold Cherniss' epochal book, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Phil-*

not a historical document but a summary of Aristotle's thinking. On the other hand, when read in those terms, it will turn out to be not only interesting but significant.

At the very beginning of the chapter we find another of those questions on which the commentators traditionally take sides: the identity of the two generic causes of the poetic art. Everybody agrees that the first cause is the instinct or natural faculty of imitation, τὸ μιμεῖσθαι, b5. But what is the second one: the pleasure everyone gets out of imitations (b8-9), or the natural gift for melody and rhythm (b20-21)? Both views have had convinced partisans,⁸ and there are plausible arguments for and against both.⁹ Careful reading of the passage as a whole, however, will show that the required second cause is our natural bent towards melody and rhythm, b20-21.¹⁰ The clinching evidence is that ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποιήσιν, b23, repeats and echoes γεννησαι ... τὴν ποιήσιν, b4. Hence οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς ἀψτά, b22, must refer to the two natural causes, and these must therefore both be present in κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος κτλ.

But there is a difficulty which this solution, undoubtedly correct though it is, does not dispose of. Why is the second cause dealt with so curtly—in a grammatical aside, as it were (b20)—while fifteen lines of elaborate commentary (b5-19) are devoted to the first? We have to explain the disproportion. In doing so we will begin with Aristotle's 'sign,' b9. "A sign of this is what happens in (our) actual experience. We see certain things with pain (distaste), but enjoy viewing the most exact reproductions of them: for example, forms of the lowliest animals and of cadavers. The cause of this also is that learning is highly pleasurable not only to philosophers but to the rest (of mankind) on the same basis; ..."

osophy, Baltimore, 1935, although there were hints and mutterings before, e.g. Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 402. The *Poetics* is at least free from the worst disturbing factor in the *Metaphysics*, i.e., Aristotle's implicit assumption that he is the τέλος of the whole development and all his predecessors were stammering Aristotelians.

⁸ Partial lists in Gudeman *ad loc.* and Montmollin, n. 53, p. 79.

⁹ Thus τὸ τε μιμεῖσθαι ... καὶ τὸ χαίρειν κτλ. and σύμφυτον seem to be almost irresistible echoes of αἰτίαι δύο, καὶ αὗται φυσικαί; and it stands to reason that the second cause should be mentioned not too long after the theme has been introduced. On the other hand the pleasure men take in imitations is, it can be argued, only another aspect of the instinct of imitation itself. And so on.

¹⁰ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 10-11 (1. 274-278); Montmollin 32-34.

Here Aristotle cannot be talking, as he is often thought to be, about "works of art" (*ἔργων*).¹¹ For the whole point of his 'sign' is that the enjoyment of imitation *as such* makes us enjoy reproductions even of the lowliest and most repulsive objects; and Greek art had not yet taken up such objects in the fourth century. A regular painting or statue would please us by the beauty of its object, as well as by its own; hence for his test case Aristotle specifies objects which are ugly. What kind of *εἰκόνες* has he in mind, then? I suggest that he means *drawings, models, or sections of animals and human cadavers, i.e. reproductions used for biological teaching or research: laboratory equipment, not works of art.*¹²

Now what does Aristotle mean by "the cause of this *also*" (b12-13)? The cause is the inborn and universal love of learning. As the following lines make clear, it is the cause of our enjoyment of the *εἰκόνες* (b15; obviously the same ones as those mentioned above, b11). But *καί* implies that it is also the cause of something else previously mentioned. For this something else we naturally look first to *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντα*, b8-9. But that is only the general phenomenon to which the 'sign' bears testimony, whereas *αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου διὰ κτλ.* suggests that the cause itself has been previously mentioned or at least adumbrated. We look, therefore, for a broader reference for *αἴτιον*;¹³ and, considering that the cause is the love of *learning*, we find it in *καὶ τὰς μαθησεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας*, b7-8. But this clause also, or rather the clause of which it is a part (*καὶ τούτω διαφέρει κτλ.*), requires some attention. Montmollin points out¹⁴ that it does not belong organically to the primary sentence and

¹¹ Victorius' interpretation. But *ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων* is a stock phrase in Aristotle's vocabulary, meaning 'in practice,' 'in actual experience'; see Bonitz, *Index* 286a-37-46. Such an appeal to experience is of course thoroughly in accord with the Aristotelian concept of a 'sign'; and it is doubly effective in a discourse on art if the example is not directly from the arts.

¹² We know that Aristotle used charts and diagrams; cf. *Eth. Eud.* 2. 3. 1220b37; 3. 1. 1228a28; *Hist. An.* 1. 17. 497a32, and see Bonitz, *Index*, s. vv. *διαγραφὴ, ὑπογραφή*. But the teaching and research equipment must also have included zoological models in the round; and the practice can as well have begun in Assos or Mitylene as in the last period at Athens.

¹³ Rostagni refers the *σημεῖον* and the *αἴτιον* to the same thing, our pleasure in viewing 'images.' But this makes Aristotle spend seven lines (b12-19) merely on the cause of a secondary phenomenon, losing sight of the major issue, which is the natural status of imitation and the pleasure all men get from *all* imitations.

¹⁴ Pp. 34-35. But M.'s analysis is cursory and inadequate, and he does not notice

interrupts the close connection of its two coördinate parts (τό τε γὰρ μιμῆσθαι ... καὶ τὸ χαίρειν ...).

These considerations point, I believe, to the conclusion which Montmollin reached, that Aristotle's original treatment of the first 'cause' of poetry was limited to the sentence τό τε γὰρ μιμῆσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παλδων ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας, with the following 'sign' (b9-12). To this he later added a double justification, καὶ τοῦτω διαφέρει ... τὰς πρώτας (b5-8) and αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτου ... ἄλλην αἰτίαν (b12-19). *These two additions are interdependent.* Both of them stress the idea of learning and intellectual pleasure; and this idea, which is adumbrated in the first, is spelled out explicitly in the second.¹⁵

The second added passage, b12-19, traces the springs of imitation to a deeper cause, an *intellectual* cause which nevertheless is a part of our general human nature: οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ... ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. Pleasure in learning belongs to all men, because the desire to learn is a fundamental human impulse. Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. Whatever the burden of that famous sentence in its original context,¹⁶ here the assertion that learning is enjoyable to all men, not merely to philosophers, and that the reason why we enjoy viewing images is that they teach us something—this double assertion is a challenge to Plato. For Plato had expressed profound skepticism about the intellectuality of all men except a saving remnant; he had predicated his political arrangements on the irrationality of the average human being; and in particular he had accused poetry and art of pandering to the irrational part of the soul, indeed of not knowing enough to appeal to any other part.¹⁷ From its images we can learn nothing, at least nothing that is true. Against this skepticism (or pessimism, if one prefers) Aristotle sets a belief in the intellectuality of

the problem posed by καὶ τοῦτου. On his chronological inference from συλλογίζεσθαι see below, n. 21.

¹⁵ The second note refers directly to τὸ χαίρειν ... πάντας, over the head of the 'sign' (as a subsequent note it can do this; as a part of the original text it could not). Καί (καὶ τοῦτου) refers by implication to the coördinate status of that clause with τό τε γὰρ μιμῆσθαι: the cause is the natural ground of both aspects of imitation.

¹⁶ Jaeger, *Aristotle*³ 68-69, shows highly plausible reasons for tracing it back to the *Protrepticus*, i.e., a Platonizing work; but it must represent at the very least a new orientation of Platonism.

¹⁷ *Rep.* 10. 602c-605c (cf. *Laws* 2. 657d-659c). The artist or poet knows nothing except the external appearance of things and has nothing to offer the mind.

both the artist and the spectator or viewer. We all crave to know. Imitation, which is man's earliest mode of learning (b7-8), is natural to us all; and although not all of us have the special combination of abilities that makes the artist, we all respond—and respond *intellectually*—to his imitations.

Aristotle has often been reproached for making the basis of artistic enjoyment too narrowly intellectual. One defense, at least so far as the present passage is concerned, is that he is reacting consciously and perhaps a little violently against Plato's denial of intellectuality to art. What he feels it necessary to defend and illustrate is not the naturalness and universality of the mimetic impulse—Plato had not really denied that¹⁸—but its roots in man's highest, i.e., his intellectual, nature. In any case this emphasis on the intellect, though not incompatible with the rest of the *Poetics*, lies aside from the main course of argument of the work¹⁹ and is more plausible in an added note than in the original text.

For these reasons I find myself led, in this case, to the same conclusion as Montmollin: that b12-19 is an "addition ultérieure." And clearly b6-8 goes with it: *καὶ τούτῳ ... τὰς πρώτας*. It will be observed that this diagnosis of both passages as additions gives the necessary sharpness of definition to *καὶ τούτου* (b13) at last. The original text spoke of the naturalness of (a) imitation and (b) the pleasure all men take in imitations. Aristotle now adds a comment on (a): "In fact this is one of man's distinctive marks:²⁰ he is the most imitative animal and learns his first lessons that way"; then one on (b), with an allusion to the idea implied in the comment on (a): "The cause of this *also* [i.e., of the pleasure, as distinguished from the bent towards imitation] is that everybody enjoys learning [this was already implied for (a) in the words *τὰς μαθήσεις κτλ.*]; for that is why they enjoy looking at the images," etc. Thus grammatical indications and considerations of meaning seem

¹⁸ Plato's fears about the influence of wrong imitations on his guardians are based on the recognition that they *will* imitate what they see and hear and it will pass into character: *Rep.* 3. 395d.

¹⁹ The present passage is not alluded to or echoed in any way where we should expect it to be, in the section on 'universals' at the beginning of chapter 9.

²⁰ I believe that *διαφέρει* (Riccardianus) is the correct reading. The singular is strongly indicated by what follows (*ὅτι μιμητικώτατ ὁ ν ἑ σ τ ι*), while the only recommendation of the plural is the apparent symmetry of *καὶ τούτῳ κτλ.* with the preceding clause. Once the note was incorporated into the text, the attraction of the verb into the plural was natural enough.

to combine in favor of designating b6-8 and b12-19 as a pair of notes written simultaneously by Aristotle.

So far we will go with Montmollin. But his further attempt to stamp the added portions as 'late' and belonging to a definite stratum, with a characteristic 'late' ideology, is decidedly risky.²¹ A supplementary remark to bring out the difference between his own conception and Plato's is conceivable at any stage of Aristotle's development, even a comparatively early one. And the two passages in other works which most strikingly resemble ours are quite consistent with the idea that it is relatively early. *Parts of Animals* 1. 5. 645a7-17 speaks of the joys of studying (*θεωρεῖν*) even ugly and less esteemed animals, and says expressly that we enjoy looking at accurate representations of them: τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν. There is conscious divergence from the Platonic notion of *θεωρία* in this bold statement, but it probably belongs to the Assos-Lesbos period,²² not to the second sojourn in Athens. *Rhetoric* 1. 11. 1371b4-10 also shows striking parallels: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμητικόν, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητικὴ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εἰς μεμιμημένον ᾗ, καὶ ἂν ᾗ μὴ ἡδὺν αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει. Precise datings within the *Rhetoric* are still hazardous, but according to Solmsen²³ chapters 4-15 of Book 1 belong to a revision, but not the last revision, of the work. Hence they too can perhaps be dated approximately to Aristotle's middle period, not too many years after the first draft of the *Rhetoric* (ca. 355).²⁴ Thus there is no cogent reason why our added passage cannot have been written in Assos or Lesbos, or even before Aristotle left Athens in 347.

The *Rhetoric* passage suggests two small emendations, <τό> μανθάνειν in b13 and especially οὗτος ἐκεῖνο[ς] in b17.²⁵ For what Aristotle

²¹ His argument that *συλλογίζεσθαι*, b16, implies the invention of the syllogism, and is therefore late, seems to be wrong. The word does not seem to have a technical meaning here—'infer, reason, make out' are possible translations—and anyway the dating of the logical works is very uncertain (as Montmollin himself admits, n. 386, p. 355).

²² See above, c. 1, nn. 41 and 43, on the dating and on Jaeger's assertion that it is the 'program' of the new, scientific spirit of the Lyceum.

²³ *Die Entwicklung der Arist. Logik u. Rhetorik* (*Neue Philol. Unters.* 4), Berlin, 1929, 221-225. Cf. A. Kantelhardt, *De Ar. rhetoricis* (diss.), Göttingen, 1911, 59-60.

²⁴ Solmsen, *op. cit.* 217-218.

²⁵ *Τούτο ἐκεῖνο* Gudeman (in his crit. appar., not in his text).

means by "learning and inferring"²⁶ is not the recognition that "this person is that person," but that he is "that *kind* of creature," or as Rhys Roberts puts it in the Oxford translation of the *Rhetoric*, "That is a So-and-So." *Οὗτος ἐκεῖνος* = "Why, that is So-and-So!" (Cooper),²⁷ which is nothing to the point. In Aristotle's terms, if you have merely recognized the resemblance of one individual (the portrayed one: *οὗτος*) to another individual (the original: *ἐκεῖνος*) you have not learned anything. Learning and knowledge are of universals;²⁸ the individual *per se* is unknowable. The first question for the would-be knower is that indicated here, *τί ἕκαστον* (N.B.: not *τις ἕκαστος*): to what genus does this individual belong?²⁹ Say that the viewer sees a picture of a largish animal with a certain kind of ears and head, solid hooves, etc. When he identifies this, not with another individual, but with the genus 'animal' and the species 'horse,' and says, "Ah yes, that is a horse!," he has learned something. Such an identification is presumed to rest on a previous view of the species, i.e., of other individuals belonging to the species.³⁰ In other words the trick of recognizing and identifying images or reproductions is *a part of the general process of acquiring experience*,³¹ and is pleasurable for the same reason, because we are learning a part of the grand structure of genera and species which constitutes reality. This would seem in turn to point further, to the theory that the object represented by poetry is the universal. But Aristotle does not say so here, and we have already pointed out that the passage on the subject in chapter 9 contains no discernible allusion to ours.

The reduction of the original text of 48b4-19 to less than half its length (b4-6 and 8-12) decidedly mitigates the disproportion in length between the statements of the two causes of poetry (as the text usually stands, 15 lines against 2). For the rest, the brevity and casualness of

²⁶ There is no special reference to the 'syllogism,' as Montmollin alleges, p. 35, and therefore no inference to be drawn (p. 204) that the added matter postdates Aristotle's invention of the syllogism. See n. 21 above.

²⁷ Cf. Gomperz: "dass Dieser da eben Jener ist."

²⁸ *Metaph.* K1. 1059b29; Z11. 1036a28-29.

²⁹ For example, one must consider first what virtue is generically: *τί ἐστίν ἡ ἀρετή*, *E. N.* 2. 4. 1105b19, the answer being that virtue is a disposition, *ἐξέτις*; then what kind of disposition it is specifically, *ibid.* 5. 1106a14-15.

³⁰ Not, obviously, the same individual. See Sykutris, *Introd.* 81*, who emphasizes that when the subject is mythical, as in Greek tragedy, we cannot have 'seen' the same individual before.

³¹ *Metaph.* A1. 980b28, *γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις · αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν.*

καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ can perhaps be accounted for in a special way: Aristotle is presupposing and building upon Plato's elaborate discussion of the matter in the second book of the *Laws*.³³ Plato had had a great deal to say about the natural status of melody and rhythm,³⁴ and had never seen in them as such a threat to morals or social harmony. Imitation was the instinct whose status needed fresh analysis and justification.

This explanation, if correct, has an important corollary, namely that the basic text of our passage and of the passages related to it—i.e., the original text of at least the whole introductory section of the *Poetics* (chapters 1-5)—was written while Aristotle was still close to Plato. A time either just before or shortly after Plato's death is indicated: such a tacit presupposition of Platonic passages is hardly conceivable much after, say, 345. This, then, is one of what we shall find to be a lengthening list of indications that the *Poetics* is basically an early work.

The second cause, as Aristotle gives it, turns out to be our old friend the list of three poetic media, but without λόγος. This deficiency has troubled some commentators,³⁴ but can be explained without serious difficulty. Μέτρα, as we have already seen,³⁵ means 'verses' (concrete), not 'meters' (abstract); and verses are made of language.³⁶ As for μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν, and its counterpart in the *Rhetoric* (3. 8. 1408b29), ῥυθμός ... οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά,³⁷ their meaning is clear enough

³³ 2. 653c ff.; see esp. 653e-654a, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῶα οὐκ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεισι τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιών, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμός ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία ἡμῖν δὲ οὗς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδῶσθαι [sc. Apollo, Dionysus, and the Muses], τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἐνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἑναρμόνιον αἰσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Plato's gods and Muses are metaphorical clothing for the idea that rhythm and harmony are a part of man's nature (unlike the nature of the other animals); cf. just above, 653d, ὄρα ἂν ἄ χρη πότερον ἀληθῆς ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν ὁ λόγος ὑμνεῖται τὰ νῦν, ἢ πῶς. Finsler 192, on our passage: "Während die zweite Quelle der Poesie nur mit der knappen Aufführung abgetan wird, nimmt die Erörterung der ersten einen viel breiteren Raum ein, Beweis genug, dass für die zweite nur auf Platon verwiesen zu werden brauchte. Dieser hatte sich nämlich in den Gesetzen ausführlich über den Gegenstand ausgesprochen." See also Hermann Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike* (Diss. Bern. 5), Bern, 1954, 25-27.

³⁴ And not only in the *Laws*; cf. *Rep.* 3. 400d ff.

³⁵ Valgimigli proposed καὶ <διὰ τοῦ τε λόγου καὶ> τῆς ἁρμονίας.

³⁶ Above on 1. 47a29 and 47b20.

³⁷ See below on 6. 49b34, 50b14.

³⁸ Τμήματα? Bywater. Cf. Aristid. Quintil. 1. 23, p. 32, 7 Jahn: διαφέρειν δὲ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ [sc. τὸ μέτρον] φασὶν οἱ μὲν ὡς μέρος ὅλου (τομὴν γὰρ ῥυθμοῦ φασιν αὐτό...).

if we keep the concrete situation in mind. A poem in dactylic hexameters, the *Iliad* for example, is a continuous flow of dactylic rhythm (that is, of dactylically 'rhythimized' language) which is broken after every sixth 'foot.' The individual verses, therefore, are 'segments' of the total body of rhythm. All is well so long as we think, like Aristotle, of actual poems and verses, not of abstract rhythms and 'meters.'³⁸

Thus Aristotle has not really forgotten language. But there are other factors in play also. The causes are mentioned here in close connection with the first beginnings of poetry, and those beginnings are *lyric* (hymns and encomia; invectives). Moreover, even in the later development, when *λόγος* begins to predominate over music, the major changes in the poetic medium, the ones Aristotle chooses to emphasize, will not be in diction properly speaking so much as in the *rhythms* that go with the respective genres: the use of 'heroic' and iambic verses and the replacement of tetrameters by trimeters. Even with all this, however, we cannot acquit our author of some carelessness: the whole passage remains awkward and slightly opaque.³⁹

The stage is now set and the play begins: *ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς*⁴⁰ *αὐτὰ ... ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποιήσιν.* The event has already been alluded to in abstract form, b4: *γεννηῖσαι μὲν ὄλως τὴν ποιήσιν;* now it comes as an actual happening, *ἐγέννησαν.* Moreover the "begetting" is the work of a special group, men of outstanding abilities with respect to the two causes: *οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς αὐτά.* Aristotle is no believer in folk-creation. Art springs from special brains. All of us are capable of enjoying artistic imitations; not all of us are capable of producing them.⁴¹ Further, the stage of art, *ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποιήσιν,* is to be distinguished sharply from the stage of innocence out of which it is created. Aristotle's history will remind us in many ways of organic

³⁸ It is well known that *μετρική* began with, and on the whole stuck to, spoken verses, that it took the syllable as its smallest practical unit and was in fact a branch of philology or *γραμματική*, the study of words; cf. Aristid. Quintil., *loc. cit.*, and Goodell, *op. cit.* (above, c. 1, n. 254) 6-19. It was Aristoxenus who first attempted to base metric on rhythmic, the general science of rhythm, for which language is only one mode of embodiment.

³⁹ Possibly half intended: Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 17-18 (558).

⁴⁰ For the reading see Tkatsch 2. 94-95.

⁴¹ This explains why *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι* and *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι* had to make up the first cause between them. The universal mimetic tendency would never bring things to the stage of art: everything would remain at the level of improvisation. Art requires the creative few—but then the appreciative many are equally needed to give it a solid place in the scheme of things.

growth, but poetry never grew spontaneously out of universal mimicry. And the first step was something special. It was *difficult* (μέγιστον ἀρχὴ παντός, as Aristotle says with emphasis in connection with the development of the arts),⁴² and it *took time* (κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες). Although the first poems were perhaps not very far above the primitive improvisations, their creation may represent a greater absolute achievement than the writing of the *Oedipus*.

48b24-34

- 25 διεσπάρθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἦθη ἢ ποιήσεις. | οἱ μὲν γὰρ
σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοι-
ούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους
[28- ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ἕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια · [τῶν μὲν
-30] οὖν ... καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.] ἐν οἷς κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον [λαμβεῖον]
ἦλθε μέτρον (διὸ καὶ λαμβεῖον καλεῖται νῦν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ
τούτῳ λάμβιζον ἀλλήλους), καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ
μὲν ἡρωικῶν οἱ δὲ λάμβων ποιηταί.

48b24

- But poetry split up according to the kinds of character
25 that naturally belong to it. | For people of nobler cast were
imitating noble actions and the actions of noble men, while
the cheaper sort would imitate those of worthless people,
producing invectives at first, while others were making
[28-30] hymns and encomia. [Now of ... poems of that kind.] In
these performances, in accordance with the principle of
suitability, [iambic] verse came into use (in fact that is why
the term 'iambic verse' is employed nowadays, because it
was in this verse that they used to lampoon or 'iambize'
each other); and so it was that some of the ancients be-
came poets (makers) of 'heroic' verses, others of 'iambics.'

So much for the factors which "begot" poetry as a whole; now it is divided.⁴³ But actually it was never begotten as a whole. The art

⁴² *Soph. El.* 34. 183b20, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἶωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῶ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται. διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον · ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσοῦτῳ μικρότατον ὄν τῷ μεγεθεὶ χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ἀφθῆναι.

⁴³ As was pointed out above, διεσπάρθη δὲ corresponds to γεννηῖσαι μὲν ὅλως, b4.

was split down the middle from the beginning, and it remained so ever afterward. The new factor is of course the differentiation according to object, which at once produces two different kinds and levels of poetry, whereas the two general causes reveal themselves as forces for differentiation later, in the course of the development. Thus all three of the principles that served for the classification of the poetic art now turn up in the genetic sphere, as *ἀρχαί* of its development, not merely defining its species but producing them. Their order of appearance (that is, not the order in which they are first mentioned in this chapter, but that in which they go into operation) is as follows:

1. Differentiation by object, 48b24 ff.
2. Differentiation by medium, 48b33.
3. Differentiation by method (purity of 'imitation'), 48b35.

The usual understanding of *κατὰ τὰ οἰκειὰ ἤθη* is that it refers to the individual poets ("Poetry now diverged in two directions, according to the individual character of the writers," Butcher), who in turn are specified in detail in the following lines (*οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι κτλ.*). But the dichotomy *σπουδαῖοι - φαῦλοι* is a primary, objective datum which attaches to poetry inherently, as a representation of life. It inheres in it because poetry represents men in (and of) action and such men are necessarily high or low types. Such a determination has no business being left to individual temperament. The usual interpretation has to be rejected, for four reasons:

- † 1. Grammatical. It requires *οἰκειὰ* to be defined from outside the clause, by *οἱ ... σεμνότεροι* and *οἱ ... εὐτελέστεροι*, whereas it can get its orientation more naturally from inside (*ἡ πόησις*).
2. Lexical. Elsewhere in the *Poetics* *οἰκεῖος* does not mean 'individual, particular,' but 'proper (to), inherent (in), belonging to the nature of.'⁴⁴
3. Psychological. If individual temperament were the decisive factor, Homer would be an insoluble paradox, not to say a monster, since he wrote masterpieces in both genres. Was he both *σεμνότερος* and *εὐτελέστερος*?

⁴⁴ The *οἰκειὰ ἡδονή* of 13. 53a36; 14. 53b11; 23. 59a21 (also implied 26. 62b14) is the one proper to, inherent in tragedy (and epic), as opposed to one that is external or accidental. The episodes in a poem should be *οἰκειὰ*, i.e., germane to the central plot, 17. 55b13; 24. 59b28. Of the six 'parts' of tragedy, *ὄψις* is least *οἰκεῖον*, i.e., least integral to the poetic art. On *τὴν οἰκεῖαν φύσιν*, 49a4, see below *ad loc.* (same idea as here).

4. Philosophical. Works of art are produced by artists, but *qua* artists, not *qua* individuals. "It is an accident to the sculptor to be Polyclitus."⁴⁵ In this narrative the poets figure as carriers of the causes of poetry. A permanent differentiation ought to have causes of the same order.

Hence I propose to take *οἰκεῖα* in its usual and natural sense: "Poetry"⁴⁶ split according to the characters that inhere in it," namely the *σπουδαῖον* and *φᾶλον*.⁴⁷

The next question that presents itself is how and when the split took place *in poetry*. It is universally assumed that this process is described in the following lines, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι κτλ.* Again we must challenge the reigning interpretation, for a number of reasons; and since these have to do with the whole economy of the argument from b25 (*οἱ μὲν γὰρ*) to b34 (*ποιηταί*), we shall have to be even more circumstantial and roundabout than usual. Briefly, the main novelties of the interpretation proposed here are that (1) poetry proper does not appear until b32, *καὶ ἐγένοντο κτλ.*, everything before that being assigned to the stage of improvisation; but (2) b28-30, *τῶν μὲν οὖν ... καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, belongs to the stage of poetry and is placed after *λάμβων ποιηταί*.

The traditional difficulties in the passage, if one may call them so, cluster around *τῶν μὲν οὖν ... καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα* and the words immediately following, *ἐν οἷς κτλ.* It has long been felt⁴⁸ that *ἐν οἷς* cannot refer directly to *ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, since the adoption of iambic verse is connected here with satirical purposes (*λάμβιζον ἀλλήλους*), whereas in b38 Aristotle makes it clear that he considers the *Margites* noteworthy because it was *not* satirical. Vahlen's solution was to refer *οἷς* back to *ψόγους* in b27, over the head of everything between (b28-30), leaving the latter in a somewhat indeterminate

⁴⁵ *Phys.* 2. 3. 195a34; see above, c. 1, n. 17.

⁴⁶ Perhaps a reminder is in order that when we say "poetry" in this book we always mean the art of poetry or its active counterpart, the composition (making) of poetry. See above, p. 4.

⁴⁷ Already suggested by Finsler, 198 n. 2: "Ich fasse die *οἰκεῖα ἦθη* nicht als die der Dichter, sondern als das *σπουδαῖον* und *φᾶλον*, die den dargestellten Charakteren entsprechen."

⁴⁸ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*⁹ 12, 247 (1. 277, 306-307). The most recent survey of the problem, though not in quite the broad context that we are giving it here, is by Montmollin, pp. 36-37.

status as a parenthesis.⁴⁹ This establishes a clear sequence for one part of the passage: *ψόγοι* → *λαμβεῖον μέτρον* → *λάμβων ποιηταί*. But it does not really help b28-30 very much; for it is still inconsistent, if not absurd, to make *ὁ Μαργίτης κτλ.* depend on *ψόγους* (via *τοιούτον ποίημα*) if the poem was not a *ψόγος*.

Thus the most difficult problem appears to center in *τῶν μὲν οὖν ... καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*. Montmollin's designation of these three lines as an "addition ultérieure" has the virtue of simplicity and provides for *ἐν οἷς*, but like Vahlen's solution leaves an unresolved contradiction in the relation of *τοιούτον ποίημα κτλ.* to *ψόγους*.⁵⁰ On the other hand the attempt of Rostagni to attach *ἐν οἷς* to *ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα* in spite of all,⁵¹ though ingenious, is not convincing. This time the stumbling block is *διὸ καὶ λαμβεῖον ... ἀλλήλους*, which really does not fit the *Margites* very well either: the same difficulty turning up again in a different form. It is only natural for Rostagni to suggest that the clause may be an interpolation; but he does so without conviction.

The first major move on the board, which I believe one has to make regardless of how one interprets the rest of the passage, is to put *τῶν μὲν οὖν κτλ.* after *λάμβων ποιηταί*, b34. A number of things then fall into place:

1. The most obvious inconsistency, that the *Margites* is cited as an instance of a genre (*ψόγοι*) to which on the other hand it is said not to belong, is mitigated to a considerable extent. *Τοιούτον ποίημα* will now refer to *λάμβων*, not directly to *ψόγους*, and we shall see as our analysis progresses that that is a real distinction.

2. *Μὲν οὖν* is now thoroughly in order, summarizing one stage of the development and leading to the next (*ἀπὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου κτλ.*).

3. *Οὐδενός* and *πολλούς* are much more plausible immediately following *λάμβων ποιηταί* than they were after *ψόγους ποιῶντες ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια*. The persons are now referred to, rather than the genres.⁵²

⁴⁹ For a similar case (reference of a *οὔτοι* becomes apparent as soon as an intervening alien [but still Aristotelian] piece of text is recognized) see Ross's edition of the *Metaphysics*, Oxford, 1934, 2. 347, on *A8*. 1074a31-38), and above on 3. 48a35.

⁵⁰ Also it is hard to account for *μὲν οὖν* in an independent note; and the contents of these lines do not really belong to the documentary, *literaturgeschichtliche* stage that Montmollin alleges for them.

⁵¹ Similarly Hardy.

⁵² With the traditional order one would expect something like *ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρὸ Ὀμήρου χρόνων οὐδὲν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιούτον ποίημα*.

4. The following sentence, b34 ff., *ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κτλ.*, gains considerably in point, as we shall see in due time.

With b28-30 so placed we are ready to take a new look at the whole sequence b25-34. But instead of going back to the beginning of it we will start near the end, with *διό καὶ λαμβεῖον κτλ.* In the context, this seems to offer an explanation for the adoption of iambic verse in the *ψόγοι*, namely that it is the verse best suited to invective (*λάμβειζον ἀλλήλους*). But there is no parallel elsewhere in the *Poetics*—or in Aristotle—for such a description of iambic,⁵³ and on closer inspection we see that the sentence does not quite say that. What it says is that the *λαμβεῖον* (i.e., the iambic trimeter) is so called now because “they used to ‘iambize’ (berate, satirize, vilify, flout) each other” in it: in other words, Aristotle is saying that the term has derived its connotation from its use. The remark is only incidentally a characterization of the verse.⁵⁴

What particular trait or situation is suggested in *λάμβειζον ἀλλήλους*? The point to which I would call notice is that *ἀλλήλους* implies give-and-take, an *exchange* of banter or abuse between individuals or groups, and that this in turn implies an improvisational situation (like the *γεφυρισμοί*,⁵⁵ the Fescennine verses, modern *carnavale*, and so forth) rather than a poem formally composed by a poet. But the context of this activity, whatever it be, is fixed by *ἐν οἴς*, which in turn refers back to *ψόγους*. It would follow that the original ‘lowlifes,’ the makers of *ψόγοι*, were not poets but plain people, mocking and flouting each other at popular festivals, etc.—in short, that b25-27 refers to the stage of improvisation, antedating the beginnings of poetry.

The suggestion will appear shocking at first sight, but it fits the text in every detail and at the same time disposes of several difficulties. Let us follow it through the sentence:

Οἱ μὲν σεμνότεροι ... οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι—descriptions of broad classes of people, not of the small group of budding poets.

Ἐμιμοῦντο. The imperfect is strictly in order. The main sequence of events is narrated by aorists—*ἐγέννησαν*, b23; *διεσπάσθη*, b24; *ἦλθε*, b31; *ἐγένοντο*, b33—and the imperfect denotes something that

⁵³ Everywhere else it is characterized simply as the verse of *conversation*: so in 4. 49a24, cf. 24. 60a1; *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b33.

⁵⁴ See Sykutris *ad loc.*

⁵⁵ Hesych. *s. vv.* *γεφυρίς* and *γεφυρισταί*; see Schmid 1. 1. 634 nn. 3-9.

was going on during that time (specifically, at the time of *διεσπίασθη*), viz. the improvisations.

Πράξεις. Τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν ... διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας · τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἐξεώς ἐστίν.⁵⁶ Similarly blame is for actions (because, to be sure, they reveal a certain moral quality).⁵⁷ Imitation is of action even before it becomes poetry.

Πρῶτον. This is the ultimate, improvisational beginning; the next stage is the first birth of poetry proper: καὶ ἐγένοντο ... ποιηταί, b32.

Ψόγους—no longer designates the first low-class poems, but the primitive matrix out of which they came: 'flyting,' Fescennine verses, *σκόμματα ἐκ τῶν ἀμαξῶν*, Demeter festivals ('*Ἰάμβη!*'), etc., etc.

Ἐτέροι—no longer has to express a strict dichotomy, as it should if it applies to the much smaller group of poets only (hence Spengel's *ἀτεροί*, from the feeling that we must have "the ones" and "the others"). In the broad mass of improvisers such a strict antithesis is not needed or appropriate. "As others (another kind)⁵⁸ did hymns and encomia."

Ὑμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια—(improvised) songs in praise of gods and heroes. Can it be a coincidence that these, the only varieties of poetry which Plato was ready to admit to his state without question,⁵⁹ are put by Aristotle at the very bottom of the ladder as the most primitive, in fact not quite poetry at all? Aristotle had a pretty wit: surely he was conscious of the irony here.

Now comes the first step toward actual poetry: ἐν οἷς κτλ. Unfortunately the text is not certain. Κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον has better manuscript authority than καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον.⁶⁰ On the other hand κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον λαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον is hardly admissible, and καὶ τὸ before λαμβεῖον is not impressive (Riccardianus only). The assumption of Gomperz, Gercke, and others that λαμβεῖον is an interpolation seems to me sound. We are left with a text which seems bare but actually is superior to any fuller one: ἐν οἷς κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον ἦλθε μέτρον, "in which (in them), in accordance with what was fitting, there came⁶¹ (a) verse." Aristotle does not mean iambs only. He is thinking of both sides of the equation, hymns and encomia as well as *ψόγοι*. In

⁵⁶ *Rhet.* 1. 9. 1367b28; cf. *Eth. Eud.* 2. 1. 1219b8-16; *E. N.* 1. 12. 1101b31-34.

⁵⁷ Cf., e.g., *E. N.* 5. 10. 1135a21; 4. 10. 1125b8-17.

⁵⁸ See above on *ἔτεροι*, 1. 47a20.

⁵⁹ *Rep.* 10. 607a; *Laws* 7. 801e.

⁶⁰ It is not clear from Tkatsch that the Arabic version implies καί, as Gudeman claims.

⁶¹ "Turned up, appeared, stellte sich ein." See Gudeman's note *ad loc.*, p. 126.

both types of improvisation, verse—that is, one of the three or four regular stichic verses that Aristotle recognized as μέτρα⁶²—put in an appearance, came to be used more or less regularly, in accordance with the nature of the imitation. Κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον ἦλθε expresses exactly the same idea as αὐτῇ ἢ φύσις τὸ οἰκειὸν μέτρον εἶρε later in the chapter (49a24), τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἡρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἤρμοκεν (24. 59b31), and especially ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν αὐτῇ ἢ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῇ αἰρεῖσθαι (*ibid.* 60a4). In fact our passage seems to provide the point of reference for ὥσπερ εἴπομεν in chapter 24.⁶³ Aristotle is talking in both places about how it happened that the particular verse came to be used for poetry. In chapter 24 he indicates that it was because the epic is a *narrative* genre and narrative poems tend to be *long*. We may assume, then, and indeed it is obvious on the face of it, that he thought of the primitive hymns, encomia, and invectives as short, and that serious poetry, at least, settled upon its chosen meter in proportion as it grew longer.⁶⁴

Διὸ καὶ ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται νῦν κτλ. If the parenthesis is genuine (and there is at least a possibility that it is not), it must have a somewhat different meaning from that usually given it, because we have bracketed the preceding ἰαμβεῖον, so that μέτρον no longer refers exclusively to iambic. The subject of the parenthesis is ἰαμβεῖον itself: not "it (i.e., iambic verse) is called ἰαμβεῖον," but "the term ἰαμβεῖον is used."⁶⁵ Also it should be noticed that the text runs διὸ καὶ ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται νῦν (not διὸ καὶ νῦν ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται): "that in fact is why the term ἰαμβεῖον is used now."⁶⁶ The verse, then, had

⁶² See above on 1. 47b20.

⁶³ See below *ad loc.*

⁶⁴ Another aspect of the development is left completely dark, viz. how, when, and why the primitive musical accompaniment was dropped in favor of using verses 'bare.'

⁶⁵ For the usage cf. 21. 57b33, πεποιημένον δ' ἐστίν [*sc. ὄνομα*] δ, ὅπως μὴ καλούμενον [*cf.* 58a6, ὀνομαζομένου] ὑπὸ τινῶν, αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής; *Poet.* 3. 7. 1279a37, δταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία ("the name common to all the constitutions is used, viz. πολιτεία"); *ibid.* 4. 8. 1294a15; *Poet.* 1. 47b14-15, ὀνομάζουσιν ... προσαγορεύοντες ("use the term 'elegiac poet' ... applying the term 'poet'"). The usage is an outgrowth of the construction of καλεῖν, ὀνομάζειν, προσαγορεύειν with double accusative (ὀνομάζειν τινὰ ὄνομα τι), whence ὀνομά τι καλεῖται (ὀνομάζεται); cf. *Pl. Crat.* 419e, 420b. The final step is to substitute an actual name for the word ὄνομα, as here.

⁶⁶ Not "still used"; cf. Bywater: "Hence our present term 'iambic'."

no name in the early period, but acquired and still has one based on its employment for flouting and 'flyting' in that period. We have already suggested that the original ground for the use of iambic verse in the *ψόγοι* was not that it was inherently satirical—an idea which Aristotle nowhere mentions—but that it fitted their lively, conversational nature. This would make the ground for its adoption symmetrical with that for the adoption of hexameter in the epic. Hexameter is inherently fitted for narrative, iambic verse for direct speech. The serious improvisations *reported* the deeds of others, deeds recent or remote but in any case belonging to the past; the other kind involved *verbal exchanges*, direct attacks on one another. Hence the two genres settled down to different kinds of verse. But since iambic verse came to be devoted to *ψόγοι* rather than noble or serious matters, the *activity* of flyting or 'satirizing' (*λαμβίζειν*; cf. Demeter's companion 'Ιάμβη in the Homeric hymn) gave it its name; and this, Aristotle seems to say, is why we now call the verse 'iambic.'⁸⁷ Presumably the same principle holds good for Aristotle's own customary term for the hexameter, *ἡρώος* (sc. *στίχος*) or *ἡρωικόν* (*μέτρον*): it is so called now because it was used to recite the deeds of heroes.

Καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἡρωικῶν οἱ δὲ ἰάμβων ποιηταί. Here at last *poets* appear. The split is complete, and each branch has (1) its content and (2) its appropriate medium. The road is now open to the next significant development, which is represented by Homer.

48b34-49a6

- <28- <τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὀμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον ποίημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλοῦς· ἀπὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου ἀρ-
-30> ξαμένους | ἔστιν, οἷον ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.>
35 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὀμηρος | ἦν, μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εἰς ἄλλα καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν, οὕτως καὶ τὰ τῆς κωμωδίας σχήματα πρῶτος ἐπέδειξεν, οὐ ψόγον ἄλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης

⁸⁷ The statement accords with the facts, so far as we can see. The iambic character of the Greek language, i.e., its native tendency to the sequence \cup — (rather than — \cup or ——), is a general fact; the use of this sequence for a certain *ethos* ('flyting,' invective) is a special matter. Aristotle's statement does not necessarily touch on the original meaning of *ἰαμβος* (this against Rostagni, who reproaches him for reversing the order of derivation), but only on Greek usage since the practice of *λαμβίζειν* became established. We may compare the development *satura* → *saffra* → 'satire.'

- 38 | a1 ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιάς | [καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια] πρὸς τὰς
 τραγωδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμωδίας. παρα-
 φανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας καὶ κωμωδίας, οἱ ἐφ' ἑκατέραν
 τὴν ποίησιν ὁρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντι
 5 τῶν ἰάμβων κωμωδοποιοὶ ἐγέ|νοντο οἱ δὲ ἀντι τῶν ἐπῶν
 τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ μείζω καὶ ἐντιμότερα τὰ σχή-
 ματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων.

48b34

- <28- <Now of the pre-Homeric poets there is none for whom
 we can cite such a poem, but it stands to reason that there
 were many. Beginning with Homer, however, there are such
 -30> poems: for example his own *Margites* and others of that kind.>
 35 But, as in the serious line Homer | was most truly a poet,
 since he alone not only wrote well but composed *dramatic*
 imitations, so likewise he was the first to outline the main
 forms of comedy, by giving us a drama, and not one of in-
 vective but of the laughable; for the *Margites* stands in the
 38 | a1 same relationship to our comedies as the *Iliad* | [and the
Odyssey] to our tragedies. And once tragedy and comedy
 had been thus partially brought to light, those who were
 in pursuit of the two kinds of poetry became, in accordance
 with the inherent nature of each, the ones comic instead of
 5 | iambic poets, the others poets of tragedy instead of epics,
 because these genres were greater and worthy of more esteem
 than the others.

We have seen that the transposition of τῶν μὲν οὖν ... καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα clarifies the argument of the preceding section; we must now consider how well it fits as an introduction to the present one. *Μὲν οὖν* marks, as it should, a major stage in the development, for Homer makes an epoch. Moreover the connection between the transposed sentence and the one that follows (ὥσπερ δὲ κτλ.) is close and cogent: For the period before Homer we can only say that it stands to reason⁶⁸ that there were many who wrote 'iambic' poems; but beginning with his *Margites* we can point to actual examples. However (note δέ, not γάρ), the *Margites*, although it contained iambic lines,⁶⁹ was not really an 'iambic' poem but a comic poem, a prototype of actual comedy (49a1);

⁶⁸ Cf. εἰκός δέ with εἰκασί, b4.

⁶⁹ Hephaestion 60, 2; 65, 10 Consbruch.

or, as the main clause of the sentence puts it, Homer "half revealed the forms of comedy." Thus Homer's work on the comic side is not merely an achievement but an achievement which gives a decisive twist to the whole later development; for 49a2-6 will show us that the future lay with comedy as Homer had sketched it, not with 'iambic.'

Homer's achievement in serious poetry is characterized as parallel to that in 'comedy': ὡσπερ δὲ ..., οὕτως καὶ ... What does Aristotle praise him for here? Not merely for being "pre-eminent among poets" (Butcher), but for being "most (truly) a poet." Chapter 24, 60a6 ff., tells us what a poet's duty is, namely to be dramatic, and that Homer μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖν. So here he is "most a poet" because he made *dramatic* imitations of serious themes. On the comic or low side the counterpart is δραματοποιήσας, so that we have a noticeable symmetry: ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ σπονδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς ... μιμήσεις δραματικάς ~ οὕτως καὶ ... σχήματα ... δραματοποιήσας. But dramatic form is not the only σχῆμα⁷⁰ of comedy; there is also the substitution of humor for invective or malicious satire. Here again Aristotle is working with the same principles as in the first three chapters. Δραματοποιήσας represents the tendency which we already noticed in chapter 3, among the three poetic methods, and τὸ γελοῖον belongs to the category of the object of imitation. So far as comedy is concerned Homer represents a step forward in both respects: the *Margites* is humorous instead of satirical, and (partially) dramatic instead of merely invective.

There does not appear to be a corresponding advance on the serious side, so far as the object is concerned.⁷¹ Actually Aristotle betrays

⁷⁰ Gudeman's reading τὸ ... σχῆμα, which is based on the Riccardianus and possibly the Arabic version ("figuram" or "formam" Tkatsch), is clearly not right, since comedy has two different σχήματα.

⁷¹ Possibly we should read οὐχ ὅτι <τὸ> εἶδ. The text is not in very good condition just here, and the degree of disturbance it implies (οὐχ ὅτι εἶδ' ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ plerique) is enough to make the loss of τὸ palaeographically possible. (Loss of small single words is very common in the *Poetics*). The Arabic version renders εἶδ' by a subordinate clause: Tkatsch 1. 169b. Τὸ εἶδ' is a standing Aristotelian term for the noble, the ideal: virtue as motive; e.g., *E. N.* 2. 2. 1105a10; *ibid.* 9. 1109a29; Bonitz, *Index* 291b29-40. Aristotle's climax would then be that Homer not only 'composed' (i.e., represented, put into his poem: cf. 23. 59a31-32, τὸν πόλεμον ... ποιεῖν δλον) nobility, the struggle for virtue and happiness, but also composed *dramatic* representations of it. (The slight zeugma involved for ἐποίησεν would not be un-Aristotelian.) But this still would not mean any improvement with respect to the object itself: τὸ εἶδ' = τὰς καλὰς πράξεις.

here, if not greater interest in the comic side, at least more concern about it. There was little documentary evidence for the early history of the *φαῦλα*, as he admits in his more candid moments; worse still, the term and concept 'comedy' covered two almost totally different kinds of performance and types of humor. How could one arrange the *Margites* and Archilochus, Epicharmus and Cratinus, in the same series, as if it were all one story? Aristotle's *a priori* ideas shape his 'history' to the point of actual distortion. *Ψόγος*, invective or satire, the starting-point, is for him the wrong kind of fun, something to be abandoned. By the same token τὸ γελῶν, harmless humor, is the *τέλος* towards which the whole comic creation moves. But what few facts were available were very unhandy for Aristotle's purposes. Satirical comedy was still kicking up its heels in Athens long after it should have given way to the right kind of farce, and conversely the true comic attitude was awkwardly late in making an appearance. Aristotle seizes on the *Margites* with some urgency as one of the few phenomena that fit his theory.⁷² It would seem in fact that the need for evidence to bolster the theory has dulled his critical sense; for the man who perceived the spuriousness of some or all of the poems attributed to Orpheus⁷³ should have been able to detect that the *Margites* was not by the author of the *Iliad*. But Aristotle needed an upward movement in the spirit of comedy early enough to exert a possible influence on Dorian, and through it on Attic, comedy. The only literature that offered any such possibility was the *παίγνια* in the epic tradition,⁷⁴ and in Aristotle's eyes their fixation on the 'laughable' instead of personal invective was so high an achievement (seen against the background of the primitive *ψόγοι*) that it could not be ascribed to anyone less than Homer. Hence the godlike Homer, supreme poet in the field of worthwhile poetry, must carry off the laurels in the 'worthless' kind also.⁷⁵

⁷² One would like to know what poems are meant by τὰ τοιαῦτα, b30. Certainly poems by others are included, since the period covered is Homer and after (ἀπὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου ἀρχαμένοις). Ἐκείνου suggests that the other works are not Homer's; but any such judgment will be subjective.

⁷³ Ar. fr. 7 Rose.

⁷⁴ On them see Schmid 1. 1. 226-231.

⁷⁵ The notion of Homer as the prototype of tragedy as well as epic was familiar to Plato, *Rep.* 10. 595c; but when he has to put an archegete of comedy alongside him he names Epicharmus: *Theaet.* 152e, τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας [cf. ἑκατέραν τὴν ποιήσιν, 49a3 l], κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρ.

It has of course always been recognized that in b34-a2 Aristotle makes Homer the spiritual father of the whole of Greek drama. But the exact relation of this to what follows has never been defined very closely—chiefly because it has been unanimously assumed (I am not aware that the matter has even been discussed) that Homer is dropped at 49a2 and a new subject is begun. "But when Tragedy and Comedy came to light, the two classes of poets still followed their natural bent," says Butcher. In the twinkling of an eye we are somewhere in the sixth century, observing the beginnings of Tragedy and Comedy out of the dithyramb and the phallic songs. For several centuries—unless we are to assume that Aristotle, like Bethe, dated Homer in the sixth century—the two breeds of poets have gone on writing *ἠρωικά* and *ἰαμβοί*, as they had before. Then, as the first rudiments of tragedy and comedy begin coming to light, the poets with one accord abandon their accustomed forms and go over to the new ones because these are "greater and better"—this when tragedy was, say, somewhere between Arion and Thespis and comedy had not yet reached Epicharmus.

The alleged development does not make sense logically, chronologically, or psychologically. Practitioners in an old-line, well-established genre do not normally throw it over at the first glimpse of a new, unproved form. Moreover the centuries between Homer and the Great Shift are left blank and bare: Aristotle's story breaks in two in the middle. And above all Homer does not appear in any direct way as the *ἀρχηγός* of the drama.

The repetition of *σχήματα* after so short an interval (b36, a6)⁷⁶ should have given the warning that the "appearance" of tragedy and comedy which is alluded to in a2 is their appearance *in Homer*: that the new and higher 'forms' which so dazzled and overmastered the later poets were the forms which had been outlined or sketched by him.⁷⁷ The connection is reflected in the order *ἰάμβων - ἐπῶν*, because

μος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος. (Actually this is not so far from Aristotle: for him Epicharmus is the next figure to rise out of the fog after Homer).

⁷⁶ Undoubtedly an instance of a fairly common happening: a word that has been used once tends to bob up in the writer's mind again shortly thereafter.

⁷⁷ *ὔπεδειξεν*, 'sketched, adumbrated.' Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 2. 1404b25; *Ath. Pol.* 41. 2. (see Sandys *ad loc.*); *ὑποφαίνειν* (-εσθαι), *Hist. An.* 4. 10. 537a21; *E. N.* 1. 4. 1096b9: all with the notion that something relatively bare or reduced is communicated to the viewer. Cf. especially *ὑπογράφειν*, *Pl. Rep.* 6. 501a, *ὑπογράφασθαι* ἄν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας (cf. 8. 548d); *Laws* 5. 734e; *Ar. De Gen. An.* 2. 6. 743b24; *De An.* 2. 1. 413a10; cf. *ὑπογραφή*, 'diagram,' *Eth. Eud.* 2. 3. 1220b37,

the comic side has been uppermost in Aristotle's mind in the last sentence or two. More significant, however, is *κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν*, which like *κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη* in 48b24 refers to the objective, 'inherent' nature of the two genres, not to the individual tastes of the poets. The phrase modifies *ἐγένοντο* but is defined by the preceding *ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ποιήσιν*: "those who were moving towards each kind of poetry [i.e., tragedy and comedy, not the primitive *ψόγοι*, etc.] now became, in accordance with the inherent nature of each [as partly revealed by Homer], the ones comic poets instead of satirists, the others poet-directors of tragedies instead of epic poets, because these forms were greater and more estimable than the others." Everything is neatly in order here. The poets who made the Great Shift were not simply out to be what they already were, *οἱ μὲν ἡρωικῶν οἱ δὲ λάμβων ποιηταί*. They were actually out ("launched," *ὀρμῶντες*) after a pair of forms, and these, once Homer had revealed them at least in outline, outshone the more familiar charms of epic and satire. The movement that ends in Sophocles begins under the spell of Homer.

This is a very different view of the development, and of Aristotle's theory of it, than we are accustomed to. It looks at the growth of the drama from the inside instead of the outside and puts Homer in the position of an actual producing cause, whereas most modern historians of Greek drama have allowed him at most a 'literary'—and therefore much later—'influence.'⁷⁸ Clearly Aristotle is not thinking of Aeschylus and Sophocles here, but of a stage at least several

and often (Bonitz, *Index* 795b33). In these latter uses a notion of *laying the thing out* as a model, for someone to follow, begins to appear: cf. *De Gen. An.* 2. 4. 740a28: Nature first laid out, *ὑπέγραψεν* (like the artist making his initial sketch), the two blood-vessels from the heart; *Pol.* 2. 5. 1263a31: it is so laid out, prescribed (by law), in some cities. This semi-authoritative connotation of *ὑπο-* (doing it for the use of someone, and bindingly: cf. *ὑπομιμνήσκειν*, *ὑπόμνημα*) may be present in *ὑπέδειξεν* also.—The sense of *παρα-* in *παραφανείσης* is a little harder to define, but in any case should not be ignored. The word (which is not extremely common) seems to carry the connotation of 'show (appear) in passing, give a glimpse of (be glimpsed)': "in transitu et velut praeteriens ostendo," *Theo. Gr. Ling.*, s.v.; cf. Aristoph. *Ecl.* 94; *Frogs* 1362 ("just shine into Glauce's house for a minute"); Pl. *Theaet.* 199c; [Pl.] *Theog.* 122a; [Ar.] *Oec.* 2. 1350b24. The connotation in our passage is perhaps that of something being caught sight of, then lost to view again for a time.

⁷⁸ Wilamowitz, *Eint.* 106: "Es ist offenbar geworden, dass der anschluss an die heldensage das ist, wodurch Aischylos die tragödie geschaffen hat." See also L. A. Post, *From Homer to Menander*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951, 56.

generations earlier: Thespis, if not Arion.⁷⁹ Since that was the heyday of the dissemination of the Homeric epics by word of mouth—i.e., the heyday of the rhapsodes—Aristotle must be thinking of an effect produced chiefly through recitation by the rhapsodes; and the thing he seems to imagine as particularly carried across by those recitations is Homer's *dramatic method*. Thespis, or perhaps Arion, being led to the first conception of the drama by Homer: it is a novel idea for our anthropological age, which had rather find the root of tragedy at all costs in some variety or outgrowth of Dionysiac ritual; but is it necessarily a foolish one? ⁸⁰ (In any case it is an idea, not a fact.)

This scheme of things—as we have just reminded ourselves, it is above all a *theoretical* scheme—still unavoidably leaves a chronological gap between Homer and the beginnings of tragedy and comedy proper. But under our new reading of the text we can at least posit that the Homeric ferment was infecting others and beginning to work.⁸¹ We cannot visualize the details very well, but on the tragic side at least the idea seems plausible in a general way.⁸² The comic sequence, on the other hand, not only is not clear but reveals, upon examination, a mildly scandalous anomaly: there is no place in it for Archilochus.⁸³ Where in fact could he be fitted into the story? Not before Homer, since Aristotle says that he knows of no iambic poems from that period but has posited them on the basis of theory (*εἰκός*); and for Homer's own period and thereafter he mentions only the *Margites* and poems like it, i.e., non-satirical works. If Archilochus is to be put after Homer (and it is the only plausible dating) his work will have to figure, not as the hold innovation we are accustomed to thinking it, but an outworn remnant of the primitive *ψόγοι*. Archilochus will no longer be the Homer of iambic poetry⁸⁴ but a backslider, a denier of the light,

⁷⁹ For the evidence that Aristotle spoke of both these persons somewhere (in the dialogue *On Poets*?) see below.

⁸⁰ Since these lines were written I have developed the idea in detail as a serious theory; see "The Origin of *Τραγωδία*," *Hermes* 85 (1957) 17-46.

⁸¹ *Ἐγένοντο* need not mean that the event took place in a short time. Here the process is viewed aoristically. In 49a13, on the other hand, *ἐγέννητο* looks at the development 'developmentally,' as the series of steps takes place.

⁸² The invasion of every branch of lyric in the sixth century by the myth, and specifically by Homer, is a commonplace. The name of Stesichorus will serve as a reminder of the tendencies that had the most direct kinship with tragedy-to-be.

⁸³ Hermann thought (see Wecker, *Kl. Schr.* 4. 31 n. 19) that Archilochus was particularly meant in *ἐν οἷς κτλ.*, b32—why, in view of τὰ τοιαῦτα, one does not see.

⁸⁴ *Testimonia*, Schmid 1. 1. 389 n. 2.

and therefore unimportant. The paradox is startling but, I think, an unavoidable corollary of Aristotle's theory; for he cannot consistently allow the 'iambic' spirit to come to a climax after Homer has once shown the way towards the true comic spirit, the *γελοῖον*. Thus the strange case of Archilochus⁸⁵ demonstrates vividly how arbitrary and abstract Aristotle's pattern is. Archilochus' very existence, the whole tenor of his work, was an implicit threat to the history of comedy as Aristotle saw it, i.e., a consistent, consecutive development towards the ideal of harmless humor.

49a7-15

- τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄρ' ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἰ-
 δεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ, <δ> αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτό κρίνεται καὶ
 πρὸς τὰ θεάτρα, ἄλλος λόγος · γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς
 10 αὐτο|σχεδιαστικῆς, [καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῶδία, καὶ ἡ μὲν
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ
 †φραυλικὰ† ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει
 νομιζόμενα] κατὰ μικρὸν ἠϋξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγγίγνεται
 φανερόν αὐτῆς, καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα [ἢ |
 15 τραγωδία] ἐπαύσατο ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν.

49a7

- Now a review of the question whether even tragedy adequately represents the basic principles or not—<an issue which> is to be judged both in itself and in relation to the audience—that is a subject for another discussion. In any
 10 case it did grow out of an improvisational | beginning, [both it and comedy: the one from those who used to 'lead off' the dithyramb, the other from those who led the (low-class performances?) which still remain in the repertory in many of our cities even now] and grew little by little as they developed each aspect of it which kept coming to light; and
 15 after going through many changes | [tragedy] it stopped when it had attained its inherent nature.

⁸⁵ Archilochus is quoted with approval, *Pol.* 7. 7. 1328a3; without explicit disapproval (but note ὡς Ἄ. ψ ἐ γ ε ι), *Rhet.* 3. 17. 1418b27; disapprovingly (but βλάσφημον ὄντα may be quoted from Alcidas), *ibid.* 2. 23. 1398b12; and finally he is mentioned among elegiac poets, fr. 676 Rose (Schol. Bob. in Cic. *Arch.*, p. 358 Orelli). These citations are enough to prove that his tacit exclusion in the *Poetics* is not due to ignorance or inadvertence.

Again the most important, and the most difficult, question is how and where the argument runs. It is all the more necessary to keep this in mind because our passage is so famous that nobody can discuss the early Greek drama without at least mentioning the *ἐξάρχοντες* of the dithyramb. But our job here is not to reconstruct the origins of tragedy but to make out Aristotle's conception of it, so far as that is revealed in the *Poetics*. The scholars have been so busy with the things he talks about that hardly anyone has taken time for the task of scrutinizing the course of his thought.

Only such neglect can account for the persistent belief that in *ἀρ'* *ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἰδεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ* Aristotle is asking whether tragedy was "now"—i.e., in his own day—perfect or not. The question is foolish in itself, since Aristotle makes it perfectly clear elsewhere that he regards tragedy as having reached the heights with Sophocles and Euripides; and the present context rules it out of court altogether. *Ἄλλος λόγος*, in the Aristotelian treatises, regularly implies a promise to discuss the matter in question at some later time, and Aristotle nowhere again discusses or even broaches the question whether tragedy had reached perfection in his own day.⁸⁶

The keys to the passage are *εἶδεσιν*, a8, and *ἤδη*, a7. *Εἶδεσιν* refers to the same circle of ideas as *σχήματα*, 48b36 and 49a6. It means the constituent forms of tragedy and comedy, and particularly the two which were mentioned or implied in b36-37: (1) object of imitation (in the case of tragedy, *σπουδαῖοι*) and (2) dramatic method.⁸⁷ The development of tragedy was a development towards these forms, i.e., towards adequate (= fully dramatic) representation of heroic characters. Since Homer had given the glimpse of them which so bewitched the poets, the tendency had become a conscious effort to achieve their full realization.⁸⁸ But this view of the development raises an unavoid-

⁸⁶ Vahlen, *Beiträge* 14 (1). 279), "(die Betrachtung) ... gehört nicht an diesen Ort. Die Ablehnung ist allgemein und schliesst nicht das Versprechen in sich, an einem andern Orte in der Poetik selbst auf diese Frage zurückzukommen"—a remark whose weakness is remarked on in turn by Gudeman.

⁸⁷ These are, be it noted, our old friends the second and third *differentiae*.

⁸⁸ *Σχήματα*, a6, still means 'forms' in the same sense as in 48b36. It was not their own products that bedazzled the early dramatists, but the forms which were to be embodied in the products and which Homer *ὑπέδειξεν*. Thus Aristotle's narrative follows the Aristotelian principle that the chief cause of a work of art is the idea in the poet's mind: *ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος*. What Homer gave a glimpse of was not tragedies and comedies—cf. 48b38-49a1, *ὁ γὰρ Μ. ἀνάλογον ἔχει ...*

able question. Was tragedy in fact, in comparison with the epic, a perfect embodiment of the forms? Was it actually "greater and more estimable (valuable)"? *Hδη expresses this comparative idea: "whether tragedy, when you come to it, is adequate to the forms." German (or Latin: *iam*) can render it better: "ob nun die Tragödie den Formen vollauf genügt." There is nothing specifically philosophical, much less Aristotelian, about this use of ἤδη. It presents itself naturally in Greek whenever one is thinking, by implication, of a list or series and of progressing along it from one item to the next, provided there is a contrast or potential contrast between the items. *Hδη points up this contrast: "Now *this* one (to go no farther)...."⁸⁹ In our case the contrast is between tragedy, to which we have now pushed forward, and epic, which we have just compared disadvantageously with tragedy.

The following clause lacks only the relative δ,⁹⁰ which could easily have fallen out between diphthongs, especially in uncials (OYOAAYTO → OYAYTO). This enables us to save κρίνεται from Forchhammer's very awkward emendation κρίναι.⁹¹ The clause specifies the two ways in which the question may be judged: (1) in itself, i.e., in terms of the two arts themselves, and (2) in relation to the audience. And thus we can assign a satisfactory meaning to ἄλλος λόγος. For the question whether tragedy is superior to the epic is indeed brought up for discussion again, in chapter 26, and under precisely these two aspects:

π ρ ὅ ς τὰς κωμῶδίας — but the forms 'tragedy' and 'comedy' (whether one says "the form 'tragedy'" or "the form of tragedy" does not essentially matter). The 'nature' of tragedy, a15, is the same thing once more; compare ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὁρμῶντες (still in pursuit) with ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν (pursuit ended, goal attained).

⁸⁹ See Köhner-Gerth 2^a. 2. 122; for Aristotle, Bonitz, *Index* 314a10-17. Add *Rhet.* 1. 1. 1354a10, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη (i.e., looking for causes, in contrast to working by chance or habit); *ibid.* b6, ὁ δ' ἐκκλησιαστής καὶ δικαστὴς ἤδη (contrasted with the lawgiver, b5) περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀπωρισμένων κρίνουσι πρὸς οὐδὲ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη (unlike the lawgiver) ...; 1. 2. 1357a1; 1. 10. 1369a27; 2. 6. 1384a12; *De An.* 3. 3. 428b20, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη (i.e., in judgments as to what a given object is, not as to sensuous qualities) ἐνδέχεται διαψεῦσθαι; *ibid.* 25; 3. 9. 432b30. Cf. *Pl. Menex.* 241c; *Symp.* 204b; and *passim*. Aristotle often uses εὐθύς in the same way: cf. *Poet.* 5. 49a36, οἷον εὐθύς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον; 10. 52a14; *Rhet.* 1. 10. 1369a21; *Pol.* 3. 4. 1277a6.

⁹⁰ Proposed by Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 14, 249 (1. 278, 309), but after αὐτό.

⁹¹ *H καί (Parisinus and most MSS) is either a gloss intended to supplement ἢ οὐ (so Vahlen, *loc. cit.*) or, less probably, a variant reading: ἢ -ναι, i.e., γράφεται "κρίναι," *lege* "κρίναι."

first *πρὸς τὰ θέατρα*,⁹³ in consideration of the kind of audiences that seem to go with them (61b27-62a13), then *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* (62a14-b15).

Thus the question whether even tragedy is entirely adequate to its basic forms is reserved for later discussion. "But however that may be, so much at least (*δ' οὖν*) can be said: tragedy did rise out of improvisations and develop through many changes up to a certain point, and there it stopped." This is the burden of 49a9-15.⁹⁴ Pragmatically, then, so far as his 'history' of the poetic art is concerned, Aristotle justifies his implication (a5-6) that tragedy was its highest form and had reached a kind of perfection by pointing out that serious poetry did end its development with that form.

This view of the place and purpose of a9-15 in the argument brings certain corollaries in its wake. But they will have to wait for a moment while we consider some details. First, *γενομένη δ' οὖν*. As Vahlen saw, the nominative is indispensable.⁹⁵ The participle agrees with *ἡ τραγωδία*, which is understood from two lines above and continues to be the subject of the sentence (*ἠρξήθη, αὐτῆς, μεταβαλοῦσα ἐπαύσατο, ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*). On the other hand *αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς* is required, in agreement with *ἀρχῆς*; for the meaning we need is "having come, arisen, developed out of an improvisational beginning," not "having been improvisational at the beginning."⁹⁶

The three lines *καὶ αὐτὴ ... νομιζόμενα* are at most a parenthesis, under any constitution of the text, so we cast ahead to *κατὰ μικρὸν ἠρξήθη*: "it was augmented (or, enlarged) little by little." The parallel with 48b22-23 (*κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες*) will occupy us in a moment; meanwhile it may be useful to notice some others. *Constitution of the*

⁹³ The plural *θέατρα* may even be used because Aristotle is thinking implicitly of both genres and the audience(s) appropriate to each.

⁹⁴ Cf. Vahlen's summary, *Beiträge*² 15 (1. 280): "Die Frage, ob die Tragödie bereits hinreichend entwickelt ist oder nicht, will ich hier nicht entscheiden: wie dem aber sei, nachdem sie vom Dithyramb ausgegangen, durch mannigfache Wandlungen hindurch bis zu dem ihr eigenen Wesen gelangt war, blieb sie in ihrer Entwicklung stehen."

⁹⁵ *Beiträge*² 251 (n. 12; 1. 310); given up in favor of *γενομένης* in his edition (*Poet.*²), solely out of respect for the Parisinus.

⁹⁶ "Having become improvisational" would be nonsense, since the improvisational state is by postulate the first one of all.—The manuscript readings come in pairs, *γενομένη ... αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ* (two lesser MSS, Marclanus 200 and Laurentianus LX 16) and *γενομένης ... αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς* (all the other MSS, so far as reported by Gudeman and Fostagni). But that fact is not binding on us: it is too apparent that assimilation has taken place (*γενομένη* to *αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς*).

Athenians 3. 3, διὸ καὶ νεωστὶ γέγονεν ἡ ἀρχὴ [*sc.* the archonship proper] μεγάλη, τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις [*i.e.*, by later political functions] αὐξήθεισα; *Politics* 2. 12. 1271a9, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγε αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν (said of the Athenian democracy: Solon, Ephialtes, and Pericles have been mentioned); *De Caelo* 1. 5. 271b12, ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρόν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ γίνεται παμμέγεθες; *Metaphysics* A2. 982b12, διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρόν προΐόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μείζονων διαπορήσαντες; and above all *Sophistical Refutations* 34. 183b22-34, μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὡσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσοῦτω μικρότατον ὅν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι. ταύτης δ' εὐρημένης ῥῆσιν προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστιν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὐρόντες παντελῶς ἐπιμικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν ὅσον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγόντων οὕτως ἠύξηκασιν; *Metaphysics* a1. 993b3, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροισμένων γίνεσθαι τι μέγεθος.

These passages reveal clearly that we are in the presence of a pattern, a sequence which Aristotle believed was a standard one for all the arts: a very modest beginning (ἀρχή), small and unimpressive to the eye but pregnant with possibilities ("big δυνάμει"); then a long, gradual (κατὰ μικρόν) development (προάγειν) and expansion (αὐξάνειν), based on what went before; and finally the attainment of "something sizable" (τι μέγεθος), a result that amounts to something. So with tragedy in our passage: it started from an improvisational beginning, then the poets gradually advanced and expanded it until it reached its full development.⁹⁸ Here, however, the general pattern is used for a particular purpose, to argue that whether or not tragedy is theoretically a perfect form, it did in any case develop from an improvisational beginning to a certain culmination, where it stopped (*i.e.*, it did not keep moving towards a still higher perfection). From this I derive what seem to me two ineluctable corollaries:

⁹⁸ Τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, the full extent of its inherent potentiality. See the often-quoted passage, *Pol.* 1. 2. 1252b32.

1. The only genre really concerned in the case is tragedy. Whether 'comedy' is adequate to *its* forms is another question altogether, with quite different implications; at any rate Aristotle does not raise it here. Beginning at a7, in fact, he makes a pronounced swing towards the tragic side of his story, from which he does not return to comedy until chapter 5. So, as we have said, *ἡ τραγωδία* is the implied subject of our sentence from the beginning. It is evident, then, that *ἡ τραγωδία* at the very end, just before *ἐπαύσατο*, is a misleading and erroneous insertion. Its author saw that what follows (a16 ff.) is indeed about tragedy alone, but he thought that tragedy and comedy (*καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμωδία*) were joint subjects of the sentence down through *ἠὲξήθη*; so he inserted *ἡ τραγωδία*.⁹⁷

2. The emphasis falls on the end of the story, not its beginning. The words which particularly speak to the question *ἄρ' ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ* are *ἐπαύσατο ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*. The beginning is essential here only for completeness, to remind us that the tragic art has indeed gone through a whole cycle. Whatever we are told in addition about the *ἀρχή* will be secondary. Hence a9-12 cannot at most be anything more than a parenthesis. But more of this in a moment.

To these factors we have to add another which is equally certain but admits of two possible applications. As Montmollin saw,⁹⁸ the parallels between our passage and 48b22-24 are too close and numerous to be accidental (*ἐγέννησαν ~ γενομένη; ἐξ ἀρχῆς ~ ἀρχῆς; ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων ~ ἀπ' ... αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς; κατὰ μικρὸν = κατὰ μικρὸν; προάγοντες = προαγόντων*). The two sentences are deliberately parallel. The question then arises: do they refer to similar chains of events or to the same ones? The latter possibility has never been assayed, so far as I know, and at first blush it does seem unreal or foolish. But what Aristotle needs here above all, as we have said, is completeness, and now that we have removed the supposed reference to seventh- or sixth-century origins in *παραφανείσης*, a2, it would be possible to refer *γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς* all the way back to the ultimate beginning, to the hymns and encomia from which all serious poetry sprang.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ For the athesis see Montmollin 40-41.

⁹⁸ P. 39.

⁹⁹ In that case "dithyramb" is a more precise specification of "hymns and encomia," and *τὰ φαλλικά* (?) of the *ψόγοι*. The dithyramb was certainly one variety of hymn, namely, that sung to Dionysus; for *τὰ φαλλικά* see below.

It will be objected that Aristotle could hardly be referring to the hymns and encomia as the beginnings of *tragedy*, since even on our showing tragedy in any proper sense of the word did not begin until much later (*παραφάνεισης*, a2). But one can speak of tragedy as having come or sprung from a much earlier primitive stage, just as one can speak of "a man's birth and early years" even though during them, strictly speaking, he was a baby and not a man. Moreover *κατὰ μικρὸν ἠδὲξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς*, with its clear reminiscences of the other passage, suggests a long series of stages (including Homer: *ὑπέδειξεν*) of which the earliest would show very little resemblance to tragedy. It was not yet visible then, it was just becoming (*ἐγίγνετο*) visible. Thus the idea that *γενομένη δ' οὖν κτλ.* casts back once more to the beginnings of all poetry, as related in 48b 22-24, is both possible and attractive. On the other hand we shall find that the parenthesis *καὶ αὐτὴ ... νομιζόμενα*¹⁰⁰ pretty certainly refers to post-Homeric developments. This does not necessarily prove anything for *γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς*, since the parenthesis may be spurious and indicate only some subsequent reader's conception of Aristotle's meaning. But we may as well say at once that there is nothing about the parenthesis to require such an assumption. It is most likely to be a subsequent note by Aristotle himself.¹⁰¹ Hence we may infer that *γενομένη δ' οὖν κτλ.* also refers to the immediate (post-Homeric) beginnings of tragedy proper, as it is usually thought to do.

The phrase *ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον* is so famous, and has been fought over so vigorously in recent times, that it is hard to divest ourselves of presuppositions and consider it in itself. When writers on the origin of tragedy opine that we must begin with Aristotle,¹⁰² they have this phrase in mind above all others. But it is notorious in what opposite directions scholars can march under the same

¹⁰⁰ Or rather *καὶ ἡ μὲν ... νομιζόμενα. Καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία* could be original even if the rest were not.

¹⁰¹ It does not seem plausible that Aristotle would have diverted attention so strongly from his main point, which is the *end* of the story, in his first draft. The general situation is very reminiscent of that in the latter part of chapter 3, including the fact that both passages show a strong focus on comedy, quite beyond the needs of the context. They would seem to stem from a period when Aristotle was more interested in comedy.

¹⁰² E.g., Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.* 5; A. Dieterich, *Arch. f. Rel.-wiss.* 11 (1908) 164. See C. del Grande, *ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΑ*, Naples, 1952, 2-16.

banner, and so, although the historians of Greek tragedy (I am speaking here of those who try to explain it on the basis of Greek evidence, not of Bulgarian mummings, Mexican vegetation rituals, or dramatizations of the Osiris legend) begin with the *ἐξάρχοντες τὸν διθύραμβον*, they end in all possible directions. Most usually the *ἐξάρχοντες*, or rather the *ἐξάρχων*, is assumed to be a single person, a "Vorsänger" who stands over against the chorus and out of whom, by some process of development, the tragic actor is born.¹⁰³ Others, e.g., Bywater and Hardy, understand the *ἐξάρχων* to be the poet himself: an identification which hardly needs to be argued if and when a poet is present, but *ἐξάρχειν* as such does not seem to denote the kind of formal composition we associate with 'poet' (see below). Sometimes connected with this line of interpretation, sometimes distinguished from it, is the one which identifies the dithyramb in question with the satyr-play, or at least with something 'satirical' (*ἐκ τοῦ σατυρικοῦ*, 49a20). Under this combined hypothesis (which goes back to Welcker) the *ἐξάρχοντες* have sometimes been identified with the "Vorsänger," as above,¹⁰⁴ sometimes with the chorus itself.¹⁰⁵

The difficulties of deriving tragedy from the dithyramb, especially a 'satyric' dithyramb, are so formidable¹⁰⁶ that another very different point of view has also been heard in this century: that *ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον*, like the rest of Aristotle's prehistory of tragedy (i.e., before the year 500), is only a hypothesis and need not be treated as a sacred revelation.¹⁰⁷ This view has the disadvantage of leaving us

¹⁰³ So E. Reisch, *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Vienna, 1902, 470; A. Dieterich, *loc. cit.*; M. Croiset, *Hist. de la Litt. Gr.* 3^e. 35; Alfred Winterstein, *Der Ursprung d. Trag.*, Leipzig-Vienna-Zurich, 1925, 98; Flickinger, *op. cit.* 6, 16; Susemihl, n. 39, p. 165; Sykutris.

¹⁰⁴ So for example Dieterich, Croiset, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁵ Wilamowitz, *Einl.* 3 64, 82-87: "die sänger des dithyrambos"; *Neue Jahrb.* 15 (1912) 466 ff. On Kranz's 'lyrical tragedy' see just below.

¹⁰⁶ The chief one, already clearly stated by Erich Bethe, *Prolegomena zur Gesch. des Theaters im Alt.*, Leipzig, 1896, 27, is that the tragic actor represents something fundamentally different from the chorus and cannot have grown out of it but must have been added to it. See further my article in *Hermes* (referred to above, n. 80).

¹⁰⁷ So M. P. Nilsson, *Neue Jahrb.* 14 (1911) 609-613; W. Kranz, *ibid.* 22 (1919) 153-155; Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 128; Schmid 1. 2. 38-39. Very strongly on the other side are, e.g., K. Ziegler s. v. 'Tragoedia,' PW 6A. 1905-1906; M. Untersteiner, *Le origini della tragedia*, Milan, 1942, 212. See also A. Lesky, *AAW* 1 (1948) 67; E. Roos, *Die tragische Orchestik im Zerrbild der Komödie*, Lund, 1951, 118 n. 1.

without much solid basis for a history of the beginnings of tragedy, since what little other evidence we have from antiquity either stems indirectly from Aristotle or tells us very little.¹⁰⁹ Fortunately, however, we are not writing a history of Greek tragedy here but trying to interpret Aristotle. This is still worth doing, if it can be done; for in spite of the growing suspicion that the *ἐξάρχοντες* of the dithyramb are an Aristotelian hypothesis rather than a plain historical fact, nobody¹⁰⁹ has investigated the rationale of the hypothesis within the context of Aristotle's own thinking.

There cannot be any doubt that the basic sense of *ἐξάρχειν* is to 'lead off' with a song or speech or form of words which is echoed or followed up in some way by others: so, to lead off the funeral lamentation (*γόος*),¹¹⁰ a song (or song-and-dance) in general,¹¹¹ speeches in council¹¹² or elsewhere,¹¹³ an oath,¹¹⁴ a part of a ceremony.¹¹⁵ The most pertinent parallel is the famous fragment of Archilochus (fr. 77 Diehl):

ὥς Διωνόσοι' ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάραξε μῆλος
οἶδα, διθύραμβον, οἴνω ξυγκεραυνωθεὶς φρένας.

It has been suggested, and seems to me very probable, that Aristotle

¹⁰⁹ Thus Herodotus' report (5. 67) of the *τραγικοί χοροὶ* at Sicyon may or may not be true, but in any case we cannot make effective use of it without combining it with Aristotle's testimony, because the latter offers the only *over-all pattern of development*. Without it we do not know which way to turn. Kranz's attempt to extrapolate a stage of 'lyrical tragedy' between the dithyramb and tragedy proper (*loc. cit.*; *Stasimon*, Berlin, 1933), by working backward from Aeschylus, only shows how helpless we are without Aristotle—as well as with him.

¹¹⁰ Not even the commentators on the *Poetics*—presumably because they have been under the ban of the old conception that these are not theories but facts, and therefore independent of what Aristotle thought about them.

¹¹¹ *Iliad* Σ51 (Thetis), 316, X430 (Hecuba), Ψ17, Ω747, 761 (Helen), cf. 721 *ἐξάρχωνς*, 723 *ἤρχε*. On the whole subject see K. Ziegler, *op. cit.* 1907 ff.; E. Kalinka, *Die Urform der gr. Trag.* (*Commentationes Aenipontanae*, 10), Innsbruck, 1924, 34.

¹¹² Σ606, δ19; [Hom.] *Hymn.* 27. 18; [Hes.] *Scut.* 205; Pind. *Nem.* 2. 25; Eur. *Tro.* 147, 152; in Xenophon especially of the *paean*, *Cyrop.* 3. 3. 58; 4. 1. 6; 7. 1. 25; *Hell.* 2. 4. 17; cf. *Anab.* 5. 4. 14; Demosth. *De Cor.* 260 (*ἐξαρχος*).

¹¹³ *Βουλὰς*, B273; *βουλῆς*, μ339.

¹¹⁴ *Λόγους*, Soph. *El.* 557; Pl. *Laws* 10. 891d (*οἱ λόγων ἀπτόμενοι δασεβῶν ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες*).

¹¹⁵ Eur. *I. T.* 743, Orestes to Pylades and Iphigenia: *δμν· σὺ δ'* (Iph.) *ἐξαρχ' ὄρκον ὅστις εὔσειβής*, "and you speak, repeat an oath [*sc.* for him to say after you]."

¹¹⁶ Eur. *I.A.* 435, *ἐξάρχου κανᾶ* (cf. 1470, *κανᾶ δ' ἐναρχέσθω τις*; *El.* 1142).

has this utterance specifically in mind; at any rate Archilochus' impromptu, drunken dithyramb is closer than any other dithyramb we know of to being *αὐτοσχεδιαστική*.¹¹⁶ But Aristotle must have known that variety from elsewhere in Greece also, perhaps even in his own time.¹¹⁷

One coincidence, if it is a coincidence, deserves special notice. Aristotle speaks (49a22) of the meter of early tragedy having been the trochaic tetrameter: a remark which creates decided difficulties, chronological and other, in the context in which it is usually placed.¹¹⁸ Is it pure accident that the fragment of Archilochus, the bit of early evidence which offers the closest parallel to our present passage, is also in tetrameters? We shall find, through an analysis which is entirely independent of the present passage, that *τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο* must refer at least to the period before Aeschylus. But there is no particular evidence, Aristotelian or otherwise, for connecting the tetrameter with Thespis. Aristotle's argument points back beyond Thespis to the dithyrambic stage. Has he drawn a bold inference from the presence of the tetrameter in Archilochus and in Aeschylus (*Persians*), that it was the chief meter of the early dithyramb and the first stages of tragedy?

If these speculations about Archilochus have any merit, again we see Aristotle depreciating him. This time he figures in the line of succession of tragedy, but only as an *ἐξάρχων*, an improviser, on the most primitive level of imitation. The Archilochian dithyramb points on to the next stage, when the dithyramb enters the realm of poetry;

¹¹⁶ Strictly speaking, *ἐξάρχειν* here does not necessarily connote genuine improvisation; that implication comes from the parallel *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς—ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων*. The song or speech which is 'led off' may be perfectly conventional, fixed by tradition: certainly funeral lamentations (*γόοι*) ran very much to form, and so did the battlefield paean to which Xenophon refers so often. When Orestes tells his sister, *ἔξαρχ' ὄρκον ὅστις εὐσεβῆς* (Eur. *I.T.*, *loc. cit.*), he wants a traditional oath, one conformable to custom, not a brand-new one; and the atheistical opinions which Plato fears (*Laws*, *loc. cit.*) are learned from others and passed along to still others. So what Archilochus shouted as *ἐξάρχων* was perhaps mainly traditional. But it was still shouted impromptu, not 'composed' by the poet himself beforehand; the revel-chorus replied as the spirit (of Dionysus) moved them; and the whole performance was not scheduled, rehearsed, and formally presented as the fifth-century dithyramb was. That would be enough for Aristotle.

¹¹⁷ Why cannot *ἔτι καὶ νῦν ... διαμένει νομιζόμενα* refer to the dithyramb as well as the *φαῦλα*?

¹¹⁸ See below *ad loc.*

and we know that Aristotle assigned that stage to Arion: *εὐρεθῆναι δὲ τὸν διθύραμβον Πίνδαρος ἐν Κορίνθῳ λέγει· τὸν δὲ ἀρξάμενον τῆς ᾠδῆς Ἀριστοτέλης Ἀρίωνα φησιν.*¹¹⁹ This agreement with Pindar¹²⁰ and Herodotus¹²¹ cannot be accidental. Aristotle must be thinking of Arion in our passage too, as well as of Archilochus and his ilk.¹²² We start from the improvisational matrix of the Archilochian dithyramb; then, *κατὰ μικρὸν προάγων*, Arion lays the foundations of an *art of the dithyramb* (*διθύραμβοποιητική*, ~ *ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποιήσιν*) by writing a text (*ποιήσαντα*) and training a chorus (*διδάξαντα*) to perform it.¹²³

There cannot be much doubt that Aristotle thought of Arion too as an *ἐξάρχων*, that is, as an individual standing over against the chorus as Archilochus had done—and as Thespis was to do later. And yet Arion's part in the development, i.e., the creation of dithyramb as a literary genre, is not the work of an *ἐξάρχων* as such, but of a poet. Aristotle surely thought of Arion as taking the leading role in his own compositions, like the other early poets. Later, after Thespis' invention of 'speech,' they 'acted,' *ὑπεκρίνοντο*;¹²⁴ at this earlier stage they 'led off,' *ἐξῆρχον*. But I doubt that *ἐξαρχόντων* is meant to express Arion's special contribution. The only thing our parenthesis attempts to state directly is the *ἀρχὴ αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ*; Arion would be implied in it only in so far as he too was an *ἐξάρχων*. At all events there were

¹¹⁹ Proclus *ap. Phot. Bibl. cod.* 239, p. 320, 30 Bekker (= Ar. fr. 677 Rose).

¹²⁰ See Schol. *Ol.* 13. 25 (= frags. 82, 125 Turyn). The ascription to Naxos surely has in mind the 'Archilochian,' improvisatory dithyramb; that to Thebes needs no explanation beyond Pindar's patriotism and the special association of Semele's son with Thebes.

¹²¹ 1. 23, *Ἀρίωνα ... διθύραμβον πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν ποιήσαντα τε καὶ ὀνομάσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ*. See Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 20-22, 131-135.

¹²² If the meaning of *ἐξάρχειν* were not so clearly delimited, one would be tempted to take *ἐξαρχόντων* as equivalent to *ἀρξάμενον* in Proclus: "those who originated (were originating) the dithyramb."

¹²³ How this appraisal of Arion's contribution is to be reconciled with the remark of Themistius (partly quoted above, c. 3, p. 117), *καὶ τραγωδίας εὐρεταὶ μὲν Σικυώνιοι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ποιηταί*, we cannot tell. No doubt there is room in *πολλὰς μεταβολὰς* for both Arion and the Sicyonians. It should be noticed, too, that *so far as Aristotelian evidence is concerned* Arion is affiliated with the dithyramb and not directly with 'tragedy,' while with the Sicyonians it is the other way round. The two remarks belong to different contexts.

¹²⁴ *Rhet.* 3. 1. 1403b23.

many *ἐξάρχοντες* but few who "carried the art forward": *ναρθηκοφόροι πολλοί, βάρκοι δέ τε παῦροι*.

If Arion is only indirectly implied by our phrase, it seems clear that Thespis is not included in it at all, much less anybody after him. It is true that Thespis' name is the next one we can identify in the apostolic succession, so far as our evidence goes. But he figures there for a wholly different reason. According to Themistius, Aristotle attributed to him the invention of a prologue and a speech.¹²⁵ The introduction of speech marks an epoch: we shall find the evidence in the next section of Aristotle's history. With it we enter on the final stage of the development, that which can be called 'tragedy' in the proper or narrow sense. For (1) prologue and *ῥήσις* are written in advance, 'composed' in Aristotle's sense, not improvised, and (2) they are speech, not song. Whatever Arion composed for himself or another *ἐξάρχων* to deliver was still song.¹²⁶

Thus the *μεταβολαί* in the total development are many and distinct. Between Archilochus and Arion we advance from *improvisation* to *art*; between Arion and Thespis, from *song* to (song-and-)speech¹²⁷—and we can add, between Thespis and Aeschylus, to genuine *dramatic action* and the predominance of dialogue over song. Each stage is distinct, not to be confused with the others. And yet from another point of view there is a link which binds them all together. Each is *a step in the progressive emergence of the mimetic individual against the comparatively unmimetic background of the chorus*.¹²⁸ So far as the later period is concerned, the reason is stated in *Problems* 19. 15. 918b27: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτῆς ἀγωνιστῆς καὶ μιμητῆς · ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἦντον μι-*

¹²⁵ Themist. *Orat.* 26. 316d, *ὃν προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιῶν ἦδεν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν; cf. Diog. Laert. 3. 56, τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ πρότερον μὲν μόνος ὁ χορὸς διεδραμάτιζεν, ὕστερον δὲ Θέσπις ἓνα ὑποκριτὴν ἐξεῦρεν; and see Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 97-121 (on ὑποκριτῆς see my article, "The Case of the Third Actor," *TAPA* 76 [1945] 1-10; Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 123-125).*

¹²⁶ Suidas' ascription of spoken verses to Arion (*καὶ [sc. λέγεται] σατύρους εἰσενεγκεῖν ἔμμετρα λέγοντας*; on the meaning of *ἔμμετρα* see A. E. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, Oxford, 1896, 19 n. 3) seems to be tied up with the satyr-play theory of the origin of tragedy (see below), or perhaps has nothing to do with dithyramb or tragedy: Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 133-134.

¹²⁷ See below on *λέξεως γενομένης*, 49a23.

¹²⁸ Historically this means the emergence of the actor. But the actor is only a means. On the plane of ideas it is the dramatic *character* that counts, and he does not essentially depend upon the actor for realization.

μειται. But the applicability of the principle is not limited to that stage. It goes all the way back to the beginning; for the *ἐξάρχων* is the predecessor of the actor.

Thus the sequence (Archilochus-)Arion-Thespis-Aeschylus represents the progressive unfolding of *μίμησις*. In this sense Schmid's conjecture¹²⁹ is correct, that Aristotle must have posited a development from the *ἐξάρχων* to the first actor. But the development is not linear: the *ἐξάρχων* does not simply 'become' an actor. What intervenes is the creative activity of the *poet*, who invents an actor (himself)¹³⁰ in place of the *ἐξάρχων* as a new and more perfect approximation to the ideal.¹³¹

Where did the poet get the ideal? We already know the answer in general terms: from Homer. It was thanks to Homer's adumbration of the 'forms' of tragedy that the serious poets became tragic instead of epic poets. We must understand this idea as applying to Arion, Thespis, and Aeschylus, especially the latter two.¹³² Their increasing realization of *μίμησις* was manifested in written texts, actor's parts etc.; and it was inspired by Homer. We are faced with the paradox that the dramatic poets learned from an epic poet how to be dramatists.

This constructive and consecutive use of the dramatic imagination, following in Homer's footsteps, is obviously the most important thing to Aristotle, far outweighing the concrete details as to the various poets' 'inventions.' With it, moreover, we have closed the circle of his entelechic idea. Our discussion began with *γενομένη ... ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς* (= ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον), but went far beyond the scope of that phrase; for the developments we have been sketching grew out of the matrix of the *ἐξαρχόντων* but really belong to the stages designated here by *προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς*¹³³ and *πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα*. Thus technically speak-

¹²⁹ I. 2. 38 n. 5.

¹³⁰ Still called, as I would maintain, *τραγωδός*; see *op. cit.*, nn. 80 and 125.

¹³¹ The poets have to be understood as subject of *προαγόντων*, a13.

¹³² Not in the sense that they had been epic poets and shifted to tragedy, but that they became tragedians instead of epic poets as they might otherwise have done.

¹³³ The affinity between this phrase and *παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας*, a2, has already been noticed. Tragedy became visible little by little as the poets made this and that improvement; but how was the visible part recognized for what it was, as belonging to 'tragedy,' and how was its degree of approximation to the ideal gauged? By comparison with the standard in Homer, where 'tragedy' had already been adumbrated.

ing we have gotten ahead of ourselves, especially since we suggested that *καὶ ἡ μὲν ... νομιζόμενα* is a later note by Aristotle. But actually the discrepancy does not matter. The note does not imply any change in doctrine; it points to the same entelechic idea as the rest of the text. Our reason for declaring it a later addition is quite different, namely that an emphasis on the beginnings and firsts stage of the development runs counter to the original weighting and purpose of Aristotle's sentence as a whole.

The note would seem to belong to the same period as the long addendum in chapter 3, on the Dorian claim to the drama. They share an interest in origins and an implied acceptance (at least partial) of that claim.¹⁸⁴

Perhaps this enucleation of Aristotle's theory is enough, without further commentary. Still, it may be worth while to notice something about its quality. What Aristotle does is something that few modern theorists on the subject have managed to do: to strike a balance between literary and anthropological factors in the development of tragedy. We are accustomed to hearing about the *ἐξάχροντες* of the dithyramb, about Dionysiac cult, mimetic dances, projection of the group-*psyche*, Oriental and Indian parallels, etc., etc.—as if such things could explain the inner constitution of an art. Aristotle lets tragedy be begotten *out of* a matrix of social activity (the improvisations), but *by* individual artistic intuition of a form adumbrated in Homer. This is, unless I am mistaken, a mature and cogent way of looking at the matter. The invasion of Greek literature and art in the sixth century by epic material and epic feeling—the 'mythification' of the world of the Greek spirit—is a commonplace,¹⁸⁵ and Wilamowitz and others have emphasized the crucial importance of heroic saga and Homeric poetry in fifth-century tragedy from Aeschylus on.¹⁸⁶ What nobody has sug-

¹⁸⁴ In the present case, even more clearly than in chapter 3, both the note and the original text imply a fuller discussion elsewhere. We could not make much of anything out of the passage without the help of scraps like those in Themistius.

¹⁸⁵ On the flowing of the myth into choral poetry, Schmid 1. 1. 409, 469 (Arion), 474 ff. (Stesichorus); cf. *ibid.* 456; J. Geffcken, *Gr. Literaturgesch.* 1. 82; T. B. L. Webster, *Greek Literature and Art*, Oxford, 1939, 19-20; for vase-painting, E. Buschor, *Griechische Vasenmalerei*, Munich, 1925, 85; for sculpture, G. Karo, *Greek Personality in Archaic Sculpture (Martin Classical Lectures, 11)*, Oberlin, 1948, 25-26.

¹⁸⁶ Wilamowitz, *Eint.* 95: "Aischylos ward der erbe Homers... die heldensage wird der inhalt der poesie und der dichter führt ihre einzelnen stücke seinem volke in demselben sinne vor, in dem es Homer getan hatte, zur erbauung und erhebung";

gested is the paradoxical notion that the very idea of serious drama, the dramatic form itself, came from Homer.¹⁸⁷

So much for the tragic line of development as it is implied in 49a9-15. For the comic line, unfortunately, we have almost no comparable evidence to go on, and even the basic phrase in the text itself is not certain. All modern texts print *φαλλικά*, but what the manuscripts actually offer¹⁸⁸ is *φανλικά* or *φανλλικά*, a form which as Rostagni suggests may have sprung from a conflation of *φαῦλα* and *φαλλικά*. The Arabic version may possibly point to *φαῦλα*,¹⁸⁹ and that may even, conceivably, be the correct reading. The vagueness of *φαῦλα* would be in keeping with Aristotle's self-proclaimed ignorance (49b1) about the beginnings of comedy. *Τὰ φαλλικά* is a hallowed concept to us, but only out of habit, and certainly the 'phallic' songs and ceremonies we observe or hear about elsewhere in antiquity¹⁹⁰ are very unpromising as a source of anything truly dramatic. It is true that we can take the liberty of positing a Homeric influence comparable to that in the development of tragedy, and perhaps of assuming that the mimetic element was particularly inspired by Homer, as it was there. Still the beginning has to come *ἀπὸ τῶν* (*sc. ἐξάρχοντων*) *τὰ φανλικά†*, and that implies at least as much mimetic quality in the *ἐξάρχοντες* of the *φανλικά†* as in those of the dithyramb. Again, one is tempted to try to work back from the stage implied in the fifth chapter, 49b2 ff., *ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα κτλ.* But the fact is that Aristotle himself has closed the door in our faces. *Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπονδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν.* The *a priori*, theoretical character of his 'history' is especially obvious just here.¹⁹¹ As for the text, I have left *τὰ φανλικά†* standing.

Jaeger, *Introd. to Gustav Schwab, Gods and Heroes*, New York 1946, 23-24; *Paideia* 1. 241-245.

¹⁸⁷ See my article referred to above, n. 80.

¹⁸⁸ Except Parisinus 2038, which has *φαλλικά*.

¹⁸⁹ So Margoliouth; see Tkatsch 2. 63b.

¹⁹⁰ Aristoph. *Ach.* 241-279; *Athen.* 14. 621f-622d. See Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 228-240, esp. 234-235 (on the *φαλλοφόροι* described by Semus), 239 (on the phallic procession in the *Acharnians*); but also H. Herter, *Vom dionysischen Tanz zum komischen Spiel*, Iserlohn, 1947, 16-22.

¹⁹¹ On Themistius' *κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας* see below on 5. 49b4-6.

49a15-31

- καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος
Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον
πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, [τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν
Σοφοκλῆς] [ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ <μεγα-
 20 *λοφωνίαν ἐκ?> λέ|ξεως γελοίας· διὰ <γὰρ?> τὸ ἐκ σα-*
τυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὄφρ' ἀπεσεμνύνθη] τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τε-
τραμέτρον ἱαμβεῖον ἐγένετο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετρα-
μέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὄρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι
τὴν ποιήσιν· λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκτεῖον
 25 *μέτρον εὔρε. μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτι|κὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμ-*
βεῖόν ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· πλείστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέ-
γομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ ὀλι-
γάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας.
ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη, καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμη-
 30 *θῆναι λέγεται, | ἔστω ἡμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἴσως*
ἔργον εἶη διεξιέναι καθ' ἕκαστον.

49a15

- Namely, on the one hand Aeschylus first raised the com-
 pany of 'actors' from one to two and diminished the choral
 odes and gave the dialogue the leading role, [and Sophocles
 three (actors) and scene-painting] [furthermore the amplitude
 out of little stories and <sublimity of diction out of?> |
 20 ludicrous diction; <for?> thanks to its having grown out
 of satyr-play it was late in acquiring seriousness] and on
 the other hand the verse changed to iambic (trimeter) in
 place of (trochaic) tetrameter. For in the beginning, because
 the piece was satyr-like, that is, more in the nature of a dance-
 performance, they used the tetrameter; but after dialogue
 had come in the very nature of the genre discovered the
 appropriate verse. For of all the verses the iambic is most
 25 suited | to speech. An indication of this is that we utter
 more iambic verses than any other kind in our ordinary
 conversation with each other, but use hexameters seldom,
 and when we do we depart from the normal tone of speech.
 Further, as to masses of 'episodes,' and the other 'extras'
 30 with which tradition records tragedy as having been adorned,
 | let us assume they have been discussed; for no doubt it
 would be a big job to go through them in detail.

**Ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν* marked the completion of the entelechic growth of tragedy. But the details, or at least some details, remain to be specified, for we remember that Aristotle was out to establish a point. Whether or not tragedy was a completely adequate embodiment of the basic 'forms,' he said, it did at all events begin with improvisations and climb a long ladder of gradual improvements until it reached its 'nature,' and there it stopped. We see that the argument needs bulwarking by some specification as to what level tragedy did reach and what its 'nature' was. Otherwise Aristotle's remark remains arbitrary. The specification is given in the passage before us, and in two main parts: (1) a15-18: victory of the dialogue over the choral parts, and (2) a21-25: adoption of the appropriate meter. In an earlier analysis I pointed to the coördinate construction (*τε ... τε*) which is the backbone of the passage.¹⁴² The first of the two sections which are thus coördinated recites Aeschylus' contributions: number of *ὑποκριταί* increased from one to two, choral part diminished, dialogue (speech) given the leading role; and the second states the natural corollary: trochaic tetrameter replaced by iambic trimeter because iambic is the natural rhythm of speech.

These details have been selected according to a strict principle. They are (a) direct manifestations and (b) a direct concomitant of the final attainment of *dramatic form*. Tragedy had emerged ultimately from a lyric genre, the dithyramb; here it reaches the classical limit of its movement away from the lyric (song) and towards the dramatic (speech). The three points of development ascribed to Aeschylus have to do exclusively with this movement and its termination. They are specifications of *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*; the *καί* (*καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν κτλ.*) is epexegetic.¹⁴³

¹⁴² "Aristotle and Satyr-Play. I," *TAPA* 70 (1939) 139-157. Montmollin's mention of this article (n. 73, p. 284) speaks of "certain sophisms" but does not take notice of the central argument based on *τε ... τε*. His own solution (p. 44), which is to designate a15-19, *καὶ τό τε ... Σοφοκλῆς*, as an 'addition ultérieure,' misses the over-all rationale of Aristotle's argument—a fault which is inherent in Montmollin's method.

¹⁴³ So Bywater, Sykutris, Gomperz (implied in his translation: "So hat, um einige dieser Wandlungen namhaft zu machen, Aeschylos..."); except that they wrongly connect the word with *μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα* instead of *τὴν ... φύσιν*. The interpolation *τρεῖς δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνύθη*, on which see below, is partly to blame for this, because it seems to supply a further stage beyond Aeschylus (viz. Sophocles).—Gudeman's *κατὰ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλήθος* (*sic*) would be inconceivable were it not for similar aberrations elsewhere.

We will come back to the question of the number of actors in a moment. It is a special point, and our first concern is the over-all direction and connection of Aristotle's thinking. It is evident that Aeschylus is credited here with providing at least a minimum acting company for purposes of dialogue, and that this increase in the acting personnel is what makes possible in turn the supremacy of the dialogue over the choral parts (*τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε* and *τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν* are complementary, expressing the same idea from opposite sides). *Λόγος* is the medium of the specifically mimetic part of tragedy; the victory of *λόγος* therefore signifies the victory or full realization of *μίμησις*. At the same time *λόγος* is speech, our ordinary or normal means of communication as human beings, as against song; and iambic verse is the kind that is natural and appropriate to speech. Hence it is the kind that takes over, driving out the tetrameter, "after speech had been adopted" (*λέξεως γενομένης*).

The sequence here is complete and tight. The only discrepancy is that *λέξεως γενομένης*, a23, ought by rights to refer to the invention or first use of speech in tragedy, while *τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν* designates only an enhancement of the status of speech, not its first use. We shall look at this inconsistency again after the intervening matter (a18-21) has been disposed of.

It is especially difficult to settle on an order of discussion here, because to a certain degree the interpretation of every part of the passage depends on the interpretation of every other. But of all the factors that have obscured Aristotle's meaning the most crucial is the intrusion of a18-21, *τρεις δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνόνθη*, into his coördinate sentence. I believe that these lines are spurious, and that their spuriousness can be proved. But if they are not, if they were written by Aristotle, still it would be a great step towards clarification to separate them from the main text. The effects of the excision are double: the main sentence recovers its structure (*τε ... τε*) and meaning, and the inserted matter itself takes on a quite different look when it is examined independently. Our procedure, then, will be to go through *τρεις δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνόνθη* phrase by phrase and word by word, not presupposing it to be spurious but testing each element against the background of Aristotle's argument.¹⁴⁴

Τρεις δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς. As the passage is punctuated

¹⁴⁴ What follows is based on my earlier essay (*op. cit.*), which however did not sufficiently keep the larger context of Aristotle's argument in view.

and printed in modern editions (and indeed there is no other way to print it so long as the words remain an integral part of the text), this is tacked on to the preceding sentence. Its construction then remains indeterminate. It is really impossible to say what verb we are to supply—or verbs, since a noticeable *zeugma* is involved even between the two objects *τρεις* (sc. *ὑποκριτάς*) and *σκηνογραφίαν*. *Εισήγαγε* (Gudemán) is oblique in relation to *ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο ἤγαγε* ("developed it [cf. *προαγόντων*, a13] from one to two") and hardly appropriate at all with *σκηνογραφίαν*;¹⁴⁵ and there is no other word that would do better, except perhaps the standard *cliché* of the later grammarians, *ἐξεῦρε*. It is evident, in fact, that grammatically *τρεις δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς* is much easier to explain as an interpolated note (whose author need not have been so precise as to his construction) than as an original part of the text or even a subsequent addition to it by Aristotle himself.

So far as the actors are concerned, I have argued elsewhere¹⁴⁶ for a new interpretation of the whole passage and of the origin and bearing of the term *ὑποκριτής*. According to that interpretation, the person we usually call the 'first actor' (that is, so far as the individual goes, Thespis) was actually called *τραγωδός*; *ὑποκριτής* originally denoted the *second* member of the acting company, who was called into being as 'answerer' to the first; Aeschylus added both this first *ὑποκριτής* (second member of the company) and the second one (third member of the company); and this last innovation is what Aristotle designates here by *τὸ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο ἤγαγε*. Thus the clause would refer to an event which we can date before 458 (*Oresteia*), and which is normally attributed to Sophocles:¹⁴⁷ the introduction of the 'third actor.'¹⁴⁸

Τὸ τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ... ἤγαγε and *τρεις δὲ ... Σοφοκλῆς* would

¹⁴⁵ *Εισάγειν* is a technical theater term, but in connection with actors, not scenery: 'to bring on (stage).' Cf. 24. 60a10.

¹⁴⁶ "The Case of the Third Actor," *TAPA* 76 (1945) 1-10; and see n. 80 above.

¹⁴⁷ The explanation of the discrepancy, under my theory, is that Aeschylus added the third man (second *ὑποκριτής*) to the tragic company, but when Sophocles gave up acting (*Vita Sophoclis*) a third *ὑποκριτής* (= 'professional actor') was added to replace him; so that from then on all three members of the tragic company were *ὑποκριταί*. Thus in different senses both poets added the third *ὑποκριτής*.

¹⁴⁸ For a recent interpretation of tragedy which emphasizes the high importance of the third actor see H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*³, London, 1950, esp. 75-77, 148-155. Kitto of course accepts the ascription to Sophocles.

then seem to contradict each other; from which it would follow either that the latter clause is spurious or that my interpretation of the former is wrong. But this dilemma is not unavoidable. The two clauses can be reconciled—that is, Aristotelian authorship can be maintained for both—even under the hypothesis that ὑποκριτῶν here denotes only the professional actors, as distinguished from the poet-actor. For in that case τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ... ἤγαγε would refer to the addition of the third and final man (but the second ὑποκριτής) to the tragic company, while τρεῖς δὲ ... Σοφοκλῆς could denote the poet's replacement of himself by a third ὑποκριτής (without increasing the total number). However, the hypothesis is not proved¹⁴⁹ and it would be unwise to make our interpretation of the text depend on it. We can hold to the conventional reading of the two passages (Aeschylus introduces the second man, Sophocles the third) without essentially weakening our case against τρεῖς δὲ ... Σοφοκλῆς, since the latter still has nothing to do with the point at issue, the triumph of dialogue over the choral parts.¹⁵⁰

The same is true, but even more obviously, of καὶ σκηνογραφίαν, for scene-painting has nothing whatever to do with the victory of λόγος. Moreover, in this case the statement conflicts with circumstantial and apparently solid testimony by Vitruvius, that the first 'scene' was made by Agatharchus, a well-known fifth-century painter, for Aeschylus (*Aeschylo docente tragoediam*), and that he wrote a book on the problems in perspective that it involved.¹⁵¹ Thus the two innovations ascribed here to Sophocles are both attributed to Aeschylus elsewhere, and neither has any visible bearing on Aristotle's argument.

Similar objections can be brought against every point and almost every word in what remains (ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ... ἀπεσεμνύθη). But before we take up the details it will be profitable to go back and review

¹⁴⁹ Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge did it the honor of careful consideration—and rejection—in his last book, *Dr. Fest.* 131-133; similarly Lesky in *Studi in onore di U. E. Paoli*, Florence, 1955, 469-475.

¹⁵⁰ Τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ... Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε, followed directly as it is by καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ κτλ., indicates a causal relationship between the increase in numbers and the victory of speech over song. There is no corresponding indication for Sophocles' deed: it is just tacked on as an item in a list.

¹⁵¹ Vitruv. 7 pref. II; cf. *Vita Aeschylí* 14, πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ... τὴν σκηνὴν μετεκαίνισεν. On Agatharchus see H. Brunn, *Gesch. d. gr. Künstler*², 2, Stuttgart, 1889, 35-36; J. Six, *HJS* 40 (1920) 180-189; M. Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik (Zelemata, 12)*, Munich, 1955, 113 n. 3.

the rationale of the passage as a whole. We began by showing, in general terms, how *τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος κτλ.* and *τό τε μέτρον κτλ.* fit together as coördinate halves of the same argument. Now let us consider for a moment how the passage hangs together under its usual constitution, with *τό τε μέτρον κτλ.* following and depending on *ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ... ἀπεσεμνύθη.* "Moreover, it was not till late that the short plot [*μικρῶν μύθων*] was discarded for one of greater compass [*τὸ μέγεθος*], and the grotesque diction of the earlier satyric form [*σατυρικοῦ*] for the stately manner [*ἀπεσεμνύθη*] of Tragedy. The iambic measure then replaced the trochaic tetrameter..." (Butcher). This translation, which can fairly be taken as representing the vulgate, grows vague and contradictory in proportion as we try to pin it down. I am not referring just now to grammatical details, but to the rationale of the whole. When did all these things take place? The last person we heard mentioned was Sophocles, and the last events referred to were the introduction of the third actor and of scene-painting—both datable to the 460's. We should expect, then, that the events next following would belong to the same period, or an even later one; and *ὄψέ*, vague as it is, would fit the expectation very well. But this is impossible. We cannot seriously imagine Aristotle thinking that all or almost all of Aeschylus' plays lacked *μέγεθος*, were ludicrous in tone and style,¹⁵² and belonged to the *σατυρικόν*, and that the shift to iambs did not take place till 460 or after. Nor has any responsible scholar suggested these things, although the conventional text calls for them. Instead the acquisition of *μέγεθος* and seriousness, together with the change from satyr-play, is either left conveniently undated or put back to Thespis¹⁵³ or even beyond, while the change

¹⁵² It has indeed been alleged that the *Suppliants*, particularly the last scene has traces of the *λέξις γελοία*; but the claim will not stand inspection. There are touches of grim or sardonic humor here and there in Aeschylus (see W. B. Stanford, *Aeschylus in his Style*, Dublin, 1942, 122-125), and one naturally thinks of the Watchman in the *Agamemnon* and the Nurse in the *Choephoroe*, as well as the Egyptian Herald in the *Suppliants*, as having suggestions of comedy about them. But their speech is essentially the speech of the heroes.

¹⁵³ So for example Geffcken and Gudeman; but the latter ascribes the change of meter to Aeschylus. On recent theories as to the 'satyric' stage see A. Lesky, *AAW* 1 (1948) 67-68; *id.*, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*, Göttingen, 1956, 19-29. Bywater dates *ὄψέ ἀπεσεμνύθη* to the "age of Phrynichus," which is vague enough. Montmolin 43: "L'évolution envisagée remonte aux origines de la tragédie et prend fin vraisemblablement au début de la carrière d'Eschyle... Le changement de mètre... [a] dû se produire à la même époque ou un peu plus tard."

in meter is tacitly assumed to be later. Actually the commentators on the *Poetics* have not spread themselves very much in attempts to define the exact sequence of events here; and indeed it is impossible, since those denoted by *ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ... ἀπεσεμνύθη* must ante-date Aeschylus while the change from trochaic to iambic is apparently still going on in his work.¹⁵⁴

There is, in short, no satisfactory way of arranging and dating the events referred to so long as a17-21 are run together. Furthermore, the impression given by the conventional text is that the tragic verse changed from trochaic to iambic after and because of the attainment of seriousness (*ἀπεσεμνύθη*), whereas a23-28 makes it clear that iambic was adopted solely because it is a speaking and speakable verse-form. These considerations point ineluctably to one basic fact: *the two clauses (ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ... ἀπεσεμνύθη and τό τε μέτρον κτλ.) do not belong together.* This is the converse of what we said at the beginning of this section, that *τό τε ... παρεσκεύασεν* and *τό τε μέτρον κτλ.* do belong together as coördinate halves of the same statement. Moreover this coördinate statement, unlike the one in the texts, can be dated. It refers to Aeschylus throughout, and stamps him as the man who brought tragedy to the attainment of its *φύσις*.

Now, to return to the details, we can attempt a survey of *ἔτι δὲ κτλ.*:

Ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος. Grammatically, the two chief lines of interpretation are that of Vahlen, who took *τὸ μέγεθος* as accusative of specification,¹⁵⁵ and the one represented by Bywater and Gudeman, who explain it as a kind of topic-heading or inventory item (out of construction) and put a colon or even a full stop after it.¹⁵⁶ The latter solution is unsatisfying at best, because it leaves no clue to the meaning of *μέγεθος*, and in spite of Gudeman's repeated discovery of such "stichwort- oder lemmaartige" phrases there is no certain example of one—i.e., a genuine one—in the *Poetics*. On the other hand Vahlen's

¹⁵⁴ There are tetrameters in *Pers.* 155-175, 215-248, 698-700, 703-758; *Agam.* 1346-1371, 1649-1673; frags. 60, 296 Nauck.

¹⁵⁵ *Beiträge*³ 251 n. 13 (1. 310). Vahlen later adopted the view (*Poet.*³ 109) that *τὸ μέγεθος* was a *nominalivus pendens*, left hanging by a shift of construction after *μύθων*.

¹⁵⁶ Gudeman himself is at considerable pains to distinguish his interpretation from Bywater's. The older and simpler-minded view which made *τὸ μέγεθος* the subject of *ἀπεσεμνύθη* hardly seems worth discussing, although it still has adherents, e.g., Sykutris. Surely the tautology is unbearable or the whole form of expression is silly, or both.

explanation is not much better (he himself claimed nothing for it except that it was preferable to the wild transpositions of Schmidt, Susemihl, *et al.*). Whether one attaches the accusative to *μικρῶν*, as he did, or, as Gomperz proposed,¹⁵⁷ to the sentence as a whole, the word-order and or construction are very awkward indeed.

Even if we were sure about the construction we would still not be sure what *μέγεθος* means. Good arguments have been advanced for its meaning (1) 'magnitude' (length or size),¹⁵⁸ (2) 'grandeur,'¹⁵⁹ and (3) both.¹⁶⁰ And the reckoning is still further complicated by the possibility that the text was originally fuller than it is now. The Arabic version seems to imply another accusative object before *λέξεως*, to match *μέγεθος*;¹⁶¹ I have suggested <*μεγαλοφωνίαν ἐκ*?> *λέξεως* in the text lemma. But we cannot be sure whether a strict distinction was implied between *μέγεθος* (quantitative) and the other word, whatever it was (qualitative).

The ambiguity of *μέγεθος* of course extends to *μικρῶν* (*μύθων*). It too may be either quantitative ('short stories') or qualitative ('slight [undignified, trivial?] plots') or both, and we have no good way of deciding which.¹⁶²

(**Ἐκ*) *λέξεως γελοίας* is clear enough in itself, but as the text is normally constituted it stands in serious contradiction with *λέξεως δὲ γενομένης* below (a23). The first phrase implies that *λέξεις* (namely *λέξεις γελοίας*) had been there more or less from the beginning, the second that it was introduced just before the change of meter began.¹⁶³ Otherwise we have to suppose that the word has two wholly different

¹⁵⁷ *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 20-21 (= *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 560).

¹⁵⁸ So, e.g., Butcher, Bywater, Lane Cooper, Hardy.

¹⁵⁹ Gomperz, Kranz (*Neue Jahrb. f. d. kl. Alt.* 26 [1919] 146 ff.), Menardos-Sykturis.

¹⁶⁰ Rostagni, Albergiani, Valgimigli.

¹⁶¹ "*Atque etiam est primus, qui manifestavit e carminibus parvis magnitudinem sermonis et strepitum et tumultum in sermone et dictionibus pertinentibus ad negotium ludibrii et iocis*," Tkatsch. It must be admitted that the translation is especially confused just here and may possibly reflect more widespread disturbance—or merely ineptitude on the part of the translators. Thus the name Aeschylus does not appear: everything from *τὸ τοῦ χοροῦ* on is ascribed to Sophocles.

¹⁶² The translators divide, but not according to any clearly visible principle. "Short stories," or the equivalent: Albergiani, Butcher, Bywater, Cooper, Gudeman, Hardy, Susemihl, Vahlen, Valgimigli; "slight fables," etc.: Gomperz, Kranz (*op. cit.* 146 n. 3), Pitcher, Potts.

¹⁶³ See below on *λέξεως γενομένης*.

meanings in the two places: "ludicrous *diction*, style," and "*dialogue* having come into existence." But that is an anomaly almost as bad as the other.

In *διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβελεῖν* we have perhaps the second most famous phrase in the chapter. The version of the beginnings of tragedy which was still generally accepted around the turn of this century—perhaps it is still more or less the vulgate¹⁶⁴—was a conflation of this remark and *ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον* with a few other pieces of "evidence": e.g., Suidas' statement that Arion introduced satyrs *ἔμμετρα λέγοντας* into the dithyramb. The resulting theory, or rather patchwork, is the one we are all familiar with: that *τραγωδία* was so called because it originally had a chorus of satyrs (*τράγοι*, goat-men); that this satyr-chorus was invented (that is, introduced into the dithyramb) by Arion; that 'tragedy' remained essentially satyr-play until the time of Thespis, or (according to taste) Choerilus and Phrynichus; and that traces of this origin remain even in the earliest plays of Aeschylus (*Suppliants*, "ludicrous diction";¹⁶⁵ *Persians*, tetrameter verse).

The 'satyric dithyramb' theory was threadbare from the beginning. We may be sure that if it had rested on anything less than the alleged authority of Aristotle it would have been laughed out of court long ago. The fact is that it represents a purely artificial mixture of two wholly different things and creates more problems than it solves. Schmid, Reisch, and Nilsson declared it impossible years ago,¹⁶⁶ and Pickard-Cambridge's quiet but exhaustive examination gave it its death notice.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless it has a ghostly vitality,¹⁶⁸ and nothing else has appeared to replace it.

Gomperz saw the insuperable difficulties of the tragedy-out-of-satyr-

¹⁶⁴ For example a book like A. E. Haigh's *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, Oxford, 1896, which was reprinted unchanged as late as 1946, purveys it without any hesitation or critical appraisal in Chapter I ("Early History of Greek Tragedy"). See Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.*,⁴ 1-3.

¹⁶⁵ One scholar even found Danaus and his daughters reminiscent of Papa Silenus and his satyric crew—surely a case of association by contraries.

¹⁶⁶ W. Schmid, *Zur Geschichte des griechischen Dithyrambus*, Tübingen, 1901, 19 n. 2; E. Reisch in *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Vienna, 1902, 451-173, esp. 472; M. P. Nilsson, *Neue Jahrb.* 14 (1911) 612-613 (= *Opuscula Selecta*, 1, Lund, 1951, 66-67).

¹⁶⁷ *Dith.* 124-131.

¹⁶⁸ See Albin Lesky, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 153).

play theory and tried to avoid them by giving a somewhat vaguer meaning to *σατυρικοῦ*: not *Satyrspiel* but *satyrspielartig*.¹⁶⁹ But it will not do. *Σατυρικοῦ* too obviously and stubbornly means 'satyr-play'.¹⁷⁰ The retort that *σατυρικήν* means the same thing just a few lines later (a22) proves nothing; for *σατυρικήν* has a clear-cut noun to modify (*ποίησιν*) and its whole situation is quite different, as we shall see in a moment.

As for the syntax and reference of *διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν*, it seems to hang somewhere between *ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων (...)* καὶ *λέξεως γελοίας* and *ὄψὲ ἀπεσεμνύθη*, in the same indeterminate fashion as the rest of the passage. Tragedy came from small plots, etc., because it grew out of satyr-play, and/or it acquired seriousness late because until then it was satyr-play:¹⁷¹ we cannot tell exactly how the parts of the sentence are supposed to go together. We can in fact not quite assign anything between *ἔτι δέ* and *ἀπεσεμνύθη* a fixed place and a definite meaning: everything 'gives' when weight is put on it.

Finally, I urged in my previous discussion¹⁷² that *ἀπεσεμνύθη* was suspicious in the sense 'became serious, gained dignity.' The charge needs some qualification, because there are some fourth-century examples, at least of the simple verb *σεμνύεσθαι*, with that meaning, particularly in Isocrates.¹⁷³ But (*ἀπο*)*σεμνύεσθαι* normally means

¹⁶⁹ In his translation (1897); approved by Reisch, *loc. cit.*, and Flickinger, *GP* 8 (1913) 264. Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Gött. Nachr.* 1926, 298 n. 1: "Σατυρικόον ist nicht das Satyrspiel in der festausgeprägten Form des fünften Jahrhunderts, sondern zunächst ein 'satyrhaftes,' mehr heiteres Spiel mit lebhaften Tanzbewegungen, wie sie dem Satyr anstehen." But Pohlenz goes on to say that the dancers were satyrs (i.e., not merely "satyrhaft"): otherwise Aristotle would not have used the word *σατυρικός* twice. The inconsistency is patent. M. Untersteiner, *Le origini della Tragedia*, Milan, 1942, 249, 261, still maintains almost exactly the same paradoxical point of view, since he too believes (pp. 221-222) that Arion introduced actual satyrs into the dithyramb.

¹⁷⁰ The only word we can supply with it is *δράματος*. If Aristotle had wanted to say "something satyr-like" he would have had to append at least a *τινός*.

¹⁷¹ "Discarding short stories and a ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric stage, it assumed... a tone of dignity," says Bywater's translation. This makes *διὰ τὸ ... μεταβαλεῖν* depend on a verb that does not exist ("discarding" is fabricated out of the idea of change implied by *ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων*): a legitimate enough device for purposes of translation, but useless so far as strict interpretation is concerned. E. Kalinka, *op. cit.* (above, n. 110) 35, takes *διὰ ... μεταβαλεῖν* as explaining *λέξεως γελοίας* specifically. In the text I suggest *διὰ <γάρ?>*.

¹⁷² *TAPA* 70 (1939) 148.

¹⁷³ *Aroop.* 49, *σεμνύεσθαι γὰρ ἐμελέτων ἀλλ' οὐ βωμολοχεύεσθαι*; cf. *ad*

'puff oneself up, boast, brag' in the classical period, particularly the fourth century.¹⁷⁴ So for example in the only other case in Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* 4. 3. 1124b20, τῶν μὲν (sc. τῶν ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις) γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν ("something to be proud of"), καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι ("a lofty bearing," Ross) οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν. Thus ἀπεσεμνύθη in our passage, in the sense 'became serious,' is unusual, to say the least, in a fourth-century work.

It is time to stop and take stock. We have several observations of different kinds and levels to correlate:

1. Καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ... πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν and τό τε μέτρον κτλ. are coordinate clauses. Between them they represent Aristotle's main idea: the victory of speech (~ dialogue, action, imitation) over song, and the consequent adoption of the meter most appropriate to speech.

2. What stands between these clauses, viz. τρεῖς δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνύθη, cannot be a *direct* part of the main argument, i.e., the main text, but must be at best a parenthesis of some kind. This is certain in the same degree.

3. From this point on the possibility of certainty diminishes rapidly. It is not certain, for example, whether τρεῖς δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνύθη is all one piece or falls into two (τρεῖς δὲ ... Σοφοκλῆς and ἔτι δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνύθη).¹⁷⁵

Nic. 34; *Helen* 11 (= σπουδάζειν). But cf. *Eosag.* 7, ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει τοῦ σώματος σεμνομένους; *De Pace* 50, σεμνονόμεθα μὲν καὶ μέγα φρονοῦμεν; *De Iugo* 17; 29, σεμνύνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν προγόνων ἀρεταῖς. This is the normal meaning; see next note.

¹⁷⁴ E.g., Aristoph. *Birds* 727; *Frogs* 703, 833, 1020; cf. *ibid.* 178, ὡς σεμνός δ' ἀπάρατος; not "how serious," but "how puffed up the rogue is." Plato has ἀποσεμνύνειν only once (active): *Theaet.* 168d (Protagoras), ἀποσεμνύνων τὸ πάντων μέτρον, "playing up, extolling that 'measure of all things' of his" (i.e., as something important). Σεμνύνεσθαι: *Gorg.* 512b, οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καλτερ σφύζοντα ἡμᾶς; cf. *ibid.* 511d; *Theaet.* 175a, ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνονομένων, "when people get puffed up over a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors" (in a row); *Parm.* 128c, οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύεται τὸ γράμμα, "my essay does not make any such pretensions at all." Demosthenes (no case of ἀποσεμνύνειν): *De Corona* 256, εἴ τις ἐν ἀφθόνοις τραφεῖς ἐπὶ τούτῳ σεμνύεται; cf. *ibid.* 107, 259; *In Androt.* 75; *De Falsa Leg.* 235. Xenophon, *Agésilas* 9. 1: τῷ σπανίως ὀφράσθαι ἐσεμνύετο. Further references in Stephanus-Hase-Dindorf, *Thes. Gr. Ling.* 7. 162. Similarly the active regularly means 'honor highly, extol, make much of,' not 'make serious.'

¹⁷⁵ It would be theoretically possible that ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος is a third scrap,

4. Theoretically, either of these pieces (one hesitates to call them 'sentences'), or the whole if it is one piece, could be (a) a parenthesis belonging to the original text, (b) a subsequent note by Aristotle, or (c) an interpolation, i.e., a note written by somebody else. There is no way of attaining more than probability here.

5. *Τρεῖς δὲ ... Σοφοκλῆς* and *ἔτι δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνόνθη* both show obliquities of construction, but these are much more prominent and bothersome in the latter than in the former.

6. Both parts show apparent contradictions with other statements by Aristotle himself (tragedy sprang from the dithyramb) or others (scene-painting introduced by Aeschylus); but again the discrepancy in the second part (satyr-play vs. dithyramb) is more serious and harder to account for. If the two 'parts' are separate, therefore, the second is perhaps more likely to be spurious than the first.

Under the conventional constitution of the passage the two pieces are necessarily separate, *τρεῖς δὲ ... Σοφοκλῆς* going with the preceding sentence and *ἔτι δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνόνθη* with the following. If on the other hand the passage is a parenthesis, perhaps an interpolation, but in any case not an integral part of the text, the situation is changed. Two possibilities present themselves:

1. The whole passage is one note. In that case it all refers to Sophocles: "and Sophocles (introduced)¹⁷⁶ three (actors) and scene-painting, also the amplitude...."

2. There are two notes supplementing the tale of Aeschylus' contributions, the first mentioning two by Sophocles, the other adding a different kind of achievement on the part of Aeschylus (attainment of grandeur).

The first of these possibilities, which brings Sophocles into some kind of organic connection with satyr-play, may seem impossibly naïve, even fantastic. Nevertheless we find traces of such a theory in an epigram of Dioscorides, *Anthologia Palatina* 7. 37, where a satyr, imagined as guarding the tomb of Sophocles, presents himself as a rude Phliasian dancer who has been transformed by the poet into a tragic actor: *τύμβος δδ' ἔστ', ὄνθρωπε, Σοφοκλέος ... ὅς με τὸν ἐκ Φλιούντος, ἔτι τρίβολον πατέοντα, πρίνινον, ἐς χρυσεὸν σχῆμα μεθῆρ-*

independent of the other two. But the probability is so slight that it can be ignored here.

¹⁷⁶ We saw above that the verb to be supplied must be *εἰσήγαγε* or *ἐξεύρε*.

μύσατο. Pohlenz¹⁷⁷ saw that more was meant here than a change in the satyric actor's costume: that Dioscorides is implying an actual derivation of tragedy from satyr-play *at the hands of Sophocles*—ὄψέ indeed. In order to account for this and certain other *testimonia*, Pohlenz posited a hitherto unknown Alexandrian theory which, in opposition to the Peripatetic doctrine deriving the *earliest* tragedy from satyr-play (Arion), made tragedy a strictly native Attic product and satyr-play an entirely independent genre which was only brought to Athens by Pratinas around 500.

Pohlenz's thesis, in spite of the rather general acceptance it has found,¹⁷⁸ has several defects. The one which concerns us is that, as Pohlenz himself admits, Dioscorides elsewhere (*A. P.* 7. 410, 411) makes tragedy a native Attic product, while here he seems to derive it from satyr-play: an anomaly for which no good reason is given. Nevertheless the fact remains that the epigram on Sophocles presents a view which is reminiscent of *διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὄψέ ἀπεσεμνύθη*.

Ordinarily, however, when there is talk of amplitude, grandeur, *σεμνότης* and the like, one thinks first of Aeschylus, not Sophocles.¹⁷⁹ On that score at least it seems more likely that *ἔτι δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνύθη* was intended (though not by Aristotle) to refer to Aeschylus.¹⁸⁰ For this theory too we can find a parallel in Dioscorides: *A. P.* 7. 411, κώ-

¹⁷⁷ *Op. cit.* (above, n. 169).

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Edouard Tièche, *Thespis*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1933, 23 ff. Schmid is more reserved, 1. 2. 83 n. 2.

¹⁷⁹ Especially so far as ancient judgments are concerned. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1004, *πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρυγώσας ἑήματα σεμνά*: a passage whose inspiration Pohlenz traced to Gorgias, *Göbl. Nachr.* 1920, 163. The commonest epithets are *μεγαλοπρέπεια*: Dion. Hal. *Π. μμ.* 2. 10, p. 206, 3 Usener-Radermacher; *μεγαλοφροσύνη*: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52. 4; Dion. Hal. *De Comp. Verb.* 22 (cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1059, *ἀνάγκη μεγάλων γνώμων καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ἑήματα τίττειν*); *μεγαλόφωνος* (-ως, -νία): Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 158, p. 328 R.; Himerius, *Or.* 23, p. 774 W.; Basilius M. *Epist.* 74; Quintil. 10. 1. 66 (*sublimis et gravis et grandilocus*); Theodore. *Hist. Eccl.* 3. 3 (*μεγαληγορία*); *σεμνός* (-της): Athen. 13. 600a; Dion. Hal. *Demosth.* 39, p. 213, 18 Us.-Rad.; cf. Himerius, *Or.* 33. 4. (All these refs. are from the *testimonia* collected by Friedrich Schoell and prefaced to F. Ritschl's edition of the *Seven Against Thebes*, Leipzig, 1875 ["De Aeschylli poesi ludicra," pp. 36-49]).

¹⁸⁰ Actually, in defiance of logic (that is, in defiance of the immediately preceding word *Σοφοκλής*), most of the commentators and translators have tacitly assumed this, even under the usual constitution of the text: see above on the tendency to refer *ἀπεσεμνύθη* to Aeschylus.

μους τούσδε τελειότερους (τούσδ' ἔτι μειοτέρους Jacobitz, *alii alia*) Αἰσχύλος ἐξ ὑψωσεν; or in the anonymous *Life of Aeschylus*, 5: ζηλοῖ τὸ ἀδρὸν αἰεὶ πλάσμα ... ὄγκον ... τὸ βάρος ... μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἥρωικόν; *ibid.* 14, εἰς τοσόνδε μεγέθους τὴν τραγωδίαν προαγαγεῖν. Moreover there is another set of *testimonia* which speak of tragedy developing out of satyr-play; and these, or at least one version of them, can be shown to have a probable reference to Aeschylus. They are the scholia which we find in Suidas and elsewhere on the proverb οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον.¹⁸¹ In general they show two versions, one of which talks about Epigenes of Sicyon but not about satyr-play, while the other derives tragedy from satyr-play and makes the decisive change take place at the hands of certain poets the last of whom is stated or implied to be Aeschylus.

Suidas,¹⁸² after speaking of Epigenes, says βέλτιον δὲ οὕτως· τὸ πρόσθεν εἰς τὸν Διόνυσον γράφοντες τούτοις ἠγωνίζοντο ἅπερ καὶ σατυρικὰ ἐλέγετο· ὕστερον δὲ μεταβάλλοντες εἰς τὸ τραγωδίας γράφειν, κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς μῦθους καὶ ἱστορίας ἐτρέψθησαν, μηκέτι τοῦ Διονύσου μνημονεύοντες· ὅθεν τοῦτο [*sc.* οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Δ.] καὶ ἐπεφώνησαν. καὶ Χαμαιλέων ἐν τῷ περὶ Θέσπιδος τὰ παραπλήσια ἱστορεῖ. Plutarch is briefer but more specific: *Symptotic Questions* 1. 1. 5, ὥσπερ οὖν Φρυνίχου καὶ Αἰσχύλου τὴν τραγωδίαν εἰς μῦθους καὶ πάθη¹⁸³ προαγόντων ἐλέχθη, "τι ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον;" These are clearly different versions of the same story, and the mention of Chamaeleon's work *On Thespis* enables us to make a very likely conjecture as to the supposed sequence of events. Surely Thespis¹⁸⁴ is the first of those who began the change (a gradual one: κατὰ μικρὸν) towards tragedy (= μῦθοι καὶ πάθη), and Aeschylus completes the process.¹⁸⁴ His *σεμνότης* would contravene the 'satyric' spirit (here assumed to be the original one) in especially pointed fashion. Thus the story as it was told by Chamaeleon seems very close indeed to the one implied by ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος κτλ. in the *Poetics*,¹⁸⁵ both

¹⁸¹ For discussion see Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (above, n. 169); Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 166-168. Pickard-Cambridge is perhaps a little too skeptical, not as to the value of the tradition, but as to what can be made of it.

¹⁸² *S.v.* ο. π. τ. Δ.; = Phot. *Lex.*, *s.v.* Ἐπιγένης; Apostolius 13. 42.

¹⁸³ Cf. ἐκ μικρῶν μῦθων (i.e., stories without πάθη)?

¹⁸⁴ The complaint οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον could be thought of as arising at almost any point in the development.

¹⁸⁵ Even the apparently variant version offered by Zenobius, 5. 40 (see Pohlenz, *op. cit.* 302; Pick.-Camb. 167), may be basically the same. The phrasing at the end,

referring to Aeschylus as effecting the greatest change in the Dionysiac spirit of tragedy.

Our conclusion will be, not that Chamaeleon, Plutarch, Suidas, and the rest are echoing the *Poetics*, but that the *Poetics* passage belongs to the οὐδέν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον group; indeed it could well have been taken from a paroemiographer. In any case I believe it came into the *Poetics* at a late date, long after Chamaeleon. The awkwardness of the phrasing seems to be sufficient evidence of that. But the original authors of the theory were no doubt Chamaeleon and some other Peripatetic of his time.¹⁸⁶

Two questions present themselves: (1) why did Chamaeleon (and perhaps someone else) put forward the tragedy-out-of-satyr-play theory, and (2) why was it interpolated into the *Poetics*? We cannot make a reasonable conjecture about the first question. We cannot even tell, in fact, whether satyr-play was intended to replace the dithyramb in the prehistory of tragedy or to be equated with it.¹⁸⁷ Fortunately the other question, which is more urgent for us, is also easier. Nothing was said explicitly in Aristotle's text about the majesty, the σεμνότης of tragedy, and particularly of Aeschylean tragedy. Here was an obvious gap, especially as σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν below seemed to denote an undignified early stage.¹⁸⁸ And these same words seemed to connote a satyr-play origin of tragedy, as it was put forward in the tradition on οὐδέν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. From the point of view of the annotator, his διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν is simply a paraphrase

διὰ γοῦν τοῦτο τοὺς Σατύρους ὕστερον ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς προεισάγειν, surely refers by implication to the fourth-century order of events in the Dionysiac contests (one satyr-play, at the beginning); so Wilamowitz. But it does not necessarily imply, as Pohlenz thinks, that the satyr-play was not there to begin with. The point of προεισάγειν may be that the satyrs had gradually been put off to the end of the proceedings, after the tragedies, and were now restored to a place of honor at the beginning.

¹⁸⁶ Ἡ Χαμαιλέων τὰ παραπλήσια ἱστορεῖ, in Suidas, really implies another author.

¹⁸⁷ It is notable that we do not find an explicit identification of dithyramb with satyr-play in the οὐδέν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον tradition, any more than in the *Poetics*. The explanations speak of dithyramb (in connection with Epigenes: Suid.; *Paroem.* 1. 137 = Aesch. *ed. mai.* Wilamowitz, p. 18) or satyr-play (Suid., 2nd explanation), not both together.

¹⁸⁸ I take it that the athetesis of a passage—even of a few words—requires a combination of negative and positive criteria: i.e., proof that the author could not have written the words in question, and proof, or at least a plausible suggestion,

of *διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν ... εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν*,¹⁸⁹ making Aristotle's meaning clear and bringing out its intended application to Aeschylus.

A similar motive will account for *τρεις δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς*. Sophocles was not mentioned in the text—an omission all the more striking because he was so clearly Aristotle's favorite and ideal tragic poet. Moreover there appeared to be ample room left for him, since Aristotle had not mentioned the third actor or said anything at all about the *Bühnenbild*.

We cannot hope to determine whether the two notes were written by the same person. In any case both were appended to the summary of Aeschylus' achievements, *καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ... παρεσκεύασεν*, in order to fill apparent gaps in the story.¹⁹⁰

With this we can return at long last to Aristotle's own text. Let us remind ourselves once more how specific and limited his purpose was: to point to the time and place where the mimetic element, the dialogue, definitively won out over music and dancing, the choral element. This victory was won by Aeschylus; and with it tragedy essentially "attained its nature," that is, became dramatic. But there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle thought of this as an instantaneous event. *Κατὰ μικρὸν προαγόντων* applies to the end of the story as much as the beginning: the aorists summarize a long development.

Correlative with the rise of speech (dialogue) to predominance over song and dance, and constituting another, complementary phase of the movement denoted by *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*, was the change of the meter of tragedy from trochaic to iambic. This also was not accomplished in a day. So much is evident on the face of it when we consider *λέξεως δὲ γενομένης* ("when dialogue came in") in relation to *τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστῆν παρεσκεύασεν*; and at the same time we can begin to appreciate the clarification we have achieved by the bracketing of *τρεις δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνόνθη*. For on the one hand the person

as to why somebody else might have written it. Neglect of this principle did a great deal to discredit the whole idea of athetesis as it was practiced by Ritter in the last century. His *interpolator stolidus* had no purpose or function except to impede understanding.

¹⁸⁹ Thus *λέξεως γενομένης* (on whose meaning see below) is twisted into (*ἐκ*) *λέξεως γελοίας* — unless, as we have conjectured, some word like *μεγαλοφωνία* was actually expressed.

¹⁹⁰ It goes without saying that the annotator or annotators did not fathom Aristotle's special purpose and point of view here, but read his brief remarks as if they were meant to be a complete thumbnail history of the tragic theater.

who introduced dialogue (under whom dialogue "came in") cannot be the same as the one who gave it the leading role—i.e., cannot be Aeschylus; and on the other hand the removal of Sophocles from the immediate environs of the phrase enables us to date that introduction with confidence to a period long before him, viz. the time of Thespis.¹⁹¹ The process denoted by *αὐτῇ ἢ φύσει τὸ οἰκειὸν μέτρον εἶρε* began with Thespis, then, and was finished by Aeschylus. Moreover we are now free to take *λέξεως* in the sense which it clearly has to have. So long as *λέξεως γελοίας* stood in the text (a19-20), we had to understand that *λέξεις* already existed in the earliest stages of the development, say in Arion's dithyramb or whatever it was that Thespis inherited from his predecessors. That is, the *λέξεις γελοία* was the 'ludicrous diction' of the 'satyric' choral odes. But Aristotle does not use *λέξεις* in that sense. When he speaks of the *λέξεις* of tragedy he means the *spoken dialogue* only: the choral parts are not *λέξεις*, or do not have *λέξεις*, in the proper sense.¹⁹² Thus *λέξεως γενομένος* means, in a perfectly straightforward way, "when speech [spoken dialogue] came in."

This clarification enables us in turn to interpret *διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν* with some sharpness. *Ποίησις* here means specifically *the poet's work of composition*, his 'making,' as it does throughout the *Poetics*. But in this case, in the period before Thespis, we have a composition which was not in spoken dialogue but entirely in songs, *μέλη*. In chapter 6 the tragic text is divided into *μέτρα* and *μέλη*, and the 'making,' *ποίησις*, is correspondingly divided into *λέξεις* and *μελοποιία*. In pre-Thespian 'tragedy,' then, the *ποίησις* was exclusively *μελοποιία*, whereas from Thespis on *λέξεις* was added.¹⁹³ We can now see what Aristotle means by saying that the *ποίησις* was *σατυρικὴ καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέρα*: not that the chorus were gotten up as satyrs, or that tragedy had come from satyr-play, but that *before Thespis the (musical) composition was 'satyr-like' (i.e., lively, full of movement) and largely given over to dancing*. That was the reason for the use of the trochaic meter. As commentary on *σα-*

¹⁹¹ Thespis has not been mentioned, to be sure. But Aeschylus' changes are specified here as instances of *μεταβολαί*, namely those changes that brought tragedy to the end of its development, and *λέξεως γενομένης* refers in a natural way to a previous *μεταβολή* which is organically connected with his.

¹⁹² See below on 6. 49b34.

¹⁹³ *Γενομένης* may conceivably be used with the nuance of 'added,' = *προσγενομένης*.

τυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν we need cite only *Poet.* 24. 60a1, τὸ μὲν [sc. τετράμετρον] ὀρχηστικόν, and *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b36, ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος · δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα · ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄρθμος τροχαῖος τὰ τετράμετρα. Σατυρικὴν and ὀρχηστικωτέραν are synonyms: the second term explains the first.¹⁹⁴ Aristotle wants a word which will suggest vividly the character of the earliest 'tragedy' as primarily a dance-production (dancing accompanied by song, of course), and the nearest parallel he can think of in his own time is the satyr-play, so he says "satyr(-play)-like, that is, pretty much just dancing."¹⁹⁵

Thus by a roundabout route we arrive at the conclusion for σατυρικὴν which Kranz, Pohlenz, and others had arrived at for σατυρικοῦ in a20:¹⁹⁶ that it does not actually mean that early tragedy was a satyric drama, but only that it had the liveliness and dance-character of one. But the whole phrase does by implication designate pre-Thespian 'tragedy' as predominantly a choral performance, and Aristotle must mean that the chorus's own songs and dances, not merely some lines by the ἐξάρχων, were in tetrameters. The trimeter was not added to the tetrameter when dialogue came in alongside the χορικά; it replaced it. What happened to the rhythms of the choral parts thereafter is not mentioned.¹⁹⁷ Presumably it did not interest our philosopher.

We pointed out a long time ago that the φύσις which discovered the right verse-form was not 'Nature' in general, but the specific nature of tragedy. Αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις is an allusion to ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, a15. The "nature" which is finally "attained" has lured the genre on to attain it. Being is the cause of Becoming. The nature of tragedy, that is, the master principle of imitation itself, took charge and decreed that to represent speech that verse should be used which is most like the natural rhythm of speech.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ I.e., the καὶ is exepexegetic; see Gudeman *ad loc.*

¹⁹⁵ Κορδακικώτερος in the *Rhetoric* is said in the same way, not from any narrowly technical point of view (not the *cordax* in the sense of a dance pertaining to 'comedy' only: that narrowing of meaning was the work of Aristoxenus, cf. *Athen.* 14. 630e).

¹⁹⁶ For σατυρικοῦ we have already rejected their thesis. That word must mean 'satyr-play': σατυρικοῦ, sc. δράματος.

¹⁹⁷ The trimeter is the only verse Aristotle ever speaks of in connection with tragedy. See below on 5. 49b11, τὸ μέτρον ἄπλοῦν ἔχειν.

¹⁹⁸ Λέξεως - λεκτικόν - λέγομεν - διαλέκτω - λεκτικῆς. In this company λέγομεν means 'speak' in the specific sense, as against singing. Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b33, ὁ δ' ἱαμβος αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἢ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν · διὸ μάλιστα πάντων μέτρων ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες.

The parallel between a21-24 and 48b30-34 (*ἐν οἷς ... ποιηταί*) is evident. In each case ('iambic,' tragedy) the development of a new form of poetry is capped and ratified by the adoption of the appropriate verse-form. Yet the verse that nature turns up for the purpose is the same: the iambic. Whence this inconsistency? The answer is simple. In both cases what brings the introduction of iambic verse is not the special character of the individual genre (the bitterness or jocularly or vulgarity of the *Ἰαμβοί*, as against the stateliness of tragedy) but what they have in common: that is, their status as imitations of human utterance. Aristotle is not much interested in the solemnity of tragedy *per se*. What engages his attention in it is the degree to which it embodies *μίμησις*, and *μίμησις* is the imitation of men acting and *speaking*.

The last sentence in the chapter may possibly contain another interpolated note.¹⁹⁹ But there is no compelling reason for assuming one here, and the offhand construction seems conceivable as Aristotle hastily winds up his allusions to tragedy and prepares to go over to the story of comedy. Furthermore, some allusion to an increase in the length of tragedy (number of episodes) seems indispensable here, since it is presupposed in chapter 6²⁰⁰ and we find it nowhere else in this chapter.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Bywater and Gudeman print *ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθην* by itself as a kind of independent caption or title. The meaning of the phrase is another question. It is natural to take it as denoting an increase in the number of 'acts' or scenes, which grew from two or three to as many as seven (Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.*,⁴ 192-193) in classical tragedy. But *κοσμηθῆναι* suggests a non-essential 'adornment,' and *ἐπεισοδίων* therefore may mean 'episodes' in the special sense, i.e., non-essential *extra* scenes or interludes, as it does elsewhere in the *Poetics*. See below on 9. 51b33 ff.

²⁰⁰ 49b23, *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*.

²⁰¹ See below on 5. 49b14 ff., *καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον κτλ.* On the present sentence see also Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.*, 1. 21 (*Sitzungsber. Vienna* 1888, 561).

CHAPTER 5

49a32-b9

[ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὡσπερ εἶπομεν, μίμησις φανλο-
 35 τέρων μὲν · οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ,
 οὗ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρ|τημά
 τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ
 γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδυ-
 νης.] αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ δι' ὧν
 38 | b1 ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ | σπου-
 δάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν, [καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδοῖς ὀφέ-
 ποτε ὁ ἀρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν] ἤδη δὲ σχή-
 ματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μνη-
 μονεύονται · τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ |
 5 πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὄσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγνόηται. τὸ δὲ μύθους
 ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος] τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικε-
 λίας ἦλθε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν ἀφέ-
 μενος τῆς λαμβικῆς ιδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους.

49a32

[Comedy is as we said, an imitation of relatively worthless
 characters; not, however, covering the full range of villainy,
 but merely the ugly and unseemly, one branch of which is
 the laughable. Namely, the laughable is some mistake |
 35 or piece of ugliness which is not painful or destructive to
 life: as for example, to go no farther, the laughable (comic)
 mask is one that is ugly and distorted but does not cause
 pain.] Well then, the changes that tragedy went through,
 and the persons responsible for them, have not been forgotten.
 Comedy, on the other hand, had no attention paid to it at
 38 | b1 first because | it was not taken seriously, [in fact it was at
 a late date that the archon 'gave a chorus' to comedians; be-
 fore that they were volunteers] and it is only when it already
 possessed certain elements of form that we find a record of
 men called 'comic poets'; who gave it masks or prologues
 5 or | numbers of actors, and all that sort of thing, remains
 unknown. The practice of composing plots, however, [Epi-
 charmus and Phormus] came from Sicily originally, and a

μύσατο. Pohlenz¹⁷⁷ saw that more was meant here than a change in the satyric actor's costume: that Dioscorides is implying an actual derivation of tragedy from satyr-play *at the hands of Sophocles*—ὄψέ indeed. In order to account for this and certain other *testimonia*, Pohlenz posited a hitherto unknown Alexandrian theory which, in opposition to the Peripatetic doctrine deriving the *earliest* tragedy from satyr-play (Arion), made tragedy a strictly native Attic product and satyr-play an entirely independent genre which was only brought to Athens by Pratinas around 500.

Pohlenz's thesis, in spite of the rather general acceptance it has found,¹⁷⁸ has several defects. The one which concerns us is that, as Pohlenz himself admits, Dioscorides elsewhere (*A. P.* 7. 410, 411) makes tragedy a native Attic product, while here he seems to derive it from satyr-play: an anomaly for which no good reason is given. Nevertheless the fact remains that the epigram on Sophocles presents a view which is reminiscent of *διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὄψέ ἀπεσεμνύθη*.

Ordinarily, however, when there is talk of amplitude, grandeur, *σεμνότης* and the like, one thinks first of Aeschylus, not Sophocles.¹⁷⁹ On that score at least it seems more likely that *ἔτι δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνύθη* was intended (though not by Aristotle) to refer to Aeschylus.¹⁸⁰ For this theory too we can find a parallel in Dioscorides: *A. P.* 7. 411, *κώ-*

¹⁷⁷ *Op. cit.* (above, n. 169).

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Edouard Thèbe, *Thespis*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1933, 23 ff. Schmid is more reserved, 1. 2. 83 n. 2.

¹⁷⁹ Especially so far as ancient judgments are concerned. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1004, *πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ἑήματα σεμνά*: a passage whose inspiration Pohlenz traced to Gorgias, *Gött. Nachr.* 1920, 163. The commonest epithets are *μεγαλοπρέπεια*: Dion. Hal. *Π. μίμ.* 2. 10, p. 206, 3 Usener-Radermacher; *μεγαλοφροσύνη*: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52. 4; Dion. Hal. *De Comp. Verb.* 22 (cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1059, *ἀνάγκη μεγάλων γνώμων καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ἑήματα τίκτειν*); *μεγαλόφωνος* (-ως, -νία): Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 158, p. 328 F.; Himerius, *Or.* 23, p. 774 W.; Basiliius M. *Epist.* 74; Quintil. 10. 1. 66 (*sublimis et gravis et grandilocus*); Theodoret. *Hist. Eccl.* 3. 3 (*μεγαληγορία*); *σεμνός* (-της): Athen. 13. 600a; Dion. Hal. *Demosth.* 39, p. 213, 18 Us.-Rad.; cf. Himerius, *Or.* 33. 4. (All these refs. are from the *testimonia* collected by Friedrich Schoell and prefaced to F. Ritschl's edition of the *Seven Against Thebes*, Leipzig, 1875 ["De Aeschylī poesi ludicia," pp. 36-49]).

¹⁸⁰ Actually, in defiance of logic (that is, in defiance of the immediately preceding word *Σοφοκλής*), most of the commentators and translators have tacitly assumed this, even under the usual constitution of the text: see above on the tendency to refer *ἀπεσεμνύθη* to Aeschylus.

μους τοῦσδε τελειότερους (τούσδ' ἔτι μειοτέρους Jacobitz, *alii alia*) Αἰσχύλος ἐξ ὑψώσεων; or in the anonymous *Life of Aeschylus*, 5: ζηλοὶ τὸ ἀδρὸν αἰεὶ πλάσμα ... ὄγκον ... τὸ βάρος ... μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἡρωικόν; *ibid.* 14, εἰς τοσόνδε μεγέθους τὴν τραγωδίαν προαγαγεῖν. Moreover there is another set of *testimonia* which speak of tragedy developing out of satyr-play; and these, or at least one version of them, can be shown to have a probable reference to Aeschylus. They are the scholia which we find in Suidas and elsewhere on the proverb οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον.¹⁸¹ In general they show two versions, one of which talks about Epigenes of Sicyon but not about satyr-play, while the other derives tragedy from satyr-play and makes the decisive change take place at the hands of certain poets the last of whom is stated or implied to be Aeschylus.

Suidas,¹⁸² after speaking of Epigenes, says βέλτιον δὲ σὺτως · τὸ πρόσθεν εἰς τὸν Διόνυσον γράφοντες τούτοις ἠγωνίζοντο ἄπερ καὶ σατυρικὰ ἐλέγετο · ἕστερον δὲ μεταβάαντες εἰς τὸ τραγωδίας γράφειν, κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς μῦθους καὶ ἱστορίας ἐτρέπησαν, μηκέτι τοῦ Διονύσου μνημονεύοντες · ὅθεν τοῦτο [*sc.* οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Δ.] καὶ ἐπεφώνησαν. καὶ Χαμαιλέων ἐν τῷ περὶ Θεσπίδος τὰ παραπλήσια ἱστορεῖ. Plutarch is briefer but more specific: *Symptotic Questions* 1. 1. 5, ὥσπερ οὖν Φρυνίχον καὶ Αἰσχύλου τὴν τραγωδίαν εἰς μῦθους καὶ πάθη¹⁸³ προαγόντων ἐλέχθη, "τι ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον;" These are clearly different versions of the same story, and the mention of Chamaeleon's work *On Thespis* enables us to make a very likely conjecture as to the supposed sequence of events. Surely Thespis is the first of those who began the change (a gradual one: κατὰ μικρὸν) towards tragedy (= μῦθοι καὶ πάθη), and Aeschylus completes the process.¹⁸⁴ His σεμνότης would contravene the 'satyric' spirit (here assumed to be the original one) in especially pointed fashion. Thus the story as it was told by Chamaeleon seems very close indeed to the one implied by ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος κτλ. in the *Poetics*,¹⁸⁵ both

¹⁸¹ For discussion see Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (above, n. 169); Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 166-168. Pickard-Cambridge is perhaps a little too skeptical, not as to the value of the tradition, but as to what can be made of it.

¹⁸² S.v. ο. π. τ. Δ.; = Phot. *Lex.*, s.v. Ἐπιγένης; Apostolius 13. 42.

¹⁸³ Cf. ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων (i.e., stories without πάθη)?

¹⁸⁴ The complaint οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον could be thought of as arising at almost any point in the development.

¹⁸⁵ Even the apparently variant version offered by Zenobius, 5. 40 (see Pohlenz, *op. cit.* 302; Pick.-Camb. 167), may be basically the same. The phrasing at the end,

referring to Aeschylus as effecting the greatest change in the Dionysiac spirit of tragedy.

Our conclusion will be, not that Chamaeleon, Plutarch, Suidas, and the rest are echoing the *Poetics*, but that the *Poetics* passage belongs to the οὐδέν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον group; indeed it could well have been taken from a paroemiographer. In any case I believe it came into the *Poetics* at a late date, long after Chamaeleon. The awkwardness of the phrasing seems to be sufficient evidence of that. But the original authors of the theory were no doubt Chamaeleon and some other Peripatetic of his time.¹⁸⁶

Two questions present themselves: (1) why did Chamaeleon (and perhaps someone else) put forward the tragedy-out-of-satyr-play theory, and (2) why was it interpolated into the *Poetics*? We cannot make a reasonable conjecture about the first question. We cannot even tell, in fact, whether satyr-play was intended to replace the dithyramb in the prehistory of tragedy or to be equated with it.¹⁸⁷ Fortunately the other question, which is more urgent for us, is also easier. Nothing was said explicitly in Aristotle's text about the majesty, the σεμνότης of tragedy, and particularly of Aeschylean tragedy. Here was an obvious gap, especially as σατυρικὴν καὶ ὄρχηστικωτέραν below seemed to denote an undignified early stage.¹⁸⁸ And these same words seemed to connote a satyr-play origin of tragedy, as it was put forward in the tradition on οὐδέν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. From the point of view of the annotator, his διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν is simply a paraphrase

διὰ γοῦν τοῦτο τοὺς Σατύρους ἕστερον ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς προεισάγειν, surely refers by implication to the fourth-century order of events in the Dionysiac contests (one satyr-play, at the beginning); so Wilamowitz. But it does not necessarily imply, as Pohlenz thinks, that the satyr-play was not there to begin with. The point of προεισάγειν may be that the satyrs had gradually been put off to the end of the proceedings, after the tragedies, and were now restored to a place of honor at the beginning.

¹⁸⁶ If Χαμαιλέον τὰ παραπλήσια ἱστορεῖ, in Suidas, really implies another author.

¹⁸⁷ It is notable that we do not find an explicit identification of dithyramb with satyr-play in the οὐδέν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον tradition, any more than in the *Poetics*. The explanations speak of dithyramb (in connection with Epigenes: Suid.; *Paroem.* 1. 137 = *Aesch. ed. mat.* Wilamowitz, p. 18) or satyr-play (Suid., 2nd explanation), not both together.

¹⁸⁸ I take it that the athetesis of a passage—even of a few words—requires a combination of negative and positive criteria: i.e., proof that the author could not have written the words in question, and proof, or at least a plausible suggestion,

of *διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν ... εἶναι τὴν ποιήσιν*,¹⁸⁹ making Aristotle's meaning clear and bringing out its intended application to Aeschylus.

A similar motive will account for *τρεις δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλήης*. Sophocles was not mentioned in the text—an omission all the more striking because he was so clearly Aristotle's favorite and ideal tragic poet. Moreover there appeared to be ample room left for him, since Aristotle had not mentioned the third actor or said anything at all about the *Bühnenbild*.

We cannot hope to determine whether the two notes were written by the same person. In any case both were appended to the summary of Aeschylus' achievements, *καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ... παρεσκεύασεν*, in order to fill apparent gaps in the story.¹⁹⁰

With this we can return at long last to Aristotle's own text. Let us remind ourselves once more how specific and limited his purpose was: to point to the time and place where the mimetic element, the dialogue, definitively won out over music and dancing, the choral element. This victory was won by Aeschylus; and with it tragedy essentially "attained its nature," that is, became dramatic. But there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle thought of this as an instantaneous event. *Κατὰ μικρὸν προαγόντων* applies to the end of the story as much as the beginning: the aorists summarize a long development.

Correlative with the rise of speech (dialogue) to predominance over song and dance, and constituting another, complementary phase of the movement denoted by *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*, was the change of the meter of tragedy from trochaic to iambic. This also was not accomplished in a day. So much is evident on the face of it when we consider *λέξεως δὲ γενομένης* ("when dialogue came in") in relation to *τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν*; and at the same time we can begin to appreciate the clarification we have achieved by the bracketing of *τρεις δὲ ... ἀπεσεμνόνθη*. For on the one hand the person

as to why somebody else might have written it. Neglect of this principle did a great deal to discredit the whole idea of *athetesis* as it was practiced by Ritter in the last century. His *interpolator stolidus* had no purpose or function except to impede understanding.

¹⁸⁹ Thus *λέξεως γενομένης* (on whose meaning see below) is twisted into (*ἐκ*) *λέξεως γελοίας* — unless, as we have conjectured, some word like *μεγαλοφωνία* was actually expressed.

¹⁹⁰ It goes without saying that the annotator or annotators did not fathom Aristotle's special purpose and point of view here, but read his brief remarks as if they were meant to be a complete thumbnail history of the tragic theater.

who introduced dialogue (under whom dialogue "came in") cannot be the same as the one who gave it the leading role—i.e., cannot be Aeschylus; and on the other hand the removal of Sophocles from the immediate environs of the phrase enables us to date that introduction with confidence to a period long before him, viz. the time of Thespis.¹⁹¹ The process denoted by *αὐτὴ ἢ φύσις τὸ οἰκειὸν μέτρον εἶρε* began with Thespis, then, and was finished by Aeschylus. Moreover we are now free to take *λέξεως* in the sense which it clearly has to have. So long as *λέξεως γελοίας* stood in the text (a19-20), we had to understand that *λέξεις* already existed in the earliest stages of the development, say in Arion's dithyramb or whatever it was that Thespis inherited from his predecessors. That is, the *λέξεις γελοία* was the 'ludicrous diction' of the 'satyric' choral odes. But Aristotle does not use *λέξεις* in that sense. When he speaks of the *λέξεις* of tragedy he means the *spoken dialogue* only: the choral parts are not *λέξεις*, or do not have *λέξεις*, in the proper sense.¹⁹² Thus *λέξεως γενομένου* means, in a perfectly straightforward way, "when speech [spoken dialogue] came in."

This clarification enables us in turn to interpret *διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν* with some sharpness. *Ποίησις* here means specifically *the poet's work of composition*, his 'making,' as it does throughout the *Poetics*. But in this case, in the period before Thespis, we have a composition which was not in spoken dialogue but entirely in songs, *μέλη*. In chapter 6 the tragic text is divided into *μέτρα* and *μέλη*, and the 'making,' *ποίησις*, is correspondingly divided into *λέξεις* and *μελοποιία*. In pre-Thespian 'tragedy,' then, the *ποίησις* was exclusively *μελοποιία*, whereas from Thespis on *λέξεις* was added.¹⁹³ We can now see what Aristotle means by saying that the *ποίησις* was *σατυρικὴ καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέρα*: not that the chorus were gotten up as satyrs, or that tragedy had come from satyr-play, but that *before Thespis the (musical) composition was 'satyr-like' (i.e., lively, full of movement) and largely given over to dancing*. That was the reason for the use of the trochaic meter. As commentary on *σα-*

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¹⁹² See below on 6. 49b34.

¹⁹³ *Γενομένης* may conceivably be used with the nuance of 'added,' = *προσγενομένης*.

τυρικῆν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν we need cite only *Poet.* 24. 60a1, τὸ μὲν [sc. τετράμετρον] ὀρχηστικόν, and *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b36, ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἔνθμος τροχαῖος τὰ τετράμετρα. Σατυρικῆν and ὀρχηστικωτέραν are synonyms: the second term explains the first.¹⁸⁴ Aristotle wants a word which will suggest vividly the character of the earliest 'tragedy' as primarily a dance-production (dancing accompanied by song, of course), and the nearest parallel he can think of in his own time is the satyr-play, so he says "satyr-(play)-like, that is, pretty much just dancing."¹⁸⁵

Thus by a roundabout route we arrive at the conclusion for σατυρικῆν which Kranz, Pohlenz, and others had arrived at for σατυρικοῦ in a20:¹⁸⁶ that it does not actually mean that early tragedy was a satyric drama, but only that it had the liveliness and dance-character of one. But the whole phrase does by implication designate pre-Thespian 'tragedy' as predominantly a choral performance, and Aristotle must mean that the chorus's own songs and dances, not merely some lines by the ἐξάρχων, were in tetrameters. The trimeter was not added to the tetrameter when dialogue came in alongside the χορικά; it replaced it. What happened to the rhythms of the choral parts thereafter is not mentioned.¹⁸⁷ Presumably it did not interest our philosopher.

We pointed out a long time ago that the φύσις which discovered the right verse-form was not 'Nature' in general, but the specific nature of tragedy. Αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις is an allusion to ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, a15. The "nature" which is finally "attained" has lured the genre on to attain it. Being is the cause of Becoming. The nature of tragedy, that is, the master principle of imitation itself, took charge and decreed that to represent speech that verse should be used which is most like the natural rhythm of speech.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ I.e., the καὶ is exegetical; see Gudeman *ad loc.*

¹⁸⁵ Κορδακικώτερος in the *Rhetoric* is said in the same way, not from any narrowly technical point of view (not the *cordax* in the sense of a dance pertaining to 'comedy' only: that narrowing of meaning was the work of Aristoxenus, cf. *Athen.* 14. 630e).

¹⁸⁶ For σατυρικοῦ we have already rejected their thesis. That word must mean 'satyr-play': σατυρικοῦ, sc. δράμιτος.

¹⁸⁷ The trimeter is the only verse Aristotle ever speaks of in connection with tragedy. See below on 5. 49b11, τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν.

¹⁸⁸ Λέξεως - λεκτικόν - λέγομεν - διαλέκτω - λεκτικῆς. In this company λέγομεν means 'speak' in the specific sense, as against singing. Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b33, ὁ δ' ἱαμβος αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἢ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντων μέτρων ἱαμβεία φθέγγονται λέγοντες.

The parallel between a21-24 and 48b30-34 (*ἐν οἷς ... ποιηταί*) is evident. In each case ('iambic,' tragedy) the development of a new form of poetry is capped and ratified by the adoption of the appropriate verse-form. Yet the verse that nature turns up for the purpose is the same: the iambic. Whence this inconsistency? The answer is simple. In both cases what brings the introduction of iambic verse is not the special character of the individual genre (the bitterness or jocularly or vulgarity of the *ἰαμβοί*, as against the stateliness of tragedy) but what they have in common: that is, their status as imitations of human utterance. Aristotle is not much interested in the solemnity of tragedy *per se*. What engages his attention in it is the degree to which it embodies *μίμησις*, and *μίμησις* is the imitation of men acting and *speaking*.

The last sentence in the chapter may possibly contain another interpolated note.¹⁹⁹ But there is no compelling reason for assuming one here, and the offhand construction seems conceivable as Aristotle hastily winds up his allusions to tragedy and prepares to go over to the story of comedy. Furthermore, some allusion to an increase in the length of tragedy (number of episodes) seems indispensable here, since it is presupposed in chapter 6²⁰⁰ and we find it nowhere else in this chapter.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Bywater and Gudeman print *ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη* by itself as a kind of independent caption or title. The meaning of the phrase is another question. It is natural to take it as denoting an increase in the number of 'acts' or scenes, which grew from two or three to as many as seven (Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.* 4 192-193) in classical tragedy. But *κοσμηθῆναι* suggests a non-essential 'adornment,' and *ἐπεισοδίων* therefore may mean 'episodes' in the special sense, i.e., non-essential *extra scenes* or interludes, as it does elsewhere in the *Poetics*. See below on 9. 51b33 ff.

²⁰⁰ 49b23, *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*.

²⁰¹ See below on 5. 49b14 ff., *καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον κτλ.* On the present sentence see also Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 21 (*Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 561).

CHAPTER 5

49a32-b9

- [ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὡσπερ εἶπομεν, μίμησις φανλο-
 τέρων μὲν · οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ,
 35 οὗ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρ|τημά
 τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ
 γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρὸν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδυ-
 νης.] αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ δι' ὧν
 38 | b1 ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ | σπου-
 δάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαβεν, [καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδοῖς ὀφέ-
 ποτε ὁ ἀρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν] ἤδη δὲ σχή-
 ματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μνη-
 μονεύονται · τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ |
 5 πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγνόηται. τὸ δὲ μύθους
 ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος] τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικε-
 λίας ἦλθε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν ἀφέ-
 μενος τῆς λαμβικῆς ἰδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους.

49a32

- [Comedy is as we said, an imitation of relatively worthless
 characters; not, however, covering the full range of villainy,
 but merely the ugly and unseemly, one branch of which is
 the laughable. Namely, the laughable is some mistake |
 35 or piece of ugliness which is not painful or destructive to
 life: as for example, to go no farther, the laughable (comic)
 mask is one that is ugly and distorted but does not cause
 pain.] Well then, the changes that tragedy went through,
 and the persons responsible for them, have not been forgotten.
 Comedy, on the other hand, had no attention paid to it at
 38 | b1 first because | it was not taken seriously, [in fact it was at
 a late date that the archon 'gave a chorus' to comedians; be-
 fore that they were volunteers] and it is only when it already
 possessed certain elements of form that we find a record of
 men called 'comic poets'; who gave it masks or prologues
 5 or | numbers of actors, and all that sort of thing, remains
 unknown. The practice of composing plots, however, [Epi-
 charmus and Phormus] came from Sicily originally, and a

Athens it was Crates who first began to give up the 'iambic' character and compose arguments, that is, plots, along general lines.

The story of tragedy has been told, so far as Aristotle intends to rehearse it here,¹ and he goes on to do the same for comedy. But this is a very different kind of undertaking, both in size and in nature. Aristotle had or professed to have at least some hints and touches on which to base a sketch of the development of tragedy; for comedy, as he himself tells us, he had almost nothing.

The last we heard of comedy was that Homer had produced an analogue or prototype of it in the *Margites* (4. 48b37-19a2), and that under the spell of that achievement the iambists began to abandon their *ἴαμβοι* and become *κωμωδοποιοί*. What Homer had sketched or adumbrated was two essential 'forms': (1) humor instead of invective, and (2) dramatic method; and it was those forms that so fired the imagination of the comic-poets-to-be.

The first words of chapter 5 refer to the remark about the *Margites*, as well as to chapter 2 (48a2, *φαύλους*; *ibid.* 4, *χειρνας*; *ibid.* 17, *χείρους*; cf. 4. 48b25, *τὰς τῶν φαύλων*). But they are not intended as a literal quotation of either of those passages. This is in fact the first of a number of instances in the *Poetics* where *ὡσπερ* (*καθάπερ*) *εἶπομεν* refers to the content or sense of a previous statement, not to the statement itself.* "Comedy is as we said, [i.e., is as we said it was; not "comedy is, as we said,"], an imitation...." The reminiscence extends to what follows, for although *τὸ γελοῖον* had not been defined before in so many words, its distinctness from satire was sufficiently indicated: *οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον*. And there is a special point in *ἡ κωμωδία ἔστιν ὡσπερ εἶπομεν*. Aristotle had said that Homer adumbrated the forms of 'comedy' and that the *Margites* *ἀνάλογον ἔχει πρὸς τὰς κωμωδίας*. These statements would by no means be acceptable, or even automatically comprehensible, to all who heard them. They apply best to that variety of 'comedy' which was in fact not originally called *κωμωδία*: i.e., Dorian farce; and conversely a good part of the variety that *was* called *κωμωδία*—the Attic Comedy of

¹ In these "historical" chapters, with their selectivity and air of rapid allusion, one feels especially strongly the existence of another, fuller account of the matter by Aristotle somewhere else. We cannot make sense of his sketchy remarks here except as extracts from a full-scale version.

* See below on 24. 60a3.

Cratinus and Aristophanes—is excluded. Thus Aristotle's 'definition'³ is actually a polemical remark, put in to clarify and defend a usage of *κωμῳδία* which might shock or puzzle his hearers.

Is the 'definition' part of the original text? It is well known that the older editors thought it out of place and tried—in vain—to put it somewhere else. Vahlen's suggestion (the last of this kind),⁴ that it should go at the end of the chapter, is superficially attractive but has rightly been rejected by recent editors. They have, however, been equally to blame for overlooking or trying to explain away the awkwardness of the passage in its immediate context. After the end of the story of tragedy we expect something similar for comedy; and indeed the following sentence, *αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις ... οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία...*, unmistakably offers the expected sequel. There is no room here for *ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ... ἄνευ ὀδύνης*. But it does not belong anywhere else either. The 'definition' was written for this place, but not in the original text. It is an afterthought, put in to reassert and justify Aristotle's use of *κωμῳδία*. Logically enough, he placed it at the beginning of his short 'history' of comedy.⁵ It seems to be another in the sequence of notes we have been finding, which betray a special flurry—or revival—of interest in comedy. But actually we are in no position to give it a firm date. It might have been written on the heels of the text itself, just after the latter had taken shape, but without being quite integrated into the argument. *Μὲν οὖν* in 49a37 remains to betray the insertion.

We said that the 'definition' was anticipated by *οὐ νόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον*. What it does, in fact, is to reaffirm the original definition of comedy as *μίμησις χειρόνων (φαιλοτέρων)*,⁶ but with particular attention to the difference between *νόγος* and *τὸ γελοῖον*. 'Blame' attaches to moral badness, *κακία*.⁷ *Φαῦλος* also denotes such states;

³ Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 22 (= *Sitzungsber.* Vienna, 1888, 563), insists that it is not one. In any case, so far as it is, it is more a definition of the comic than of comedy.

⁴ *Beiträge*² 19 and 252, n. 14 (1. 283-284 and 311-312). There is no sign of this in his third edition of the *Poetics*.

⁵ Christ, in his first edition of the *Poetics*, marked *ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ... ὀδύνης* as a subsequent note by Aristotle (along with 49b6-9, *τὸ μὲν ... μύθος*). In later editions he withdrew the suggestion. On Moutmollin see below.

⁶ *Φαιλοτέρων* is a conflation of *φάυλους*, 2. 48a2, and *χείρωνας*, *ibid.* 4.

⁷ *Eth. Eud.* 2. 6. 1223a9, *ἡ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ πεντά*; cf. *E. N.* 5. 10. 1135a20; *Rhet.* 1. 9.

hence φαῦλος and ψεκτός can be used more or less as synonyms.⁸ But ψεκτός goes farther, having to do with actions that spring from deliberate choice. For example the excesses of attitudes which are praiseworthy in themselves are φαῦλοι καὶ φευκταί, but incontinence (ἀκρασία) is not only φευκτόν but ψεκτόν.⁹ Thus φαῦλος is a very broad term; but Aristotle warns us here not to take it in too broad a sense: οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν.

The limitation of comedy to the 'ugly,' and to that part of the ugly which causes no pain or damage, signifies a greater refinement of feeling,¹⁰ but also an objectification of the poet's attitude. Instead of hating and berating, he depicts. This is one aspect of the objectivity, impersonality, which Aristotle so admired in Homer and which he thought had inspired later poets to become κωμωδοποιοί. Thus the restriction of comedy to the μίμησις γελοίων (-ου) has implications for form as well as content. It corresponds to and complements the dramatic principle. The laughable is inherently a more dramatic object than the blameworthy; hence the dramatic impulse will naturally lead a poet—as it led Homer—away from satire and toward true comedy. Comedy is a higher level, a purer 'form,' of imitation than the ἴαμβοι, even though the ludicrous itself stands no higher in the scheme of things than any other φαῦλον.

Aristotle's theory of the comic, i.e., the laughable,¹¹ rests on Platonic foundations but goes beyond them. We cannot attempt a complete discussion of it here. Such a discussion would have to take stock of the problems connected with the so-called Tractatus Coislinianus, the other echoes of Aristotelian theory, real or apparent, in men like Cicero and Quintilian,¹² and the vexed question of the lost second book of the *Poetics*. We will confine ourselves to direct explication of Aristotle's 'definition' of the γελοῖον. It offers ample room for commentary.

⁸ E. N. 4. 13. 1127a28, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν.

⁹ E. N. 7. 6. 1148b4-6.

¹⁰ Cf. E. N. 4. 14. 1128a12-b1, contrasting the jests of the well-bred man with those of the clown (βωμολόχος).

¹¹ 'Comic' would be a good term, but seems to have been still so closely associated with theatrical production in Aristotle's day (ὑποκριτῆς κωμικός, ποιητῆς κωμικός, etc.) that it lacked the necessary scope to designate the object of comedy as such.

¹² See Lane Cooper, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, New York, 1922; J. Kayser, *De veterum arte poetica quaestiones selectae*, Leipzig, 1906, 5-44.

"The ludicrous is one (kind of) error and (/or) ugliness, (namely the kind which is) painless and not destructive." There are two parallel classes or levels of evidence here, one pointing to a distinction between comedy and 'iambic,' the other to one between comedy and tragedy. We will begin with the former.

Plato had pilloried comedy, like tragedy, for catering to the appetites and passions; the best-known passage is in the *Republic*, 10. 606c-d. In the *Philebus*, 48a-50b, the indictment is further amplified to say that the laughter of comedy, though pleasurable *qua* laughter, is mixed with the pain that springs from envy (*φθόνος*). What we enjoy in it is seeing our enemies, but particularly our friends, suffer. Thus comedy—and, as Plato says in a notable passage (50b), this includes the entire comedy of life, as well as that presented in the theater—nurtures our malice and so breeds a painful joy. In the *Laws*, 11. 934d-936a, the same ideas are canvassed once more, though in a slightly (not essentially) different context. Plato is laying down regulations for the confinement of madmen and pauses to remark that some madness is caused by disease, some by an ill-natured, irascible disposition nurtured by feuds and enmities. For, he says, in the heat of argument men are prone to call each other bad names (*αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων*, 934e); and then the speaker, "sating his anger with evil feasts," indulging and spoiling his temper, ends by being a savage once more. In such a case, says Plato (935b), everybody naturally plunges into *τό τι γελοῖον περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου φθέγγεσθαι*. Severe penalties must be imposed upon this kind of *λοιδορία* or *κακηγορία*, when it is motivated by anger. Then (*ibid.* d) Plato considers *τὴν τῶν κωμωδῶν προθυμίαν τοῦ γελοῖα εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους λέγειν ... εἰάν ἄνευ θυμοῦ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἐπιχειρῶσιν κωμωδοῦντες λέγειν*, and concludes that no writer of comedy or iambic or melic verse shall be allowed to satirize (*κωμωδεῖν*, 935e) any citizen under any circumstances, whether the satire is meant in jest or earnest.

From this interesting passage we see that Plato was aware of possible differences of motivation within the field of satire (*τοὺς πολίτας κωμωδεῖν*), namely that the professional comedian (*ποιητῆς κωμωδίας*) was not necessarily impelled by malice but might do his work 'for fun' (*παίζοντι*, *ibid.* d). Nevertheless the main and central motive for 'comedy' ("saying funny things against [*εἰς*] people") remains envy, spleen, the excess of bad temper; it is a variety of madness and must be curbed by law.

Aristotle fully shared these views, at least in their practical applica-

tion. In his sketch of an ideal state, in the *Politics* (7. 17. 1336b3-23), he banishes *αλοχρολογία*¹³ as sternly as Plato had, and although the passage is an excursus in the middle of a treatise on the education of the young, the ban is explicitly extended to citizens of all ages and conditions.¹⁴ Personal abuse was as repugnant to Aristotle as it had been to Plato. The new thing we see in him is not a change of attitude towards *ιαμβισμός*, but a new conviction that 'comedy' should be defined so as to exclude it, whereas Plato had not gone farther than saying that some 'comic' poets were not really malicious in their satire.

Aristotle's definition of comedy, then, is thoroughly Platonic in spirit, but improves on Plato. And we can see that in another way too he was able to get beyond his master. The *Laws* talks of comedy as if things had not changed very much from the fifth century. Aristotle, on the other hand, from the vantage-point of his new theory and his pan-Hellenic point of view—and perhaps because of the mere fact that he was born in the fourth century, not the fifth—was able to see the triumph of the 'true' (i.e., non-iambic) idea of comedy as a historical process spreading over centuries, from Homer to his own day. Thus the *ψόγοι* are not merely the worst variety but the earliest stage, and so far as the Old Attic Comedy is a *ψόγος* it shares that primitive character. In the larger perspective of history the true line of development is seen to be quite a different one, leading from Homer to Crates via Dorian comedy. The Old Comedy (so far as it is 'iambic') is no longer the center of the story, but a relatively minor episode, in fact a survival.

Aristotle's concept of the *γελοῖον* clearly owes a great deal to Plato; but even an experienced Platonist might not recognize its implications for the theory of comedy unless they were spelled out for him. At any rate Aristotle seems to have felt, upon reflection, that *οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον* was not enough to carry his meaning. But there is no 'later' doctrine in the new definition. The concept of the *γελοῖον* is implicit in Aristotle's story from the beginning.¹⁵

¹³ The word connotes not merely indecency ("indecent language," Newman; "bad language," Barker) but also abuse, invective; cf. *ταθασμόν*, b17. Obscenity and insult have a natural affinity in Aristophanes: one draws the other after it.

¹⁴ The only exception allowed is in the rituals traditionally associated with certain gods: i.e., Demeter (*ιαμβε*; *γεφυρισμοί*) and Dionysus.

¹⁵ Our results agree with Montmollin's (pp. 45-46) so far as the origin of the sentence is concerned. But he goes too far (p. 192) in making practically everything Aristotle says about comedy in chapters 3-5 a later addition. The theory implied by *οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον* is basic in Aristotle's thinking from the very first.

The first implication of *ἀνώδυνον*, then, is that true comedy stirs no painful emotion in the soul of either the comedian or his hearer (or reader). But *ὁ φθαρτικόν* points to something different. Nothing that happens in a play could be *destructive* to the poet or the spectator, in any case. Have we been barking up the wrong tree? The word must mean "destructive to the hero or other characters." And then we recall that Aristotle later (11. 52b11) defines the tragic *pathos* as a *πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά*; and still further that the *pathos* is often brought on—and better so than otherwise—by a *ἁμαρτία*.¹⁶ The tragic error is "big" (*μεγάλην*, 13. 53a16) in its dimensions and consequences for the characters of the play. It leads to death, wounding, blinding, or the like: i.e., the *pathos*. The comic *ἁμαρτήματα*, on the other hand, is small, has to do with 'no-account' people, and does not involve pain or destruction to them.

█ All this is not only true but very important. The comic error¹⁷ is as much a part of Aristotle's thinking as the tragic error; it is in fact its counterpart. As such, it must be an actual mistake or misstep by one of the characters,¹⁸ which threatens to but does not cause pain or damage to him or somebody else.

Which contrast is in Aristotle's mind, that between comedy and 'iambic' or that between comedy and tragedy? Surely both. Comedy does not involve us in the painful emotions of envy, anger, malice, and the like; and it does not involve the comic characters in pain, death, and destruction. Both aspects are pertinent to the definition of the genre, and to its history. If Aristotle discussed them at greater length elsewhere (e.g., in the lost second book), no doubt he made not only the difference but the connection between them clear.

We are ready to resume the story of poetry, bringing comedy up to a point corresponding to that where we left tragedy.¹⁹ I say "re-

As for Montmollin's argument that Aristotle would not have written the 'definition' of comedy and the *γελοῖον* if he had already written a second book on comedy, it does not hold water. The 'definition' no more precludes later discussion than the list of differences between tragedy and epic (below, 49b10-16) precludes the thorough treatment of these same matters in chapter 24, 59b17 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. Rostagni *ad loc.*, and see below on 14. 53b25 ff.

¹⁷ "Error and/or [καί for 'or,' as often in Aristotle] ugliness."

¹⁸ The idea springs from Plato's concept of ignorance or self-delusion in the *Philebus* (*τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοῦς*, 48d; *δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν*, 49d), but points more objectively to an *act* (*ἁμαρτήματα*, cf. *E. N.* 5. 14. 1137b17, 25).

¹⁹ *Ἀλλ'... τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις* is a clear reference to *πολλὰς μεταβολὰς*

sume" advisedly, because *ἡ δὲ κωμωδία κτλ.* looks like, and has generally been taken for, a new beginning. Actually *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* here refers to the same beginning as in 4. 48b22, that is, the first origination of poetry out of the improvisations; and the admission Aristotle makes, that there is no record of the early stages (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν*) is the same one he made before, 4. 48b28-30 (we cannot cite any 'iambic' poems from before Homer).

The counterpart to this general comment on the earliest stage is 49b2 ff., *ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα κτλ.*, "and (but) it already had certain 'forms' when...." As we shall see, this refers to the Homeric and post-Homeric period. Thus in two rapid phrases Aristotle summarily covers the whole early history of the *μίμησις φαυλοτέρων*. For 'comedy' is used here in that broader sense (not in the narrower sense of 'comic stage-play'), just as 'tragedy' was in 4. 49a9-15.²⁰

This chief reason why this context (*ἡ δὲ κωμωδία ... ἔλαθεν* and *ἤδη δὲ ... μνημονεύονται* as mutually supplementary statements) has not been recognized is that another clause with a wholly different reference has intruded between them. But of course the intrusion cannot be proved merely by showing that the preceding and following sentences fit together without a seam. The offending member has to be shown to be suspicious in its own right, and we have to account for its being added. We turn therefore to *καὶ ... ἦσαν*.

The writer of this sentence assumed implicitly that the beginning referred to in b1 (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς*) was the beginning of comedy in its normal, narrow sense ('comic stage-play'), and at Athens.²¹ It follows that he cannot be the person who wrote *ἡ δὲ κωμωδία ... ἔλαθεν*, if our interpretation of that sentence was correct. But there are other reasons also for thinking that he is not Aristotle. Gudeman noticed that *καὶ γὰρ ... ἦσαν* does not quite belong where it stands, though the objection he makes is a little too oblique to serve our purpose.²² Mont-

μεταβαλοῦσα, 4. 49a14. The rest of chapter 4 was, as we saw, a selective survey of those particular *μεταβολαί* which led tragedy to its *τέλος*, with (49a29-31) a carefully weighed refusal to go into unessential details. We are now ready to repeat the process for comedy.

²⁰ Cf. above *ad loc.*

²¹ Since he writes *ὁ ἄρχων*, without qualification.

²² He objects (p. 150) that the sentence gives, strictly speaking, "gar keine Begründung des *μη̄ σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, sondern nur eine natürliche Folgeerscheinung." But the normal function of *καὶ γὰρ* is precisely to introduce a "Folgeerscheinung" or confirmatory circumstance ("and in fact..."), not a cause.

mollin accepts Gudeman's criticism, and solves the difficulty by declaring the sentence an 'addition ultérieure' (i.e., by Aristotle) which has gotten into the wrong place in the text.²³ But it does not fit any better after *ἤδη δὲ ... μνημονεύονται* than after *ἡ δὲ κωμωδία ... ἔλαθεν*. In fact it is clearly intended as a confirmatory comment on *διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάξασθαι*: a striking evidence of this lack of serious attention, it points out, is the late period at which the state officially 'gave a chorus' for comedy.

Thus our sentence is not in place, since it obtrudes a specifically Athenian detail upon a context which is much broader and refers to a much earlier time. But neither is it out of place. It was written as a comment on *ἡ δὲ κωμωδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάξασθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν*, and makes no sense anywhere else. By the same token, it is difficult to imagine that Aristotle wrote it.

There are further difficulties in the words *κωμωδῶν* and *ἐθειλονται*. We begin by noticing that they must designate the same persons. But *κωμωδῶν* (the unanimous manuscript reading: see note 30 below) must mean the comic choreutae; and it is doubtful whether Aristotle ever used the word in that sense. *Κωμωδοίς*, 3. 48a37, pretty certainly referred to a troupe of actors, or at least speakers, not to a chorus;²⁴ and in the only other phrase in which the word is used in Aristotle, *χορηγεῖν κωμωδοίς*,²⁵ the word means either 'comic poets' or, by a well-known and very common idiom, the comic competition itself (*κωμωδοίς*, "at the comic performances, in the comic contest").²⁶ *Τραγωδοίς* in 22. 58b32 must mean 'tragic poets.'²⁷ Thus, quite aside from the etymology and early use of *τραγωδός* and *κωμωδός*,²⁸ we have no evidence for an Aristotelian use of *κωμωδοί* = 'comic chor-

²³ P. 46.

²⁴ See above *ad loc.*

²⁵ *E. N.* 4. 6. 1123a23; fr. 630 Rose; cf. Lysias 21. 4.

²⁶ E.g., *IG* 2-3. 1. 1202. 15; probable in *Pl. Rep.* 3. 395a, and very frequent with *τραγωδός*: see Liddell and Scott⁹ *s. v.*, I. 2.

²⁷ Cf. the un-Aristotelian but early Peripatetic *Oeconomica*, 1. 4. 1344a21 ('tragic actors')—the only other instance of *τραγωδός* listed in Bonitz's *Index*.

²⁸ At the very least, Bywater and Gudeman are right in rejecting H. Richards' allegation (*CR* [1900] 201-214) that *τραγωδός* and *κωμωδός*, in the fifth and fourth centuries, never mean the poet or actor. See J. B. O'Connor, *Chaps. in the Hist. of Actors and Acting in Anc. Greece* (Princeton diss.), Chicago, 1908, 8-26, and my articles, *TAPA* 76 (1945) 1-10 and *Hermes* 85 (1957) 17-46.

cutae.' Moreover *χορὸν κωμωδῶν ... ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν* is both bald and oblique. Not only does one naturally look for an indirect object to complete the phrase, but the critical point is how late it was before the archon 'gave a chorus' to the poets (hence no records of them before that time: *ἡ κωμωδία ... ἔλαθεν*), not how late it was before he gave a chorus of choreutae.²⁹

The upshot of all this is that, as Gudeman says, the emendation *κωμωδῶ* or *κωμωδοῖς* seems unavoidable.³⁰ This is connected in turn with the question of the meaning of *ἔθελονταί*. Even more clearly than *κωμωδῶν*, this word ought to refer to the poets; for whether the choreutae were volunteers or not has nothing to do with the case, whereas a volunteer status for the poets down to a late period would explain the lack of records (*ἡ δὲ κωμωδία ... ἔλαθεν*). But (1) *ἔθελονταί* necessarily refers to the same people as *κωμωδῶν*, so that its reference to the poets depends on the emendation *κωμωδοῖς* (-δῶ); and (2) it is not clear exactly what Aristotle could mean by *ἔθελονταί*. The poets were under no more compulsion, i.e., were no less 'volunteers,' after the official 'granting of a chorus' than they had been before. The sense implied in our passage is a peculiar one to which Tyrwhitt first called attention on the basis of a note of Eustathius on *Iliad* K230: *ἔθελοντῆς, ὁ ἀθβαιρέτως τι ποιῶν ἔκαλοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἔθελονταί διδάσκαλοι, δραμάτων δηλαδὴ, ὅτε τις μὴ λαβὼν χορὸν μηδὲ χορηγητὴν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα παρείχε*. Here the poet is not presented as volunteering his own services (as poet, actor, *διδάσκαλος*, or whatever), but those of the chorus. Eustathius got this bit of lore from the lexicographer Aelius Dionysius (fr. 150 Schwabe). Where Dionysius got it we do not know, but it is hard to ascribe it to Aristotle.³¹ On

²⁹ To my knowledge, the phrase *χορὸν δίδοναι* always appears without qualification except the reference, explicit or implicit, to the poet (cf. the converse expression *χορὸν λαμβάνειν*).

³⁰ It does not seem to be necessarily true, however, that the Arabic version requires *κωμωδοῖς* (Gudeman 463; *id. ap.* Tkatsch 2. 225). "*Ab hominibus coniecit*" (Tkatsch) seems to be reconcilable with a genitive.

³¹ Since it rests on a mistaken notion about the organization of the contests, viz. that even after the regularization of comedy the poet could provide a chorus on his own account if he had not been given one by the archon. That, as Gudeman remarks (p. 148), is impossible, since the 'granting of the chorus' was the official sign of admission to the contest. A poet who was not given a chorus could not have competed at all. It is hard to imagine Aristotle, even before his didascalic researches—or for that matter anybody in the classical period—committing such an error.

the other hand its presence in an Atticist lexicon would have made it easily available, and no doubt plausible, to an annotator at any time in late antiquity.

Thus the indications call for a special sense of *ἐθελονταί* which we can hardly ascribe to Aristotle but which would have been available to a commentator in late antiquity. To this we may add that an error in an ending (*κωμωδοῖς* → *κωμωδῶν*) would be especially plausible in a note originally written in compendia, and that we shall find evidence of another such note, with a like error, just three lines below (b6).³² And there is one more consideration. *Ὀψέ ποτε* has always been a stumbling block. The attempts to explain it, for example in the paramount article by Capps,³³ normally assume that the phrase is used by way of contrast with tragedy: i.e., the tragic poets were given a chorus early, the comic poets much later. But the first 'giving of a chorus' was fixed by Capps himself³⁴ at 502/1 and 487/6 B.C. for tragedy and comedy respectively—dates which are generally accepted today but are much too close together to justify an *ὄψέ ποτε*.³⁵ Moreover, as Capps emphasized, these epochs, if not determined by Aristotle himself on the basis of his researches, must at least have been known to him.³⁶ The result is that either (a) Aristotle did not write *ὄψέ ποτε* or (b) he meant something else by it. Now the only other thing he could mean is simply that it was a long time after the first beginnings of *comedy* before the poets were given a chorus. But it was also a long time after the beginnings of tragedy, in Aristotle's broad sense, before the tragic poets were given a chorus, so that one would be at a loss to account for the difference that he insists on between the early history of the two genres.

In the light of all these considerations I venture to call *καὶ γὰρ ... ἦσαν* another late note which has made its way into the text. Its motive

³² See below *ad loc.*

³³ E. Capps, "The Introduction of Comedy into the City Dionysia," *Decennial Pubs. of the Univ. of Chicago*, 1st ser., vol. 6, Chicago, 1904, 261-288, esp. 268 n. 33, 270, 286. Capps's article actually began as an attempt to interpret *καὶ γὰρ ἔδωκεν*.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 287; cf. *Hesperia* 12 (1943) 10-11.

³⁵ Capps's attempt to get around this (p. 286: Aristotle may be thinking of some earlier period for tragedy after all [i.e., Thespis? so also Gudeman]; or he may not even be thinking of tragedy) is a confession of failure, in spite of his insistence that Aristotle knew just what he meant by the phrase.

³⁶ *Id.*, *Hesperia* 12 (1943) 2 n. 2. On Aristotle's didascalic researches see most recently Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 69-70, 105; also Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.*⁴ 319 ff.

is clear enough, if Aristotle is not the author. The writer knew enough about the history of the dramatic contests at Athens to know that comedy was officially admitted later than tragedy. (Why he thought it happened *much* later we cannot tell.)³⁷ Moreover he understood Aristotle's allusion to the beginnings of comedy (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν*) as a reference to the beginnings of stage-comedy in Athens (Susarion?). Hence he jotted down what seemed to him a notable proof of the comparative neglect of comedy by the Athenians.

Relieved of the interpolation, Aristotle's sentence is seen to fall into two symmetrical halves. *Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ... ἔλαθεν*, as we said, goes back to the ultimate beginnings, the *ψόγοι* and the iambic poems. *Ἦδη δὲ σχήματά τινα ... μνημονεύονται* completes the sequence with a nod in the direction of Homer and the development of comedy after him. We have already heard that Homer sketched the 'outlines' (*σχήματα*) of comedy, and that 'comedy' came into repute, in fact into being, because of the impression that his adumbrations made on the poets; for it was thanks to him that they became *κωμωδοποιοί*. The present sentence surveys the same history from a slightly different angle. Comedy already possessed some 'forms' or outlines at the time when we find the first records of persons called 'comic poets' (*οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταί* = *οἱ λεγόμενοι "κωμωδοποιοί"*).³⁸ That is, 'comedy' already existed and possessed certain basic characteristics before anything actually called *κωμῳδία*, or any persons actually called *κωμωδοποιοί*, existed. It is exactly the paradox we noticed in 4. 49a2 (*παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας καὶ κωμῳδίας*): that tragedy and comedy in a sense already 'came to light' in Homer, although Homer was not actually a *τραγωδοδιδάσκαλος* or a *κωμωδοποιός*. In fact the parallels between the two passages leave no doubt, it seems to me, that the *σχήματα* here (*ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχοῦσης*) must at least include the 'forms' derived from Homer.³⁹

³⁷ He may have been thinking of something as early as Thespis for tragedy and something as late as Cratinus for comedy (beginning ca. 455). But speculation is useless.

³⁸ So Bywater ("those termed comic poets"), Butcher, Susemihl, Hardy, *et al.* Other interpretations make *λεγόμενοι* no more than a doublet of *μνημονεύονται* (Gudeman: "... ihre uns überlieferten Dichter"), or rest too much weight on *ποιηταί* (Rostagni: "i propriamente detti poeti"), or over-translate *λεγόμενοι* (Sykutris paraphrases with *οἱ ὀνομαστί ἀναφερόμενοι ποιηταί*, which would require at least *ὀνομαζόμενοι*).

³⁹ 48b36, *τὰ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχήματα ... ὑπέδειξεν* (cf. 49a6, *τὰ σχήματα*

Let us pause to summarize. The beginnings of comedy were not recorded. The genre had already acquired certain 'forms' by the time of the earliest persons who were actually called 'comic poets.' These *σχήματα*, or two of them, were dramatic form and comic content (the ludicrous), and their inventor was Homer.

Aristotle now mentions other improvements⁴⁰ whose authors are unknown: masks, prologues, plurality of actors, etc. Are these items *σχήματα* also? If they are, they are secondary to the major 'forms' adumbrated by Homer, and clearly they must come later. Consider the parallel with tragedy. The only tradition we have about the invention of the tragic masks ascribes it to Thespis.⁴¹ For prologues we have Aristotle's own testimony, via Themistius,⁴² that Thespis introduced *πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν*. We saw that this fits nicely into the extremely rapid and allusive sketch in chapter 4; and it is equally plausible that Aristotle somewhere, in the fuller narrative which must lie behind that sketch,⁴³ attributed the first masks (i.e., the first external sign that a *part* was being played) to Thespis also. Finally, the *Poetics* itself mentions the increase in the number⁴⁴ of tragic actors: *καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε*. Thus all three of the comic innovations mentioned by Aristotle have to do with concrete means of realization of the dramatic form—how the characters look and speak—and all three are parallel to developments in tragedy which he certainly or probably assigned to Thespis and Aeschylus. That is the relative stage he is thinking of, then: following some time after Homer, and just preceding the final development.

ταῦτα ~ ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης; 49a4, *κωμωδοποιοί* ~ οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταί. *Ἀπιδώκεν* in the next sentence refers implicitly to the same idea: the various *σχήματα* are not alien adornments, they 'belong' to comedy, even before she quite exists, and the poet does not invent them out of the blue, he finds and 'renders' them (pays, gives them as its due) to the concept. We are still in the thick of the Aristotelian entelechy.

⁴⁰ The new sentence (*τίς δὲ πρόσωπα κτλ.*) is not simply a fuller statement of the preceding (Montmollin 47). If it were, Aristotle would have written *γάρ*, not *δέ*.

⁴¹ Suid. s. v. *Θέσπις*; cf. Hor. *A. P.* 277, *peruncti faecibus ora*, and see Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 177.

⁴² *Orat.* 26. 316d.

⁴³ See above, n. 1.

⁴⁴ *Πλῆθος* (*πλήθη*) may possibly mean concretely 'troupe(s).' But more likely it signifies a *plurality* (-ties) of actors, i.e., the decisive change from the one-actor to the more-than-one-actor drama. Cf. *ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη*, 4. 49a28: "masses of episodes," = more than one.

This leads us at last to the question who "the persons called 'comic poets'" are. They cannot be simply the first Athenian claimants, Chionides and Magnes. Aristotle's canvas is too international for that. But we need not exclude the Athenians either; what we must do is to add the Sicilians (Epicharmus and Phormus) to them. The almost exact synchronism of Epicharmus and Chionides which emerges from the *testimonia* in Suidas, the one being dated to 485/4 B.C., the other to 487/6,⁴⁶ the evident parallelism of expression between the two notices (πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν; ἦν διδάσκων - διδάσκειν; ἔτη ἕξ - ἔτεσιν ὀκτώ), and especially their use of the term διδάσκειν, point strongly to their being derived from a good didascalie source;⁴⁶ and in fact there is no good reason why that source should not ultimately be Aristotle himself. The reason why the possibility has not been entertained before is of course that 3. 48a33, Ἐπίχαρμος ... πολλῶ πρότερος ὢν Χιονίδου καὶ Μάγνητος, excluded it. Now that we have found that phrase dubious, the road is open for reconsideration. Thus it is entirely likely that Aristotle counted Epicharmus, Phormus,⁴⁷ Chionides, Magnes, and no doubt some others besides,⁴⁸ as close contemporaries and as

⁴⁶ Suid. s.v. Ἐπίχαρμος: ἦν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν ἔτη ἕξ διδάσκων ἐν Συρακούσαις · ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις Εὐέτης καὶ Εὐξενίδης καὶ Μύλλος ἐπεδείκνυτο: id. s.v. Χιονίδης: Ἀθηναῖος ... ὃν καὶ λέγουσι πρωταγωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας, διδάσκειν δὲ ἔτεσιν ὀκτώ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν. The dates given above are based on inclusive reckoning, counting back from 480/479. It is possible of course that they ought to be raised by a year each (486/5, 488/7); but most scholars have accepted Capps's date of 487/6 for Chionides.

⁴⁷ See Capps, *op. cit.* 263 n. 5; Usener, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F. 28 (1878) 423. On the value of the notice on Chionides see correspondingly A. Wilhelm, *Urkunden dramatischer Aufführungen in Athen*, Vienna, 1906, 108-109; Ed. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* 4^o, Stuttgart, 1939, 740 n. 1.

⁴⁸ Suid. s.v. Ἐπίχαρμος: ὃς εἶρε τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἄμα Φόρμω.

⁴⁹ Suidas mentions Euetes, Euxenides, and Myllus as contemporaries of Epicharmus. Euetes of course was a tragic poet from exactly this period (*IG* 2-3.^o 2. 2325, 2, between Aeschylus and Polyphrasmon: i.e., his first—and only—victory was won between 485/4 and 471/0). Euxenides is not recorded in the extant didascalie or victor-lists but might possibly fit into the latter in the second line above Magnes, where there is room for nine letters (one too many, but the columns are not written strictly stichedon) before a final s and the mark for a single victory. Myllus is mentioned elsewhere as a comic poet (by Zenobius and Arcadius; see Pick.-Camb. *Dith.* 285) and might also be accommodated in the comic victor-list between Chionides and Magnes. It is possible that Suidas' three names reflect some of the didascalie data for a single year (the competitors in comedy; or tragic winner, comic winner, and choregus?). Or Myllus might conceivably be the person mentioned

constituting the first recorded⁴⁹ generation of comic poets. They, then, are the *λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταί*, the first tangible crop of those *κωμωδοποιοί* who followed in the footsteps of Homer (4. 49a4).

Aristotle next refers to the Sicilian members of this group as the known originators (in that respect, then, unlike the inventors of masks, etc.) of the composition of regular plots. As we shall see in a moment, this represents the final attainment of the other Homeric *σχῆμα*, viz. *τὸ γελοῖον* (*δραματοποιήσας* being represented by *πρόσωπα ... καὶ ὄσα τοιαῦτα*).⁵⁰ But the first thing that calls for attention is the text. Here we run head-on into the paradoxical but incontrovertible fact that the words *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις* are a gloss and have no construction in Aristotle's sentence.⁵¹ But even more puzzling are the words which stand in the Arabic version in place of the two names, and which Tkatsch translates "*ut relinquatur omnis sermo, qui est per compendium.*" Tkatsch cudgelled his brain for an explanation of this nonsense and could find one only in some gross misunderstanding on the part of the Syriac or the Arabic translator.⁵² But the mind boggles at a misunderstanding so spectacular as to turn *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις* into the equivalent of *ut relinquatur*, etc. The real explanation is much

by Eustathius (on *Od.* τ 106) as a *ὑποκριτῆς παλαιός*. Some actors' names were certainly preserved even from before the opening of the actors' contest in 450/49: cf. Cleander and Mynniscus in the anonymous *Life of Aeschylus*, § 15. In any case there is nothing fantastic or inherently impossible about Suidas' information.

⁴⁹ *Μνημονεύονται* of course refers to records, but not exclusively to the records of the Athenian archons, as has often been suggested in recent years (so for example Rostagni). There must have been something in the way of dramatic records at Syracuse also; at least there was a competition (Epicharm. fr. 229 Kaibel). *Ἦν διδάσκων* in the Suidas notice suggests that its author (Aristotle, as we are hypothesizing) treated the Syracusan evidence, whatever it was, in the same way as the Athenian.

⁵⁰ The *σχῆματα* were sketched, adumbrated, by Homer, but only concretely realized later by the actual *κωμωδοποιοί*, and then in a certain order: first the means of dramatic realization (masks, prologues, plurality of actors, etc.), then truly ludicrous, as opposed to satirical, subjects.

⁵¹ Bywater says all that needs to be said on the subject. The athetesis goes back to Susemihl. Even if one granted Rostagni's *τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν Ἐ. καὶ Φ.*, supplying *ἀπέδοσαν* from above, *τὸ μὲν οὖν ... ἦλθε* remains impossible (with *μὲν οὖν*, *τὸ* must be the article and requires an attribute: it cannot be pronominal, with *τὸ* = *τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν*) — not to mention that *οὖν* in Parisinus 2038 is obviously a conjecture by some earlier Rostagni, and that the alleged confirmation by the Arabic version is very dubious.

⁵² Tkatsch 1. 230 n. 8; 2. 5, n. 15 to p. 231). Gudeman, *crit. apparat. ad loc.*, recognizes "augmentum quoddam" here.

simpler. In the archetype of the Arabic (i.e., of the Syriac) version the two names were written in compendia, and the apparently irrational phrase which the Arabic offers in their place is *a warning against copying such notes or phrases!*⁵³ The Greek manuscripts show no trace of the warning, either because it stood only in the direct ancestor of the Arabic version or because the Greek copyists, unlike the Syriac translator, recognized it for what it was. In any case the latter guilelessly translated it in place of the two names; or possibly the names had already been deleted by the writer of the warning or some intermediate reader. However the process worked, its end result is that the Greek manuscripts carry only the names while the Arabic version carries only the warning.

As it happens, there is a small piece of evidence in the names themselves which serves to confirm our solution. The manuscripts of the *Poetics* unanimously call the second and lesser poet Φόρμις. But he is mentioned four times elsewhere, twice by Suidas, once by Athenaeus, once by Themistius, and always as Φόρμος.⁵⁴ In most modern treatises he appears as Phormis,⁵⁵ out of deference to the supposed authority of Aristotle. But Phormus (-ος) is clearly correct; the Phormis of the *Poetics* manuscripts is an error. And the error is surely due to the names of the two poets having been written originally in compendia, so that the less-known one was subsequently misread.⁵⁶ We will assume therefore that the annotator originally wrote Φόρμος.

⁵³ Perhaps it is idle to try to reconstruct the Greek original, but I cannot repress the suggestion that "ut" may represent *ἵνα* + subj. in a direct command. This of course is the modern Greek construction (*ἵνα* in the form *νά*), but it goes a long way back—quite far enough, if the note was Byzantine, and to all appearance it was. Hence: *ἵνα λειφθῆ* (or, better, *ἀφελθῆ*; cf. Tkatsch: "sive missus fiat") *πᾶσα λέξις ἢ δι' ἐπιτομῆς*.

⁵⁴ Suidas, Φόρμος · Συρακούσιος, κωμικός ...; *id. s.v.* Ἐπίχαρμος: ἄμα Φόρμος; Athen. 14. 652a, Φόρμος ὁ κωμικός; Themist. Or. 27. 406, Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμος. This last passage (for its significance see below) proves that Themistius is not quoting from the *Poetics* itself but from some other Aristotelian work, and that it is the *Poetics* that contains the error.

⁵⁵ So for example Kalbel, *CGF* 148; but Pickard-Cambridge has it right, *Dith.* 413-414.

⁵⁶ On the abbreviations for -ος and -ις in the later (minuscule) manuscripts see O. Lehmann, *Die tachygraphischen Abkürzungen der griechischen Handschriften*, Leipzig, 1880, §42 (p. 75 and pl. 7) and §39 (pp. 68-70 and pl. 6); T. W. Allen, *Notes on Abbreviations in Greek Manuscripts*, Oxford, 1889, p. 20 and pl. 6, p. 13 and pl. 4; V. Gardthausen, *Griechische Paleographie*, 2^a, Leipzig, 1913, 337 and 339. But it must be kept in mind that these treatments refer to a time several centuries later

Our discovery is of course important beyond the bounds of the immediate passage, because it establishes the existence of at least one marginal or interlinear note in compendia in the *Poetics*. Thus it establishes a general basis for our atheteses of particular notes, especially as in several of the latter we have found an error or change in ending (e.g., *κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετή* for *κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῆ*, 2. 48a3; *κωμωδῶν* for *κωμωδοῖς* in 5. 49b1) or some other corruption which would be especially easy to explain on the basis of compendia (e.g., the omission of *τοῦτον*, 1. 47b23; *Χω(ο)ν(ν)ι(ύ)δου*, 3. 48a34; the possible substitution of plural for singular [*μιμοῦνται* for *μιμεῖται*] in 1. 47a26).⁵⁷ In other words a general plausibility is re-established for the thesis that interpolations may exist in the text of the *Poetics*—a thesis which has not been respectable, except in especially brief and flagrant cases like *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος* itself, since the interpolation theory as a whole was discredited by the excesses of Ritter and others⁵⁸ in the nineteenth century. We are not presented hereby with a general license to find any inconvenient passage spurious; but we are at least guarded against the charge that to allege any interpolation in the *Poetics* is stupid or irresponsible.⁵⁹

Now, however, having established that *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος* is an interpolation, we must admit at once that Epicharmus and Phormus are almost certainly the poets Aristotle had in mind. Themistius says,⁶⁰ *κωμωδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας* [*~ τὸ*

than the archetype of the Arabic version (sixth century at the latest: see Konstantin Horna, *Wiener Studien* 52 [1934] 142; Gudeman, *Philologus* 90 [1935] 48, 56; cf. his edition, p. 456). The copyists' error in fact suggests that the compendium used for Phormus, whatever it was, was one unfamiliar to the Byzantine scribes: perhaps the simple ζ which sometimes appears for -ιζ in minuscule manuscripts (*Φόρμ*^ς).

⁵⁷ See also below on 19. 56b1-2.

⁵⁸ E.g., T. G. Tucker, whose edition (*Aristotelis Poetica*, London, 1899) marks 58 interpolations, many of them of considerable length. Tucker indents them all and sets them off in different type, which gives his edition a quaintly scholastic look.

⁵⁹ The warning against statements written in compendia, coming where it does (here rather than at the beginning of the treatise), perhaps lends some color to the idea that there was a special concentration of them just here; and that in turn may lend some slight additional credit to our diagnosis of *καὶ γὰρ ... ἦσαν* just above (b1-2) as an interpolation. Conversely, we can perhaps see evidence that the warning had some effect, in the fact that the number of probable interpolations declines rather steeply from this point on.

⁶⁰ *Or.* 27. 406.

μύθους ποιεῖν ... τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε], ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἤστην Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμος· κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη. We have already noticed⁶¹ the close verbal parallels between that passage and the two in the *Poetics* (3. 48a33 and the present one), and conjectured that they all echo something said by Aristotle elsewhere, probably in the dialogue *On Poets*. Certainly none of the three passages is borrowed directly from either of the others, since each of them has something that is not found in the others.⁶² But the parallels are sufficient to show that Epicharmus and Phormus were both mentioned in the common source, and since it is Themistius who gives the fullest and most meaningful version, Aristotle is indicated—probably but not certainly—as the source.

Comparison of Themistius with our present passage (*κωμῳδία - τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν; κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη - τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης κτλ.*) shows clearly what the original point was. What came from Sicily was not everything (the masks, etc.), but the *comic spirit* (*κωμῳδία*, = *μίμησις τοῦ γελοίου*). And it was not merely taken over and imitated at Athens, but developed and perfected there.

This throws further light on Aristotle's attitude towards the Dorian claims to comedy which were mentioned in chapter 3. He did not accept them in any vague or loose fashion. He did accept Epicharmus and Phormus as antedating the Athenian *κωμῳδοποιί*, not absolutely but in the sense that *they achieved a dramatic imitation of the laughable* while the Athenians were still pursuing the *ιαμβικὴ ἰδέα*. It was in this sense that Aristotle was willing to say that comedy "came from (began in) Sicily," not necessarily in the sense that the first beginnings of all comic drama whatever lay in Sicily. As to them he professed ignorance (*ἠγνόηται*), except that the whole development stood under the sign of Homer.⁶³

It may be objected that *ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε* implies Athens as the point

⁶¹ Above on 3. 48a33.

⁶² The surplusage is:

(1) 3. 48a33: *πολλῶ πρότερος ὢν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος.*

(2) 5. 49b5: *τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν ... Κράτης κτλ.*

(3) Themistius, *κάλλιον Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη.*

(4) 5. 49b5 and Themistius: *Φόρμος.*

⁶³ Still, although Aristotle disclaimed knowledge of the earlier stages, he may have been more inclined to locate them in Dorian lands, as anticipations of the first great comedian he did know about, than in Attica. To this extent he may have tended to favor the Dorian claim even for the blank period.

of reference throughout: that the story is of an Attic development to which a specific contribution, but only that, is made by Sicily. Such an objection cannot hold, however, in view of the fact that Themistius makes *κωμωδία* itself the subject of *ἤρξατο*, and that for Aristotle the construction of general plots (*τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν*) is no mere detail but the essence of comedy. Of the two fundamental *σχήματα* adumbrated by Homer, the crucial one (the 'comic') was developed by Dorians. Athens can only claim the other one (the dramatic), and that chiefly in the sense of completion, not of origination. This does not necessarily rob Athens of her meed of glory; for to achieve the *τέλος* is the culmination that justifies all the effort.

Aristotle's sketch of the development of comedy, brief though it is, shows the same entelechic structure as his account of tragedy, a structure which as we said is best represented, so far as the history of arts is concerned, by the paragraph or two at the end of the *Sophistical Refutations*.⁶⁴ It can be summed up succinctly as *ἀρχή - αὐξησις - τέλος*. Only, in the case of comedy Aristotle admits to having no actual evidence for the early stages. He hypothesizes that it was born out of improvisations, like tragedy, and he gives these the designation *ψόγοι*. He further hypothesizes that the earliest *poems* of the lower variety (*γένος φαῦλον*) were personal invectives or lampoons (*ἰαμβοί*), and that a large crop of iambic poems sprang up before Homer. Homer represents an even more crucial stage in the growth of comedy than in that of tragedy. He did not write 'comedies,' but he sketched or outlined or adumbrated two basic 'forms' of comedy, the comic (*τὸ γελοῖον*) and the dramatic (*δραματοποιήσας*). The rest of the story, although large stretches even of it are unknown, is essentially a realization of these two forms; for the comic poets became comic poets under the spell of Homer (*Margites* and similar works). A good many aspects of dramatic form—masks, prologues, plurality of actors, etc.—were achieved by persons unknown and were already in the possession of the genre when the first records of 'comic poets,' properly so called, appear. These first recorded *κωμωδοποιοί* were working at the time of the Persian Wars (*ca.* 487-5), in Syracuse and Athens. The greatest of them was Epicharmus. From him Crates and subsequent Attic poets (*not* the first generation or two) learned the art of constructing

⁶⁴ *Soph. El.* 34. 183b17-end. Cf. esp. b20-22, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐ-
ρισκόμενα ... τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξησεως (cf. Themist. *συνηυξήθη*;
Poet. 4. 49a13, *ἠὲξήθη*).

generalized plots; and this was subsequently refined and perfected until comedy reached its *φύσις*.⁶⁵

It is evident from this summary how different Aristotle's construction is from what we call 'literary history,' and particularly from our modern conception of the history of Greek comedy. There is nothing here about animal-mummers, *αἰδοίη*, or parabasis, and it is doubtful whether we would find them in his complete account if it were extant. The fact is that Aristotle did not begin with our bias (historically conditioned, in so far as we see all later comedy going back to Athens, and literarily conditioned by the unique preëminence of Aristophanes)⁶⁶ in favor of the Athenian Old Comedy, with its peculiar composite structure and its strong 'iambic' tendencies. He saw Old Comedy as one stage in the development of 'comedy,' and not the best or most significant one. By *κωμωδία* he meant something else: a presentation of the ludicrous, without satire or anything painful, in genuinely dramatic form; and his sketch, in default of evidence, is mainly a hypothesis as to how those features were attained. In that process the decisive stages are Homer-Epicharmus-Crates? Aristotle does not supply a name for the last stage; it ought to read "Menander."

One more phrase calls for comment before we go on. *Τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν* is replaced at the end of the sentence by *καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους*, but there is no change of meaning. *Καί* is expegetic, as Gudeman says; *λόγους καὶ μύθους* is no more than an extension of *λόγους*: "arguments, that is, plots."⁶⁷ The construction of plots is in Aristotle's eyes *the* function of the poet: 9. 51b27, *τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσα ποιητῆς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ἐστὶ*. Moreover it is an active job, and the only proper way it can be done is *καθόλου*, in general terms. If the poet gives real people, actual events, he is not making his plot but simply re-telling history. *Λόγους*, therefore, means the same thing here as in 17. 55b17: the *λόγος* of the *Odyssey*, the generalized, skeleton outline of the action, without any proper names or details (cf. *ibid.* 1. ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, exemplified by the following sketch of the *Iphigenia*). Crates, then,

⁶⁵ This last stage we infer from Themistius' *καλλίωρ ... συνηυξήθη* and 9. 51b11 ff. (see below *ad loc.*).

⁶⁶ Rendered still more unique *for us*, let us not forget, by the loss of everything else of the Old Comedy except fragments.

⁶⁷ Not "realistische und mythenparodische Stücke" (Schmid 1. 4. 90 n. 8). Aristotle lays no stress whatever on parody of myths, in fact he implies the opposite for comedy: see 9. 51b12 ff.; and there is no trace of it in Crates so far as we know.

was the first poet at Athens to *construct* a plot. What Aristotle thought his Athenian predecessors had done is hard to say. They must either have indulged in pure *ψόγος*, i.e., random satire, or retold actual events. In any case they cannot have proceeded as Aristotle represents the true comic poets doing, 9. 51b12, *συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον κτλ.*: i.e., drafting the outline of the plot first in general terms, then filling in the names as they came.

49b9-20

- 10 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μέ|τρῳ
 μεγάλη μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἠκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ
 μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέ-
 ρουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα πειραῖται ὑπὸ
 μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι, ἡ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ
 ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει· καίτοι
 15 | τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίησαν καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς
 τραγωδίας. διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας
 καὶ φάλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει,
 20 ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ | ἐποποιίᾳ.

49b9

- Well then, the epic followed in the train of tragedy up
 10 to the point of being | a large-sized imitation of serious
 matters in verse; but in its having its verse unmixed (with
 song), and in its being a narrative, there they differ. Fur-
 thermore, so far as their bulk is concerned the one (tragedy)
 strives hard to exist in a single daylight period, or to vary
 but little (in length), while the epic has no fixed limit as to
 15 its time and differs with respect to this; though | at first
 they used to do this in tragedies in the same way as in
 epics. Some of the 'parts' are common to the two genres,
 some are peculiar to tragedy. Hence whoever knows about
 good and bad tragedy also knows about epics; for the parts
 the epic has are also available to tragedy, but not everything
 20 the latter has is present in the | epic.

The history is finished; we are ready to take up poetry genre by genre. The remaining chapters will deal with serious poetry, leaving comedy to a second book.⁶⁸ Aristotle treats tragedy first, and at what

⁶⁸ See below, on 26, 62b19, on the debate (recently revived by Montmolin) over the existence of a second book. It does not concern us here.

seems like disproportionate length (16 chapters: 6-22),⁶⁹ then epic very briefly (3 chapters: 23-25),⁷⁰ then gives a final *σύγκρισις* of the two (chapter 26). The reason for this disproportion is that tragedy, as the higher genre, includes the lower genre in itself except where the latter specifically differs. In other words the chapters on tragedy also cover serious poetry generically, and therefore the epic too so far as it is like tragedy. Hence the definition and discussion of tragedy as a species has to be preceded by a delimitation of the *likenesses and differences* between epic and tragedy. The likenesses will be treated mainly under tragedy, the differences under the epic.

For Aristotle, the superiority of tragedy to epic is a historical as well as a theoretical fact. *Tragedy represents a further point along a common line of development.* Indeed, as we have seen, the whole history from the beginning is in a sense a history of tragedy. This point of view is confirmed, and also further illuminated, by ἡ ... ἐποποιία τῆ τραγωδία ... ἠκολούθησεν, "epic followed tragedy." Aristotle does not mean, of course, that it came after it in time, but that it followed, went with, the higher species up to a certain point in its march towards perfection,⁷¹ then stayed there while tragedy went on to the heights.

The level "up to which" epic followed tragedy is designated by the infinitive clause μέχρι ... σπουδαίων. The items in this clause must therefore be features which are shared by the two genres. Unfortunately the text has suffered some damage and requires examination; and this can best be done by scrutinizing each item in turn. Μίμησις ... σπουδαίων, at the end, is a fixed point, since the reading is certain. Epic and tragedy both imitate serious or worth-while things. There are two further specifications lodged between μέχρι and μίμησις: (1) some form of the word μέτρον (μέτρου *codd.*), and (2) either the

⁶⁹ Not counting the spurious chapter 12.

⁷⁰ Chapter 25 is separate but has to do specifically with the epic.

⁷¹ It is the old basic meaning of ἀκολουθεῖν, 'accompany, go in the train of' (specifically, as a 'follower' or satellite), which has not been recognized here because the time-relation seemed to require the transferred sense 'follow in time, succeed.' Then, since this is impossible, the common disposition has been to take the verb in the sense 'agree with' (which it can indeed have in Aristotle: see Gudeman's examples), and the aorist as vaguely gnomic or resumptive (Bywater: "seems to imply that the fact has already been recognized" [but where?]). Sykutris gets the meaning precisely in his note (ένα μέρος τοῦ δρόμου ἐπῆγε μαζί), but then fobs it off as a metaphor and translates by συμφωνεῖ.

phrase *μετὰ λόγου* (Σ , Riccardianus 46, Parisinus 2038) or some form of *μέγας* (*μεγάλου cell.*).⁷² And these are preceded in turn by something which must represent either *μόνον* (-ου) *τοῦ* or *μὲν τοῦ*; it does not greatly matter which, but the latter is simpler and more natural.⁷³ Of the two uncertain elements, the first should certainly be kept,⁷⁴ and the only viable case-form is *μέτρῳ*.⁷⁵ For the other element the choice seems to me equally straightforward. Palaeographically, either reading could have grown out of the other;⁷⁶ but in spite of Tkatsch's ingenious and spirited defense,⁷⁷ *μετὰ λόγου* is a feeble tautology alongside *μέτρῳ*. Verse necessarily includes speech; whereas, as Gomperz says, the phrase *μέτρῳ μετὰ λόγου* would be permissible only if there were such a thing as a *μέτρον ἄνευ λόγου*. Some form of *μέγας* is indicated, then; but not *μεγάλου*, since the genitive could only go with *μέτρον*, and *μεγάλου μέτρον* has no meaning. Aristotle does not call verses 'large' or 'small';⁷⁸ and anyhow the verses used by the two genres are different and of different length. On the other hand both epic and tragedy have some size or length (*μέγεθος*, *μῆκος*), as distinguished from the primitive hymns and encomia, which Aristotle naturally thought of as short. Moreover length (*μῆκος*) figures in the list of *differentiae*, just below, in the same way as *μέτρον*. It is appropriate therefore, if not necessary, that a mention of size or length should appear here.⁷⁹ Hence on several counts Lasson's emendation *μεγάλη* is the best.

⁷² It is apparent that a leveling of case-forms has taken place in the manuscripts: *μόνον μέτρον μέγας*.

⁷³ *Τοῦ* is required in any case, with the infinitive. A corruption *MENTOY* → (*MONTOY?* →) *MONOY* involves fewer letters than *MONONTOY* → (*MONTOY?* →) *MONOY*.

⁷⁴ Rostagni's *μόνον μὲν τοῦ* is the wrong way to dispose of *μέτρον*. *Τὸ μέτρον* in the next line calls for a previous mention of *μέτρον*.

⁷⁵ Tyrwhitt's conjecture. Tyrwhitt, in fact, had the entire passage right except that he kept nothing to represent *μεγάλου*. Actually what he bracketed was the *μετὰ λόγου* of the Aldine, and quite rightly; he seems not to have known of *μεγάλου*. See Gomperz's discussion, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 25-27 (= *Sitzungsber.* Vienna, 1888, 565-567), which is admirable on every point; and cf. Tkatsch 2. 113a.

⁷⁶ (*ΜΕΓΑΛΗ* →) *ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ* → (*ΜΕΤΑΛΟΥ?* →) *ΜΕΤΑΛΟΓΟΥ* or *ΜΕΤΑΛΟΓΟΥ* → (*ΜΕΤΑΛΟΥ?* →) *ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ*. In either case the confusion between Γ and Τ shows that the error arose in uncials.

⁷⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁸ See below on 26. 62b7, τῷ τοῦ μέτρον μήκει. In 24. 60a3 the hexameter is said to be the appropriate verse for a long poem, but not because it itself is 'large.'

⁷⁹ Both genres use verse, but in different ways; both are 'big,' but in different ways.

We end with four points of likeness: epic, like tragedy, is "a (1) sizable (large-scale) (2) imitation of (3) serious (worth-while) things in (4) verse." Now come the differences. Epic (1) uses verses, but differently; (2) is an imitation, but of a different kind; and (3) has length, but a different rule of length. (Only the object, the *σπουδαία*, is precisely the same.) As we said, these three *differentiae* will be discussed later, and as *differentiae* of the epic specifically, rather than of tragedy. They appear there in changed order: 24. 59b17-31, *μέγεθος (μῆκος)*; 59b31-60a5, *μέτρον*; and 60a5-17, *ἀπαγγελία*.⁸⁰ And finally they recur once more at the end of the *Poetics*, 26. 62a14-b12, in slight disguises but still essentially the same: a14-16, *μέτρον*; a17-18, *ἀπαγγελία* (or rather its converse, dramatic form); a18-b12, *μῆκος*. Thus we can be sure that Aristotle distinguished just these three *differentiae*, and that he considered them to be of cardinal importance. It is worth noticing also, before we get down to details, that in each of the three passages the section on *μῆκος* is the longest (in two of the three cases, here and in chapter 26, very much the longest).

Epic differs from tragedy first of all *τῷ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν*. The universal interpretation of this statement, so far as I know, is that epic uses just one kind of verse (the hexameter) while tragedy uses many. But Aristotle never speaks of tragedy as using many different *μέτρα*. The *μέτρον* of tragedy is the trimeter, as that of epic is the hexameter, *et voilà tout*.⁸¹ For him the lyric parts of tragedy are not *μέτρα*, they are *μέλη*.⁸² The distinction he is after here is clearly not the one he implies in 24. 59b31 ff., between hexameter and iambic; hence it must be the other, broader one which was laid down in chapter 1 and is alluded to again in chapter 26,⁸³ namely that the epic uses verse *alone* while tragedy also has song. *Ἀπλοῦν* is in predicate position, like *ψιλοῖς* in 1. 47a29, and has essentially the same meaning: in the epic the verse is used 'bare' or 'unmixed,' i.e., not mixed with music.⁸⁴ We may add that this, for what it is worth, is a mark of com-

⁸⁰ See below *ad loc.* for the way in which the concept of narrative is basic for the whole discussion of the *διαφοραί*.

⁸¹ 4. 49a21; cf. 22. 59a10, 24. 59b37.

⁸² 6. 49b29-31.

⁸³ 1. 47a29, *ψιλοῖς ... τοῖς μέτροις*—47b24, *πάσι ... τοῖς εἰρημένοις*; 26. 62a-14-15.

⁸⁴ Cf. *Metaph.* A8. 989b17, *De An.* 1. 2. 405a16 (*ἀπλοῦν ~ ἀμιγές*); *Metaph.* K10. 1066b27, *Phys.* 3. 5. 204b11, *De Coel.* 2. 4. 286b17 (*ἀπλοῦν* opposed to *σύνθετον*); *De Sensu* 7. 447a18 (*ἀπλοῦν* opposed to *κεκραμένον*).

parative poverty, and therefore of inferiority, in the epic.⁸⁵

The second *differentia* is clear enough on the face of it: epic is narrative, tragedy is dramatic. Here, however, there is a lurking anomaly. The very first time we heard of the differentiation by method, Homer was put in a special class (a 'mixed' class) by himself; and we shall find this discrepancy omnipresent in the discussion of the epic later in the *Poetics*.⁸⁶ Nothing is breathed about it here; epic is passed off simply as the narrative genre. Again we may notice that the difference is a mark of inferiority, and that one of the two crucial ideas which governed Aristotle's sketch of the development of tragedy and comedy was how under the inspiration of Homer the poets moved from narrative to dramatic form.

The third *differentia*, that of size or length, is the most difficult; also, if we are to judge by the length of Aristotle's treatment of it, the most important. We have already pointed out that it recurs, and again at greater length than the others, in chapters 24 and 26. In the latter, moreover, it stands next to last (just before the important but vague reference to the 'function' of poetry, 62b12) and carries more weight than any other part of Aristotle's argument for the superiority of tragedy over the epic. These things are worth saying with some emphasis, even at the risk of repetition, as we approach a passage (the so-called 'unity of time' statement) which modern scholars with rare unanimity have put down as a casual and not very important remark. The men of the Renaissance differed violently over what length of time Aristotle meant by "one revolution of the sun," but agreed that he intended it as a poetic law. Modern scholars are equally sure that it is nothing but an incidental observation.⁸⁷ On one point,

⁸⁵ It is officially presented as such, 26. 62a16-16; cf. 5. 49b18-20. But actually Aristotle so belittles and ignores the role of music in the functioning of tragedy (see below on 18. 56a25-32) that this is hardly more than a technical 'win.'

⁸⁶ I.e., in chapters 23 and 24.

⁸⁷ Butcher 290: "We have here a rough generalisation as to the practice of the Greek stage"; Bywater 148: "What Aristotle actually says is not a precept, but only an incidental recognition of a fact in the practice of the theatre in his age"; Gudeman 155-156: "...die Anschauung, dass A. hier die 'Einheit der Zeit' als ein 'Gesetz' aller dramatischen Kompositionstechnik aufgestellt habe, während er doch in Wahrheit nur einer empirisch begründeten Beobachtung Ausdruck verleihen wollte"; Lane Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*², Ithaca, 1947, 15: "Aristotle, as we see, remarks that in practice the Greek tragic poets of his own day (seventy years after the death of Euripides) try to confine the action within certain limits of time. This is a purely scientific observation.... He neither commends nor censures

however, Renaissance and modern scholarship are agreed: that "one revolution of the sun" refers to the feigned or alleged duration of the dramatic action, the period of time that is supposed to elapse during the play. We shall argue, on the contrary, that (1) the duration Aristotle has in mind is the real duration of the play, and (2) his remark is indeed intended as a rule, that is, as bearing on an essential difference between the two genres epic and tragedy. The first of these theses was maintained by Teichmüller,⁸⁸ but in an unguarded and peculiar fashion, hence with very limited success. His heresy is all but forgotten today. I believe that Teichmüller was fundamentally right; but the discussion needs to be carried on with greater circumspection, and above all with more attention to the argument of the *Poetics* as a whole. We will begin at the beginning and go through the passage very slowly, considering thought and expression reciprocally.

**Ἐτι δὲ τῷ μήκει.* All modern editors, so far as I know, assume a break in construction after *μήκει*, and supply *διαφέρουσι* or *διαφέρει* (sc. *ἡ ἐποποιία*) from the preceding sentence. They then make the text continue with either (1) a causal clause beginning *ἢ μὲν <γάρ>*, *<ἐπεὶ> ἢ μὲν*, *<ἦ> ἢ μὲν*, or the like,⁸⁹ or (2) a parenthesis running from *ἢ μὲν* to *χρόνῳ* (b14).⁹⁰ But neither of these devices is necessary or advisable. The manuscript authority for *γάρ* is weak;⁹¹ most likely it is a conjecture, like the modern *ἦ*, *ἐπεὶ*, etc. The real reason for these expedients is the rooted prejudice (which I have not seen justified anywhere) that *διαφέρουσι* or *διαφέρει* has to be supplied with *ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει*. Connected with this assumption, especially among the advocates of a parenthesis, is the belief that Aristotle is setting up a proportion between two different things, the actual length of the

the practice." It may have some value, as we approach the critical passage, to point out that there is nothing in it to correspond to Cooper's expressions "in practice," "the... poets," "his own day," etc., "confine," "action," "limits." Rostagni follows the common line but adds that Aristotle considered the limits "opportuni"; and Sykutris, in a burst of insight, says that Aristotle offers the remark *ὡς ἀπλῆν παρατήρησιν ἢ ὡς τὸ δρθότερον*.

⁸⁸ "Untersuchung über die Einheit der Zeit in der Tragödie," *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 169-240; cited here as "Einheit."

⁸⁹ So Vahlen, Gomperz, Susemihl, Butcher, Gudeman.

⁹⁰ Bywater, Rostagni.

⁹¹ Four of the so-called 'apographa': see Gudeman's apparatus. *Γάρ* is not expressed in the Arabic version: see Tkatsch 2. 60b; or in the medieval Latin translation ("adhuc autem longitudine, hec quidem [μέν] quasi maxime temptat," etc.).

poem (*μήκος*) and the presumed duration of its action (*χρόνος*).⁹² According to this interpretation, which notwithstanding its weakness is the only serious one in the field at present, Aristotle makes the actual length depend on the presumed duration. The longer the action is supposed to last, the longer the poem will be. But the most elementary view of this supposed correlation shows that there is nothing in it. The events of years can be shrunk to a few minutes in the telling, and conversely a very brief action can be spun out to any desired length. There is no constant relation whatever between alleged duration and real length.⁹³

The alleged compound structure has no warrant at all. An unprejudiced inspection of Aristotle's sentence shows that there is no reason to stop the construction at *μήκει*, or in other words that *ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει ἢ μὲν κτλ.* is one unbroken sentence which stretches at least as far as *διαφέρει* in b14.⁹⁴ To begin with, we must read *ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει* in its context. The first *differentia* of the epic was not *τῷ μέτρῳ*, in its verse, but *τῷ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν*, in the way it *had* or *used* its verse (namely *ψιλῶ*, without song). So here epic and tragedy do not merely "differ in length," the one being longer and the other shorter. The difference is *with respect* to length, in the relation between the genre and the category of magnitude. *Τῷ μήκει*, then, stands in direct construction in its clause, with *πειρᾶται ... εἶναι*, just as *χρόνῳ* depends on *ἀόριστος*. "And furthermore, so far as the (their, its)⁹⁵ length is concerned, the one tries...." There is no indirect or oblique construction here.

⁹² Bywater 147-148; Butcher 289-290 n. 2; Sykutris 49 n.9. It should be noticed that this view is composite in origin (see Bywater, *loc. cit.*). It is the result of accepting Teichmüller's thesis for *μήκος* but keeping the traditional meaning for *χρόνος*.

⁹³ Teichmüller, "Einheit" 176; Tkatsch, *loc. cit.* One can observe in the *Iliad* how the longest stretches of time pass in the fewest verses; see below, n. 123.

⁹⁴ Another possibility would be to adopt Gomperz's <ἐπει> ἢ μὲν, but to take *ἢ μὲν κτλ.* and *ἢ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ* as protases and *καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει* as the apodosis of the whole: "Moreover with respect to their length, <since> the one tries... whereas the epic is unlimited in its time, it differs with respect to this also." This has the advantage of making Aristotle predicate the *differentia* of length of the epic, as is implicitly the case above ("having the verse unmixed" and being narrative are predicates of the epic, in spite of the plural *διαφέρουσιν*). Moreover it would not be hard for *ἐπει* to drop out after *μήκει*. But I have not ventured to put this in the text.

⁹⁵ *Τῷ μήκει* refers to *μεγάλη* above: an attribute which belonged to both genres. We are now hearing about the differentiation between them with respect to that common attribute.

"Ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι. Again the most necessary thing (and the hardest, with all the associations that cluster around the famous clause) is to see just what Aristotle says and what he does not say. First of all, if he is talking about the action of the poem, he does not say so; in fact the concept of the action as one 'part' of the poem has not even been developed yet.⁹⁶ Again, he says nothing about the events of the play being *represented as occurring* within such-and-such a time; all he says is that "tragedy endeavors to be (exist) in a single revolution of the sun." Yet it is assumed on all hands that (1) Aristotle is referring to the events (the 'action') of the play, (2) these events have a time-scheme of their own, and (3) this time-scheme can be measured in the same fashion as that of ordinary events, so that we can say, "This play 'lasts' 36, or 9, or 70 hours." These assumptions are perfectly gratuitous. There is nothing to support them in the text, and they do not accord with the rest of Aristotle's theory. There is in fact nothing behind them except that the Renaissance began the study of the *Poetics* with them and they have never been seriously questioned since, except by Teichmüller.⁹⁷

The difference between what Aristotle says and what he is supposed to say can best be measured by the verb *εἶναι*. What it says is: "Tragedy tries to be, exist, in a certain space of time." What it is made to say, or is supposed to imply, is: "Tragedy presents a series of incidents which it makes out as taking place within a certain space of time." Surely it is obvious that *εἶναι* is not equal to carrying such a weight. We are not dealing with alleged time-relations of the tragic incidents, that is, of the objects represented by the poem,⁹⁸ but with the exist-

⁹⁶ Except by remote implication in *μιμοῦνται πράττοντας*, 2. 48a1.

⁹⁷ The strangest part of all is that most modern translations say no more about the action and its duration than the text does. Thus Butcher: "Tragedy endeavours ... to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun"; Bywater: "Tragedy endeavours ... to keep within a single circuit of the sun"; Rostagni: "cerca di tenersi entro un sol giro di sole." On the face of it these translations do not say a word about the *events* of the play or their presumed duration. Yet the translators themselves, as well as their readers, assume with one accord that they do. How is one to account for such a discrepancy?

⁹⁸ Aristotle was quite capable of expressing such an idea when he chose, and the language he uses in that case has no resemblance to anything here. Cf. 23. 59a22, *οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι δήλωσιν ἀλλ' ἐνὸς χρόνου*; *ibid.* 31, *μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον ... ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν* ("compose," make into a poem) *δλον*; *ibid.* 37, *οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἓνα ποιῶσι καὶ περὶ ἓνα χρόνον κτλ.*

ence of tragedy (that is, of the imitation, or, to speak concretely, the poem) in time.⁹⁹

If this were all, the long and almost unanimous agreement that Aristotle is talking about alleged duration here would be inconceivable. The real justification for it lies in the apparent antithesis *ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρόν ἐξαλλάττειν*. For fairly obvious reasons, these words seem to present an alternative between staying 'under' (*ὑπό*) a certain time-limit and going slightly *over* it (*ἐξαλλάττειν*). And this alternative appears to have meaning only when applied to the tragic *action*; for the actual length of a tragedy, or even of a trilogy, could not possibly exceed one revolution of the sun, whether that be defined as twelve or twenty-four hours. Thus if actual length were meant it appears that *μικρόν ἐξαλλάττειν* would be impossible and meaningless. Since this is the rock on which Teichmüller's theory came to grief,¹⁰⁰ it behooves us to examine it carefully.

The alleged antithesis does not exist. In the first place *ὑπό* does not really mean 'under,' i.e., 'in less (time) than,' as we speak of "running the mile (in) under four minutes." The preposition is common in expressions of time, but always with the meaning 'at (the beginning of)'—for example, *ὑφ' ἡμέραν*, '(just) at day(-break),' *ὑφ' ἑσπέραν*, *ὑπὸ νύκτα*¹⁰¹—or, in a very broad and general sense, 'during, in the course of': *νύχθ' ὑπο τήνδ' ὀλοήν*, *Iliad* X102 ("during this fatal night"); *ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον*, *Thuc.* 4. 129. 2 ("around, about the same time"). Aristotle's use of *ὑπό* in no way differs from this standard usage.¹⁰² It can be said confidently that our modern application of

⁹⁹ It hardly seems necessary to cite examples of *εἶναι* in the sense 'be, exist.' It may be worth while, however, to notice that what exists in time is measured by time, i.e., time-units: cf. *Phys.* 4. 12. 221a8, b5, 15, 23. In the exactly parallel passage 26. 62a18, *ἐν ἐλάττωι μήκει τὸ τέλος τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι*, nobody has ever suggested that *εἶναι* refers to the alleged duration of the events.

¹⁰⁰ See below.

¹⁰¹ This is probably the archetypal phrase from which the others developed, Night being thought of by the early Greeks (like other early peoples) as a kind of tent or cover under whose edge one slips (see O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, Basel, 1945, 29-30, on Night in Hesiod).

¹⁰² Kühner-Gerth 2^a. 1. 525, on *ὑπό* w. acc.: "2) temporal: zur Angabe einer Annäherung an einen Zeitpunkt, wie das Lat. *sub*, ... wie überhaupt bei *unbestimmten Zeitangaben*." Cf. Bonitz, *Index* 795a9: "circa aliquod tempus"; F. Sommer, *Abh. Bayer. Ak.*, N.F. 9 (1934) 10-11. Rudolf Eucken, *Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles*, Berlin, 1868, 74, renders the temporal sense of *ὑπό* in Aristotle by 'während,' 'um,' and none of the examples he cites (*Hist. An.* 4. 10. 537a15; 5.

'under' to time springs from our spatialization of time ('Newtonian' time), which is expressed in written calendars, graphs, and charts and has come to dominate our time-sense to the point of obsession. There is no evidence and no likelihood that Aristotle or any other ancient man had it. All that he means by *ὑπό μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου* is "during a single circuit of the sun"—not necessarily "within (in less than)" that period of time.

Nor, at the other end of the alleged antithesis, does *ἐξαλλάττειν* mean "to exceed this limit" (Butcher). Its basic signification, constant throughout all the poetic and technical uses of the word, is 'change' or 'vary.'¹⁰⁸ Epithets, for example, vary the customary expression and make one's language seem unusual.¹⁰⁴ An *ἐξηλλαγμένον ὄνομα* is an 'altered word,' i.e., a variant form, as *δεξιτερόν* for *δεξιόν* (21. 58a5-7), and Aristotle classifies *ἐξαλλαγαί τῶν ὀνομάτων* with *ἐπεκτάσεις* (lengthenings) and *ἀποκοπαί* (curtailments) as types of variation of words from their normal forms.¹⁰⁵ There is no implication of exceeding a limit; the variation may be in any direction and any amount.¹⁰⁶ The notion of a mathematical limit has been smuggled into our sentence by the prevailing interpretation which forces *ὑπό ... εἶναι* and *ἐξαλλάττειν* into the position of contraries (deficiency and excess respectively); and for some reason the two errors, instead of weakening the whole interpretation, have buttressed each other—an interesting case in philological statics.

But of course even this is not all. The nub of the matter is the limit around which the duration of the tragic action is supposed to revolve,

19. 552b18; 6. 2. 560a7; 9. 13. 615b30; *De Gen. An.* 3. 5. 756a8; *Pol.* 5. 3. 1303a10; 5. 7. 1306b38) shows anything but this simple meaning.

¹⁰⁸ Bywater was too good a Hellenist not to know this. It is interesting to watch him derive the traditional translation from the correct one: "μικρόν ἐξαλλάττειν = to vary, or depart, from that only a little," i.e., 'to exceed that limit only a little.' The reference is not to variation within the limit, but to variation beyond it." Here 'depart' serves as a modulation to lead from 'vary' to 'exceed.'—The definition 'exceed the limit' in Liddell and Scott's *v.*, II. 2, is taken from Butcher; no other example is cited for it.

¹⁰⁴ *Rhet.* 3. 3. 146a14, *ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ (sc. τὰ ἐπίθετα) τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν*; cf. *ibid.* 2. 1404b8.

¹⁰⁵ 22. 58b2. *Ἐξαλλαγή* is of course a standing rhetorical term; see J. Bernays, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F. 8 (1853) 590; Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 296, n. 11 (13. 317).

¹⁰⁶ Thus Vahlen, *loc. cit.*, points out that in *Rhet.* 3. 2. 1404b31 (*ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ πρέποντος τοῦ πρέποντος*) depends on *τὸ μείζον*, not on *ἐξαλλάττει*; the latter still means simply 'vary,' not 'exceed.'

going sometimes below it (*ὑπό*), sometimes a little above (*μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν*). Presumably this limit is stated in the central phrase *μίαν περιόδον ἡλίου*. As everybody knows, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the great battle raged over these words, between the twelve-hour men and the twenty-four-hour men.¹⁰⁷ In the heat of the fray none of the combatants paused to question the assumptions which they all shared in common, viz. (1) that *μίαν περιόδον ἡλίου* is intended as a mathematical limit (twelve hours or twenty-four, depending on one's interpretation, but in any case an exact number of hours and minutes), and (2) that *ὑπό ... εἶναι* and *ἐξαλλάττειν* represent deviations from it in opposite directions. The dispute over the number of hours has been dead, or as we say, academic, since the eighteenth century; but the assumptions just mentioned have not been challenged down to the present day, even by Teichmüller. He argued that Aristotle meant the actual duration of plays, not the alleged duration of their actions; but he assumed as implicitly as everybody else that the span of twelve or twenty-four hours—he believed that it was twelve—was a mathematical limit to which the plays were supposed to approximate.¹⁰⁸ But Teichmüller could not possibly make out that the length of a play, or for that matter of a whole trilogy, could exceed twelve hours or even reach it. He therefore felt obliged to demonstrate on the one hand that the tragedies did at least fill up *most* of a twelve-hour day (hence some eccentric theories as to the program of the dramatic contests, which discredited his whole argument),¹⁰⁹ and on the other hand that *μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν* could mean a divergence *towards the under-side* (p. 209: "Das tragische Spiel versucht einen Umlauf der Sonne auszufüllen oder doch nur wenig daran fehlen zu lassen"), which is absurd.

Thus Teichmüller's challenge to the reigning view came to grief, but not because of a fault in his basic idea. What defeated him was his tacit acceptance of the limit-and-deviations theory. His failure should not blind us to the absurdities on the other side. What can Aristotle mean by saying or implying that the action of a play sometimes exceeds the limit by a little? There are, certainly, some Greek plays which by any strict reckoning go over the mark. The most

¹⁰⁷ For a short sketch of the question see Gudeman 155-158; Joel E. Spingarn, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, New York 1908, 91-101, 206-210.

¹⁰⁸ "Einheit," 208 ff., esp. 209 n.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 184-203. See Bywater 147-148; Butcher 290, n. 2 to p. 289.

flagrant examples are the *Agamemnon* and the *Eumenides*, each of which must last several days (long enough at least for the Argives to get from Troy to Argos, suffering a great storm on the way, and for Orestes, Apollo, and the Furies to get from Delphi to Athens). The trouble is that these dramas exceed the mark by a lot, not a little. And anyway, how much is a little? Is thirteen or fourteen hours permissible (or twenty-six or twenty-seven), but not sixteen or eighteen (twenty-eight or thirty)? And who has ever seen a play, ancient or modern, whose action could be reckoned down to the hour and minute in this fashion? There is no good evidence that Greek dramatists thought very much about the matter one way or another,¹¹⁰ and above all no evidence that Aristotle was interested in it. We shall see later¹¹¹ that in his eyes the representation of the events of a single, unified time-span, of whatever length, is the mark of an inferior poem (the chronicle epics as compared with Homer).

Another feature of the text which has done a good deal to sustain the old view is *πειράται*, "tries, endeavors." It is hard to read *πειράται* without reading into it the added connotation "but sometimes fails"; and then *μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν* is at hand to describe the failure. Actually the word does not necessarily have any such connotation. Tragedy tries very hard (*ὅτι μάλιστα*) to do what it does—and succeeds. Bywater himself points out that *πειράται* means much the same thing as *βούλεται* in 2. 48a18, and neither he nor anyone else has suggested that tragedy and comedy try but sometimes fail to imitate their respective kinds of object. *Βούλεται εἶναι* is in fact a common phrase in Aristotle to signify the tendency (the 'desire') of a thing to attain or exercise its nature, whether the attempt is successful or unsuccess-

¹¹⁰ See O. J. Todd, "One Circuit of the Sun: A Dilemma," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada*, 3rd ser. 36 (1942), sec. 2, 119-132, esp. 124. Wilhelm Felsch, *Breslauer Philol. Abhandl.* 9. 4 (1907), finds in the plays of all three tragedians a consistent striving to limit the action to one day. He claims explicit evidence for this in eleven plays: Aesch. *Suppl.*; Soph. *Ajax Trach.*, *O.T.*, *El.*; Eur. *Atc.*, *Hippol.*, *Med.*, (?) *Ion*, *Phoen.*, *Or.* See pp. 3, 18-21, 44-47. For the other plays Felsch's argument is in general (e.g., p. 19, on *Antigone*) that the successive events are so closely linked together that the action is indubitably finished the same day it is begun. On this fallacy see Todd 120-124. It must be admitted that Felsch has shown evidence for an intermittent tendency, especially on the part of Euripides, to give an impression that the action takes place in a day. But he has not shown that the tendency dominates fifth-century tragedy, or even that it imposes a strict time-scheme on the plays where it does appear.

¹¹¹ Below on 23. 59a22-24, 30-33.

ful.¹¹² He uses *πειρᾶται* here not to suggest an occasional derailment, but to contrast tragedy with epic (and with an earlier stage of tragedy itself), which made no such effort.¹¹³ We notice, moreover, that although the modern commentators talk about a practice of *the poets* (suggesting a spasmodic and irregular affair), Aristotle says nothing of the kind. He is talking about tragedy and epic as genres, about their inherent tendencies, just as he was talking about tragedy and comedy at the end of chapter 2. And indeed the present passage set out (at b9) to compare the two genres as such. Individual poets have nothing to do with the case.

I suggest, therefore, that Aristotle is not talking about the alleged duration of the action or setting up any rule about it, but that he is setting up a rule (i.e., stating an inherent tendency) about the length of tragedy as contrasted with the epic: a rule, or at least something very far from a casual observation. What he says is, "The one works very hard indeed to be (exist) during one circuit of the sun, or to vary but little (i.e., in length, *τῷ μήκει*),¹¹⁴ while the epic has no norm as to its time."

It remains to comment on the sentence from the positive side. Tragedy works hard to exist in a day: that is, to play itself through¹¹⁵ (and thereby to be seen, heard, read, experienced in some fashion or other) in a day. Why is Aristotle interested in this idea, if he was not interested in 'dramatic time'? Because that was an arbitrary and unreal concept, whereas this one is real, in two ways: (1) inwardly or structurally, in that length is the concrete sign of the amount and unity of the action; and (2) outwardly or psychologically, in that the recipient's apprehension of the poem differs essentially with certain differences in length. These propositions are not very meaningful just now, but they will take on body and weight as we come to the other passages that have to do with the length and unity of poems.¹¹⁶

¹¹² See above on 2. 48a18. Cf. the meaning 'mean,' 'veut dire' (said of a word): e.g., Pl. *Crat.* 395b, 401c, 402c, 414d, etc.; [Pl.] *Minos* 315a, νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις; and see R. D. Hicks on *De Anima* 2. 11. 423a14.

¹¹³ *Πειρᾶται* used in this way does seem to be unique here; though *Pol.* 5. 7. 1307a11 is perhaps a parallel.

¹¹⁴ *Τῷ μήκει* is to be taken with both *ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι* and *ἐξαλλάττειν*, as *τῷ χρόνῳ* (which replaces it) goes with *ἀόριστος* (*ἔστιν*).

¹¹⁵ Cf. 26. 62a18, *ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει τὸ τέλος τῆς μμήσεως εἶναι*: an almost precise parallel.

¹¹⁶ Viz. 7. 51a6-15; 9. 51b33-52a1; 17. 55b15-17; 23. 59a22-b2; 24. 59b17-31; 26. 62a18-b12.

With this understanding of Aristotle's meaning, the old question, "Twelve or twenty-four hours?" takes on importance again. Todd,¹¹⁷ after surveying the matter from all angles, and certainly not from the point of view proposed here, concluded that in the *Poetics* (it would not necessarily be the same in a scientific treatise) *περίοδον ἡλίου* means the daylight period.¹¹⁸ This agrees excellently with our argument. So long as *μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου* was supposed to designate 'dramatic time,' the actual length of the period did not matter much, for the extant plays do not give us much help and *a priori* there is little to choose between, say, ten hours and twenty-two, or thirteen and twenty-five. Certainly no extant tragedy is laid at night except the *Rhesus*, although a few begin before dawn;¹¹⁹ so that the night hours do not matter in any case. But if the question is one of actual duration they do matter: that is, they must be excluded. Plays were not performed, and we can be sure that they were not normally read, at night; they did not 'exist,' and were not experienced, during those hours. The drama was a daytime affair in Greece. Aristotle seems to have chosen his language—*περίοδον ἡλίου* in place of *ἡμέραν*—in order to emphasize that he means the visible course of the sun. Unfortunately in so doing he has introduced a new ambiguity, since *περίοδος ἡλίου* could mean the complete diurnal revolution (24 hours). But Todd gives a sufficient answer to these doubts.¹²⁰ The decisive consideration is that tragedy's *περίοδος ἡλίου* must be a time-span that is significant in human experience. Clearly there is nothing significant in the twenty-

¹¹⁷ *Op. cit.* 130-132.

¹¹⁸ It is better not to talk about the '12-hour' day, the modern 'hour' being a completely fixed and dead unit. The natural day varies between nine and fifteen of our hours.—The old use of 'natural day' to denote the 24-hour period, its daylight half being the 'artificial day,' was unfortunate in the extreme: see Teichmüller, "Einheit" 214 n. 2. In the natural language of early Greece *ἡμέρα* (*ἡμέρα*) means 'daylight period,' like *day*, *days*, etc.: cf. *Od.* ξ93; *Hes. O. D.* 102; Heraclitus fr. 67 Diels, *ἡμέρη ἐσφρόνη*; and cf. the phrases *ἄμ' ἡμέρα*, *ἐξ ἡμέρας*, *μεθ' ἡμέραν*. It acquires the inclusive, 24-hour meaning only when *series* of days come up for consideration, e.g., in calendar-making, history, etc. But even there the inclusion of the hours of darkness is usually implicit rather than explicit.

¹¹⁹ Notably *Agamemnon*, *Antigone*, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, *Acharnians*. Only war, love, wine, or thievery, or a combination of them, kept classical Greeks awake after sundown, and three of these pursuits were not heroic enough for tragedy. Even war, of the heroic variety, is recessed for the hours of darkness (the *Doloneia* is the exception that proves the rule).

¹²⁰ *Op. cit.*

four-hour span. What is there in the natural day? This: 'one circuit of the sun' represents *the maximum length of a single span of uninterrupted attention, and therefore of a single poetic experience*. It is the greatest possible stretch of felt unity in an art that operates through time. We shall be able to develop this idea more fully when we have the material provided by the next passage that deals with the length of tragedy, 7. 50b34-51a15.

Ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίον εἶναι, then, states a principle of concentration that is sought—and attained—by tragedy. It states it in concrete, experiential terms: the literary work exists during a single waking period. But this is not the only way in which the phenomenon can be grasped. Tragedy had, in contrast to the epic, a notable tendency to *uniformity* of length. If we set Aeschylus aside, on the ground that Aristotle perhaps was not thinking about him, our extant classical tragedies range in length from 1234 lines (Euripides, *Suppliants*)¹²¹ to 1779 (Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*): a variation against which one must set a range of thousands of lines in the epic. It seems clear that *ἢ μικρόν ἐξαλλάττειν* refers to this comparative invariability of length in tragedy: "or to vary (but) little" (·c. in length, τῷ μήκει). It is a statement of greater generality than the other one: the same tendency is seen from another point of view.¹²² What it presents is not an alternative length but an alternative formulation of the principle of length. Both ways of putting the matter will reappear in the *Poetics*. As for the principle itself, we will learn to know it later (7. 51b14) as the *δρος τοῦ μήκους (μεγέθους)*, the *norm of length*.

Ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ. So long as the sentence was thought to refer to 'dramatic time,' the sense of this was perfectly clear: the action of tragedy was limited to one day, or a few hours more, while that of the epic might cover months or years. But in fact the two Homeric epics, which Aristotle certainly has specially in mind in later passages dealing with length and time and most probably has in mind here, do *not* run to months or years. The action of the *Iliad*

¹²¹ The *Cyclops* (709 lines) is a satyr-play; the *Alcestis* (1163) was given in lieu of one; the *Heraclidae* (1055) is defective; and we cannot reliably fix the date or authorship of the *Rhesus* (996). Hence it seems fair enough to begin with the *Suppliants* (Sophocles' shortest play, the *Trachiniae*, is about the same length: 1278). Aeschylus I omit altogether, on the ground that Aristotle's present tense *περιῶται* probably does not include him. See below on *ἔστ*, 13. 53a18.

¹²² It is conceivable that the phrase is a later addition by Aristotle, but see below on 7. 51 a 6-8.

lasts only fifty or fifty-one days, that of the *Odyssey* forty-one. Moreover the largest part of these time-allowances is purely arbitrary, theoretical, so to speak (the visit of the gods to the Ethiopians in *Iliad* A; the preparations for Hector's funeral in Ω ; Odysseus at sea on his raft for seventeen days, in ϵ). In both poems the real action lasts only a few days: hardly enough to justify *δόριστος*.¹²³ And anyway there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle supposed they covered vast amounts of time. The evidence, if anything, points in the other direction.¹²⁴ Our interpretation of the sentence enables us to get at his real meaning. What he means is simply that the epic, unlike tragedy, has no effective norm of length.¹²⁵ Practically, this has two aspects: (1) some epics, especially the ones Aristotle most admired (*Iliad* and *Odyssey*), are so long that they could not possibly be 'played' or read

¹²³ On the supposed duration of the *Iliad* see J. van Leeuwen, *Commentationes Homericae*, Leyden, 1921, 44-45; H. Draheim, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F. 76 (1927) 331-332; for the *Odyssey*, H. Peters, *Neue Jahrb. f. d. kl. Alt.* 53 (1924) 201-202. The longest time-spans in the *Iliad* are those during which nothing happens (i.e., no change takes place in the situation, there is nothing new to tell): A53 (nine days: plague), 423-475 (eleven days: gods absent in Ethiopia), Ω 12-30 (eleven days: Achilles continues to maltreat Hector's body), 784-787 (eleven days: gathering of wood, burning of the body). Together, these few lines account for forty-two days, over four-fifths of all the alleged elapsed time in the poem, while conversely most of the fighting (books A to Σ) takes place in one day. In the *Odyssey* nearly half of the alleged total duration passes in one line, ϵ 278. In short, the supposed times are meaningless, at least for purposes of comparison with tragedy. See H. Fränkel, "Die Zeitaufassung in der archaischen griechischen Literatur," *Beltageheft zur Zeitschr. f. Ästhetik u. allgem. Kunstwiss.* 25 (1931) 97-118, esp. 99 (= Fränkel, *Wege u. Formen frühgr. Denkens*, Munich, 1955, 2-3): "Es gibt noch keinen festen zeitlichen Rahmen, der die epischen Ereignisse umspannen, und jedes an seinen Ort binden würde. Soweit die Vorgänge zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt sind, ist es ein sachlicher Zusammenhang: die Personen gehören zusammen; ein Ereignis wird für jemanden zum Anlass darauf zu reagieren; es begegnet jemandem etwas; jemand beobachtet etwas und greift nun ein. Ein homerisches *während* oder *als* oder *nachdem* meint viel weniger ein Zeitverhältnis, als einen solchen sachlichen Zusammenhang." Willamowitz, *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus*, Berlin, 1927, 133: "Die Tage hat der Dichter nicht gezählt, die Hörer konnten es gar nicht, und so viele das auch in Ilias und Odyssee getan haben, immer ist es ein Rationalismus gewesen, der die Poesie und erst recht den rhapsodischen Vortrag verkennt."

¹²⁴ See below on 23. 59a30-37.

¹²⁵ As we said, *χρόνος* is substituted for *μήκει* here as it is in 26. 62b1, *πολλῶ κεραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ*. Thus *τῷ μήκει* and *τῷ χρόνῳ* frame the sentence between them. Their equivalence was established by Teichmüller: too bad that his proof did not survive the collapse of his thesis as a whole.

in a single waking period, and (2) taken all together, epics show the wildest variation in length, from a few hundred lines (e.g., the *Shield of Heracles*) to over 15,000 (the *Iliad*). The epic is ἀόριστος from both points of view.

The difference that Aristotle has in mind is no casual or unimportant one, since he puts it last and dwells on it longest. Uniformity of length, or completion in a day: both traits mark tragedy as the superior genre, more efficient, more in command of its means. Aristotle will draw this moral in chapter 26. Here it is indicated indirectly, by the remark that "in the first stage they used to do this in their tragedies in the same way as in (their) epics." It is hard to give this clause a definite meaning¹²⁶—until we notice that Aristotle is now speaking of individual poets, not of the genres as such, and recall that according to his view of the development the epic poets turned into tragic poets under the influence of Homer. The earliest tragedians were still epic poets at heart, just learning the demands of the new genre. What more natural than that they should retain at first the diffuseness of epic and not know how to achieve the norm of length? Unfortunately, lacking any clue to the persons or even the exact period Aristotle has in mind, we cannot quite bring his remark into focus—that is, we cannot tell whether he means Arion, Thespis, or Phrynichus and Aeschylus. Hardly the latter: τὸ πρῶτον sounds too distant. But we can guess at one fact which may have assisted Aristotle's conjecture. In Homer he found poems of vast length, embracing masses of material; and at the other end, in Aeschylus, he observed the connected trilogy, a kind of epic on the stage. Καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον κτλ. suggests that he drew a line between these two phenomena and assumed at some point along it, well before Aeschylus, a still more epic stage of composition when the poets 'sowed with the sack.'¹²⁷ In any case we see once more that he is theorizing.

The last two sentences of the chapter (μέρη δ' ἐστὶ κτλ.) are not essential but serve as preface to the discussion of tragedy, warning the reader that everything that is important about epic is contained

¹²⁶ Rostagni's note on it is a striking proof of his power of intuition under the handicap of a wrong understanding of the passage as a whole.

¹²⁷ Thus, as Rostagni says, Aristotle may have anticipated Maurice Croiset's theory (*RÉG* 1 [1888] 369-380) that the content of a whole trilogy was originally poured into a single play—except that the idea has nothing to do with 'dramatic time.'

in tragedy, so that the chapters on the latter will also give us the basic doctrine on the former. Above all, the theory of tragedy will equip us to *evaluate* the epic, i.e., to see its value in the light of the higher form.

Three things about these last few lines suggest the possibility that they are a later addition by Aristotle:

1. The consideration of the likenesses and differences between the two *genres* is really finished at *ἐν τοῖς ἔπεισιν*, and *περὶ μὲν οὖν κτλ.* at the beginning of chapter 6 resumes the forward march.

2. The *μέρη* are those of the next chapter, and there is some incongruity in their being mentioned here before they are established and defined—an incongruity which would be lessened if Aristotle penned these lines after chapter 6 was written.

3. The use of *σπουδαίας* and *φύλης* in a sense so different from the one we have had so far—a frankly technical, craftsman's sense of 'good' and 'bad'—would likewise be easier to explain psychologically if the rest of the work had been written earlier.

But these surmises are not sufficient for proof. We will leave b16-20 as a part of Aristotle's transition.

49b21-31

- περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ κωμωδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν· περὶ δὲ τραγωδίας λέγωμεν ἀπολαμβάνοντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὄρον τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας
- 25 | καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχουσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας [δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περιίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν]. (λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν [καὶ μέλος], τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς
- 30 | εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἕνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους.)

49b21

- Well then, about the mimetic art that works in hexameters, and about comedy, we shall speak later; let us now discuss tragedy, picking out of what has been said the definition of its essential nature that was emerging in the course of its development. Tragedy, then, is an imitation of
- 25 an action which is serious, complete, and has bulk, in speech that has been made attractive, using each of its species separately in the parts of the play; with persons performing the action rather than through narrative [carrying to completion, through a course of events involving pity and fear, the purification of those painful or fatal acts which have that quality]. (By "speech that has been made attractive" I mean speech that has rhythm and melody
- 30 [and song] attached to it; and by "each of its species separately" I mean that some sections of the play are carried forward by verses alone and some the other way round, by song.)

Enough of epic and comedy for a while; we turn to tragedy. The famous definition appears to be put forward as "emerging (Bywater: "resulting") from what has been said." But this involves assuming a

hyperbaton (*ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὄρον* for *τὸν ἐκ τ. ε. γ. ὄρον*)¹ and an awkward catachresis of *γινόμενον*. Definitions do not "grow" out of things said, in Aristotle's world, however natural the metaphor may seem to us. The clue to the participle is rather in 4. 49a13-14, *ὄσον ἐ γ ἰ γ ν ε τ ο φανερόν αὐτῆς*; *ibid.* 15, *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*; and the implication which we uncovered in 5. 49b9-10, *ἣ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ ... ἠκολούθησεν*. Tragedy became itself in the development which was outlined in chapters 4 and 5; and the allusion here is to that process of becoming: "Let us talk about tragedy, (first) picking out from what has been said the definition of its essence as it was (which was, which we saw in process of) becoming." The present participle represents precisely the imperfect *ἐγίγνετο*.

This not only clarifies the present construction but supplies another proof that the 'history' in chapter 4 was indeed intended as a record of tragedy's *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*. And this in turn facilitates our review of the items in the definition: they are in fact taken both from the systematic chapters 1-3 and from the 'history.'

Μίμησις was introduced in chapter 1, but attained its first significant realization in Homer (4. 48b34, *μάλιστα ποιητής*, = *μάλιστα μιμητής*) and its final one in tragedy (49a15, *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*, which as we saw meant (1) the victory of dialogue over choral odes and (2) adoption of the appropriate verse-form).

Πράξεως. Poetry was said to imitate *πράττοντας*, 2. 48a1. The implication inherent in the participle, which will later be formulated in explicit terms (50a16, *μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίον κτλ.*), was likewise adumbrated by Homer: 48b35-37, *μμήσεις δραματικὰς ... δραματοποιήσας*, and even before him, in the first serious improvisations, 48b25, *τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις κτλ.* Moreover the words used to designate the object of imitation have tended from the beginning to be neuter more often than masculine:² Aristotle has been thinking all along of actions more than of men.

Σπουδαίας has been said before (2. 48a2), but when put, as now, in direct connection with *πράξεως*, makes it clearer than before that the business of tragedy is not simply to represent moral elevation. A shift of meaning has set in which is parallel to that actually stated for comedy in 5. 49a32: *μίμησις φανλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν*.

¹ See Gudeman *ad loc.*; Vahlen, *Poet.*³ 117, 184-185.

² *Ἐτερα*, 1, 47a17; 2. 48a8; τὰ αὐτά, 3. 48a20; ᾱ, *ibid.* 25; τὰ σπουδαία, 4. 48b34; τὸ γελοῖον, *ibid.* 37; 5. 49a34; *σπουδαίων* (probably neuter), 5. 49b10.

Τελείας was more evidently *not* anticipated in any of the preceding chapters. It was at best implied in the 'norm of length' passage, 5. 49b12-14—how, we shall see when we come to chapter 7. The concept is part of a fabric of thought that will not be finished for some time yet.

Μέγεθος was stated explicitly in 5. 49b10 as a point of likeness between tragedy and epic.³ There it was not attached to the action, but was an attribute of 'tragedy' and 'epic' as such. Why it must belong specifically to the action is again something that will have to grow clearer as we proceed.⁴

Ἠδυσμένω λόγῳ again introduces no new element, but makes explicit the hierarchical relation which emerged in the course of the 'history' among the three media, speech, melody, and rhythm. In chapter 1 they seemed to figure as equals, marrying and divorcing with apparent freedom. But even there we found that poetry was really the realm of speech. Its two great divisions were those of 'speech used bare' and speech combined with melody and rhythm.⁵ Here at last speech takes its due place at the center, in explicit terms, and is distinguished according as it is 'sweetened' by rhythm alone (the spoken verses, *μέτρα*, b30) or by rhythm and melody (the songs, *μέλος*, b31).⁶ This is at the same time a ranking: speech is the basic food, rhythm and melody are the frosting on the cake.⁷ Again we were prepared for this estimate by Aristotle's 'history,' which ignored melody⁸ and took effective cognizance of the poetic medium only *qua* verse, that is,

³ The customary reference to *ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος*, 4. 49a19, is not in place, even if our athetesis of that passage should be wrong, since there the word almost certainly implies 'grandeur,' 'solemnity,' and here it almost certainly does not.

⁴ A formal distinction between terms previously mentioned or virtually mentioned—e.g., *μέγεθος* (in *μεγάλη* and *μήκει*, 5. 49b10-12)—and those not so mentioned, like *τελείας*, would be artificial and misleading. 'Catharsis' is different; see below.

⁵ As we saw, *τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν*, 5. 49b10, summarized and implied this dichotomy.

⁶ *Καὶ μέλος* is a gloss (*del.* Victorius) on *ἁρμονίαν*, by someone who had 1. 47b25 (*ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ*) in mind. In b31 *μέλος* is song, the compound of words, rhythm, and melody; it cannot at the same time be one of its own components, or be 'had' by *λόγος*. See above on 1. 47b25.

⁷ Aristotle betrays the limitations of his literary sensibility in *ἡδυσμένω λόγῳ*. The expression may be borrowed from Plato, *Rep.* 10. 607a, but there it refers to all the wanton enticements of poetry, not merely its music and rhythm. When all is said and done, Aristotle's attitude toward style is basically that of the *Rhetoric*, 3. 1. 1404a11: *ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν*.

⁸ After its first mention, 4. 48b20.

quia rhythmical speech. Moreover the crucial fact about the culmination of the development was the emergence of speech or dialogue as the 'protagonist,' under Aeschylus.⁹

*Χωρίς ἐκάστω*¹⁰ *τῶν εἰδῶν*. *Ἡ χωρίς ἢ μεμιγμένοις* was the principle of division of the media in chapter 1 (47a23), and we saw that *χωρίς* there did not mean each medium singly: that it referred to their use in pairs. Moreover, under the rubric *μεμιγμένοις*, which denoted the use of all three media, tragedy belonged to the class which used them *κατὰ μέρος* (47b28). *Χωρίς ἐκάστω τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις* is a restatement of (*πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις*) *κατὰ μέρος*. Fortunately Aristotle has spelled out his meaning in this case (a29-31) and made it clear that he regards the play as falling into just two alternating¹¹ 'parts,' the verses (dialogue) and the songs.¹²

Δρώντων is the new formulation of the principle (*ἔστι μιμῆσθαι ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους*, 3. 48a23. We saw that the long subsequent note, 48a24-b2, betrayed a new special interest on Aristotle's part in the term *δρᾶμα*; that in fact, so far as we can see, he is the originator of the concept 'drama.' But this concept already appeared full-fledged in the new terms *δραματικός* and *δραματοποιήσας*, 4. 48b35-37, a passage which we saw no reason to diagnose as 'late.' *Δρώντων* likewise belongs to the original stock of Aristotle's theory, indeed it seems to represent the germinal idea of 'drama.'

So far we have found no term, or at least no concept, which was not either stated or prepared for in chapters 1 to 5. The exact word or phrase was not there in every case; but it is a matter of ideas, not words. Aristotle's definition is not assembled mechanically out of phrases previously employed; it represents the essence which was in process of realization in the history as he summarized it.

Δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαινουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. This part of the definition has certainly *not* been prepared for. Nothing in chapters 1 to 5 gives us the slightest clue to anything

⁹ 49a17; cf. *ibid.* 23, *λέξεως ... γενομένης*.

¹⁰ Tkatsch's defense of *ἐκάστω* as genitive absolute, 2. 75-76, is not convincing in the absence of an *ὄντος*. The parallel *τὸ δὲ χωρίς τοῖς εἰδοῖσι*, b29-30, is decisive.

¹¹ *Καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους*.

¹² That is, he pays no attention to the *interlacing* of spoken verses and songs (*κομμοί, ἀπὸ τῆς σκηρῆς*), the operative tendency which, especially in Euripides, tended to break down the clear division between the two 'kinds.' The handling of these matters in the spurious chapter 12 is quite different; see below *ad loc.*

in it. It is not merely that the terms are new, but that nothing has been said with which we could possibly associate them. The difference in this respect between the clause and the rest of the definition is complete.

The isolation and difficulty of the catharsis-clause are indeed notorious; for the word *κάθαρσις* does not occur again in the *Poetics*.¹³ But critics and philologists are not the men to be daunted by lack of evidence: the mass of writing about *δι' ἑλέου ... κάθαρσιν* is almost in inverse proportion to the extent of the visible material. The controversy over catharsis has revolved—for some periods, 'spun' would be a better term—on its own axis for so long, and with so little determinate result, that one sometimes wonders whether it should not be declared officially closed or debarred. Certainly it would be quixotic to try to deal with it as a whole here. Even a full survey of the literature on the subject would require a book in itself.¹⁴ All that we are

¹³ Except in one passage (17. 55b15) which has nothing to do with 'catharsis.'

¹⁴ There is no full survey in print of the voluminous literature on the catharsis question. An unpublished North Carolina dissertation by Duane W. Robertson, Jr. (Chapel Hill, 1937), gives *A Preliminary Survey of the Controversy over Aristotle's Doctrine of the Tragic Catharsis*. Unfortunately the only *Jahresbericht* on Aristotle published in this century devotes only five pages to the whole *Poetics* (Paul Gohlke, *Burs. Jahresber.* 220 [1929] 323-328). The most useful summaries of the standard interpretations of catharsis are still those of Susemihl and Hicks, *The Politics of Aristotle, Books I-V*, London, 1894, 641-656, and Bywater, 152-161, 361-365. Butcher's chapter (VI, pp. 240-273) professes to accept the medical interpretation, but builds on top of it a precarious structure of other ideas ("refining or clarifying of emotion"; connection with the theory of the universal) which really have nothing to do with it. The prevailing 'medical' interpretation is of course that of Jakob Bernays, *Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie*, Breslau, 1857; reprinted in *Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotelische Theorie des Drama*, Berlin, 1880 (anticipated by Henri Weil, "Ueber die Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles," *Verhandlungen der 10. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Basel 1847*, Basel, 1848, 131-140, and in effect by Tyrwhitt and others as far back as the Renaissance: see Bywater, *loc. cit.*), according to which 'catharsis' is a purgation, accompanied by a pleasurable sense of relief, from accumulating emotional tendencies, especially tendencies to pity and fear, which would otherwise poison our mental health. Bernays' interpretation has been corrected or refuted on several major points, e.g., by Bonitz, who showed ("Aristotelische Studien, V. Über πάθος and πάθημα im Aristotelischen Sprachgebrauche," *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 55 [1867] 13-55) that Aristotle makes no essential distinction between πάθος and πάθημα. Nevertheless it has dominated most thinking on catharsis since its publication, and still remains, with minor variations in detail, what one might call the vulgate. The most determined attack upon Bernays' theory was made by Heinrich Otte in a series of publications beginning with

attempting to do is to analyze Aristotle's argument as it moves forward, leaving the general *Katharsisfrage* to come up later.

It will assist in clarifying our interpretation, however, if we begin by summarizing the presuppositions that are shared by all or most of the writers on the subject:

1. They almost all¹⁵ agree that Aristotle is talking about a change of feeling, or even of character, which tragedy brings about (effectuates: *περαίνουσα*) in the spectator.

2. They all assume (implicitly) that this effect is automatic and is produced by all 'tragedies.'

3. They almost all¹⁶ presuppose that *παθημάτων* means 'feelings' or 'passions.'

4. Most of them take *ἔλεου καὶ φόβου* as likewise denoting the spectator's emotions: pity and fear are aroused in him and subsequently purified or purged. Others, however,¹⁷ read *δι' ἔλεου καὶ φόβου* as equivalent to *δι' ἔλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν*, the pathetic and fearful *events* of the play.

5. Most of them translate *τῶν τοιούτων* by "such" (*dergleichen, de ce genre, talium*, etc.)—a translation which if pressed would force one to admit that there are other "such" emotions (i.e., tragic emotions)

Kennl Aristoteles die sogenannte tragische Katharsis? Berlin, 1912, and ending with *Neue Beiträge zur Aristotelischen Begriffsbestimmung der Tragödie*, Berlin, 1928, and "Noch einmal *κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων*," *Philol. Wochenschrift* 50 (1930) 1165-1166 (for the rest see the Cooper-Gudeman *Bibliography of the Poetics of Aristotle*, [Cornell Studies in English, 11], New Haven, 1928, 167). My own interpretation is akin to Otte's (summarized briefly in *Neue Beiträge* 9-10) in some respects, but was arrived at independently and differs in important particulars.—The Cooper-Gudeman *Bibliography* and its continuation by M. T. Herrick (*AJP* 52 [1931] 168-174) list 147 books, dissertations, and articles since 1856 whose titles clearly indicate that they deal specifically with catharsis; and to that figure one must add of course all the major editions of the *Poetics* and many of the general books on the *Poetics* and Aristotle. I confess that I have not tried to master this flood of publications, few of which are of more than ephemeral importance. But those of the last fifteen years are summarized in my report in *CW* 48 (1954-55) 73-82. See also Pohlenz *Trag.* 487-489, Erläut.-band 195-198; and cf. H. Flashar, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 17-18.

¹⁵ Except Otte.

¹⁶ Again excepting Otte.

¹⁷ E.g., Rostagni (= Valgimigli): "mediante (una serie di) casi che suscitano pietà e terrore"; Fyfe: "with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis ..."

besides pity and fear. Others take τῶν τοιούτων as meaning in effect τούτων, pity and fear being the only tragic emotions.¹⁸

6. Almost all of them understand Aristotle to say that the emotional change designated by τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν is brought about *by* (by means of, δι') pity and fear: the pity and fear aroused in the spectator somehow purge or purify themselves.

7. As to the change itself (κάθαρσιν), a majority of interpreters in the last century follow Bernays and Weil in understanding it to be a 'purgation'; though the older idea of 'purification' still has some supporters.¹⁹

It will be seen that notwithstanding the controversy over κάθαρσιν itself ('purgation' vs. 'purification'), most of the interpreters agree on a series of understandings as to the other terms in the passage. The sum or mean of these understandings can be suitably represented by Butcher's translation: "through pity and fear effecting the purgation of these emotions." In particular it has been taken for granted, without argument, that the catharsis-clause, whatever it means, has to do with the emotional reaction of the spectator (no. 1 above).²⁰ So deep-seated is this prejudice ('prejudice' in the root-sense) that a challenge to it is not very likely to receive a full hearing. It is like the unspoken pre-

¹⁸ So Bernays himself, Butcher, Gomperz, Rostagni. On the importance of the phrase see Otte, *Neue Beiträge* 8; for a refutation of its equivalence to τούτων, J. I. Beare, "Anaphoric ὁ τοιοῦτος in Aristotle," *Hermathena* 18 (1914-19) 116-135. Recent explanations of the construction of the genitive by F. Dirlmeier, "Κάθαρσις παθημάτων," *Hermes* 75 (1940) 81-92; Max Kommerell, *Lessing u. Ar. (Frankfurt. Wiss. Beiträge zur Kull.-wiss. 2)*, Frankfurt, 1940, 262-272; R. Schottlaender, "Eine Fessel der Tragödiendeutung," *Hermes* 81 (1953) 22-29.

¹⁹ Spengel, for example, sustained it against Bernays. Actually it is an oversimplification to reduce the alternatives to two, purgation and purification, since there are a number of other possibilities. Cf. A. Dyroff's complaint (*Berl. Philol. Wochenschrift* 38 [1918] 615-617) against Bernays for insisting on a strict alternative, 'lustration' (religious) or 'relief' (medical). But in fact, since Bernays, there have been two main lines of interpretation of 'catharsis,' one holding to the medical sense (purgation or relief of the spirit *from* the emotions) and insisting on the 'autonomy' of art, the other explaining the word in various ways but tending towards an ethical concept (purification *of* the emotions). The latter view has been on the wane; but Rostagni, for example, though professing to accept the medical sense, combines it with the 'orgiastic' and arrives at an eclectic moral theory: catharsis is the reduction of the passions to measure and reason. See his *Introd.* XLIII-LIV, and, for a similar interpretation, Louis Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des grecs d'Homère à Aristote (Études et Commentaires, 12)*, Paris, 1952, 410-419.

²⁰ See Otte, *op. cit.* 11-12.

judice that 5. 49b12-14 deals with the alleged duration of the poetic action, and perhaps it will do no more good here than there to point out that Aristotle does not *say* anything of the kind: that the reigning assumption is based entirely on a particular interpretation of terms which are capable of other meanings.

In the present case, since we cannot fall back on anything that has been said by Aristotle up to this point, we shall have to break our rule of method and lean more heavily on what he says later; for in contradistinction to Bernays and the cathartic school I believe that there is adequate material later in the *Poetics* to define his meaning here.²¹ That material is mainly in chapters 13 and 14. We will do no more at present than to show by means of it that the catharsis clause *can* have a different meaning from the one usually ascribed to it; the full analysis of the matter will be reserved till later.

Δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου need not necessarily mean 'through, by means of' pity and fear. A good many unprejudiced observers have questioned²² how pity and fear can be purged or purified—whichever it is—by themselves. Some critics have therefore tended to reinterpret 'pity and fear' as 'pathetic and fearful incidents' (= *δι' ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν*). That is sound enough so far as it goes, but it does not solve the problem. The reason why the notion of pity and fear being purged by pity and fear has persisted is that no other agency has been visible in the sentence through which the catharsis could be brought about. But there is such an agency, as we shall see in a moment.

"The purification (or purgation) of such emotions." It is natural to refer *παθημάτων* to *ἐλέου καὶ φόβου*, since the latter stand so near. But the reference involves us in another ineluctable difficulty; for then either (1) *τῶν τοιούτων* must = *τούτων*, or (2) there must be other tragic emotions besides pity and fear. But (1) *τῶν τοιούτων* is *not* simply = *τούτων*,²³ and (2) there is no plausible case for any other tragic emotion, much less a series of them.²⁴ The solution is not dif-

²¹ One considerable weakness of Bernays' theory, though one which has seldom been pointed out, is that although it draws on the *Politics* (particularly, of course, 8. 7. 1341b32-42a16), Plutarch, Aristides Quintilianus, Iamblichus, and Proclus, but neither explains nor is supported by anything in the *Poetics* itself. See below, pp. 440-441.

²² Most recently Maria T. Cardini in *Studi di filosofia greca*, Bari, 1950, 302 n. 1, and Schottlaender, *op. cit.*

²³ See Beare, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Not that others are not possible, but that Aristotle never speaks of them.

ficult, but it involves reading *παθημάτων* in the sense which is defined in 11. 52b11: *πάθος δέ ἐστι προᾶξις φθαρτικῆ ἢ ὀδυνηρά.*²⁵ It is clear that Aristotle thought the *pathos* the basic, indispensable 'part' of the tragic plot, since (1) peripety and recognition are limited to complex plots while the *pathos* is not, and (2) the calculations of the tragic quality of a play (14. 53b14 ff.) are based upon the way the *pathos* is brought about, revealed, averted, etc.²⁶ The purpose of Aristotle's survey there is to determine which of the *συμπέπτοντα* (that is, the *pathē*: 53b20) are pitiable and fearful. There are in fact *pathē* which are bloody or painful enough but which do not arouse either pity or fear, or not in the desired amount.²⁷

These parallels supply us with an unexceptionable meaning for *τῶν τοιούτων*. "Such *pathē*" are *pathē* which are such as to have tragic quality, i.e., to arouse pity and fear.²⁸ Aristotle makes it amply clear, 53b19, under what general condition they have that quality, or the possibility of it: namely when the destructive or painful events in question take place *within the bounds of family ties* (*ἐν ταῖς φιλίας*). *Τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων*, then, will be *pathē*—a murder or intended murder, etc.—involving father and son, brother and sister, or the like. (Once again, we are not trying to settle the whole catharsis problem here, but simply to show another possible meaning for the catharsis-clause. The final decision must wait until we have analyzed chapter 14).

To return now to *δι' ἔλεον καὶ φόβον*: the preposition can perfectly well mean 'through (a sequence of), in the course of,' referring not to an emotional end-effect with which we leave the theater, but to pity and fear as they are incorporated in the structure of the play by the poet.²⁹

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτλ., 13. 53a1 ff., clearly excludes any third factor (*ὁ μὲν* and *ὁ δέ*, 'the one' and 'the other'). *Τὸ φιλόανθρωπον*, in the same passage, is not a distinct emotion but a low-grade variety or sub-form of pity; see below *ad loc.*

²⁵ *Παθημάτων* is normally used for the genitive plural, instead of *παθῶν*, without any difference in meaning; Bonitz, *op. cit.* (above, n. 14), esp. 53 n. 16. It appears in precisely the sense suggested here in 24. 59b11-12.

²⁶ See below *ad loc.*

²⁷ E.g., the killing of an enemy, 53b17.

²⁸ The reference to *ἔλεον καὶ φόβον* is close and easy, and since the *pathē* are not themselves emotions but have emotional quality, we are rid of the awkwardness about *τοιούτων*. When I say, "If you want to arouse pity and fear you have to look for such incidents (incidents of that kind)," it will not occur to anybody that "such" includes more emotions than the two I have just mentioned.

²⁹ "Built into the events," i.e., woven into the plot, 14. 53b13.

Περαίνειν, usually translated 'effect, accomplish,' has from its root (*πέρας*) the sense 'carry through, bring to completion': said of something that takes a while to complete, and emphasizing the duration.³⁰ Naturally this is especially the case in the progressive tenses (*πεπεράνθαι* means either 'to be finished' or 'to be bounded'). Above all it is profitable to notice the other two occurrences of the word in the *Poetics*: 24. 59b27, *πολλὰ μέρη ἄμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα*, "to 'compose' many 'parts' at (as of) the time³¹ they are happening, being carried on"; and three lines below our own sentence, 43b30, *διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι*, "that some are carried on (forward)³² by verses alone." It seems at least possible, in view of these facts, to take *περαίνουσα* as denoting a process which goes forward throughout the play, rather than simply an end-result which accrues to the spectator.

What, now, 'carries forward' the purification through the course of the play? Not the text, as a body of words, or the performance of the text in a theater, but the *process of imitation* which tragedy essentially is. Tragedy, which imitates action, is itself an action. According to Aristotle's analysis, which is put forward and strongly emphasized later in this same chapter, this action is represented by the plot: the plot is the imitation of it.³³ Plot is the *ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλον ψυχῆ* of tragedy: i.e., its principle of motion, its soul, as it were.³⁴ The purification, then, is carried forward by the plot, the 'structure of events' which is the poet's own indispensable contribution to the play. What this means cannot be seen clearly or fully until we have studied chapters 13 and 14. But there is a corollary that can be seen at once: this reading makes catharsis a process, not an end-result, and a *process operated by the poet through his 'structure of events.'* It follows that some tragedies will accomplish it supremely well, others less well, still

³⁰ E.g., *Phys.* 4. 14. 223b6, *τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἄμα περαινόμενων*; *De Part. An.* 3. 4. 666b14, *περαίνονται (sc. αἱ κινήσεις) διὰ τοῦ ἔλκεω καὶ ἀνέναι*; *Hist. An.* 1. 15. 494a24, *ἵνα περαίνηται τὸ ἐφεξῆς*; cf. *Pl. Prot.* 353b, *πέραιναι ὡσπερ ἤρξω* ("carry on as you have begun"); *Laws* 9. 864c, *περαίνοντες τὴν θέσιν τῶν νόμων*; and the common expression *ὁ συλλογισμὸς περαίνεται*, "the syllogism is completed" (synonym *τελειοῦται*, cf. *Anal. Pr.* 1. 7. 29a30-34). See Bonitz, *Index* 579b17-25.

³¹ See below *ad loc.* for this interpretation of *ἄμα*.

³² "Verlaufen," Gomperz. Not "are rendered" (Butcher), "are worked out" (Bywater).

³³ 50a3-4.

³⁴ 50a38.

others, it may be, not at all. If catharsis depends on the constructive activity of the poet, it ceases to be a standard result, automatically attained by any play called 'tragedy.'

As for *κάθαρσιν* itself, we shall have to reserve our explanation of it also till later.³⁵ Again, however, one fact is clear at once. If the *παθημάτων* are incidents or actions rather than emotions, then *κάθαρσιν* must mean purification of some kind, not purgation: for the incidents are certainly not to be purged out of the play.

I submit that this interpretation of the catharsis clause is possible, does full justice to every word, and is not dogged by the paradoxes and inconsistencies that we have noticed in the current theory.³⁶ Its final justification remains to be seen. Again, however, there is a corollary which must follow if our analysis has had any virtue at all. Howald and his pupil Lienhard³⁷ have put forward the thesis that the catharsis clause belongs to an early, in fact the original, stage of the work: that when Aristotle began he was concerned above everything else with the ethical and emotional *effect* of tragedy. If there is any virtue in our analysis so far, Howald would seem to be wrong. The catharsis clause must be, if anything, later than the rest of the sentence, for three reasons:

1. Unlike the rest of the definition, there is not a syllable in it which has been said or anticipated in the foregoing chapters.

³⁵ Below on 14. 53b37-54a9.

³⁶ The chief strength of Bernays' theory was that it fit the passage in the *Politics* (8. 7. 1341b38 ff.) so well; its chief weakness was its inadequacy vis-à-vis the present clause, which it was supposed to explain. Conversely, the chief weakness of my hypothesis is that it does not fit the *Politics* passage. I hope that it has the compensating virtue of according with the *Poetics*, including the crucial passages in chapter 14. "Ἀμεινον τὰ μὲν οἴκοι καλῶς ἔχειν...—Otte was right, I think, on the main point, that the clause has to do with how the poet shapes his plot (*op. cit.* 9); in taking *παθημάτων* to denote events or actions rather than feelings as such; and in seeing that *περαινουσα* refers to something *going on* throughout the play, not merely delivered as a product at the end (the same point is made by E. P. Papanoutsos, *Eranos* 46 [1948] 77-93). He went astray, on the other hand, in insisting that the purification is achieved *by pity and fear* and in making τῶν τοιοῦτων refer all the the way back to *πράξεως σπουδαίας* (*op. cit.* 22-46). Moreover he established no really organic link between the catharsis clause and the crucial remarks in chapter 14, although he saw that there must be a connection.

³⁷ Ernst Howald, "Eine vorplatonische Kunsttheorie," *Hermes* 54 (1919) 187-207, esp. 188, 196; *id.*, *Philol.* 76 (1920) 215-222; Max K. Lienhard, *Zur Entstehung und Geschichte von Ar. Poetik* (diss.), Zurich, 1950, esp. 17-21.

2. *Παθημάτων* (πάθος) is used in a sense which was not likely to be understood unless one had read or already knew the contents of chapters 11 to 14.

3. *Περαίνουσα* is felt in close connection with *μίμησις*: a connection which is much easier to imagine if Aristotle wrote *δι' ἰλέου κτλ.* as a subsequent note, with his eye directly on *μίμησις*,³⁸ than if he wrote it in its present place, separated from *μίμησις* by so many subordinate elements.³⁹

For these reasons I have ventured to show the clause in double brackets. But once more it should be borne in mind that marking a clause as 'subsequent' does not necessarily make it 'late' or identify it with a 'late stratum' in the work. Such a note might have been written at any time after the first draft had 'hardened' slightly.⁴⁰

Howald and Lienhard seem to be wrong on another count also. According to them catharsis belongs to the original stock of the *Poetics* but was later incorporated—inorganically—into a new scheme which emphasizes the concept of 'structure of the plot' (*σύστασις τοῦ μύθου, τῶν πραγμάτων*). If our approach to the matter is at all correct, catharsis is on the contrary a function of the structure of the plot and cannot therefore be earlier than that concept—which, be it noticed, need not be 'late.'

49b31-36

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιῶνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τῆς τραγωδίας ὃ τῆς ὄψεως
 κόσμος, εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξεις, ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιῶνται
 35 τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν | μέτρων
 σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν.

49b31

Since they carry on the imitation by their own action,
it follows in the first place, out of mere necessity, that the

³⁸ Later, when it was copied into the text, the note of course lost this immediacy of connection.

³⁹ We can add a fourth argument: that *λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον κτλ.* is a trifle abrupt as it stands, referring back over the intervening words, but is very natural if most of the latter are a subsequent addition. The same must be said of the following sentence also (*ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες κτλ.*): it refers back to *δρώντων* in a matter-of-fact way which is easier if the catharsis-clause was originally not there.

⁴⁰ See further below, on 9. 52a1 ff.

adornment of their physical appearance must be to some degree a portion of the art of tragedy, and secondly song-composition and the use of speech, for it is in these media that they carry on the imitation. By 'speech' I mean precisely the composition of the | verses, and by 'song-composition' an activity whose meaning is perfectly clear from its name.

Now begins a systematic deduction of the 'parts' of tragedy, with the proof that there are necessarily just six; followed (50a15) by an elaborate discussion of their relative importance. It has not been sufficiently noticed to what an extent the parts are derived logically from the definition, and in particular from one word in it: *δρώντων*. *The six parts of tragedy are all secured deductively from the concept of tragedy as a dramatic genre, i.e., a genre in which (1) the characters themselves carry out (2) an action.*⁴¹ The key idea is first stated here, for the first three 'parts' (with the repetition *ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιουσὺνται τὴν μίμησιν*); then repeated for the second set of three, 49b36-37, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων*; and then finally echoed once more in the summary, 50a10 ff., *οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται κτλ.* Throughout the entire deduction the subject of *ποι(μιμ)οῦνται* remains *the dramatic characters*. Everything depends on the fact that in tragedy it is they who "make the imitation."

The first of this series of deductions from *δρώντων* is that *ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος* "must⁴² necessarily be some 'part' of tragedy." What we have just said above is enough to set aside the usual interpretation of *ὄψις* as 'spectacle,' i.e., the staging or *mise en scène* in general, and commend Bywater's suggestion⁴³ that it means the 'look' or visible manifestation of the characters.⁴⁴ *Ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος* is, then,

⁴¹ The deduction theory was maintained by L. Spengel, *Abhandl. d. Münch. Akad., Philos.-philol. Cl.* 2 (1837) 223 ff., and by Susemihl, *Rh. Mus.*, N.F. 19 (1864) 197; *id.*, *Fleckeisens Jahrbücher* 10 (1864) 505-520, against Vahlen, *Symbola ... in honorem ... Ritschell ...*, Leipzig, 1864, 155 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 235); cf. *Beiträge* 20 (41. 284): "Die Teile aber werden nicht aus der Definition abgeleitet, sondern zunächst durch äusserliche Betrachtung der tragischen Aufführung gewonnen." Vahlen's 'empirical' interpretation is commended by Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 29 (= *Sitzungsber. Vienna* 1888, 569). Cf. also Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 39.

⁴² *Ἄν εἴη* is the optative of philosophical inference.

⁴³ *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Vienna, 1902, 166-167.

⁴⁴ So far as staging goes, their *σκευή*, the masks and costumes. *ὄψις* is the bu-

"the adornment of *their* appearance." ⁴⁵ Incidentally this explains the plural *δψεις*, which Aristotle uses (50a13, b20) as well as the singular (here; 50a10, b16; 14. 53b1 ff.); for the appearance(s) of the characters can be considered either collectively (*δψις*) or distributively (*δψεις*).

{ Why is the decking out of the characters' appearance a necessary feature of tragedy, since Aristotle later (50b16 ff.; cf. 14. 53b7) deprecates it and declares it "least essential to (inherent in) the poetic art"? At the end of chapter 15 (54b15) we shall find a similar (actually the same) concept phrased in general terms: "the perceptions which *necessarily* attend upon the poetic art." In the first part of chapter 17⁴⁶ we shall see that these are the (a) visual and (b) audible manifestations which are *necessarily involved in the presentation of a drama as an action performed by (dramatic) persons*. Notice that I say "persons," not "actors"; for the point at issue is not performance on a stage, by living actors, but a feature inherent in the drama as such. It is inherent in the drama of *Othello* that Othello is a Blackamoor, or in that of *Lear* that Lear is a kingly old man. The concept of these characters—and it is a concept implicit in the idea of a drama—is that they will 'look' or appear in such and such a way: as a Moor, not a white man, a king, not a commoner, etc. Moreover the characters must be thought of ("seen," i.e., by the poet: 17. 55a24, 27) as being in certain places, moving in certain directions, being on or off stage at certain times, etc. These are necessities that the dramatist cannot dodge, a condition which he has laid upon himself by the act of writing a play, and which must necessarily affect the way he writes it and the way a reader—independently of any actual performance—will visualize it. It is a necessity which impinges upon the dramatist because in writing a play he has stepped across the line that separates the pure universal (the pure potentiality of a given type of human character; see below on 9. 51b6-11) from its embodiment in a given dramatic person (*Oedipus*, *Antigone*, *Dicaeopolis*).

'Necessity' is an ambiguous concept in Aristotle. There is the necessity of logic and pure Being, that which flows directly from the essence; and there is the necessity which flows from the fact that Being

siness of the *σκευοποιός* more than the poet, 50b20; and the *σκευοποιός* is the costume- and mask-maker, not the 'stage-manager.'

⁴⁵ By the same token *δψις* disappears as a serious candidate for the designation of the fourth kind of tragedy, 18. 56a2; see below *ad loc.*

⁴⁶ See below *ad loc.*

'has' to be incorporated in a material.⁴⁷ In the *Politics*, 7. 13. 1332a7-16, 'necessary' acts are contrasted with truly free and noble ones as those which are contingent, dictated by the material we 'have' to deal with in politics. In the field of oratory (*Rhetoric* 3. 1. 1401a ff.) style is, in the last analysis, something you 'have' to have—*οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου*—not because it is better so, but because we cannot escape the limitations of our human nature, which demands phrasing, ornament, something beyond the straight fact or the bare idea.⁴⁸ A drama is an action performed by persons, and persons necessarily enter, in some fashion and to some degree, into the visible realm.⁴⁹ And yet, as Aristotle says in the *Rhetoric* (3. 1. 1404a11), "all this is imagination (*φαντασία*), and intended for the hearer; nobody teaches geometry that way." The 'looks' of the characters fall to the art of the *σκευοποιός* more than to that of the poet.

Next come the media "in which they make the imitation." These too must be put down as 'parts' of tragedy *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*;⁵⁰ they are the *audible* manifestations that "necessarily attend upon the poetic art." It must be admitted with chagrin that Aristotle regarded the audible garment of poetry as, when all was said and done, an unfortunate necessity. "The plot ought to be so constructed that the man who hears (of) the events as they happen shivers and feels pity because of them";⁵¹ and what our philosopher imagines him hearing is the bare outline of the play, e.g., the *Oedipus*,⁵² before it is put into "sweetened language." Nevertheless dialogue and song differ from the visible embodiment of the characters in an important particular: they are not quite so material, or, to put it the other way round, they belong to the poet's art a little more integrally. The drama is a presentation of men acting; and men 'act,' in Aristotle's sense, by speaking (and singing). Therefore the poet has to compose a text for them to speak and sing. We shall see later that this first stage in the embodiment of poetic ideas is relatively important after all in Aristotle's thinking,

⁴⁷ *De Part. An.* 1. 1. 642a1, *εἰσὶν ἄρα δύο αἰτίαι αὐται, τὸ θ' οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης*; cf. *De Gen. An.* 4. 8. 776a25; 5. 1. 778a35; *ibid.* 8. 789b3, 20.

⁴⁸ The whole idea is of course Platonic in origin; cf. the Necessity which strives with the *καλόν*, *Tim.* 47e ff.

⁴⁹ See below on *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ*, 11. 52b12.

⁵⁰ The phrase is to be understood again here: *εἶτα (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴεν τινα μέρη τῆς τραγωδίας) μελοποιία καὶ λέξις*.

⁵¹ 14. 53b3-6.

⁵² Not merely the story of Oedipus. See below *ad loc.*

whereas the actual delivery of the lines or songs by actors and chorus has nothing to do with ποιητική.⁵³

Λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν φανεράν ἔχει πᾶσαν. What is the shade of meaning of αὐτὴν? ⁵⁴ It points back to b30, τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἓνια μόνον περαινέσθαι: "By λέξεις I mean just the composition of the verses," i.e., that very composition of the verses which was implied by διὰ μέτρων περαινέσθαι. Λέξεις, then, is the composition⁵⁵ of the *spoken* verses, the dialogue. And what about μελοποιία? It is too bad that Aristotle thought its meaning so entirely⁵⁶ clear; his auditors may have understood it, but his modern readers have not. However, since we have established the reference of the sentence to b30, through αὐτὴν, it is clear that μελοποιία refers to the other 'part' of tragedy, the songs (διὰ μέλους). And indeed it is obvious (φανεράν) that μελοποιία consists of μελο- plus -ποιία: "song - making." Only in interpreting it the modern commentators have forgotten that μέλος, 'song,' includes *everything in the song, words and melody alike*, not just the melody.⁵⁷

Thus Aristotle's remark δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ... πᾶσαν reinforces the implicit reference to b30-31 and shows us that he intended λέξεις and μελοποιία to divide the poem between them, in the sense of διὰ μέτρων ἓνια ... καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. This has an important corollary: λέξεις has nothing to do with the songs, and conversely μελο-

⁵³ Naturally there is also a difference between song and speech in this respect. Spoken verses do not depend so much on ὑπόκρισις, delivery by an actor (though they may be more effective that way); they can be taken in directly by any reader. Song, on the other hand, cannot be 'read' to any purpose, it has to be sung: it is inherently more physical and sensuous. Aristotle has, accordingly, almost nothing to say about it in the *Poetics*, but a good deal to say about λέξεις (i.e., the poet's writing of dialogue).

⁵⁴ Bywater's ταύτην (accepted by Gudeman) is patterned after μῦθον τοῦτον, 50a4, but wrongly. There Aristotle is defining a special, technical sense of μῦθος ("this 'myth,' 'myth' in this case"); here he is defining λέξεις in a thoroughly normal and natural fashion as the 'verse part,' i.e., the spoken part.

⁵⁵ Not their versification. Μέτρων is concrete, as always: 'verses,' not 'meters.' There is no contradiction with 50b13: see below *ad loc.*

⁵⁶ Πᾶσαν, predicative: "has its meaning clear entire(ly)": i.e., every part of it (μέλος + ποιεῖν) is obvious. There is no need to emend to πᾶσιν or (with Rostagni) to understand φανεράν as meaning 'on the surface, external.'

⁵⁷ Even today, in Tin Alley lingo, a 'song-writer' is a person who composes both—or at least a team of song-writers composes both between them. 'Song' still does not connote the music alone: cf. "Do you remember the words of that song?"

ποιία has nothing to do with the dialogue. The 'diction' of the songs is a part of *μελοποιία*; if anything were to be said about it, it would have to be put under the latter heading. Actually Aristotle says nothing about the diction of the choral odes in the *Poetics*. The examples of *λέξεις* in chapters 20-22 are taken exclusively from the epic and from tragic dialogue; indeed, except for one very general reference to dithyramb,⁵⁸ lyric poetry is entirely ignored there.

One practical consequence of this is that 'diction' will not do as a translation of *λέξεις*, because we do not normally hear in it the connotation of speaking as against singing.⁵⁹ And "melody" (Bywater) and "music" (Pitcher) are still worse for *μελοποιία*, implying as they do that the text of the song is not a part of it.

We must add that *λέξεις* and *μελοποιία* are both *action-words* signifying 'parts' or moments of the poetic *art*, the making of the poem, not parts of the poem itself. Thus *λέξεις* does not mean simply the inventory of words used in the poem, but the principles that guide the poet in choosing and 'composing' his words. It is a part of *τραγωδία*, the art of writing tragedy, which in turn is a branch of *ποιητική*.⁶⁰

49b36-50a15

- ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν
πραττόντων, οὗς ἀνάγκη ποιῶς τινὰς εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ
38 | α1 ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς | πράξεις
εἶναι φαμεν ποιῶς τινὰς, [πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων
εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἦθος] καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι
καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες), ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ
5 μῦθος ἢ μίμησις (λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν | σύνθεσιν
τῶν πραγμάτων), τὰ δὲ ἦθη καθ' ἃ ποιῶς τινὰς εἶναι φαμεν
τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοια δὲ ἐν ὅσοις λέγοντες ἀποδεικ-
νύασιν τι ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην—ἀναγκη οὖν πάσης
τῆς τραγωδίας μέρη εἶναι ἔξ, καθ' ὃ ποιῶς τις ἐστὶν ἢ τρα-
10 γωδία (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἦθη, καὶ λέξεις καὶ | διάνοια,
καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία). οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται δύο

⁵⁸ 22. 59a9.

⁵⁹ We speak for example of the 'diction' of a singer. No doubt one reason for our insensitivity to the paradox is that 'diction' is a Latin-derived word and the etymological sense is therefore blunted for English-speakers; whereas no (classical) Greek could hear *λέξεις* without hearing *λέγειν* in it.

⁶⁰ See above on I. 47a13, ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιήσις, which of course is too cumbersome a phrase for steady use.

μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ μιμοῦνται ἓν, ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται τρία, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.

τούτοις μὲν οὖν [οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν] κέχρηται τοῖς εἶδεσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν, καὶ ἦθος καὶ μῦθον,

15 καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος, καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύ|τως.

49b36

38 | 50a1 { And since tragedy is an imitation of an action, and is enacted by certain people through action, who must necessarily have certain qualities of thought and character (for it is thanks to these elements that we speak of their actions too as having a certain quality [there are two natural causes of actions: thought and character], while it is in accordance with their actions that they all either succeed or fail), and since it is the plot which is the imitation of the action (for 5 by 'plot' I mean here the | arrangement of the events), and the 'characters' are those indications by virtue of which we say that the persons performing the action have certain moral qualities, and 'thought' the passages in which by means of speech they try to prove some argument or else state a general view—it follows necessarily that the constituent elements of the tragic art as a whole are six in number, in so far as tragedy is a special kind of art (they are 10 plot and characters, speech-composition and | thought, visual appearance and song-composition). For the elements with which they imitate are two, the manner in which they imitate is one, and the things they imitate are three, and there are no more beyond these.

These then are the constituent elements they [not a few of them, generally speaking] use; and in fact the whole (of tragedy) comports visual appearances, and character and 15 plot, and speech and song, and thought | likewise.

The first difficulty here is that the bulk of Aristotle's long sentence has been underestimated.⁸¹ From the material and semi-material com-

⁸¹ Long complex sentences in Aristotle, especially ones that had been overlooked, are dealt with in the second installment of Bonitz's "Aristotelische Studien," *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 41 (1863) 379-434. Our sentence belongs to those of which he says (p. 387): "Ähnliche Perioden mit mehrgliedrigem Vordersatz sind nicht selten in der Weise verkannt, dass als Nachsatz angesehen ist, was vielmehr noch einen

ponents of the tragic art we pass to the inward 'parts,' following as before the clue of what an imitation of an action that is "performed by certain performers" necessarily includes. Aristotle first recalls the concepts of 'imitation of action' (from the definition of tragedy, *μίμησις πράξεως*) and 'performers of the action' (*πραττόντων*, = *δρώντων*); then notes that such performers must have definite qualities with respect to character and thought; goes on to define the three elements of plot, character, and thought in relation to these agreed-on concepts; and ends by asserting that there must therefore be six and just six 'parts,' viz., these three and the previous three. The sequence of this long but tolerably clear sentence is disrupted by two things in particular: the intrusion of *πέφυκεν ... καὶ ἦθος* in the first part, and a certain tendency towards assimilation to *λέγω γὰρ μῦθον κτλ.* in the second part, which has obscured the rationale of the three definitions.

We learned as early as chapter 2 that *πράττοντες* necessarily have moral quality (*ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι*); here for the first time this is discriminated into 'character' and 'thought.' These two elements are basic in Aristotelian ethics and hardly need extensive commentary. Aristotle distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtues;⁶² but the distinction is more misleading than useful in a case like ours. For action, though it belongs to the practical and not the intellectual or theoretical realm, still requires intellect (the practical intellect), in coöperation with healthy moral habit, to reach the goal of happiness.⁶³ (*ἦθος* and *διάνοια* in our passage designate these two factors in the moral or practical life of man: the set of character, which is primarily a matter of habituation,⁶⁴ and the practical reason, which judges particular cases in relation to general principles.⁶⁵ Out of their interaction come our decisions, choices (*προαιρέσεις*); and choice is the

Theil des Vordersatzes bildet." See the whole section, pp. 382-402. On Vahlen's application of the principle to the present sentence see below, nn. 68, 76, 88.

⁶² E. N. 1. 13. 1103a3-7; 2 *init.*; 6. 2. 1138b35 ff.

⁶³ E. N. 6. 2. 1139a31, *πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαιρέσεις ... προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἢ προαιρέσεις· εὐπρεξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἠθους οὐκ ἐστὶν. διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐδὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆς.*

⁶⁴ E. N. 2. 1. 1103a17, *ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ (sc. ἀρετὴ) ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.* See the whole first chapter of the second book, with its conclusion: "That is why it makes such a difference, in fact all the difference, what habits we form in youth."

⁶⁵ E. N. 3. 5. 1112b11-27 (the 'practical syllogism').

test and fullest expression of the moral life. It would be possible to state this interaction of 'ethical' and intellectual factors in several different ways, indeed in this very chapter Aristotle shows signs of wavering as to the delimitation between them. But in any case there is no doubt that the decisive factors in dramatic action are the same as in life.

How are these ideas brought to bear specifically upon tragedy? "Since it is an imitation of (an) action and is performed by certain performers,⁶⁶ who must necessarily have a certain quality with respect to (a) character and (b) thought (for it is because of these [factors] that we speak of their actions having moral quality too...." Why must the 'performers' be *ποιοί τινες*? Not simply because their acts are *ποιαί τινες*; for a man is not necessarily just because he performs a just deed.⁶⁷ The reason is given by the full complex *διὰ γὰρ τούτων ... ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες*. Here the key to further understanding, as Vahlen saw, is that *κατὰ ταύτας*, a2, refers to *τὰς πράξεις*, a1. He and Gomperz further drew the correct conclusion that the intervening clause *πέφυκεν ... ἦθος* cannot stand where it is, because it breaks this close sequence.⁶⁸ They proposed to move it, but each to a different place (Vahlen after *ἡ μίμησις*, 50a4; Gomperz before *διὰ γὰρ τούτων*). Neither ventured to declare it spurious. Yet it is impossible where it stands;⁶⁹ it will not fit anywhere else in the sentence either; and unprejudiced inspection shows that it was intended as a paraphrase of *διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι φάμεν ποιάς τινας*. Moreover it is a crude and misleading paraphrase, which reduces Aristotle's very precise and specific remark to a *cliché*.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Try as we will, we cannot get a good English equivalent for *παίροντες*. 'Actors' and 'performers' both suggest the theater; 'enactors' is impossibly artificial and smacks, if anything, of legal jargon; and 'characters,' besides not carrying the implication of *πράττειν*, runs into ambiguity with 'character.' Is 'agents' possible? I hardly think so.

⁶⁷ *E. N.* 2, 3. 1105b5: an act is just when it is such as the just man performs, but a man is not just simply because he performs such acts: he must also perform them in the same way (i.e., in the same spirit) as the just man. Cf. *ibid.* a23: a man will be 'grammatical' if he does something grammatical and does it 'grammatically.'

⁶⁸ *Beiträge* 20-21 (1. 285-286); *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 29-31 (= *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 569-571). Vahlen later (as so often) gave up his correct intuition and restored the clause to its traditional place: see his text in *Poet.* 2; but even then he insisted on the direct reference of *ταύτας* to *πράξεις* ('Mantissa' *ad loc.*).

⁶⁹ Montmollin sees this also, pp. 51-52, but his solution, which is to mark the clauses *before and after* the offending one as 'additions ultérieures,' cuts out the heart of Aristotle's argument.

⁷⁰ The doctrine is in fact not really Aristotelian. The two causes of action, ac-

With *πέφνκεν ... ἦθος*⁷¹ removed we can see the scope and bearing of Aristotle's parenthesis. "For it is through them that we declare their actions to have (moral) quality too, and it is in accordance with these (i.e., with morally qualified actions) that they all succeed or fail." The argument does not depend on either clause alone, but on both together. Character and thought are needed to give the 'performers' actions moral quality, and moral quality is needed in order to account plausibly for their success or failure—or, as we can say in Aristotle's more usual terminology, their happiness or unhappiness. It is one of the commonplaces of Aristotelian ethics that happiness is virtuous activity or the result of virtuous activity,⁷² and Aristotle says it in so many words a few lines below (a20). But there is still a link missing. Why must the characters reach the stage of happiness or unhappiness at all; why must they "succeed or fail"? Because—so runs the only argument that can fill the gap—tragedy is an imitation of an action, and "action" means "complete action," action carried through to a natural goal in happiness or unhappiness. In short, Aristotle means by *πράξεως* the *πράξεως σπουδαίας και τελείας* of the definition:⁷³ he is thinking, not of all 'action,' but specifically of the tragic action with its completeness and its seriousness.

Thus the second clause of the first part of the apodosis (*οὗς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινὰς εἶναι κτλ.*) is made to depend on the first (*πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις*) by way of the unexpressed assumption that this action, being that of tragedy, must lead to a conclusion. The reference to the drama is also implicit in *εἶναι φάμεν*, which—certainly not by accident—

according to Aristotle (*E. N.* 6. 2. 1139a31; *De An.* 3. 10. 433a10-30), are mind or reason (*λόγος, διάνοια, or νοῦς*; but the *νοῦς* can be mere imagination, *φαντασία*) and desire (*ὄρεξις*). It is true of course that character ends by shaping one's desires. See Leon Robin, *Aristote*, Paris, 1944, 250 ff.)

⁷¹ The reading *πέφνκε δέ*, for which the only MS authority I see cited is Parisinus 2938 (Sykutris; "apogr." Butcher; "Paris. 2038" Rostagni and Montmollin, apparently in error), is clearly a Renaissance emendation anticipating Vahlen. The note was not originally written this way, to fit into Aristotle's sentence, but as an independent comment on it (*πέφνκεν κτλ.*).

⁷² *E. N.* 1. 6. 1098a16, *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*; cf. 10. 2. 117a14.

⁷³ *Σπουδαίας*, because the *γένος φαῦλον* never arrives at either real happiness or its opposite; see *E. N.* 10. 6. 1177a3-11. To reinforce the sense of completeness, Aristotle adds *και βίον* in a17; see below. But *πράξις* already has that connotation in its own right: *πράττειν*, originally 'to get through, complete' (a journey, an intended result). See Boisacq and Hofmann s. v. *πράττω*; B. Snell, *Philol. Suppl.* 20. 1 (1928) 10-18 (p. 12: "*πράττειν* blickt zurück auf die vollendete Handlung").

reappears below (a6).⁷⁴ However the case may stand in life, in the drama we cannot assess the moral quality of an action unless the playwright gives us a chance to do so by the clues he 'plants' in his work. These may be either actions or words; whichever it is, we infer the moral quality of the actions ("say them to be such-and-such") from the evidence he gives us.

Thus the first part of the protasis (*ἐπεὶ δὲ ... πάντες*) has to do with the dramatic action and the dramatic characters from first to last.⁷⁵ Hence as we move on to the second part we are not "turning from life to poetry," as Gomperz thought, but simply making a concrete application of what we have just formulated: we are defining the three new 'parts' of poetry in the light of their function, which has just been indicated. What remains is to identify plot, character and thought concretely, as they appear in tragedy; then the whole result can be gathered up (for all six parts) in the apodosis of the long sentence, *ἀνάγκη οὖν κτλ.* Vahlen must have the credit for seeing this too: that is, that the apodosis is *ἀνάγκη οὖν κτλ.* and not *ἔστιν δὴ τῆς μὲν ... ἣ μίμησις*,⁷⁶ as the modern editions uniformly have it. But the definitions of plot, etc., are not conclusions which flow from the premises stated above. It does not follow that, because tragedy is an imitation of an action, the plot is that imitation; and the definitions of character and thought are not inferred directly from the premises but added to them.

The *μῦθος* is the imitation of the action, says Aristotle; he means it in the same sense that a man's soul is the man. For the plot is the *structure* of the play, around which the material 'parts' are laid, just as the soul is the structure of a man.⁷⁷ It is well known that in Aristotle's biology the soul—i.e., the form—is 'prior' to the body;⁷⁸ and we shall see⁷⁹ that he thinks of the plot as prior to the poem in exactly

⁷⁴ And again in 50b8, *δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν*; see below.

⁷⁵ It is apparent how out of tune *πέφκεν...ἦθος* is with this train of thought. Its author took Aristotle's *διὰ γὰρ τούτων ... ποιὰς τινὰς* as a general statement, which he has paraphrased. Cf. 2. 48a3, *κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῆ τὰ ἦθη διαφέρουσι πάντες*.

⁷⁶ Unfortunately Vahlen later gave up this also, along with his objection to *πέφκεν ... ἦθος*. *ἔστιν δὴ* is Eucken's conjecture (Rostagni wrongly attributes it to Bywater), without manuscript authority.

⁷⁷ 50a38; see below *ad loc.*

⁷⁸ W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London, 1949, 74-75.

⁷⁹ 17. 55b1 ff.

the same way. By this I do not mean what we mean when we say that the 'story' or 'myth' of Oedipus was there before Sophocles wrote his drama. For Aristotle the plot precedes the poem, but it too is essentially 'made' by the poet, even if he is using traditional material.⁸⁰

Aristotle is aware that this idea is new to his auditors: that is why he keeps hammering on it throughout the *Poetics*. And particularly he is aware that his use of the word *μῦθος* may be unfamiliar. *Μῦθος* had progressed since Homer from the general sense of 'word, talk, utterance'—what was later denoted by *λόγος*—through the meaning 'talk or story about the heroic or distant past' to something very like our 'myth,' i.e., a mythical or fabulous tale.⁸¹ To use it, as Aristotle does here, in the sense of the structure or composition of the events, quite apart from their mythical status, was a fairly radical departure and one that called for special remark.⁸² It would seem, then, that we have here an innovation by Aristotle himself. I suspect, however, that he found the way prepared by his friend Theodectes or other practicing dramatists. It was a commonplace that the poets based their work on *μῦθοι*, 'myths,' and among the thoroughly competent and conscious playwrights of the fourth century it must have been a commonplace that they did not merely use 'myths' but essentially constructed—or reconstructed—them.⁸³ Thus in pushing on to his new abstract meaning of *μῦθος* Aristotle must have been ex-

⁸⁰ 9. 51b27, τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μῦθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων. Cf. above on 1. 47b15, and below on 14. 53b25.

⁸¹ Plato will serve to indicate the fourth-century meanings of the word: (1) 'story, account' in general, *Theaet.* 156c, 164d, *Laws* 6. 771c, 7. 812a; (2) 'old story, myth,' *Laws* 4. 719c (the madness of the Muses), 1. 636c (Ganymede), *Rep.* 1. 330d (Hades), *Tim.* 22c (Phaethon). From this Plato develops (3) the habit of calling his own made-up 'tales' (actually allegories) 'myths': *Gorg.* 527a, *Rep.* 3. 415a (the metals), 10. 621b (Myth of Er), *Tim.* 26c (referring to the ideal city of the *Republic*), *Laws* 1. 645b (the image of men as puppets). *Λόγος*, sober or prose account or argument, is contrasted with *μῦθος*, myth or tale: *Prot.* 320c, 324d, *Gorg.* 523a, *Tim.* 26c. The dominant connotation is, I think, the same as with us (at least in common English usage): that the story is not literally true. Nowhere is there a suggestion (even in the *Laws*, in which the word is quite common and applied to many 'stories' or images of Plato's own composition) of Aristotle's idea of a structure of events.

⁸² λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον, "for I call 'myth' here, in this case,..." (not τοῦτον for τοῦτο by assimilation: Bywater).

⁸³ Σύνθεσιν of course has an active sense: the constructing, putting together, of the events. Cf. above on λέξις (= τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν) and μελοποιεῖα.

tending an awareness that was already there, at least in the technical circle of the producing dramatists. In any case, whatever his contribution to it, the native context of the new usage was the theater. Similarly in the definitions of character and thought we are very close, I believe, to technical theater usage in the fourth century.

The clauses on character and thought are parallel in every way to *ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις*. It is not clear why all the chief modern editors make them depend on *λέγω γάρ*, especially as they then have to account for the isolated *μὲν* (*τῆς μὲν πράξεως*).⁸⁴ These clauses, like the one on *μῦθος*, are definitions, if one will, but definitions of specific and technical meanings which the two words are to have as 'parts' of tragedy—a status which is not necessarily the same as they have in life at large. (We have already seen why character and thought must be present in tragedy: that was stated in the first part of the protasis. The key to the definitions of them which now follow in the second part is the simple fact that in the making of a play (as 'parts' of the 'making) *they must be expressed in some perceptible fashion*. We know from the guard that Antigone has given symbolic burial to her brother, but we would not know how to interpret the act (i.e., the character and thought which led her to it) if she herself were not at hand to tell us, first through her argument with Ismene in the prologue, then through her confrontation with Creon. In the drama it is not enough that the characters act or be known to have acted; they must tell us or show us *why* they act as they do.)

Character can be conveyed through speech or action—though, considering the severe limitations of the Greek stage, tragedy does it primarily through speech. Thought, on the other hand, *cannot be conveyed by anything but language*.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ It seems too naive to say, as Gudeman does, that one expects a correlative *δέ*-clause to balance the *μὲν*, when two such clauses are already available. The prevailing view of the passage seems to go back to Vahlen; at least I can find no argument for it except his assertion (it is not a proof), *Beiträge*² 253 (41. 313), n. 15, that the three clauses *ἔστι δὲ μίμησις, τὰ δὲ ἤθη ... πράττοντες*, and *διάνοια δὲ ... γνώμην* are not a uniform series. To make the assertion plausible Vahlen has to maintain that the subject of the *μὲν*-clause is not *ὁ μῦθος*, but *ἢ μίμησις*—this in order to make out that that clause is not a definition like the others. On the other hand *διάνοια* (nom.), on which my interpretation depends, has not much MS authority. It is ascribed to the Parisinus by Rostagni, but otherwise carried in critical apparatuses (those that mention it) as a conjecture by Reiz and/or Hermann.

⁸⁵ *Λέγοντες*, 26. Cf. 15. 54a17, *ἔξει δὲ ἤθος μὲν ἐὰν ... ποιῆ φανερόν ὃ λ δ*—

I spoke of the modern vulgate which these makes two clauses depend on λέγω γάρ, a4, as part of the parenthesis on the special use of μῦθος. That is a short-sighted view: it cuts out the clinching part of Aristotle's protasis and robs it of any probative force (that is, robs him of the right to say οὐδὲν immediately below). On the other hand we perhaps cannot acquit Aristotle of some ambiguity or hesitation as to the exact line of division between character and thought.⁸⁶ Just above (a1) we were told that the moral quality of actions is judged by both criteria, but here that function is ascribed to character alone, without any clear reason for the change, while the definition of διάνοια seems to give it no connection with action. We find in 50b4-12 a passage which must be intended at least in part as a supplement to the present sentence; for character and thought are defined over again there—the latter, in fact, twice over. We will reserve the discussion of διάνοια for that passage. Meanwhile, however, it seems fairly clear that the delimitation of the two terms gave Aristotle trouble.⁸⁷

Now comes, as Vahlen saw, the conclusion of the long sentence: "it follows necessarily then⁸⁸ that tragedy as a whole has six parts...." All the recent editors read πάσης τραγωδίας (which to be sure is much better attested).⁸⁹ "every tragedy." But Aristotle himself proclaims a few lines below (a25) that "tragedy can exist without character(s),"⁹⁰ and in a30 the possibility of a plotless play seems to be envisaged.

γ ο ς ἢ ἡ π ρ ᾶ ξ ι ς π ρ ο α ἴ ρ ε σ ῖ ν τ ι ν α, with 19. 56b4-8, on which see below *ad loc.* Μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα there denotes precisely the kind of general ideas (τόποι) which are referred to here as γνώμην and in 50b12 as καθόλου τι.

⁸⁶ See Susemihl, *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F. 19 (1864) 200.

⁸⁷ One finds the same ambiguity or indecision⁸⁷ over their respective roles throughout Aristotle's ethics. Cf. Louis Robin, *Aristote*, Paris, 1944, 271.

⁸⁸ *Beiträge*⁸ 20 (11. 285): "wo οὐδὲν keinen anderen Zweck hat, als nach den verschiedenen Zwischengliedern auf den Hauptsatz zurückzuleiten." That the apodosis begins here was also seen by Thurot, *Rev. Archéol.*, N. S. 8 (1863) 289-290. Cf. the long sentence 7. 50b34-51a6, *ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ ... εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι*, where after a series of protases and remarks appended to them Aristotle begins the apodosis with ὥστε.

⁸⁹ Only the Riccardianus has πάσης τῆς, but it may possibly lurk in the Arabic version ("omnes partes artis encomii," Tkatsch), though the Syriac Fragment shows no sign of it ("omnis tragoediae," Tkatsch l. 155; cf. *ibid.* 156 b).—Of the recent editors, only Sykutris and Rostagni even mention πάσης τῆς.

⁹⁰ The attempts of the commentators to explain away this discrepancy are not convincing. We shall find that it has also distressed some earlier reader and led to an interpolation.

Thus it is not necessarily true that every tragedy has all six parts, or at least has them developed beyond what the meteorologists would call a 'trace.' What does have all the parts is the *concept or art of tragedy*, "tragedy as a whole." If the reading *πάσης τῆς τραγωδίας* did not exist we should have to invent it.

"... six parts, so far as tragedy is (a species) with definite characteristics." Here, the other way round, the vulgate reading *καθ' ὃ* is decidedly preferable to *καθ' ἃ*. *Καθ' ὃ* is a formula which calls attention to the definition or nature of the subject of a statement. Our sentence is exactly like those cited as examples by Bonitz:⁹¹ *ὁ ἀγαθός, καθ' ὃ ἀγαθός, εὐδαίμων ἐστί*, "the good man, so far as (with respect to that [supplying *κατ' ἐκεῖνο*] by virtue of which) he is good, is happy," and *ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, καθ' ὃ ἐπιφάνεια, κέχρωσται*, "surface, *qua* surface, has color."⁹² So here *τῆς τραγωδίας* and *ἡ τραγωδία* both refer to the concept or essence or art of tragedy, and the sentence could be rephrased so: *ἡ τραγωδία, καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστίν, ἐξ ἑξ ἑξ μέρη ἔχει*, "tragedy, so far as it is a distinct species (e.g., distinct from the epic), has six parts," or "tragedy, *qua* tragedy, has six parts."

Since *ἡ τραγωδία* is said generically, *ποιά τις* cannot refer to the quality (excellence or the opposite) of individual tragedies.⁹³ The quality of individual plays can of course be judged by reference to the concept of 'tragedy as a whole' and its full complement of parts. Thus when Aristotle measures (below, a29-33) a relatively plotless tragedy with good characterization, thought, and speech against one with the opposite traits, and awards the palm to the latter, his first reason will be the concept of tragedy itself as an imitation of an action, with its corollary that the plot is that imitation; the psychological argument he cites is secondary or tertiary. The function of our passage is precisely to establish that concept of 'tragedy as a whole' which will *subsequently* be used to set up a rank-list of the parts and through it a measuring-stick for individual plays.

But if *ποιά τις* does not refer to the rating of individual plays, neither has it anything to do with the so-called 'quantitative parts' (*μέρη*

⁹¹ *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, ed. H. Bonitz, Bonn, 1848-49, 2. 265 (comm. on Δ18. 1022a14-24). Cf. 9. 51b32, *καθ' ὃ ἐκείνος αὐτῶν μιμητῆς ἐστίν*, "(which is the principle) according to which he is the 'imitator' of them."

⁹² That is, *καθ' ὃ*,¹ like *ἡ*, refers to the basic concept which is assumed to give the subject under discussion its character.

⁹³ So Bywater; see Gudeman *ad loc.*

κατὰ τὸ ποσόν) which are distinguished and defined in 12. 52b15 ff.⁹⁴ Thus the passage establishes no presumption in favor of the genuineness of chapter 12.⁹⁵

The relationships Aristotle is really thinking about are indicated in the next clause, οἷς μὲν γὰρ κτλ. (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ κτλ. is a parenthesis, perhaps an interpolation; we will come back to it later). "For the 'parts' with which⁹⁶ they imitate are two, how they imitate is one, and what they imitate are three, and there is none besides these." The subject of μιμοῦνται—this is the most important thing about the word, though it is ignored or glossed over in the commentaries and translations—is still the dramatic characters, οἱ πράττοντες. They have in fact been the subject throughout: 49b31, ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν; 34, ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν; 36, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων; 37 and 50a5, ποιοῦς τινὰς εἶναι; 37, ἀποδεικνύουσι ... ἀποφαίνονται. Thus Aristotle's argument is more rigorous than it is usually understood to be. His procedure has been in effect to say: we have before us a genre which has just been defined as an imitation of an action, etc., etc. Now what will be its necessary components—that is, the necessary components of the total art of writing tragedy (πάσης τῆς τραγωδίας)? Everything hinges on the fact that the characters perform the action themselves, through action. First, they will necessarily look one way rather than another. Second, they must speak part of the time and sing part of the time; for those are the means they have of performing the action. Next, the action they perform will have a certain structure (σύστασις) which we call the plot or fable ('myth'), and since it is to end in happiness or unhappiness for them (= σπουδαίας), we shall need to know the moral and intellectual springs that lie behind it; these are the substantive things that they place before us. These, then, are the six 'parts' of the art of tragedy, and there cannot be any more; for (1) the characters must present the action to us through the media of sight

⁹⁴ So Gudeman, Sykutris, Rostagni (who is subtler and draws in the four εἶδη of tragedy in chap. 18—not without some justification: see below on 18. 55b32 ff.).

⁹⁵ The only implication as to 'quantitative parts' is above in the definition, 49b25: χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορφοῖς. But Aristotle's explanation of the phrase shows how little distinct emphasis he places on the μόρια: they become simply ἕνια and ἕτερα and nothing more is said about them. We have already said above that the division is based on a different principle from the one in chapter 12.

⁹⁶ Ἐν οἷς (cont. Hatzfeld-Dufour) is superficially attractive (see above on 1. 47a17), but the preposition is not essential.

and sound: there are no others that could be used for the purpose; and (2) they must present to us what they do and why they do it: there is nothing else they could present.

Every detail of the six 'parts' is deduced—or at least Aristotle so intends—from the definition. Every part of the definition is used (except again, be it noted, the 'catharsis' clause); but the controlling principle throughout is what the dramatic characters, *qua* dramatic characters, must do and how they must do it. In other words the controlling factor is the word *δρώντων*: the six 'parts' are deduced from the idea of (serious) *drama*.

But still more: The idea of drama itself—its means (*οἷς μιμοῦνται*), its objects (*ἃ μιμοῦνται*), and its method (*ὡς μιμοῦνται*)—is grounded in the analysis which Aristotle laid before us in the first five chapters.

They were inductive - deductive; the present deduction uses their results in turn.⁹⁷ Thus the *Poetics* down to this point (including, as we saw, the 'history') is a single structure of argument. Aside from certain gaps and irregularities, the only important concept we have met with which is not clearly and directly a part of that argument is the concept of catharsis.

The list of the six parts at a9-10 is a puzzle, but fortunately not a very important one. The need for a list just here is not very apparent, especially with another following in a few lines (a13-15);⁹⁸ and it interrupts the direct line of Aristotle's reasoning. Moreover the items seem to stand in random order.⁹⁹ All these phenomena suggest interpolation. On the other hand one sees no more reason for a later annotator to produce the list than for Aristotle himself. It will have to be left provisionally as a parenthesis—perhaps a subsequent jotting by Aristotle, but there is no decisive evidence.

The next sentence (*τούτοις μὲν οὖν κτλ.*) actually belongs with the

⁹⁷ By drawing on the definition, which is drawn in turn *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*.

⁹⁸ And one which, as we shall see, is organic.

⁹⁹ Perhaps there is an arrangement by pairs: (a) plot and character, the two most important 'parts' and the ones most closely related to each other; (b) verse-composition and 'thought,' since thought can be expressed only in the speeches (see below on 6. 50b11; 19. 56a36-37, b2-7); and (c) 'visual manifestation' and song-composition, the two most external and non-essential parts. The main difficulty is the position of *λέξεις*, which Spengel therefore (followed by Susemihl and Christ) put after *ᾄσεις*. S. E. Bassett, who found a *hysteron proteron* order in the list, as compared with *οἷς μὲν κτλ.* (*Class. Stud. pres. to E. Capps*, Princeton, 1936, 11), seems to have used Susemihl's or Christ's text without noticing that their order of the 'parts' rested on this transposition.

following section; for *μὲν οὖν* betrays it as a transition to a new theme. But its interpretation depends so closely on the foregoing that we will treat it here. It contains a notorious *crux*, in the words *οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν*. The numerous modern emendations, transpositions, etc., of this phrase¹⁰⁰ are all predicated on the assumption that the subject is the *poets*, whereas the rationale of the passage demands that it be the *dramatic characters*. Aristotle's deduction of the 'parts' of tragedy, which is being summarized here, is based on what the characters necessarily do, not on what the poets may or may not do. *Τούτοις κέχρηται τοῖς εἶδεσιν* is in fact nothing but a summary of *οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται κτλ.*: "These, then, are the *εἶδη* which they use."¹⁰¹ The actual practice of the poets is another matter. We learn a few lines below (50a25) that "the tragedies of most of the recent poets are without 'character': i.e., the element of 'character' is not represented in them. But that is a statement about tragedies, not about 'tragedy.' The nature of the genre comports certain elements, but it can happen that not all specimens of the genre have them all."

*Οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν*¹⁰² runs plain counter to Aristotle's argument, whether *αὐτῶν* be taken to refer to the poets or the characters. In either case—whether the point is that some poets do not use all the 'parts' or that some of the characters (presumably the minor ones) do not—the fact has nothing to do with the truth of the deduction, which has shown that essentially, *so far as the idea of tragedy is concerned*, dramatic characters must perform their imitation according to the six 'parts.' A remark about deficiencies, i.e., failures to use them all, is in place later, where Aristotle is showing that *if* the poet neglects any of them he is better advised to neglect character

¹⁰⁰ The passage is one of the *loci vexatissimi*: every major scholar who has dealt with the *Poetics* has had a hand at it. Besides the commentaries and editions *ad loc.* (the fullest information on the various emendations is given by Butcher and Sykutris), see Vahlen, *Beiträge* 22 (21. 287); Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 36-39; Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 34 (*Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 573); Montmollin 54, 58-59.

¹⁰¹ The perfect tense connotes finality, possibly with a suggestion of appeal to history, as the development of the genre has shown, these are the *εἶδη* they use.

¹⁰² *Ὡς εἰπεῖν* must go with *οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν* (this against Gudeman and Montmollin). It does not really make sense except as a mitigation or qualification of the quantitative statement, foolish though it is when attached to *οὐκ ὀλίγοι* (Vahlen compares "fast nicht wenige"). *Ὡς εἰπεῖν* is used normally, though not exclusively, with quantitative expressions: Kühner-Gerth 2^a. 2. 508 (§585, 3). For its use in Aristotle see Bonitz on *Metaph.* A1, 980a21-28, *op. cit.* 38; R. Eucken, *Fleckeisens Jahrbücher* 15 (1869) 817-818.

than plot, but not here. I conclude therefore, with Butcher,¹⁰³ that *οὐκ ἄλλοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν* is another interpolation. Its author assumed—as the modern interpreters have, partly under his influence—that the subject of *κέχρηται* is the poets; and since Aristotle so clearly indicates below (a25) that not all poets did use all the ‘parts,’ he has tried to soften the apparent inconsistency.

We are left with *τούτοις μὲν οὖν κέχρηται τοῖς εἰδεσιν*.¹⁰⁴ From 12. 52b14, *μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδεσι δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἶπομεν*, it is clear that he means the six ‘parts’;¹⁰⁵ otherwise we might suggest the three categories ‘with which,’ ‘what,’ and ‘how’ (*οἷς μιμοῦνται, ἃ μιμοῦνται, ὡς μιμοῦνται*), which are identical with the three original criteria for the classification of poetry.¹⁰⁶

The sentence that follows (*καὶ γὰρ ... ὡσαύτως*) has usually been taken as an appeal to experience, especially by those who regard the preceding argument as deductive. But it belongs to the same sequence as the rest. According to Rostagni’s subtle conjecture, *πάν*¹⁰⁷ is equivalent to *πάν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας*, “the whole of the essence (of tragedy).” If so, it means the same thing as *πάσης τῆς τραγωδίας* above, and we are still following the train of the deduction: “and in fact the (essence as a) whole involves visual manifestations,” etc.¹⁰⁸ Unlike the other list a few lines above, this one has some point, because the six names are the final clincher to Aristotle’s long argument; but like it it appears to be in random order.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ Although he leaves *<πάντες> ὡς εἰπεῖν* in the text, Montmollin makes *οὐκ ἄλλοι αὐτῶν* (not *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, which he attaches to *τοῖς εἰδεσιν*) a subsequent addition by Aristotle himself, correcting his own inconsistency. But this rests on the old fallacy that Aristotle means the poets; and M. does not really explain why, if he was correcting himself, he did not expunge *πάν* in the next line.—A more venturesome and considerably riskier hypothesis would be that the whole of b12-15, *τούτοις μὲν οὖν ... ὡσαύτως*, is spurious.

¹⁰⁴ Which, incidentally, heals the grammar; for as Gudeman rightly says, *τούτοις* was much too far from *τοῖς εἰδεσιν*.

¹⁰⁵ See below *ad loc.* Hence Vahlen’s proposal (*loc. cit.*) *κέχρηται ὡς εἶδεσιν*, which he himself later gave up but was accepted after the fact by Gudeman (together with a transposition of *ὡς εἰπεῖν*).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. 3. 48a25. The *εἶδη* would then be parallel to the two *σχήματα* or *εἶδη* of 4. 49a6-8, with the *οἷς μιμοῦνται* added; see above *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁷ Should it be *<τὸ> πάν*?

¹⁰⁸ Cf. L. A. Post, *ΤΑΡΑ* 69 (1938) 2: “In fact presentation belongs to a [read “the”] drama as a whole.”

¹⁰⁹ Once more we can observe a tendency to pairs (Vahlen), but not the same pairs. *Καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύτως* seems especially lame.

- μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις. ἡ γὰρ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, [~~καὶ εὐδαιμονία~~ καὶ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστίν] καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τίς ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης. εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἦθη ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ
- 20 | τὰς πράξεις εὐδαιμονες ἢ τοῦναντίον. οὐκ οὖν ὅπως τὰ ἦθη μιμῆσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἦθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς πράξεις. ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων.
- ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ
- 25 δὲ ἠθῶν γένοιτ' ἂν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγωδίαι εἰσὶν, καὶ ὅπως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει ἠθος.
- 30 [ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῆ ῥήσεις ἠθικὰς καὶ λέξεις | καὶ διανοίας εὖ πεποιημένας, οὐ ποιήσει δὲ ἦν τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις κεχηρμένη τραγωδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων.
- <39-| b1 <παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ | ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως
- 3> εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα.> πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγωδία τοῦ μύθου μέρη
- 35 ἐστίν, αἱ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις.]
- ἔτι σημείον ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρότερον δύνανται τῆ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἠθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν ἢ τὰ πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες.
- ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγωδίας,
- [39- δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἦθη· [παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἐστὶ ... λευκογραφή-
- b3] σας εἰκόνα] ἐστὶν τε μίμησις πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων.

But the most important of these is the structure of the events. For tragedy is an imitation not of men as such but of an action, a career, a man's happiness, [~~both happiness~~ and unhappiness lie in action] and the end of the story is a certain action, not a quality. The dramatic persons have certain qualities by virtue of their 'characters,' but it is

20 by virtue of | their actions that they are happy or the reverse. Hence they are not acting in order to represent their characters; they include their characters (along with the actions) for the sake of the actions. Thus the course of events, the plot, is the goal of tragedy, and the goal is the most important thing of all.

Further, a tragedy cannot exist without an action; it can
 25 | without expressions of character. In fact the tragedies of most of our modern dramatists are 'character'-less, and in general many poets are of that sort, like Zeuxis among the painters in relation to Polygnotus; for Polygnotus was a good portrayer of character, while Zeuxis' painting has no expression of character in it.

[Further, if a writer strings together speeches expressive of
 30 character and well-turned expressions | and arguments, he will not be accomplishing what we said was the function of tragedy; it will be accomplished much more by the tragedy which makes a less full and satisfactory use of these elements, but which has a plot, a structure of events. <It is very
 <39- | b1 much like the case | in painting: if someone should smear the picture with the most beautiful colors, but at random, he would not please us as much as if he gave us a simple
 -3> outline on a white ground.> And besides all this, the most important devices by which tragedy grips our feelings are
 35 parts of the plot, namely the peripeties and | recognitions.]

Another indication is that when people are making their first attempts at poetic composition they are able to get the effect they want in their verse-composition or their character-portrayals before they are able to construct a plot; as was also true of the earliest poets, nearly all of them.

Well then, the plot is the foundation or as it were the soul
 [39- of the tragic art, with character portrayal second; [It is
 -b3] very much like ... on a white ground.] it is in fact an imitation of an action and for that reason, rather than any other, an imitation of the dramatic persons.

Here begins the assessment of the six 'parts,'¹¹⁰ in which they

¹¹⁰ For the whole of 50a15-b20 (end of the chapter) see Vahlen, "Aristoteles' Lehre von der Rangfolge der Teile der Tragödie," in *Symbola philologorum Bonnens-*

emerge in the order: (1) *μῦθος*, a15-b4; (2) *τὰ ἥθη*, a38, b8-10; (3) *διάνοια*, b4-8, 11-12; (4) *λέξεις*, b12-15; (5) *μελοποιία*, b15-16; (6) *ὄψεις*, b16-20. This ranking will also determine the order of treatment of the parts in the following chapters: (1) *μῦθος*, chaps. 7-11, 13, 14;¹¹¹ (2) *ἥθος*, 15; (3) *διάνοια*, 19; (4) *λέξεις*, 19-22.¹¹²

Actually, of course, Aristotle's main interest is in proving the overwhelming importance of the plot as against all the other parts. His belief in this predominance amounts in fact to an obsession¹¹³ which is reflected in the comparative bulk of text devoted to each. In this chapter, plot has 28 lines, the other five parts together 18 lines; in the work as a whole, plot has 7 chapters plus a share in 2 others and a supplement of 1, while all the others have 5 chapters among them.

The superiority of activities over states—e.g., virtue—is a commonplace in Aristotle's philosophy and so widely attested that we hardly need to document it.¹¹⁴ The question is how that superiority is exploited for his immediate purpose here, which is to prove the supremacy of the plot, i.e., the poetic action. The usual understanding of the way this is done is that the supremacy of action is first developed in general terms, as a feature of 'life,' and then applied to the drama. Thus Lane Cooper makes Aristotle say just below (a19 ff.): "*Men* are better or worse, according to their moral bent; but they become happy or miserable in their actual deeds. *In a play*, consequently, *the agents* do not perform ..." (italics mine). In this representative¹¹⁵ translation the

stium in honorem Friderici Ritschellii collecta, Leipzig, 1864, 155-184 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 235-274) (referred to here as "Rangfolge"); and Sussemihl's reply, *Fleckensens Jahrb.* 10 (1864) 505-520.

¹¹¹ Chapter 12 is spurious; 16 is a later, special appendix by Aristotle to the discussion of plot; 17 and 18 form a practical supplement to the treatment of plot and character. These statements will be justified in their due places.

¹¹² Only those parts are discussed which are 'proper' to the tragic art (see b17) and common to tragedy and epic. *Μελοποιία* is treated only in a brief remark at the end of chap. 18, and *ὄψεις* in a purely negative reference in chap. 14 (53b1 ff.).

¹¹³ Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 39 (*Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 577).

¹¹⁴ Refs. in Bywater and Gudeman. One parallel to the present passage may be cited, because it is a paradox like the one before us. *E. N.* 1. 9. 1099a3: the winners at the Olympics are not the best or the strongest, but *those who compete* (= *οἱ πράττοντες ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ποιοῖ τινες ὄντες*).

¹¹⁵ Similarly, with slight variations in phraseology, Albergiani, Butcher, Bywater, Gomperz, Gudeman, Hardy, Menardos-Sykutris, Potts, Valgimigli. Epps appears to follow the old suggestion of Vahlen in a20 (adopted by Sussemihl but later almost given up by V. himself: see *Poet.*³, crit. note *ad loc.*), *πράττ<οντα> ποι>οῦσιν*. Only Fyfe (1927) and Pitcher give the two sentences the same subject, and Fyfe

change of subject is very clear; but it does not correspond to anything in the original. Aristotle's text runs on without break or pause: "They" are such-and-such by virtue of their characters, but they are happy or not in accordance with their actions. Hence they do not act in order to imitate, etc., etc. In short, what Aristotle has to say is said from first to last about the *dramatic characters*. We are still close to the demonstration of the six 'parts,' with the *πράττοντες* in the center of the stage, and the failure to observe this fact here corresponds to the myopia that has prevailed there.

How far back does this situation extend? *Καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης* could refer either to life or to the drama; at any rate we find no sign of a change of subject or focus there. The immediately preceding words, on the other hand (the ones ending *ἐν πράξει ἐστίν*), are clearly a generalization on life. Here it has been universally recognized that the text is in some disorder,¹¹⁸ so we shall have to consider the textual problem along with the other. Most editors have assumed a lacuna, and the most popular remedy has been Vahlen's *εὐδαιμονίας <καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ἢ δὲ εὐδαιμονία> καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία κτλ.*, although several scholars including Susemihl and Gomperz found fault with it. In any case even an editor like Gudeman, who scornfully rejects the idea of a lacuna, reads *καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστίν*, so that this latter clause is substantially the same in most texts. And in fact the words *καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστίν* imperatively require the amplification *καὶ ἡ (ἢ δὲ) εὐδαιμονία*, regardless of one's conception of the text; for it is absurd to say only that unhappiness exists in action.

The sentence, then, requires a text which says that "happiness and

returned to Bywater's translation in 1940. Montmollin says, p. 56: "(Nous aurons) enfin une remarque 'ce n'est donc pas pour limiter des caractères que les personnages (à noter le changement caractéristique du sujet: *homines-personae*) agissent.'" But there is no change of subject.

¹¹⁸ Almost all the MSS read *βίον καὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία*; the Riccardianus alone has *βίον καὶ εὐδαιμονία* (not the medieval Latin version, as Gudeman alleges; "*uite et felicitatis*," Franc.-Min.-Pal.). The Arabic MS (Rostagni's critical note is seriously misleading here) has a hole just at this point. Tkatsch (1. 130; 233, n. 36 to p. 232; 2. 8, n. 85 to p. 233) and Gudeman, without showing entirely sufficient reason why, believe that the missing word or words can be restored from Avicenna's commentary. On their showing it was *εὐδαιμονία* (nominative). There is no sign of *κακοδαιμονία* in either place, one gathers, and Margolouth's "*et <olita> est in opere*" is an error (Tkatsch, *loc. cit.*).

unhappiness are in action." It is obvious that this is a general pronouncement about human life, as indeed almost all the interpreters have taken it to be. But a *transition* from this to the drama is still not to be found anywhere; certainly not in the next clause, *καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης*. In fact this clause makes a serious difficulty for that very reason. On the face of it, under the usual interpretation, τὸ τέλος must mean the goal of life. But the goal of life is happiness, which has already been mentioned, so that the clause is a mere tautology:¹¹⁷ happiness is in action, and the goal of life (*viz.*, happiness) is an action.

When we add to these considerations the fact that *κακοδαιμονία* appears not to be an Aristotelian word,¹¹⁸ the case seems sufficiently strong for athetesis. Gudeman is quite right in saying that no real case has been made out for a lacuna, and yet the vulgate text is unsatisfactory. The hypothesis of an interpolation, *καὶ εὐδαιμονία καὶ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστίν*, disposes of the textual difficulty and also of the tautology *εὐδαιμονία ... ἐν πράξει* — τὸ τέλος πράξις τις. The note itself would be in origin an explanatory paraphrase of the latter clause, suggested by its proximity to *εὐδαιμονίας*.¹¹⁹ Once it was in the text, the doublet *εὐδαιμονίας καὶ εὐδαιμονία* (ἢ εὐδ.) would easily be simplified by haplography.

¹¹⁷ Gomperz notices this, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 35 (*Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 575), but only as a support for the otherwise discredited reading <καὶ ὁ βίος δ'> (see preceding note).

¹¹⁸ *Κακοδαιμονία* occurs only here in Aristotle; *κακοδαίμων* is not found at all. *Κακοδαίμων* appears only four times in Plato, none of them after the *Republic* (*Meno* 78a [*bis*], *Symp.* 173d, *Rep.* 4. 440a), and *κακοδαιμονία* not at all. *Κακοδαίμων*, *κακοδαιμονία*, are sparse in the fourth century in the literal sense 'unfortunate,' 'misfortune'; mostly they have an idiomatic flavor akin to the ὦ κακόδαιμον or *κακοδαίμων ἐγώ* of comedy (see Dunbar's *Concordance of Aristophanes*, p. 154). Cf. Demosth. *Olynth.* 2. 20, τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης καὶ κακοδαιμονίας (Demosthenes has just been talking about Philip's low taste for mimes and jugglers); *id.*, *De Falsa Leg.* 115, ἐστὶν οὖν οὕτω τις ... ἀνόητος ἢ κακοδαίμων, "is there such a dolt or a poltroon?"; but Xen. *Mem.* 1. 6. 3, νόμιζε κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι, "consider yourself a teacher of (how to live in) misery." Cf. above on *ἀπεσεμνόνθη*, 4. 49a20, which is similarly used in the *Poetics* in the literal, etymological sense and shows no sign of the idiomatic flavor which usually characterizes the word in the fourth century.

¹¹⁹ It is of course possible that *εὐδαιμονίας* never stood in Aristotle's text at all: in other words, that it ran *καὶ βίον, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις...* But the note is easier to account for if *εὐδαιμονίας* served to touch it off.

With the doublet removed, Aristotle's text is seen to deal with the drama throughout, not first with life and then with poetry. "For tragedy is an imitation not of men but of an action and (a) life and happiness, and its end is an action, not a quality. They [*sc.* the dramatic persons] are of such-and-such quality in accordance with their characterizations,¹²⁰ but it is in accordance with their actions that they are happy or the opposite. Hence they are not performing the action so as to represent their characters (present their characterizations of themselves), but they include the characters (along with their actions) for the sake of the actions. Thus the sequence of events, the 'plot,' is the end of tragedy; and the end is the most important thing of all."

The argument grows directly out of the definition of tragedy as a *μίμησις πράξεως*, and out of the other specification *δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας* (~ *πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν*, 49b31, cf. 36-37). Tragedy is not an imitation of men but an imitation of an action by men: that is, what they imitate in the first instance is not themselves but the things they do. And the end toward which their action moves is happiness or unhappiness. It is not merely an action but a *transaction*, a decisive change in the whole posture of a life. For a *πρᾶξις* is not a mere act or event. The word has—more clearly the more we hear it in the *Poetics*—the twin implications of *completeness* and *seriousness*, of great issues fought out for the weal or woe of an important human being and climaxing in a decisive turn for the better or the worse. In other words the concepts of the tragic 'change' (*μεταβολή*) and of its unity, necessity or probability, etc., are already beginning to move here, though they will not be explicitly developed until chapters 7, 8, and 9.

The aura that plays around *πρᾶξις* is enhanced by the addition of *καὶ βίου* (and *καὶ εὐδαιμονίας*). 'Life' tends to connote to us the vastness, complexity, unpredictability, inexhaustible variety, etc., of the human scene: witness phrases such as "life is like that," "slice of life," "taken directly from life." No doubt *βίος* was already beginning to take on such connotations in fourth-century Greece. Lycurgus¹²¹ speaks of the poets "imitating human life," and Aristotle himself records the same phrase from Alcidamas, who called the *Odyssey* "a fair mirror

¹²⁰ *Τὰ ἤθη* in the sense defined in a5-6 and further clarified below, b8: i.e., not the underlying 'character' of the dramatic persons, but the *features* of that character which the poet manages to convey to us through their action and their speech.

¹²¹ *In Leocr.* 102.

of human life."¹²³ Such epithets become commoner in the Alexandrian period and thereafter—one thinks of "O Menander and Life, which of you imitated the other?"—but almost exclusively in connection with *comedy*.¹²³ Aristotle is almost the only ancient critic (besides Plato) to make tragedy an imitation of 'life' also. Now *βίος*, unlike *ζωή*, carries from the beginning the connotation of a *career*: the life of man seen as a single entity, from one vantage-point, or at least as a single span. 'O *βίος* can be long or wretched or paradoxical or a number of other things; the point is that it can somehow be assessed and judged as a whole. The sense of conscious direction, purpose, over-all coherence and significance, is clear in such phrases as *Λακωνικόν* and *Ἰωνικόν βίον*, *Ὀρφικοί βιοί*.¹²⁴ In the *Gorgias* the Two Lives,¹²⁵ those of the philosopher and the sophist, come before the bar of judgment. In the *Philebus*¹²⁶ three lives (that of pleasure, that of reason, and the 'mixed' life) are surveyed; and Aristotle raised essentially the same question (it was the central question that every young Platonist faced: how then shall I live?) in the *Protrepticus*, of which there are echoes in both the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, with his theory of the Three Lives (theoretical, practical, apolaustic).¹²⁷ Finally, in the latter *Ethics*, after defining happiness as an activity (*ἐνέργεια*) of soul in accordance with virtue, Aristotle adds "in a complete life."¹²⁸

Καὶ εὐδαιμονίας also fits well into this sequence. An 'imitation of (a) life and (a) happiness' need not present the hero as happy, that is,

¹²³ *Rhet.* 3. 3. 1406b12.

¹²³ The *Odyssey*, the "fair mirror of human life," is likened to a comedy by Aristotle, 13. 53a32, and "Longinus," *II. Ὑψους*, 9. 15.

¹²⁴ Pl. *Laws* 3. 680; 6. 782c; cf. *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 16. 7, *ἐπι Κρόνου βίος*. On *βίος* in general see Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 15 (1880) 515-516; F. Leo, *Die gr.-röm. Biographie*, Leipzig, 1901, 86, 95-99.

¹²⁵ 500d, *τοῦτω διττῶ τῷ βίῳ*.

¹²⁶ 22a, 33b, 43c; cf. *Laws* 5. 733d; 7. 817b (the *Laws* an imitation of "the fairest and best life," i.e., of the carefully laid out and regulated existence recommended in the work).

¹²⁷ See Jaeger, *Aristotle*³ 79-81, 97-98, 252-254; *ibid.*, Appendix II, 426-461, "On the Origin and Cycle of the Philosophic Ideal of Life."

¹²⁸ From a little later in book 1 (c. 11, esp. 1101a16 ff.) we see that Aristotle is re-examining and broadening the old Solonian concept, *χρεῶν τέλος* (sc. *τοῦ βίου*) *ὄραν*. It is not necessary to wait until a man is dead to call him happy, but he must have reached some stable and significant point from which one can judge his happiness as a whole, not merely as an episode.

as becoming or remaining happy.] *Paradise Lost* is still about Paradise. But it must in any case show a *struggle* for happiness, and enough of its course that we can assess it and say, "This man was happy (or unhappy)." Thus the assessment of the 'parts' of tragedy, like their derivation to begin with, is based on the root-concept of 'men enacting a *πρᾶξις*'—from which it follows that that enactment, not the men, is the end and heart and soul of tragedy. The persons are the fulcrum of the drama, but they cannot be its *τέλος*.

The following paragraphs (a23-b4) offer four more arguments for the preëminence of plot. They are 'signs' (*σημεία*)¹²⁹ rather than arguments, and their relative concreteness makes them relatively easier to follow. The first two, though separate, both operate with the idea of tragedies that lack one or more of the six 'parts.' We have already seen that in alleging the possibility, in fact the existence, of 'characterless' tragedies Aristotle is not contradicting himself in the least. He had never said that every tragedy had all six parts, but only that the concept of tragedy ("tragedy as a whole") comported all six. And we might add that he is not sneering here at 'characterless' tragedies. Plays ought if possible to have everything that belongs to them, but may be allowed to settle for *τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα*; and Aristotle shows his impatience with those who expect the modern poet to equal Sophocles, Euripides, and the rest, each in the field of his special excellence.¹³⁰ In other words he is willing to recognize and accept grades of perfection, so long as they are assessed by a proper standard and we are not deceived as to which are superior and which inferior. The plays of the moderns, which tend to be all plot and no character, at least err in the right direction, if one must choose.

Contrariwise a play that is nothing but a string of finally worded character-utterances, striking phrases, and *bon mots*¹³¹ "will not do

¹²⁹ One is actually called so, a35.

¹³⁰ 18. 56a3-7.

¹³¹ Vahlen's conjecture *λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ* (*Rhein. Mus.*, N.F. 28 [1873] 185) is seductive but undesirable. The context calls for a mention of *all* the other parts that count for anything (all of them together will not do what a plot can do, even without them), and the confrontation is much more effective if the other parts appear as separate elements (*ἐφεξῆς θῆ*), "sets down one after the other," just as they come). So Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 35 (*Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 576). *Λέξεις* are any and all stylistic turns, ornaments, *lumina*. *Λιάροια* = *γνώμαι*, 'sayings, (pithy) utterances.' *Γνώμη* in this sense is defined *Rhet.* 2. 21. 1394a22; cf. 3. 17. 1418b34; *Soph. El.* 17. 176b18.

what (we said) was the work of tragedy, but much rather a tragedy that is (more) deficient in these respects but has a plot, that is, a structure of events." The contrast between random order (*ἐφεξῆς θῆ*) and structural unity (*σύστασις πραγμάτων*) is unmistakable; and so is the reference of *ἤν*.¹³² Aristotle has not mentioned a 'work' of tragedy before; but there is one and just one previous remark to which he can be referring: the catharsis clause. We have already cited the present passage to help prove that catharsis is operated specifically by the plot (*μίμησις ... περαίνουσα τὴν ... κάθαρσιν*; see above *ad loc.*). What this means remains to be seen. But one thing is clear at once: if we were correct in diagnosing the catharsis clause as a later note by Aristotle, this reference to it must be later also.

The sentence which follows in the manuscripts and all the recent editions proclaims itself an additional comment (*πρὸς δὲ τούτοις*). It too undoubtedly belongs to the supplement, since it alludes to 'parts of the plot' which have not been mentioned yet (in fact we have not even heard that the plot has parts), much less defined. Other evidences of lateness will appear in due course. But before we delve into the sentence any farther there is another matter that has to be settled. Several lines below in the manuscripts is a short passage (50a39-b3, *παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἐστὶ ... λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα*) which Castelvetro saw would fit excellently just after *ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων*, whereas where it stands it is a grammatical stumbling-block and means nothing. Castelvetro's transposition seems to me one of those strokes of genius which commend themselves at sight. It heals the otherwise formidable difficulties of the paragraph a38-b4 (*ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ... τῶν πραττόντων*); and with equal ease and grace it fits into the present context. If a poet simply writes a string of brilliant speeches and gems of thought and style, says Aristotle, his play will not accomplish the 'work' of tragedy as well as one that is poorer in those respects but has a plot. For—so the new passage goes on—it is the same way as in painting: a rash of the most beautiful colors laid on at random is not as pleasing as an outline drawing on white.¹³³ It springs to the eye that the beautiful colors are exactly

¹³² See Vahlen, "Rangfolge" 163 n. (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 246 n. *26); Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 43-45.

¹³³ On the technical process involved see Sykutris' note. *Λευκογραφεῖν* is a denominative from *λευκογράφος*, a painter on white (e.g., the white-ground lekythoi), not a direct compound of *λευκο-* and *γράφειν* (to paint + [*sc.* with] white).

parallel to the *ρήσεις καὶ λέξεις καὶ διανοίας* of a29-30,¹³⁴ and *χόδην* to *ἐφεξῆς θῆ*, while *εἰκόνα* corresponds to *μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων*. The comparison—if we accept its validity to begin with¹³⁵—does in fact illuminate and strengthen the initial statement, which sounded a little arbitrary when it was made; and it supplies an excellent take-off point for *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ.*, which otherwise seems a trifle up in the air. I mean that *ἐδράνειεν* provides a background for *ψυχαγωγεῖ*, and the superlative (*τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ*) is easier if the notion of pleasure has already been introduced in some way.¹³⁶

Castelvetro's proposal was accepted by almost all the editors and annotators of the *Poetics* in the last century: Hermann, Bekker (third edition, 1873), Überweg (1870), Susemihl, Christ, Vahlen, Gomperz. Vahlen indeed gave it an exhaustive and especially convincing explanation.¹³⁷ Yet it does not appear in a single major text in this century; in fact some of them do not even mention it.¹³⁸ Undoubtedly much of the blame for this retrogression belongs to Vahlen himself, for subsequently abandoning his position (as he did so often) out of deference to the Parisinus; for it must have been Vahlen's enormous *auctoritas* that restored the vulgate order to our texts.¹³⁹ It is time to go back to his original and correct interpretation. And we are in a position to lend it added plausibility in a way that Vahlen could not: we can account for the origin of the error, at least in a general sense.¹⁴⁰ We

¹³⁴ The parallel is much less apt if only the 'characters' are included, since character is the least *decorative* of the three parts concerned.

¹³⁵ We shall have to take Aristotle's word for it that Greeks preferred a simple line-drawing on white to a sunburst of colors laid on at random, though from the vase-paintings, especially the white-ground lekythoi, it seems more than likely.

¹³⁶ At the same time we need not and should not limit *ψυχαγωγεῖ* to meaning any casual pleasure. The pleasure that stems from peripeties and recognitions is the special one that is linked with pity and fear (14. 53b12, *τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως .. ἡδονήν*); that is, it has a strong emotional charge.

¹³⁷ "Rangfolge" 166-167 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 250-252). See Gomperz's enthusiastic tribute to Vahlen, *op. cit.* 36 (576); A. W. Gomme, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* (*Sather Classical Lects.* 27), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, 65 n. 1.

¹³⁸ Bywater and Gudeman mention it in the commentary but not the critical apparatus; Hardy and Rostagni say nothing about it at all.

¹³⁹ There was also the unfortunate circumstance that in this case the Arabic version shares the error, so that those who were most alive to its value (Butcher, Gudeman) were not alerted.

¹⁴⁰ This is by way of allaying the doubts expressed, for example, by Ritter ("violentum remedium") and echoed by Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 46-48.

have already seen that *ἔτι εἰάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῆῃ κτλ.* and *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ.* are later notes by Aristotle. It appears that *παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἐστὶ κτλ.* belongs to the same note, but in being copied into the text somehow got detached from the rest and wandered into the wrong place a few lines later. It is futile to speculate on how this came about. *Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ.* might possibly represent a still later addition tacked on by Aristotle in a margin, which has got in the way of the second part of the previous note: the latter was passed over, then noticed by the copyist and copied in the wrong place. We cannot recapture the details, but the internal and external arguments seem to me to reinforce each other especially well here and make our hypothesis of the miscopied note almost certain.¹⁴¹

Whether *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ... ἀναγνωρίσεις* is an original part of the note that begins *ἔτι εἰάν τις*, or a still later addition, it brings a new and slightly different point. The 'parts of the plot' that are alluded to here (peripety and recognition) belong specifically to the complex plot; and the complex plot has additional resources over the simple, the most effective ones for the purpose in question (*τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγωδία*).¹⁴² This agrees with what we shall find later (chapters 11 and 14): that the complex plot gives the same generic kind

¹⁴¹ Montmollin's treatment of the passage (pp. 60-62) is especially interesting. He correctly spots a39-b3 as a later addition, but hesitates whether to accept Castelvetro's transposition or not, and ends by deciding against it on the ground that the broken sequence has been sufficiently restored. But this only accounts for the immediate context, a38-b4 (*ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ... πραττόντων*), and does nothing about the obvious affinity between the "later addition" and a29-33 (*ἔτι εἰάν τις ... πραγμάτων*). M. has stood in his own light here. For other reasons he has already decided that a29-33 is an *old* passage (though everything around it is recent!); from which it follows that a39-b3 cannot belong to it. A glance at his text of this part of the chapter (p. 221) will show how capriciously he has played with the idea of 'addition ultérieure': a17-22 is new, 22-23 old, 23-29 new, 29-35 old, 35-38 new, 38-39 old, 39-b3 new, and b3-4 old again. Thus the whole passage is reduced to rags and tatters, and neither the alleged original text nor the alleged additions have any real rationale. It is a *reductio ad absurdum* of M.'s method, whose besetting fault is that he tries to perform his surgery too easily, through quick grammatical analyses backed up by fragile analogies with distant parts of the *Poetics* (see his pp. 147-148).

¹⁴² Montmollin overlooks this crucial difference. His prime argument for *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ... ἀναγνωρίσεις* being 'old' (p. 148) is that it does not mention the *pathos* alongside peripety and recognition. But the *pathos* is not one of the *μέγιστα*; in some form or other it is found in all plots. (The other arguments which M. bases on the same fact, *ibid.*, are equally fallacious).

of pleasure as the simple but has a superior capacity for doing so. Thus the point is additional, yet is based on the concept of the 'work' of tragedy which was already alluded to in a30. It is exactly the kind of argument Aristotle might have been tempted to add on a subsequent re-reading of his notes.¹⁴³

The last argument (a35-38: explicitly called a 'sign') is one that Aristotle could have added at any time, and it perhaps smacks of ripe observation rather than youthful intuition. On the other hand it fits rather better with a23 ff. (ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως κτλ.) and its allusion to the poets than with the new argument ἔτι εἰάν τις κτλ. We shall have to leave its status undecided: it may be either 'new' or 'old,' we cannot tell.¹⁴⁴

Without forgetting this possibility, we can detect a rationale running through the passage from a15 (μέγιστον δὲ τούτων) to a35 (σχεδὸν ἅπαντες). The common feature of these arguments, as contrasted with a29-33, is that the plot is set against the *characters*.¹⁴⁵ This is the direct background for the summary ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ... δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἡθῆ, a39. Within this framework, the first argument (a16-23) is abstract, based on the nature of tragedy as a μίμησις πράξεως; the second (a23-29) offers a concrete confirmation, the fact that characterless tragedies exist; and the third is merely a 'sign,' that poets in general develop talent at thought and characterization before they do at constructing plots.¹⁴⁶

The plot as "basic principle and as it were the soul of tragedy" is surely part of Aristotle's original stock of ideas in the *Poetics*.¹⁴⁷ The plot or

¹⁴³ Again, when we suggest that a note has been added by Aristotle, there is no necessary implication that this happened a long time later or betrays a decisive change in point of view. The addition might have been made the next morning after the first draft of the manuscript was finished. All that we imply by the signs [] is that the passage does not belong to the first draft itself.

¹⁴⁴ *Ὅλον καὶ οἱ πρόωτοι ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες* must have direct implications for Aristotle's history of poetry, if we could be sure of how to apply them. In any case it cannot include Homer. (Is *σχεδὸν ἅπαντες* so phrased in order to exclude him? In that case *οἱ πρόωτοι* — *τῶν παλαιῶν*, 4. 48b33).

¹⁴⁵ Whereas a29-33 assesses it against three other 'parts,' character, thought, and style.

¹⁴⁶ The unspoken premise is that the best things come last in the order of development, though first *λόγῳ*.

¹⁴⁷ It would be interesting to try to fit it into the chronology of his psychological theories, as it has been developed by Nuyens (F. C. Nuyens, *L'Évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, Louvain, 1948), but time and space are lacking.

arrangement of the incidents is the framework, the form, of tragedy. A poem is not a living thing and cannot literally have a soul. But we have to bear in mind constantly that by 'plot' Aristotle means primarily the *shaping* of the structure of incidents,¹⁴⁸ the forming process which goes on in the mind (soul) of the poet: in other words that *μῦθος* really signifies a working part of the *art of tragedy*. It is the *ἀρχή* of the poem just as the idea of house in the builder's mind is the *ἀρχή* of the house.¹⁴⁹

50b4-12

- 5 τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. τοῦτο δὲ | ἐστὶν τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι
τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, διπερ [ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων] τῆς
πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι
πολιτικῶς ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστι δὲ
ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὅποια τις
[ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δηλὸν ἢ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει]· διόπερ οὐκ
10 ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων | ἐν οἷς μηδ' ὄλωσ ἔστιν ὃ τι προ-
αιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὃ λέγων· διάνοια δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσι
τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται.

50b4

- 5 Third is the 'thought.' This | means the ability to express what is involved in a given situation and is appropriate: a matter which [in the case of the speeches] is the job of the political art or of rhetoric; for the older poets used to present their characters speaking in a 'political' fashion, whereas our modern poets present them speaking rhetorically. Now 'character' means such an utterance, one that reveals a moral choice, i.e., its moral quality [(in situations?) in which it is not clear whether (?) he is choosing or rejecting]; hence there is no character involved in those kinds of speeches |
10 in which there is nothing whatever that the speaker is choosing or rejecting; and 'thought' means such speeches in which the persons try to prove that something is so or not so, or express some general view.

¹⁴⁸ That is why he so often amplifies or paraphrases *μῦθος* by *σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*, as here (a32).

¹⁴⁹ We might recall that art is defined as *ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ*, *Metaph.* A3. 1070a7; cf. *E.N.* 6. 2. 1139b5, *ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπου*; *De An.* 1. 1. 402a6, *ἔστι γὰρ (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ) οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζώων*. This is the *ἀρχὴ ἢ ὡς κινούσα*, *Metaph.* H4. 1044a31.

The passage is even more difficult than most, and our results will not be able to claim very great certainty.¹⁵⁰ The prime difficulty is that there appear to be two definitions of 'thought' in the passage, based on different principles. The first (b4) describes it as a faculty of speaking (*τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι*), the second (b11) as the actual speeches (*ἐν οἷς*) in which arguments are given or general opinions stated. It springs to the eye that the first definition is broad—very broad—and the second one much narrower. (Vahlen,¹⁵¹ although he admitted that Aristotle gives no clear transition from one to the other, in fact no clue to the relation between them, argued that 'thought' in the narrower sense is included, *along with character as defined here* (b8), in the broader concept of thought as a faculty. The over-all pattern would then be: *διάνοια* qua ability to say the right things has two sub-species, (1) *ἦθος*, the revelation of character ('choice') in speech ("das Ethos der Reden"), and (2) *διάνοια*, argumentation and the expression of general views. Vahlen's interpretation has been attacked by Gomperz¹⁵² and Montmollin and does indeed seem impossible to maintain as a whole. Yet it remains the best and subtlest, and we should produce excellent reasons before throwing it away.

It may be well to begin by hauling back a little, to see the larger context. The plot has been dealt with: it is a structure of actions, a *σύστασις πραγμάτων*. The fourth part, which we will take up in a moment, is the verbal expression (*λέξις*) of the speeches.¹⁵³ The present paragraph, then, has to do with the *content* of the speeches made by the dramatic characters.¹⁵⁴ But can both character and thought be subsumed under *διάνοια* here, in b4, only to resume their separate status in b8-12? It seems unlikely that Aristotle would make 'thought' one of its own sub-species. However, before answering the question decisively we must look at the key clauses *ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων κτλ.* and *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι κτλ.*: "(a thing) which in the case of speeches is the job of politics and rhetoric; for the older poets used to present

¹⁵⁰ Montmollin also (p. 65) makes very modest claims for his solution.

¹⁵¹ "Rangfolge" 170-179 (255-268).

¹⁵² *Op. cit.* 38-41 (579-582).

¹⁵³ B12, *τῶν μὲν λόγων ἡ λέξις*; see below.

¹⁵⁴ H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern*, Berlin, 1853, 255, n. 2 to p. 254: "Also ist *διάνοια* der Inhalt der Reden, den die Personen des Drama aussprechen; *λέξις* aber die Form der Rede: *ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνεία.*"

their characters talking *πολιτικῶς*,¹⁵⁵ those of our time rhetorically."

Here the first stumbling block is *ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων*. Some have thought that because of the context *λόγων* could only refer to the speeches in tragedy itself,¹⁵⁶ while the majority have taken it to mean either oratory in general or prose oratory, in any case speeches *other* than those of tragedy. But neither interpretation can be right. (1) Aristotle cannot mean to single out the *speeches* in tragedy here, because there is nothing else the remark could apply to.¹⁵⁷ (2) He cannot be referring to oratory outside the drama, because that has nothing to do with the case, and anyhow *ἐπιόουν λέγοντας*, introduced by *γάρ*, makes it clear that he has only poetry in mind. The fact is that *ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων*, coming on the heels of *τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι*, is an unbearable tautology. Aristotle cannot have been talking about anything but speeches—namely those of tragedy—since the beginning of the sentence. Moreover, *ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων* is not in the Arabic version.¹⁵⁸ The phrase is a gloss or heading¹⁵⁹ written to apprise the reader (quite correctly, for that matter) that what is said here "applies to the speeches" (i.e., of tragedy).

What now is meant by the apportionment of *τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι* to both politics and rhetoric, and by the supporting statement that the old poets used to present their characters talking "politically" whereas the moderns present them talking rhetorically? It is easy to be led astray by *πολιτικῆς* (-κῶς) into notions of "speaking the language of civic life" (Butcher). Such 'political' translations miss the point. Aristotle does not mean that Sophocles' characters all talked like statesmen or as if they were addressing a public meeting. Rather *πολιτικῆ* is for him the general name for the combined art of Ethics

¹⁵⁵ We will avoid translating the word for a moment.

¹⁵⁶ E.g., Susemihl and Bywater. The *λόγοι* in b9, to which B. points, are not limited to tragedy; see below.

¹⁵⁷ *Ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων* would have meaning only as an antithesis to *ἐπὶ τῶν μελῶν* understood: "in the case of the speeches" as opposed to the songs. But then one would expect *ἐπὶ τῶν μέρῶν λόγων*; and anyhow Aristotle gives no indication that he expects *διάνοια* in the songs also. The most he requires is that they be relevant to the plot, 18. 56a25 ff.

¹⁵⁸ Margoliouth saw faint traces of letters which Tkatsch (l. 235, n. 17 to p. 234; 2. 8, n. 63 to p. 235) thinks point to *ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων*; but they are not in the right place and the whole assumption seems highly conjectural.

¹⁵⁹ The athetesis was proposed by Moriz Schmidt in his edition (1875) and accepted by Christ. It is not mentioned by any of the recent editors except Butcher and Sykutris.—See below on the exactly similar phrase *ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν*, 15. 54b13, which Lobel, *CQ* 23 (1929) 78, recognized as a gloss.

and Politics.¹⁶⁰ Thus he says elsewhere that rhetoric is a sort of offshoot of dialectic *καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἠθῆν πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν*.¹⁶¹ From this passage and a few others like it Vahlen argued that *πολιτικῶς λέγοντας* in our passage is equivalent to *ἠθικῶς λέγοντας*. (The difficulty is that *ἠθικῶς λέγειν* ought to mean "speaking in a manner consistent with (one's) character" or "in such a way as to convince others that one has a certain character."¹⁶²) The phrase would not ordinarily connote that the speaking is done on the basis of an art, as here (*πολιτικῆς*); or, if it did, the art implied would appear to be rhetoric itself.¹⁶³

Vahlen also believed that the antithesis *πολιτικῆς - ῥητορικῆς* must be connected in some way or other with the antithesis *ἦθος - διάνοια* which follows just below. (We can say at once that this ought to be true, for a general but cogent reason. There is no discernible motive for defining 'character' and 'thought' here if the passage does not contain something that alters the case with respect to them, as against the earlier definition in a5-7. (And there is indeed something here which alters the case. It is the conception of both character and thought as being *speech, or conveyed through speech*: τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι ... πολιτικῶς ἐπόουν λέγοντας ... τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς ... διάνοια δὲ (sc. ἐστὶν οἱ λόγοι) ἐν οἷς κτλ. (In their original context

¹⁶⁰ E. N. 1. 1. 1094b10, *ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος ταύτων ἐπίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα* (not "being a species of Politics," but "being in a sense a political art"), 1095a2; 1. 2. 1095a16, b5; 2. 2. 1105a12; 7. 12. 1152b1; cf. *Magna Mor.* 1. *init.* To my knowledge the term *ἠθική* (sc. *τέχνη*) does not occur in Aristotle (though phrases like *ἠθικὴ θεωρία* do: *Anat. Post.* 1. 33. 89b9). The "Ethics" is regularly referred to as τὰ ἠθικά or τὰ περὶ τὰ ἠθικά.—C. Brandstaetter, *Leipziger Studien* 15 (1893) 135-145, suggests another possible connotation: *πολιτικῶς* and *ῥητορικῶς λέγειν* imply the distinction which Isocrates is fond of making between 'public' (i.e., *δημηγορικά*, sometimes *δικανικά* also) and 'private' (i.e., *epideictic*) speeches. *Πολιτικῶς λέγειν* would then suggest the straightforward speech of a man facing real issues of public moment, *ῥητορικῶς λέγειν* the elaborate or disingenuous manner of a man showing off his art.

¹⁶¹ *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1356a26; cf. *ibid.* 4. 1359b10; E. N. 1. 2. 1094b10.

¹⁶² See E. M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, London and Cambridge, 1867, 108 ff.

¹⁶³ *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1356a2 ff., *ibid.* 9. 1366a25 ff.; but above all 2. 1. 1377b25 ff. Aristotle protests, 1356a10 ff., against the view of some of the textbook writers (*τεχνολογούντων*) that the character of the speaker (i.e., the hearers' impression of it) has nothing to do with making his case more plausible.

the two 'parts' were brought in primarily as the factors which 'qualify' the actions of the dramatic characters. There only *διάνοια* was defined in terms which clearly referred to the actual expression of thought. Here they are defined—redefined—as the content of the characters' speeches. We are farther inside the making of tragedy, so to speak, asking what the poet is to make his characters say and on what basis he is to do so.

Even here *τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα* seems to be presented as a definition of *διάνοια* alone. Yet the terms *ἐνόητα* and *ἀρμόττοντα* are general: that is, in themselves they do not necessarily point to 'thought' as the only faculty that could express them in speech. *Τὰ ἐνόητα* means what there is to be said in a given situation. Suppose that two unequal sisters are confronted with a decree that one of their two brothers is to be given burial and the other not. There are certain things that 'lie' in this situation, are there to be said: such as that the decree flies in the face of one's holiest obligations; that there is no valid reason for the discrimination; that it is on the other hand an official order, issued by duly constituted authorities; that we are women and cannot oppose the commands of men; and so on. Of these things which are 'there to be said,' the two sisters will choose different, in fact opposite, ones. Antigone will argue along one line and Ismene along the other, *each in accordance with her character*: Antigone will plan defiance, Ismene will urge submission, and the scene will end accordingly. In other words each sister will say the things that are fitting to her.¹⁶⁴

Τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, then, could designate what guided Sophocles in writing the prologue of the *Antigone*; and when we read *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας* we cannot doubt (in spite of the ambiguity of *πολιτικῶς*) that that is what Aristotle means.¹⁶⁵ We could carry out a similar exegesis for a Euripidean scene¹⁶⁶—e.g., the grand debate between Medea and Jason—and show that the same categories are present but are treated

¹⁶⁴ My justification for using the *Antigone* is *Rhet.* 3. 16. 1417a29-33, on which see below (on b8).

¹⁶⁵ Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 16. 1417a24, *καὶ* (sc. *ἠθικόν ἐστι*) *μη ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὡ σ π ε ρ ο ἰ ν ὦ ν*, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως, on which see further below; and *Poet.* 15. 54a22 on *τὸ ἀρμόττον* as a requisite for the dramatic presentation of character.

¹⁶⁶ Euripides may be included in *οἱ νῦν*; see below on 13. 53a18 ff.

'rhetorically,' perhaps with correspondingly greater attention to τὰ ἐνόητα than to τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, but in any case doing full justice to τὸ ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ παθόλον τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι. But the experiment is hardly necessary: it is a commonplace that Euripidean and post-Euripidean tragedy is full of these things. Nor it is necessary to show in detail that τὰ ἐνόητα and τὰ ἀρμόττοντα can also be rhetorical concepts. The former appears in the orators, meaning "what there is to say";¹⁶⁷ and the idea, though not the precise term, is of cardinal importance for Aristotle's conception of rhetoric, which he defines not as an "art of persuasion," as his predecessors had, but as a "faculty of observing or discovering in every case presented the possible means of persuasion" (~ τὰ ἐνόητα).¹⁶⁸ As for τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, appropriateness is the particular aim of the rhetorical cultivation of an 'ethical' style, *Rhetoric* 3. 7. 1408a26. But it is also applicable to the general communication of character, i.e., making the audience believe one to be a solid and reliable person; for the secret of success in that line is to make your remarks, as well as your style, suitable to the age, character, political views, etc., of your hearers.¹⁶⁹ Thus it will be necessary or desirable, according to the circumstances, to speak 'proportionately' to the facts in the case, or to one's own character, or to that of the audience, or sometimes in all these ways: the same principle is at work throughout.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Demosth. *De Corona* 190, 256; Isoc. *Phil.* 110, *Bus.* 44, *Plat.* 63, *de Iugo* 39, cf. *Areop.* 77; Pl. *Phaedr.* 235b; cf. Thuc. 4. 59. 2; Thrasymachus B1 Diels; [Ar.] *Rhet. ad Alexandrum* 35. 1439b25, 32; *Pol.* 4. 10. 1295a1; *De Gen. An.* 2. 8. 747b21. Cf. also, e.g., Eur. *Hippoi.* 984, τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον ἔχον καλοῦς λόγους, εἰ τις διαπτύξειεν, οὐ καλὸν τόδε; and the long-standing concept of τὰ δέοντα λέγειν, e.g., Thuc. 1. 22; Pl. *Phaedr.* 234e; Isoc. *Phil.* 24.

¹⁶⁸ *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1355b25, δύνανται περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρησαί τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (cf. *ibid.* 1. 115, τὸ φαινόμενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν; 2. 1356a33, δυνάμεις τινές τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους). The translation is Cope's (*op. cit.* 33; see his entire account, 27-34), the italics mine. The idea is phrased even more vigorously just before, 1. 1. 1355b10: οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα (= τὰ ἐνόητα) πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον.

¹⁶⁹ *Rhet.* 2. 1; *ibid.* 12-17, esp. 13. 1390a26, ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφειτέρῳ ἢ θείει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους; 1. 8. 1366a8-16; and cf. 3. 16. 1417a22, ἠθικά τὰ ἐπιόμενα ἕκαστῳ ἦθει, with 3. 7. 1408a26.

¹⁷⁰ It is in fact the old master-principle of Greek rhetoric, τὸ πρέπον (τὸ δέον), which goes back at least to Gorgias: *Encom. Hel.* 2, λέξει τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς; *id.*, *Epritarh.* (fr. 6 Diels [p. 285, 17]), τοῦτον νομίζοντες θεϊότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον, τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι (= τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα) καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν.

(It is perfectly possible, then, to understand τὸ λέγειν κτλ. in either an 'ethical' ('political') or a rhetorical sense. There is, moreover, a certain overlap between the two, since on the one hand every art (including the 'political') knows something about communicating its own problems and principles,¹⁷¹ and on the other hand rhetoric properly includes some attention to character and feeling (τὰ πάθη) as well as the objective questions at issue. The antithesis, then, need not be absolute. Nevertheless οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι - οἱ δὲ νῦν describes a real and massive change that had actually taken place in Greek dramatic poetry: the tendency to replace 'character' (~ πολιτικῆς) by 'thought' (~ ῥητορικῆς). Lacking any fourth-century tragedy, except possibly the *Rhesus*, we cannot document the change in detail. But we do know that the most prominent tragedians around and just after the middle of the century, or at least the ones whom Aristotle knew best and admired most, were trained rhetoricians and practiced both arts.¹⁷²

Let us try to summarize. (In his first definitions of character and thought, a5-7, Aristotle was thinking primarily of their connection with the *actions* of the dramatic persons: character as the 'ethical' (~ habitual) moment, thought as the intellectual or generalizing moment. Here he is thinking more of character and thought as *what the dramatic persons say*, the way in which they present the 'ethical' and intellectual moments in their own make-up through speech. Such a self-presentation can stem from and be shaped by either of two points of view, the 'political' or the rhetorical. These two points of view, or, as Aristotle calls them here, arts, are called upon to set the complete human being before us, by making him say "what 'belongs' and is appropriate." But they themselves are skewed with respect to the two moments that compose him, the one towards the 'ethical' or habitual, the unreflective, conditioned element in us, the other towards the reflective, self-conscious one: i.e., towards 'thought.' The old 'politically' oriented art of Aeschylus and Sophocles had its maxims and statements of general principle, but tended above all to present man as an *ethos*. Conversely the art of rhetoric is capable of projecting

¹⁷¹ *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1355b27-31.

¹⁷² Especially Astydamas (the elder), who ἀκροασάμενος ἦν Ἰσοκράτους καὶ ἐγράφη ἐπὶ τραγωδίαν (Suidas), and Theodectes, ῥήτωρ, τραπείζδ ἐπὶ τραγωδίας (*ibid.*; cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. Φάσηλις; [Plut.] *Vita X Orat.* 837c; Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 260, 2. 487a1 Bekker). See T. B. L. Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*, London, 1956, 58-62.

character, or rather of *giving an impression* that the speaker has such and such a character;¹⁷³ but as an intellectual activity (though of relatively low grade) it is interested and competent above all in argument (b11, ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν) and generalization (b12, καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται). Thus thought comes out short under the old dispensation, character under the new; and in fact Aristotle has told us just above (a25) that most of the "new" tragedies (i.e., especially those since Euripides) are "characterless."¹⁷⁴

There is no doubt where Aristotle's own sympathies lay. His ranking of character above 'thought,' as well as the whole tone of his discussion, shows clearly that they were with the old order. But he is also prepared to face facts. For better or worse he recognizes the victory of rhetoric over 'politic,' and along with it the relative victory of 'thought' over 'character.' Hence so far as his own time is concerned, it is with perfect propriety that he identifies the general capacity for saying "what 'belongs' and is fitting" with 'thought' and assigns it to rhetoric.¹⁷⁴ Under this dispensation character also is an appanage of the latter (we shall see how in a moment), but a special one: a subdivision, as it were, of thought. So far as it is attended to at all by the dramatists of his day, they approach it in the spirit of the speaker who must 'sell' his own character to his audience by conscious means: ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος (sc. δεῖ) παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι (19. 56b6).

The close affiliation between character and thought, as joint or reciprocal aspects of *what is said by the dramatic persons in their speeches*, continues in the following pair of (re)definitions. Ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, κτλ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον has been universally understood as equivalent to ἐκεῖνο and defined by what follows: "'character' is that (the kind of thing) which reveals the moral purpose...." But actually it has its own direct reference, back to λέγειν ... τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα (reinforced by πολιτικῶς ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας κτλ.): "'character, is (an utterance) of that kind [i.e., expressing what 'belongs' and is appropriate] which makes clear the moral choice(s) (of the dramatic persons)...." With διάνοια δέ we are to understand a similar reference (ἐν οἷς, sc. τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν οἷς): "while 'thought' is (utterances of that kind) in which they (undertake

¹⁷³ *Rhet.* 2. 1. 1377b29, τὸ ... ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα; cf. *ibid.* 21. 1395b15.

¹⁷⁴ See below on 19. 56a36.

to prove that something either is or is not (true) or expound some general principle." Thus 'character' and 'thought' are now symmetrically defined as *speeches*¹⁷⁵ which convey respectively (a) moral orientation and (b) intellectual¹⁷⁶ operations (argument and generalization).

The text of the next two and a half lines (*ὅποια τις ... ὁ λέγων*) is pretty clearly in some disorder.¹⁷⁷ The Arabic version omits *ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ... φεύγει*,¹⁷⁸ the Riccardianus most of the following clause (*διόπερ ... φεύγει*). Of these omissions, the latter can be a mere haplography (jumping from the first *φεύγει* to the second), the former cannot. The preservation of the first clause depends on finding a subject for the verbs: a problem which most of the modern editors have solved by appropriating *τις* for the purpose and writing *ὅποια τις*: "what kinds of thing a man ... either chooses or avoids." But it is more plausible on the face of it that *ὅποια* (*sic*) and *τις* belong together. The clear reference to our passage in 15. 54a17-19 distinctly enhances this probability: *ἔξει δὲ ἦθος εἰάν ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη¹⁷⁹ ποιῆ φανερόν ὁ λόγος ... προαίρεσίν τινα, <ἢ τις ἄν> ἦ*,¹⁸⁰ where the appended clause, like *ὅποια τις* here, focuses on the moral quality of the 'choice' itself rather than on the quality of the things or actions the person chooses or rejects.

It seems, then, that the integrity of *ὅποια τις* should be respected. But this in turn robs *ἐν οἷς ... φεύγει* of construction and meaning; for the verbs are left without a subject and the clause as a whole

¹⁷⁵ The use of *ἦθος* in a different sense just below (b9, certain kinds of discourses do not have 'character') is no bar to this interpretation. Cf. below on the apparent inconsistency in 15. 54a17 ('characters' may have or not have 'character').

¹⁷⁶ 'Intellectual,' of course, in the sense of the practical intellect, not the theoretical.

¹⁷⁷ Montmollin gives a good survey of the problem and the solutions that have been proposed, pp. 63-65. But his own solution (which he advances with noticeable hesitancy), involving a later addition by Aristotle which has subsequently got split into two parts (*ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτλ.* and *διόπερ... φεύγει*), is complicated and not very plausible. I believe that *ἐν οἷς ... φεύγει* has to stand or fall as a whole.

¹⁷⁸ Also omitted by Bekker (1831), as an interpolation.

¹⁷⁹ Not a verbal citation but, as always, a substantive reference: "in the manner that was stated." *

¹⁸⁰ Gudeman and Tkatsch (2. 147-150) advocate *<ὅποια τις ἄν> ἦ*. For the reason for preferring *<ἢ τις ἄν> ἦ* see below *ad loc.*; in any case the meaning is the same.

without a rationale.¹⁸¹ It is in fact quite clearly either a doublet or a paraphrase of *ἐν οἷς μὴ δῆλός ἐστιν ... ὁ λέγων* a line and a half below, with some corruption at the first *ἤ*.¹⁸² "(speeches) in which it is not clear whether (? what, in what respect?) he is choosing or rejecting." This diagnosis accounts for the lack of a subject: it was stated below (*ὁ λέγων*) and the paraphrast did not need to repeat it; or, if the clause is a doublet, the duplication extends only from *ἐν οἷς* to *φεύγει*.

To Aristotle's own sequence of thought (*τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὅποια τις διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν κτλ.*) the best commentary is a passage in the *Rhetoric*, 3. 16. 1417a16 ff.: *ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιῶν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιῶν ταύτην· ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιῶν τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἦθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν. Mathematical and other scientific and metaphysical discourses are not concerned with the *τέλος* (happiness); hence they involve no moral choices (there is "nothing to choose"), hence no 'character'.¹⁸³*

The parallel does two valuable things for us: (1) it suggests very strongly that the sequence of ideas is as we have reconstructed it, omitting *ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτλ.*, and (2) it settles a textual question in favor of the manuscript reading *μηδ' ὀλως* and against (*μὴ*) *δῆλος* which is implied by the Arabic version.¹⁸⁴ But the writer of *ἐν οἷς οὐκ*

¹⁸¹ Rostagni, Sykutris, and others detach *ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον* from *ὅποια τις ... ἢ προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει* and explain it as meaning "in circumstances in which it is not clear (sc. to us) what the moral choice is." In other words 'character' denotes the expression of moral choice where the situation or action itself does not suffice to make it clear. But the word-order will not fit. The clause could mean this if it ran *ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ὅποια τις ἢ προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει*. As it stands, it has to mean "what kinds of thing a man chooses ... in situations in which it is not clear" (i.e., not clear to him what he *ought* to choose)—which is absurd.

¹⁸² *Εἰ Φ*, Hermann; *τί* Vahlen; *ἤ*?

¹⁸³ Incidentally, the remark about the Socratic *λόγοι* further illuminates what we said about them above, on 1. 47b11.—I see no reason why this distinction between the two kinds of *λόγοι* should not have been in Aristotle's mind from the beginning (Montmollin, p. 65); it seems almost necessarily required by the definition of *ἦθος* as a certain kind of utterance. The partitive *τῶν λόγων* shows that Aristotle is thinking of the *whole* class of *λόγοι*.

¹⁸⁴ "*Per quem <non> certior fit aliquis.*" Tkatsch. *Μὴ δῆλος* was proposed by Lobel, CQ 23 (1929) 79, and adopted by Gudeman.

ἔστι δῆλον κτλ. must have had μὴ δῆλος before him; in fact the unfamiliar construction may have been partly responsible for his feeling that the clause needed paraphrase.¹⁸⁶

The new definition of 'thought'—to come to it at last—contains no particular difficulties or surprises. It is simply a restatement of 50a6-7, with minor elaborations.¹⁸⁶ Nor is there much left to be said about the relation between thought and character. As we have seen, rhetoric can handle character-portrayal if necessary; that is, it is not limited to 'thought.' However, its trend is too contrived and intellectualistic to represent character fairly, on its own terms.¹⁸⁷ Aristotle's discussion of character in chapter 15—unlike that of thought in chapter 19—makes no reference to rhetoric, and undoubtedly he regrets the day when the latter took the place of πολιτικῆ. Nevertheless it does not appear that he seriously thought the trend of the time could be reversed. Character maintains its rightful position, second in the rank-list; but in actual practice it may be necessary to let it be managed by rhetoric or vacate the field to 'thought' entirely.

One possible misunderstanding of καθόλου τι should be resisted. 'Thought' in poetry deals with generalities, 'universals,' but not with *metaphysical* generalities. Dramatic characters do not characteristically expound views on πέρασ and ἀπειρον or the motion of the stars. We need to keep steadily in mind that tragedy—for Aristotle—has nothing to do with philosophy proper ('first philosophy'), and that any thinking in it has to do exclusively with the practical questions of

¹⁸⁶ The hypothesis that ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτλ. is a paraphrase is plausible enough in itself (we have found similar glosses in 1. 47b22; 2. 48a3; 6. 50a1) and is preferable to the hypothesis of a textual 'doublet' in the usual sense. The *Poetics* was not an edited text ('protected,' in F. W. Hall's term [*A Companion to Classical Texts*, Oxford, 1913, 45-52]), and there is no sign in it of an apparatus of variant readings, any more than there is of genuinely ancient scholia or commentaries. Lobel, *op. cit.* 78, calls the clause a 'doublet' but seems to mean a gloss.—Montmollin rightly says, p. 64, that to prove the offending clause an intrusion we should show "pourquoi un érudit s'est crû obligé de compléter le texte." But he also rightly points out that the omission in the Arabic version is not such as could have been caused by homocoteleuton (in a text which originally contained both clauses, as Butcher for example presupposes).

¹⁸⁸ Ἀποδεικνύονσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν = ἀποδεικνύασίν τι; καθόλου τι = γνώμην.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 16. 1417a24, shortly after the passage cited just above: καὶ (sc. ἠθικόν ἔστι) μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὡ σ π ε ρ ο ἰ ν ὅ ν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως.

human living. Perhaps it is worth pointing out also that for Aristotle there is no such thing as the 'thought' of the poet. If the poet has a 'philosophy of life,' it is his private affair, a thing of no general concern; anyhow there is no place for it in a theory of poetry.¹⁸⁸

50b12-20

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ λέξις (λέγω δὲ ὡσπερ πρό-
 15 τερον εἰρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν,
 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [ε'] ἢ μελοποιία μέγιστον
 τῶν ἡδυσμάτων. ἢ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον
 δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκείον τῆς ποιητικῆς · ἢ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας
 δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἐστίν, ἐτι δὲ
 20 κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν | τῶν ὄψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευο-
 ποιῶ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστίν.

50b12

Fourth is the *composition* of the speeches (I mean this in the same sense as my previous remark, namely that *lexis*, 'speech-composition,' is the expression of meaning through the use of language: a statement which means the same
 15 thing whether one speaks of 'verses' or | 'speeches'); and the song-composition of the remaining parts [5th] is the greatest of the sensuous attractions. As for the costuming, it has emotional power to be sure, but is the least artistic element, the least integral to the art of poetry; for the capacity of the tragic art exists even without a competition
 20 or actors, and moreover in the execution | of the masks and costumes the costumer's art plays a more decisive role than the art of the poets.

"Fourth among the literary elements¹⁸⁹ is the Diction of the personages, i.e., as before explained, the expression of their thoughts in words, which is practically the same thing with verse as with prose" (Bywater).¹⁹⁰ But this reading is open at once to several objections:

1. It requires an emendation (τῶν ἐν λόγῳ Bywater; τῶν λεγομένων

¹⁸⁸ See below on 9. 51b5.

¹⁸⁹ *Τῶν ἐν λόγῳ*. See below.

¹⁹⁰ The translation is representative; cf. Butcher, Gomperz, Gudeman, Hardy,

Gomperz); for if τῶν λόγων is partitive, as it is generally assumed to be, a word is needed to replace it which can designate the 'parts' of tragedy, or some of them (the 'literary' ones), and λόγων obviously cannot do that.

2. What is said here has *not* been "before explained." The inconsistency with 49b34 (the only passage that can possibly be meant) is notorious.

3. Expression or diction is *not*, in Aristotle's eyes, "practically the same thing with verse as with prose." In chapter 22 his main effort is to distinguish poetic diction from prose diction,¹⁹¹ and the distinction is insisted on with clarity and wearisome iteration in the *Rhetoric*.¹⁹²

The first step is to recognize that τῶν λόγων is not a partitive, with τέταρτον, but the object of ἡ λέξις.¹⁹³ Τέταρτον δέ is exactly parallel to δεύτερον δέ and τρίτον δέ above; we can understand τῶν μερῶν with it if we like. Τῶν μὲν λόγων ἡ λέξις, then, is "the verbal expression of the speeches." Aristotle has already been talking about the speeches. As we saw, character and thought make up their content, and now it is the turn of their linguistic form, to use the modern jargon. The weight of the phrase rests not on the old term, λόγων, but on the new one, λέξις: "Fourth (in rank) is the *expression* of the speeches."¹⁹⁴

Thus we have arrived at λέξις again, but from a new angle of approach, through the concept of *speech*, whereas in the earlier passage (49b34) it was through the concept of *verse* (as opposed to song). There we had τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν, here we have τῶν λόγων ἡ λέξις. How is it with this substitution of λόγων for μέτρων? Far from ignoring or glossing over the apparent discrepancy, *Aristotle takes express notice of it in the next sentence (λέγω δὲ κτλ.) and explains*

Albeggiani, Valgimigli. Potts and Pitcher seem to imply the omission of τῶν μὲν λόγων.

¹⁹¹ Ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικόν, 58a21; cf. *ibid.* 32, b1.

¹⁹² 3. 2. 1404b4, 12 ff., 27-1405a2, 4-8; 3. 1406a5, 11-15, 32-b1.

¹⁹³ This interpretation was anticipated by Tyrwhitt, then suggested by Vahlen, "Rangfolge" 180-181 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 268-270), but later given up (in *Poet.* he feebly suggests that μὲν may be μέν *solitarium*). It is also maintained by Spengel, Teichmüller (*Ar. Forsch.* 1. 51, 246), and now Rostagni. As we shall see, the interpretation of τῶν μὲν λόγων ἡ λέξις hangs together closely with that of τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἢ μελοποιία below.

¹⁹⁴ Rostagni notices the clue of the inverted order but does not explain it quite right.

that there has been no essential change in his meaning. "I mean (by this) (the same thing) as was said before, (namely) that λέξις is the expression (of meaning)¹⁹⁶ through the use of words—(a statement) which has the same meaning in connection with 'verses' as in connection with 'speeches.' "

This reading of the passage calls for several notes:

1. Ὡσπερ εἴρηται is a substantive, not a verbal, reference. Aristotle is referring to the gist of his thought, not merely quoting his previous statement.¹⁹⁶ When he wrote τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν he did not mean for a moment that λέξις had to do only with versification. He took it for granted that it was the verbal expression (composition) of a meaning in verses. He had not bothered to make that implication clear; now he does so.

2. Λέξιν, like σύνθεσιν ("composing") in the other passage and ἐρμηνείαν ("expressing of meaning") here, is an actively verbal term. Λέξις is a 'part' of the art of tragedy, not of the product; what it denotes is not the inventory of words and expressions used by the poet but the way he uses them.

3. The relative δ (note the gender) refers to the whole previous clause (λέξιν εἶναι κτλ.), not merely to ἐρμηνείαν.¹⁹⁷ The point is not that the poet's form of expression has the same character as something else, but that Aristotle's statement has the same application as the previous one.

4. Ἐμμέτρων¹⁹⁸ and λόγων refer to the terms used in Aristotle's two definitions of λέξις, or rather to the alternative conceptions under which the tragic dialogue has so far been regarded, namely as 'verses' and as 'speeches,' rather than to the categories 'verse' and 'prose.' Κατηγορεῖσθαι (λέγεσθαι) ἐπὶ τινος is Aristotle's standard expression for something being predicated of something. Thus species are predicated of individuals (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων), *Metaphysics* B3. 998b16, 999a15; Z15. 1040a24; the quality is predicated of the substance, *Topics* 1. 15. 107b4; *Physics* 4. 14. 224a14; the definition of the *definiendum*, *De Anima* 2. 1. 412b4.¹⁹⁹ So here a definition has been offered (λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν), and the point

¹⁹⁶ I.e., of character and thought.

¹⁹⁶ See below on 24. 60a3-4, on ὥσπερ εἴρηται throughout the *Poetics*.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. above on 4. 49a8, <δ>.

¹⁹⁸ One is tempted to emend to μέτρων, but the change does not seem to be necessary.

¹⁹⁹ Further references in Bonitz, *Index* 268a13-31.

made in δ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων κτλ. is that that definition is equally applicable to the tragic dialogue whether the latter is called 'verse(s)' or speech(es).'

Thus λέγω δὲ ... τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν is a genuine exegetic note by Aristotle himself; it is in fact, as we can see, a parenthesis. But there is no reason to suppose it a subsequent addition. It came over him, when he wrote τῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ λέξεις, that he now seemed to be implying a different conception of λέξεις, and the parenthesis is devoted to setting that possible misapprehension straight. It has every appearance of belonging to the same stage of composition as the surrounding text.

Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἢ μελοποιία follows: the pendant to τῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ λέξεις.²⁰⁰ The antithesis is the one we had in 49b30: διὰ μέτρων (= τῶν λόγων) ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους (= τῶν λοιπῶν). "... and the song-composition of the remaining (parts of the play: cf. μορτίοις, 49b26) (is the) greatest of the 'sweetenings.'" Λέξεις and μελοποιία are coördinated here, occupying the fourth and fifth places in the rank-list.²⁰¹ Under the usual constitution of the text μελοποιία is paired with ὄψεις, so that ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων and ἡ δὲ ὄψεις ψυχαγωγικὸν μὲν κτλ. are taken together, with the implication that both elements are 'sweetenings' but μελοποιία is the bigger one. Earlier, however (49b31-33), Aristotle said nothing about ὄψεις being a ἡδυσμα; on the other hand he did specify that ἡ δ υ σ μ ε ν ο ς λόγος included the verse parts and the songs. Our arrangement, which pairs μελοποιία with λέξεις rather than ὄψεις,²⁰² preserves this correlation, with the added specification that song-composition is the greatest of the 'sweetenings': i.e., greater than λέξεις.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ This also is part of Vahlen's interpretation referred to above on b4-12: "Rangfolge" 180-182 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 268-271).

²⁰¹ A reader—undoubtedly the same one as in the other cases—has jotted down opposite the clause the annotation πέμπτον, or more likely the sign ε', which has then gotten into the text just after λοιπῶν (in the Parisinus and some others it appears as πέντε); see Tkatsch 2. 165b and Gudeman's apparatus. There is no doubt that it is a gloss: see Tkatsch's analysis. (The doublet πέντε is more easily accounted for if the original was ε'. MS T of the medieval Latin version has *quintum forte*).

²⁰² In 26. 62a16, where τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς ὄψεις are listed together as the elements "through which the (spectator's) pleasures are constituted most vividly," the relative δι' ἧς reveals that καὶ τὰς ὄψεις is an interpolation; see below *ad loc.*

²⁰³ Vahlen's <τοῦτο δὲ> μέγιστον ("Rangfolge" 183 n. [= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 272 n. *14]) is not necessary.

One corollary of our interpretation deserves to be repeated:³⁰⁴ that *μελοποιία* includes the text as well as the music of the songs. The text of the choruses is not *λέξεις* in Aristotle's sense and is not considered in his discussion of it in chapters 19-22.

Ὀψις brings up the rear.³⁰⁵ We have already seen that it does not mean the 'spectacle' or staging of the play as a whole, but simply the visual aspect of the dramatic characters; and we cited in support of this the word *σκευοποιουῦ*, which certainly means the 'property man' or stage costumer. Another indication is *ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν*, which is pointless if Aristotle is talking about the stage-set and scene-painting.³⁰⁶ Still further confirmation comes from 14. 53b1-8, *ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερόν καὶ ἔλλεινόν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος ... τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότατον καὶ χορηγίας δεδμενόν ἐστιν.* The verbal echoes of our passage are unmistakable, and the references to the specific function of costuming are still clearer.³⁰⁷ Moreover the effects of fear and pity are attached very closely and directly to the tragic *characters*, their persons and their fortunes—not to the stage-set, which in any case, under Athenian conditions, could not vary enough from drama to drama to make an appreciable difference in the emotional effect.³⁰⁸ What Aristotle is thinking of in *ἔστιν ... τὸ φοβερόν ... ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίνεσθαι* is cases like the famous one recorded from the first performance of the *Eumenides*, when the masks of the Furies were so terrifying that some of the younger spectators fainted, women suffered miscarriages, etc.;³⁰⁹ and for *τὸ ἔλλεινόν* we

³⁰⁴ See above on 49b35.

³⁰⁵ *Ψυχαγωγικόν μὲν* is influenced by *μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων* just before, but not organically connected with it. The visual appearance, like the music, has emotional capabilities.

³⁰⁶ The plural *τῶν ὄψεων* (see above on 49b33) is also more natural as referring to the 'get-ups' of the actors, since a single actor might play as many as four or five roles: see Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.*,⁴ 173-182; Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 137-147.

³⁰⁷ The choregus had to provide for the chorus and chorus-trainer and pay for the masks and costumes (see Flickinger, *op. cit.* 270-271; Pick.-Camb. *op. cit.* 75-78), but the *testimonia* nowhere speak of his being responsible for the stage-set.

³⁰⁸ The two crucial factors are (1) the essential uniformity of the stage-set from one play to another, and (2) the absence of dramatic lighting (absent in the modern theater too until the development of electrical 'spots').

³⁰⁹ *Vita Aeschyli* 9 Wil.: *τινὲς δὲ φασιν ἐν τῇ ἐπιδείξει τῶν Εὐμενίδων σποσράδην εἰσαγαγόντα τὸν χορὸν τοσοῦτον ἐκπλήξει τὸν δῆμον ὥστε τὰ μὲν νήπια*

need think no farther than Euripides' heroes-in-rags.¹¹⁰ These effects are what he means by *ψυχαγωγικόν*. To add that the costuming and outfitting of the actors is *ἀτεχνότατον καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκείον τῆς ποιητικῆς* is only to state the obvious. The poet's main job is to plan the action and develop the characters who perform it, prior to any incorporation of them into visible shapes (but see below on 17. 55a22-29).

Let us cast a retrospective eye over our findings for chapter 6. In it the basic theory of tragedy is outlined. The six 'parts' are deduced systematically from the definition, which in turn—except for the catharsis clause—is derived systematically from the initial classification of poetry and the 'historical' sketch of its development. The deduction of the parts draws on all the elements in the definition—again excepting the catharsis clause—but is founded above all on the basic concept of the drama as an imitation of an action which is performed *directly by the characters* (*δρώντων*); thus:

1. The characters must be *seen*.
2. They use *speech* (*λέξις*) or
3. *Song* (*μελοποιία*).
4. They are 'imitating' (performing) an *action*.
5. They have certain *moral qualities*.
6. They express *ideas*.

We saw, however, that the six parts are not thought of by Aristotle primarily as parts of the product (the play), but as constituent elements of the art of tragedy, or what comes to the same thing, moments in the activity of building a tragedy. Thus they really mean respectively:

ἐκφύξαι τὰ δὲ ἔμβρυα ἐξαμβλωθῆναι. But the real reason for the consternation is given earlier, 7: *ταῖς τε ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἑκπληξίαν τετρατόδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην [= τὸ πιθανόν, εἰκός] κέχρηται*. Cf. *ibid.* 14: *πρώτος Αἰσχύλος πάθεισι γεννικωτέροις τὴν τραγωδίαν ἠῶξεν τὴν τε σκητὴν ἐκόσμησεν καὶ τὴν ὄψιν τῶν θεωμύμων κατέπληξε τῇ λαμπρότητι, γραφαῖς καὶ μηχαναῖς, βωμοῖς τε καὶ τάφοις, σάλπιγγιν εἰδώλοις, Ἐρινύσι, τοῦς τε ὑποκριτὰς χειρῶσι σκεπάσας καὶ τῷ σῶματι ἐξογκώσας μείζοσι τε τοῖς καθάρνοις μεταωρίσας*. The general affinity of these remarks with Aristotle's is clear; cf. also 53b8-9, *μητὸ φοβερόν ἀλλὰ τὸ τετρατόδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες*.

¹¹⁰ See the catalogue of them in Aristoph. *Ach.* 418 ff. (Schmid, 1. 3. 765 n. 9, adds Menelaus in the *Helen*); G. Eggerking, *De Graeca artis tragicae doctrina ...* (diss.), Berlin, 1912, 21-22.

1. The *visualization* of the characters.
2. The *composition* of the *verses* (dialogue).
3. The *composition* of the *songs*.
4. The *structuring* of the *action*.
5. The *expression* of *character* mainly through speeches.
6. The *expression* of *ideas* through speeches.

Having secured his list of the parts and demonstrated (or at least indicated how to demonstrate) that it is complete, Aristotle rearranges it as a rank-list, in the order:

1. Plot (structuring of events).
2. Expression of character.
3. Expression of ideas.
4. Composition of dialogue.
5. Composition of songs.
6. Visual manifestations.

6 constituent elements
of tragedy

Here the three substantive parts (*ἃ μίμνῃται*) lead the list, the two varieties of composition (*οἷς μίμνῃται*) follow, and the 'visualization' (*ὡς μίμνῃται*) brings up the rear, barely escaping being cut off altogether. Actually the argument in this section proceeds from point to point. Each element is weighed primarily against the next one above or below it in the list: plot against character, character against ideas, dialogue- and song-composition (verbalization of the speeches) against each other and against character and ideas (content of the speeches), and costuming, by implication, against song-composition. In one case (character and ideas) this leads to a re-examination and re-definition of the concepts involved; in another (dialogue-composition), to an explanation of an apparent inconsistency. Aristotle is concerned above all to show the overwhelming importance of plot; so much so that he has subsequently added some further arguments (50a29-35 and a39-b3, perhaps also a35-39). Thus the argument for the primacy of plot occupies more than half the entire section (50a15-b4), and we are mentally prepared for the massive and detailed analysis of plot-making which now follows (chapters 7-14, 16-18).

CHAPTER 7

The inventory and ranking of the 'parts' of tragedy being completed, we begin the detailed study of them, commencing naturally with the "first and greatest," the plot—or, to repeat the phrase as Aristotle does, the 'structuring of the incidents.' The first part of this discussion of plot extends without interruption almost to the end of chapter 9 (52a1) and has to do with the *general* properties of the well-made plot.¹ It falls into three main sections, dealing with (1) its completeness and order (τάξις), 7. 50b23-34; (2) its length and unity, 7. 50b34 - 8 end (51a35); and (3) its subject, the 'universal,' 9. 51a36-b33.² The order of treatment is significant: Aristotle proceeds from the aesthetic or artistic properties to the substantive or philosophical ones.

50b21-34

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν τινὰ
δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ
πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγωδίας ἐστίν. κεῖται δὲ ἡμῖν
25 τὴν τραγωδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μὴ μῆσιν
ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος· ἐστὶν γὰρ ὅλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος.
ὅλον δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν· ἀρχὴ
δὲ ἐστὶν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ'
ἐκεῖνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τελευτὴ δὲ
30 τοῦναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀνά-
γκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν· μέσον
δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. δεῖ ἄρα
τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους μῆθ' ὀπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι
μῆθ' ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρηῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις
ιδέαις.

50b21

The 'parts' being now distinguished, let us state next what qualities the plot-structure should have, since this is

¹ The treatment of the special properties of the complex plot begins in chapter 10, with an introductory section in 9 (52a1 - end).

² 51b33-52a1 presents a special problem; we shall see that it belongs in a sense to both the general and the special sections.

both the first and the most important thing about the art of tragedy. Now it has already been laid down in our definition that tragedy is an imitation of an action which is
 25 complete and a | whole and has a certain magnitude (for there is also such a thing as a whole that has no magnitude). 'Whole' is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A 'beginning' is that which does not itself necessarily follow something else, but after which something else naturally exists or happens; an 'end,' the other way round, is that which itself naturally exists after another thing, either
 30 | of necessity or as a general rule, but not something else after it; and a 'middle' is that which both follows another thing and has something else following it. Therefore well-composed plots should neither begin at an accidental point nor end at an accidental point, but follow the lines we have indicated.

The passage presents no difficulties in text or interpretation. The only question about its earlier part might be whether *δλης* (b24) is not smuggled in. But a fair-minded reading will show that Aristotle intends to do no more than explain and clarify *τελείας*, of which *δλης* is almost the exact equivalent.³ So far as he is concerned, then, he is quoting without essential change from the definition of tragedy.

It is worth noticing how carefully Aristotle develops the definitions of 'beginning,' 'middle,' and 'end' in purely abstract terms, so as not to compromise their usefulness by identifying them prematurely with any particular type or aspect of human action. But one has only to consider the *Oedipus Rex* (which Aristotle undoubtedly thought had a proper beginning, middle, and end) to see that his definitions amount to a declaration of independence—and therewith also of responsibility—for the poet. The dramatist is not required to begin at the 'beginning of the story,' i.e., with Oedipus' birth and exposure, nor to end with his death. He is bound by an inner necessity, which it is his job to perceive and follow, not by tradition or biology. This concept of necessary sequence will be adopted later, in the formula *ἢ εἰκός ἢ ἀναγκαῖον*,⁴ as the grand law of poetry.

³ See Bywater *ad loc.*

⁴ ~ ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, b30.

50b34-51a6

- 35 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἄπαν | πρᾶγμα δ συν-
 ἔστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν, οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν—τὸ γὰρ καλὸν
 ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ οὔτε πάμμικρον ἂν τι γέ-
 νοιτο καλὸν ζῶον, συγγεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναι-
 39 | a1 σθήτου χρόνου γινομένη, οὔτε παμμέγεθες, οὐ γὰρ | ἅμα ἡ
 θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ
 ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας, οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῶον—
 ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματίων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων
 5 ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω | καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.

50b34

- Furthermore, since a beautiful thing, either a living creature
 35 or | any structure made of parts, must have not only an
 orderly arrangement of these parts but a size which is not
 accidental—for beauty lies in size and arrangement, hence
 neither a very tiny creature can be beautiful, because our
 view of it is blurred as it approaches that instant where
 perceptibility ceases, nor an enormously big one, because
 39 | 51a1 then | the perception does not take place all at once and
 the sense of oneness and wholeness is gone from the viewers'
 vision, as for example if it were a creature a thousand miles
 long—hence as in the case of bodies, i.e., living creatures,
 a certain size is required, but one that can be readily per-
 5 ceived as a whole, so | in the case of plots they should have
 length, but such as can be easily remembered as a whole.

The sentence is a fine specimen of the *sententia Aristotelica longa impedita*, and an especially amusing one because its message is that structures made of parts should be *εὐσύνοπτα*. Fortunately, this time there are no textual corruptions or interpolations and we have only to hold fast to the course of Aristotle's reasoning. To be beautiful, a thing (we will consider in a moment what kinds of thing are meant) must have size as well as proper arrangement; for if it is too small our view of it is blurred and if it is too large we cannot see it as a whole; so⁵ in the same way the tragic plot, to be beautiful, must have a deter-

⁵ The sentence is of the same type as the one that caused us so much trouble in chapter 6 (49b36-50a10). There Aristotle caught up the apodosis with an οὕτω,

minate size, such that we can survey it as a whole.

"Since a beautiful thing must have size as well as arrangement...." The most surprising feature, though not the most obtrusive, is that Aristotle never bothers to tell us why the tragic plot must be beautiful; he simply takes it for granted. Perhaps there is no better answer than that he was, after all, a Greek. At any rate we should notice carefully that we are told about the beauty of the plot long before we hear anything about its truth or its emotional effectiveness. Beauty is the root of Aristotle's theory, from which the other blossoms spring.⁶ Here⁷ it is the principle which requires a certain order (*μηθ' ὀπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι μηθ' ὀπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν*, b32)⁷ and a certain length (*μέθεγος ... μὴ τὸ τυχόν*): that is, an order and a length planned by the poet, not left to the vagaries of his material.

According to the *Metaphysics*, M3. 1078a36, *τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον* (= *μέγεθος μὴ τὸ τυχόν*; cf. *δρος τοῦ μεγέθους* below, a15). In our passage the second of the three elements, *συμμετρία*, appears to be missing. But closer scrutiny of the argument shows that it is there by implication.⁸ For the structures with which the tragic plot is compared here, viz. animate bodies⁹

here he recovers with a *ὄστε*. But this time we are not dealing with definitions of a set of elusive terms. The punctuation does not matter very much—the thought carries itself forward anyhow—except that parentheses should not be used: not for Montmollin's reason, that Aristotle was not capable of writing them, but because the clauses which might be parenthesized contribute essential elements to the conclusion.

⁶ See my "Aristotle on the Beauty of Tragedy," *Harvard Stud. in Class. Phil.* 49 (1938) 179-204, esp. 187.

⁷ The way in which *τάξις* is brought in here (*οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ εἶχειν*) shows beyond any doubt that the principle has been operative from the beginning of the chapter (actually from long before; for it is the real reason why *τελείας* appeared in the definition of tragedy).

⁸ If *Metaph.* M1-8 is a late work (Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 171, 176-189), it might be argued that the *Poetics* represents an earlier stage when Aristotle had not yet taken explicit cognizance of the idea. But *Top.* 3. 1. 116b21—certainly an early work—says that the beauty of limbs (*sc.* of the body) is *συμμετρία*; and the idea is already explicit in the *Philebus*, 64c.

⁹ Susemihl's suggestion that *ζῶον* means a painting is inappropriate and unnecessary; see among others Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 55-57. The comparison of a poem or discourse with a body (animal or human) is amply guaranteed by the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*, 264c. *Ζῶον* means 'animate body'; *ἅπαν πρᾶγμα κτλ.* extends this to all objects consisting of parts, but especially objects *made* of parts (*συνέστηκεν* = passive), i.e., artefacts; cf. *Pl. Epist.* 7. 342d; *Ar. Top.* 1. 15. 106a20, *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πῶ καλῶ τῶ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῶου τὸ αἰσχρόν [sc. ἐναντίον ἐστίν],*

and constructed objects, are *made up of parts*, and the argument that the whole must have a limited and determinate size depends implicitly on the notion of the parts. If the whole becomes too small the view of it becomes "blurred" (*συγχεῖται ἡ θεωρία*):¹⁰ that is, we can no longer see the parts at all and so cannot perceive a harmonious proportion, or indeed any proportion, between them and the whole. On the other hand, if the whole is too large to be grasped in a single vision¹¹ "the one and the whole are lost to the viewers": that is, only the parts (some of them) remain in view. Thus the requirement of a 'limit of length' does depend implicitly on the concept of the *συμμετρία* of the parts and the whole: that they must be seen, and their relation appraised, together.

The application of the comparison from "bodies"¹² and animals" to plots involves a change of medium from sight to sound and from space to time. Aristotle seems unaware of any difficulties, such as a modern aesthete might raise, about the validity of the transfer from one sense to the other.¹³

51a6-15

(τοῦ δὲ μήκους ὄρος <δ> μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἰσθησιν [οὐ τῆς τέχνης] ἐστίν—εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγω-

τῶ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς οὐκίας τὸ μοχθηρόν; *ibid.* 107a19-31, on ζῶον and σκεῦος. The supposition of "an animal a thousand miles long," fantastic as it is (deliberately so: Aristotle had a weakness for such drastic illustrations), is less fantastic than the idea of a painting or a statue a thousand miles long. Impossibly large animals are not uncommon in legend.

¹⁰ Ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινόμενη, "getting close to the imperceptible (moment of) time." Χρόνου is challenged by Tkatsch, 2. 70-71, and Gudeman, who propose χρόνος, "in time, finally." Others (see Tkatsch 70b) have deleted the word. But in Aristotle's theory of vision the size of the thing seen and the time required to see it are interconnected. Magnitude, motion, and time are strictly correlative: *Phys.* 4. 11. 219a10; *ibid.* 12. 220b15; 6. 2. 233a10; cf. J. F. Callahan, *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, 55. They are continuous and—potentially, at least—infinately divisible. Half the motion, half the time: *Phys.* 6. 4. 235a15-25. Hence there is an 'imperceptible time' corresponding to the imperceptible magnitude. But we cannot discuss the matter fully here.

¹¹ Ἐὐσύνοπτος also implies the parts, which are seen 'together.'

¹² Σωμάτων, a3, is a loose term, but it does not seem necessary to emend to σπαστημάτων (Bywater) or σχημάτων (Überweg). Ἀσωμάτων is foolish. Sykutris' suggestion that σωμάτων is intended as a synonym of ζῶων seems to be excluded by the repetition of ἐπί.

¹³ Ἐδύνοπτος is replaced by εὐδνημόνευτος, a5; but ἐδύνοπτος reappears in 23. 59a33 and συνοραῖσθαι in 24. 59b19; cf. σύνδηλος just below, 51a10.

- δια<ι>ς ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδραν ἂν ἡγωνίζοντο,
 ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν—ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν
 10 | τοῦ πράγματος.) [ἄρος] αἰεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέγρι τοῦ σύν-
 δηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος· ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς
 διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων, συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ
 15 | ἄρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους.

51a6

- (As for a norm of the length, the one looks to the com-
 petitions and the demands of sense-perception [not of the art]
 —for if they had to compete <with> a hundred tragedies,
 they would be competing by the water-clock, as they say was
 the case at other times too—while the other springs from the
 10 very nature | of the object.) [Norm] In every case the longer
 plot, up to the point of still being clear as a whole, is more
 beautiful so far as magnitude is concerned; and, to state
 the norm in abstract terms, a magnitude in which, with
 events following in unbroken sequence, a change can plaus-
 ibly or necessarily take place from misfortune to good for-
 tune or from good fortune to misfortune: that is the true
 15 | norm of magnitude.

The modern vulgate text runs, with few variations, as follows: τοῦ
 δὲ μήκους ἄρος <δ> μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς
 τέχνης ἐστὶν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγωδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι ... φασιν.
 ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ἄρος, αἰεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων....
 "The limit of length in relation to dramatic competition and sensu-
 ous presentment, is no part of artistic theory. For had it been the
 rule ... was formerly done. But the limit as fixed by the nature of
 the drama itself is this:—the greater the length, the more beautiful
 will the piece be ..." (Butcher).

Against this text and reading a number of objections must be lodged:

1. Πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, as an attributive phrase,
 presupposes that a *ἄρος* of length has already been stated *in these terms*.
 But where has this been done?

2. Conversely, οὐ τῆς τέχνης does not serve very well as predicate.
 The following clause, which ought to justify the statement, really
 speaks to πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, not to οὐ τῆς τέχνης;

what it argues is that the *δρος* in question really does look to the requirements of the competitions (and to 'sense-perception'), not that it is un-artistic.

3. The two limits (*δρος ὁ μὲν, ὁ δὲ ... δρος*) ought by rights to be in parallel construction—if possible, in the same sentence.

4. The asyndeton after *δρος* in a10 (*ἀεὶ μὲν κτλ.*) is distressingly harsh and makes the ellipsis of *μῦθος* (sc. *ὁ μείζων μῦθος*) especially difficult.¹⁴

5. Above all, *ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων ... κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος* is not a *δρος* but simply a preparatory remark. It says that a plot will be more beautiful the longer it is, up to the limit of being *σύνδηλος*, but does not itself define the limit. The *δρος* begins at *ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς*, not at *ἀεὶ μὲν*.

We begin by noticing that the first *δρος* has indeed already been stated, in 5. 49b12-13 (*ὕπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίον εἶναι*), not in the precise terms employed here, but in terms which justify this remark. The present sentence points out that that *δρος* was based on the requirements of the dramatic competitions and on 'sense-perception.' Thus *πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν* is a predicate. But what is the point of its two elements? 'Perception' is easy enough: the transit of the sun was a visible measure of the spectator's capacity for a unified aesthetic experience. But in chapter 5 nothing was said about the competitions. What have they to do with the fixing of the norm? The next sentence enables us to grasp the connection. The restriction of the tragic contest to a few competitors (specifically, in the fifth century, to three) made it possible to grant each of them the maximum or optimum length of time: a whole day, or whatever part of it the poet wanted. The result was good, but the cause was accidental and irrelevant. For, as Aristotle says—and we now see the purport of the remark for the first time¹⁵—if they were required to compete with¹⁶

¹⁴ That *μῦθος* has to be supplied surely needs no argument. It is not the limit itself that will be more beautiful the longer it is, but the plot. Cf. 23. 59a33, *λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος (= σύνδηλος) ἐμελλεν εἶσθαι ὁ μῦθος*.

¹⁵ The mention of a day's span in chapter 5 supplies the necessary antithesis for what follows. Without it the remark about the klepsydra remains abrupt and pointless.

¹⁶ I have suggested the slight emendation *τραγῳδία<ι>ς*. Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 1. 1404a5, *δίκαιον αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν*; Aristoph. *Wasps* 1479, *τῶρα γὰρ ἐκεῖν' οἷς θέσπις ἡγωνίζετο*. *Τραγῳδοῦς* is an enticing possibility, but hard to justify.

a hundred tragedies (i.e., instead of nine), their allotment of time would be measured not by the sun but by an *equally visible* but much more niggardly measure, the klepsydra.¹⁷ The yardstick is external, sensuous, in both cases, and fixed in both cases (though the time-allotment comes out differently) by a decision as to the competition. Against this external determination Aristotle will set in a moment the one which is *κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος*.

If *πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἰσθησιν* is the predicate of the first clause, *οὐ τῆς τέχνης* does not belong to it; and in fact, as we said, the following sentence ignores these words. They are a marginal or interlinear comment on the first *δρος*: "Does not belong to the art."

The connection of our passage with 5. 49b12-13 also enables us to suggest an explanation—no more than a possible one, to be sure—of the dubious and much-discussed remark *ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτὲ φασιν*.¹⁸ We saw in the other passage that the chief trait of the epic was *variability* in length: *ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ*. We interpreted the further remark that "at first they did this in their tragedies as (they had) in their epics" to mean primarily that the early tragedies were long. But it could equally well mean that they were sometimes short. We cannot tell what evidence Aristotle might have had for such a state of affairs, or for a report that the water-clock was actually used at one time; but it is not impossible that there was such a report and that he is alluding to it here.

The second *δρος* was represented in chapter 5 by *μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν*. Unlike the first one, it did not state any quantity, only the tendency toward invariability. Here it is not restated or defined,

¹⁷ I follow Gudeman in writing the singular. The point is that the poet's work would be measured by a single klepsydra, like a speech in a law court: that is, very harshly. For the running time of a klepsydra see Bruno Keil, *Anonymus Argentinensis*, Strassburg, 1902, 236-269 (2 to 10 *choes* allowed, according to the nature of the speech and the case; running time per *chous*, 4 - 4 1/3 minutes; hence maximum permitted length ca. 43 minutes); Suzanne Young, *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 274-284, with full discussion of the problem (p. 281: running time of a *chous* in the klepsydra found in the Agora, 3 minutes). Of course a single klepsydra could be refilled any number of times; but surely the implication of Aristotle's remark is that the tragedians would be as restricted as the courtroom speakers, to something like 30 or 40 minutes.

¹⁸ For a sketch of the controversy see Tkatsch, 2. 143-145. But one is not impressed by the text which he squeezes out of the Arabic (*φάσκει εἰλόθα>σιν*) or by his forced interpretation of it ("as they are accustomed to speak on other occasions also": i.e., in the law-courts; but does *φάσαι* ever mean 'make a speech'?).

any more than the first one is—that remains for *ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς κτλ.* below—but simply characterized; and again this fact has been obscured by the intrusion of a false complement, the word *δρος* in a10. Its excision restores the parallel construction: *ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος* (*sc. ἐστίν*), "while the other (is) in accord with the very nature of the object." *Ἄει μὲν ὁ μελλῶν κτλ.* then stands apart from *ὁ δὲ κτλ.*, to their mutual advantage; for, as we said at the beginning, it is not a part of the definition. "*Ὀρος* itself is a rubric or marginal tag jotted down over or opposite it, under the impression (which it has helped to fasten on the modern vulgate) that the *δρος* is stated there."¹⁹

That the connection between our passage and chapter 5 has not been recognized before is due to the tenacity with which editors, translators, and interpreters ever since the Renaissance have believed that Aristotle was talking there about 'dramatic time.' Hence it has not occurred to anybody to look for a connection with our passage, which was unmistakably talking about the length of tragedy.

Actually, however, the affiliations reach still farther. 5. 49b12-16 and 7. 51a6-15 are only the first two links in a chain of passages extending throughout the *Poetics*. The others are 9. 51b33-52a1; 17. 55b1 and 15; 18. 56a14; 23. 59a30-37; 24. 59b17-28; and 26. 62a18-b11. All these discussions have to do in one way or another with the unity and the 'limit of length' of tragedy, two concepts which we shall find so closely affiliated as to be almost inseparable. The *δρος τοῦ μήκους* is in fact the most important strictly aesthetic principle in the *Poetics*, and the one to which Aristotle devotes the most attention.

We are free, then, to take up *ἀει μὲν ὁ μελλῶν* as a new sentence. It is not the *δρος* but only a preliminary remark, fixing the context within which the *δρος* operates. We supply *μῦθος* from before (a5), and also the basic assumption that the plot is to be beautiful. Aristotle now lays down the further specification that it will be more beautiful the longer it is, up to the limit of "being clear as a whole" (*σύνδηλος, ~ εὐμνημόνευτον*, a5). The principle is thoroughly Greek: we find it established as early as Homer that the *καλοί* (i.e., gods and

¹⁹ Or possibly it was originally intended for *ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς κτλ.* but has gotten out of place. In any case it is correlated with *οὐ τῆς τέχνης* above and signifies, "The real *δρος* begins here."—Susemihl proposed the bracketing of *δρος*, but with a colon after it, so that *ἀει μὲν ὁ μελλῶν κτλ.* still belongs to the preceding: "Die nähere Bestimmung dagegen aus der Natur der Sache selbst wird also lauten: je ausgedehnter...." My proposed solution was arrived at independently of Susemihl.

heroes) are tall and large things are especially beautiful.²⁰ At any rate we see that there are two more or less distinct elements in Aristotle's theory of μέγεθος: (1) that the thing which is to be beautiful must have size, i.e., be large rather than small; and (2) that it must have a limit of size (μέγεθος μὴ τὸ τυχόν; τὸ ὠρισμένον).

The epic too had a tendency to size (cf. 5. 49b10), and Aristotle recognizes this, within limits, as contributing to its grandeur and impressiveness (24. 59b29). The tendency was inherent in the character of the epic as a narrative genre (*ibid.* 22-28); and for the same reason it tended to go wild, to exceed all limits. Yet the epic too, as a work of art, ought to be subject to some kind of limit. Aristotle's discussion of the problem will concern us later;²¹ but the problem itself deserves mention here because he firmly believes that it is important and that the two principles we have just mentioned (size and limit of size) are indeed essential to all poetry. Hence not only the remark ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος but the ὄρος which follows is pertinent to both genres, and we should keep this in mind in studying them.

The definition itself is a general or abstract statement (ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν),²² directed to the essential nature of tragedy

²⁰ See W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemos.* 4th ser. 2 (1949) 294-298. No doubt the prejudice (if it is one) had its origin in the difference in stature between the invading Greek-speakers and the indigenous Mediterranean peoples; although primitive and naive people everywhere—e.g., in the U.S.A.—are impressed by size as an essential ingredient of beauty.

²¹ See below on 24. 59b22 ff.

²² The basic sense of ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν (λέγειν) in Aristotle seems to be 'just to make a statement, without adding any qualifications': *Top.* 2. 11. 115b33, ὃ ἐν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῆ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. Then, since substance is prior to ('simpler' than) accident (i.e., you can predicate it, e.g., ἄνθρωπος, without adding λευκός or whatever), the word denotes a statement about the basic or 'first' thing in any category, or about the universal: *De Gen. et Corr.* 1. 3. 317b5, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς ἦτοι τὸ πρῶτον σημαίνει καθ' ἐκάστην κατηγορίαν τοῦ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ πάντα περιέχον. Thus ἀπλῶς is opposed to καθ' ἕκαστον, κατὰ μέρος, e.g., *E. N.* 1. 1. 1095a1, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα [sc. κρίνει καλῶς] ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πάντων πεπαιδευμένος; *ibid.* 5. 10. 1134a25, τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. This seems to be the sense here: the ὄρος is a definition κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος (b9), and does not descend to the concrete details which are involved when one talks about tragedy in the context of "the competitions and sense-perception." Certainly the sense is not the pejorative one in which ἀπλῶς is opposed to διορίζειν, as a hasty or over-

(κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος) rather than to the accidents of competition and physical performance. Its gist is that the plot (that is, the action, for at this point it is useless, in fact impossible, to make a distinction between them) should be long enough for a complete change to take place from happiness to unhappiness or the reverse. Nothing is said in the *δρῶς* itself about our ability to grasp or remember the plot as a whole.

The structural analysis that is implied here involves two elements: (1) two poles or end-points between which the action moves, and (2) a necessary or probable sequence of events leading from the one to the other. But these elements are nothing but our old friends the 'beginning,' 'middle,' and 'end': happiness or unhappiness is the beginning, the opposite state, whichever it is, is the end, and the incidents in between are the 'middles.'²³ Thus we can rephrase the definition in the following terms: the ideal length of the plot is that in which one can move from one extreme state of human fortune to the other, passing through a necessary or probable sequence of intermediate steps.

In the section on 'arrangement,' 50b26-34, it was laid down that a 'beginning' is that which is not necessarily preceded by any other event, and an 'end' that which is not necessarily followed by any other. Now that we have given the two end-points qualitative content (happiness or unhappiness), we can see better what this means. Let the play begin with a happy man: say Oedipus, the wise, renowned, and universally respected King of Thebes, surrounded by trusting and devoted subjects (he is their father and all of them are his children), happily married to a great queen, the father of two sons and two daughters. And let it end at the opposite pole of Oedipus' fortune: self-discovered murderer of his father, his queen also his mother, his children his own half-brothers and -sisters, blind, alone, and ready to go into permanent exile. What the definition, combined with the previous

simplified and therefore unscientific definition, e.g., *Eth. Eud.* 3. 1. 1229a32, *περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς κερήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον.*—When Aristotle says, a14, that the present *δρῶς* is *ἰκανός*, he does not mean merely that it will do until a better one comes along. It is a thoroughly 'adequate' definition (as opposed to the one *πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας κτλ.*), framed with care and containing everything essential. See my article cited above (n. 6), 191-193.

²³ Aristotle said *μέσον* in 50b26, 31, but clearly did not mean that a play has only one 'middle,' since the latter is defined as an incident preceded and followed by others. The *Oedipus Rex*, for example, has a number of *μέσα*. The plural appears in 23. 59a20 (*ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος*), a passage which is clearly intended as an exact recapitulation of 50b24-27.

definitions of 'beginning' and 'end,' tells us is that the poet need not go beyond these end-points. Oedipus began happy and has 'changed' full-circle to unhappiness: the span of the play is fixed by these visible poles.

So far so good. The play need not be, in fact must not be, a chronicle of a man's whole life. But we cannot fix its length adequately merely by fixing its end-points. Between them must stand an organized, logical sequence of 'middles.' How many 'middles' must there be, and how long should each of them last? This is the least clear point in Aristotle's theory. He never mentions any number or specifies any mean length for the *μέσα*. Perhaps he did not notice the problem;²⁴ or perhaps the reason is simply that no theoretical solution can be given in advance, in abstract terms. How many steps must Oedipus go through to get from 'happy' to 'unhappy'? Why, the number that Sophocles has put into his play. There is no formula that could tell us more. If we feel, as each event succeeds the last, "Yes, it had to happen that way"—that is, if we do not feel a gap, a 'skip' in the logic at any point—the number of 'middles' must be right.

But even if the number of 'middles' is fixed, or tacitly assumed to be fixed, we still have not attained a complete definition of the length of tragedy. In real life the downfall of a man from high prosperity may come in a few minutes, as in a stock market crash, or be spread over months or years. One sequence may be as necessary or probable as the other, it may even contain the same number of necessary steps; the total time-spans in the two cases will still have no relation to each other.

The reason for this is, in brief, that the variability is caused by the variable amount of *empty time* that intervenes between significant events in real life. Thus I may choose to entrust a vitally important secret to a friend, and the friend may betray me—whether intentionally or unintentionally does not matter; in either case, *when* he does so may depend on pure accident: it may come months or years later. Or to take an example closer to the mark, I may send a vitally important message, the answer to which is bound to make or unmake me. But *when* the message is delivered or the answer received is a matter that depends on all sorts of irrelevancies: the time of day the letter is dropped in the box or received in the post-office at the other end,

²⁴ The tendency of classical Greek tragedies towards a uniform length (see above on *μικρόν ἐξαλλάττειν*, 5. 49b13) may have beguiled him into overlooking it.

the state of the air in the delivery boy's bicycle tire, the addressee's sudden absence from town for four days on other business, his distance from me (though modern communications have progressively reduced this factor), etc., etc., etc. Or the message may for fortuitous reasons never be received at all (and that mischance may itself constitute an answer), as with Tess's famous letter under the door. In short, the necessity of an act, as a sequel to another act, can be determined, but not when it will take place. *We cannot gauge the total length of a complete action, in Aristotle's sense of the word, if the accidents of 'empty time' are left in the reckoning.*

*Greek tragedy, and Aristotle, solve this problem by excluding empty time from the reckoning.*²⁵ So far as the plays themselves are concerned this is done by the simple device of ignoring the matter. Thus in the notorious case of the *Agamemnon* the beacon-signal is received from Agamemnon at Troy at the beginning of the play and the hero himself appears an hour or so later, having meanwhile conducted the sack of the city, navigated the Aegean, and survived a disastrous storm which dispersed his fleet. But the aberrations (from a bourgeois, clock-watching point of view) are not limited to Aeschylus.²⁶ In the *Oedipus Rex* there is a question of sending for the old man who was present at the death of Laius. In real life it might have taken ten hours, or three days, for a messenger to find the man and bring him into the king's presence;²⁷ and during that time the king would have eaten, slept, received delegations on other matters, talked to his children, etc., etc. No matter: in the play the order to bring him is dispatched shortly after line 862, and half an hour or so later (at line 1110), *precisely when the plot demands his presence, no sooner and no later*, he appears, ready for the fatal interview. The poet has ignored the bourgeois necessities of time absolutely; we cannot even tell whether he ever gave them a thought.

Aristotle shows a little more awareness of the matter, in the unobtrusive phrase *ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων*, "with (the events) happening in continuous succession." Here it is necessary to observe very precisely

²⁵ Conversely, the Renaissance borrowed most of its trouble over the 'unity of time' by insisting on including it, e.g., on reckoning the length of time it would take a messenger to go from Venice to Padua and return, and counting it an offense if the playwright brought him back in fewer hours than the posting schedule allowed.

²⁶ Cf. Todd, *op. cit.* (above, c. 5, n. 110) 120-123.

²⁷ We do not know how far he was from Thebes, but it was as far as possible: see line 762.

what he says and what he does not say. He says, "with the events happening in continuous succession;" he does *not* say that they are presented as so happening in 'real life,' that they must be such as could happen in the corresponding time in real life, or anything of the sort. There is no implication of the kind that has always been fundamental in the 'unity of time' controversy, of a congruence between the time-scheme in the play and another, 'normal' time-scheme outside the play. The selected and logically ordered 'middles' follow each other without a break, that is all. Whether they could do so in real life is irrelevant and not considered.

With *ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων* we have completed the list of determinations that are necessary to measure the length of tragedy. What is required is a series of events that follow each other in necessary or probable order, cheek by jowl, from the 'beginning' to the 'end.' It is a pure or ideally dense time-scheme with no empty spaces in it, a kind of Parmenidean *ὄν* in the realm of art. It is evident, therefore, that the 'norm of length' is nothing but a corollary of the unity and completeness of the action: its concrete manifestation in time. The action marches from one pole to the other along a fixed course; it is all there, and nothing but it is there. And we see further that the length of the action, so measured, is the length of the play. Here, and only here, action and poem coincide: the one begins and ends where the other begins and ends. Against this concrete identity the correlation imagined by Bywater and others,²⁸ between the alleged duration or 'dramatic' time of the play (i.e., the time it would or might last in the real world) and its actual length, is a phantasm, something that does not exist for Aristotle any more than it existed for Sophocles. The simplicity of his idea is what has prevented its being understood.

Thus we can read off the length of the action from the length of the poem: from that point of view they are interchangeable. Aristotle has achieved a definition *κατ' αὐτήν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος*, wholly in terms of the action itself. But the definition ought properly to tell us what the threshold of 'surveyability' is: that is, within what limit the length must be kept in order to be *σύνδηλος*. It is not apparent how it does this, since the definition itself makes no reference to our powers of synoptic apprehension. What guarantee do we have that our ability to grasp the action as a single whole will coincide with the limit established for it by its own nature? I do not see an answer

²⁸ See above, c. 5, n. 92.

to this question—not even an implied answer—in the text. Again Aristotle seems to ignore the problem. A kind of preestablished harmony must reign between the two realms, so that the upper limit²⁹ in one turns out to coincide with the upper limit in the other; but we are not told how or why this is so. There seems to be a blind spot in Aristotle's vision just at the point where the objective and the subjective realm meet;³⁰ in any case, I am afraid it is a fact that he has not built a satisfactory bridge between them.³¹

One incidental question which presents itself here is whether the norm of length includes the trilogy: that is, the connected trilogy. Aristotle says nothing about the matter, no doubt because the connected trilogy was almost an Aeschylean monopoly³² and his theory takes very little account of Aeschylus. But if a single play is more beautiful the longer it is, provided certain conditions are met, a trilogy which meets the same conditions ought to be still more beautiful. Thus it would seem that there is room for the trilogy in Aristotle's doctrine, even though it is not explicitly provided for.³³

²⁹ Obviously the only limit that matters practically is the upper one. Nobody was likely to write tragedies so short that *συγγεῖται ἢ θεωρία*.

³⁰ It would be possible to maintain that the need is met by the requirement of probability or necessity: that we can grasp any action as a whole so long as we can mentally survey the logical links that bind it together. The 'surveying' of the action is in fact a synthetic judgment like that involved in the syllogism (seeing the togetherness of the premises in the conclusion), and *συμβαίνει*, a13, is the same word that Aristotle uses for the way the conclusion 'follows' from the premises: cf. *Apa1. Pr. 1. 1. 24b18*, *συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερον τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι*; and see the other references in Bonitz, *Index* 713b10-38. But this still does not tell us how long a logical chain we can keep in consciousness simultaneously.

³¹ One factor, undoubtedly, is his tendency to equate aesthetic experience with *αἰσθησις*, which he has ruled out (a7) as a serious criterion. One sees how far Aristotle is from modern theories of the 'autonomy' either of the work of art or of aesthetic experience.

³² *Suidas s.v. Σοφοκλῆς*: *καὶ πρῶτος ἤρξε τοῦ δράμα πρὸς δράμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ τετραλογεῖσθαι*. It is true that we know of a Sophoclean *Telegony* (inscription of Aixonai first published by A. R. Palaios, *Πολέμων* 1 [1929] 161 ff.; see Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 52-54), and that Euripides' *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, and *Trojan Women* and his *Oenomaus*, *Chrysiptus*, and *Phoenician Women* were more or less connected (see Schmid 1. 3. 474-478, 570-573, and for the Alexander trilogy B. Snell, *Euripides Alexandros* [*Hermes Einzelschr.* 5], Berlin, 1937, 66-68). But these are isolated phenomena in comparison with the ten or more connected trilogies we know of from Aeschylus (Schmid 1. 2. 188-189 n. 8).

³³ See also below on 24. 59b21.

CHAPTER 8

51a16-29

μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἰς οὐχ ὡσπερ τινὲς οἴονται, ἐὰν περι
 ἕνα ἢ πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων
 οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν. οὕτως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἐνός πολλαί εἰσιν,
 ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πράξις. διὸ πάντες εἰκόασιν
 20 | ἁμαρτάνειν, ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακλήϊδα καὶ Θησιήϊδα
 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα πεποιήκασιν. οἴονται γάρ, ἐπεὶ
 εἰς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἕνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι προσήκειν.
 ὁ δ' Ὀμηρος, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικεν
 καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν. Ὀδύσειαν |
 25 γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον
 πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι
 ἐν τῷ ἀγερεμῷ, ὧν οὐδέν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν
 ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πράξιν οἷαν λέ-
 γομεν τὴν Ὀδύσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
 Ἰλιάδα.

51a16

But a plot is not unified, as some people think, simply by
 having to do with one individual; for many things, in fact
 an infinite number, happen to an individual, some of which
 do not contribute to any unity, and in the same way
 there are many actions of a single individual out of which
 no single action emerges. Hence it stands to reason that
 20 all those poets | are wrong who have composed a *Heracleid*
 or a *Theseid* or poems of that kind. They think that since
 Heracles was a single individual it naturally follows that the
 plot is one also. But Homer, superior as he is in other
 ways as well, seems to have seen this point in its proper light
 also, thanks either to art or to natural endowment. For in
 25 composing | an *Odyssey* he did not incorporate into it every-
 thing that happened to the hero, for example how he was
 wounded on Parnassus, or how he pretended to go mad at
 the muster, neither of which events, by happening, made it
 necessary or probable for the other to happen; rather he

constructed the *Odyssey* around a single action of the kind we are talking about, and the *Iliad* in the same way.

The chapter division is misleading. It gives, and indeed is based on, a mistaken impression that we are entering on a new topic here. Actually the first sentence follows directly upon the last one in chapter 7: ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων, as it were. The essential principles of poetic unity—wholeness, order, logical sequence, continuity, 'surveyability'—were all presented in chapter 7 and summed up in the 'norm of length,' which was in fact nothing more or less than a definition of the unity of the action¹ from the side of its measurable length. Aristotle assumes that we now know what unity is, and goes on to specify what it is not. It is not, for one thing, biographical unity, the sum of everything that happens to a man during his life. The link with the preceding sentence is especially close in πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῶ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει κτλ., where the antithesis to κατὰ τὸ εἶκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ... συμβαίνει is deliberate,² with a special play on συμβαίνει: συμβαίνει ... μεταβάλλειν, it follows (logically) that a change should occur, against πολλὰ ... συμβαίνει, many things happen (happen to occur).³

It is noteworthy that the examples of mistaken, i.e., merely biographical, unity are taken from the epic (*Heracleids*, *Theseids*). That is permissible, we might say, because the discussion of tragedy also includes the epic so far as it is like tragedy.⁴ But the reason is rather different. In chapter 5 Aristotle told us that tragedy has a tendency toward uniform length while the epic is ἀόριστος. Now that he has just defined the ὄρος which was implied there, the epic springs to his mind as most conveniently illustrating the lack of one. Many things, in fact an unlimited number of them (ἄπειρα ~ ἀόριστα), happen to a single man, and the ordinary epic is ready to narrate them all. Homer, on the other hand, "composed the *Odyssey* about a single action of

¹ Vahlen, *Beiträge*⁸ 27 (31. 292): "In dem letzten Satze des 7. Kapitels ist in der für den Umfang der Tragödie massgebenden μεταβολή (in Glück oder Unglück) die Forderung der Einheit der Handlung eingeschlossen... Die Worte μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς, mit denen man nicht angemessen ein neues Kapitel eröffnet, sind daher jenem Satze enger anzuschliessen, und ergeben in diesem Zusammenhang eine positive Bestimmung der Einheit des μῦθος, auf welcher das 8. Kapitel basiert."

² Cf. #27 below: ὧν οὐδέν ... ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἶκός θάτερον γενέσθαι.

³ It is perhaps because he has begun with συμβαίνει, with its passive connotation (~ πάθη), that Aristotle adds "and in the same way many actions also"; otherwise the clause seems a little otiose.

⁴ See above on 5. 49b16-20.

the kind we are describing."⁶ Does it follow that the action of the poem is subject to the norm of length? Yes, as we shall see, the *action* of the *Odyssey* falls within the permitted length, though the whole poem, which consists of action *plus* 'episodes,' exceeds it.⁶

The notion of the Homeric epic as a compound, though never stated with quite the clarity we could wish, is guaranteed by three or four later passages and is a cornerstone of Aristotle's appraisal of Homer. It also supplies a possible solution for one of the minor *cruces* in this chapter, the wounding of Odysseus on Parnassus (a26). Since the episode in question is related in our *Odyssey* (τ392-466), it has been suggested that Aristotle either had a different text of the poem or had forgotten what was in his text.⁷ But these hypotheses are not very plausible, and neither is necessary. The wounding is an *episode*,⁸ not a part of the main story, and so does not prejudice the unity or the limitation of length of the latter. As an episode it may stand, since the epic has a comparatively free hand in adding them (24. 59b22 ff.). So much is said by most of the modern interpreters.⁹ But *οὐκ ἐποίησεν* is a distressingly bald statement; after all, Aristotle must have known that Homer did "write" the passage, episode or no. Can we read *ἐποίησεν* more strictly? The essential thing the true poet 'makes' or 'composes' is the *structure of events*, the *σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*; the poem (i.e., the verses that constitute the poem) comes later.¹⁰ Thus when Homer "made" or "composed" an¹¹ *Odyssey*, what he was making was the *plot of an Odysseus-epic*. This strict reading of *ποιῶν* and *ἐποίησεν* is confirmed by the word which Aristotle substitutes below (a29): *τὴν Ὀδύσειαν συνέστησεν*, in which we can hear clearly

⁶ The reference to the 'norm of length' is unmistakable; see Vahlen, *loc. cit.* *Οἶα λέγομεν* does not refer to *μίαν* as a lexical item: "unity in the sense we (customarily) give to the word." Cf. Butcher: "an action that in our sense of the word is one."

⁷ See below on 17. 55b15-23; 23. 59a35-37; 24. 59b22-28; 26. 62b5-11.

⁸ See Hardy and Gudeman respectively.

⁹ A *παρέκβασις*, the scholiast calls it.

¹⁰ E.g., Susemihl, Bywater, Sykutris, Rostagni.

¹¹ Cf. 9.51b27, *τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων*; see also on 24. 60a6.

¹² The lack of an article just here (a24) perhaps has a special point. Homer was 'making' the story of a man, Odysseus, as other poets 'made' stories of Heracles and Theseus. But unlike them he made it a plot, not a chronicle. *Ὀδύσεια*, without article, is exactly parallel to *Ἡρακληίδα καὶ Θησηίδα*, "a *Heracleid* or a *Theseld*." This reading of *Ὀδύσειαν* is strengthened by *αὐτῷ* (*ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη*); the *Ὀδύσει* which Gudeman smuggles in here is a gloss in the Arabic version: cf. *Ποσειδῶνος*, 17. 55b18), which implies that the personal reference is uppermost.

the echo of *σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*. And it is further confirmed by the exactly parallel remark about Homer's procedure in making the *Iliad*, 23. 59a31, τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον ... ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὄλον: i.e., he did not try to incorporate (build) the whole war into his plot.¹²

In spite of all this, there is still something slightly mysterious about the two episodes of the wounding and the feigned madness. Bywater rightly says that *μέν* and *δέ* indicate a difference—we can even say a contrast—but we cannot quite make out what it is.¹³ Bywater's emendation οὐδέ for οὐδέν in a27 (ὧν οὐδέ θατέρον κτλ.) is also very tempting, making the clause refer directly to the two examples rather than to the vague concept of "everything that happened to him." But then, although it is clear that no strict causal relation does exist between the two episodes, it is not clear why anybody should expect one, or what Aristotle's purpose is in citing them. The point would perhaps be, not that there is no direct causal relation directly from one to the other, but that they are not such as to take a suitable place in any *total* structure of cause-and-effect. Ἐν κοινῷ ἡ ἀπορία; we must leave it there.

51a30-35

| χρῆ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἢ μία μίμησις ἑνός ἐστιν. οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστι, μιᾶς τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὥστε μετατιθεμένον τινός μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένον διαφέρεισθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ
35 ὄλον. δ γὰρ προσόν | ἢ μὴ προσόν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὄλου ἐστίν.

51a30

30 | Hence, just as in the other mimetic arts a single (unified) imitation is of a single object, so also the plot, since it is an imitation of an action, should be an imitation of an action that is unified, and a whole as well, and the constituent events of the plot should be so put together that if one of

¹² He did incorporate a good deal of the rest of it into the poem, *ibid.* 35; see below *ad loc.* and on τὴν ποιήσιν, a37, which likewise does not mean the whole poem but the central action, the plot.

¹³ Surely the distinction is not that one is something that *happens* to Odysseus (a πάθος) while the other is an *action*. One fails to see why that is a significant distinction just here; and anyhow both episodes are cited as examples of ὅσα αὐτῷ σὺν ἔβη (cf. συμβαίνει, a17).

35 them is placed elsewhere or removed, the whole is disjointed and dislocated. For a part which, by being added | or not added, does not lend any greater clarity, is not a part of the whole.

This summary closes the circle in the first two parts of the general discussion of plot (see above, beginning of chapter 7) by bringing the concepts of unity and wholeness together.¹⁴ Wholeness guarantees that no part is missing which should be there; unity, that nothing is there which belongs somewhere else. There are no new ideas here, but the theory is rounded off on its negative side, in the same way as the definition of length (i.e., unity in time) was rounded off by considering what kinds of plot are *not* unified. A part whose presence or absence makes nothing strikingly clear¹⁵ is not a part of the whole. The surgical metaphors *διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι* ("disjoined and dislocated") should be noticed;¹⁶ we shall find *διαστρέφειν* in exactly the same kind of context (9. 52a1).

When Aristotle speaks of parts that can be shifted or removed without damage, he is perhaps thinking in the first instance of the epic 'episodes.' But the whole context of the chapter makes it evident that such 'separable' parts must exist in some tragedies also. One wonders, then, whether *πρόσόν* may not signify 'parts' added to the central action of the play, as the episodes are in epic.¹⁷ We will return to this idea in chapter 9 (51b33-52a1).

¹⁴ The plot must be an imitation "of a single action, and that a whole one" (or, "of an action that is single and yet complete"). Susemihl's *ταύτης καὶ ὅλης* (which he himself later withdrew: see Tkatsch 2. 169-170) was no improvement on the MSS reading *καὶ ταύτης ὅλης*. A thing can be one without being complete; the action should be both.

¹⁵ *Ἐπίδηλος* is one of Aristotle's favorite words, denoting, as Bonitz says (*Index*, 270b55), "id quod evidens est et quasi in oculos incurrit."

¹⁶ See Bywater's note *ad loc.* The background of the metaphor in Aristotle's thinking, however, is Platonic as much as it is medical. Cf. the passage already referred to, *Phaedrus* 264c, *δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὡσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι κατὰ*, and the closely related description of the dialectical (diaeretical) process, *ibid.* 265c: *τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον*. On this concept of proper 'dissection,' following the natural 'joints,' see J. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, Oxford, 1940, 91-92.

¹⁷ For *προσεῖναι* in the sense 'be there in addition, be added' see *De Gen. et Corr.* 2. 9. 335b7, *δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην (sc. αἰτίαν)*; *Metaph.* M7. 1081b23; *Pl. Rep.* 4. 437d, *ἐὰν μὲν τις θερμότης τῷ δίψει προσῆ*, "If there is some warmth in addition to the thirst."

CHAPTER 9

51a36-b15

φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα
λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ
38 | b1 τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ | ἱστορι-
κός καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῶ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμμετρα δια-
φέρουσιν, εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι καὶ
οὐδὲν ἦττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων,
5 ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῶ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέ|γειν, τὸν
δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιό-
τερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον
τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. ἔστιν δὲ
καθόλου μὲν τῶ πολῶ τὰ ποῖα ἅττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ
10 πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἶκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ στο|χάζεται
ἢ ποίησις, ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, τί
Ἄλκιβιάδης ἐπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κωμω-
δίας ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον γέγονεν· συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦ-
θον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων, οὕτω τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασι,
καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἱαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον |
15 ποιῶσιν.

51a36

From what has been said it is clear too that the poet's job
is not to tell what has happened but the kind of things that
can happen, i.e., the kind of events that are possible accord-
38 | b1 ing to probability or necessity. | For the | difference between
the historian and the poet is not in their presenting accounts
that are versified or not versified, since it would be possible
for Herodotus' work to be put into verses and it would be
no less a kind of history with verse than it is without verses;
5 rather the difference is this: the one | tells what has hap-
pened, the other the kind of things that can happen. | And
in fact that is why the writing of poetry is a more philo-
sophical activity, and one to be taken more seriously, than
the writing of history; for poetry tells us rather the uni-
versals, history the particulars. 'Universal' means what

kinds of thing a certain kind of person will say or do in accordance with probability or necessity, which is what poetic composition aims at, lacking on names afterward; while 'particular' is what Alcibiades did or had done to him. Now in the case of comedy this has become clear; for they construct the plot with the use of probabilities, then (and not until then) assign whatever names occur to them, rather than composing their work about a particular individual as the 'iambic' poets do.

Again there are no serious textual problems, in fact they have all but disappeared since we left chapter 6. Likewise there are no certain traces of additions by Aristotle in this section, and fewer and fewer signs of interpolation.¹

The passage presents itself as a direct inference from what has gone before: *φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*,² i.e., from chapters 7 and 8. This fact, though noticed by Vahlen³ and most of the commentators, has not received quite all the attention it deserves. The distinction between poetry and history, between "telling of universals" and "telling of particulars," is rightly famous, but is usually cited or alluded to as if it were an independent principle springing directly from the concept of poetry;⁴ and the even more famous dictum, "hence poetry is both more philosophical and more serious than history," is often quoted as if poetry were actually a branch of philosophy⁵ and the representation of universals were the fundamental concept of *ποιητική*. On the contrary, these notions of the 'philosophical' content of poetry grow out of the concept that the work of art must be *beautiful*. Poetic truth is a corollary of poetic beauty. The structure of events 'built' by the poet, in order to be beautiful, must be a unified and complete whole. Hence the parts, i.e., the constituent events (*πράγματα, μέρη*) that are to make up the whole, must be so selected and arranged in

¹ Montmollin (p. 66) finds no certain indication of Aristotelian supplements in chapters 7-9, down to 51b33.

² Cf. 6. 49b23, *ἀναλαμβάντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὄρον τῆς οὐσίας*.

³ *Beiträge*² 28 (21. 293).

⁴ So in Butcher's otherwise excellent discussions, 163 ff., 368 ff.

⁵ E.g., Truesdell S. Brown, *AHR* 59 (1953-54) 830: "The separation between philosophy and history is, then, a recognized fact in the fourth century." Poetry is not mentioned.

relation to each other (τάξις) and the whole (συμμετρία) that none can be moved or removed without "disjointing and dislocating" the whole. The inference Aristotle draws is that the structure must be built of parts which are "possible according to probability or necessity" (= τὰ καθόλου), because they are the only kind that will lend themselves to such treatment. A beautiful and unified whole cannot be made out of particulars. The rest of the present passage is devoted to spelling out the implications of this inference in detail.

The first step in this spelling-out is the injection of history into the discussion.⁶ What has history to do with the case? It is cited to make Aristotle's point more graphic and more concrete. He is not afraid that the poets will confuse regular historical works with poetry, or suddenly start writing them; what he does fear is that they may write *poems which are in fact histories*. We have already had an example of such poems; the *Heracleïds* and *Theseïds* and other epics which chronicle the life of one man. But chronicle epics are not limited to the biographical type. They may relate "the events of a single time, involving the experiences of one man or many" (23. 59a23-24; cf. *ibid.* b1). In either case they are "similar to histories" (*ibid.* a21). Thus Herodotus is not mentioned here for his own sake. The supposition of his history being turned into verse (b2) is an illustration of a point about poetry, not history.⁷ The result of such a translation would be a chronicle epic; but its origin in a work officially labelled and recognized as 'history' brings Aristotle's point home more forcibly than an actual epic could.

It might be objected that Herodotus after all wrote real history, that is, a record of real events, whereas the chronicle epics dealt with myths and fables. But Aristotle makes no such distinction between myth and history (the proof will come shortly, in 51b15-19), and of course he is quite right in not doing so, at any rate for the Greek epic cycle. We have only recently, thanks to Schliemann, Nilsson, and the rest, found our way back to the idea which Aristotle, like all classical Greeks, took for granted: that the Greek epics, for all their dis-

⁶ See most recently A. W. Gomme, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* (*Sather Classical Lectures*, 27), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, 1 ff.

⁷ The phrase τὰ γινόμενα reveals the same connection with the foregoing, being the equivalent of ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, 8. 51a25 (cf. ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη, 23. 59a23). Universals are not ὅσα συνέβη, but ὅσα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πρᾶττειν—the same 'logical' use of συμβαίνει that we have already noticed in 7. 51a13.

tortion and 'dressing up' of the facts, were nevertheless at bottom a record of real events—history, though of a mythologizing kind.⁸

When Aristotle says, then, that poetry is more philosophical than history, the dictum will include not only, say, Homer as against Herodotus,⁹ but also Homer as against the cyclic poets (*οἱ ἄλλοι*, 23. 59a37), the historians-in-verse. But other aspects of the remark are even more important. In the first place we must remember that 'poetry' (*ποίησις*), as always in the *Poetics*, means *the art or operation*¹⁰ of making poetry, not the product as such. Not every poem is necessarily more philosophical than every history, for not every poem fully or adequately embodies the spirit of *ποιητικῆς*; and anyhow the contrast Aristotle is talking about is one of form (that is, structure) and idea, not of the vehicle.

Again, and more important still, in saying that poetry is "more philosophical" Aristotle does not say that it *is* philosophy. Certainly the doctrine that poetry imitates universals is a reply to Plato's re-proclamation of "the ancient feud between philosophy and poetry,"¹¹

⁸ Wilam. *Eintl.* 119: "die Griechen haben ja in wahrheit nur historische tragödien gehabt: selbst Aristoteles hält die sage für geschichte." M. P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece*, Lund, 1951, 13-14: "The Greeks, whose history was much shorter than ours, founded their claims on myths. People think that this implies a great difference, for to them myth is fiction, history fact. We must get rid of this attitude... No Greek doubted that the heroic myths were the early history of his people." Cf. Thucydides' attitude towards Homer. He is very much concerned to warn the student of 'ancient' history against Homer's distortions and exaggerations for poetical effect (1. 10. 3), but never doubts that the poet was recording real events, the truth of which can be gotten at by analysis of his account (*ibid.* 4-5); and he lumps the poets and the historians together as exaggerators and misrepresenters of facts, 1. 21. 1.

⁹ There is no really satisfying explanation of Aristotle's absolute neglect of Thucydides (for a recent attempt see D. M. Pippidi in *Mélanges Marouzeau*, Paris, 1948, 483-490), who had unmistakably tried to make history 'philosophical,' i.e., an analysis of causes, not merely a record of events, and whose speeches so often deal with *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*. It is not enough to point out (Schmid 1. 5. 209-210) the strong, even violent, reaction of Plato against Thucydides' view of political reality (freedom and power the basic drives; Athenian imperialism a brutal but necessary and ultimately justified domination of the weak by the strong; justice contrasted with *τὸ συμφέρον*; human calculation [*γνώμη*] balanced against Chance; etc.), or the domination of historiography in Aristotle's own time by the Isocratean school (Theopompus and Ephorus). It seems to be a genuine blind spot—or a deliberate omission. (*Ath. Pol.* 33. 2 [if by A.] proves that he knew the *History* [8. 68. 4], but not necessarily that he knew it at the time he first wrote the *Poetics*, if the latter is an early work.)

¹⁰ See above on 1. 47a10.

¹¹ *Rep.* 10. 607b.

his allegation that poetry has no access to reality, no philosophical grasp of truth.¹² But Aristotle's defense does not take the crude form of identifying poetry with philosophy, and his 'universals' are not Plato's Ideas. Plato's indictment had come to this: poetry cannot represent truth because it cannot penetrate to the Ideas but stops short at the veil of Appearance (particulars). So stated, the case of poetry is hopeless; for no one can argue seriously that she has either the method or the will to reach the abstract plane of the Ideas. Aristotle's defense (which is implicit, not explicit) does not attempt that gambit. In his scheme, metaphysics, the science of Being, and its congeners physics and mathematics (also to some extent astronomy), are a special group of 'theoretical' sciences;¹³ and the theoretical sciences have theoretical objects only.¹⁴ Human life and action belong to the 'practical' sphere and have nothing to do with metaphysics. Our world, except in so far as we live the theoretical life of pure reason, is a realm of contingency and approximation. It has principles, but they are valid only "for the most part" (*ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*).¹⁵ That, in fact, is why Aristotle so carefully uses the double formula "according to probability or necessity" throughout the *Poetics*; for necessity can never be absolute in the sublunar world. Thus there are general principles, 'universals,' that are valid here, but they partake of the nature of the realm to which they belong. To expound these principles is the business of ethics and politics, the 'practical' sciences, i.e., the sciences of action in the narrower sense.¹⁶ Hence in so far as 'poetic' deals with universals at all it must be correlated with ethics and politics, or with rhetoric, which is an 'offshoot' of politics.¹⁷ But 'poetic' is not a science, even at this level. What it can offer us is a view of the *typology of human nature*, freed from the accidents that encumber our vision in real life. It can show us "what kind of thing such and such a kind of man will naturally say or do" under given circumstances.

¹² *Ibid.* 598b, e, 599b-d, 601d.

¹³ *Metaph.* E1. 1026a18, cf. 1025b25.

¹⁴ Cf. *E. N.* 6. 2. 1139a8, *πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός*. On Aristotle's fundamental notion of the exact correlation of knowledge with its object—the "identity of knower and known"—at each level in the scheme of things see, for example, G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle*, (London and) New York, 1932, 129-130, 191; Léon Robin, *Aristote*, Paris, 1944, 33 and 38.

¹⁵ See Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 2. 18-20, 29-31.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 25-29.

¹⁷ See above on 6. 50b7.

Seen in the light of Plato's attacks on poetry, Aristotle's theory is, depending on one's point of view, either a liberation or a condemnation. The poet is released from Plato's requirement that he must go to school to philosophy to learn the truth (the Ideas). But he is also condemned to the 'practical' realm and must not claim that he understands the ultimate things. There is in fact not a word in the *Poetics* about the ultimate "secrets of life," about why mankind should suffer or be happy, about Fate, or man's relation to God, or any such metaphysical matters. These omissions are not accidental. The proof is that there is nothing about them in Aristotle's discussions of ethics or politics either.¹⁸ He has solved Plato's insistent question about the metaphysical justification of poetry by begging the question: that is, by assuming tacitly that poetry has no metaphysical dimension.

Thus we are not to ask the poet for ultimate answers. Aristotle's 'practical' world, which is also his poetical world, is the world as we know it from day to day: the realm in which we strive for happiness through 'virtue' and sometimes achieve it and sometimes fail, in which we are what we are because of the choices we have made and what we have done or failed to do. God or Fate do not break into the charmed circle. The ultimate never confronts us in the *Poetics*, any more than it does in the *Ethics* or the *Politics*—except in the form of Chance or the marvelous, τὸ θαυμαστόν.

The poetic universal has nothing to do with what happens to man from outside, but only with how he reacts to it: τῷ πόλῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. What happens to the tragic man, except so far as he himself is its cause, remains outside the grasp of Aristotle's theory, or can appear in it only as an inscrutable premise. This had to be so, if not because Plato had laid it down that God can only be the cause of good,¹⁹ then because Aristotle excludes God from history and leaves no rationale for our fate except what we ourselves do. The paradox can be formulated this way: Aristotle's theory of the practical world has no room for any systematic cause of action except man himself; yet the tragic 'action' involves not only man's own

¹⁸ The 'theonomic' doctrine of the *Eudemian Ethics*, upon which Jaeger lays such stress (*Aristotle*² 239-243), views God only as the ideal which we apprehend as the norm of our lives. He has nothing directly to do with what happens to us, but only with what we do. This is Aristotle's Platonic heritage. Plato had made God as Fate unthinkable (αἰτία ἐλομένον · θεὸς ἀναίτιος, *Rep.* 10. 617e), and Aristotle implicitly accepts the principle.

¹⁹ *Rep.* 2. 380b-c.

causality (which is amenable to the requirement of the *εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον*) but something that breaks in upon him, 'happens' to him from outside. Oedipus, the wise, kind, hot-blooded, vital king, is all very well as the direct source of the actions that constitute the play. But these actions (*πράγματα*) would not constitute *an* action (*πρᾶξις*), and certainly not a tragic action, were it not that something frightful has *happened* to Oedipus. Aristotle's theory can posit a character, Oedipus the man; it cannot posit anything corresponding to account for Oedipus the tragic victim.²⁰

This discrepancy is perhaps reflected—no doubt unconsciously—in Aristotle's language. He defines tragedy as an imitation of an action, but speaks of it only as "telling of" the universals: the word *μίμησις* does not appear. What it "tells of" are the building blocks that fit together to constitute the whole; but what it imitates is the whole, and in this case the whole is more than the sum of its parts. There are two other signs that perhaps point in the same direction. ('Universals' are the things that a man of such and such a character will naturally say or do; 'particulars,' on the other hand, are "what Alcibiades did or *what happened to him*" (italics mine). ('What happened to Alcibiades cannot belong to the universal, and not simply because Alcibiades is an individual instead of a type, but because *in Aristotle's lexicon there is no principle outside of character itself that can determine what will happen to a man, whether he be a type or an individual.* The other clue is the *pathos*, which is the nub of the tragic plot. For although the *pathos* is defined as an 'action' (*πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ*, 11. 52b11), the idea expressed by its name is that it is an action which *befalls* somebody.²¹)

Ὅδ' στοχάζεται ἢ πόησις, ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη. *Ὅδ'* refers to the whole definition of the 'universal,' but particularly to the concept of *κατὰ τὸ εἶκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. The real difficulty is in *ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη*. The interpretation of the participle has taken two divergent lines, which can be conveniently represented by the translations of Butcher ("it is this universality at which poetry aims *in* the names

²⁰ See L. A. Post, *From Homer to Menander* (Sather Classical Lectures, 23), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951, 253.

²¹ Naturally the primary implication is that it befalls the victim, the person who is killed, wounded, or the like. But it is also 'befalls' Oedipus to kill his father: it is an action of which he is in one sense the cause, in another sense the victim. See below on *hamartia*, 13. 53a10.

she attaches to the personages") and Bywater ("which is the aim of poetry, *though* it affixes proper names to the characters"). But neither interpretation will quite do. The assignment of names to the characters is neither in accordance with the universalizing aim of poetry nor at variance with it,²² but simply *subsequent*. The poet builds or should build his action first, making it grow probably or necessarily out of the characters of the dramatic persons, and then—only then—he gives them names. Aristotle's meaning is evident from 17. 55b12, where after outlining the plot of the *Iphigenia in Tauris* without mentioning a single name, he adds, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ("then and not before") ἐποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιοῦν; and from the next sentence in our own passage, συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον ... οὕτω²³ τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασιν: "having constructed the plot ... they then assign (supply, i.e., to the characters) whatever names turn up."²⁴ Aristotle insists on the principle with special force just because in Greek tragedy, with an occasional exception like Agathon's *Antheus* (b21), it looked as though the plot always came complete with the traditional names: the brother about to be slain by his sister in a foreign land was Orestes and not Alcmeon, etc. Aristotle's view is that even here, if the poet does his work properly, the plot comes first and the names are "tacked on" (ἐπιτιθεμένη) afterward.²⁵

²² See Sykutris *ad loc.*

²³ For οὕτω ("on that basis; then and then only"; = ἤδη in the passage just quoted) cf. Sykutris *ad loc.*; Vahlen *Poet.* 139; and see 17. 55a34, τοὺς τε λόγους ... ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἰθ' οὕτω εἰς ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν. Tkatsch, 2. 48-50, shows that the negative in the Arabic version represents ΟΥΤΩ misread as ΟΥΠΩ (cf. οὐπω below, b17, and the inverse error in the Parisinus: ΟΥΤΟ [οὐ τό] misread as ΟΥΤΩ, a36); but his explanation of the passage falls into the old error of making the name-giving in some way significant of the καθόλου. So Gudeman also ("οὕτω in der angegebenen Weise," nämlich in Bezug auf das καθόλου οὐ στοχάζεται ἢ ποιήσις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη").

²⁴ Ὁ τυχόν (τὸ τυχόν, etc.), one of Aristotle's favorite phrases; cf. 11. 52a34-35 and see Bonitz, *Index* 778b32-50.

²⁵ Ὑποτιθέασιν (b13), which some of the older editors wanted to change to ἐπιτιθέασιν, suggests the arbitrary and secondary nature of the process. Cf. the concept of ἐπόθεσις in logic, as an assumption which is agreed upon but is not necessarily true, e.g., *Anal. Post.* 1. 10. 76b23-77a4; or ἐξ ὑποθέσεως = ἐξ ἀνάγκης (i.e., one has to do so-and-so, assuming that one wants something else), e.g., *Pol.* 7. 13. 1332a10; *Metaph.* M7. 1082b3, λέγω δὲ πλασματώδες τὸ πρὸς ἐπόθεσιν βεβιασμένον, "by 'fictional' I mean twisted to fit an assumption"; cf. *ibid.* 32, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀρθῶς λέγουσιν, ἄλλως [= ἀπλῶς] δ' οὐκ ἀρθῶς. The standing opposition between ἐξ ὑποθέσεως and ἀπλῶς (see Bonitz, *Index* 797a34-

All this seems to imply a conceptualism radically at variance with the way in which the great Greek tragedies were actually produced. Aristotle is standing the creative process on its head. Aeschylus and Sophocles, or even Euripides, did not begin with an abstract type or conception ('military conqueror,' 'king who has unwittingly slain his father,' 'young-man-about-to-be-slain-by-priestess-sister')²⁶ and end with Agamemnon, Oedipus, and Orestes. They began with the concrete individual figures—τὰ γερόμενα ὀνόματα, b15—and the stories attached to them by tradition, then saw in these stories new possibilities of development, which in turn necessitated changes or elaborations of character, etc.²⁷ No genuine tragedy (as distinguished from melodrama, detective fiction, etc.) was ever produced by Aristotle's analytical method.

But, whatever we may think of Aristotle's theory, it is his theory, and he does in effect advise the tragedian to imitate the method of comedy. This raises two difficult questions: (1) what kind or period of comedy has he in mind? and (2) exactly what change would be effected if its methods were copied by the tragedian? We will take up these questions in order.

Bywater and others thought that Aristotle meant the New Comedy; but that is impossible in the proper sense, since Menander did not begin to produce until 322 or 321, i.e., after Aristotle's death.²⁸ The easiest—apparently easiest—solution is the *Mέση*.²⁹ But Aristotle is not thinking in these terms. *Συστήσαντες τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων*

57) shows the connection between the notion of addition and that of arbitrariness: the 'hypothesis' is what one tacks on after the fact, on top of the basic principles.

²⁶ One cannot even formulate the 'types' in this way without running into the difficulty we mentioned above, that a play requires an action, something that happens to a man, as well as a character for it to happen to. There is no direct bridge from 'character' to 'tragic action.'

²⁷ Wilamowitz, *Eint.* 113-114: "Es ist die meinung verbreitet, dass die attische tragödie erst allmählich dazu fortgeschritten wäre, individuelle menschen zu schildern, nachdem sie typen gebildet hatte, also Sophokles 'den könig' 'die schwester' 'den greis.' Das würde sehr seltsam sein, denn erst die abstraction findet solche typen, während die beobachtung nur individualitäten liefert ... der gang der entwicklung ist umgekehrt ... die tragiker empfangen ihre gestalten von der sage, und die liefert ihnen nicht greis und schwester, sondern Oedipus und Antigone." Cf. *ibid.* 114-115 on the "Dichterwillkur" with which the tragedians reshaped their material after they took it from the legend. See also now Gomme, *op. cit.* (above, n. 6) 13-14, 69-72.

²⁸ Körte, *PW* 15. 710; 11. 1267.

²⁹ So Gudeman, against Bywater.

is the exact equivalent of his earlier phrase (5. 49b8) καθόλου ποιεῖν³⁰ λόγους καὶ μύθους, and in that passage the practice was traced back to Crates at Athens and to Epicharmus before him at Syracuse (ultimately, of course, its ancestry goes all the way back to Homer). Moreover, that practice is what constituted comedy as a genre distinct from iambic. The form that began with Epicharmus and Crates was not a new variety of comedy, but rather comedy itself. This paradoxical but simple view of the matter is the clue to our passage also. Ἡδη here is not chronological but logical, as we found it to be in 4. 49a7: "In the case of comedy, to come to it" [i.e., to go no farther]. As before, we have an implicit comparison: there it was between tragedy and the epic, here it is between comedy and tragedy (ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κωμωδίας ἤδη ... ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας ...).³¹ Thus when Aristotle speaks of 'comedy' here he is not speaking of chronological divisions within the genre but of the genre itself, which he had defined at the beginning of chapter 5 as μίμησις τοῦ γελοίου; and conversely when he speaks of iambic poets he is not thinking of Archilochus and Hipponax (note ποιῶσιν!) but of all the so-called 'comedians,' before Crates or since, who have not realized the true spirit of the comic form.

Aristotle certainly did not think that Crates' innovation caught on at once. He knew as well as we that personal satire, the 'iambic' mode, dominated Attic comedy for the rest of the fifth century and only gave way definitively to the non-satiric mode after the fall of the Athenian empire. Hence clichés like 'Old' and 'New' Comedy,³² though ultimately based (apparently via Theophrastus)³³ on his distinction between the satiric and the non-satiric, are far from representing it adequately. The comic 'form,' even at Athens, went back as far as Crates (around 450): that is, it was present, though not dominant, throughout more than half the life of what we call the 'Old' Comedy. Conversely, a large part of the latter, down to around 400, was still not really comedy at all but 'iambic.'

³⁰ On συνιστάται = ποιεῖν see above on 8. 51a29, συνέστησεν.

³¹ Rostagni *ad loc.*: "Quel già (ἤδη) è detto della Commedia in confronto con la Trag. ... Parla della Comm. in generale ... In una visione sintetica e tendenziale quel che conta è l'idea." See particularly Gomme, *op. cit.* 72 n. 6.

³² See Gilbert Norwood's vigorous and sensible remarks, *Greek Comedy*, London, 1931, 37 n. 1. For the meaning and justification of the division Old-Middle-New see P.-E. Legrand, *Daos*, Lyon and Paris, 1910, 4-14; Körte, *PW* 11. 1255-1259; Rostagni, *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 2 (1922) 134-139.

³³ See Rostagni, *loc. cit.*

Where does Aristophanes belong in this scheme? His dramatic production began as 'iambic'—the high point of this phase is the *Knights*—and retained strong elements thereof as late as the *Thesmophoriazusae*. But even we, with our limited selection from his work, can clearly see the change that came over him, especially in the last two extant plays, and it must have been still more apparent to Aristotle.³⁴ Hence Lane Cooper's argument is plausible enough, that Aristotle would have found the turning-point between the earlier and the later comedy (more correctly, between 'iambic' and comedy) in the time and the works of Aristophanes himself.³⁵ But this remains only a probability; we have not enough evidence to decide. What is clear in any case, apart from the question of Aristotle's personal taste or distaste for Aristophanes, is that the latter cannot have held any key position in his theory of 'comedy,' since he is not identified with any significant major step in either its introduction or its ultimate triumph.

Thus when Aristotle commends 'comedy' he means it in the strict sense, as that generalizing *μίμησις τοῦ γελοίου* which was Dorian in origin and was introduced into Athens by Crates. For examples, then, he might have cited plays from any period between 450 B.C. (the date of Crates' first victory)³⁶ and his own time. But no doubt the majority of examples would come from what we conventionally call the Middle Comedy (*ca.* 400 - *ca.* 330); and this raises another problem. Aside from satire, Greek comedy had two principal resources, the humorous representation of ordinary life, and parody of myth. Both these types of subject were already flourishing in Epicharmus³⁷ and in the Athenian Old Comedy, including Aristophanes;³⁸ but mythological parody was

³⁴ Cf. Platonius, *Π. διαφορᾶς κωμῳδιῶν* 7 (CGF p. 4): τοιοῦτος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς μέσης κωμῳδίας τύπος, ὁ ἰός ἐστὶν ὁ Αἰολοσίκων Ἀριστοφάνους καὶ οἱ Ὀδυσσεῖς Κρατίνου καὶ πλείστα τῶν παλαιῶν δραμάτων κτλ.; Schmid 1. 4. 441.

³⁵ *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, New York, 1922, 24-25. But the further implication, p. 27, that Aristotle would have especially liked and valued Aristophanes because he occupied this middle position, is not impressive. See above on 3. 48a27.

³⁶ Eusebius 2. 105 Schöne; *IG* 2-3^a. 2. 2325. 52 (victor lists).

³⁷ See Norwood, *op. cit.* 97-105; Schmid 1. 1. 641-642.

³⁸ On parody of myth Schmid 1. 4. 54-56, 193-194; Körte, *PW* 11. 1240-1241. Aristophanes' use of it is of course mainly indirect, through his parodies of tragedy, above all Euripides; and he turned to it primarily between the Peace of Nicias and the end of the war (Schmid, *loc. cit.*), when his own chief political bugaboo, Cleon, was gone.

especially and notoriously a favorite theme of the *Mέση*.³⁹ Can Aristotle have ignored this fact, especially in urging a close parallel between comedy and tragedy? To what extent is he thinking of the representation of daily life, and to what extent of a new way of handling heroic material? We cannot tell. It would seem on the one hand that parody ought to be included, since the contrast of method (between *συστήσαντες τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων* and *τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται*) is especially vivid where the material is overtly the same. In dealing with a heroic figure, say Heracles, the tragic poet begins with the deeds or adventures traditionally assigned to the individual Heracles. The comic poet, on the other hand, begins with the concept of 'glutton' or 'enormously powerful individual' and develops an action or scene which fits the concept; the action or scene will then almost certainly be new, i.e., fictitious, and may develop in any direction the poet pleases.⁴⁰

Thus it seems that the 'generalizing' treatment of mythical material would be especially apposite to Aristotle's point. Furthermore, the only examples he gives us of his recommended procedure, the outlines of the *Iphigenia in Tauris* and the *Odyssey* in chapter 17, are of just such cases; and the *Antheus* of Agathon, which he implicitly commends below (b21) for its free invention of plot *and* characters, seems to have been set in the heroic world even though not based on an existing myth.⁴¹ Nevertheless Aristotle says nothing explicitly to indicate that he is thinking chiefly, or even at all, of mythical material. He may never have taken cognizance of the problem in any conscious way; or perhaps more likely, so far as he thought about the matter, he saw no important difference between the two cases, i.e., between using the heroic world and 'our' world. For him the significant thing was the concept, the *καθόλου*, and it lay behind both worlds alike. We may

³⁹ Körte, *op. cit.* 1262-1263; Katherine Lever, *CJ* 49 (1953-54) 172; T. B. L. Webster, *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, Manchester, 1953, 57-58, 82-84.

⁴⁰ So for example Heracles as the starved glutton in the *Birds*. Still, this differs only in degree from his combat with Pholus and the other Centaurs over the wine-jar (in Aristophanes' lost *Δράματα ἢ Κένταυρος*), a plot which happened to have a root in the myth but where the 'concept' of Heracles is also operative; and cf. the Heracles of the *Alcestris*, or the Odysseus of the *Philoctetes*, who is the very exemplar of 'crafty politician.' These parallels and shadings-off show that tragedy could, and to some extent already did, treat the figures of myth with the same freedom as comedy.

⁴¹ See below *ad loc.*

conclude tentatively that Aristotle saw no bar to tragedy moving freely between them, or in either one, as comedy did.⁴²

As a final confirmation of our reading of the passage we may consider the reference to Alcibiades. Why does Aristotle hit upon his name out of all the hundreds that were available? Perhaps not merely because Alcibiades was a well-known *historical* figure⁴³ (in tune with the reference to history just above), but *because he was a favorite and conspicuous butt of the Old Comedy*. Eupolis derided him as a lecher as early as 421,⁴⁴ and attacked him so fiercely in the *Βάπται* (416 or 415) that a persistently popular legend⁴⁵ made Alcibiades drown the poet in revenge on the way to Sicily. He was the object of a famous jibe in an unknown play of Pherecrates, which later served as model for an equally famous sneer of the elder Curio at Caesar.⁴⁶ Amipsias may also have attacked Alcibiades in the *Revellers* (*Κωμασταί*), in 414;⁴⁷ and it appears that during those same years Aristophanes devoted two plays to his uproarious style of life.⁴⁸ At the very least it

⁴² The conclusion is unsatisfying at best. Plato had found a new heroic world, with just one hero in it, to substitute for the old (sec. e.g., *Apol.* 28b-e), and Aristotle's partial identification of the Socratic dialogues with poetry proves that he was alive to the fact (see above on l. 47b11). One would like, therefore, to know whether he wanted to see tragedy renewed in the sense of a new, free mythologizing of the *same kind* of material as the classical tragedians used, or in the very different sense of a free fictionalizing of 'every-day' material. No great period of tragedy—Greek, Elizabethan, French Classical—has ever drawn its overt material from its own time, no matter how much its heroes may bear the stamp of that time. Did Aristotle think a bourgeois tragedy possible? Again we cannot tell. On the one hand there is his tacit identification of the objects of tragedy with the heroes (see above on *σπουδαίους*, 2. 48a2), on the other hand his obvious lack of interest in myth *qua* myth (in our sense of the word). It seems most likely that he thought the poet could 'invent' heroes who did not belong to the mythical world; but they would still be extraordinary men, not mere types off the streets of Athens.

⁴³ So Rostagni. Alcibiades enjoyed a 'rehabilitation' in the fourth century; see I. Bruns, *Der literarische Porträt der Griechen*, Berlin, 1896, 36, 251-254, 509-521. Gudeman rejects the explanation but offers no substitute for it.

⁴⁴ Fr. 158 Kock (*Κόλακες*): Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξίτω. — τί ληρεῖς; οὐκ οἶκαδ' ἐλθὼν τὴν σεαυτοῦ γυμνάσεις δάμαρτα;

⁴⁵ References in Schmid, 1. 4. 112 n. 18.

⁴⁶ Fr. 155 Kock: οὐκ ὦν ἀνὴρ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὡς δοκεῖ, ἀνὴρ ἀπασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν ἐστι νῦν; Sueton. *Div. Jul.* 52. 3, *Curio eum* [sc. Caesar] *omnium mulierum virum et omnium virorum mulierem appellat.*

⁴⁷ Schmid 1. 4. 142.

⁴⁸ *Ταγηνισταί* and *Τριφάλης*. See Schmid 1. 4. 197, who compares for the former Eupolis fr. 351 (Alcibiades speaking): μισῶ λακωνίζειν, ταγηνίζειν δὲ καὶ

is evident that Alcibiades played a conspicuous role in Athenian comedy (as he did in politics and social life) during the decade after the Peace of Nicias, though perhaps more for his debauchery than his politics.⁴⁹

That the notice taken of Alcibiades by comedy is what Aristotle is thinking of is suggested by the parallel τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπραξεν ἢ τί ἐπαθεν ~ περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ποιούσιν, since the latter phrase refers as we have already seen to the 'iambic' variety of comedy; and by another disregarded turn of expression, ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κωμωδίας. Μὲν οὖν here cannot be the standard Aristotelian formula of transition from one major topic to another,⁵⁰ because the discussion is not finished.⁵¹ The explanation of οὖν is that comedy was already in Aristotle's mind when he penned his definitions of the universal and the particular: true comedy corresponded to the one and 'iambic' to the other.⁵² "In the case of *comedy* [see above on ἡδῆ], then, this has become clear." The development of comedy has sorted out and separated the two tendencies; in tragedy they have remained fused and confused together.

51b15-33

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γεγόμενα οὐπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γεγόμενα φανερόν ὅτι δυνατά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
 20 καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις, ἐν ἐνίαις μὲν ἐν | ἢ δύο τῶν γνωρίμων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πεποιημένα, ἐν ἐνίαις δὲ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεῖ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἐν

πριαίμην. The pertinence of both plays to Alcibiades is beyond much doubt, though they do not seem to be concerned with his politics and there may be some question whether the *Τριφάλης* was hostile or friendly: see G. Murray, *Aristophanes*, Oxford, 1933, 182. Aristophanes' other references to Alcibiades are either ambiguous, as in *Frogs* 1422 ff., or relatively harmless: *Wasps* 44, 46, fr. 198 (*Δαιταλῆς*), 554 (Alcibiades born under the archon Phalennis: a reference to his sexual prowess).

⁴⁹ See A. Couat, *Aristophane et l'ancienne comédie attique*, Paris, 1902, 177-186; V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*, Oxford, 1951, 105.

⁵⁰ *Cl.* 3. 48b2, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν κτλ.; 5. 49a37; 6. 49b21, 50a12; 11. 52b9; 13. 53a22; 14. 53b1, 22; 19. 56a33, 34; 22. 59a15; 24. 59b18, 60a11; 25. 61b22; 26. 62b15. Note that a common, though not invariable, version of the formula is περὶ μὲν οὖν + gen.

⁵¹ Comparable μὲν οὖν 's in b16-17; 14. 53b32; 24. 60a8.

⁵² In other words, κωμωδία takes the place of ἡ ποίησις, b10, since in this case tragedy does not represent the poetic art as well as comedy does.

τούτω τά τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πεποίηται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἤτιον εὐφραίνει. ὥστ' οὐ πάντως εἶναι ζητητέον τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὓς αἱ τραγωδίαί εἰσιν, 25 ἀντέ|χεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὁμ<οί>ως εὐφραίνει πάντας.

δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσω ποιητῆς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ἐστίν, μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. κἂν ἄρα συμβῆ 30 | γενόμενα ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν ἤτιον ποιητῆς ἐστὶ· τῶν γὰρ γενομένων ἕνα οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι ὅλα ἃν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι, καθ' ὃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητῆς ἐστίν.

51b15

But in the case of tragedy they cling to the historically given names. The reason is that what is possible is plausible; now what has not happened we are not yet sure is possible, but what has happened seems clearly possible; for (we say) it would not have happened if it were impossible. But nevertheless the fact remains that even among our tragedies 20 some have one | or two familiar names and the rest fictitious, and some have none, for example Agathon's *Antheus*; for in that play the names are as fictitious as the happenings, and it is none the less enjoyed. So one should not try to hang on at all costs to the traditional stories, around which our 25 tragedies | center. And in fact it is absurd to strive for this, since even the familiar names are familiar to few, but all enjoy them for essentially the <same> reason.

Thus it is clear from these considerations that the poet ('maker') should be a maker of his plots rather than his verses, in proportion as he is a poet by virtue of his imitation and the thing he is imitating is actions. And in fact 30 even if he turns out | to be putting actual events into his poetry, he is none the less a poet for that; for there is nothing to prevent some actual events being the kind that might probably happen, i.e., are capable of happening—which is the principle by virtue of which *he* is their 'maker.'

"But in the case of tragedy they cling to the historical names." We have already pointed out that Aristotle makes no distinction

between 'myth' and history as poetical subjects, but only between the ways in which the poet and the historian (or the 'iambic' poet) handle their material. *Τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων* is parallel to *τὰ γενόμενα* at the beginning of the chapter, 51a36; in fact the correspondence is complete, for although Aristotle only mentions the names here he is also thinking of the events that are attached to the names.⁵³ That is evident not only from the definition of the 'particular' as what Alcibiades did or what happened to him (events, in both cases), but also from the paraphrase which Aristotle substitutes in b24 when he comes to sum up the argument: *ὥστ' οὐ πάντως εἶναι ζητητέον τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων ἀντέχεσθαι*.

The cause of the prevailing conservatism, as it is stated in b16-18, is a paralogism in the average man's brain ("we believe") which Aristotle is anxious to counter; not, as many of the commentators seem to take for granted, a simple, generally accepted fact. The cornerstone of the argument is the concept of the 'possible,' which properly means (as Aristotle has already hinted, 51a37, *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατόν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*; cf. b31, *οἷα ἂν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι καὶ δυνατόν γενέσθαι*)⁵⁴ a conceptual possibility, quite distinct from actual occurrence. The major premise, "the possible is plausible (believable)," is quite correct; but the minor, "that which has happened is possible," is fallacious. Aristotle's remark in b30, that "there is nothing to prevent some of the things that have happened from being such as might happen, that is, being 'possible,'" proves on the face of it that

⁵³ H. C. Baldry, *CQ*, N. S. 4 (1954) 151-157, esp. 154-155, suggests that *τὰ γενόμενα*, b17, refers to the names only, not to the events. The distinction is attractive but seems to me forced. The passage belongs to the context of Aristotle's argument as a whole, in which *τὰ γενόμενα* consistently (51a36, b4, 30, 31) signifies events, not merely names. The tragic poet is urged here to free himself from dependence on both the traditional stories (*τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων*, b24) and the names that are attached to them. Thus I am not denying Baldry's larger point (cf. *id.*, *Greece and Rome*, 2nd ser. 3 (1952) 24-37), that Aristotle is advocating freedom of creation, or that he was aware that the tragic incidents were more likely to be original than the names; see below on the *Antheus*.

⁵⁴ Objections have been made to *καὶ (τὰ) δυνατόν* in one or both places ever since Madius; see Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 2. 2-3. The latest attack on *καὶ δυνατόν γενέσθαι* in b32 (first athetized by Vorländer) is based on its apparent omission in the Arabic version; see Tkatsch 1. 15. But the omission, if it is one, is due to haplography (*γενέσθαι ... γενέσθαι*) and proves nothing. The objectors have not seen that *in this passage δυνατόν = εἰκὸς (= οἷα ἂν γένοιτο)*. See Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 62-63, and the next note.

some of the things that have happened are *not* 'possible'.⁵⁶ Hence it is not true that "they would not have happened if they were impossible." That is a vulgar error, and so is the inference based on it (the minor premise of the syllogism), that whatever has happened is possible. That that proposition is obvious (*φανερὸν*) is not Aristotle's statement, it is a part of the paralogism. In other words *τὰ δὲ γενόμενα φανερόν ὅτι δυνατά* depends on *πιστεύομεν*, like its sister-clause *τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα ... εἶναι δυνατά*; they are coördinate parts of the fallacy.⁵⁶ *Φανερόν ὅτι* is constructed like *δηλον ὅτι*, which is so often elliptical, especially in Plato and Aristotle:⁵⁷ not in the extreme ('absolute') form that *δηλον ὅτι* often takes (= "obviously"; printed by many editors as one word, *δηλονότι*), but with ellipsis of the preceding verb.⁵⁸ Thus *τὰ δὲ γενόμενα φανερόν ὅτι δυνατά*, given the context, means *τὰ δὲ γενόμενα (πιστεύομεν) φανερόν (εἶναι) ὅτι δυνατά (ἐστίν)*, "things that have happened (we feel sure) it is obvious are possible." The following clause (*οὐ γὰρ ἀν κτλ.*) is then a part of the paralogism also (and depends indirectly on *πιστεύομεν*), giving the ground of our false reasoning.

The fallacy is not formally refuted in the following lines; its real refutation is contained implicitly in the summary of the whole argument which comes at b27 (*δηλον ἐκ τούτων κτλ.*). Instead Aristotle puts forward by way of immediate reply what amounts to a 'sign' (*σημείον*).⁵⁹ In spite of all that, he says (*οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*; note the vigor

⁵⁶ The *bon mot* which is twice repeated later in the *Poetics* (24. 60a26; 25. 61b11), that plausible impossibilities are to be preferred to implausible possibilities, presupposes a different concept of possibility, identifying it with actuality (on the principle "anything can happen") and opposing it to *τὸ εἰκόζ*. Those passages are a problem which we shall have to face later. They should not be allowed to interfere with an interpretation of the passage before us in its own terms. On the whole question see Luigi Pareyson, "Il Verisimile nella Poetica di A.," *Univ. di Torino, Pubbl. della Fac. di Lett. e Filos.* 2 (1950), fasc. 2.

⁵⁷ The two clauses are exactly parallel. *Τὰ μὲν οὖν* (*μὲν* and *οὖν* function separately here; see above on b13) *μὴ γενόμενα* ~ *τὰ δὲ γενόμενα*; *οὐ(πω) ... δυνατά* ~ *δυνατά*; and *φανερὸν ὅτι* exactly balances the nuance expressed in *-πω*. We do not "yet" feel sure that a thing which has not happened is possible: i.e., we had rather wait and see it happen first; whereas if it has happened we are ready to believe at once: it is obvious without further ado that it is possible.

⁵⁸ Kühner-Gerth 2^a. 2. 368 (§ 551, 6) Anm. 1; Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum* 1. 449 bottom - 450 top; Vahlen, *Beiträge*³ 347 (34. 432, in n. 9 to c. 26).

⁵⁹ The ellipsis is particularly easy where the clauses are exactly parallel and the verb to be supplied is so close as here (*εἶναι δυνατά*).

⁶⁰ On 'signs' see *Anal. Pr.* 2. 27. 70a3 ff.; *Rhet.* 1. 2. 1357a22-b35.

of the phrase), it is a fact that some tragedies have only one or two 'known' names, and some, like Agathon's *Antheus*,⁶⁰ none at all, yet they please an audience just as much as the others. It is evident that Aristotle is appealing here to the same level of popular taste and reasoning that the tragedians by implication were catering to. He is saying to them: "Look at your audience. It is true that they like to be reassured as to the plausibility of an action by hearing the familiar 'historical' names. Yet they respond equally well to stories about people whose names they have never heard. So you need not hang on to the traditional stories so grimly."

The last item in the 'sign,' which Aristotle plays as his trump card—that even the 'known' names are known only to a few, and yet all enjoy them⁶¹—is especially interesting, although we have no way of testing its accuracy. The enormous popularity of mythological parody in the Middle Comedy would seem to argue an audience of connoisseurs in these matters.⁶² But no doubt a gradual change came over the

⁶⁰ It is not necessary for our purpose to go into the controversy over the title and character of the play. The most recent full discussions are by S. M. Pitcher, "The *Anthus* of Agathon," *AJP* 60 (1939) 145-169, and C. Corbato, "L' 'Anteo' di Agatone," *Dioniso* 11 (1948) 163-172. Pitcher's reconstruction of an *Anthus* plot (~*Ἀνθος* as a proper name, not = "flower"), on the basis of the story in Antoninus Liberalis, 7 (ed. Martini, *Mythographi Graeci* 2. 1, Leipzig, 1896, 76-78), seems to me too fanciful: it involves too bucolic a setting for the end of the fifth century—even for an Agathon—and necessitates making the drama a satyr-play (*op. cit.* 154), which is inappropriate, to say the least, for Aristotle's purpose here. Also the *Anthus* story as reported by Antoninus involves several γνώριμα ὀνόματα, though perhaps not in the usual context: Autonomous, Hippodamia, Schoeneus. The more probable hypothesis is still that the title was *Ἀνθεύς* and the matter was at least roughly that suggested by Parthenius, *Ἐρωτ. παθ.* 14 (see H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Literature*², London, 1948, 208; Pitcher, *op. cit.* 147-149), who drew on the *Ἀπόλλων* of Alexander Aetolus (Corbato, *op. cit.* 164). In any case it is time that the title "Flower" disappeared from literary history: see Gudeman *ad loc.* The Arabic ("qui ponit:" ΟΣΑΝΘΗ read as δς ἄν θῆ) and medieval versions imply *Ἀνθη*, nom. *Ἀνθή*, or *Ἀνθημειή*, nom. *Ἀνθεύς*.

⁶¹ In b26 I have written *ὁμοίως*: "but they please them all equally (on the same basis, in the same way)." Cf. 4. 48b14.

⁶² Cf. the often cited lament of Antiphanes, fr. 191 Kock, that the tragic poets have only to mention the name of the hero and the audience immediately knows how things stand, whereas the comic poet has to invent everything: *μακάριόν ἐστιν ἢ τραγωδία | ποίημα κατὰ πάντ', εἴ γε πρῶτον οἱ λόγοι [i.e., οἱ μῦθοι] | ὑπὸ τῶν θεατῶν εἰσιν ἐγγωρεσμένοι, | πρὶν καὶ τιν' εἰπεῖν, ὥσθ' ὑπομνήσαι μόνον | δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν. Οἰδίσκουν γὰρ ἄν μόνον | φῶ, τὰλλα πάντ' Ἰσασιν· ὁ πατήρ Λάιος, | μήτηρ Ἰοκάστη, θυγατέρες, παῖδες τίνες, | τί πει-*

Athenian audience, as the educational diet shifted little by little from poetry to rhetoric, so that perhaps by the middle of the century only the older hearers would be thoroughly at home with mythological allusions.⁶³ Moreover we must take into account the fact that the fifth-century Athenian's broad training in mythology came primarily from tragedy itself, and that according to Aristotle's own later testimony (13. 53a18 ff.)⁶⁴ the tragedians, beginning with Euripides, had concentrated more and more on the stories of a few houses. This impoverishment of the tragic repertory would have as its natural effect a corresponding impoverishment in the ordinary man's acquaintance with mythology. In any case I think we must take Aristotle's remark at face value.

A still more significant and interesting remark is that about the *Antheus*: "for in that play both the events and the names are fictitious." This clearly implies, by the order in which events and names are mentioned ("both the events *and* the names"), Aristotle's awareness of a fundamental fact: *that in Greek tragedy the action was likely to be partly or wholly fictitious even if the names were 'known.'* For this we need not rely on Euripides, whose proclivities for innovation are notorious. Not a single extant play of Sophocles is simply a re-telling of a familiar story—that is, so far as the structure and the details of the action are concerned. In all of them the particular course of the plot is almost entirely *πεποιημένον*.⁶⁵ They lie, of course, within the general framework of accepted tradition, which however specified no more

σεθ' οὗτος, τί πεποίηκεν. ἄν πάλιν | εἶπη τις Ἀλκμήωνα, κτλ. But the comedian is exaggerating his troubles for comic effect, and it is to be noticed that as examples he cites two of the very best-known heroes: they happen, in fact, to be exactly the two who lead off Aristotle's short list, 13. 53a20 ff.

⁶³ Compare the lamentations in our own day, by professors trained in another generation, that college students no longer catch even elementary references to the Classics, the Bible, or Milton or Wordsworth. The drift of such educational changes at Athens is hard to assess. But we do know the massive pull of rhetoric and we can see from Menander, as compared with Aristophanes, how much less readily mythological allusions came to the lips of the man in the street—or, what amounts to the same thing, how restricted their scope is.

⁶⁴ See below *ad loc.* Whether the remark is intended particularly for Aristotle's own time or for the whole period since, say, 420 (see Gudeman *ad loc.*, p. 244), does not matter for our point here.

⁶⁵ Two of the extant plays, the *Antigone* and the *Oedipus at Colonus*, are made almost out of whole cloth (in the latter case following the lead of Euripides); see Schmid 1. 2. 345-347, 408-410.

than that Oedipus had killed his father and married his mother, that Ajax went mad and committed suicide after he lost the Contest for the Arms, that Philoctetes was visited by a delegation which somehow brought him from Lemnos to Troy, etc.⁶⁶ The remark we are considering, incidental as it is, shows that Aristotle was aware of this basic fact, and that his exhortation to the poets in the following lines is therefore not simply an *αὐτοσχεδίασμα*.

The upshot of the whole argument is now summed up: "Hence it is clear from these considerations⁶⁷ that the poet ('maker') should be a maker of his plots rather than of his verses." In translating such a statement it is hard to repress the terms 'creator' and 'creation.' This is, in fact, of all the passages in the *Poetics*, the one where the new Aristotelian sense of 'imitation' and 'poetry' (art of making) appears most luminously. The poet is not a poet⁶⁸ in so far as he merely clothes a traditional story in new verses. He is required to *make* something for himself, namely that structure of events in which universals may come to expression; and it is evident from Aristotle's earnestness and emphasis that he regards this as the paramount duty of the poet. But on the other hand 'creation' is too pretentious and implies too much. Aristotle is a Greek, for whom creation means *discovery* (*εὐ-γεσις*), the uncovering of a true relation which already exists somehow in the scheme of things. The poet is not a creator in the irresponsible sense that the whole construct is made out of his own unregulated sensibility.⁶⁹ He is not invited to study his own soul and express things that never existed before, but to apprehend true types of human character and represent what they will do or say under given circumstances.

⁶⁶ See below on 14. 53b22.

⁶⁷ *Τούτων* refers not merely to the 'sign' (b19-25), but to the whole argument that poetry deals with the universal. *Τὸν ποιητὴν ... τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν* is a restatement, in slightly different terms, of *φανερὸν δὲ ... ὅτι ... ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστὶν (λέγειν) ... οἷα ἂν γένοιτο κτλ.*, 51a36-38.

⁶⁸ It is impossible to give Aristotle's full meaning in English, since we are condemned to rendering *ποιητής* ('maker') by 'poet', in which the etymological meaning does not shine through sufficiently. This is the curse that attends the blessing of the Greek and Latin heritage in English.

⁶⁹ Have not the English words 'creator' and 'creation' been damaged irreparably for this purpose by their prior association in our minds with God and His creativity? An omnipotent divinity can presumably 'create' *ex nihilo*; and that idea has clung to the word. *Ποιητής* had no such connotation, even if applied (by exception) to a god. Plato plays with the term in *Rep.* 10. 596d, but the idea is really carried by *δημιουργός*, *ibid.*; cf. *Soph.* 265b ff.

This is not *the* Platonic answer to the problem of the irresponsibility of the poet; but it is *a* Platonic answer, because it posits that the poet must know Man, in some way, before he sets out to write about him. Aristotle, like his master, requires the poet to go to school and discipline himself; only the school is not the Academy but the broad scene of life itself, and the discipline is not metaphysics.

The paradox inherent in Aristotle's concept of 'imitation' rises to a climax in the last sentence. "So even if he should chance to 'compose' things that have happened, he is none the less a maker;⁷⁰ for there is nothing to prevent some actual events being such as might happen, i.e., being 'possible'; (which is the principle) by virtue of which *he*⁷¹ is their maker." *Γενόμενα ποιεῖν* expresses one aspect of the paradox in pregnant form. These events are already there, they have happened, and yet the poet 'makes' them just as much as if he had invented them himself.⁷² What the poet 'makes,' then, is not the actuality of events but their logical structure, their meaning. Their having happened is accidental⁷³ to their being composed, and vice versa. It is not their own status that matters, but the poet's creative intervention. Hence, although 'historical' subjects are not to be clung to at all costs (b23), neither are they to be eschewed at all costs. Their actuality will not contaminate the poet's work if he knows what he is doing. The form of the remark is so ironical that one senses a possible retort against someone else (some poet who professed his distaste for 'actual' subjects?); but its purpose is to reestablish the proper weight and balance of Aristotle's theory. After b19-26 it might seem that he was urging the poets at all costs to give up historical-mythical subjects and invent their own. And it is true, he does urge upon them the possibility of free invention. But he is also ready to accept the traditional names and plots if they are handled in the right way.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ 'Maker' is needed (rather than 'poet'), to match *αὐτῶν ποιητής ἐστιν* below, for the two clauses refer to the same thing.

⁷¹ For *καθ' ὃ* see above on 6. 50a8.—*Ἐκεῖνος* emphasizes the difference in principle between the poet's 'making,' which is a logical shaping, and the ordinary causation of events by the people who perform or transact them.

⁷² A translation like Bywater's ("if he should come to *take* [Italics mine] a subject from actual history") is too passive. *Ποιεῖν* means making, not taking.

⁷³ *Καὶν* ... *σ υ μ β ῆ*. This is the 'accidental' meaning of *συμβαίνειν*; cf. the set term *συμβεβηκός* (Bonitz, *Index* 714a20, "id quod fortuito alicui substantiae inhaeret ac vere de ea praedicatur").

⁷⁴ Cf. 14. 53b22-26, where almost exactly the same point is at issue and Aristotle

A poet, then, is an *imitator* in so far as he is a *maker*, viz. of plots.⁷³ The paradox is obvious. Aristotle has developed and changed the bearing of a concept which originally meant a faithful *copying* of pre-existent things, to make it mean a *creation* of things which have never existed or whose existence, if they did exist, is accidental to the poetic process. Copying is after the fact; Aristotle's *μίμησις* creates the fact. It is clear that his use of the word in such a way can only be accounted for historically: that is, that such a redefinition of a simple concept can only be understood as the end-product of a long, gradual development. Without Plato especially, and a considerable development of the idea in him, Aristotle's use of *μίμησις* would be inconceivable.⁷⁴

To summarize: Both tragedy and comedy aim at "speaking of the universal." The difference between them tends in practice to be that the comedian invents his own plot while the tragedian takes his from tradition (myth or history, between which Aristotle makes no distinction for these purposes). But this distinction is illusory or mistaken. In both genres the good poet 'makes' his own plot, only in tragedy this fact is more apt to be masked by the use of the traditional or 'known' names. Aristotle in effect urges the tragic poet to be less hesitant about revealing his 'makership' through the use of invented names. What matters, however, is not so much whether the plot is overtly original as whether the poet has understood his obligation to frame it on the principle of 'probability or necessity' and knows that that framing is his chief job as a poet. The onus of the 'making' is on him, whether the externals of the plot (the names) reveal it or not.

51b33-52a11

τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις εἰσὶν
 35 χεῖρισται. λέγω δ' ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπει|σόδια
 μετ' ἄλληλα οὐτ' εἰκός οὐτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τοιαῦται δὲ

is clearly willing to accept either transmitted plots or new ones, provided they are "used well" (*χρησθαι καλῶς*, *ibid.* 25).

⁷³ *Μύθων ποιητής* = *πράξεων μιμητής*, since the poet *μιμείται τὰς πράξεις*.

⁷⁴ We cannot enter on a general discussion of *μίμησις* here; it would fill a chapter or a book. The best treatment known to me is that of U. Galli, *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 4 (1926) 281-390; the most recent (ingenious and in many ways attractive, but guilty of a number of distortions in the interpretation of the *Poetics*), that of H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike*, Bern, 1954. See also Richard McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity," *Mod. Philol.* 34 (1936-37) 1-35; reprinted in *Critics and Criticism*, ed. R. S. Crane, Chicago, 1953, 147-175.

- ποιούνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι' αὐτοῦς, ὑπὸ
 δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ ποι-
 38 οῦντες, καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες τὸν μῦθον,
 | a1 | πολλάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἢ μίμησις ἀλλὰ
 καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα
 [καὶ μᾶλλον] δταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα—τὸ
 5 γὰρ θαν|μαστὸν οὕτως ἔξει μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
 καὶ τῆς τύχης (ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατα
 δοκεῖ ὅσα ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες φαίνεται γεγονέναι, ὅλον ὡς
 ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος ἐν Ἄργει ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αἷτιον
 τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Μίτυι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπεισῶν· ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ
 10 τοιαῦτα | οὐκ εἰκῆ γίνεσθαι)—ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοιοῦ-
 τούς εἶναι καλλίους μύθους.

51b33

Of simple plots and actions, the episodic are the poorest.

- 35 By 'episodic' plot I mean one in which the | episodes follow
 each other in no probable or necessary order. Such actions
 are constructed by bad poets for their own reasons, and by
 good ones because of the actors; for writing contest-pieces
 for them, as they do, and having therefore stretched out the
 38 | 52a1 plot beyond its inherent capacity, | they are forced to dis-
 locate the continuity of events frequently.
 But since the imitation is not only of a complete action
 but of events replete with fear and pity, and since these
 are brought about most particularly [and more] when they
 happen contrary to our expectation (yet) because of each
 5 other—for they will possess the quality | of surprise more
 if they happen that way than if all by themselves, i.e., by
 chance (for even among chance happenings the ones which
 impress people as most astonishing are those which appear
 to have happened as if by design, for example the way the
 statue of Mity's at Argos killed the man who had been the
 cause of Mity's death, by falling upon him while he was
 attending a religious festival; for people consider it plausible
 10 that things like that | do not happen accidentally)—so that
 such plots are necessarily more artistic.

The chapter division is faulty and misleading: chapter 10 ought to begin with *ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον κτλ.*, 52a1. The general discussion of plot

is finished and the special part, the survey of its species (simple and complex) and 'parts' (peripety, recognition, *pathos*), is about to begin. Or, as Vahlen puts it,⁷⁷ the discussion in chapter 7-9 has been on the question how the myth should be constituted in order to be dramatic; now the question is how it should be shaped in order to be tragic. The "sharply marked transition" at 52a1 is indeed unmistakable and sounds the theme of a whole new section of the treatise (chapters 10-14), the *μίμησις φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλευσινῶν*. The place and affiliations of our first paragraph, on the other hand, are notoriously obscure, and it has been subjected to more than the usual amount of attack, emendation, and transposition.⁷⁸ The main reason for these expedients is, of course, that 'simple' plots have not yet been defined and are not defined until several lines below (10. 52a14).⁷⁹ But to use a term before it has been defined is not un-Aristotelian,⁸⁰ and a distinction between simple and complex is especially easy to anticipate. After a general discussion of the workings of a type or species it is perfectly natural to refer to 'simple' specimens of it, meaning ones which involve no complication of the principles just set forth, before complex varieties are introduced.⁸¹

In the case before us, the paragraph *τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν ... τὸ ἐφεξῆς* has to do with an aberration from the general rules of unity of plot which were laid down in chapters 7 and 8. *Ἀπλῶν* simply crystallizes an assumption implicit in those chapters, that unless and until further distinctions are introduced we are talking about a simple form of plot, i.e., one in which the hero moves straight from happiness to unhappiness or the reverse.⁸² Thus our paragraph belongs to the general sec-

⁷⁷ *Beiträge*³ 31 [2. 89].

⁷⁸ Thus Castelvetro proposed *ἀπλῶς δὲ τῶν*; Tyrwhitt, *τῶν δὲ ἄλλων*; Gudeman (*Krit. Anhang*, p. 475), *τῶν δὲ ἀτελῶν*. Buhle bracketed *ἀπλῶν*. Hermann wanted to put the paragraph after the definition of the simple plot, 10. 52a16; Vahlen (*Beiträge*³ 88-89 [2. 148-149]) suggested putting it at the end of chapter 18; and Bekker, in his third edition, bracketed the whole passage.

⁷⁹ Best statements of the objections: Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 2. 5-6 (argues for Castelvetro's emendation); Montmollin 67-68.

⁸⁰ See Vahlen, *Poet.*³ 142.

⁸¹ Thus a writer on physiology, after describing the process of digestion in general terms, might perhaps go on: "In simple organisms this process is subject to very few disruptions; one of them is ... In complex organisms, however (and by 'simple' and 'complex' I mean so-and-so),..."

⁸² All that 7. 51a13-14 provides is the simple concept of a (one-way) *μεταβολή*; there are no hints about peripety or recognition.

tion of the discussion, and in particular it fits directly on to the end of chapter 8.⁸³ There we were told that the plot should be so constructed that no 'part' can be removed or put elsewhere. Here the episodic plot is defined as that in which there is no probability or necessity for the 'episodes' being "after one another": that is, as one in which the episodes could be reshuffled or removed without serious damage, since there is no particular reason why they should be in one place rather than another.

It appears, then, that the episodic plot is the converse of the one recommended in chapters 7-8. But in what sense is it the converse: in the sense that it is no plot at all, but merely an unrelated jumble of 'episodes,' or that episodes have been tacked on to an already existing plot? The answer is perhaps already implicit in the term 'episodic plot' (i.e., it is after all a plot); but it emerges more clearly in the account Aristotle gives of how good poets come to write such plays: *ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ ποιῶντες, καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες τὸν μῦθον*, "trying to stretch out *the plot* beyond its natural capacity."⁸⁴ This is consonant with the prescription in 17. 55a34 ff.: the poet is to lay out his plot (*τοὺς λόγους*, = *τοὺς μύθους*) first in general terms, then "episodize it and stretch it out" (*ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν*). 'Episodes' are not forbidden; the correct procedure includes their use, but they are to be kept relevant (*οἰκεία*, 55b13, cf. 24. 59b28) and brief (*σύντομα*, 55b16). The episodic plot, then, is one in which the episodes are irrelevant or inorganic (*μετ' ἄλληλα οὐτ' εἰκός οὐτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι*) and outgrow their proper size: they are too numerous or too long in proportion to the rest of the play. In short, we can define an episodic play as one in which *the episodes overshadow the plot*.⁸⁵

⁸³ The join is so close as to tempt one to the hypothesis that the whole first part of chapter 9 (the 'philosophical' part, 51a36-b33) is a later addition by Aristotle. But I have not been so bold.—Montmollin's solution, that b33-52a1 itself is a later addition, takes account of the lack of continuity with what immediately precedes, but fails to notice the organic connection with chapter 8.

⁸⁴ Cf. Vahlen, *Beiträge*³ 89 (12.149): "... dass man von der Handlung selbst [Italics mine] nicht dargebotene oder geforderte Episodien einflechtend *diese selbst* in ihrem einfach natürlichen Zusammenhang stört." Bywater on b34: "the *ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος* is one with acts or incidents inserted into it, i.e., only loosely connected with the *main course of the story*" (Italics mine).—On the aorist participle *παρατείναντες* see Bywater's note, p. 196.

⁸⁵ The sense of *ἐπεισόδια* in b34-35 is obviously the same as in 17. 55b13, 16, namely incidents which are 'extra,' i.e., lie outside the main plot. A. H. Gilbert argues,

These inferences are reinforced by another feature of Aristotle's language in the passage: *πολλάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς*. *Πολλάκις* is usually taken with *ἀναγκάζονται* (e.g., "they are often [i.e., often in their careers?] forced to break the natural continuity," Butcher). But it ought properly to go with *διαστρέφειν*. Moreover this verb does not mean 'break,' it means 'twist, wrench, distort.'⁸⁶ Thus "they are forced to wrench the continuity frequently."⁸⁷ The story has a 'line'; that is, it follows the fortunes of a certain person and moves in a certain direction. A plethora of episodes diverts us off this line and back onto it again several times in the course of a single play; and each time—at each joint, so to speak, between two 'parts' of the play which ought to fit tightly together (*ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων*, 7. 51a13)—there is a wrench in the continuity. Such things are permitted in the epic (24. 59b23, *ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος*; cf. *παρτείναντες* here) but are disastrous in tragedy (18. 56a15, *πολὸν παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει, ~ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρτείναντες τὸν μῦθον*).

Tyrwhitt made the eminently sound observation that the *Prometheus Bound* is an especially good example of the episodic play.⁸⁸ It is obvious in the first place that there is no imperative logic which demands that

AJP 70 (1949) 56-64 (summary on pp. 63-64), that in the *Poetics* *ἐπεισόδιον* always means "any action that is a subordinate but necessary [italics mine] component of the integral action of the play." The truth is rather the other way round: with the possible exception of 4. 49a28 (see above ad loc.), *ἐπεισόδιον* seems to mean everywhere in the *Poetics* a non-essential added scene, an 'episode' in the special sense. See below on 18. 56a2, and Twining's note on the present passage (ed. of 1789, pp. 210-213).—T. B. L. Webster argues, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 307, that *Metaph.* N3. 1090b19, *οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὐσα ὡσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία* (said against Speusippus), implies in the audience an "acquaintance with the whole theory of organic composition developed in Ch. 7-9 of the *Poetics*." But it may only imply that *ἐπεισοδιώδης* was an established term among dramatists and theater people and Aristotle borrowed it from them.

⁸⁶ Again a medical term; cf. above on 8. 51a34. For *διαστρέφειν* (*διαστροφή*, *διάστρεμμα*) see Hippocr. *Aph.* 4. 49; *Art.* 38; 47; *Fract.* 16; *Κατ' ἰητρείων* 23; *Προρρηγ.* 1 (1. 169 Kühn); *Κω. προγν.* (1. 243 Kühn); Aristoph. *Knights* 175; *Birds* 177; *Pl. Prot.* 325d; *Gorg.* 524c (makes the distinction between twisting and breaking especially clear: *κατεαγότα εἶ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος*); *Ar. E. N.* 6. 5. 1140b14 (fig.); *Rhet.* 1. 1. 135a24; *Poet.* 5. 49a36. Undoubtedly the word was familiar to Aristotle from his medical background, and he uses it fairly often (see Bonitz, *Index*).

⁸⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 9. 1409b18, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν*, "makes him stumble frequently."

⁸⁸ See his whole note (*Aristotelis De Poetica Liber*, ed. Thomas Tyrwhitt, Oxford, 1794, 129).

just these particular visitors shall come to see Prometheus, and then that there is no particular probability or necessity in the order of their coming, though the poet has made Io's scene into a climax by spinning it out (*παρατείνας*!) to enormous length, and by emphasizing her as the ancestress-to-be of Prometheus' deliverer. The fact is that nothing happens in the play between the prologue and the coming of Hermes, and that with each new arrival we are turned ('wrenched') in a new direction.⁸⁰ Moreover the poet's motive for all this, though perhaps not quite the one Aristotle suggests, is certainly to spin out (*παρατείνειν*) a 'thin' plot; indeed he could not have made a play out of it by any other means.

We shall make use of Tyrwhitt's suggestion in attacking the problem of the fourth kind of tragedy, 18. 56a2. Meanwhile the only point left for mention in our passage is the reason Aristotle gives for the production of episodic plays by good poets:⁸⁰ *διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς*.⁸¹ Why should the actors like or demand episodic plots? Possibly because padding the play with episodes makes it longer, fuller, and so guards against the hazard of having to face one's competitors in a shorter, less impressive vehicle; perhaps also because an episodic play will tend to contain a greater number and/or variety of roles and thus offer a wider field for histrionic virtuosity.⁸² But above all, I imagine, the actor wants an episodic play because in it the audience's attention is less engaged by the plot and the interaction of plot and character—that is, by the poet's part in the whole—and so freer to notice gems of acting *per se*.⁸³

⁸⁰ See Schmid 1. 3. 281-306, esp. 296.

⁸⁰ One wonders, in the light of 18. 56a2, whether Aeschylus ranks among the bad poets; see *ad loc.*

⁸¹ In spite of Tkatsch's impassioned defense of *κριτάς*, *ὑποκριτάς* remains the better-attested reading (including the Arabic version), as even Gudeman admits. But so much is true, that *διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς* cannot be simply an equivalent of *διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν* (cf. Vahlen, *Poet.* 142; Überweg, *διὰ τὰς ὑποκρίσεις*; Bywater: "because the play has to be acted"); and Rostagni's explanation (*ἀγωνίσματα* = declamatory parts, epideictic speeches) is over-strained.

⁸² This, however, would tend to benefit the second and third actors especially, who were not in the actors' competition. Thus in the comparatively simple *Prometheus*, written for two actors, what a nosegay of roles for the deuteragonist (Oceanus, Io, Hermes)!--Aristotle might also mean scenes written for a particular actor; cf. the tradition about Shakespeare and Burbage.

⁸³ The principle would be analogous to that implied in Aristotle's advice, 24. 60b2-5, that the poet should put forth his best stylistic efforts *ἐν τοῖς ἀργείοις μέρεσιν καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς μήτε διανοητικοῖς*.

The upshot of our discussion as a whole is that the episodic plot represents a conspicuous offense against the rules of unity and concentration ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\varphi\epsilon\acute{\xi}\eta\zeta$) laid down in chapters 7 and 8. It is in fact an aberration in the direction of the epic, an attempt to make a thin tragic plot bigger and more impressive, but without observing the law of economy (restricted length, tight-packed sequence) which is incumbent upon *dramatic* poets. Such misguided imitation of the epic must have been not uncommon in the fourth century,⁶⁴ common enough in fact to constitute a class of plays; for we shall see that the episodic is one of the four kinds of tragedy. Also it is evident that Aristotle regards the fault of episodic construction as inhering in simple plots especially,⁶⁵ so that it was appropriate that it be mentioned here. The possible faults of the complex plot lie in other directions; for its principal virtue and justification is the enhancement of the *emotional content* of tragedy (its tragic side), to which we now turn.

The next paragraph, $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}$ $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$ $\kappa\tau\lambda.$, ought as we said to begin chapter 10. It prepares the way for the concept of the complex plot, which will now occupy the center of the stage until the end of chapter 14 (with a supplement in chapter 16). By all odds the most important thing about this short preface is that it derives the idea of the complex plot from the premise that tragedy is an imitation of fearful and pitiable events—that is, from its special emotional content. We must keep this steadily in mind throughout the next two chapters (10 and 11) especially, because we are too used to thinking of peripety and recognition purely in their own terms, as structural elements, as if complex structure were an end in itself or were recommended by Aristotle primarily for the intellectual interest it gives to a play.

The premise that tragedy is to imitate "not only a complete action but fearful and pitiable events" is drawn from the definition in chapter 6 in its expanded form. In analyzing the definition we saw reason to mark the last clause as an addition. But we said at the same time that there was no necessary reason for regarding it as 'late,' that is, as representing a new and different conception of tragedy: that it could have been added at any time after the first draft of the definition had 'hardened.' The present passage indicates that that must indeed have been the case; for here we find the concept of the $\mu\acute{\iota}\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\varphi\omicron$ -

⁶⁴ Considering that Aristotle twice repeats his warning to the tragic poets, once in 17. 55b15 and again in 18. 56a10, *q.v.*

⁶⁵ See below on 18. 56a2.

βερῶν καὶ ἔλκεινῶν taken as the premise for a whole section of Aristotle's work, and a section which must be regarded as primary.⁹⁶

Very well then, "since the imitation⁹⁷ is not only of a complete action but also of fearful and pitiable events, and (since) these come about most (effectively)⁹⁸ when they happen contrary to our expectation (but) because of one another...." The sentence is of the complex trailing type, like the one we discussed in 7. 50b34,⁹⁹ and as he does there Aristotle finally retrieves the lost construction, after a good deal of subordinate matter has intervened, with a ὥστε (a10). The main burden of the sentence (as in the other case) is in the minor premise, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται κτλ. Pity and fear are most effectively aroused—or rather, since Aristotle is talking about events, structural elements in the play, fearful and pathetic happenings¹⁰⁰ are most effectively brought about—when they come about unexpectedly but logically (δι' ἄλληλα). This is one of the most pregnant remarks in the entire *Poetics*. It is in fact the key not only to Aristotle's conception of the complex plot but to his doctrine of *hamartia* and catharsis, and thereby to his apparent (my reason for saying "apparent" will become apparent in due time)

⁹⁶ It would be absurd to infer that the whole of chapters 10 to 14 is a 'late' addition. The sequence of events would seem to be this: Aristotle originally drafted his definition without regard to the special character of the complex plot and the 'twist' it gives to the emotional content. Not that he did not have the emotional content in mind from the beginning, but that originally he did not think of it as belonging in the *definition* of tragedy. Then, as he elaborated the theory of the complex plot and the way in which structure and emotional material condition each other, he came to feel that these matters did belong in the definition after all, as a part of the structural concept of tragedy itself. The correction in chapter 6 must have been made very early; but the basic theory (chapters 1-5) had already been laid down without regard to it, and Aristotle never got around to revising the earlier chapters from this point of view.

⁹⁷ There is no need to interpolate ἡ <τραγωδία> μίμησις (M. Schmidt) or ἡ <τῆς τραγωδίας> μίμησις, as Gudeman suggests (but does not print). We are well within the special discussion of tragedy and there is no danger of misconception.

⁹⁸ No amount of ingenuity can justify καὶ μάλιστα καὶ μᾶλλον. Καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ μάλιστα, if it is in *Anal. Post.* (Rostagni's reference is wrong), is another matter. On the various suggestions of a lacuna here, which flourished in the last century, see Vahlen, *Beiträge*³ 327 (14. 412, in n. 2 to p. 354); Tkatsch 2. 189-190 (argues for καὶ μάλιστα).

⁹⁹ See above *ad loc.*, and cf. Vahlen, *Poet.*³ 145.

¹⁰⁰ This substitution is the best warrant for taking δι' ἔλεου καὶ φόβου as = δι' ἔλκεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν in the definition of tragedy; see the discussion there.

view of the 'tragic.'¹⁰¹ For the essence of the tragic is an irreconcilable conflict between man's nature and his fate.¹⁰² Aristotle does not speak of such a conflict; his Socratic-Platonic inheritance was too strong for that. Nevertheless, in so far as he sensed its existence, it plays its role in his theory in the guise of the 'fearful and pitiful.' This means in the first place a drastic reduction in its dimensions; for fear and pity are measured by "us," *l'homme moyen sensuel*. But then Aristotle further postulates that they are most felt *when the events that 'carry' them seem to be irrational* (παρὰ τὴν δόξαν, i.e., contrary to what we expected)¹⁰³ *but are not so* (δὲ ἄλληλα, i.e., standing in causal relation to one another after all). This is his attempt to make the best of two incompatible worlds. The Tragic, the inrush of demonic powers upon a man's happiness,¹⁰⁴ becomes merely the 'un-

¹⁰¹ I do not say "of tragedy." *Τραγικὸς* is a much rarer word in the *Poetics* than *τραγωδία*. Out of six occurrences listed in Bywater's index, two (26. 61b26, 62a3) are purely neutral in meaning, one is in a spurious note (18. 56a21; see below *ad loc.*), and the other three, which do carry the meaning 'tragic,' are all in chapters 13 and 14 (13. 53a27, 30; 14. 53b39). *Τραγωδία* does not in itself connote 'tragic,' but 'serious drama.'

¹⁰² "Alles Tragische beruht auf einem unausgleichbaren Gegensatz": Goethe, quoted by J. Geffcken, "Der Begriff des Tragischen in der Antike," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* 1927-28, 90 n. 4 (see Geffcken's own remarks, *ibid.*). "Es [das Tragische] ist eine metaphysische Kategorie, gegründet in jenem Kampf zwischen Chaos und Kosmos, dessen Rhythmus durch das Weltwesen geht. So hat sich auch die kleine Welt, der Mensch, unablässig zu wehren gegen das Unheimliche, das Zerstörende, das immer wieder gebündigt und zurückgedämmt immer wieder über uns hereinzubrechen droht": P. Friedländer, "Die griechische Tragödie und das Tragische," *Die Antike* 1 (1925) 5-6. I need not recall Nietzsche's "Dionysische," the joyous-painful contradiction lying at the heart of things, which, however perverse Nietzsche's historical application of it to the origins of Greek tragedy, was an intuition of the same primal fact.

¹⁰³ There can be no question that the *δόξα* is that in the mind of the reader or spectator, not the tragic hero. The point will be of some importance a little later, when we come to peripety and recognition.—Montmollin's removal of *καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* as an 'addition ultérieure' (pp. 68-70) cuts out one of the two cardinal concepts in the passage, on which the whole theory of the complex plot is subsequently built. See below on the definitions of the complex plot itself (10. 52a16-18) and of peripety (11. 52a22-24).

¹⁰⁴ "Der Einbruch göttlich-zerstörender Kräfte in die menschliche Sphäre": Friedländer, *op. cit.* 6. But in partial defense of Aristotle's attempt to link the two worlds we should let F. finish his sentence: "(Der Einbruch, etc.) kommt nicht als etwas Fremdes, sinnlos Zufälliges über den Helden. Sie ist 'auf ihn zugeschnitten,' hat sein Mass und eine geheime Verwandtschaft zu ihm. Dies ist *ein* Geschehen, aber dies ist *mein* Schicksal."

expected, the unforeseen, and in this guise the Tragic is wedded to Causality (= probability or necessity). Thus in our short phrase the tragic side of tragedy is made to depend after all on the structural considerations Aristotle has laid down in the last three chapters. The tragic quality has to be "built into" the sequence of events, as he says later (14. 53b13, ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμπουητέον); and the "building in" has to follow the general lines that hold for tragedy as a dramatic poem.

But we are not simply returning to the general theory of the tragic poem. In Aristotle's view, pity and fear cannot be aroused to their fullest measure by a simple plot, that is, one in which the outcome is foreseen all the way from the beginning; or, to put it in his terms, one in which the tragic 'change' (μεταβολή, 7.51a14) moves in a straight line from happiness to unhappiness or the reverse. The requirement that the outcome be unexpected (but logical) is the basis of his concept of the complex plot. All that remains is to define the latter formally (10. 52a16-18) and analyze its 'parts,' peripety and recognition. Thus the five words παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα contain *in nuce* the doctrine of chapters 10 and 11,¹⁰⁶ and beyond them of chapters 13 and 14.

What follows (a4-10) is a justification of δι' ἄλληλα in particular. It is assumed that unexpected events have something of the marvellous about them; but they will have it in greater degree if they happen "that way" (i.e., δι' ἄλληλα) than if from mere chance.¹⁰⁶ The marvellous figures prominently later in the *Poetics*, in Aristotle's theory of the epic, but not in so organic a fashion as here: that is, not in close

¹⁰⁶ Παρὰ τὴν δόξαν is rephrased in technical terms (μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν) in the definition itself, and δι' ἄλληλα is restated in the next sentence (ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ κτλ., a18-21; we shall see that it also is partly included in the definition). The definition of the simple plot, although it stands first, is merely the converse of the other: a simple plot is one that lacks the special 'parts' of the complex.

¹⁰⁶ Spontaneity (τὸ αὐτόματον) is distinguished from chance (ἡ τύχη) in *Phys.* 2. 5 (convenient summary in W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics*, Oxford, 1936, 354-355): chance can happen only to adult human beings, i.e., beings who are capable of purposive action, while the 'spontaneous' can happen to children, animals, and inanimate objects as well. Cf. *Metaph.* Z7. 1032b21-30; 9. 1034a9-57. In the adult human sphere the two concepts overlap, as here, and Aristotle customarily speaks only of chance; cf. *E. N.* 3. 5. 1112a31, αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη. ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. In our passage δι' ἄλληλα roughly corresponds to τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, human causality (though not necessarily reason).

alliance with the tragic emotions. It appears to be a concept which Aristotle originally associated with the epic, in the primary sense of wonders and marvels (Cyclopes, Circe, the magic ship of the Phaeacians,¹⁰⁷ etc.), and only later worked into his view of tragedy. In the epic it is characterized as having a kind of low 'appeal' (ἡδύ, 24.60a17), and it is practically identified with the irrational or the absurd (ἄλογον, 60a13; cf. 25. 61b14). The irrational, Aristotle says there (60a29), should be banished from tragedy so far as possible, or at least from the central plot, and he cites as a prime example the *Oedipus Rex*. But since the *Oedipus* is also Aristotle's prime example of the correct handling of a complex plot, it is clear that the *θαυμαστόν* for which he calls in our passage cannot be the same as the irrational-marvelous of chapter 24. Here the marvelous is to be attained *through* rationality, not in defiance of it. The events are to be surprising at first glance, or in themselves, but the surprise is to come from, and be heightened by, the reflection that they are perfectly natural and logical in the light of what went before.¹⁰⁸

So far all seems clear. But when we come to the example that follows, that of the statue of Mityls, doubts begin to arise. The nub of the matter is this: Aristotle did not believe in any god or other supernatural agent who could or would push a statue over upon a murderer. Hence he can only, at best, have regarded the occurrence as one which *looked* like an intentional act; and indeed that is all he implies in a7 (ὅσα ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες φάλλεται γεγονέναι). But the paraphrase or echo of this in a9 (ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰχῆ γίνεσθαι) is more difficult. How are we to translate *ἔοικε*? If it means "it is probable," as it does elsewhere in the *Poetics*,¹⁰⁹ then Aristotle is implicitly vouching for the probability that intention was involved; which is absurd.

Naturally we can take *ἔοικε* as applying to the average man's way of looking at things: it looks reasonable to *him* that more than chance was involved. And this reading is supported by a6-7, *θαυμασιώτατα δοκεῖ*, where *δοκεῖ* likewise refers, as so often in Greek idiom, to generally or popularly accepted views. But there are other features of the Mityls story that may still give us pause. The affair is referred to twice elsewhere in antiquity, once by Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta*.

¹⁰⁷ 24. 60a35 ff.

¹⁰⁸ Hence 'surprising' seems a better translation of *θαυμαστόν* here than 'marvelous.' There is no question of man-eating giants or magic ships.

¹⁰⁹ 4. 48b4, cf. 29; 8. 51a19, 23; all denoting *natural* or *reasonable* assumptions.

dicta, 8. 553d, and again in the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus*, 156. 846a22. Plutarch's account is much richer in details than that in the *Poetics*. It tells us that: (1) Mityts had been killed *κατὰ στάσιν*. (2) his statue was of bronze, (3) the incident in question (the falling of the statue) occurred in the market-place, and (4) it happened during a festival: *θείας οὔσης*. It is evident that these details point to a fuller source, rather than to Plutarch's having copied Aristotle and added a few embellishments (so Rostagni). The *De Mir. Ausc.*, on the other hand, except for an error in the name and a few minor variations, offers a text identical with that in the *Poetics*.¹¹⁰ It follows that there is no direct connection between (a) Plutarch and (b) the *Poetics* and *De Mir. Ausc.*, but that one of the latter has copied the other. Which is the original, then? The *Poetics*. (The answer is not necessarily obvious, for if the *Poetics* passage were an interpolation it could have been borrowed from the *De Mir. Ausc.* or from its source.) The error *Βίτυος*, *Βίτυι* for *Μίτυος*, *Μίτυι* seems to give the clue, for we can be sure from Plutarch and pseudo-Demosthenes¹¹¹ that the correct form of the name was Mityts, not Bitys. But this does not exhaust the implications of the error. For one thing, it can only have sprung from a confusion of *cursive M* (μ) with the *cursive* form of *B* (υ), and such a confusion, though possible, is not very likely before the fourth or, better, the fifth century A.D.¹¹² But this same period (the fourth, or at latest the fifth century A.D.) is also the probable date of the latter part of the *De Mir. Ausc.* (sections 152-178), which has a separate origin from the rest.¹¹³ In other words, this sec-

¹¹⁰ *Φασίν ὡς ἀνδριάς ὁ τοῦ Βίτυος ἐν Ἄγγει ἀπέκτεινε [τὸν αἰτιον] (i.e., <τὸν αἰτιον>) τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Βίτυι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπροσθέν. ἔοικεν οὖν οὐκ εἰλεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι* (Bekker's text). *Γίνεσθαι* here is perhaps sufficient to justify *γίνεσθαι* in the *Poetics* (Riccardianus, perhaps confirmed by the Arabic version: "fieri," Tkatsch).

¹¹¹ *Contra Neerom* 33, *Μίτυος τοῦ Ἄγγελίου* (the affair of the statue is not mentioned).

¹¹² Cf. the table of Greek cursive alphabets, no. 3, in E. M. Thompson, *An Introduction to Greek and Latin Palaeography*, Oxford, 1912, p. 193, with those of Greek literary alphabets, nos. 3 and 4 (1st-2nd cent. A.D.), *ibid.* 146-147, which show that although the cursive B appears earlier than the fourth century (e.g., in two of the [non-literary] hands of Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.*, ca. A.D. 90: table no. 3, p. 146, cf. also p. 166, on a document [no. 31] of the second century), the letter-forms of *M* and *B* did not approach each other closely enough to be easily confused until then. See also V. Gardthausen, *Grlechische Paläographie*² 2. 193; cf. *ibid.*, 177.

¹¹³ A. Westermann, *Παραδοξογράφοι*, Brunswick, 1839, *praef.* IV, XXVI: V.

tion of the *De Mir. Ausc.* seems to have been compiled at just about the time when a confusion of *M* and *B* was most possible.

But still further: The error requires us to assume an original in cursive, whereas the archetype or archetypes of our manuscripts of the *Poetics* was (were) certainly in uncials.¹¹⁴ It would seem to follow that, *although the body of the text was in uncials, the story of Mity's statue was in cursive*¹¹⁵—i.e., that it was an added note, not yet a part of the text.

To these mechanical considerations we should add the doubt already mentioned, as to what Aristotle can have meant by *ἔοικε*. Certainly for him, as we said, the falling of the statue cannot have been anything more than a chance occurrence which *looked* like a matter of intention. Plutarch and the compiler of the last part of the *De Mir. Ausc.*, on the other hand, are pious men who firmly believe in the religious implications of the story;¹¹⁶ and certainly its original meaning, whatever its origin, is that indicated in the title of Plutarch's essay: that sooner or later the criminal is punished *by God* for his crime. One detail in Plutarch is especially telling from this point of view, namely that the fatal incident took place during a festival. Surely this setting is not accidental. The people of Argos are assembled, in festive yet reverent mood, the murderer of Mity is among them, and behold

Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Leipzig, 1863, 280; H. Schrader, *Fleckeisens Jahrbücher* 14 (1868) 217. Gercke, *PW* 2. 1048-1049, prefers the sixth century.

¹¹⁴ See Bywater xxviii (errors due to confusion of uncial letters), xxxi (the Parisinus' errors "often carry one back to the papyrus period of the text, before the accents and breathings were superimposed on the uncial *scriptura continua*"). The archetype of the Syriac-Arabic version was certainly an uncial manuscript, probably not later than the fifth or sixth century and possibly much earlier; see Gudeman, *Philol.* 90 (1935) 47-48; also his ed., *Krit. Anhang*, p. 456.

¹¹⁵ This might also explain the minor variants: omission of *τὸν αἴτιον* (τ' αἴτ' ?); change of *γάγ* to *οἶν*.

¹¹⁶ Several of the neighboring tales in the *De Mir. Ausc.* are similarly edifying: 152 (on the punishment of oath-breakers), 154 (Aetna's lava-flow turning aside to spare the pious), 158-160, 162-163 (amulets). Cf. Porphyry, *II. ἀγαλμάτων* fr. 1 Bidez (= Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 3. 7. 1), on the divine power or life which inheres in statues, and Pausanias 6. 11. 6 on the statue of Theagenes at Thasos, which fell upon the enemies of Theagenes and destroyed them. Cf. M. P. Nilsson, *Gesch. der griech. Religion*, 1, Munich, 1941, 74, who emphasizes how rare such stories are in the comparatively rationalistic atmosphere of classical Greece; but see G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, Paris, 1904, 184-187; Rohde, *Psyche*, London, 1925, 136 and notes thereto. Nilsson remarks also that miracles of this kind are attributed to statues of 'heroes' rather than of gods.

the gods choose this solemn moment to show in the sight of all—by public execution, as it were—what the fruits of crime are. Undoubtedly that is an integral part, in fact the main point, of the original story. It even seems to have left one trace in the abbreviated version in the *Poetics*: the verb *θεωροῦντι*. It was Dacier who first suggested,¹¹⁷ in the light of Plutarch, that the word must mean “while attending a festival” rather than “while he was looking” (viz. at it, the statue). Gudeman objects to this on the double ground that Aristotle never uses *θεωρεῖν* in the sense ‘visit a festival,’ and that anyway the detail is “für die Pointe völlig belanglos.” But whether it be irrelevant or not for Aristotle’s own point, it certainly was of importance in the original story. Moreover it is not true that Aristotle never uses *θεωρεῖν* in the required sense. In a famous passage in the *Protrepticus*¹¹⁸ he compared the philosopher’s contemplation of reality to the viewing (*θεωρία*) of the sacred spectacle at Olympia or at the Dionysia.¹¹⁹ There is no doubt then that Aristotle knew this specific sense of *θεωρεῖν*¹²⁰ and used it in at least one early work. Hence, whether the passage is genuine or not, *θεωροῦντι* can and undoubtedly does mean “while he was at a festival.”¹²¹

¹¹⁷ See Bywater *ad loc.*

¹¹⁸ Fr. 12 Walzer (= Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 53, 19 Pistelli).

¹¹⁹ Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 97-98, shows how this comparison is related to the well-known parable (Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 3. 8, from Heraclides Ponticus) likening the world to the throng at Olympia: most men are there to buy and sell and have a good time, some to compete in the contests, a few (~ the philosophers) solely to witness the spectacle; and to the other story (Ar. fr. 11 Walzer [p. 49], = Iamblich. *Protr.* p. 51, 8 Pistelli) that Pythagoras, when asked the purpose of human life, *τὸ θεάσασθαι εἶπε τὸν οὐρανόν, καὶ ἑαυτὸν δὲ θεωρῶν ἔφασκεν εἶναι τῆς φύσεως* (cf. the almost identical remark of Anaxagoras just below). These parables are of course nothing but an echo of Plato’s concept of philosophy as a ‘viewing’ or witnessing of all reality (*τὴν θεωρίαν τοῦ παντός* in fr. 12 is a conscious echo of the famous *θεωρία παντός μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας*, *Rep.* 6. 486a).

¹²⁰ It is not uncommon in fourth-century writers. *Θεωρία*: Pl. *Crilo* 52b; *Phaedo* 58b, c; *Rep.* 8. 556c; *Laws* 1. 650a; 12. 947a; Xen. *Mem.* 4. 8. 2; Dem. *De Falsa Leg.* 128; *In Meid.* 115. *Θεωρεῖν*: Pl. *Epist.* 3. 315b; 7. 350b (*θεωροῦντα*, “at Olympia”); Xen. *Anab.* (1. 2. 10); 5. 3. 7; *Hiero* 11. 10; [Lys.] 6. 5; [Andoc.] *In Alc.* 20. Plato, *Laws* 12. 950d-953a, shows how easily the sense ‘visit a festival’ (primarily the great ones at Delos, Delphi, Olympia, so that the notion of going abroad is involved) can shade off into ‘travel, be a tourist.’ Cf. also the sight-seeing visit (*θεάσασθαι, θεωρήσαντες*) of Socrates and his party to the festival of Bendis at the Piraeus, *Rep.* 1. 327a, b.

¹²¹ If the festival played a central role in the original story, and if *θεωροῦντι*

Finally, among the unsatisfactory features of the passage we should notice the oblique reference which it forces upon us for τοὺς τοιοῦτους... μύθους in a10. With the Mity's affair standing where it does, τοὺς τοιοῦτους almost inevitably refers directly to it and only indirectly to the governing specification above, *δταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα*. But Aristotle cannot mean to commend the Mity's story as a good plot for a tragedy. It is an example of a curious accident, which he has cited in the sense that *even* accidents (καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης) are most effective in arousing wonder if they look as though they had happened by intention. The tragic plot should not be based on accidents; or, if it is, they should be kept outside the plot proper (24. 60a29).¹²² Hence τοὺς τοιοῦτους ... μύθους ought not to refer to the Mity's story but to what precedes it; specifically, to δι' ἄλληλα and the justification that follows that phrase (τὸ γὰρ θαυμαστόν ... ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης), which recommends a logically constructed plot *above* those based on chance happenings. Moreover καλλίους undoubtedly refers to plot-construction in this sense; compare 1. 47a10, καλῶς εἶπειν; 13. 52b31, δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγωδίας μὴ ἀπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην; 13. 53a22, ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία; 14. 53b25, χρῆσθαι καλῶς.

The obvious, indeed the only solution, if the Mity's passage is genuine, is a parenthesis cutting out the lines which have to do with τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης: that is, a6-10, ἐπεὶ καὶ ... γίνεσθαι.¹²³ It is an awkward solution at best, and perhaps another indication of the spuriousness of a7-10.¹²⁴

Here are a number of reasons for casting suspicion on the Mity's passage. Yet they do not seem quite sufficient, even when combined, to constitute decisive proof, and I have therefore not ventured to

can have that meaning, it would be too long a coincidence that it should denote something entirely different here.—I. M. Glanville, *CQ* 41 (1947) 74 (see below on peripety, c. 11 *init.*), emphasizes the festival and suggests that it is what makes the incident a peripety in Aristotle's sense.

¹²² A Mity's tragedy, with the felling of the statue for its climax, would be subject to the strictures that Aristotle lays upon recognition by 'tokens,' i.e., inanimate objects: 16. 54b20, πρῶτη μὲν ἢ ἀτρεχνοτάτη ... ἢ διὰ τῶν σημείων; cf. 11. 52a34 ff.

¹²³ So Hardy. Rostagni begins the parenthesis at a4, τὸ γὰρ θαυμαστόν; but this cuts off the clause which is essential for the justification of δι' ἄλληλα.

¹²⁴ Bracketing these lines would leave a short parenthesis, a6-7, ἐπεὶ καὶ ... γεγρονέναι, which could be taken in stride.—Montmollin, in spite of his objections to parentheses, does not notice that a parenthesis has to be posited here if the text is to be preserved as it is.

bracket the lines in the text lemma. The most interesting implication of the passage, whether genuine or not, is the almost incontrovertible evidence it gives (through the echo in *De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus*) that the *Poetics* had come to light again¹²⁶ in the fourth or fifth century A.D. The fact is obvious in any case, since our Greek manuscripts presuppose a copying onto vellum sometime before the "great gap" of the seventh to ninth centuries (the archetype of the Syriac-Arabic version was certainly an uncial manuscript also, and the Syriac version itself was probably made not later than the sixth century); but it is valuable to have it confirmed by such casual—and therefore unbiassed—testimony.

¹²⁶ I say "come to light again" because I can see little firm evidence of a knowledge of our *Poetics* at any time between Theophrastus and the fourth century A.D.—either in Aristophanes of Byzantium (A. Trendelenburg, *Grammaticorum graecorum de arte tragica ludicorum reliquiae*, Bonn, 1867, 65-70), or in Philodemus (Gomperz, *Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gym.* 16 [1865] 717-726; *id.*, *Wiener Eranos*, Vienna, 1909, 1-7; Rostagni points also to Philod. *II. ποιημάτων* 2, fr. 72 Hausrath [*Fleckeisens Jahrbücher*, Suppl. 17 (1889-90) 270]), or in Plutarch (Susemihl, *Einleit.* 27 n. 3), or in the anonymous papyrus fragments published by Oellacher (*Études de Papyrologie* 4 [1938] 135-181; see Montmollin 178-179), or in Porphyry (Trendelenburg, *op. cit.* 72-85). On the whole question see Rostagni, "Aristotele e aristotelismo nella storia dell' estetica antica," *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 2 (1922) 1-147, and his ed. of the *Poetics*, *Introd.* LXXXIV-XCIII. The vast field, of which the references just given represent only a selection, deserves investigation on a new basis: that is, we need a study of where, when, and by whom the actual arguments and turns of phrase of our *Poetics* are echoed (as opposed to vague echoes of its ideas, which could have come to the echoer through a wide variety of channels), from Theophrastus to Tzetzes.

CHAPTER 10

52a12-21

εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοῖ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ὧν μιμήσεις οἱ μῦθοί εἰσιν ὑπάρχουσιν εὐ-
 15 θὺς οὔσαι τοιαῦται. λέγω δὲ ἀπλῆν μὲν πράξιν ἧς | γινο-
 μένης ὡσπερ ὄρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς, ἄνευ περιπετείας
 ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ μεταβάσεως γίνεται, πεπλεγμένην δ' <ἧς>
 ἐξῆς μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἢ μετά-
 βάσεως ἐστίν. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστά-
 20 |ῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος γίνεσθαι ταῦτα. διαφέρει
 γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε.

52a12

Some plots are simple, others are complex; in fact the actions of which the plots are imitations are of those two kinds to begin with. By 'simple action' I mean one in
 15 which, | as it develops in a consecutive and unified manner in accordance with our norm, the shift of fortune comes about without peripety or recognition; by 'complex,' one in which the shift is accomplished consecutively (but) with recognition or peripety or both. But these developments must arise out of the very structure of the plot, in such a way that as a result of what has happened beforehand it
 20 follows | either necessarily or probably that these particular things happen. For it makes a great difference whether these events are the result of those others or merely follow them.

We are ready to have the two species of plot defined. Although Aristotle is sometimes casual about *μῦθος* and *πράξις*, on this formal occasion he is careful¹ to define plots in terms of "the actions of which they are imitations." The definitions themselves will repay close scrutiny. That of the simple action consists of two parts, the first specifying that the action must be continuous and single, the second that in it

¹ As in the first formal introduction of the concept of 'plot,' 6. 50a3, *ἔστι δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις*.

the 'shift' takes place without peripety or recognition. In *συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς*, although the former term has not been used before, we recognize in general outline the specifications laid down in chapters 7 and 8. But *ᾧρισται* is too particular a verb to refer merely to such discussions. What Aristotle means by *ᾧσπερ ᾧρισται* is the *ἄροσ τοῦ μεγέθους* at the end of chapter 7, which as we saw was actually a definition of the unity of tragedy in terms of its length.

The dependence of the present definition on the former one extends to every detail. In the first place they are both definitions of the tragic action *in motion*.² *Γινομένης*, like *γυνομένων* in 7. 51a13, is a substantive verb, not a mere surrogate for *οὔσης*.³ The technical fact that here Aristotle is defining the action itself, instead of the plot, has forced a slight change in construction, that is all. *Γυνομένων* was a genitive absolute with subject understood, viz. *τῶν πραγμάτων* (= *τῆς πράξεως*). Here, although *πρᾶξιν* itself is the antecedent of *ῆς*, on which *γυνομένης* depends, the participle is still absolute: a construction more familiar in Latin than in Greek.⁴ It cannot be rendered literally in English; for lack of case endings the obliquity becomes nonsense. We have to translate: "By 'simple action' I mean one such that, while it moves forward continuous and single, the change takes place...."

By the same token *συνεχοῦς* = *ἐφεξῆς* in the former definition. This is in fact the chief point of the reference *ᾧσπερ ᾧρισται*. The action is to move forward with each of its 'parts,' i.e., its constituent events, cheek-by-jowl with those that come before and after.⁵ The

² They are distinguished thereby from the restatement of the original definition of tragedy in 7. 50b23 (*κεῖται δὲ ἡμῖν κτλ.*), which is static, viewing the action as a whole *body*.

³ "An action which *is* [italics mine] one and continuous in the sense above defined," Butcher; "bei welcher, während sie den obigen Bestimmungen gemäss innerlich zusammenhängend und einheitlich *ist*," Gomperz; "l'action est 'simple' quand elle *est*, dans le sens qui à été défini, cohérente et une," Hardy.

⁴ Cf. the common type *qua re nuntiata, quibus rebus cognitis, quo consule*, etc. Latin can translate our sentence word for word: *simplitem autem actionem (eam) dico, qua eo modo quem definiimus procedente fortuna mulatur*, etc. The corresponding construction is relatively undeveloped in Greek. Kühner-Gerth notices it (2^a. 2. 100-101), but gives no examples like ours. E. H. Spieker, however, *AJP* 6 (1885) 326, cites one instance from Lysias, 12 from Isocrates (perhaps especially pertinent for Aristotle), and 5 from Demosthenes. An example from Aristotle himself is *E. N.* 10. 3. 1174a17-19, *κατ' οὔδ'ένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονήν ἥς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γυνομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος*.

⁵ In *Phys.* 5. 3. 226b34-227b2 (~ *Metaph.* K12.1068b31-1068a14; see Ross *ad loc.*)

specification not only echoes the former one but is framed so as to exclude 'episodic' plots, in which extra scenes or speeches are inserted at random between the integral parts.

The specification of unity (*μῖα*), although it reminds us in a general way of chapter 8, likewise goes back to the *ἄροσ τοῦ μεγέθους*.⁶ We saw there that the unity of the plot depended on two things: (1) the definition afforded by the two end-points, happiness and unhappiness, the action being a single movement from one to the other, and (2) the implicit provision (which was spelled out later, at the end of chapter 8) that no events are to be included which are not an integral part of that movement. Here the first point is represented more particularly by *μῖα*; and the second by *συνεχοῦς*—although perhaps it is useless to assign specific nuances when the two words are actually used so closely together.

Thus there is nothing in the first part of the definition which was not contained, either explicitly or by implication, in the *ἄροσ τοῦ μεγέθους*. In the second part, *ἡ μετάβασις* (*μεταβολή* below, 11. 52a23, 31) likewise represents the *μεταβάλλειν* of 7. 51a14. To this is added—what in fact was likewise implied there, *ex silentio*—that the shift of fortune takes place without peripety or recognition.

The second definition, that of the complex plot, is clearly parallel to the first in shape and construction; but it appears to have only one part (the second). I believe, however, that the idea of continuity is here also, lurking behind the obvious corruption *λέξις*.⁷ The Riccardianus has *πεπλεγμένην δὲ ἐξ ἧς*,⁸ and this reading has tended to become the vulgate in recent editions (Rostagni, Gudeman, Hardy,

τὸ ἐφεξῆς is distinguished from *τὸ συνεχές* as a ny item in a series which has nothing of the same class between it and the adjoining items, whereas *τὸ συνεχές* is that whose extremes are integral with the extremes of the adjoining items. There *ἐφεξῆς* is the generic concept, *συνεχές* a species of it in which the 'continuous' items are more integrally united. But it is clear that the distinction is not observed in our passage; cf. *De Gen. et Corr.* 2. 11. 337a34, where *συνεχῶς* and *ἐφεξῆς* are used as synonyms. As usual, we find that the use of terms in the *Poetics* is comparatively untechnical (as befits the subject; cf. *E. N.* 1. 1. 1094b19 ff.); see O. J. Todd, *op. cit.* (above, c. 5, n. 110) 129-131.

⁶ It may be useful to recall that *μίαν πράξιν οἷαν λέγομεν*, 8. 51a28, referred directly to the *ἄροσ*; see above *ad loc.*

⁷ So the Parisinus. *Πράξις*, in Parisinus 2040 and some others (see Tkatsch 2. 123 for details), is pretty clearly an attempt to emend *λέξις*.

⁸ Vahlen had already anticipated *ἐξ ἧς* in his third edition, though in different form (*πεπλεγμένη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς*).

Sykutris, Montmollin [p. 225]). But ἐξ ἧς is not suitable. The tragic 'change' does not come *out of* the action but in it, during it. My suggestion is that δὲ ἐξ ἧς and δὲ λέξεως represent an original δ' ἧς ἐξἧς. The Arabic version seems to imply δ' ἐν ἧ ("in qua fit transitio," Tkatsch), which would also be possible; but it is hard to be sure.⁹ In either case ἐξἧς is essential.¹⁰ It establishes the principle of unbroken continuity (and with it that of unity: see what was said just above on the close interrelation of συνεχοῦς and μιᾶς) for the complex plot, in parallel with the simple. "And (by) complex (I mean) one of¹¹ which the 'change' is (takes place) (in) continuous (sequence), with recognition or peripety or both."

The following sentence is nothing but an amplification and reaffirmation of the master-phrase δι' ἀλλήλα, 9. 52a4 (cf. διὰ τὰδε, a21), applying it to the new concepts of peripety and recognition¹² and bringing them explicitly within the ambit of the long-established principle of 'probability or necessity.' It calls for no further remark.¹³

⁹ Margollouth suggested—hesitantly—πεπλεγμένη δὲ λέγεται ἐν ἧ.

¹⁰ The word, though much rarer in Aristotle than ἐφεξῆς, appears in *De Caelo* 4. 3. 310b12; *E. N.* 4. 1. 1119b22.

¹¹ It seems too adventurous to take ἧς as genitive absolute again, with γινομένης understood from above.

¹² Ταῦτα, a18, refers directly to them. Rostagni's paragraphing misrepresents this close connection.

¹³ Gomperz's τὰ ἐ(σ)τι(τα)α, for ταῦτα in a20 (γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα), is ingenious but based on the mistaken idea that the sentence refers to both kinds of plot, simple and complex. Ταῦτα is strong: "these (and just these) things." In the complex plot, just because the decisive 'parts,' i.e., the peripety and/or recognition, are so unexpected, it is extra important that they in particular should arise probably or necessarily out of what has come before.

CHAPTER 11

52a22-b3

ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττο-
 μένων μεταβολή καθ' ἅπερ εἴρηται· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὡσπερ
 λέγομεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον—οἷον ἐν τῷ Οἰδί-
 25 ποδι <ὁ> ἐλθὼν, ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλά-
 ξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβον δηλώσας ὃς ἦν, τοῦναν-
 τίον ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀπο-
 θανόμενος, ὁ δὲ Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν
 μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σω-
 30 θῆναι—ἀναγνώρισις δέ, | ὡσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ
 ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φίλαν ἢ εἰς ἐχθραν,
 τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὠρισμένων. καλλίστη δὲ
 ἀναγνώρισις ὅταν ἄμα περιπέτεια γένηται [οἷον ἔχει ἐν τῷ
 Οἰδίποδι]. εἰσὶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνώρισις, καὶ γὰρ
 35 πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ | τυχόντα ἔστιν ὡσπερ εἴρηται συμ-
 βαίνειν, καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνω-
 ρίσαι. ἀλλ' ἢ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἢ μάλιστα τῆς πρά-
 ξεως ἢ εἰρημένη ἔστιν. ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις καὶ
 38 | b1 περιπέτεια ἢ ἔλεον ἔξει | ἢ φόβον, οἷων πράξεων ἢ
 τραγωδία μίμησις ὑπόκειται· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ
 τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων συμβήσεται.

52a22

'Peripety' is the shift of the action towards the opposite
 pole in accordance with the principles previously mentioned,
 and that in the manner we were just speaking of, i.e., in
 accordance with probability or necessity—as for example
 25 in the | *Oedipus* the messenger <who> has arrived, when
 it seems that he will make Oedipus happy and relieve him
 of his fears towards his mother by revealing who he was,
 brings about the opposite; and in the *Lynceus*, the hero
 being led off as though to execution, and Danaus following
 him as if to perform the execution, it follows logically as
 a result of what has happened that the latter dies and the
 30 former is saved—and | 'recognition,' as in fact the term

itself indicates, is a shift from ignorance to awareness, pointing either to a state of close natural ties (blood relationship) or to one of enmity, on the part of those persons who have been in a clearly marked status with respect to prosperity or misfortune. The recognition is finest artistically when a peripety takes place at the same time [as is the case in the *Oedipus*]. Now there are indeed other varieties of recognition also; that is, it is possible for it to take place in
 35 the aforementioned manner with respect | to inanimate objects or chance events, and it is possible to recognize whether someone has done a thing or not done it. But the one which is most integrally a part of the plot, i.e., the action, is the one we have mentioned. For that kind of recognition and
 38 | b1 peripety will carry with it either pity | or fear, which are the kind of actions of which we have defined tragedy to be an imitation; and furthermore happiness or unhappiness will be the natural result of such occurrences.

The introduction of 'peripety' and 'recognition' in chapter 10 calls for definitions of them in turn. But before examining these in detail we had better look at the construction of the passage as a whole. The two definitions are given in exactly parallel form (like those in chapter 10), as coördinate clauses of a single compound sentence, the same verb (*ἔστι*, a22) serving for both. This fact—which appears to have been overlooked, no doubt because it makes Aristotle's sentence so long¹—has more than grammatical significance. Peripety and recognition are each defined as a change (*μεταβολή*) from a certain state to its opposite. But all tragedy is or involves such a change (*μεταβάλλειν*, 7. 51a14; *μετάβασις* just above and in 18. 55b28, but compare 13. 52b34, 53a9, 13). Peripety and recognition, then, are *special* varieties or structural forms of the tragic 'change,' the shapes it may take when the plot is complex; and this fact, common to them both, is expressed grammatically in the coördinate construction *ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ... μεταβολή ... ἀναγνώρισις δὲ ... μεταβολή ...*

These considerations, general though they may be, are of prime

¹ Several recent editors (Butcher, Hardy, Rostagni) even print *ἀναγνώρισις δὲ κτλ.* as a new paragraph (Butcher in his translation, though not in his text). Similarly some of the older editors (Fekker, Susemihl) put a second *ἔστιν* after *ἀναγνώρισις δέ*, to carry the new sentence which supposedly begins there.

importance for the interpretation of the definitions themselves; for these—as so often in the *Poetics*—have been read too much in isolation from the context of Aristotle's argument. There is a long-standing controversy over the meaning of 'peripety.' The standard interpretation has always been 'reversal of fortune.' Vahlen² proposed to substitute 'reversal of intention' (taking τῶν πραγματοποιῶν as "what one did or is doing for a particular purpose"). But this special reading is disposed of by a look at the passage in its total setting. *Εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ... μεταβολή* is nothing new; it is merely the *εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν* of 7. 51a13. Hence τῶν πραγματοποιῶν are simply *the events of the play as it moves along*. In the earlier passage these were alluded to in the phrase *ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων*, and Aristotle might equally well have repeated *γιγνομένων* here, except that he wanted to attach the idea more directly to the persons of the play. It follows that τῶν πραγματοποιῶν depends on *μεταβολή*, not on τὸ ἐναντίον: it is a change of or in the events of the play towards the opposite (*viz.* unhappiness, if we began with 'happiness,' or the reverse).

So far there is nothing in the definition which was not already in the *ἄρος τοῦ μεγέθους* in chapter 7. The further specification which turns the generic 'change' into the specific variety called peripety lies in the phrase *καθ' ἅπερ εἴρηται*, and this refers not to 7. 51a14, as Vahlen thought, nor to 10. 52a19 as Bonitz suggested,³ but to 9. 52a4, *ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα*,⁴ which as we have already seen is the general formula for the basis of the complex plot. The reference in *καθ' ἅπερ εἴρηται* is substantive, not verbal: not "as has been said" but "(the change ...) in accordance with what has been said."⁵ Peripety, then, is an *unexpected yet logical* shift in the events of the play from happiness to unhappiness or the reverse. To

² *Beiträge*² 34-36 ('2. 92-94); supported by Walter Lock, *CR* 9 (1895) 251-253; attacked by Bywater, *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Vienna, 1902, 167-172. See also Butcher's long note, 329 n. 2, and F. L. Lucas, *CR* 37 (1923) 98-104 (supports Vahlen).

³ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 35 ('2. 93) n.

⁴ Rightly urged by I. M. Glanville, *CQ* 41 (1947) 73 ff., on the basis of an unpublished paper by Cornford.

⁵ Vahlen recognized this (*loc. cit.*: "nicht 'wie früher bemerkt,' sondern 'nach der angegebenen Weise'") but mistook the passage that Aristotle is referring to. The case belongs with the many others in the *Poetics* where *καθ' ἅπερ (ὡςπερ) εἴρηται* has been mistaken for a mere verbal citation; see below on 24. 60a3-4. In view of the direct reference here I have ventured to write *καθ' ἅπερ*, separately.

this Aristotle adds at once: "and that in the way just mentioned [i. in 10. 52a18-21],⁶ in accordance with probability or necessity." This is a further specification,⁷ already implied in καθ' ἕπερ εἴρηται (i.e., παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα), but which Aristotle feels it desirable to emphasize once again because it is so easy for the poet, in handling 'paradoxical' events, to forget the standing requirement of probability or necessity.

It lies in the nature of the case that peripety, though it represents the total μεταβολή, i.e., the whole 'shift' of the play, should be concentrated in a single scene; for it belongs to its nature to be 'marvellous,' that is, unexpected, sudden. In a complex plot, unlike a simple one, the change is not visible for a while. The hero does not march steadily along the road from happiness to unhappiness, as we feel that Agamemnon for example is doing in Aeschylus' play. Instead he proceeds for some time in what seems to be an even tenor of εὐτυχία, until suddenly, contrary to expectation, his fortune swings to the opposite. The notion of 'reversal of fortune' is inherent in all tragedy, as Aristotle sees it, not merely in complex tragedies. On the other hand the notion of a sudden reversal, which touches off the catastrophe, is inherent in παρὰ τὴν δόξαν, which implies that our expectation must have time to expand in one direction before the action 'swings' to the other.

Two questions remain. First, is the 'expectation' ours or that of the hero? The question needs only to be stated to answer itself; for the whole *raison d'être* of the paradoxicality was (9. 52a2-4) its emotional effect on 'us,' the audience (or the reader). The test of the paradox is that *we* are affected, surprised, moved to pity, etc., not that the hero is. It lies in the nature of the case that the hero will be surprised and emotionally affected also. Only—and this is the decisive argument against those (Vahlen, Lock, Lucas) who make the reversal of the hero's intention or expectation the essence of peripety⁸—his realization of the change and his consequent emotional reaction to it are subsumed by Aristotle under 'recognition.'

⁶ Ὡσπερ λέγομεν is a substantive reference also, but the change of tense is significant, referring to what Aristotle has been saying *just now*, in the preceding sentence.

⁷ As Rostagni says, it is not strictly a part of the definition.

⁸ According to Glanville, *op. cit.* 76, Cornford also held this view. I cannot quite follow Glanville's own explanation, *ibid.*, which appears to accept Cornford's view in part.

Second, how can we properly speak of surprise, and its concomitant emotional effects, in a case like the *Oedipus* where everybody knows the story in advance? This is a minor complication in the theory, of which Aristotle takes no direct notice; but it is not hard to supply the answer for him. Our knowledge that Oedipus's situation is going to be reversed is 'accidental' in Aristotle's sense. It is not an expectation based on the facts *as they are given in the course of the play*—that is, before the climax—or on any general considerations of probability or necessity, but on a prior knowledge which we happen to have of the play or the myth.⁹ In other words, so far as we anticipate the peripety we do so on the basis of knowledge which is external to the play itself and the nexus of probabilities and/or necessities which constitute it. Still, this answer is only halfway satisfactory. In a new melodrama it is indeed accidental whether we know the outcome beforehand (cf. the movie-goer who has already seen the film and is implored by his companion, who has not, "Don't tell me how it comes out!"). But in a drama like the *Oedipus* the knowledge is not merely accidental, and not purely irrelevant to our experience. That Oedipus killed his father and married his mother were notorious facts *which Sophocles himself has taken most subtly into account in writing the play*. It is not written for the uninstructed soul who merely sits and waits to see what will happen. On the contrary, our knowledge of what is to happen forms a very important part of the dramatist's calculations. He knows our expectation and plays with it as a cat plays with a mouse. The peculiar horror—though not the pity—of the *Oedipus* rests on the paradox that we expect the 'unexpected' catastrophe from the beginning. I think it is not unfair to Aristotle to say that he gives no sign of awareness of these subtleties.¹⁰

In any case we must insist that the logical nexus of the play, and the paradoxicality which seems—but only seems—to contradict it, are determined by reference to the spectator or reader, since the added emotional impact of the events upon him is the only justification for constructing complex plots at all. This consideration is of direct use in interpreting the two examples which follow, especially that from the *Oedipus*. Under the usual constitution of the text, with commas after *φόβου* and *ἦν* (a26) but none after *ἐλλόων*, Aristotle

⁹ See Glanville, *op. cit.* 77.

¹⁰ His remark, 9. 51b25, that "the known names are known to few," perhaps indicates that he discounted prior knowledge of the outcome as a serious factor.

is made to say that "the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus and free him from his alarms about his mother, but by revealing who he is, (he) produces the opposite effect" (Butcher). The inaccuracy of the statement is notorious. The Corinthian messenger could not possibly have come with any such intention, since he knows nothing about Oedipus' "alarms" until after his arrival. It is strange that so many editors and commentators have been willing to let Aristotle talk such nonsense.¹¹ Moreover, as Bywater rightly says, it would follow that the peripety is an event in the life of the messenger rather than in that of Oedipus.

What we require is an interpretation which will (a) do justice to the facts of the play, and (b) square with Aristotle's concept of peripety as a sudden and unexpected yet logical reversal in *our* expectations (*παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*). Such an interpretation emerges if we are willing to take both the future participles (*εὐφρανῶν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων*) with *ἐποίησεν* rather than with *ἐλθῶν*. In lines 994-999 of the drama Oedipus reveals the reason for his self-imposed exile from Corinth, viz. the oracle's prediction that he would slay his father and marry his mother. The Corinthian messenger asks for confirmation that that is indeed the reason (1000), then says—and Aristotle's remark is an echo of these words—*τί δ' ἦ τ' ἐγὼ οὐχὶ τοῦδε τοῦ φόβου σ', ἄναξ, ἐπέπερ εὔνοος ἦλθον. ἐξελεσάμην*: [= *ἀπαλλάξων κτλ.*] The messenger's¹² good will, which he had when he came to Thebes, *now* expresses itself in a wish to cheer up Oedipus and relieve him of his fears about his (father and) mother. The new decision is a logical and natural (*δ' ἦ τ'*) consequence of the good will. Yet it leads straight towards *unhappiness* for Oedipus; and it does so contrary to our expectation. For although the intent which forms the premise is the messenger's, the judgment whether its consequence is logical yet 'paradoxical' belongs to us.¹³ (The messenger's surprise is of no

¹¹ Gudeman represents the vulgate explanation, that his memory slipped—as if such a lapse were credible in connection with the one play that Aristotle exalts above all others. It would be roughly comparable if he should recall that in the *Iliad* Phoenix makes a long speech urging Achilles to stay in his tent, or that Hector goes back to Troy in order to see Andromache. On Aristotle's alleged lapse of memory about the hunt on Parnassus, 8. 51a26, see above *ad loc.*

¹² *Ἐλθῶν*, once detached from the participles, is too bare; cf. *ὁ μὲν* [*sc. Λυγκεύς*] and *ὁ δὲ Δαναός* just below. Hence I have proposed <ὁ> *ἐλθῶν* (not Rostagni's text, but he translates "chi veniva").

¹³ Subject always to the reservation already mentioned, that we really know what is to going happen.

importance: he is present at the final revelation, 1185, but makes no further comment after he has identified the Theban, 1145, and we give no further thought to him.)

The case is still clearer with the *Lynceus*, little as we know about the play. The crucial point is not Lynceus' expectation that he will be executed,¹⁴ but ours.

There is still another apparent anomaly about the reference to the *Oedipus*, which I think gives strong support to this interpretation. So far as Oedipus himself is concerned, the peripety and climax of the action come not in the scene with the Corinthian messenger but in that with the Theban Shepherd, line 1110 ff. Here is the moment (line 1180) when the final revelation passes the old man's lips and Oedipus rushes offstage, only to discover Jocasta's body and blind himself. Thus Aristotle's location of the peripety seems to antedate the true one by a whole scene. But then chapter 18, 55b26, comes to our aid,¹⁵ where Aristotle (again with an illustration from the *Lynceus*, so that he is clearly thinking of the same kind of structure) defines the *δέσις* as "the part of the play which extends from the beginning as far as that 'part' (scene) which is the last *from which the shift takes place to happiness or unhappiness*," and the *λύσις* as "the part from the beginning of the shift to the end (of the play)." In these terms, the peripety is the "beginning of the shift." And in fact in the *Oedipus*, although the final and official revelation does not come until line 1180, it begins with the facts supplied by the Corinthian, which 'naturally and probably' force Oedipus to the last discovery. The sign *to us* that the secret is out, that the dreadful 'change to unhappiness' is beginning, is Jocasta's exit at line 1072; it takes Oedipus himself another hundred lines to fill in the last link. The fact is that Sophocles, by an astonishing *tour de force*, has produced two successive climaxes, one for Jocasta and us, another (a second and redoubled one for us) for Oedipus. Aristotle's designation of the first one as the peripety is, it seems to me, the best confirmation that peripety is measured by *our* expectation and falls at the point where that expectation shifts to its opposite. The second climax is not a 'peripety' but a 'recognition.'

¹⁴ *Ἀποθανοίμενος* makes the meaning clearer, since men do not *intend* to be executed.

¹⁵ The fact that that passage appears to be a later addition by Aristotle (see below *ad loc.*) does not invalidate this argument. There is no change of conception so far as our present point is concerned.

Aristotle's other example of peripety, from the *Lynceus* of Theodectes, unfortunately is not very illuminating to us, since the play is lost. However, what is said about it at the beginning of chapter 18 gives some possible clues, and we will discuss the matter there.

The other moment or structural form of the complex tragic change is 'recognition.' Its definition, as we said, is given in parallel with that of peripety, and likewise contains the basic word *μεταβολή*: it too is a change, this time from ignorance to knowledge.¹⁶ The rest of the definition tells us (a) what makes the change *tragic*, and (b) how it fits into the *pattern* of tragic reversal. For the interpretation of (a)—i.e., *ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἐχθραν*—we have to go to chapter 14, 53b15 ff., where Aristotle analyzes the kinds of bloody deed which are properly tragic. There he points out that the killing, wounding, etc., of an enemy by an enemy or of a 'neutral' by a 'neutral' is not tragic either in prospect or in execution (*οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλον*); that what one wants is a fearful deed of that kind which involves *close kin* (b19, *ὅταν ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη*).¹⁷ So in our passage *φιλίαν* is not 'friendship' or 'love' or any other feeling, but *the objective state*¹⁸ of being *φίλοι*, 'dear ones' by virtue of blood ties. When Oedipus 'recognizes' Laius—that is, realizes who it was he killed at the cross roads—he changes from ignorance to knowledge, and at the same moment, since Laius was his father, he moves into the status of *φιλία*. 'Love,' not to mention 'friendship,' is much too puling a word for his feelings at that moment, and anyhow his feelings do not count so much as the new *situation* into which he has moved with his shift from ignorance to awareness. A glance at the list of

¹⁶ The clause *ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα σημαίνει* refers, of course, only to the specification *μεταβολή ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν*.

¹⁷ That *ταῖς φιλίαις* not merely includes blood relatives, as Vahlen seems to imply (*Beiträge*² 48 [2. 107]), but refers strictly to them, is clear from the relationships that Aristotle mentions: *οἶον ἢ ἀδελφός ἀδελφόν κτλ.* Vahlen himself tactfully corrects his formula not far below, p. 49 (108): "Wenn aber die unheilvolle That die durch Bande des Bluts verbundenen [italics mine] auseinanderreisst oder zu reißen droht."

¹⁸ Cf. Vahlen, *loc. cit.*: "... zwischen Freunden (wobei immer auch an Blutsfreunde gedacht ist, sowie überhaupt hier [sc. 14. 53b15] und später nicht das im πάθος sich äussernde, sondern das in der Natur begründete Verhältnis der Personen [italics mine] vorausgesetzt ist)." Similarly on our passage, p. 36 (2. 95): "die in leidenschaftlichem Hader auf einander Platzenden erkennen sich als durch die Bande des Blutes (denn φιλία schliesst auch die Blutsfreundschaft ein) verbunden, oder umgekehrt."

tragic heroes whose stories Aristotle says are the finest and have been settled on by the poets (13. 53a20) shows that this is indeed his meaning: they are Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus.¹⁹

So much for *φιλία*; what of *ἐχθρα*? The very passage we just appealed to (14. 53b15 ff.) seems at first glance to exclude it: there is nothing tragic, Aristotle says, about bloody dealings between enemies. But what we have to do with here is not a natural state of enmity (which hardly exists in the same sense as the natural *φιλία* of close blood-kin) but a passage into enmity on the part of natural *φίλοι*. When Jason recognises that his wife has become his enemy and killed his sons; or, better still, when Clytemnestra (in Sophocles' *Electra*) recognises that this is her son and he has come to kill her, in other words that he who was naturally *φίλος* is now her enemy²⁰—then we have a recognition *εἰς ἐχθραν*.

The common denominator of the two modes of recognition, then, is the existence of a bond of natural *φιλία* between two people. Upon this natural state contrary factors have supervened, or now supervene, so that (a) he who has treated the other as an enemy (Merope and her son, 14. 54a5) or as an indifferent stranger (a 'neutral': Oedipus and his father, Iphigenia and her brother) now recognizes the natural bond of *φιλία* between them; or (b) he who has regarded the other as a *φίλος* now recognizes him as an enemy (Clytemnestra and her son). In both cases the true state of affairs was unknown and has now become known.

It is clear that this interpretation of *ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἐχθραν* gives point, as no other does, to Aristotle's subsequent remark (52a38) that "such a recognition and peripety will contain (involve) either pity or fear." In fact it alone accounts for the alternative phrasing "either pity or fear," which appears only here and is usually ignored or not convincingly explained. A recognition *εἰς φιλίαν* will especially arouse pity (even if its result is to avert the deadly act—see 14. 54a4 ff.—and much more if it comes after the act, as in the *Oedipus*); a recognition *εἰς ἐχθραν* will especially arouse fear, since it reveals the

¹⁹ See below *ad loc.*

²⁰ This inversion of the natural state of affairs is emphasized by Sophocles himself, *El.* 1410 ff., cf. 780 ff. A similar shift occurs when Polynices, in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, realizes that his father is irrevocably set against him; but his is not a recognition of the best type, i.e., of persons. It is in the nature of the case that recognition *εἰς ἐχθραν* is rarer than the converse.

horror of the deed which is to come.²¹ And similarly with the following remark: "Furthermore unhappiness and happiness²² will follow upon such events." It is not evident why a recognition that leads to love or hate should necessarily eventuate in unhappiness and (or) happiness; it is evident when the recognition discloses that the other party involved in a fatal act is a natural 'dear one.'

The second phrase of the definition (τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὀρισμένων) also needs careful scrutiny, and in the light of what we have discovered in the first. The commonly accepted version, e.g., "in the personages marked for good or evil fortune" (Bywater), will not do. "Marked" is an equivocation. If it means anything it suggests an idea of Destiny, which has no place whatever in Aristotle's theory of poetry²³ (or for that matter in his view of life). Butcher's "destined by the poet for good or bad fortune" is franker but equally wide of the mark; for the final state of the hero is precisely that element of the plot which is fixed by tradition and does not lie within the poet's discretion: 14. 53b22. Oedipus' deed, Clytemnestra's death at the hands of her son, were given 'facts' so far as Sophocles was concerned; he did not invent or control them.

The decisive argument is that in Aristotle's language ὀρισμένος does not mean 'destined' or 'marked,' but 'defined,' 'delimited.'²⁴ What he is referring to here is not the idea that Oedipus is 'destined' to be unhappy, but the simple fact that at the beginning of the play he has a determinate status with respect to 'happiness': that is, that he enters upon the action a happy man.²⁵ Thus the phrase is

²¹ Actually, of course, the two situations are reciprocal: each puts one of the tragic emotions to the fore while the other is kept in the background.

²² The apparent reverse order in the Arabic version ("*felicitas et successus et infelicitas et adversitas*," Tkatsch) is not sufficient ground for reversing the two verbs in the Greek text, as Gudeman does.

²³ See Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 2. 8.

²⁴ *Meteor.* 2. 9. 369b28, ἀποκεκρισμένον τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον αἰεὶ καὶ ὀρισμένον; *Metaph.* M10. 1087a16, ἢ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὡς ἔλη καθόλου οὐσα καὶ ἀόριστος ..., ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια ὀρισμένη καὶ ὀρισμένον; *Rhet.* 2. 22. 1395b31, ὡστ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὀρισμένων λεκτέον; *E. N.* 5. 3. 1129b12, τὰ τε γὰρ ὀρισμένα ἐπὶ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι; *ibid.* 2. 6. 1106b36, ἀρετὴ ... ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα ... ὀρισμένη λόγῳ.

²⁵ The prologue of the *Oedipus*, though its immediate occasion is the plague, brings out Oedipus' fame (lines 8, 33), his 'luck' (52), his fatherly care for his people (1, ὦ τέκνα; 58, ὦ παῖδες; cf. the following lines), and their admiration for him (33, 46) and trust in him (40ff.). The rest of his 'happiness' we learn gradually.

the exact counterpart, grammatically and in sense, of 13. 53a10, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία. Oedipus enters the action as the wise and beloved king of a great kingdom, father of his people, husband of a gracious and lovely wife, father of four flourishing sons and daughters. Contrast Orestes at the opening of the *Iphigenia in Tauris*: alone in the world except for one friend, an exile from his country, deprived of his kingly inheritance, hounded by the Furies, and thrown upon an unknown and inhospitable shore. These are the statuses we saw defined in 7. 51a12 ff. as the poles from which the tragic action swings to its opposite. Oedipus, the ideally 'happy' man, ends as a self-recognized parricide and committer of incest, blind, no longer king or husband: εἰς δυστυχίαν μετέβαλεν. Orestes, on the other hand, ends as the prince officially accredited and returning to his inheritance, taking his new-found sister and his friend with him, and released from his madness: a happy man. These shifts of fortune depend on recognitions, and *the measure of what is accomplished by the recognition, for weal or woe, is the status from which the hero began.*²⁸

We may summarize, then, by saying that the tragic recognition is the discovery, by a person who has been in a clearly defined status of 'happiness' or 'unhappiness,' of the identity of a naturally dear person with whom he has been involved, or is in danger of being involved, in a fatal act. Obviously this may fall out in various ways, which Aristotle will explore in chapter 14; what concerns us here is the general theory. The effect of the recognition, in general, is to uncover a horrible discrepancy between two sets of relationships: on the one hand the deep ties of blood, on the other a casual or real relation of hostility that has supervened or threatened to supervene upon it. Although Aristotle does not say so here, its emotional power (cf. ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα, 9. 52a3; ἡ ἀναγνώρισις ἐκπλητικόν, 14. 54a4) depends on the tension inherent in this discrepancy; ultimately, therefore, upon the deep-seated, immemorial power of the taboo against the shedding of kindred blood.

²⁸ Another possibility ought at least to be mentioned: that τῶν ὀρισμένων is an objective genitive, depending on γινῶσιν rather than on μεταβολή, and means "(awareness) of those who have a defined status in relation to (one's own) happiness or unhappiness." This has the virtue of specifying what the newly acquired knowledge is a knowledge of, and of specifying it as a knowledge of people. Lalus would then be ὀρισμένος in relation to Oedipus' (un)happiness, and Iphigenia in relation to Orestes'. But the grammar seems strained, and the parallel in 13. 53a10 points the other way.

This view of the tragic recognition makes it a good deal more specific than is customary. At the same time it explains the high tragic power which Aristotle ascribes to it (52a38); and it links recognition organically with the structural analysis of the tragic plot and the tragic *pathos* in chapters 13 and 14. Recognition is in fact a way in which the emotional potential inherent in certain human situations can be brought to its highest voltage, so to speak, at the moment of discharge. It is evident, then, how far Aristotle is from regarding recognition merely as a 'plot-device,' a matter of technique. Tragic recognition is indeed a technical device, but its *raison d'être* is its power to concentrate an intense emotional charge upon a single event, a change of awareness; for in that *μεταβολή* the whole depth of a human tragedy can be "contained."

Aristotle is perfectly aware that this is a special definition of recognition, and hastens to admit that there are other kinds. But it is evident why only the recognition of *persons* can generate the emotional power he requires; for only men are capable of *φιλία*²⁷ and therefore capable of involving themselves in a contravention of *φιλία*. The recognition of inanimate objects or chance events can take place "in the aforementioned manner," viz., paradoxically yet logically,²⁸ but it cannot reach the requisite level of emotional power; and neither can the realization that "one has acted or not acted." In the *Oedipus* the tragic fact is not that Oedipus has killed a man, but that that man was his father: recognition of the person, not the deed, is what counts.²⁹ The recognition of things and events may be dramatic or superficially exciting; it can hardly be tragic.

Moreover the finest recognition is one that is linked with peripety. This is said in a32 and implied in a38. But the text at a32-33 appears doubtful and the reference to the *Oedipus* dubious. The best text

²⁷ *Eth. Eud.* 7. 2. 1236b5-10; *ibid.* 1238a30-33.

²⁸ "Ὡσπερ εἴρηται, a35, like καθ' ἅπερ εἴρηται above (a23), is a substantive, not a verbal, reference, and points to the same old specification, παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα. Spengel's emendation ὡς ὅπερ (Gomperz ἔστιν ὅθ' ὅπερ) is a misguided attempt to get a reference to the definition of ἀναγνώρισις itself. — Ὡσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνειν proves, incidentally, that we are to understand a proviso like that in 52a23 (καὶ τοῦτο δὲ κτλ.) attached to the definition of ἀναγνώρισις also.

²⁹ H. Philippart, *RÉG* 38 (1925) 181. Gudeman, with curious obtusely, lists a number of examples for πέπραγε and μὴ πέπραγεν, in almost all of which the tragic point is the person, not the act itself. So in *Oedipus*, *Hecuba*, *Herc. Fur.*, *Thyestes*, etc.

seems to be Spengel's conjecture *περιπέτεια γένηται*,³⁰ now confirmed by the Riccardianus and—apparently—by the Arabic version. But the real difficulty is that the peripety in the *Oedipus*, as we have already said, does not come at the same time as the recognition but a hundred lines before it. Gomperz's *ἄμα περιπετεία*³¹ does better justice to the facts, and if the reference to the *Oedipus* were genuine we should have to adopt it. But in 14. 54a4-9 Aristotle says explicitly that the best (*κράτιστον*, = *καλλίστη*) handling of recognition is *to let the fatal deed be threatened but then averted by the recognition* (cf. 53b35, *τὸ μέλλοντα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι*). In this structure the recognition is immediately and necessarily followed by a peripety: the one who was about to be slain is taken into the slayer's arms instead and emerges 'happy' instead of dead.³² It seems to me evident that this is what Aristotle means by *ὅταν ἄμα περιπέτεια γένηται*, especially as the reference below (a38) shows recognition and peripety again in that order. The *Oedipus*, then, although the finest play as a whole, does not have the "most beautiful" use of recognition,³³ and the reference to it here must be an interpolation. That conclusion is suggested also by the halting grammar of the clause: *οἶον* (*οἶαν* Bywater) *ἔχει* (subject impersonal and vague: "the way things are")³⁴ *ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι*. The note is a tribute from a reader who had been persuaded by Aristotle that the *Oedipus* was supreme in everything.

Although peripety and recognition can be thus associated, almost merged, they remain distinct moments and can appear separately. The hero can learn the identity of his victim or victims without any reversal ensuing: recognition without peripety. So Heracles in the *Hercules Furens*, Agave in the *Bacchae*. Or his fortunes may undergo a spectacular change *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα* without any recognition of identities being involved: Admetus in the *Alcestis*, Creon in the *Antigone*.

³⁰ Bywater's suggestion that *περιπέτεια* "denotes the concrete instances of *περιπέτεια*, as actual incidents in plays," is possible, although in that case *ἀναγνωρίσεις* ought to be plural too. (Christ did in fact write *καλλίσται δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεις*).

³¹ *Zu Ar. Poet.* 2. 9.

³² Aristotle gives three examples, of which only the *Iphigenia* is extant, but his meaning is clear.

³³ On the apparent conflict between these two principles, as they appear in chapters 13 and 14, see below, pp. 450-452.

³⁴ The article *ἡ*, which is missing in most of the MSS (see Gudeman, *app. crit.*), is a natural emendation.

Peripety emerges from our analysis a somewhat broader concept than it is usually made out to be, recognition a somewhat narrower one. Both represent special ways in which the tragic *μεταβολή* can be brought to a sharp focus, instead of being diffused over the play, so that the tragic emotions inherent in the structure of the events are raised to a new level of intensity—raised to a higher power, so to speak. This concentration and intensification is, as we said, the *raison d'être* of the complex plot. Of the two modes, recognition is less integral to the plot structure *per se*, since it is not in itself a *μεταβολή* of the action but only of the hero's awareness of what the action means. But for that very reason it carries a higher charge, because in the assessing of human fortunes awareness lies nearer the heart of the matter than mere situation. Aristotle is no Stoic or Christian, but he is a Platonist, at least to the extent that for him happiness and unhappiness are primarily matters of knowledge; and the tragic hero's 'recognition' is after all a form of self-knowledge: not the best kind, since that dwells at a level that has nothing to do with tragedy, but at least a step upward out of ignorance and self-deception. It is no accident, then, that Aristotle rates recognition even above peripety as the highest potentialization of the tragic *μεταβολή*.

52b3-13

ἐπει δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μὲν
 <εἰσι> θατέρον πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ἢ δῆλος ἄτερος
 5 | τίς ἐστὶν, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι· ὅλον ἢ
 μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστη ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως
 τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνου δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἑδεῖ
 ἀναγνωρίσεως.

10 δύο μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη ταῦτ' ἐστί, περιπέτεια |
 καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, τρίτον δὲ πάθος. [τούτων δὲ περιπέτεια
 μὲν καὶ ἀναγνώρισις εἴρηται.] πάθος δὲ ἐστὶ πρᾶξις φθαρ-
 τικῆ ἢ ὀδυνηρά, ὅλον ὅτι ἐν τῷ φανερωῷ θάνατοι καὶ αἱ
 περιωδονίαι καὶ αἱ τρώσεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

52b3

And since the recognition is of persons, some involve one of
 5 the two persons only, when it is clear who the other | one
 is; but sometimes it is necessary for both to go through
 the process of recognition, as for example Iphigenia is re-
 cognized by Orestes from her sending of the message, but the
 revelation of his identity to her requires another recognition.

- 10 These, then, are two parts of the plot, peripety | and recognition; third is the *pathos*. [Of these, peripety and recognition have been discussed.] The *pathos* is an act which is destructive to life or painful, such as killings, paroxysms of pain, woundings, and all that kind of thing in the visible realm.

The first sentence—which we have left to this section purely as a matter of convenience—develops an incidental point: that since recognition involves two people,³⁶ either one or two recognitions may be required (naturally they may follow in rapid succession), according to whether one or both of the people are unknown to each other.³⁶ Aristotle does not bother to add that if a peripety ensues it must follow the second and decisive recognition. So in the *Iphigenia* the first recognition (sister by brother, line 777) is followed immediately by the second (brother by sister, line 827) and that in turn by the peripety (salvation, i.e., 'happiness,' for Orestes).

Finally, the last paragraph in the chapter defines the third 'part' of the plot.³⁷ From chapter 10 we know that the *pathos* is not limited to complex plots, and we shall see later that its function is not to intensify the tragic emotions but to provide a base-point, as it were, to which they can attach themselves. The *pathos* is the fatal or painful event—the 'thing suffered'—around which the action, simple or complex, revolves, and without which it would lack not merely intense emotional quality but the basic emotional potential.³⁸

However, one element in the definition raises a problem: the phrase

³⁶ *Tinōn* must include the recognizer and the recognized, i.e., must combine 'objective' and 'subjective' genitive.

³⁷ In b4 I read *αἱ μὲν εἰσι* (Riccardianus). The verb may have been indicated by a sign (*//*), even in an uncial text; and anyhow omissions of a single word are not uncommon in the *Poetles*.

³⁸ At b10 I have followed Susemihl and Gudeman in bracketing *τούτων δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν καὶ ἀναγνώριστις εἶρηται* as a marginal note. *τούτων* is tautologous and confused, after *ταῦτα* in the line before, and in this case the omission of the clause by the Arabic version seems to me significant. The note may be from the hand of the writer of chapter 12.

³⁹ Cf. the way in which Aristotle introduces his analysis in chapter 14, 53b11 ff. He begins by laying it down that the poet must produce the pleasure which is based on pity and fear by means of imitation, and that this must therefore be "built into the events." Then he asks, "What events, then, appear (appeal to the listener as) fearful and what ones pitiable?" and proceeds to an analysis of the *pathē* from the point of view of their tragic quality.

ἐν τῷ φανερῷ. By universal consent Aristotle is talking here about deaths, etc., on stage. But this, although accepted apparently without question by all the commentators, is subject to a variety of objections:

1. Deaths on stage are notoriously rare in Greek tragedy. The only cases in the extant plays are the suicide of Ajax—and it is not quite a clear case³⁹—and that of Evadne in the *Suppliants* of Euripides. Whether the reasons for the avoidance were religious, aesthetic, or technical⁴⁰ need not concern us, but only the acknowledged fact.

2. There can be no doubt that ἐν τῷ φανερῷ is to be taken equally with all the nouns.⁴¹ Accesses of pain on stage are not too uncommon (e.g., Philoctetes, Heracles in the *Trachiniae*, Orestes in the *Orestes*); but where are we to find a wounding ἐν τῷ φανερῷ? Wounds, like deaths, are *reported* in the Greek theater, not enacted before the public.

3. Aristotle cannot mean that an actual death or wounding on stage is required, since he allows the *pathos* to be only intended, not performed, 14. 53b18; in fact, as we have already seen, *the 'most beautiful' form of recognition is the one in which the pathos is threatened but averted*, as in the *Iphigenia*.

4. Conversely, the *pathos* may actually take place, but not in the play itself, as in the *Oedipus*.

5. If the *pathos* is dependent on stage representation it will not be available to the *reader*; and yet according to 14. 53b3-6 the plot should be so constructed that one will feel horror and pity on merely hearing the events related, ἀνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν. The burden of 53b13, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον, is similar.

We must conclude that "on stage" is not Aristotle's meaning. I suggest that ἐν τῷ φανερῷ means "in the visible realm," but simply as a generic characterization of the events in question, not as a requirement that they must be performed where an audience can see them. Aristotle is contrasting the *pathos* with peripety and recognition.

³⁹ Since it is generally assumed that although Ajax is in view of the audience during his last monologue (lines 815-865), when he plunges on his sword his body falls behind some shrubbery (ταῦτα, 892) which conceals it; see Lobeck on line 813, Wolff-Bellermann and Jebb on line 815. Timotheus of Zacynthus, who acquired such fame for his adeptness at miming the suicide that he was nicknamed ὁ σφαγεύς (*Schol. Al.* 864; there is a punning reference to the σφαγεύς, i.e., the sword, in line 815), is a later phenomenon.

⁴⁰ The most sensible discussion of the question is by Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.*⁴ 127-132.

⁴¹ So Rostagni, Sykutris.

For it is in the nature of peripety and recognition that they are invisible events, transactions which take place in the realm of the mind, though they may be accompanied by visible tokens. Death, pain, wounds, on the other hand, are physical facts in their own nature; they belong to the visible realm.⁴² But that does not mean that they have to appear as physical events in the course of a tragedy. What is required is that they be there as the postulated physical correlate of the moral or mental events which transpire as peripety and recognition.

The *pathos*, then, though 'visible' in its own nature, appears as a factor in the tragic plot only as the correlate⁴³ or point of reference of other events which are mental and spiritual. If this seems too abstract a formulation for Aristotle's theory of tragedy, I can only plead for a delay of judgment until we reach chapter 14, where it will become evident how attenuated the *pathos* can become (i.e., as a physical event), yet still serve as anchor and base-point for the plot-structure. The real function of the *pathos* is not to shock the audience by its physical occurrence. It is a *premise* on which the plot is built, and the best use of it is that in which it most recedes into the shape of a hypothesis from which other conclusions flow. We shall see that this paradox gives the clue to several passages in the next two chapters (13 and 14) which otherwise remain opaque.

⁴² I take *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ* to be at bottom a Platonic phrase; cf. *Rep.* 6. 508c, *ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ ... ἐν τῷ ὄρατῷ*; 509d, *τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὄρατοῦ*; 7. 532b; cf. *Phaedo* 80c; *Phaedr.* 247c, *τὸν ὑπερουράνιον τόπον*; *Soph.* 232c, *ὅσα φανερά γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα* (cf. just above, *περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὅσ' ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς*); (Pl.) *Epin.* 984d, *θεῶν τῶν φανερῶν*; 985d; and see the rest of the references in Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum*, s. v. *ὄρατός*. The point of the phrase is always the contrast between the visible 'place' and the invisible, 'intelligible' one. That Aristotle should use it in such a mundane connection does not seem to me to speak against this ancestry. In the *Rhetoric*, 2. 8. 1386a5 ff., he lists the kinds of event that are pitiable: *ὅσα τε* (a) *γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἔλλεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ* (b) *ὄσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν ... ἔστι δὲ* (a) *ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωματῶν καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, (b) ὧν δ' ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία, κτλ.* The first class (a) are *physical sufferings*, corresponding to the tragic *pathos*. — This, if correct, would be still another small indication of early date for the *Poetics*.

⁴³ The notion of the *pathos* as a correlate appears in Rostagni's explanation also, but he makes *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ* refer only to the stage presentation: "*ἐν τῷ φανερῷ*, 'sulla scena,' per far intendere che πάθος è nel μῦθος quella πράξις a cui sulla scena corrispondono o per cui sulla scena si manifestano le morti, le ferte, ecc."

CHAPTER 12

52b14-27

- 15 μέρη δε τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδεσι δεῖ χρῆσθαι | πρό-
 τερον εἶπομεν · [κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κε-
 χωρισμένα τάδε ἐστίν · πρόλογος ἐπεισόδιον ἐξοδος χορικόν ·
 καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον, κοινὰ μὲν
 ἀπάντων ταῦτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κομμοί.
 ἐστὶν δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὄλον τραγωδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ
 20 | παρόδου, ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὄλον τραγωδίας τὸ μεταξὺ
 ὄλων χορικῶν μελῶν, ἐξοδος δὲ μέρος ὄλον τραγωδίας
 μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶ χοροῦ μέλος. χορικοῦ δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἢ
 πρώτη λέξις ὄλου χοροῦ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χοροῦ τὸ ἀνευ
 ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου, κομμός δὲ θρηῆνος κοινὸς χοροῦ
 25 καὶ <τῶν> ἀπὸ | σκηνῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν
 <ὡς εἶδεσι> δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἶπαμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ
 ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.]

52b14

- The 'parts' of tragedy which should be used as con-
 15 stituent elements | have been stated earlier; [But so far as
 quantity is concerned, that is, the separate sections into
 which it is divided, they are as follows: prologue, episode,
exodos, choral part; and the latter is divided into *parodos*
 and *stasimon*, these being common to all plays, while actors'
 solos and songs involving actor and chorus (*kommoi*) are
 limited to some plays. 'Prologue' is a whole part of tragedy
 20 which comes before the entrance (*parodos*) | of the chorus,
 'episode' a whole part of tragedy which is between whole
 choral odes, and *exodos* a whole part of tragedy after which
 there is no song of the chorus. The divisions of the choral
 part: *parodos* is the first speech of the whole chorus, *stasimon*
 a song of the chorus, without anapaests or trochees, and
kommos a joint lamentation by the chorus and <those> on
 25 | stage. The parts of tragedy which should be used <as
 constituent elements> have been stated earlier, but so far
 as quantity is concerned, that is, the separate sections into
 which it is divided, they are these.]

As Gudeman says, chapter 12 is one of the few passages in the *Poetics* of which Ritter's athetesis has not been entirely abandoned by modern editors and commentators.¹ I believe that it is spurious, except for the first sentence, and that its spuriousness can be proved more decisively than it has been in the past.² In any case it should not require any long argument to show that the chapter is out of place here. This has been recognized even by many of those who have not been willing to athetize it.³ The passage breaks in on Aristotle's argument in the crudest way, and has done very serious damage by obscuring the close connection between chapters 11 and 13. We shall see that they join together without a seam. Hence, if Aristotle wrote chapter 12, either (1) it belongs somewhere else—but there is no other good place for it⁴—or (2) it is a loose note, tucked in here more or less at random.⁵

It is better not to rest the case on impressions of tone and style, especially in a work which has so little style, in the conventional sense, as the *Poetics*—though one may ask in passing how Montmollin can find these definitions of the 'quantitative' parts, with their mechanical

¹ The chapter was pronounced spurious by Ritter, Bernays, Bernhardt, Überweg, Susemihl, Gomperz (*Zu Ar. Poet.* 2. 9-12), Tucker, Butcher; accepted as genuine by Vahlen (*Poet.*²; in the *Beiträge* he explicitly avoids the question), Bywater, Margoliouth, Albergiani, Rostagni, Hardy, Gudeman, Cooper, Sykutris, and more recently E. M. Dale (*Eranos* 48 [1950] 14-20). Hermann, Bekker³, Christ, and Montmollin accept everything except the repetitive last sentence (*μέρη δὲ ... ἔστιν*) as genuine; Christ and Montmollin mark the rest as a subsequent addition by Aristotle. A brief scrutiny of the list will show that all the declarations of spuriousness belong to the 19th century and most of the acceptances to the 20th. This is hardly a coincidence. It is a manifestation of the trend toward textual conservatism in our century—a conservatism which is by no means limited to the *Poetics* or to Aristotle. Its cause is well known. Modern editors have reacted strongly against the interpolation, emendation, and transposition mania of the 19th century. On the whole the reaction has been a healthy one. In the *Poetics*, for example, it has swept away almost all of Susemihl's arbitrary transpositions as well as Ritter's omnipresent brackets. But sometimes it has swept the bad as well as the good back into our texts, as here.

² The case for athetesis is best put by Gomperz, *loc. cit.*

³ Most notably by Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 39 ('2. 98), in spite of his declining to pass on the question of spuriousness.

⁴ Vahlen, *loc. cit.*

⁵ As was said above, Montmollin (pp. 125-129) makes the chapter a later addition, except for the last sentence which he explains as a stupid repetition by the 'arranger' of the text (on this person see pp. 163-166). There is no theoretical objection to hypothesizing an addition even of this length—see above on 3. 48a24-b3 and below on chapter 16—if it were such that Aristotle could have written it.

but spurious symmetry⁶ and their deadly repetitiveness,⁷ thoroughly Aristotelian. Nor should we lay too much stress on the fact that anapaests and trochees do appear in stasima in classical tragedy,⁸ or that the writer (judging from the form of his antithesis) thought that trochees *were* used in the parodos,⁹ which they were not. What counts is the rationale of the passage as a whole and its over-all view of the 'quantitative' structure of tragedy, as compared with Aristotle's.

The first sentence, or, as it is usually printed, the first clause of the first sentence, is certainly genuine.¹⁰ *Μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδει δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἶπομεν* clearly refers to 6. 50a12-13, *τούτοις μὲν οὖν [οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν] κέχρηται τοῖς εἶδειν.*¹¹ We saw that an interpolator had been at work in that passage, and that his note was predicated on the mistaken idea that Aristotle was talking about the practice of the poets, whereas he was actually talking about the 'parts' necessarily implied by the idea of tragedy. The allusion here shows no trace of that fallacy but refers to the six 'parts' correctly enough as 'constitutive elements' which the poet *should use* in his process of composition. The sentence follows hard upon the heels of the definition of the three 'parts of the plot' in chapter 11, and is followed immediately in turn by the first sentence of chapter 13 (*ὧν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι κτλ.*), which introduces the discussion of how the (complex) plot is to be managed in order to secure the desired effects of pity and fear. Chapter 11 was definitive, chapter 13 is prescriptive; and Aristotle introduces these prescriptions, which have to do with the plot, by recalling the over-all list of 'parts' (including plot) which were prescribed for the poet's use. Thus *οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδει*

* See below. On the style and tone of the chapter in general I cannot resist quoting Gomperz, *op. cit.* 11: "das zwölfte Capitel macht ... inmitten der Poetik den Eindruck, den eine Polizeiverordnung inmitten eines rechtsphilosophischen Werkes hervorbringen würde. Überall sonst der schärfste Sinn für das Wesentliche, alle Forderungen aus der Sache selbst heraus begründet, mit weitherzigem Sinn, fern von aller Kleinlichkeit ...; hier im besten Falle die dürre Aufzählung des eben zur Stunde Üblichen und Giltigen."

⁷ *Μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας* repeated three times, without real necessity, b19, 20, 21.

⁸ See Ritter *ad loc.* Gudeman's defense is very lame.

⁹ See Bywater *ad loc.*

¹⁰ The feeble repetition of it at the end of the chapter is stamped as spurious by the late form *εἶπαμεν*; perhaps also by the omission of *ὡς εἶδει*, although after some hesitation I have restored these words to the text.

¹¹ See Gomperz, *op. cit.* 10.

δεῖ χρῆσθαι κτλ. is balanced by ὧν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι κτλ.: over-all structure by specific function. The two clauses are parts of a single sentence.

Not only does the rest of chapter 12 take no notice of this connection; it begins with a sentence which destroys it. The subject of κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν κτλ. must clearly be μέρη, but the statement is incompatible with the other one. We saw in chapter 6 that the six 'parts' are not parts of a *tragedy*, but of 'tragedy,' i.e., the art or idea of tragedy; whereas the only thing that can be "divided into separate parts" is a tragedy.¹² The writer of the sentence has confused abstract with concrete. Moreover the basis of his theory—if we can call it that—of the 'quantitative parts' is a misunderstanding of an earlier remark of Aristotle's, 6. 49b25, χωρὶς ἐκάστω τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. Aristotle meant by that, as he himself explained, that some parts of the play (the dialogue) were carried on through μέτρα and others (the odes) through μέλος. Instead of his organic division between the two species of 'sweetened language'—i.e., speech and song, defined by the absence and presence of melody—we find here a purely mechanical division based on no principle and carried through in the crudest possible manner. Of the four 'parts,' the first three (prologue, 'episode,' *exodos*) are obviously thought of as *scenes*, "separated" from each other by the choral elements (*parodos*, *stasima*, perhaps also *threnoi* and *kommoi*). The distinction among them is simply their position in the play: prologue at the beginning, *exodos* at the end, 'episodes' in between. Thus the list presents the absurdity of a genus (*χορικόν*) set down side by side¹³ with three instances—they are not species—of another genus which is not even named.¹⁴

It would be useless to complain of further ineptitudes, such as the classification of the actors' arias (τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνηῆς) under the *chorikon*.

The root of the matter, aside from the stupidity of the author, is that he no longer has any conception of the difference, in the drama, between speech and song. For him the dialogue and the sung parts are both

¹² The subject of διαίρεται is of course τραγωδία understood.

¹³ The asyndetic form of listing is un-Aristotelian in itself.

¹⁴ It is hard to say what name the writer could have given to it. Not λέξεις (which he might have drawn from the *Poetics*), because he has no precise idea of λέξεις. Thus he cheerfully describes the *parodos* as "the first λέξεις [= 'utterance'] of the whole chorus," implying that its later 'utterances' (i.e., the *stasima*) could be designated in the same way.

simply pieces of text, partly distinguished by metrical differences—which, however, he does not understand.

It is significant that we find close parallels between this farrago and certain passages in the *Tractatus Coislinianus* and Tzetzes' verse treatise *Περὶ τραγικῆς ποιήσεως*.¹⁵ In all three places what we have is, undoubtedly, a reflection of late-antique or Byzantine grammatical knowledge. To ascertain the affiliation between them would be of first-rate importance not only for determining the date and provenience of chapter 12, but also for establishing the history of the *Poetics* text in late antiquity. Unfortunately the task cannot be attempted here. One thing, however, is evident: the relation between our chapter 12 on the one hand and the *Tractatus* and Tzetzes on the other is not necessarily that the latter depend upon the former.¹⁶

For our purpose here, the chief value of our findings in chapter 12 is that they establish another link in the chain of evidence that the *Poetics* text was interpolated, in Byzantine times or late antiquity if not before. If an intrusion as extensive as this could make its way into the text, then the text was 'unguarded' during at least one period in its history. Naturally each case of alleged interpolation has to be argued on its merits. But the discovery of a major example may serve to guard us against a general charge of irresponsibility for claiming the existence of minor ones.¹⁷

¹⁵ Both in Kalbel, *CGF*, pp. 43-53. Cf. *Tract. Coisl.* 9, *μέρη τῆς κωμῳδίας τέσσαρα, πρόλογος χορικῶν ἐπεισῶδιον ἔξοδος*; Tzetzes, *op. cit.* 51-52, *ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ στάσιμον χοροῦ φασὶ μέρος ἄνευ ἀναπαύστου καὶ τροχαίου τῶν μέτρων*.

¹⁶ As Gudeman by implication urges.

¹⁷ It is probable that a study of the kind suggested above would throw light on the motives and competence—perhaps even the identity—of the authors of other notes, as well as their dates.

CHAPTER 13

52b28-53a7

- ὧν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνιστάοντας
 30 τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔρ|γον,
 ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἶη λεκτέον τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένους. ἐπειδὴ οὖν δεῖ
 τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγωδίας μὴ ἀπλῆν ἀλλὰ
 πεπλεγμένην, καὶ ταύτην φοβερῶν καὶ ἔλεινῶν εἶναι μι-
 μητικήν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεώς ἐστιν),
 35 πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μετα-|
 βάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, οὐ γὰρ
 φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἔλεινόν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μιαιρὸν ἐστίν, οὔτε τοὺς
 μοχθηροὺς ἐξ ἀτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίαν, ἀτραγωδέστατον γὰρ
 38 | a1 τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δεῖ, οὔτε γὰρ φιλάν-
 θρωπον | οὔτε ἔλεινόν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἐστίν· οὐδ' αὖ τὸν
 σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν·
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχει ἂν ἢ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ'
 οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον, ὃ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν
 5 δυστυχοῦντα, ὃ δὲ | περὶ τὸν ὁμοιον [ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν
 ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὁμοιον], ὥστε οὔτε ἔλεινόν
 οὔτε φοβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμβαῖνον.

52b28

- and the next thing to be said after these remarks is what
 the poet should aim at and what he should try to avoid in
 30 constructing his plot, and whence the proper | effect of tra-
 gedy will come. Since, then, the structure of the artistically
 finest tragedy should not be simple but complex, and since
 moreover it should be an imitation of fearful and pitiable
 happenings (for that is the special trait of this variety of
 imitation), it is clear that (1) neither should virtuous men
 35 | be shown shifting from good fortune to bad, for this is
 not fearful, and not pitiable either, but morally shocking; nor
 wicked men from bad fortune to good: for this is the most
 untragic structure of all, it has none of the required char-
 38 | 53a1 acteristics, appealing neither to ordinary sympathy | nor to
 pity nor to fear; nor on the other hand (2) should the thor-
 oughly wicked man shift from good fortune to bad, for such

a construction will arouse sympathy but neither pity nor fear, since the one has to do with the man who is unhappy without deserving it and the other | with the man who is like the rest of us [pity with the undeserving man and fear with the one like us], so that the outcome will be neither pathetic nor fearful.

The argument which was interrupted by chapter 12 continues without a break. Chapter 13, or the first part of it, is often described as dealing with the tragic hero; but it does so only in so far as the character of the hero is related to the best functioning of the plot. 'Character' as such remains for treatment later. Actually the present chapter, and the next, are integral parts of the discussion of the complex plot which began at 9. 52a1.¹ This close connection is indicated by the opening words, ἐφεξῆς ἂν λεκτέον τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις. That νῦν² here refers specifically to the argument since that point is evident from the next sentence, whose protasis (ἐπειδὴ οὗτος... μμητικήν, b30-33) is a direct summary of 52a1-11; and that passage in turn gave the keynote for all of chapters 10 and 11.³

¹ To Montmollin's "demonstration" (pp. 151-152) that the whole of chapter 13 except the first sentence is an 'addition tardive' I can only say that our detailed analysis will not bear it out, except for the parentheses 53a17-22 (σημείον δὲ ... ποιῆσαι) and a23-30 (διό και ... φαίνεται). The fact that a concept (τὸ φιλόπρωρον) is used without having been formally introduced, or a term used in a different and apparently discrepant sense (ἀπλοῦς μῦθος), is not sufficient ground for marking the passage 'late.'

² Gudeman's athetesis of the word (see Krit. Anhang, p. 465) betrays a lack of understanding of Aristotle's argument which is set in still higher relief by his *Inhaltsverzeichnis*, p. vii. He has tried (cf. *Introductio*, pp. 6-8) to force upon the *Poetics* the Hellenistic Isagogic 'Dispositionsschema' which Norden, Immsch, Barwick and others have correctly recognized in the *Ars Poetica* of Horace (see Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio*, Turin, 1930, *Introductio* LXVIII-LXXXIII [*De partitione poetica*]), so that the work falls into three sections: (1) ἡ ποίησις, cc. 1-5; (2) τὸ ποίημα <τὸ?> τραγικόν, cc. 6-12; (3) ὁ ποιητής, cc. 13-25. On the violence which this does to the nexus of Aristotle's argument see Rostagni's review, *Gnomon* 11 (1935) 232; but it is also evident from the fact that it forces Gudeman to put a major break just here, where Aristotle himself indicates the most intimate connection.—The Arabic rendering "quod antea dictum est," on which Gudeman bases his athetesis of νῦν, is too frail a reed to lean on in a case like this.

³ One has to keep reminding oneself that 9. 52a1 does not lie so far back as it looks, since 10 and 11 are both short chapters and 12 was not there when Aristotle wrote.

It is true, however, that with chapter 13 we return to general considerations of how the *μεταβολή* of the complex plot should run, leaving to chapter 14 the question how it should be framed in detail (the kind of *pathos* to be used, and the placing of the recognition). Our problem here is to determine the best over-all type of plot-movement in view of the dual requirements of (a) complex plot-structure and b) fearful and pathetic content (the "imitation of fearful and pitiable happenings"). I say "over-all type" because pity and fear are not considered here, as they are in chapter 14, from the point of view of the constituent events but from that of the tragic action as a whole. Thus Aristotle's development has a clear logic. He begins with the justification of complex plots as "more beautiful" (9. 52a10) because they arouse the tragic emotions more effectively; then (c. 10) defines the complex plot⁴ as one operated by means of peripety and/or recognition; then (c. 11) defines these elements in turn, adding the third necessary ingredient, the *pathos*; then (c. 13) considers how the (complex) plot as a whole may best serve its function; and finally (c. 14) how its 'parts' can best be arranged in relation to each other for the same purpose. It is to be noticed that throughout the entire sequence the *μίμησις φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν* remains the controlling concept, to which all purely technical (i.e., structural) considerations remain subordinate. The point of view Aristotle develops in these chapters is 'structuralist,' we might say, but structure is always subservient to function.

The subject, then, is still the complex plot. But no one can assess a plot for its emotional 'charge' without taking into account the persons (i.e., practically speaking, the person) whose 'action' the plot is. Pity and fear will be aroused only if a certain kind of change takes place in the situation of a certain kind of person;⁵ and, we must add, they will be aroused to their fullest extent only if the change is brought about in a certain way, namely through the best use of peripety and/or recognition. Without a change of situation there is no emotional effect; without the appropriate kind of human being to suffer the

⁴ The definition of the simple plot was given there, as we indicated, purely for symmetry.

⁵ *Rhet.* 2. 1. 1378a23, *δεῖ δὲ διαφεῖν περὶ ἑκάστων (sc. τῶν παθῶν) εἰς τρία· λέγω δ' ὅσον περὶ ὀργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἢ τὰ δύο ἔχομεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μὴ, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.*

change, no proper emotional effect; without the special structures of the complex plot, not the highest potency of emotional effect. Situation, person, and structure of change condition each other reciprocally.

It is worth noticing again (as we did at the beginning of chapter 9, when the talk came round to universals and the 'philosophical' status of poetry) that none of this is based on metaphysical argument. It is not a matter of the Good, or of the relation between Truth and Appearance, but simply of the way our emotions work. Aristotle's theory, as befits one which belongs to the 'practical' sphere, is purely pragmatic and psychological.

The analysis of the possible types of *μεταβολή* (really types of outcome) in 52b34-53a7 is carried out in terms of (1) two types of men, a) good and (b) bad, and (2) two types of outcome, (a) happiness → unhappiness and (b) unhappiness → happiness.⁶ We will designate the four possible modes as follows:

- A. (1a - 2a) Good man → unhappiness
- B. (1a - 2b) Good man → happiness
- C. (1b - 2a) Bad man → unhappiness
- D. (1b - 2b) Bad man → happiness

But Aristotle does not list the modes in this (apparently) systematic order. Instead of A-B-C-D or A-C-B-D or the like, he deals with them in the order A-D-C, and B is passed over altogether.⁷ The reason lies not in abstract principles of symmetry, or the lack of them, but in the concrete nature of the situation involved⁸ in B. It is so obvious that such an outcome is untragic, i.e., that it does not arouse pity or fear, that Aristotle does not bother to mention it. Likewise A and D are taken before C because they stand relatively farther from the desired effect,⁹ while C (again by reason of the concrete situation it involves) points forward to the final solution, which is none of the four.

Mode A, says Aristotle, is unsuitable because it is "not fearful, and not pathetic either,"¹⁰ but 'filthy,' i.e., morally revolting, disgusting.

⁶ We find exactly the same kind of *schema* in 14. 53b36: the person may (1a) act or (1b) not act (2a) knowingly or (2b) unknowingly. These systems betray their origin in Platonic *diacreses*.

⁷ Similar phenomenon at 14. 53b27-36; see below *ad loc.*

⁸ No doubt Aristotle begins with A because it is natural to mention the good man first; then he passes to the less desirable of the two outcomes involving the bad man.

⁹ *ὀψδέ*, not merely *οὔτε*, because it does not automatically follow that such

Μιαρόν in itself of course signifies 'unclean,' polluted. The word denotes a state which can be the result of any number of causes, but applies above all to the pollution of blood-guilt. Certainly it was not originally applied to situations like the one here, where no real pollution is involved but only an affront to our moral sensibility.¹⁰ It is outrageous that a thoroughly good man should fall from happiness into unhappiness, and the feeling of outrage is likely to get the better of our pity for the victim. Such a feeling is irredeemably painful, because we are impelled to 'do something about it' but cannot: the play sets up a group of conditions which arouse our moral indignation but at the same time frustrate it.

D (bad man → happiness) is the worst pattern, the least tragic of all,¹¹ says Aristotle. It has none of the qualities it should have: it is neither *φιλόθροπον* nor pathetic nor fearful. What is the *φιλόθροπον*?¹² There are two main lines of interpretation, one going back to Lessing, the other to Twining: *τὸ φιλόθροπον* means either (a) a general feeling of sympathy with our fellow-men, or (b) the sense of justice which makes us grieve at the downfall of the good and the prosperity of the wicked.¹³ Either meaning would seem to fit the

an outcome would not be pitiable. In looser language one might speak of pitying a good man who has fallen into misfortune: *Rhet.* 2. 8. 1385b34, *κἄν οἴωνται τινος εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν* (sc. *ἐλεοῦσιν*); cf. *ibid.* 1386b4. But this is not irreconcilable with Aristotle's solution, since the sufferer whom we pity (53a7 ff.) is still a good man, though not a perfect one.

¹⁰ The implications of *μιαρόν* will be explored in detail in connection with 14. 53b39, where its original meaning of 'pollution,' and its connection with the whole complex of ideas about uncleanness and purification, are much more evident.

¹¹ *Ἀτραγωδέστατον* (only here in Aristotle) is an interesting word. The converse is *τραγικώταται* (below, 227); but *ἀτραγικώτατον* would contravene the principles of word-formation. Cf. the pairs *τεχνικός, ἄτεχνος*; *γραμματικός, ἀγράμματος*; *μουσικός, ἄμουσος*; *στρατηγικός, ἀστρατήγητος*.

¹² For the concept and its development see S. Lorenz, *De progressu vocis φιλοθροπίας* (diss.), Leipzig, 1914; U. Galli, *Atene e Roma*, N. S. 12 (1931) 243-253; S. Tromp de Ruiter, *Mnemos.*, N. S. 59 (1932) 271-306; Rostagni, "Aristotele e aristotelismo," etc., *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 2 (1922) 9-20; G. Glotz, *La soldardie de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, Paris, 1904, 423-424; R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien (Zetemata, Heft 8)*, Munich, 1954, 53-54; W. Schadowaldt, *Hermes* 83 (1955) 135-136, esp. 136 n. 1; M. Pohlenz, *ibid.* 84 (1956) 58-59. Bignami, 266-269 (append. 2), gives a handy though brief survey of the conflict of opinions over the meaning of the word in the *Poetles*.

¹³ Rostagni's attempt, *loc. cit.*, to combine these views and make *τὸ φιλόθροπον* = catharsis (cf. note on 52b37, p. 70: "esso è la catarsi o l'esito morale di questi

present clause and the one just below, 53a3;¹⁴ for in these cases τὸ φιλόανθρωπον is said to be aroused and satisfied by the downfall of a villain but not by his prospering. But there are a number of reasons for preferring the first interpretation to the second:

1. Mode D is said to be neither 'philanthropic' nor pitiable nor fearful. Aristotle writes as if τὸ φιλόανθρωπον had been mentioned before, whereas it has not. Our inference must be that it has been *implied* before, even though not mentioned; and the implication must have been in connection with mode A, the downfall of the good man. Moreover οὔτε φιλόανθρωπον implies that this preceding mode *was* φιλόανθρωπον. But in that case τὸ φιλόανθρωπον cannot be a sense of justice, for the sense of justice is outraged by the fall of a good man (it was *μιαρόν*).¹⁵

2. Again, the φιλόανθρωπον is aroused, or satisfied, by the fall of a bad man, a3. But if this mode (C) and A both satisfy the φιλόανθρωπον, it cannot be by virtue of any calculus as to the rights and wrongs of the case, but only of the fact that *a human being has suffered misfortune*, that being the only feature that A and C have in common.

3. Within its own clause, in a2-5, τὸ φιλόανθρωπον is contrasted with pity and fear, which are defined as having to do with τὸν ἀνάξιον δυστυχοῦντα and τὸν ὁμοιον (*sc.* δυστυχοῦντα) respectively. Again we can read the implication: pity and fear are directed towards *certain kinds of men* who suffer misfortune, τὸ φιλόανθρωπον is directed towards *any man* who suffers misfortune, just as such.¹⁶

4. The usage of φιλόανθρωπος in Aristotle's other works, though sparse, points in the same direction. Thus the φιλόανθρωποι in *E. N.*

sentiment! [*sc.* pity and fear]: quasi il clima morale in cui questi sentimenti debbono determinarsi!") in the sense of a reduction of the tragic emotions to due measure and proportion, seems to me thoroughly unsatisfactory, not because it is a moralizing interpretation (see Galli, *op. cit.*) but because it is based on later testimony (Cicero, Augustine, a papyrus of philosophical content; see Rostagni, *Introd.* I.II n. 1) rather than on analysis of the use of the word by Aristotle himself.

¹⁴ I leave the third occurrence of the word in the *Poetics*, 18. 56a21, τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλόανθρωπον, out of account because I am convinced (and not simply because the use of φιλόανθρωπον will not fit my interpretation here) that the remark is spurious. See below *ad loc.*

¹⁵ Hence φιλόανθρωπον cannot be the converse of *μιαρόν*, as Galli and Sykutris make it.

¹⁶ *Περὶ τὸν δυστυχοῦντα ἀπλῶς* (without further qualification), as Aristotle might say.

8. 1. 1155a20 are very close to what even we call 'philanthropists'; the constitution of Plato's *Republic* is characterized, *Pol.* 2. 5. 1263b15, as apparently 'philanthropic' because it seems to assure a high degree of harmony and brotherly love between the citizens. In neither case is the 'philanthropy,' real or apparent, equivalent to our sense of justice; and certainly the 'man-loving' animals of *De Hist. An.* 9. 26. 617b26; 44. 630a9 do not dispense their love on the basis of our deserts.

5. This is also the sense of the word wherever we meet it elsewhere in the fourth century. Thus Xenophon's Agesilaus used to subdue cities that were unconquerable by force through his *φιλανθρωπία*, that is, through kindness;¹⁷ Isocrates¹⁸ urges Philip to win eternal glory by treating the Greeks with *φιλανθρωπία* and *εὐνοία* (*πραότης*); and Demosthenes calls upon the Athenians to admire the *φιλανθρωπία* of a law which does not permit even slaves to be mistreated.¹⁹

¶ All the indices, then, seem to point to the same conclusion: that *τὸ φιλόπρωπον* means a relatively generalized and indiscriminate fellow-feeling for humanity. As such it would be distinguished from pity (with which it would appear to have a closer connection than with fear) by lacking any element of *judgment*: it is extended to all, even the wicked, without such restrictions. On the other hand it would have in common with pity that both are extended to *suffering* (hence mode D does not involve *τὸ φιλόπρωπον*). We can perhaps define it, therefore, as a diffuse disposition to sympathize with others, which when refined by judgment can become real pity.²⁰

Thus C, the downfall of the villain, is 'philanthropic' but neither pitiable nor fearful; for pity, says Aristotle, has to do with the man who suffers undeservedly, fear with the one who suffers and is 'like us.'²¹ We have already emphasized that the tragic hero as such is

¹⁷ *Ages.* 1. 22.

¹⁸ *Phil.* 114, 116. Isocrates is especially valuable as evidence for the use of the word in the fourth century by ordinary, unphilosophical citizens. See *Ad Nic.* 15; *Paneg.* 29; *Evoag.* 43; *Antid.* 132, 133, 276; *Epist.* 4. 9; 5. 2; 7. 6 and 12.

¹⁹ In *Meid.* 48. Tromp de Ruiter, *op. cit.* 277-288, gives a number of other examples from the fourth century, including those (in the orators) in which *φιλόπρωπος* means simply 'public-spirited,' 'patriotic,' sometimes almost equivalent to our tags 'democratic' or 'liberal.'

²⁰ That is, it is the *δύναμις* underlying the *πάθος*; see *E. N.* 2. 4. 1105b19-25. On *τὸ φιλόπρωπον* as the general disposition precedent to pity—and fear—see Gall, *op. cit.*

²¹ With Ritter, Susemihl, and Gudeman I bracket *ἔλεος μὲν ... τὸν ὁμοιον*,

not the subject here, but the right organization of the tragic plot for the production of pity and fear at their highest possible level of intensity. But a moral specification of the hero is indispensable, because—so Aristotle implies—we will withhold our pity and fear unless we judge him to be worthy of them. The tragic pity and fear, then, are not mere indiscriminate feeling, like the *φιλόανθρωπον*. On the other hand they are not mere judgments, for judgment *per se* connotes psychic distance between the judge and the judged, whereas in this case the two emotions depend basically on the *φιλόανθρωπον*, which means *self-identification* of the judge with the judged.

With this is connected the often-debated question whether the tragic pity and fear are identical with the pity and fear which are analyzed in the *Rhetoric*, 2. 5 (fear) and 8 (pity).²³ Certainly those emotions, as Aristotle presents them, are intimately dependent on calculation²³ and are, although in different degrees, self-regarding.²⁴ But this calls for consideration. On the one hand Aristotle emphasizes the close affinity between pity and fear: we pity that in the case of

which is too flat a repetition to be imputed to Aristotle (see, however, Montmolin 151).

²³ A survey of the literature on the Aristotelian concepts of pity and fear would include a good part of all that has been written on the *Poetics*. Generally they have come up for discussion in connection with the catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy in chapter 6. Aside from works cited there, and the commentaries on that passage and the present one, the most important discussions are perhaps A. Döring, *Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles*, Jena, 1876, esp. 306-318; K. Tumlirz, *Die tragischen Affekte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles* (Programm), Vienna, 1885; F. Knoke, *Begriff der Tragödie nach Aristoteles*, Berlin, 1903; A. W. Benn, "Aristotle's Theory of Tragic Emotion," *Mind* 23 (1914) 84-90; M. T. Herrick, "Aristotle's Pity and Fear," *Philol. Quart.* 9 (1930) 141-152; W. Schadewaldt, *op. cit.* (above, n. 12); H. Flashar, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 12-48; M. Pohlenz, *ibid.* 49-74.

²⁴ It is hardly necessary to cite chapter and verse for an idea which so pervades both passages, but *Rhet.* 2. 5. 1382a32 will do as well as any for fear: *τοιαῦτα* (sc. φοβερὰ ἐστίν) *δὲ* *ἐχθρα* *τε* *καὶ* *ὀργή* *δυναμένων* *ποιεῖν* *τι* · *δῆλον* *γὰρ* *ὅτι* *βούλονται*, *ὥστε* *ἐγγύς* *εἰσιν* *τοῦ* *ποιεῖν*; and *ibid.* 8. 1385b16 for pity: *ἀνάγκη* *γὰρ* *τὸν* *μέλλοντα* *ἐλεήσειν* *ὑπάρχειν* *τοιοῦτον* *ὅλον* *οἷεσθαί* *παθεῖν* *ἂν* *τι* *κακὸν* *ἢ* *αὐτὸν* *ἢ* *τῶν* *αὐτοῦ* *τινα*; *ibid.* 27: *καὶ* *οἱ* *πεπαιδευμένοι* (sc. *ἐλεημόνες* *εἰσιν*) · *εὐλόγιστοι* *γάρ* *ε*.

²⁴ This is implicit in the definition of fear (2. 5. *init.*) as the pain or mental disturbance attendant on our anticipation of an imminent evil, i.e., an evil threatening ourselves, and is specially emphasized in that of pity (2. 8. *init.*) as pain suffered at the contemplation of an evil *δὲ* *κἂν* *αὐτὸς* *προσδοκῆσειεν* *ἂν* *παθεῖν* *ἢ* *τῶν* *αὐτοῦ* *τινα*.

others which we fear in our own.²⁵ And he emphasizes that in both cases the emotion is aroused by things close at hand (*ἐγγύς*).²⁶ Yet he also explicitly says that fear is distinct from pity, in fact often hostile to it;²⁷ and it is clear in any case that the two emotions differ—in real life—in the psychic distance they imply. We fear that which is about to happen or seems likely to happen to ourselves; we feel pity at that which has happened or is about to happen to others and *might* happen to us.

The drama, by separating its characters from "us," necessarily alters the relation between the two feelings; and the alteration is primarily in the status of fear, rather than in that of pity. Tragic pity is still for another (with an ulterior reference to ourselves), as in real life. Tragic fear, on the other hand, cannot be directly or overtly for ourselves; it necessarily applies to the hero. But we are not in any direct sense afraid of Oedipus. Does it follow that we fear *for* him? Certainly we do, in a sense, when he is about to discover his grisly secret; and still more clearly, in the *Iphigenia*, we fear for Orestes until he is saved by the recognition. Tragic fear, like tragic pity, is based on the broader feeling of community with the hero which also underlay τὸ φιλόανθρωπον: he is "like us," one of us. Thus pity and fear are more closely affiliated in tragedy than in real life;²⁸ and in fact Aristotle, although envisaging the possibility of their separation,²⁹ normally and habitually mentions them together in the *Poetics*.

Actually we cannot completely assess Aristotle's concept of tragic fear until we have surveyed chapter 14. The *Rhetoric*³⁰ teaches us that three things are required to define an emotion: what kind of psychological state it is, what kinds of people it is directed at, and in what kind of situation (*ἐπὶ ποίοις*) it is felt. The present passage tells us something about the second of these requisites but the analysis of the third is reserved until 14. 53b14 ff. (*ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν συμπιπτόντων λάβωμεν*). Meanwhile we may reemphasize what does appear clearly from our passage: that the tragic

²⁵ *Rhet.* 2. 5. 1382b26; 8. 1386a28.

²⁶ *Rhet.* 2. 5. 1382a24-27; 8. 1386a18-25.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 22, τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου, καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον.

²⁸ For example tragic fear will not tend to "knock out" pity, as real fear does (*loc. cit.*); on the contrary, it reinforces it.

²⁹ See above on 11. 52a38.

³⁰ See 2. 1. 1378a23-25.

fear, like tragic pity, comports an element of judgment. We vouchsafe 'philanthropic' feeling even to the unhappy villain, but deny him fear as well as pity. The reason must be that we judge him not to be *δμοιος*: not that he is not human, but that he is not 'like (us),' a normal and representative human being, so that his misfortunes are not likely to befall us.²¹

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἐστὶν δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν δμοιον is often read as if the ἀνάξιος and the δμοιος were different people. This is absurd in itself, and the description of the ideal tragic hero just below (b7 ff.) refutes it. He is 'like us' in being neither saint (μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη) nor villain (μήτε διὰ κακίαν κτλ.), and he is undeserving of his misfortune (μήτε διὰ κακίαν ... μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν). Τὸν ἀνάξιον (δυστυχοῦντα) and τὸν δμοιον (δυστυχοῦντα) are different but interrelated attributes of the same sufferer.²² Pity attaches to him in so far as he does not deserve his suffering; fear and also pity attach to him in so far as he is 'like us.' Of the two predicates, the fundamental one is *δμοιος*; for our judgment that he is like us, i.e., not a villain (nor a saint), is the ground for our further judgment that he does not deserve his suffering and so is eligible for our pity.²³

²¹ A good deal of ink has been spilled over the "contradiction" between ὁ δὲ (φόβος) περὶ τὸν δμοιον and *Rhet.* 2. 8. 1386a25, καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσιν κατὰ ἡλικίαν, κατὰ ἡθῆ, κατὰ ἔξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη. The point of that passage is that we pity those with whom we have some special connection or affiliation, provided they are not too close to us; cf. a18, ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τε γνωρίμους, ἂν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγύς ᾧσιν οἰκειότητι· περὶ δὲ τούτους ᾧσπερ περὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν. The whole sentiment of pity—although Aristotle does not bother to say so in the *Rhetoric*—is based on a sense of kinship with the person who suffers: in short, on the *φιλόφρων*; see *E. N.* 8. 1. 1155a18-21, φάσει τ' ἐνπαρχειν ἔοικε (sc. ἡ φιλία) πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι ... καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνεῖσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλοφρόνους ἐπαينوῦμεν.

²² The apparent hypostatization of a trait into a person, for purposes of discussion, is thoroughly Greek, but no doubt Aristotle got it from Plato particularly. See for example *Soph.* 267e-268c: τὸν δοξομιμητήν, τὸν εἰρωνικὸν μιμητήν, τὸν δημολογικόν, etc., where the 'persons' are actually elements in the forthcoming definition of the sophist. For a striking example from Aristotle himself see the passage cited in our next section, *E. N.* 3. 2. 1110b22, τὸ ἔθ' δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελούμενός, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκόν, where τοῦ and ὁ, if taken literally as denoting persons, make nonsense.

²³ On *δμοιος* see further below on 15. 54a24, b10.

One of the chief counts in Plato's indictment against the poets was that they misrepresent the truth by alleging that good men can be unhappy and bad men can be happy.⁸⁴ Plato himself knew, with a certainty which admitted of no doubt (it was a cardinal point of faith he had inherited from Socrates), that "nothing evil can befall the good man, in this life or after his death."⁸⁵ The other chief count was that the poets feed and nourish the irrational in man by making him indulge his emotions, especially fear and pity.⁸⁶ Aristotle's theory of the tragic emotions is shaped to meet both these objections. If we survey the list of the four possible modes of the tragic *μεταβολή*, we find that those to which Plato most objected are ruled out immediately—not for metaphysical reasons, however, but simply because they are not really tragic, they do not arouse the tragic emotions. Thus the first part of Plato's case is implicitly set aside. It is taken care of by the mechanism of the emotions themselves, without recourse to metaphysics or theology.

How can Aristotle do this? By appealing to the psychological facts. We do not in fact feel pity or fear, but repugnance, when a good man falls into suffering and misfortune, or when a villain prospers. Thus, Aristotle implies, the unaided moral sense of the ordinary man performs the duties of censorship which Plato had laid upon the philosopher. We do not need to be saved from immoral stories by decree or revelation, because our own consciousness screens the reversals of fortune presented by the drama and accords pity and fear to some but denies them to others. For—and this is the nub of the whole matter—the emotions are not merely irrational, as Plato had made them out

⁸⁴ *Rep.* 3. 392a-b. Cf. the similar objection, 2. 378a-380c, that they misrepresent the nature of divinity by alleging that the gods can be evil and the cause of evil. This too conflicts with a fundamental postulate, that the divine, whatever it is, can only be good.

⁸⁵ *Apol.* 41d. The fundamentality of this principle for Plato's critique of the poets is obscured by accidental factors. He gets to it at *Rep.* 3. 392a-b, but passes over it as something to be returned to later, "after we have seen what justice and injustice really are." But then, after the true nature of justice has been established (viz. that it alone can make a man happy), he resumes the attack on the poets in book 10 from another angle of approach, that they are bad imitators. The true warrant for this sweeping assertion (hardly revealed in book 10) is that they show good men unhappy and bad men happy: cf. *Rep.* 2. 377e and see *Laws* 2. 660e, 662b. Men who are capable of such a picture of the world do not know the truth about it.

⁸⁶ *Rep.* 10. 603b-606d.

to be, they also have their rational side or at least are amenable to reason.²⁷

Clearly this amounts to a defense of the emotional side of the drama, but not in the sense that its emotional effects can be made acceptable to reason afterwards, by some ulterior means. Rather they are brought before the bar of reason to begin with, by the spectator himself, and his emotional commitment is given or withheld in accordance with its judgment. Specifically, two interlocking or interdependent judgments are involved, (1) that the hero is 'like' ourselves, (2) that he does not deserve his misfortune. If the judgment runs to the contrary on either count, this again is not a metaphysical critique but a 'constatation,' as the French would say (German 'Feststellung'), of a fault in the construction of the play; for the poet is above all a builder and his job is to construct his plot so that the two judgments will run straight and the flow of emotion will issue unimpeded.

However, the modes which Plato would have approved, the success of the good man (B) and the discomfiture of the wicked (C), are also ruled out, C explicitly, B by tacit exclusion. The reason, though superficially it might appear to be different, is basically the same as before. *Aristotle can accept the tragic emotions, especially pity, because he considers them to be affiliated with reason.* Hence, unlike Plato, he can accept the arousing of pity as a legitimate aim, in fact the aim, of tragedy; and neither of the modes which Plato implicitly favored is productive of pity.

So far we have said nothing about catharsis, although it must have something to do with this complex of ideas. The reason is that there is nothing quite concrete enough here to serve as basis for an explanation. In 14. 53b39 and 54a3 we shall find what we need, and the discussion there will draw upon the present passage also.

53a7-22

ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη, μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχ-

²⁷ *Eth. Eud.* 2. 1. 1219b28-36, 1220a10; *E. N.* 1. 13. 1102a26 ff., esp. b13-18, 28-31: φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διεικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φητικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινοῦ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ἄλλως ὁρεκτικὸν μετέχει πῶς, ἢ κατήκοον ἔστιν καὶ πειθαρχικόν. This theory had been expounded in a published work: *ibid.* a26. It is, of course, Aristotle's revision of the tripartite psychology of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*. See below on 14. 53b37-54a9.

- 10 θηρίαν μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν
 | τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία, οἷον Οἰδίπουν
 καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες.
 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον ἀπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον
 ἢ διπλοῦν ὡσπερ τινές φασι, καὶ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐ-
 15 | τυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον | ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς
 δυστυχίαν, μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην
 ἢ οἷον εἴρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χειρόνος. (σημεῖον
 δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς
 20 αἱ κάλλισται τραγωδίαι συντίθενται, οἷον | περὶ Ἀλκμέονα
 καὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην
 καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ
 ἢ ποιῆσαι.)

53a7

Hence the man in the situation between these two remains. Such a man is one who on the one hand is not a paragon of virtue and justice and on the other hand does not suffer the change to misfortune because of wickedness or villainy
 10 but because of | some mistake: one of those who are in a state of great reputation and good fortune, like Oedipus and Thyestes and illustrious men from families of that kind.

- Thus the artistically shaped plot must necessarily be single, rather than double as some maintain, and the shift must not be from bad fortune to good but the other way round,
 15 | from good fortune to bad, and not caused by villainy but by a big mistake, on the part of a man either of the kind we have specified or tending to the better rather than the worse side. (An indication of this, as a matter of fact, is what has been going on. At first the poets used to tick off whatever plot came their way, but in recent times the finest tragedies have been composed around a few noble houses,
 20 | e.g., about Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and those others who have happened either to undergo or to do fearful things.)

Rostagni complains that whereas we expect Aristotle to talk about the ideal type of *μεταβολή*, he talks instead about the best type of man. This is an illusion caused by the form of expression, *ὁ μεταξύ τούτων λοιπός*. What Aristotle means is indeed a type of change, but

as we said at the beginning of the chapter, the change cannot be considered apart from the man who undergoes it. We now know the reason for this: that the mechanism of our emotions grants sympathy to some men and refuses it to others, even though the change of fortune they undergo is the same.

Another source of confusion has been the temptation to equate Aristotle's ideal hero with the ethical Mean,³⁸ which has nothing whatever to do with the case; still another, the tripartite classification in 2. 48a4-5,³⁹ according to which the hero as defined here would fall into the middle category, between the proper objects of tragedy and comedy. Even more pernicious has been the misinterpretation of *τούτων* in a7 as referring to the good (b34) and the bad (b36, a1) men of the preceding passage, so that the ideal hero comes out a statistically average man, halfway between good and bad. These interpretations overlook the definition *ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος κτλ.* It is not merely a question of a kind of man but of a man suffering a certain fate. *Μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν* is an integral part of the definition. The first specification (*μήτε διαφέρων κτλ.*) then corresponds exactly to *τὸν ὅμοιον* just above, and the second (*μήτε διὰ κακίαν κτλ.*) to *τὸν ἀνάξιον*.⁴⁰ Thus *τούτων* refers to the two predicates immediately preceding; that is, the person "between these" is one who falls between the *undeserving sufferer* and the *sufferer who is 'like' us*.

But these are not extremes; how can a man be between them? 'Like' us means 'average,' neither very far above nor very far below the usual moral level of the race; whereas the really good man is a long jump above the average. We know from chapter 2 that the tragic hero should be *βελτίων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς*. But if he is too distinctly so and then falls into misfortune (which is required to arouse either pity or fear), the result is 'revolting.' On the other hand, if he were *merely ὅμοιος* ('average') his fate would not be significant one way or the other. Hence the hero must fall somewhere within the range, not between good and bad, but between good and average: high enough to awaken our pity but not so perfect as to arouse indignation at his misfortune, near enough to us to elicit our fellow-feeling but not so

³⁸ See, e.g., Gudeman *ad loc.*

³⁹ See above, *ad loc.*, on the spuriousness of that classification.

⁴⁰ That is, *μήτε διὰ κακίαν ... μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν* corresponds exactly to the compound concept *τὸν ἀνάξιον δυστυχοῦντα, ὡς μήτε διαφέρων κτλ.* does to *τὸν ὅμοιον (δυστυχοῦντα)*.

near as to forfeit all stature and importance. The formula defines a range of values (not a single point), within which various degrees and combinations of pity and fear are possible. The only limitation Aristotle cares to add (a16) is still permissive and general: that the hero ought to be nearer the upper end of the range than the lower (i.e., the middle).⁴¹ In other words it is even more desirable, where and so far as possible, that the hero be good than that he be like us;⁴² but this remains a preference rather than a rigid requirement.

All this is further connected with the difficult and long-debated question what Aristotle means by *ἁμαρτία* in b10 and b16.⁴³ A majority of the modern commentators and interpreters take the *hamartia* to be an error,⁴⁴ although the rival interpretation, that it denotes a moral failing, or at least some degree of moral culpability, still has at

⁴¹ The usual interpretation of a16-17, *ἢ οἷον εἴρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χειρότερος*, which assumes that the scale runs all the way from good to bad, makes Aristotle define his hero as either plain average or only slightly above it, which would be an especially glaring contradiction to chapter 2.

⁴² So far I agree with S. M. Pitcher, "Aristotle's Good and Just Heroes," *Philol. Quart.* 24 (1945) 1-11, 190-191; see p. 8: "By the logic of the argument as a whole, [the protagonist] inevitably belongs to the party of the *ἐπιεικεῖς*." But Pitcher's suggestion that the *ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας* of b34, the *μοχθηροῦς* of b36 (*τὸν σφόδρα πονηρόν*, a1), and the *τούτων* of a7 are all characters in a single play, and his translation of *ὁ μεταξὺ τούτων* as "the man who is in the midst of these" (p. 6), are not acceptable.

⁴³ For a very brief survey of the controversy see Pitcher, *op. cit.* 2-4; in a more general sense J. Volkelt, *Ästhetik des Tragischen*,³ Leipzig, 1917, 163 ff. ("Die Tragische Schuld"). Aside from the regular commentaries on our passage, *hamartia* is discussed in detail by J. H. Reinkens, *Aristoteles über Kunst, besonders über Tragödie*, Vienna, 1870, 321 ff.; P. Manns, *Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der tragischen Katharsis und Hamartia erklärt*, Karlsruhe, 1883, esp. 25 ff.; P. van Braam, "Aristotle's Use of *ἁμαρτία*," *CQ* 6 (1912) 266-272; O. Hey, "*AMAPTIA*: Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes," *Philol.* 83 (1928) 1-17, 137-163; H. Phillips, Jr., "De Vocis *AMAPTIA* Vi et Usu apud Scriptores Graecos usque ad Annum CCC. ante Christum Natum" (unpubl. Harvard diss.; summary in *Harv. Stud. in Class. Philol.* 44 [1933] 244-246); R. A. Pack, "A Passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias Relating to the Theory of Tragedy," *AJP* 58 (1937) 418-436; *id.*, "Fate, Chance, and Tragic Error," *ibid.* 60 (1939) 350-356; Max Kommerell, *Lessing und Aristoteles*, Frankfurt, 1940, 120-129; P. W. Harsh, "*ἁμαρτία* Again," *TAPA* 76 (1945) 47-58; K. v. Fritz, "Tragische Schuld u. poet. Gerechtigkeit in d. gr. Trag.," *Studium Generale* 8 (1955) 194-237.

⁴⁴ So Bywater, Albergiani, Rostagni, Valgimigli, Hardy, Gudeman, Sykutris; and, of those mentioned in the preceding note, van Braam, Hey, Kommerell, Pitcher.

least one able defender.⁴⁶ Unfortunately the issue has been beclouded by the almost habitual use of the terms 'intellectual error' or 'error of judgment' on the one side and 'moral flaw' on the other. All these phrases, as we shall see, are misleading and beside the point.

Here, as Harsh emphasizes in an important essay on *hamartia*,⁴⁶ the question of method comes to the fore. How are we to get at Aristotle's meaning? A thorough semasiological investigation like those of Hey and Phillips (to which Harsh contributes an important supplement from the fifth-century tragedies themselves), pursuing the development of the word from Homer down to Aristotle, would seem to be the answer. But such an investigation will be inconclusive, because *ἁμαρτάνειν*, *ἁμαρτία*, and their cognates and compounds display such a wide range of meanings—all the way from simple error or failure to 'sin,' or as close to it as a classical Greek ever comes⁴⁷—that either interpretation of our passage remains possible. The only safe guide is the context of Aristotle's own argument. But by "context" I do not mean the sentence before us (which tells us nothing about *hamartia* except that it is not the same as wickedness), but the larger nexus of argument to which chapter 13 belongs, namely the analysis of the complex tragic plot. (*Hamartia* must be a functional element in a complex plot, otherwise Aristotle would not mention it here.)

Once the matter is put this way, another concept springs to mind which is fitted to be the exact converse and complement of *hamartia*: i.e., recognition. Recognition is a change *ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν*; might not *hamartia* be the *ἄγνοια* from which the change begins? Moreover tragic recognition, or the best tragic recognition, is a discovery of the identity of a 'dear' person, a blood-relative; it follows that the precedent *hamartia* would denote particularly a mistake or error or ignorance as to the identity of that person.

These suggestions will not win much credence by being thus baldly stated. They need to be bulwarked by a demonstration (a) that *ἁμαρτία* can have this meaning in Aristotle's usage, and (b) that such a concept is actually required by his argument just here. For the first of

⁴⁶ Harsh. Phillips and Paek also incline in that direction, and Manns in the last century. Butcher wavers ("error or frailty"). As so often happens, the prevailing conception of *hamartia* among laymen and scholars in other fields is still that of the 'moral flaw,' which was dominant down through the nineteenth century.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.* 51, 53 n. 24.

⁴⁷ See W. C. Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge, 1944, 22, 59-60.

these two *demonstranda* we must go to three interrelated passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, where Aristotle defines or alludes to the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary action.⁴⁸ The first of these is in the third book of the *Ethics*, of which the first three chapters are devoted to a discussion of voluntary (*ἐκούσια*) and involuntary (*ἀκούσια*) acts. Aristotle begins in chapter 1, 1109b35, by laying it down that involuntary action is generally considered to have two varieties, that which is forced, *βίαια*, and that which is caused by ignorance, *δι' ἄγνοϊαν*. After an analysis of forced actions, he proceeds in chapter 2 to the other class. Here he first clears away, 1110b18-24, the category of actions caused by ignorance but not regretted (i.e., after the error is recognized); they may be called non-voluntary (*οὐχ ἐκόντων*) rather than involuntary (*ἀκωντων*). From this first distinction we gather that grief and repentance after the discovery of the error is a reliable, in fact a necessary, index of involuntary action. We can even go further and say that an act done in ignorance which is not followed by repentance upon discovery was not, properly speaking, caused by ignorance, since in that case the act might well have been performed anyway, even if the doer had had full knowledge. The distinction between 'in ignorance' (*ἀγνοοῦντα*) and 'through ignorance' (*δι' ἄγνοϊαν*), however, is only made explicitly in the next sentence, 1110b24-27, where Aristotle points out that the cause of an act performed while a man is drunk or in the heat of anger seems to be his drunkenness or his anger, not his ignorance. It is performed, therefore, *ἀγνοῶν* but not *δι' ἄγνοϊαν*.

Now we come to the distinction which most interests us, between acts caused by ignorance of general principles (*ἢ καθόλου* [*sc.* *ἄγνοϊα*], b32) and those caused by ignorance of particulars (*ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἢ περᾶξίς*). It is the latter, Aristotle says, that win *pity and forgiveness* (*ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη*). This, then, is truly involuntary action: *ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει*. Aristotle goes on to specify the varieties of detail of which the doer may be ignorant. He may not know who he is (although this is ruled out as impossible just below, 1111a7), or what he is doing (e.g., a10: Aeschylus revealed something about the mysteries "because he didn't

⁴⁸ On the connection of these passages with Plato's legislation in book 9 of the *Laos* see below on 14. 53b37-54a9; on Aristotle's theory in general, R. Maschke, *Die Willenlehre im griechischen Recht*, Berlin, 1926, 133-159, esp. 146-147, 150-155; I. Glanville, "Tragic Error," *CQ* 43 (1949) 447-456.

know it was a secret"), or what or whom he is doing it to; and in some cases he may not be aware what he is doing it with (like the man who thought the spearpoint was buttoned, a12) or how he is doing it (the sparring-partner who knocks out his friend when all he intended to do was to 'touch' him, a14). Of these varieties of ignorance, the one which interests us most is *ignorance of the identity of the person with whom the action has to do* (ἐν τίνι πράττει, a4); for we remember that the preferred tragic recognition is of the identity of persons. Surely it is no accident that the example Aristotle cites here is from tragedy (the only one in the list): the case of Merope, who was about to kill her son under the mistaken impression that he was someone else; and that this is precisely one of the instances he singles out for special commendation in the *Poetics*, 14. 54a5-6, as making the most effective use of recognition.

The other passage in the *Ethics*, 5. 10. 1135a15-1136a9, elaborates and refines the distinction between voluntary and involuntary with an eye to its application in law. Aristotle begins by laying it down that acts of justice and injustice (δικαιοπραγήματα, ἀδικήματα) are made such by their voluntary character. A voluntary act is then defined (a23, with an explicit reference to book 3) as one that lies within a man's power and is performed knowingly, not in ignorance of the details involved: μὴ ἀγνοῶν ... μήτε δὲ μὴτε ᾧ μήτε οὐ <ἐνεκα>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει...; and Aristotle adds, a28—it is hard to believe that he is not thinking of Oedipus—ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. After some further specifications which do not directly concern us, we find a further distinction within the category of voluntary acts (1135b8). Some are deliberate (προελόμενοι, b9; προβουλευσάμενοι, b10; ἐκ προαιρέσεως, b25; ἐκ προνοίας,⁴⁹ b26), others are not. The application of these distinctions to the law (of 'torts': βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινواῖς, b11) results in an apparently three-fold, actually a four-fold, classification. Involuntary acts resulting in an injury that is contrary to reasonable expectation (παρὰ λόγως) are ἀτυχήματα, accidents; when the injury is not contrary to reasonable expectation they are ἀμαρτήματα, errors or mistakes.⁵⁰ Acts which are voluntary but not pre-

⁴⁹ This is the standing legal term, as in the charge τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας, wounding with intent (to kill).

⁵⁰ The same distinction in [Ar.] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 5. 1427a27-b1, which adds (a37-

meditated are ἀδικήματα, acts of injustice; and when premeditation is added they not only are unjust in themselves but make the doer unjust.⁵¹

The secondary distinctions here, between accident and mistake and between the two grades of unjust act, do not concern us. They are relevant in a court of law, where it is essential (or at least was considered so at Athens) to fix the precise degree of legal responsibility,⁵²

b1) the interesting point that ἀμάρτημα and ἀτύχημα, unlike ἀδικία, are shared by the defendant with the jury and all mankind and therefore give him a claim to forgiveness.

⁵¹ Strictly speaking, this is a distinction between two different relations of the doer to the deed rather than two different statuses of the deed. An act is an ἀδικήμα if it is a wrong act performed voluntarily (ἐκῶν), whether or not it is deliberate; but the doer is unjust only if he does it deliberately. Nevertheless the distinction is parallel to that between mistake and accident because it depends on the presence or absence, not merely of intent, but of forethought or foresight.—These distinctions are a direct continuation of Plato's in book 9 of the *Laws*; see esp. 866d-867b.

⁵² Cf. *Rhet.* 1. 13. 1374b4-10, where the same threefold scheme is presented, and in the same terms, but where Aristotle points out (b5) that the important thing is not to assess the same penalty for the three grades of offense. The *Rhetoric* passage and the one in book 5 of the *Ethics* are often cited on all fours with the one in book 3 of the *Ethics*, as if all three were equally pertinent, and in all respects, to our problem in the *Poetics*.—In the field of homicide the Athenians had an elaborate and carefully graded series of five courts, going back at least to the time of Dracon and Solon, whose chief rationale was something very close to this set of distinctions. See R. J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, 2, Chicago, 1938, 208: "These courts had been founded, not for the purpose of insuring the prosecution of homicide, but rather for the purpose of differentiating the types of homicide and thereby procuring for the slayer, if guilty, a more equitable punishment" (cf. *Rhet.*, *loc. cit.*, for the relation of the distinctions to 'equity,' ἐπιείκεια). On the five courts themselves see Bonner and Smith, *op. cit.* 1, Chicago, 1930, 91-110; J. H. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, 1, Leipzig, 1905, 121-133; 2, 1908, 600-619; summary by W. Wyse in L. Whibley, *A Companion to Greek Studies*, Cambridge, 1931, 479-480. Aristotle's ἀδικήμα corresponds to the jurisdiction of the Areopagus over cases of φόνος ἐκούσιος, including deliberate murder (φόνος ἐκ προνοίας) and wounding with intent to kill (τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας); his ἀμάρτημα to that of the Palladion over φόνος ἀκούσιος; and ἀτύχημα in part to that of the court at the Delphinion over cases of justifiable homicide (φόνος δίκαιος, which included accidental killings at the games and of comrades in war), in part to that at the Prytaneum, which tried cases against animals and inanimate objects which had caused a homicide. Thus it was necessary to determine the type or degree of guilt, not merely in order to assess the penalty but to determine which court was competent in the case to begin with.

but Aristotle gives no sign that he regards them as vital in the case of tragedy.⁵³ In the theater our function is not to fix and assess a penalty, but to feel pity and fear—and to enjoy whatever pleasure may arise from those emotions. On this point the testimony of the *Ethics* is clear: pity goes to *ἁμαρτήματα*, acts performed in ignorance of details, and not to *ἀδικήματα* (which do indeed imply ignorance, but an ignorance of principles).⁵⁴

It follows that the tragic *hamartia* is an ignorance or mistake as to certain details. It should be, further, a "big" mistake (53a16), one pregnant with disaster for the hero. Further still, the finest mistake for the purposes of tragedy, like its correlate the finest recognition, will have to do with the identity of a 'dear' person, that is, a blood relative, and will accordingly lead to or threaten to lead to his being slain or wounded. (As a component or cause of the complex plot, such a *hamartia* is inherently fitted to arouse our pity—and our 'fear', that is, our horror that a man should have killed or be about to kill a 'dear one'.⁵⁵ The discovery is then the counterpart and reverse of the mistake. Here the emotional charge which is inherent in the mistake (not in the ignorance *per se*, but in the horrible deed to which it stands in causal relation) finds its discharge. The *hamartia* represents the reservoir of emotional potential, the recognition is the lightning-flash through which it passes off.

A little reflection shows that the development of such an energy-

⁵³ It is true that Oedipus' act in killing his father was a *ἁμαρτημα* in the strict sense, rather than an *ἀτύχημα*, since in the light of the oracle's warning it could not quite be said to have happened *παραλόγως*. And conversely we have argued that Aristotle cannot have regarded a pure accident like the falling of Mity's statue (9. 52a8) as suitable material for a tragic plot. But no weight falls on these distinctions and exclusions: it is the contrast between 'error' and 'wickedness' that counts.

⁵⁴ At *E. N.* 3. 2. 1110b29 Aristotle refers to acts caused by wickedness as *τῆν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν*. This usage, which runs square counter to the definition of *ἁμαρτία* (*ἁμαρτημα*) in *E. N.* 5. 10 and *Rhet.* 1. 13, is interesting as an example of the freedom Aristotle always reserves, of using a technical term in a broader (often a popular) sense, even in a technical passage. But it does not alter or invalidate our conclusion.

⁵⁵ More exactly, we feel horror because of the nature of the deed, and pity because it is executed or planned in ignorance. The specific concept of 'deed of horror stemming from ignorance' thus accounts for the close bond that unites the two emotions in tragedy: a bond which is even closer than that indicated by Aristotle's analysis of the two emotions (*Rhet.* 2), or that found in ordinary life.

system is not merely fostered by the complex plot but can only come to proper unfolding there. Mistake-recognition is a 'complex' structure by definition, because it signifies a complete and instantaneous reversal, not only of the hero's situation but of all his deepest attitudes and feelings. The hated enemy or casually despised fellow-wayfarer suddenly revealed as the person naturally dearest to him in the whole world: that is the quintessence of 'complex' as Aristotle defines it. A simple plot cannot be predicated on ignorance in the hero. Either it will take the turn towards recognition—that is, become complex—or he must remain in ignorance throughout and the action will have no real outcome. In other words, simple plots are necessarily restricted to deeds of horror performed or intended knowingly: the *Agamemnon* or *Medea* plot.

From these considerations it follows that *hamartia*, like its correlate *anagnorisis*, belongs specifically to the theory of the complex plot, not to the theory of plots in general. And indeed we have already pointed out, quite independently of all this, that chapter 13 is an integral part of the discussion of complex plots which began at the end of chapter 9. Let us recall that at 52b31 Aristotle reminded us of the two premises on which his examination and rejection of the various plot-patterns was to be based. The first was that the "most beautiful" plot-structure for tragedy is complex, not simple; the second was that the play must imitate fearful and pitiable things.⁶⁶ As the mustering of the modes proceeded, b34-a7, we did not notice any appeal to the first principle; all we heard about them was that they did not properly excite pity and fear. Nevertheless both principles must have been involved, since the chosen pattern which emerges at the end is inherently complex as well as pathetic and fearful. If now we look back at *μεταβάλλοντας*, b34, and *μετα πίπτειν*, a2, they are seen to refer not to the tragic *μεταβολή* in general but to peripety in particular.⁶⁷ The implication then is—although Aristotle does not make it explicit—that it is impossible to motivate the fall of the perfectly good man in the manner called for in the definition of peripety: that is, 'paradoxically' but logically. Or, to put it another way, one

⁶⁶ More precisely, the finest tragedy must have a complex structure, and that (*καὶ ταύτην*) one which is an imitation of tragic events—as opposed, no doubt, to a complex plot which only imitates something that is *θαυμστόν* but not tragic.

⁶⁷ See Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 72.

chief reason for the superiority of *hamartia* as the 'cause' of the tragic action is that it supplies a plausible reason for the fall of a good (though not perfect) man.

The correlation of *hamartia* and recognition as interdependent parts of the best tragic plot explains everything that Aristotle says about both of them. At the same time it effectively disposes, *ut mihi quidem videtur*, of the 'moral flaw' interpretation of *hamartia*. We may debate over which caused the killing of Laius, Oedipus's ignorance or his hot temper,⁵⁸ but there can be no argument about what he 'recognizes': it is the identity of the man he killed.

It would be interesting, though perhaps profitless, to speculate why this correlation of *hamartia* with *anagnorisis* has not been suggested before. No doubt the chief reason is the myopia with which the sequence of Aristotle's argument has been regarded, so that *hamartia* was thought of as a part of the hero's character, or at least of his personal experience, while recognition was purely a technical device, a part of plot.⁵⁹ (Our findings show that *hamartia* also is a part of the plot.) The reason why Aristotle does not call it so, along with peripety, recognition, and *pathos*, is presumably that it may lie outside the action of the play proper, as in the *Oedipus* where the mistake occurred years before.⁶⁰ In any case *hamartia*, along with some other major concepts of the *Poetics*, must be brought out of its isolation and seen as an integral part of a single edifice of thought.

The last specification, a10, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία, deserves remark for other reasons. In the first place it, along with μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν, a9, indicates that the change of fortune in the reverse direction, εἰς εὐτυχίαν, has been excluded—not from all tragedy, but from the best tragedy. The phrase below, b13-15, καὶ μεταβάλλειν ... εἰς δυστυχίαν, is no more than a restatement of this now accepted thesis. In the second place we have

⁵⁸ Actually the methods of the *hamartia*-hunters lead only to absurdity; see C. H. Whitman, Jr., *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism*, Cambridge, 1951, 22-41 ("Scholarship and *Hamartia*"), esp. 29-38 (Whitman himself, however, takes it as proved that *hamartia* does mean 'moral' flaw in the *Poetics*); similarly W. C. Greene in *Perspectives of Criticism*, Cambridge, 1950, 40-41.

⁵⁹ There has also been the stumbling block of chapter 12 being interposed between *anagnorisis* and *hamartia*. Even scholars who recognized its spuriousness were unconsciously influenced by its presence and position.

⁶⁰ But this may not be a very good reason. There is no *pathos* in the *Oedipus* either, but only a peripety and recognition.

already pointed to the affinity between our phrase and the one in the definition of *anagnorisis*, II. 52a31, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὠρισμένων.⁶¹ Prosperity and misfortune are the poles between which the tragic action swings, the *δροί* by which the change in the hero's status is measured and defined. If he did not stand in high fortune and repute at the beginning, his fall would not be drastic enough to affect us much: it would not be ἐκπληκτικόν.⁶² Thus the requirement of high prosperity is as functional for the best type of tragedy as that of initial misery is for the converse kind (*Orestes*, in our stock example). It is in fact both structural and emotional: structural for the sake of emotion, emotional because such a structure of change cannot help but arouse emotion.

It is interesting to compare this organic idea with its later descendants. For there cannot be much doubt that it is the ultimate ancestor—though not via the *Poetics*—of the universal conception in late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance that tragedy represents the fall of kings and potentates and those of high degree. Theophrastus defined tragedy as ἡρωικῆς τύχης περιστασις;⁶³ that is, he did not specify kings either. But the definition of comedy which Diomedes ascribes vaguely to "the Greeks"—κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἰδιωτικῶν πραγμάτων ἀκίνδυνος περιοχὴ⁶⁴—is so clearly a pendant to that of tragedy that there is general agreement on assigning both to Theophrastus,⁶⁵ and the definition of comedy implies (*ιδιωτικῶν*) that the subjects of tragedy are not only heroes but monarchs and rulers.

⁶¹ See above *ad loc.*

⁶² Again we see that the idea is meant particularly for complex plots. The fall of a thoroughly 'happy' man is contrary to expectation, *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*, in itself. Simple tragedy, if it can manage such a reversal at all, cannot achieve the requisite degree of emotional shock. *Οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτων γενῶν ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες* does not contradict this interpretation. 'Επιφανεῖς is said from the point of view of the spectator: they must be conspicuous so that their fall may be conspicuous. *Τοιοῦτων* does not mean royal families but gets its content from the mention of *Oedipus* and *Thyestes*, particularly the latter: it means the "few families" mentioned below in a19 and 14. 54a9, which happen to have suffered dreadful things—families of tragic fortune.

⁶³ Diomedes *De Poematibus*, p. 487 Kell (CGF 57).

⁶⁴ P. 488 Kell (CGF 57).

⁶⁵ H. Reich, *Der Mimus*, I, Berlin, 1903, 263-265; A. P. McMahon, *Harv. Stud. in Class. Philol.* 28 (1917) 45; *ibid.* 40 (1929) 100-104 (fuller treatment, citing *Evanthius* and *Donatus* also); Rostagni, *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 2 (1922) 128.

This implication is in fact spelled out by Diomedes himself just below:⁶⁶ *comoedia a tragoedia differt, quod in tragoedia introducuntur heroes duces reges, in comoedia humiles atque privatae <personae>*; and in similar terms by Evanthius (*in comoedia mediocres fortunae hominum ... in tragoedia ... ingentes personae*) and Donatus (*comoedia ... dictae ἀπὸ τῆς κώμης, ... hominū qui in vicis habitant ob mediocritatem fortunae, non in aulis regis, ut sunt personae tragicae*).⁶⁷

The immediate source of Diomedes may be Varro, through Suetonius.⁶⁸ As for Theophrastus himself, McMahon may be right in suggesting⁶⁹ Aristotle's dialogue *On Poets* as his source. But Theophrastus' definition, with its drastic simplification over against the definition of tragedy in the *Poetics*, and its substitution of *ἡρωικῆς τύχης* (both highly significant words) for *σπουδαίας πράξεως*, looks more like an independent formulation (naturally under strong influence from Aristotle) than a mere borrowing. Again, *ἡρωικῆς* is not necessarily *βασιλικῆς*. So we cannot tell whether Theophrastus simply took his definition from Aristotle, and in particular we cannot tell whether he explicitly mentioned kings and royal personages, though the probabilities seem to me to be against it. A Hellenistic source is more likely.

Thus we cannot quite close the last link in the chain, at the upper end. Nevertheless it remains apparent that in general Aristotle is the ancestor of the tradition. All the more striking is the vulgarization of his functional requirement—which, be it remembered, is only for the *best* tragedy—into a general rule that tragedy must or does represent only kings.⁷⁰ A social or political prejudice enters here, a disposition to read off the worth and significance of a man's actions from his place in a rank-list, which is far removed from Aristotle's thought.⁷¹

⁶⁶ P. 488 Keil (CGF 58).

⁶⁷ CGF 66, 67. See McMahon, *op. cit.* 102.

⁶⁸ Usener, *Sitzungsber.* Munich 1892, 620; Schmid 1. 2. 37 n. 4; but see McMahon, *op. cit.* 129.

⁶⁹ *Locc. citt.*, n. 65 above.

⁷⁰ It is a fact—and undoubtedly it was operative in the mind of the later grammarian (?) who added *duces reges* to Theophrastus' *heroes*—that most of the heroes of Greek tragedy are kings or princes. That is a function of the mythical material it used; but it is not a part of its essence, or at least Aristotle did not regard it so. We pointed out in chapter 2 that in the division *σπουδαῖοι - φαῦλοι* there is an echo of the old aristocratic division between *ἔσθλοί*, nobles, and *κακοί*, commoners. But it is an indirect and mitigated echo, not simply the crude distinction 'kings—private persons.'

⁷¹ How far he was removed from crude royalism may be gauged by his com-

but congenial to the Hellenistic and Imperial periods, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. The persistence of the tradition⁷² shows its popularity, but not any real understanding of Aristotle.

"Necessarily, then, the well constructed plot will be single, rather than double as some maintain, and involve a change not from unhappiness to happiness but the other way round, from happiness to unhappiness." Everything is in order here except the word ἀπλοῦν, which seems suddenly to have altered its meaning, not only since 9. 51b33 but since 52b31 (μη ἀπλήν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην).⁷³ Whence this inconsistency? Without trying to explain it away altogether, we may notice that ἀπλοῦν naturally gets its definition from what it is contrasted with: in this case, διπλοῦν. Διπλοῦν in turn is defined below, at a31; but its meaning is tolerably clear from what follows here (μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν κτλ.). A 'double' plot is a plot with two outcomes, good for the good characters and the opposite for the bad. But above all διπλοῦν must have gotten its definition, in the minds of Aristotle's listeners, from the allusion to τινές (= τινῶν, a31). Who are these τινές, and why did they commend the 'double' plot? So far as I know, nobody has suggested that it might be possible to identify them—or rather him, since in accordance with Greek usage the word probably designates a single man.⁷⁴ But we recall that Aristotle's inventory of the regular modes of μεταβολή was in effect a reply to Plato. Plato had protested bitterly that the poets offend against truth and morality by showing good men made unhappy and bad men happy. Since the objection was double, it seems likely that the type of outcome Plato preferred would be the double one, as Aristotle defines it here.⁷⁵ To be sure he does not explicitly say so in any extant passage, but Aristotle need not be referring to a written work. Or, if τινές does not mean Plato, it must refer to a man who shared Plato's views on the drama—possibly Heraclides Ponticus. It is a Platonic theory.⁷⁶

commendation of moderate democracy in the *Politics*, notwithstanding his native sympathy and interest in kingship.

⁷² Most fully documented by McMahon in the second of the two articles cited above, n. 65.

⁷³ See, for example, Bywater on 52b31.

⁷⁴ See Gudeman *ad loc.*

⁷⁵ The ἡθικῆ, as he calls it in 18. 56a1 and 24. 59b9; see below on the latter passage.

⁷⁶ It does not follow, because Aristotle says (a34) that the poets write such plays in order to cater to the "weakness" of the spectators, that the τινές must be-

Plato's theory was metaphysical and moral and therefore called, at least by implication, for a double system, embracing rewards for the good and punishment for the bad. Aristotle's, on the other hand, though certainly not immoral or even amoral, is divorced from metaphysics and grounded in psychology—a new psychology. It starts from the premise, not that tragedy must adumbrate the metaphysical truth about human affairs, but that the *best* tragedy must arouse pity and fear in the highest possible degree. From this premise it follows necessarily that the best plot must end in misfortune. Having arrived at that point, Aristotle asks how the misfortune is to be brought about paradoxically yet logically; and the answer is the hero and the plot-structure outlined in a7-10. But the immediate point for us is that Aristotle's logic, starting with his premise (pity and fear), points straight to the necessity of an unhappy ending, and an unhappy ending for a relatively good man. That is why he rejects the double structure: not because he objects to doubleness in itself but because (a) the double plot involves a happy ending, and happy endings are more comic than tragic (a36), and (b) the unhappy part of the ending is for the wrong kind of men and so cannot be tragic either.

We have already spoken of the *ἀμαρτία μεγάλη* in a16. The mistake must be a "big" one so that it can motivate a big fall, a spectacular reverse of fortune. *Οἶον εἶρηται* refers to a8-9 (*ὁ μήτε ἀρετῆ διαφέρων κτλ.*) rather than a10. To make it refer to the latter, as is often done, is to confuse the moral specification with that of high prosperity, whereas Aristotle keeps them distinct.

The 'sign' which Aristotle cites for confirmation (a17-22) has several interesting features. First, it implies the same view of literary history as chapter 4:⁷⁷ that poetry began pretty much at random and only gradually found its mark. Second, the contrast between *πρῶτον μὲν* and *νῦν δέ* is a little difficult to grasp so long as one takes *νῦν* (as is usually done) to mean Aristotle's own time.⁷⁸ Surely he did not think

long to the play-writing fraternity. *Πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν*, a30-31, implies that the preference was expressed in a theoretical context.

⁷⁷ Or as Aristotle's history of philosophy in book 1 of the *Metaphysics*. Philosophy, after a long career of wandering and stumbling, has at last found its way to the truth.

⁷⁸ Gudeman, taking it for granted that *νῦν* would have to mean this, and emphasizing (quite correctly) that Aristotle could not have meant to restrict his meaning so, proposes *ὑστερον δέ*, but for some reason does not actually print it.

that Sophocles was still groping or 'ticking off'⁷⁹ possible plots at random—or Euripides either, since he commends him just below (a23 ff.) for preferring that plot-structure which analysis has shown to be best.⁸⁰ Moreover we can be sure from all that we know about the history of Greek tragedy that the concentration upon the stories of a few houses (a19) did not begin in the fourth century but in the second half of the fifth. But then it seems to follow that *πρῶτον μὲν* refers to the early stages, down to the time when tragedy "attained its nature" (4. 49a15), that is, down through Aeschylus, and *νῦν δέ* to Sophocles and everything since him.

As for the idea involved, it is identical with the one at the end of chapter 14, 54a10-13: that for some time the poets chose their plots by chance, not art, i.e., not according to any conscious principle, and so only gradually came to center their attention on the houses or individuals who had chanced⁸¹ to undergo such fearful things. The opposite method, that of art, is illustrated by Aristotle himself in chapter 17 with the myth of the *Iphigenia in Tauris*. It consists in drafting the plot-pattern first, in the light of the abstract requirements of tragedy, before names and personal traits are allocated to the characters. This, by the contrast it implies, enables us to interpret *ἀπληθισμῶν*. The early poets, without drafting any plot-pattern in advance or even formulating any conscious principles of choice, ran over the list (the stock, as it were) of extant myths at random and 'ticked off'⁸² for use the first one they came to that seemed to promise anything.⁸³ We need not deny that this is probably more or less what did happen; but it is a question which Aristotle's remark throws more light on, the haphazard methods of the early poets or his own unawareness of the necessary order of events in poetic creation.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ See below on *ἀπληθισμῶν*.

⁸⁰ For Eur. as one of *οἱ νέοι* or *οἱ νῦν* see below on 14. 53b28.

⁸¹ *Συμβέβηκε* in both passages should not be undertranslated. See the same word below, 14. 54a13.

⁸² The word emphasizes the randomness of the procedure, which consisted in following the arbitrary selection offered by the list of extant myths instead of beginning with principles (which might not lead to any of the stories on the list, or at least might not let the poet use any of them without adaptation).

⁸³ From the parallel passage in chapter 14, 54a9-13, we shall see that the poets' procedure in the second period was equally haphazard. Originally chance led them in all directions. Later it led them to concentrate more and more on the stories of a few houses, because these seemed to be effective with the public; but it was still chance.

⁸⁴ See above on 9. 51b12-15. Aristotle thinks of the plot-pattern as a universal

But the most interesting thing is the examples. Obviously the stories of Alcmeon, Oedipus, and the rest are rich in tragic events. But the statement which the 'sign' is meant to confirm was more specific than that. It had to do with the plot of the *best* tragedy, not merely of tragedy, and it prescribed that such a plot must (a) be single, not double, (b) go from prosperity to misfortune, and (c) spring from a *hamartia*. We may also regard it as certain, from Aristotle's definition of the tragic recognition which is the counterpart of *hamartia*, that in the best plot the *hamartia* should be responsible for a *pathos*, a dreadful deed of violence performed or intended upon a person who is close blood-kin to the hero.

Aristotle's list of the "few houses" around which the finest tragedies are "now" constructed exemplifies these requirements in rich detail. Since the facts appear not to have been noticed, it may be worth while to document them:

1. Alcmeon, the son of Amphiaraus and Eriphyle, slew his mother in obedience to a command from his father at the time of the latter's departure for Thebes. This well-known version of the tale was the basis of Sophocles' *Epigoni* or *Eriphyle* and Nicomachus' *Eriphyle*, and probably or possibly of the *Alcmeon* tragedies of Sophocles, Agathon, Timotheus,⁸⁵ Nicomachus, and Evaretus. Here, by the very rationale of the story, the killing is deliberate and so (cf. 14. 54a2) inferior by Aristotle's criteria. But the *Poetics* itself mentions (14. 53b33) a variant, and a surprising one. Astydamas (probably the younger) somehow managed to make Alcmeon kill his mother in ignorance of her identity,⁸⁶

ante rem, whereas the true creative process is always concrete, *in re*. Nevertheless it is possible that Theodectes and other fourth-century dramatists operated in Aristotle's self-conscious fashion, or may have found it congenial to their ways of thinking. From 6. 50a25 we gather that they set most store by their plots (and, no doubt, the 'thought').

⁸⁵ Probably not the lyric poet. See Plekard-Cambridge in J. U. Powell, *New Chapters in the History of Greek Lit., Third Ser.*, Oxford, 1933, 72-73, 74-75.

⁸⁶ Probably, as T. B. L. Webster suggests, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 305, the deed was done in a fit of madness; W. compares Antiphanes, fr. 191 K., and Agave in the *Bacchae*. But Carl Robert, *Die Griechische Heldensage* (= L. Preller, *Gr. Mythologie*, 2^d, Berlin, 1920-1926; cited below as P.-R.) 964 and n. 2, thinks that Astydamas cannot have treated the matricide in this fashion and makes the deed of horror (which Aristotle after all does not explicitly describe) consist in Alcmeon's committing incest with his own daughter Tisiphone (see below on Euripides' *Alcmeon in Corinth*). But a slaying of his mother in ignorance may possibly be implied also by the enigmatic line quoted by Aristotle from the *Alcmeon* of Theodectes

only to discover his mistake afterwards. Moreover it is clear that Aristotle admired Astydamas' handling of the plot at least as much as that of Sophocles. Thus the origin of the *pathos* in *hamartia* need not necessarily be given by tradition; it may be devised by the poet himself, provided it does not conflict with the basic facts as given in tradition (e.g., does not present Alcmeon as not having killed his mother at all).⁸⁷

Alcmeon's later career was at least as popular with the dramatists as his slaying of his mother. Driven mad by her Erinyes, he flees Argos and comes at last to Psophis in Arcadia, where he is cleansed by king Phegeus and marries the latter's daughter Arsinoe or Alpheisiboea. This stage was the subject of Euripides' *Alcmeon through Psophis* (adapted by Ennius), of Theodectes' *Alcmeon*,⁸⁸ of the original of the *Alcimeo* of Accius, and of the *Alpheisiboea* plays of Achaëus, Chaereon, Timotheus,⁸⁹ and Accius. According to a version related by Apollodorus (3. 7. 5) and Pausanias (8. 24. 8-10), however, further purification was required by Delphi, and Alcmeon moved on to the source of the Achei-lous in Acarnania, where he was cleansed by the river-god himself and married the latter's daughter Callirrhoe.⁹⁰ Hence new difficulties arose, through Callirrhoe's longing for the fatal necklace of Harmonia and Eriphyle. Alcmeon went to Psophis to get it for her from Alpheisiboea, and was killed by the latter's brothers. According to one version,⁹¹ Alpheisiboea avenged her former husband's death by killing her brothers in return;⁹² according to another they were dispatched by the sons of Alcmeon by his other marriage, who had been sworn to revenge by

(*Rhet.* 2. 23. 1397b6; = Theod. fr. 2 Nauck): τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν (sc. the gods?), ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν; although the more natural interpretation is that Alcmeon is admitting to Alpheisiboea that it was wrong for him to do the deed (and therefore, by implication, that he did it knowingly).

⁸⁷ See below on 14. 53b25-26.

⁸⁸ See *Rhet.*, loc. cit. — Fragments of Eur.'s *Alc. through Psophis* in *Pap. gr. e lat.* 13. 1, Florence, 1949, 54 ff., no. 1302; see the important article of Schadewaldt, *Hermes* 80 (1952) 46-66.

⁸⁹ See Pickard-Cambridge, loc. cit.

⁹⁰ This extension connects Alcmeon with Delphi; see Stoll in Roscher's *Lexikon*, I. 244. His visit to Delphi was the subject of Achaëus' satyr-play *Alcmeon*: P.-R. 962 n. 1.

⁹¹ Propert. I. 15. 15-16.

⁹² Apparently through the agency of Alcmeon's brother Amphiloehus. This version, it seems, formed the plot of the Greek original of Accius' *Alpheisiboea*: P.-R. 963.

their mother Callirrhoe, and who killed king Phegeus and his queen into the bargain.⁸³

Euripides, in one of his last plays, *Alcmeon in Corinth*,⁸⁴ gave the checkered career of Alcmeon a completely different twist by making the hero marry the seeress Manto and leave their two children, Amphilocheus and Tisiphone, with king Creon at Corinth to be brought up. Tisiphone is sold into slavery and comes into the hands of her own father, who only 'recognizes' her after he has returned to Corinth to claim his children. We have already indicated (see note 86) that incest between Alcmeon and his daughter may have been the *pathos* "in the tragedy itself" in Astydamos' *Alcmeon* (*Poetics* 14. 53b33), which perhaps was modeled after the *Alcmeon in Corinth*. In any case Euripides' play anticipates the New Comedy.

This rich assortment of slayings of kin (Eriphyle by her son, Alcmeon by his brothers-in-law, they and their father by his sons) and other pollutions (incest between Alcmeon and his daughter?), with attendant purifications (Alcmeon purified by Phegeus and/or Achelous, or by Delphi, or by Manto) and recognitions (Alcmeon recognizes either his mother or his daughter, and the killings which follow his death may have been preceded or followed by recognitions), sufficiently justifies Alcmeon's place at the head of Aristotle's list. We may notice also the parallels with Oedipus (the land of Psophis unfruitful because of Alcmeon's blood-guilt, Apollodorus 3. 7. 5. 3; Alcmeon a wanderer who does not know where he can end his days, until he finds the new land at the mouth of the Achelous; incest) and Orestes (matricide to avenge a father; the hero pursued by the Eriny[e]s of his mother; prominent role of Delphi)—parallels which if not invented were certainly accentuated by the tragedians and give all the stories alluded to by Aristotle something of a family character.

2. Oedipus hardly needs commentary here,⁸⁵ nor

⁸³ Apollodorus 3. 7. 6. As so often, we cannot say whose version this is, but it certainly comes from a tragedy.

⁸⁴ Middle play of the trilogy which was produced by the younger Euripides after his father's death, the other two plays being the *Iphigenia in Aulis* and the *Bacchae*. See Schmid 1. 3. 656-657.

⁸⁵ Except to remind the reader that besides Sophocles' two plays there were single *Oedipus* tragedies by at least ten other poets (Aeschylus, Achaëus, Carcinus, Euripides, Philocles, Xenocles, Nicomachus the Elder and the Younger, Theodectes, and Lycophron; possibly also Sosigenes), and an *Oedipodeia* (tetralogy) by Meletus; not to mention plays which continue the story of Oedipus's unhappy

3. Orestes, except that under his name Aristotle perhaps means to imply others also of the chain of fearful crimes that began with Atreus. Obviously it is no mere coincidence that the Atreus-Thyestes-Agammemnon-Clytemnestra-Orestes cycle was the richest in crimes involving blood-kin and likewise the most popular in fifth-century tragedy.⁹⁶ We notice also that the further history of Orestes provides one of Aristotle's favorite examples of recognition.⁹⁷

4. Meleager's death was brought about by his mother Althaea, either by a curse (the epic form of the legend) or by burning the half-burnt log which contained his spark of life (the popular and presumably older version).⁹⁸ The reason for her action was that Meleager had killed her brothers.⁹⁹ Bacchylides, 5. 127ff., in the earliest extant passage that gives us any details, makes Meleager say (to Heracles, in Hades) that he had killed his uncles by accident, in a hot fight where it is hard to recognize a 'dear one' (οὐ γὰρ | καρτερόθυμος Ἄρης | κρίνει φίλον ἐν πολέμῳ, | τυφλὰ δ' ἐκ χειρῶν βέλη | ψυχᾶς ἐπὶ δυσμενέων φοιτᾷ θάνατόν τε φέρει | τοῖσιν ἄν δαίμων θέλη), and complains bitterly that his mother "did not take that into account." We—and Bacchylides before us¹⁰⁰—find it hard to understand the psychology of a woman who would slay her own son to avenge her brothers, or of an age to which the slaying

family: *Antigone*, *Phoenician Women*, etc. See Robert, *Oedipus*, 1, Berlin, 1915, 491-494.

⁹⁶ Leaving the Thyestes-Atreus branch of the story aside to be dealt with below, we have four tragedies dealing directly or indirectly with Orestes' killing of his mother (Aesch. *Cho.*, Soph. *El.*, Eur. *El.*, *Or.*) and know of five dealing with his trial before the Areopagus (Aesch. *Eum.*; Carcinus, Euripides the Younger, Timotheus, Theodectes) and two with the affair in the land of the Taurians (Eur. *I.T.*: Timotheus; for the supposed play by Polyidus the Sophist see below on 17. 55b10). We may also recall the three dramas concerning the sacrifice of Iphigenia (Aeschylus; Sophocles; Eur. *I.A.*).

⁹⁷ 11. 52b5-8; 17. 55b9. See also above on 11. 52a31, where it was suggested that the meeting of Orestes and Clytemnestra is an example of a recognition εἰς ἔχθραν.

⁹⁸ See J. T. Kakridis, *Phllo.* 90 (1935) 1-9; *id.*, *Homeric Researches*, Lund, 1949, 34-39; W. Kraus, *WS* 63 (1948) 8-21.

⁹⁹ Homer mentions only one brother, I 567, and makes as little as possible of the incident, the tone and purpose of the Meleager story in the *Iliad* being quite different; see W. Schadewaldt, *Hiastudien*, Leipzig, 1938, 139-142.

¹⁰⁰ The poet can no longer find a sensible reason for Althaea's wrath. Cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 602-611, where her deed is sternly reprehended, as a parallel to that of Clytemnestra, but no motive is mentioned for it.

of a *mother's* kin was an especially heinous crime.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless his version certainly represents the original point of Meleager's story, before it was overlaid by the gradually increasing mass of detail about the Calydonian hunt. The tale was dramatized by Phrynichus in his *Pleuroniae* and by Sophocles, Euripides, Antiphon (not the sophist or the orator),¹⁰² and Sosigenes under the title *Meleager*. The only one of these tragedies we can tell much about¹⁰³ is that of Euripides, which brought Atalanta to the center of the stage as the hero's *fiancée*.¹⁰⁴ But any of them may well have exploited the moment when Meleager realizes that it is his uncles he has killed, or possibly the moment when he realizes that his mother is responsible for his death.¹⁰⁵

5. Thyestes' fearful banquet on the flesh of his sons is perhaps the most famous single act of horror in Greek tragedy, so famous as to make us forget that it was a *hamartia* in Aristotle's sense. The material was worked by Euripides, Agathon, Carcinus, Apollodorus, Chaeremon, Cleophon, Diogenes of Sinope,¹⁰⁶ Ennius, Curiatius Maternus, and Seneca under the title *Thyestes*, by Sophocles and by Accius and other Romans under that of *Atreus*, and by Lycophron and Accius under *Pelopidae*. Actually Sophocles wrote an *Atreus or Mycenaean Women*, dealing with the golden lamb and Thyestes' seduction of his brother's wife, Aerope, and two tragedies named *Thyestes*.¹⁰⁷ The first of the latter, *Thyestes in Sicyon*, told of the deliberate incest of Thyestes with his daughter Pelopia, who bore him the avenger Aegisthus. In the second, which was a Euripidean intrigue-play *par excellence*, the incest occurs again,¹⁰⁸ but this time *δι' ἀμαγτίαν*: Thyestes does not know

¹⁰¹ For possible 'matriarchal' implications see Kakridis, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰² See *Rhet.* 2. 2. 1379b15.

¹⁰³ Phrynichus' play dealt with or told of the death of Meleager, and much in the spirit of Bacchylides (whose poem was perhaps influenced by the play: P.-R. 92) and Aeschylus (see n. 100 above), to judge by fr. 6 Nauck²: ὄκεια δὲ νιν φλόξ κατεδαίσατο | δαλοῦ περθόμενον ματρός ὑπ' αἰνᾶς κακομηχάνου. —There were *Meleager* comedies by Strattis, Philyllus, Philetærus, Antiphanes, Alexis; see T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 297.

¹⁰⁴ P.-R. 98-100; Kuhnert in Roscher's *Lexikon*, 2. 2500. The *Atalanta's* ascribed to Aeschylus and Aristias are entirely obscure: Schmid 1. 2. 431 n. 7. On the popularity of the play see Webster, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Bacchyl. 5. 152, γνῶν δ' ὀλιγοσθενέων.

¹⁰⁶ Note the popularity of the subject in the late fifth and the fourth century.

¹⁰⁷ See P.-R. 298-299; A. Lesky, *WS* 43 (1922/23) 172-198.

¹⁰⁸ Lesky, *op. cit.* 177-181, makes the second play center exclusively around the murder of Thyestes' sons and the 'banquet,' reserving the incest theme for the *Thyestes in Sicyon*.

the identity of his daughter. The child Aegisthus is then left with Atreus to be brought up.¹⁰⁹ Later, at the behest of their father, Agamemnon and Menelaus go to Delphi and bring back Thyestes, who is thrown in prison and is about to be slain by his own son—again at Atreus' behest—when an *anagnorisis* ensues and Thyestes recognizes both his son and his daughter (who, be it remembered, is also the son's mother);¹¹⁰ whereupon Pelopia kills herself and Aegisthus dispatches Atreus with the same sword.¹¹¹ Whether some of the later *Thyestes* tragedies dramatized this part of the hero's career we do not know, but it is certainly possible in view of the spectacular possibilities Sophocles had opened up for recognitions and peripeties.

It should be remembered that Thyestes was mentioned above, at line 11, in the same breath with Oedipus, as a suitable tragic hero. It would seem to follow that Aristotle shared the growing tendency to regard Thyestes as the injured party, more sinned against than sinning.¹¹² In any case the striking thing is how the story of the Pelopidae developed the same 'complex' traits as that of Oedipus—and at the hands of Sophocles himself, not Euripides.

6. Telephus, the son of Heracles and Auge, is the hero of no less than four episodes which involve peripeties and/or recognitions, three of them precipitated by the shedding or threatened shedding of kindred blood.

a. Telephus is exposed at birth (cf. Oedipus) and brought up by king Corythus in another part of Arcadia. Not knowing the secret of his birth, and taunted with his bastardy (cf. Oedipus again)¹¹³ by the sons of king Aleos—his uncles—he finally kills them (cf. Meleager). Aleos comes to avenge them but recognizes Telephus and realizes that this is the fate prophesied by Delphi for his sons at the hands of his

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Euripides' *Alcmeon in Corinth*, above.

¹¹⁰ The three plays may have formed a trilogy; see Schmid 1. 2. 441.

¹¹¹ A peripety similar to that referred to in 11. 52a27, in Theodectes' *Lynceus*, where the intended executee survives and the intending executioner is slain instead.

¹¹² He was, however, involved in another family crime, this time in conjunction with his brother; for the two of them had begun their gory careers by doing away with their half-brother Chrysippus (the deed being instigated by their mother Hippodamia) and being cursed therefor by Pelops: Thuc. 1. 9. 2; Schol. II. B 105, = Hellanicus fr. 157 Jacoby (see J.'s note). The incident was the subject of Sophocles' *Hippodamia*, if that play was not identical with the *Oenomaus*: see C. Robert, *Oedipus*, 1, Berlin, 1915, 405-408.

¹¹³ See J. Schmidt in Roscher's *Lexikon*, 5. 277; P.-R. 1145.

grandson.¹¹⁴ This is the story dramatized by Sophocles in the *Aleadae*;¹¹⁵ but it was already presupposed, if not told, by Aeschylus in his *Mysians*, for the person who "came from Tegea to Mysia without speaking," *Poetics* 24. 60a32, is undoubtedly the Aeschylean Telephus, under the ban of Delphi (cf. Orestes, Oedipus) until he has been purified for the shedding of kindred blood.¹¹⁶

b. Euripides gave the story a different ending in his *Auge*. Telephus is born on Mt. Parthenion and hidden by his mother in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea, where she is priestess. Hereupon pestilence and famine besiege the country (cf. Oedipus), and at the command of Aleos the child is exposed. He is later found by his own father, Heracles, who recognizes him by his ring which Auge has set out with the baby (a recognition by 'token,' à la New Comedy), and brought back to Tegea, where Heracles achieves a reconciliation between grandfather, mother, and son.¹¹⁷ The slaying of the Aleadae, naturally, does not appear.

c. Telephus and his mother have been separated. He comes to Mysia and is welcomed by king Teuthras and offered the hand of the latter's adopted daughter, who is none other than Telephus' own mother Auge. On the wedding night Auge, out of loyalty to Heracles, prepares to slay her new bridegroom, but is prevented by a snake which rises out of the ground, and finally recognizes her son.¹¹⁸ This is the plot of Sophocles' *Mysians*.¹¹⁹

d. Telephus is wounded by Achilles at the abortive first landing of the Achaeans in Asia Minor (in Teuthrania) and subsequently appears, seeking to be healed, at their second gathering at Argos or Mycenae.¹²⁰ For this purpose he disguises himself as a beggar (hence the Euripidean

¹¹⁴ Alcidas, *Odysseus* 14 (In Blass's 2nd ed. of Antiphon, p. 187).

¹¹⁵ See Welcker, *Die griechischen Tragödien*, 1, Bonn, 1839, 406-414; Jebb-Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 46-57; M. Frombold-Treu, *Hermes* 69 (1934) 324-328.

¹¹⁶ The identification was first made by Tyrwhitt (see Welcker, *Die Aeschyleische Trilogie...*, Darmstadt, 1824, 562) with the help of the *Appendix Proverbiorum*, 2. 85 (Schneidewin-Leutsch, *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum*, 1, Göttingen, 1839, 411-412).

¹¹⁷ The plot was recovered by Wilamowitz, *Analecta Euripidea*, Berlin, 1875, 186 ff.; see also Wernicke, PW 2. 2302-2303.

¹¹⁸ Note the partial parallel with Merope, 14. 54a5.

¹¹⁹ See Welcker, *Die griech. Trag.* 1. 414-416; Jebb-Pearson 2. 70-77.

¹²⁰ The underlying principle is *ὁ τρώσας ἰδοεταί*; see J. Schmidt in Roscher's *Lexikon*, 5. 284.

king-in-rags at whom Aristophanes never tires of poking fun),¹²¹ but is finally recognized and flees to the altar for protection, taking with him the young Orestes whom he has either snatched or persuaded Clytemnestra to lend him for the purpose.¹²² The latter touch is due to Aeschylus (*Telephus*), who may have influenced or been influenced by the famous case of Themistocles at the court of the Molossi in Epirus.¹²³ Sophocles, as we now know,¹²⁴ wrote a *Telephieia* trilogy, which probably consisted¹²⁵ of the *Alceadae*, the *Mysians*, and the *Assembling of the Achaeans* (representing our subdivisions a, c, and d); but the best-known and most imitated play was Euripides' *Telephus*.¹²⁶

The most conspicuous features of these myths—or rather these plot-patterns, because we are not talking about the Greek myths in their state of innocence but about the very self-conscious and often wayward new creations made out of them by the tragedians—are (a) the concentration of deeds of horror involving close blood-kin, and (b) the number of *hamartiai* and corresponding recognitions the poets found or invented in connection with them. So far as (a) is concerned, nothing could surpass the stories of the Pelopidae and the Labdacidae. But the development of the Telephus cycle is equally interesting and significant because it shows what a varied store of new 'angles' the poets (Sophocles and Euripides above all) could elicit from a minor legend.

Thus Aristotle's list has the closest possible connection with his prescriptions for the best tragic plot. These are the stories upon which the poets have come to concentrate because they offer the right kind of *pathē*, namely those ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις, and an opportunity for *hamartia* and recognition. Δεινά, tuen (a22), has to be interpreted in the light of 14. 53b14 (ποῖα οὖν δεῖνὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ ... λάβωμεν) and the rest of chapter 14, where the doctrine of the tragic *pathē* and of the pos-

¹²¹ *Acharn.* 326-357, 432-463, 496-556, 577; *Knights* 813, 1240; *Clouds* 891, 922; *Peace* 528; *Lys.* 706; *Frogs* 855, 864, 1400; *Thesm.* 76-77, 466-519, 689-727.

¹²² An especially popular motif in art: see Schmidt, *op. cit.* 304-307.

¹²³ Thuc. 1. 136. 3; see E. Howald, *Die griech. Tragödie*, Munich, 1930, 92; P.-R. 1154.

¹²⁴ From the inscription found in Aixonal and published by A. A. Palaios, *Πολέμων* 1 (1929) 161-167. Most recent discussion, with bibliography, Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fests.* 52-54, 82.

¹²⁵ See Schmid 1. 2. 425; Fromhold-Treu, *op. cit.* (above, n. 115).

¹²⁶ We know of *Telephus* tragedies by Agathon, Cleophon, Iophon (?), Moschus, Ennius (modeled on Euripides), and Accius (on Sophocles).

sible interrelations between *pathos* and recognition are dealt with in detail for the first time. It seems possible, therefore, that our passage (a17-22) is a subsequent note by Aristotle; but in the absence of proof positive I have refrained from indicating this in the text lemma. It is, however, at least a parenthesis, as will become clear from what follows.

53a22-39

ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία ἐκ ταύτης
 τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστι (διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδῃ ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸ
 25 αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτι τοῦτο | δορᾷ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις
 [αἱ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν]· τοῦτο γὰρ
 ἐστὶν ὡσπερ εἴρηται ὀρθόν. σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· ἐπὶ
 γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται
 φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ
 30 ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιη-
 τῶν φαίνεται)· δευτέρω δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν
 ἐστὶν [σύστασις], ἣ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα, καθάπερ
 ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ
 χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθέν-
 35 νειαν· ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' | εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες
 τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἡδονὴ
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμωδίας οἰκεία. [ἐκεῖ γάρ, ἂν οἱ ἐχ-
 θιστοὶ ᾄδωσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἰγισθος, φίλοι
 γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει οὐδεὶς
 ὑπ' οὐδενός.]

53a22

The artistically finest kind of tragedy, then, is based upon
 this structure (hence the same error is made by those who
 25 criticize Euripides for | doing this in his tragedies [most of
 his end in misfortune]; for this is artistically correct in the
 way we have stated. A very weighty sign of this: in our
 theaters and the competitions such plays appeal to the
 audience as most tragic, if they follow the right principle,
 and Euripides, even though in other respects his construc-
 30 tion is faulty, nevertheless appeals to the audience | as the
 most tragic, at least, of the poets); and second is that [struc-
 ture] which is rated first by certain people, the one whose
 structure is double, like the *Odyssey*, and which has op-
 posite endings for the better and worse characters. The

- reason it is considered best is the weakness of our audiences;
 35 for the poets cater to the spectators, composing plays | the way they want them. But this is not a pleasure derived from tragedy but one that belongs more to comedy. [For there, even if the greatest enemies are in the story, such as Orestes and Aegisthus, they walk off the stage as friends at the end, and nobody is killed by anybody.]

As the text is usually printed and punctuated, the first part of the passage (a22-30) is dominated entirely by the concept of the unhappy ending. This meaning appears to be fixed for *τοῦτο* (a24) by the immediately following clause *αὶ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν* (Rostagni's text), and the second *τοῦτο* (a26) and *αἱ τοιαῦται* (a28) are defined in turn by the same clause. Thus we have a clear enough, certainly a simple enough, sequence of ideas. Euripides makes most of his plays end unhappily, and this practice has been censured, but wrongly; for unhappy endings are the right thing (*ὀρθόν*, a26) and Euripides, though his handling of plots leaves much to be desired in other respects, is at least the most tragic of the poets (because he uses them).

But this exclusive concentration on the unhappy ending by no means does justice to Aristotle's theory. He has laid it down in a12-17 that the plot of the finest tragedy must (a) be simple, not double, (b) involve a 'change' from happiness to unhappiness rather than the other way round, and (c) be motivated by a *hamartia*. All these requirements, therefore, not merely the second one, should be included in the summary phrase *ταύτης τῆς συστάσεως* (a23). One of the chief reasons for the misinterpretation of the latter, and therefore of the whole passage, is that the sentence has been read in direct connection with what immediately precedes, particularly the words *ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι* (which taken by themselves strongly suggest the unhappy ending); whereas actually *ταύτης τῆς συστάσεως* refers all the way back to the definition of the *καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον* in a12-17. For, as we noted at the end of the last section, a17-22 is a parenthesis, if not actually an added note by Aristotle (see also below on *τὸ αὐτό*, a24).

When one inspects our passage it becomes apparent that the only support for the limitation of meaning (to unhappy endings) which can be found within the passage itself is the clause *καὶ (αἱ, αἱ, καὶ αἱ) πολλὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν*; and this is precisely the only clause whose text causes difficulty. *Καὶ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ* is too weak, as Gudeman says; if the sentence were genuine we should have

to accept Knebel's proposal *καὶ αἰ*¹²⁷ But with or without *αἰ* the clause still gives difficulty. Standing where it does, it must be a part of the accusation (*ἐγκαλοῦντες ... ὅτι κτλ.*) Aristotle is quoting, in which case it seems a useless doublet of *τοῦτο ὁρᾷ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις*; and *αὐτοῦ* is decidedly *gauche*: one would expect *αὐτῶν*.¹²⁸

All the difficulties disappear at a stroke when one recognizes that *αἰ πολλαὶ ... τελευτῶσιν* is an interpolation.¹²⁹ *Αὐτοῦ* has a sensible reference (to *Εὐριπίδῃ*) in the hands of a scholiast, which it could not have as a part of Aristotle's sentence. The motive for the note is clear enough also. The passage reports a charge against Euripides and defends him against it, at some length, but without specifying explicitly what it is. The note fills this gap according to the annotator's lights.¹³⁰

We can now read the passage as Aristotle intended it. The critics of Euripides are not the same persons (note *καὶ οἱ Εὐρ. ἐγκαλοῦντες*) as those who maintained the superiority of the 'double' plot,¹³¹ but the mistake they make is the same.¹³² What is it they object to, then? The whole complex of principles which Aristotle has just set forth above, and which he is commending Euripides for following. First, that his plays have single rather than double outcomes; the latter, as Aristotle indicates below (a33), were more popular "owing to the weakness of the audiences."¹³³ Second, that so many of them

¹²⁷ Postagni's *αἰ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ*, which he translates "le quall in gran numero (aggett. in funzione avverb.) da parte di lui ecc.," is surely impossible. If *πολλαὶ* is adverbial, *αὐτοῦ* is left hanging in mid-air. In fact, *πολλαὶ* not only has to be adjectival but must be understood as substantivized, if *αὐτοῦ* is to have anything to depend on: (*αἰ*) *πολλαὶ* (sc. *τραγωδίαι*) *αὐτοῦ*, "many (most) of his (tragedies)."

¹²⁸ The other alternative, to take the clause as Aristotle's own comment ("and many of his [tragedies] do in fact end in unhappiness"), is hardly viable (one would expect *καὶ γάρ*) and does not solve the difficulty of *αὐτοῦ* either.

¹²⁹ I have accepted *αἰ* from the Riccardianus, considering the corruption *αἰ* → *καὶ* more likely than the reverse.

¹³⁰ Or, just possibly, it seeks to add something concrete to the rather jejune *τοῦτο ὁρᾷ*.

¹³¹ The latter, we suggested, were more theoretically inclined, whereas the detractors of Euripides may, as Sykutris suggests, be comic poets (or even a single comic poet): cf. Aristophanes' jeers, *Ach.* 420 ff., at Euripides' miserable heroes ("No, not Oeneus's rags," says Dicaeopolis; "it was somebody miserabler than that"). But see below on *καταρρωθῶσιν κτλ.*, a28.

¹³² *Τὸ αὐτό* is the best proof that the passage refers straight back to a12-17.

¹³³ This reason is to be distinguished from that of the unnamed critics who argued for the 'double' plot: their reasons are not given. Audience popularity is

ended unhappily; but we need no longer regard this as the main burden of the complaint. Third, and most important, that so many of Euripides' heroes are victims of error or in some other way have fallen into misfortune without being the cause of it. In short, the critique alluded to here would be above all an expression of distaste (whether or not the critic was aware of the reasons for his feeling) at that peculiarly Euripidean figure, the suffering hero.¹³⁴

To this attack Aristotle replies that "this [i.e., the three-fold method: *hamartia*, 'single' outcome, unhappiness] is correct in the way that has been stated."¹³⁵ *Ὁρθόν* deserves some attention. Not a common word in the *Poetics*, it appears once in chapter 22¹³⁶ and several times in chapter 25, where *ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην* (sc. *τὴν ποιητικὴν*) *ὀρθότης* is distinguished from other kinds of correctness, 60b13 ff., and is listed at the end of the chapter, 61b24, as one of the five categories of accusation against poetry. It is a Platonic concept, or at least came to Aristotle from Plato; see above all *Laws* 2. 667b-669b, where the 'correctness,' *ὀρθότης*, of a work of art is distinguished sharply from the pleasure and the benefit it may give. Aristotle has reoriented the Platonic concept, since he does not contrast correctness with pleasure. Indeed he goes on in this very passage to say that plays which are 'correct,' i.e., follow his definition of the best plot, are also received by the public as most tragic—from which we can infer that they give the special pleasure which is proper to tragedy (below, a35; compare 14. 53b11-13). Nevertheless the idea has its roots in Plato.¹³⁷

a criterion more in line with the tastes of the critics of Euripides, if as we have suggested they were poets.

¹³⁴ Every one of the heroes mentioned in the passage cited above, *Acharnians* 420-434, is a sufferer at the hands of others (though not always as a result of *hamartia* in Aristotle's sense): Oeneus, dethroned and imprisoned by the sons of Agrius; Phoenix, led into an erotic intrigue and ultimately into exile by his mother's machinations; Philoctetes, abandoned by his companions on Lemnos; Bellerophon, victim of the Potiphar's-wife motif (*Sitheneboea*; cf. *Hippolytus*) and later abandoned by gods and men (*Bellerophon*); Telephus; and Ino (particularly strong use of the *ἄγνοια* motif: see Schmid 1. 3. 407). See Schadewaldt, *Hermes* 80 (1952) 64.

¹³⁵ Again *ὡσπερ εἴρηται* has a substantive, not a merely verbal reference. The substance of the remark has been given before, not its precise form. See below on 24. 60a3.

¹³⁶ In a context much like the present one, referring to a certain line of criticism, 58b5: *ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς γέγουσιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου* (viz. the use of lengthened, curtailed, or 'altered' forms of words) *καὶ διακωμωδοῦντες τὸν ποιητὴν*.

¹³⁷ *Ὁρθόν* is therefore perhaps another small index of early date for the *Poetics*.

All this may serve as background for the ambiguous phrase *ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν*. The suggestion that Aristotle means the necessity of good acting and a good stage presentation is an old one; but Bywater and Gudeman, following Düntzer, rightly reject it on the ground that that necessity is common to all dramas, not merely to the most tragic. What Aristotle actually means is that "such plays appeal to the audience¹³⁸ as most tragic, if they are correctly made" (or, "if they succeed" [i.e., in following the rules laid down by the art]).¹³⁹ The point of the remark is rather different than is usually supposed. Aristotle is conducting an argument against a group of *detrectatores Euripidis* who object to the very traits in Euripides which Aristotle believes to be correct. In proof he offers as the "greatest sign" the fact that such plays, when constructed according to his three-fold rule, do appeal to an audience—and that Euripides does 'get across' (*φαίνεται*) to audiences as the most tragic of the poets.¹⁴⁰ The 'sign,' together with the remark about the weakness of the audience (below, a33), allows us to infer the critics' argument in turn. It was the one we hear so often nowadays: that audiences "don't like" (i.e., don't get any pleasure from) tragic plays or movies, that the ordinary man likes to see the hero win out and the villain "get his." To this Aristotle replies below that that is all very well, it is indeed a kind of pleasure, but of the comic, not the tragic variety. Here his answer—which is put forward, be it noted, not as a direct argument but as a 'sign'—is that audiences

¹³⁸ *Φαίνονται*, like *φαίνεται* below, of the actual transitive effect, the way the work 'looks' to an audience. See below on 19. 56b5; 24. 60a34.

¹³⁹ Aristotle, like his countrymen in general, often uses *κατορθοῦν* simply to mean 'succeed' (in any endeavor, whether by luck or skill); so *Rhet.* 1. 6. 1363 a33; *ibid.* 9. 1368a14; 2. 2. 1379a16; 3. 9. 1410a9 (quotation); [Ar.] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 5. 1427a16; 30. 1437b6; *E. N.* 6. 10. 1142b30 (?); *De Caelo* 2.12. 292a28 (?). But he also uses it to denote 'being right', doing a thing correctly according to the laws of virtue or another art: *Pol.* 7. 3. 1325-b6; *E. N.* 2. 5. 1106b26: *ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς ... ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν ..., τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς. Eth. Eud.* 7. 14. (8. 2) 1247a4, 13, 15, 30 are especially interesting: the so-called 'lucky people' (*εὐτυχεῖς*), succeed, *κατορθοῦσι*, by chance, but one may also *κατορθοῦν* by foresight or reasoning (a30).

¹⁴⁰ Gudeman, in his bluff uncompromising way, starting with the premise that by 'tragic' Aristotle means only the use of unhappy endings, finds a discrepancy in the statistics, which show that Euripides has very few more unhappy endings, proportionally, than Sophocles. Hence Gudeman's unfortunate proposal to read *τραγικώτερός γε*, which throws away Aristotle's point.

do like and respond to 'tragic' tragedies, if they are constructed according to the *hamartia*—unhappiness—single—outcome rule he has deduced. The objectors are wrong, then, on their own ground; not that audience reaction *per se* is the final test of art, but that audiences do respond to art when it is true to itself.

In assessing Aristotle's meaning it is essential to remember that for him the production of tragic effects is an effect of the *plot* above all, and that the poetic art has to do with the plot above everything else. Thus in praising Euripides as the most tragic of the tragedians he is not setting his management of plots against certain other (unspecified) 'tragic' qualities. That meaning has indeed been read into *εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ*, but it is the result of inattention to what Aristotle says. If Euripides "does not manage or construct well in other respects" (for by common consent *οἰκονομεῖ* refers to plot construction),¹⁴¹ then he must construct well in the respects under discussion here, and those are the 'tragic' aspects which have occupied us since the end of chapter 9. The "other things" are the other general points of dramatic construction which were dealt with in chapters 7 and 8: order, suitable length, unity. The judgment is well taken, and much sharper than the *cliché* with which Aristotle is usually credited: Euripides emerges from the arena with a higher rating, but also with a keener assessment of his faults, than we had been led to think.

Moreover it seems to me that the whole discussion, both Aristotle's defense of Euripides and the line of attack which it implies on the part of his critics, is more specialized and technical than has generally been thought. The defense is that his method of plot-construction is the best *κατὰ τὴν τέχνην*. Does not this imply that his detractors were speaking from the same point of view (though not from so theoretical a one as the *τινές* who preferred the double plot *per se*)? In other words, are they not also persons who are interested in the dramatic art, and in plot-construction, in a technical way? Theodectes, for example, in spite of his penchant for Euripidean plots and effects,¹⁴² might be capable of such a criticism; and the idea we have inferred as lying behind it, viz., that "the public doesn't like tragedies with unhappy endings," smacks of a practising poet.¹⁴³ In any case the

¹⁴¹ See Gudeman *ad loc.*

¹⁴² E. Diehl, *PW* 5A. 1724, 36.

¹⁴³ *Εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ*, with its technical use of the verb (earliest known instance), may point in the same direction if, as seems very likely, it echoes the critic(s) whom Aristotle is answering. So also perhaps *σίστασις*, which

discussion shows us that Euripides' monarchy of the theater did not go entirely unchallenged in the fourth century.

The connection of the following clause (*δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη κτλ.*, a30) with the beginning of our passage (*ἡ μὲν οὖν ... καλλίστη τραγωδία*, a22) is so close that the whole sequence on Euripides, a23-30 (*διὸ καὶ ... φαίνεται*), must be a parenthesis, if not actually an added note (i.e., added by Aristotle). It is in the same case, then, as a17-22. The main argument moves from a17 to a22-23 (*ἡ μὲν οὖν ... συστάσεώς ἐστι*) to a30 ff.: the best tragic plot is first defined, then referred to as the best, then the one which is rated first by others is shown to be only second-best.

As for the details of the last few lines of the chapter (a30-39), there is nothing in them that requires special commentary¹⁴⁴ except the very last remark, a36 ff. After saying that in this type of plot the outcome is opposite for the good and bad (or better and worse) characters, how can Aristotle compare it to a comedy where Orestes and Aegisthus patch things up and walk off the stage friends and "nobody gets killed"? Certainly such an ending is not remotely like that of the *Odyssey*, and it is not in any way *ἐξ ἐναντίας*. Moreover there is no clue to the psychological question whether or why the theater audience would like a play which sent good and bad offstage arm in arm.¹⁴⁵

Most of the commentators seem not to have been disturbed by this complete *non sequitur*,¹⁴⁶ but we can hardly pass it by. The suspicion of spuriousness seems to me considerably strengthened by two facts: (1) the universal manuscript reading *ἂν οἱ*, and (2) the meaning that

is used by itself, not merely as a variant on *μῦθος*, and without its customary supplement, *τῶν πραγμάτων*.

¹⁴⁴ We will discuss the characterization of the *Odyssey* (as having a 'double structure') later, in connection with its characterization as *ἡθικὴ* in 24. 59b16: see below *ad loc.* There is nothing particularly noteworthy about Aristotle's citing the *Odyssey* as his example of the 'double' ending. Its final scene (that is, the Slaying of the Suitors) was the most gripping example he could think of for an ending calculated to please the public (cf. *Ion*'s description of the audience's excitement when he recites it, Pl. *Ion* 535b).

¹⁴⁵ Alexis' *Orestes* may have done so, as Meineke suggested; but that does not help with our problem.

¹⁴⁶ Susemihl did notice it, but took the improbable course (following Heinsius) of indicating a lacuna before *ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὐτή*, in which Aristotle would have spoken of a third and still poorer kind of tragedy with a happy ending for *all* the characters. There is no room for such a third variety, unless somebody could devise a *τριπλῆ σύστασις*. Gudeman notices the anomaly also, but offers no solution.

has to be given to *μῦθος* here. Nowhere else in the *Poetics* does *μῦθος* mean the original story as distinguished from the poet's version, as it must here. An excellent basis for comparison is the very next lines, 14. 53b4, 7, where *μῦθον* and *τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίποδος μῦθον* both mean *the plot as the poet shapes it*. In short, the use of *μῦθος* in our passage is un-Aristotelian.¹⁴⁷ And *ἀν οἱ* (for which Bonitz proposed the generally accepted *οἱ ἄν*) is equally so. *Οἱ ἄν* is smoother, but much too sweeping: it is not true that "whoever are most hostile in the myth turn out friends" in comedy. *Ἄν οἱ ἐχθιστοὶ οἶσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ* is what our author wrote: "if (i.e., even if)¹⁴⁸ the greatest enemies are (there, given) in the myth." The sentence is an interpolation (that is, a marginal note which has subsequently been interpolated into the text) by someone who felt that the nature of the comic plot was not clear enough in the original.

I have, in addition, followed Twining and others in bracketing the word *σύστασις* in a31.¹⁴⁹ Thus we have marked three interpolations in the passage: a higher proportion than we have found anywhere since chapter 6. Perhaps we may connect this phenomenon with the presence of the spurious chapter 12 in the immediate vicinity, which indicates particular interest on the part of somebody in this section of Aristotle's work. It is to be noticed that chapter 12 and the two longer interpolations here have in common an interest in literature and literary history. They smell of *γραμματική*, as does also the pedantic annotation on *ὁ μὲν* and *ὁ δέ* in a5-6 above.

¹⁴⁷ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*³ 236-239 (¶1. 295-298, n. 1 to p. 266). Vahlen is quite right in saying that *μῦθος* in the *Poetics* can designate either the poet's material (the 'myth': e.g., 9. 51b24; 13. 53a18; 14. 53b22) or his shaping, composition, of the material (the 'plot')—the latter being much the commoner meaning. But none of the instances of the first meaning show *μῦθος* as a fixed, independent entity which can be set *over against* the poem, as here. Here the persons in question are great enemies "in the myth." The word is used exactly as we would use it, but how could one designate the implied contrast? Not that they turn out friends *ἐν τῷ μύθῳ* or *ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει*. *Ἐν τῷ ποιήματι?* *Ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ?*

¹⁴⁸ But Spengel's *καὶν οἱ* is not necessary.

¹⁴⁹ *Σύστασις ... σύστασιν ἔχουσα* is an intolerable tautology. Naturally we are to supply *τραγωδία* from a23. Aristotle wrote the clause in strict and direct parallel with a22-23, *ἡ μὲν οὖν ... καλλίστη τραγωδία κτλ.*, but the intervention of the long parenthesis a23-30 left its connection obscure and led someone—no doubt the same person who wrote the two longer notes—to supply a subject. Cf. 4. 49a14, *ἡ τραγωδία*.

53b1-14

- ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερόν καὶ ἑλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεσθαι· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἔστι πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνοτος. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὄραν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν
- 5 | ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἑλεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερόν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγωδία κοινωνοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἑλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανερόν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον.

53b1

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- Now it is possible for the fearful and pathetic effect to come from the costuming; but it is also possible for it to come from the structure of events itself, which is theoretically prior and the mark of a better poet. For even without seeing the play, the plot should be so constructed that anyone
- 5 who | hears the events as they unfold will both shudder and be moved to pity at the outcome: which is what one would feel at hearing the plot of the *Oedipus*. The attempt to produce this effect through the costuming is less artistic and something that requires the services of a choregus. But
- 10 those who try to produce through | the costuming not the effect of fear but merely that of the monstrous, have nothing in common with tragedy at all. For one must not seek any and every kind of pleasure from tragedy, but the one proper to it. And since it is the pleasure that comes from pity and fear by means of imitation which the poet should try to produce, it is clear that this must be built into the plot.

The chapter division is somewhat misleading. The question before us is still the same as at the beginning of chapter 13: granted that tragedy is to be an imitation of pathetic and fearful events—that is, that its function is to arouse pity and fear—what plot-structure will best accomplish this end? Aristotle has shown us which plot-structures are inadmissible, which is best, which is second-best. The latter (the 'double' plot) was an aberration in the direction of comedy. It remains, before Aristotle takes up the main problem again in greater detail (b14 ff.), to speak of two kinds or degrees of aberration in another direction: (1) the reliance on purely visual means for exciting pity and fear, and (2) the use of visual means to arouse mere horror rather than tragic fear. The first is an inferior method, the second a caricature of tragedy. If we let melodrama stand for Aristotle's double plot, a certain number of modern 'tragedies'¹ may answer to (1), and the Grand Guignol shocker or the 'horror' film to (2). Aristotle's verdict on these deviations is short and sharp. What they have in common is that they try to make visual impressions take the place of tragic organization: that is, they substitute what is essentially a static effect for the dynamic working of a structure of *action*.

The first deviation operates with *ὄψεις* instead of "building pity and fear into" the structure of events (*ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιεῖν*, b13). The emotional implications of tragedy ought to be so thoroughly integral to the plot that one who merely "hears the events as they happen"²—as would be the case, says Aristotle, with one hearing *τὸν τοῦ Οἰδῖπου μῦθον*—would shudder and feel pity. Does he mean the story of Oedipus as it was fixed in outline by tradition, or the plot of the *Oedipus*, or "the story as told in the *Oedipus*" (i.e., as one would get it from reading the play itself)? All three views have been held by modern interpreters.³ But there cannot really be any doubt which of them is right. The reading of the whole play (the full text) cannot come into question here: Aristotle is still dealing with the structure

¹ Perhaps oftener in Europe than America, at least so far as the movies are concerned, since Hollywood has found it hard to abandon its tradition of 'slick' costuming and grooming.

² That is, as they unroll one after the other. See above on *ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων*, 7. 51a13, and *γινόμενης*, 10. 52a15.

³ The story in general: Hostagni, Hardy, Sykutris. The plot of Sophocles' play: Susemihl, Gomperz (? - "Erzählung der Ödipusfabel"), Bywater (? - "the mere recital of the story in *Oedipus*"). The play itself, in full: Butcher (p. 261: "in reading or witnessing the *Oedipus Tyrannus*"), Gudeman (p. 252), Valgimigli.

of the play as such and has not gotten to the writing-out stage.⁴ Nor does he mean the story in general: οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον just above (which we could paraphrase by τοιαύτην δεῖ εἶναι τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασιν) is too specific.⁵ The plot of the *Oedipus*, its outline or bare structure, before the play is written out, is what Aristotle has in mind. And the word πρότερον (b3) seems to confirm this. It cannot mean simply 'higher,' 'better'; that is contained in ποιητοῦ ἀμεινορος. The stage of composition of the plot is prior to that of writing out the play, and therefore *a fortiori* to that of staging it.⁶

But there is still an ambiguity about "the plot of the *Oedipus*," which will not bother us until later but which we might as well mention at once. The fearful and pathetic things that Oedipus has done are not actually in the play,⁷ they are only 'recognized' and alluded to in the play. The steps by which Oedipus comes to his recognition are not fearful or pathetic in themselves, but only because they circle around those incidents in the past, "outside the drama." Does "the plot of the *Oedipus*" include those incidents or not? It must, if the plot is to perform the emotional work of tragedy all by itself. If we pressed Aristotle, then, he might have to admit that the plot of a tragedy can include more than actually happens *in* (i.e., during) the tragedy. Some of the incidents may be outside the play but still in the plot.⁸ We shall return to this problem in discussing 18. 55b24-31.

The other aberration is even more deplorable, and Aristotle disposes of it even more quickly. Its chief interest for us is that it confirms our interpretation of δῦμις in chapter 6 as denoting the masks and costumes only and not including the stage-setting. There cannot be any doubt that under Greek conditions—in the open air, and with a stage-set which offered only limited possibilities of alteration for purposes of tone or mood—any emotional effect of the stage-arrangements must

⁴ See below on 17. 55a22ff.

⁵ It is true, as Rostagni says, that certain of the traditional myths have tragic potentiality: 13. 53a20. But 53b25 (see below) makes it clear that the poet's work of judgment and construction is the essential thing, whether he borrows his myth or invents it; and that is what Aristotle is talking about here.

⁶ Thinking back from this passage to Aristotle's phrase ἐν τῷ φανερόφ in 11. 52b12, we can see again how unlikely it is that he meant actual killings, wounding, etc., on stage.

⁷ Ἐξω τοῦ δράματος. b32 below.

⁸ Also they may or may not be "in" the traditional story that lies back of the play. We have to distinguish three things: story (unless the poet invents it himself, specifically for his play), plot, drama.

have come primarily from the masks and costumes. And indeed it is in connection with them, particularly in connection with the famous first staging of the *Eumenides*, that we hear of such effects.⁹ It is in fact very likely, as we said before,¹⁰ that Aristotle has Aeschylus' play particularly—though not exclusively—in mind.¹¹ His use of the plural (*ὄψεις*, 6. 50a13; *τῶν ὄψεων*, *ibid.* b20) favors the narrower sense '(masks and) costumes'; and so, I believe, does the term *χορηγία* in the present passage. The modern fashion is to take it as a metaphor, meaning "extraneous aids" (Butcher) in general.¹² We need not deny that there is some extension of meaning, since the *choregia* in the strict sense probably did not cover the actors' masks and costumes but only those of the chorus.¹³ But on the other hand it was associated definitely with the provision of masks and costumes, not with the stage-building or other stage arrangements. We can take it here, therefore, in its technical, proper sense, but without insisting on its limitation to the costuming of the chorus.

In justifying his rejection of mere horror-effects, Aristotle speaks for the second time (compare 13. 53a35) of a pleasure proper or peculiar to tragedy. Fortunately he goes on at once to define it as a pleasure which (1) comes from pity and fear and (2) is produced by (*διὰ*) imitation. Both these factors are essential to his meaning. Thus the seekers after mere horror, *τὸ τερατώδες*, are at fault because such horror is not fear of the proper tragic kind (i.e., fear based on a sense of kinship with the hero: *πρὸς τὸν ὁμοιον*). But they are also at fault because their effect is not produced by *imitation* in the proper sense (that is, the representation of human action, character, and 'thought'), but by a purely external means.¹⁴ The word-order in our clause (*ἀπὸ*

⁹ Suid. s.v. *Αἰσχύλος*: οὗτος πρῶτος εὗρε προσωπεῖα δεινὰ χρώμασι κεχρισμένα ἔχειν τοὺς τραγικούς: *Vita Aeschylī* 7, ταῖς γὰρ ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἐκπληξιν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται; *ibid.* 9, τινές δέ φασιν ἐν τῇ ἐπιδείξει τῶν *Ἐμμενίδων* σποράδων εἰσαγωγόντα τὸν χορὸν τοσοῦτον ἐκπληξαι τὸν δῆμον ὥστε τὰ μὲν νήπια ἐκφυῆσαι τὰ δὲ ἔμβρονα ἐξαμβλωθῆναι.

¹⁰ Above, on 6. 50b16-20.

¹¹ The terms used in the *Life of Aeschylus* (second note above) — *ἐκπληξιν τερατώδη* and *ἐκπληξαι* — may conceivably be a distant echo of some similar remark by Aristotle (not, obviously, of this one).

¹² See Bywater's note.

¹³ See Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 91.

¹⁴ Interesting for the implication as to what Aristotle means by 'imitation': not visual realism.

ἔλεου καὶ φόβου and διὰ μιμήσεως both enclosed by τὴν ... ἡδονήν), the contrast between this kind of pleasure and the others,¹⁵ and the conclusion that "this must be built into the events," all make it evident that both features are essential to the tragic pleasure and that the second is at least as important as the first. Furthermore the equation διὰ μιμήσεως ~ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποητέον certifies—if extra certification were needed—that μιμήσεως here means the plot specifically.¹⁶ Hence our complete formula is that the tragic pleasure must (1) grow out of pity and fear, and must, like them, (2) be integrally 'built into' the plot.¹⁷

This close affiliation of the two moments in the production of the tragic pleasure suggests the answer to a further question: how it is that pity and fear, which are painful feelings in their own right,¹⁸ can give rise to pleasure in tragedy. The answer, in general terms, must be that the pleasure is derived *from* (ἀπό) the pity and fear but *by means of* (διὰ) the imitation. The imitation—that is, according, ← to the equation we set up above, the plot—is what procures it. Now, unless we are to move in circles, we must say that the pleasure cannot stem simply from the emotional burden of the plot, the fact that it is made to represent pathetic and fearful incidents. There must be something else about it, *qua* imitation, which accounts for the metamorphosis of pain into pleasure. This could be either or both of two things: the aesthetic or purely dramatic qualities of the plot, its arrangement, length, continuity, and unity—in short, its beauty as a work of art—or the fact that it is an imitation and not life itself. In support of the aesthetic factors we can point out that in 23. 59a20 Aristotle ascribes an οἰκειά ἡδονή to the epic *qua* work of art (ἴν' ὡσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὄλον ποιῆ τὴν οἰκειάν ἡδονήν), and in support of the mimetic concept the equally important fact that in chapter 4 he designated the mimetic instinct (and the pleasure men derive from its products) as one of the two generating causes of all poetic art. To pursue these ideas through all their ramifications would lead us far beyond the

¹⁵ Another interesting implication: Aristotle is aware that people can get a kind of pleasure out of stage horrors.

¹⁶ Cf. 6. 50a3, ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις.

¹⁷ Τοῦτο, b13, refers to the whole complex τὴν ἀπὸ ἔλεου ... παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητὴν, that is, to the infinitive and all its dependents. The procuring of the pleasure, etc., must be 'built in.'

¹⁸ *Rhet.* 2. 5. 1382a21, ἔστω δὲ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ κτλ.; *ibid.* 8. 1385b13, ἔστω δὲ ἔλεος λύπη τις κτλ.

present passage; and it would be premature because not all the evidence is before us yet. We cannot even be sure at this point that Aristotle's thinking on the tragic pleasure constitutes a single, unified theory. What is important for our immediate purpose is to notice the emphasis he lays on the plot as the agent of the pleasure, and his inference that all "this" must be built into the events of the play. From these facts we can surmise, at least in a preliminary fashion, that *the way in which* the tragic events are 'built into' the action, the way they are fitted together to make a structure of events, a *σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*,¹⁸ will have a great deal to do with their capacity to give the tragic pleasure.

53b14-37

- ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν | συμπιπτόν-
των λάβωμεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ ἢ φίλων εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους
τὰς τοιούτας πράξεις ἢ ἐχθρῶν ἢ μηδετέρων. ἂν μὲν οὖν
ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρὸν, οὐδὲν ἔλεινόν οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλον,
πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος· οὐδ' ἂν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες·
20 ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ | πάθη, οἷον ἢ ἀδελφὸς
ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸς πατέρα ἢ μήτηρ υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸς μητέρα ἀπο-
κτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ, ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον δρᾶ, ταῦτα ζητητέον.
τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρελημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν·
λέγω δὲ οἷον τὴν Κλυταιμῆστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ
25 Ὅρεστου καὶ τὴν Ἐπιφύλῃν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέω|νος. αὐτὸν
δὲ <τε> εὐρίσκειν δεῖ, καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆσθαι,
καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τί λέγομεν, εἰπωμεν σαφέστερον.
ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξιν ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ
ἐποίουν, εἰδότας καὶ γιγνώσκοντας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης
ἐποίησεν ἀποκτείνουσαν τοὺς παῖδας τὴν Μήδειαν. <ἔστιν
30 δὲ μὴ πράξαι γιγνώσκοντας.> ἔστιν δὲ | πράξαι μὲν, ἀγ-
νοῦντας δὲ πράξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἰθ' ὕστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι
τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους (τοῦτο μὲν οὖν
ἔξω τοῦ δράματος· ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγωδίᾳ οἷον ὁ Ἀλκ-
μέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὁ ἐν τῷ τραυματίᾳ
35 Ὀδυσσεῖ). ἔτι δὲ [τρίτον] παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ μέλ|λοντα ποιεῖν

¹⁸ Τοῖς πράγμασιν, b13, is equivalent to τῆ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει; it does not simply denote the events individually. As we shall see, individual events are hardly tragic *per se*; it is their relationship to each other, their pattern, that is tragic.

τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι.
καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως· ἢ γὰρ πράξει ἀνάγκη
ἢ μὴ, καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας.

53b14

Let us define, then, which kinds of acts appeal to people
15 as horrible | and which as pitiable. Now such acts must
necessarily be done to one another by persons who are bound
by natural ties of affection, or are enemies, or neither. Well
then, if by an enemy to an enemy, there is nothing pathetic
either in the doing or the intention, except at the actual
moment of the deed; nor if by persons who are neither;
but when the painful deed is done in the context of close
20 | family relationships, for example when a brother kills or
intends to kill a brother, or a son a father, or a mother a
son, or a son a mother, or does something else of that kind
—those are the acts one should look for.

Now then, one cannot utterly undo the transmitted stories:
I mean for example the fact that Clytemnestra was killed
25 by Orestes and Eriphyle by | Alcmeon. But whether one
invents the plot himself or uses the transmitted ones, he
should do it artistically. However, let us state more ex-
plicitly what we mean by "artistically." It is possible,
namely, for the action to come about in the way the old
1 poets used to compose, with full knowledge and awareness,
and Euripides too has given us Medea killing her children
2 in that way. <Or it is possible not to act, having know-
30 | ledge.> Or it is possible | to act, but to do the fearful
thing unwittingly, then later to recognize the close natural
ties, like Sophocles' Oedipus (this case, to be sure, is out-
side the play; but there are cases within the drama itself,
like Astydamos' Alcmeon or the Telegonus in the *Wounded*
7 *Odysseus*). Further [third], in addition to these, is the
35 possibility of intending | some heinous deed out of ignor-
ance, but arriving at a recognition before one does it. And
there is no other way, beyond these; for one must either
act or not, and wittingly or unwittingly.

Since the structure of the complex plot has already been canvassed
and its possible varieties of outcome assessed for their productiveness
in pity and fear, it might seem that the 'building in' of the tragic

emotions has been discussed as much as it needs to be, and therefore that we could now proceed to analyze the tragic pleasure which somehow springs from them. But the foundations for this are still incomplete. All that has been covered is the modes of *outcome* of the action as a whole, in connection with the types of men who can suffer those outcomes. The working of the tragic plot remains to be analyzed in more detail, again from the point of view of its tragic quality, but this time focusing upon the tragic *act*, the *pathos*, and its relationship to the rest of the action. For the action, in order to be tragic, must not only proceed in a certain over-all direction and involve the fortunes of a certain kind of man; it must also stem from or lead up to an act of a certain kind which is the focal point of the tragic quality in the play. And even that is not enough. The act, if it is to be tragic to the fullest possible extent, will necessarily imply a certain network of relationships between it and the rest of the incidents: they will be such-and-such—or, reciprocally, it will be such-and-such—because of those relationships.

For the completion of Aristotle's analysis two factors are required which have been mentioned or implied before, but which have not been stated and/or applied in explicit terms to the detailed working of the plot. These factors are, to give them summary names: (1) *philia*, a close blood-relationship between the doer and the sufferer of the *pathos*, and (2) *hamartia* (or its opposite), the doer's ignorance (or awareness) of that relationship. *Philia* was mentioned, as we saw, in the definition of 'recognition' in chapter 11, and implied in the list of potentially tragic stories, those of Alcmeon, Oedipus, etc. *Hamartia* was mentioned in Aristotle's prescription for the 'most beautiful' tragic plot, 13. 53a10, 16, and again implied in the list of stories. Here both concepts are made explicit and applied in detail, *philia* as the general basis of the tragic quality of the *pathos*, and *hamartia*—or its opposite—in the further discrimination of the possible *degrees* of tragic quality that may inhere in (be 'built into') the nexus of incidents that includes the *pathos*.

These generalities will only be meaningful after we have studied their application; but it was necessary to prefix them to our analysis in order to see from the beginning what Aristotle is up to. He begins (b14) somewhat misleadingly by asking what kind of events are fearful and ("or") what kind are pathetic. I say "misleadingly" because the immediate answer (b15-22) is not the whole answer but only a necessary part of the whole answer. A *pathos*—that is, in the terms of the definition

in chapter 11, a destructive or painful act²⁰—which is to be fearful and/or²¹ pathetic, must necessarily take place between 'friends' or enemies or 'neutrals.' But a killing or intended killing between enemies or 'neutrals' is not tragic²² "except at the actual moment of the *pathos*." (This phrase, and the word μέλλων, are the first hint of what will turn out to be a very important principle: that the crucial thing about the *pathos*, so far as its emotional effect is concerned, is not the act itself but its intention).

What we need, then, is a *pathos* involving φίλοι. We have already seen that this word does not mean mere 'friends,' but 'dear ones,' close blood-relatives, and the point is made amply clear by Aristotle's examples: brother-brother (e.g., Eteocles-Polynices), son-father (Oedipus-Laius), mother-son (Auge-Telephus, Merope-Cresphontes), son-mother (Orestes-Clytemnestra, Alcmeon-Eriphyle). "Those," says Aristotle, "are the *pathê* one should look for." The logic of his argument, and the quiet way in which he pursues it, may make us forget its gruesome implications. The immorality of the drama, against which Plato had inveighed so bitterly: where has it been accepted, in fact demanded, in such cold and measured terms? The most revolting, the least defensible of all human actions, are precisely those the poet should look for—or invent, if he prefers to be original—and 'build into' his drama. Is Aristotle smiling covertly? There was a sardonic strain in his nature, and he knew his master's objections as well as any man; how could he fail to think of them here? The peripety that will follow shortly makes it almost certain that he is thinking of them; and there we shall see Plato answered.

²⁰ Note that in spite of its 'passive' name it was defined as an *act*, πράξις. — Τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις is ambiguous here. Τοιαύτας refers to δεινά and οἰκτρὰ in the preceding sentence, so that strictly speaking the phrase only says "such actions," viz. "fearful or pathetic actions." But Aristotle has in mind the specific kind of action that he has already defined as *pathos*. The proof—besides the word *pathos* itself in b18—is that the only verb we can supply with ἂν ... ἐχθρός ἐχθρόν, in the next line, is ἀποκτείνῃ (cf. b21). In fact the Arabic version implies such a verb, and it is a question whether the harsh ellipsis should not be healed by restoring it to the text (following Pazzi, Bekker, and others). See Gudeman's critical note *ad loc.*

²¹ *H in b14 should not be pressed.

²² Überweg's οὐδὲν <φοβερόν οὐδ' > ἔλκεινόν is attractive but probably unnecessary. It is true that Aristotle's thesis (that there is no emotional 'charge' involved πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος) would fit the fearful at least as well as the pathetic. But in this rapid clearing of the ground he chooses to emphasize pity, the more distinctively tragic of the two tragic emotions.

However that may be, the other possible varieties of *pathos* are ignored from this point on and Aristotle speaks only of homicide involving close blood-relations.²³

"Now then, the poet cannot undo the accepted stories, for example that Clytemnestra was killed by Orestes, and Eriphyle by Alcmeon. But he should invent his plots, or use the ones that have been handed down, artistically. But let us specify more clearly what we mean by 'artistically.'"

The first sentence here, like so many others in the *Poetics*, has suffered from being lifted out of its context and generalized as an independent statement. So treated, it comes into apparent conflict with 9. 51b23-25, where Aristotle urged the poets to launch out and invent plots of their own.²⁴ But the alleged discrepancy is the result of ignoring the context and of simple misinterpretation, particularly of the next sentence. The trouble is that the commentators, even those who deny that the passage conflicts with 9. 51b23-25, are tacitly agreed that Aristotle is talking only about the use of traditional myths; which narrows his meaning so that *εὐρίσκειν* in turn has to denote only minor changes or adaptations in those myths.²⁵ The difficulties come from not recognizing that *αὐτόν ... εὐρίσκειν* and *τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆσθαι* are coördinate phrases—in other words, that Aristotle is recognizing *both* methods—and that *καλῶς* goes with both verbs. One may invent, or,²⁶ if one chooses, one may use the traditional stories; in either case one should do it *καλῶς*. As Aristotle says, he will ex-

²³ Gudeman *ad loc.*, p. 257, gives a convenient list of all the known instances in Greek tragedy.

²⁴ Gudeman, for example, thinks that Aristotle, despairing of originality among the *epigonoi* of his day, has tacitly dropped his earlier suggestion and now limits himself to urging a free and artistic handling of the traditional stories. Most of the recent commentators, however, try in one way or another to deny or whittle down the contradiction. Rostagni comes closest to the interpretation offered here, but it seems to me that his explanation is not quite clear.

²⁵ "He may not indeed destroy the framework of the received legends ... but he ought to show invention of his own, and skillfully handle the traditional material" (Butcher); "the traditional stories, accordingly, must be kept as they are. ... At the same time even with these there is something left to the poet himself; it is for him to devise (*εὐρίσκειν*) the right way of treating them" (Bywater).

²⁶ *H* instead of *καί* in b26 would have made the idea clearer, but Aristotle often uses additive where we should expect disjunctive coördination. I have suggested *αὐτόν δέ <τε>*, to make the equality of the clauses evident (*τε* could easily have gotten lost after *δέ*); but the emendation is not essential.


plain *καλῶς* in what follows; but we must anticipate him enough to annotate *τοὺς ... παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν*. The phrase cannot mean that the accepted stories are not to be altered in any detail. If it did, there would be no room for *χρησθαι καλῶς*. Fortunately the examples Aristotle gives, and particularly that of Alcmeon, taken in conjunction with what he says below about Astydamos' *Alcmeon* (b33), give us the clue. What cannot be changed about the traditional stories is the bare fact of *who killed whom*. The poet is not free to devise a plot based on the assumption that Clytemnestra was not killed by Orestes, or Eriphyle by Alcmeon; but he is at liberty to devise one in which the son does the deed in ignorance of his mother's identity.²⁷

These aspects of freedom and limitation correspond to the two criteria by which Aristotle discriminates the four modalities of the *pathos*: (1) whether the deed is performed or not, and (2) whether it is performed wittingly (i.e., with knowledge of the other person's identity) or unwittingly. In an invented plot the poet is free in both these respects. He may let a killing *ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις* take place or not, and he may let it be done or intended wittingly or unwittingly. If he uses a traditional myth, the first freedom is denied him; only the second is open. In either case the *εὐρίσκειν* or *χρησθαι καλῶς* consists less in the use of the act itself than in the shaping of the attitude of the doer, which the poet is free to manipulate. Thus what Aristotle has to say here in no way contradicts what he said in chapter 9, in fact it underlines the advantages of free invention for which he argued there. A poet who redramatizes the story of Oedipus or Alcmeon cannot present a hero who does not kill his father or his mother after all, or an Orestes who is actually executed by his sister. That much deference he must pay to the tradition if he chooses to follow it.

The four modalities of the *pathos* now follow in order. We have already spoken of the two criteria involved and noted that the second ("knowingly or unknowingly") is the one in which the poet is freer to seek the *καλόν*. Let us note that it is also the one in which ignorance and knowledge, error and recognition—that is, the dyad we have already met in chapters 11 and 13—enter into the affiliations of the

²⁷ Such an arrangement is hard to imagine in view of the basic feature of the Orestes legend, that he slew his mother deliberately, at the behest of Apollo. But the same objection applies to the story of Alcmeon, yet Astydamos seems to have gotten around it somehow; see below on 53b33.

pathos. It will be worth while to diagram the possibilities abstractly, in the light of b36-37, before we study the passage:²⁸



The first mode is defined first, b27: *ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξιν ὡσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐποίουν, εἰδότας καὶ γινώσκοντας*.²⁹ No. 2, on the other hand, is not to be found in most of our manuscripts and editions. It is implied, however, by the Arabic version, the medieval Latin version, and Valla,³⁰ and is absolutely required by b37, *τὸ ὅτι τῶν δὲ τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι*, which could not have been written if this mode had not been explicitly mentioned in the preceding list.³¹ The clause was omitted by homoeoarcton, and I follow Gudeman in restoring it.

The emendation, however, involves us in trouble at b34, *ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα*; for this "third" mode is also the last in Aristotle's list. There are two possible remedies: (1) to put the lacuna after *τρίτον παρὰ*

²⁸ The numbers are assigned according to Aristotle's first listing, b27-36 (with the supplement noted below, in b29), not the rank-list in b37-54a9.


²⁹ I take the participles with *γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξιν*, which in this case is virtually equivalent to *πράττειν*; cf. *ἔστιν δὲ πράξαι μὲν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πράξαι*. This is preferable to construing them with *ἐποίουν*. — *Καθάπερ καὶ Εὐρηκίδης* is taken by J. D. Denniston, *CR* 43 (1929) 60, to mean "Eur. as well as other ancients." There is no denying that *καὶ* can have this implication ("denoting that the instance which leaps to the mind is additional to others which, for the moment, do not"). But the combined weight of 6. 50a7-8 (*οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν δημοτικῶς*) and 13. 53a17-22 (growing preference for the *hamartia*-plot, of which, as we saw, an especially large number of examples come from Eur.) seems too great. Eur. belongs to the moderns, "those now" (so, e.g., Bywater, Gudeman, Rostagni), but in this case he has shaped his plot like the *παλαιοί*.

³⁰ See Gudeman's critical note.

³¹ Also, as Vahlen says, *Beiträge*³ 51 n. (2. 23 n. 2), *καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως* presupposes a full listing of the possible modes. The case is different from that in 13. 52b34 ff., where one of the four modes of outcome (B: good man - happiness) was tacitly passed over; for it was not directly mentioned later but only indirectly, in Aristotle's rejection of the 'double' plot.

ταῦτα, but before τὸ μέλλοντα, with Vahlen,³² or (2) to put it where we have put it and bracket τρίτον, with Gudeman.³³ Of these choices the second seems to me the easier and simpler; but it does not matter very much so long as it is recognized that Aristotle originally mentioned all four modes.

Modes no. 3 and 4 are more difficult, but also more important. Here the scheme as we have diagrammed it partially breaks down or needs to be supplemented. The abstract fourth category ("not to do, unknowingly") is meaningless as it stands and in fact does not appear as such in Aristotle's scheme. Instead there is a compound mode (the last one, b34-36): (to intend to commit some unforgivable crime), not knowing (who is involved, but) not to do it (because a recognition supervenes and forestalls the act). Here we begin as in mode no. 3—ignorance leading towards a *pathos*—but the action is deflected and ends in non-performance. The sequence is ignorance → *pathos* intended → recognition → *pathos* averted.³⁴ In the third mode itself, on the other hand, the *pathos* is completed and followed by the recognition, which comes too late to avert it. These variations can be represented by a modification of our diagram; and we will also make certain substitutions of terms:



A careful inspection of the revised diagram reveals several things about the economy of this curious system. Aristotle tells us below, 54a2-5, that modes 3 and 4 are the best. The significant thing about

³² *Loc. cit.* — In the form τὸ μελλῆσαι γινώσκοντα καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι. Or, Vahlen suggests (so also Tucker), after ποιῆσαι, b36: τέταρτον δὲ τὸ κτλ. But this possibility is excluded by τὸ τελευταῖον, 54a5, which refers to the "third" mode according to the usual text (our no. 4: b34-36).

³³ *Crit. append.* 467: τρίτον is from γ', which was written in after the fourth mode was lost. Cf. πέντε in 6. 50b16.

³⁴ Aristotle does not actually say here that it is averted, but he does in 54a6: ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισε.

them is not merely that both begin with *hamartia*, but that *hamartia* figures in the tragic calculus only in team, so to speak, with its partner and contrary, recognition. Three things are required for the highest effect: *hamartia*, *pathos*, and recognition. But the relation of these three elements to each other is complicated. The *hamartia* is potentially tragic, but only if it involves a 'dear one' and leads or threatens to lead to a *pathos*. The *pathos* also is potentially tragic, but fully so only if it takes place between 'dear ones' and stems from a *hamartia*. And the recognition is the actualization of the tragic potentiality in the other two, but can be attained only on the basis of them.²⁵ Moreover, of the three components the actual *pathos* is the least essential, since it may occur outside the drama, that is, before it begins (*Oedipus Rex*, b32), or never take place at all (*Cresphontes*, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Helle*, 54a5-9). What can be dispensed with is *the act itself*. The essential thing is the *idea* of a *pathos*, the intention of performing one. The *pathos* is in fact no more than the lever by which the tragic potentiality is converted into actuality; and for that purpose—at least so Aristotle gives us to understand—the intention can serve as well as the act. The ultimate root of the tragic is ignorance, and its actualization is the conversion of the ignorance into knowledge, but with the proviso that the ignorance must have led or threatened to lead to an act which runs counter to man's deepest moral instincts.

As we said, the attenuation of the *pathos* can take two forms. It can be placed outside the drama proper, in which case it figures as the *premise* of the action: so in the *Oedipus Rex*. Here, through a feat of virtuosity which was not likely to be duplicated, the poet has managed to sublimate his plot-structure into a *pure nexus of recognition*. Was Aristotle conscious of this fact? Whether he was or not, it must have been a principal reason for his almost unqualified admiration for the play; for the formulation we have arrived at just above through analysis of his theory (sublimation of the *pathos*) corresponds very closely to Sophocles' most striking achievement. The play is, above all other Greek tragedies we know anything about, a play of ideas (where by 'ideas' we mean, of course, not abstract or metaphysical ideas but pure

²⁵ In speaking of 'potentiality' and 'actualization' I do not mean to imply that the developed Aristotelian doctrine of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* is present here, or that Aristotle is consciously employing it. If he were, surely there would be some trace of the appropriate terminology. But there is no other theoretical pattern which can account for the relationship between the three elements.

essences of tragic human relationship). But we should notice that the other mode of attenuation of the *pathos*, although it necessarily averts a tragic outcome and thereby makes a drastic difference in the total posture and effect of the play, achieves a similar end by another route. Here too the tragic emotions are involved and brought to a climax without the necessity of bringing the tragic act itself into the drama.

53b37-54a9

τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι
 χείριστον· τό τε γὰρ μισρὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικόν· ἀπαθὲς
 39 | a1 γὰρ· διόπερ οὐδεὶς | ποιεῖ ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ ὀλιγάκις, οἷον
 ἐν Ἀντιγόῃ τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἴμων. τὸ δὲ πράξαι δεύτερον.
 βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν πράξαι, πράξαντα δὲ ἀναγνω-
 ρίσαι· τό τε γὰρ μισρὸν οὐ πρόσσεστιν καὶ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις
 5 ἐκπληκτικόν. κράτιστον δὲ | τὸ τελευταῖον· λέγω δὲ οἷον
 ἐν τῷ Κρησφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν,
 ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ
 ἡ ἀδελφὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλῃ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν μητέρα
 ἐκδιδόναι μέλλον ἀνεγνώρισε.

53b37

Of these modes, the one that involves intending the deed wittingly, but not carrying it out, is the poorest; for it carries the moral revulsion with it and is untragic besides,
 39 | a1 for there is no actual deed; hence nobody | composes that way except occasionally, as with Haemon and Creon in the *Antigone*. Doing the deed comes second. Better is the one that involves doing the deed in ignorance, then coming to a recognition after doing it; for on the one hand the moral revulsion is not there, and the recognition has
 5 a powerful emotional effect. But best of all is | the last mode: I mean for example the way in the *Cresphontes* Merope is intending to kill her son, but does not kill him but recognizes him, and in the *Iphigenia* the sister her brother, and in the *Helle* the son, who is intending to betray his mother to the enemy, recognizes her.

Aristotle proceeds to rate the four modes. The one which we restored to the text at b29 above (our no. 2) is the worst, he says, because "it both has the *μισρὸν* about it and is untragic; for it is *ἀπαθὲς*." This short and apparently simple sentence needs extremely careful inter-

pretation, for a good deal depends on it. What is the meaning of the two predicates, τὸ μισρόν ἔχει and οὐ τραγικόν (*sc. ἐστίν*)? (That they are two predicates, not one, is clear from a3, where τε appears again.) They correspond to the two separable elements in the definition of the mode, μελλῆσαι and μὴ προᾶξαι.²⁶ To intend the killing of a 'dear one,' knowing who he is, is μισρόν, offensive to moral feeling, and yet there is no *pathos*, no act to arouse or justify at least a modicum of tragic feeling.²⁷

The test of this interpretation is what we can and must infer about the next-poorest mode (our no. 1), where the act is intended with full knowledge *and* carried out. Here the intention is still the same, still μισρόν; hence the superiority of this mode to the other must lie in the fact that the *pathos* does occur. We might formulate it thus: τὸ μὲν γὰρ μισρόν γε ἔχει, τραγικόν δέ· ἔχει γὰρ πάθος. But the degree or 'charge' of emotion is slight; there is no reversal or recognition to overwhelm us (ἐκπληκτικόν, a4), and the full development of tragic feeling is blocked by the presence of the μισρόν (we cannot feel that a deliberate killer of a dear one is 'like us,' or that any suffering which may follow upon his act is undeserved).

This mode constitutes the standard *simple plot* in tragedy (no. 2 being rare, as Aristotle says, by the very nature of the case). It admits of no recognition, since the doer knows what he is doing from the beginning.

The third mode (our no. 3) is still better: to perform the deed in ignorance and then recognize what one has done afterwards. Here again we find the τε ... καί structure: "for the 'impurity' does not attach to it, *and* the recognition gives a powerful emotional shock." Again, therefore, we must distinguish the two factors, but this time the task is more difficult. The doer of the deed is free from the moral

²⁶ The proof that they are separable is in the next mode (our no. 1), where the act is intended *and* performed. See next paragraph.

²⁷ Ἀπαθές, "without a *pathos*." I take it that this is what Bywater means by "the absence of suffering"; but "suffering" is too vague. Butcher renders "for no disaster follows." The other possible interpretation, "lacking in (not productive of) emotion" (e.g. Gomperz, "weil den Affecten nicht ausreichende Nahrung geboten wird"), translates οὐ τραγικόν rather than ἀπαθές, which is given as the ground of οὐ τραγικόν. The case in question does not excite tragic emotion because there is no *pathos* for it to focus on. — It should be remembered again that the *pathos*, in spite of its 'passive' name, is an act, a προᾶξις (11. 52b11), so that ἀπαθές is the precise adjectival equivalent of μὴ προᾶξαι.

stain or pollution which attaches to the killing of a 'dear one,' because this time he does not know that he is dealing with a dear one. We are therefore free to feel pity and fear for him to their full extent; for we can regard him as 'like us,' and we can regard the suffering which descends upon him after the recognition as not deserved, not his fault. On the other hand the recognition itself, by virtue of its inherent nature as a sudden reversal of his ignorance, and therefore of his whole awareness of his situation, raises the tragic emotions to their maximum intensity by adding the element of surprise, *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*. In other words the removal of the *μιαρόν* releases or authorizes our full indulgence in tragic feeling, and the recognition boosts its power to the uttermost. This coöperation of the two moments is only possible in a complex plot, that is, one which (a) is based on a *hamartia* and (b) comports a sudden reversal of that *hamartia*.

It is at this point, I believe, that we can take up the problem of catharsis again. In analyzing the catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy³⁸ we established certain tentative theses: (1) that the purification was a purification of the *pathos*, that is, of the fatal or painful act which is the basic stuff of tragedy; (2) that it was not brought about "by pity and fear" but "through (a course of) pity and fear," that is, in the course of a sequence of pathetic and fearful incidents; and (3) that the agent of the purification was the 'imitation,' that is, the plot. Since then we have accumulated a good deal of material, some of it tending to confirm those theses, some of it supplying additional concepts which appear to be parts of the same complex. Thus: (1) the *pathos* has emerged as a well-marked, fundamental element in the tragic structure, and the limits within which it can be tragic have been closely defined; (2) we have seen "pathetic and fearful events" substituted for "pity and fear" in the definition of what the tragic imitation imitates (9. 52a2-3; 13. 52b32; cf. 11. 52a38-b1, *ἔλεον ... φόβον, οἴων πράξεων ἢ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐπόκειται*); and (3) the crucial role of the imitation, i.e., the plot, as the agent of the emotional 'work' of tragedy has been explicitly affirmed, 14. 53b12: *διὰ μίμησεως*.

But even more important are the new concepts which have been introduced, above all the dyad *hamartia*-recognition. It has become clear that the best tragic plot must be complex and based on a *hamartia*, an ignorance or mistake, and a mistake as to the identity of a 'dear

³⁸ See above on 6. 49b27.

one.' The *hamartia* is the precedent condition, the premise upon which the (complex) dramatic structure is predicated; and conversely the working out of the tragic potential which lies in the *hamartia*-situation is operated by the recognition. The fulcrum upon which this emotional system balances is the *pathos*. The *pathos* in itself, merely *qua* act of violence or destruction, has only low emotional quality. It rises to the genuine tragic level only when it involves 'dear ones,' and to the highest level only when the act is based on a *hamartia* (i.e., would not be performed except for the *hamartia*).

To this complex of ideas the mention of the *μιαρόν* in our passages adds what seems to me to be the final clue for a solution of the catharsis problem. In assessing *μιαρόν* in chapter 13 (52b36) we said that its meaning there could not be the original or fundamental one. The passage now before us bears this out. The moral shock we feel at the plunge of a virtuous man into misery is a pale and derivative thing compared to our revulsion at the murder of a father or mother or son or brother. Whether this feeling is appreciably weaker among us moderns than it was among the Greeks is a point we need not argue. Neither do we need to point out what a large role was played in the history of Greek religion, law, and poetry by the concept of pollution for the killing of blood-kin. The story is familiar in all its ramifications: its roots in the primitive solidarity of the family;³⁹ the preoccupation, not to say obsession, of archaic Greece with means of purification, especially for the spilling of kindred blood;⁴⁰ the connection of all this with new ideas (actually old ideas revived) about the survival of the dead;⁴¹ the flourishing concept of the Erinyes or Erinyes, especially those excited by the murder of kindred;⁴² the very large share which these preoccupations had in the rise of Delphi to a place of commanding importance;⁴³ the tardiness and hesitancy of the state in taking over

³⁹ G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, Paris, 1904.

⁴⁰ See most recently E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (*Sather Class. Lects.* 25), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951, esp. 35-37 (with notes), 44-48, and Index s. vv. 'catharsis,' 'miasma,' 'purity'; M. P. Nilsson, *Gesch. d. gr. Religion* (*Handb. d. Alt.-wiss.*), 1, Munich, 1941, 88-92. The most complete and lucid survey of the whole range of concepts involved is that by Pfister, art. 'Katharsis,' *PW Suppl.* 6. 146-162; the most exhaustive treatment is that of L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs d'Homère à Aristote* (*Études et Commentaires*, 12), Paris, 1952.

⁴¹ E. Rohde, *Psyche*, London, 1925, 174-182 and notes.

⁴² Rapp, art. 'Erinyes' in Roscher's *Lexikon*, 1. 1310-1336.

⁴³ Nilsson, *op. cit.* 599-604. T. Dempsey, *The Delphic Oracle*, Oxford, 1918:

responsibility for the direct prosecution of homicide, especially the murder of blood-kin;⁴⁴ the special provisions (as to both courts and procedure) for handling such cases, even in fully developed Greek law;⁴⁵ and, finally, the literary precipitate of all these fears and taboos in Attic tragedy, particularly that of Aeschylus (above all in the *Oresteia*, but also in other trilogies and in individual plays).⁴⁶

This, I submit, is the background we require for Aristotle's concept of the "purification of tragic acts." The acts he calls for as peculiarly suited to tragedy (53b19-22) are precisely those to which the immemorial taboo was most firmly attached; in fact we need look no farther to understand what he means by tragic fear or "shuddering" (*φρίττειν*, 53b5). No doubt the fourth-century Athenian had lost some of the superstitious fears to which his ancestors had been subject in the sixth century or the early fifth. But such feelings do not die out in a generation or two, no matter how much they may be overlaid by more 'civilized' attitudes;⁴⁷ and we know from a number of sources

see pp. 149-163 (no more than a provisional compilation; see Nilsson 592 n. 2); Parke, H. W., and Wormell, D. E. W., *The Delphic Oracle*, Oxford, 1956, I. 303-307, 362-364, 382-383.

⁴⁴ It is well known that even in the fourth century the prosecution for murder still lay upon the relatives of the slain man, the state limiting itself to seeing that the relatives did take action: Glotz, *op. cit.* 304-306, 372-376, 425-427. Plato, *Laus* 9. 871b, permits any citizen to institute prosecution if the relatives are derelict in their duty. Glotz remarks, 321, that the most fearful crime of all, parricide, is not mentioned in the code of Draco: not because it was condoned, but because its punishment was left solely and entirely to the family.

⁴⁵ See above, c. 13, n. 52, on the five Athenian homicide courts. Our chief ancient source for them is the speech of Demosthenes *Against Timocrates*, 65-81.—One of the most important documents from outside Athens for the fourth-century view of all matters involving purity and impurity is the so-called sacred law of Cyrene (last published in *Suppl. Epigr. Graec.* 9 [1938] 31-34, with bibliography).

⁴⁶ Notably in the Theban trilogy of which the *Seven Against Thebes* was the last play; see esp. *Sept.* 682, *ὄχι ἔστι γῆρας τοῦδε τοῦ μιάσματος*; 694. We do not know whether the murder of their bridegrooms by the Danaids, which must have occurred in the middle play (*Egyptians?*; see Schmid I. 2. 198) of the trilogy which began with the *Suppliants*, led to their pollution and some form of purification, but it does not seem likely that Aeschylus would have avoided it. On his blood-polluted Telephus who journeyed to Mysia in search of purification see above on 13. 53a21.

⁴⁷ We need not pronounce for or against the Freudian and other neo-psychological explanations of the 'Oedipus complex' and the rest. What Freud and his successors have certainly done is to illuminate the persistence of sub-conscious fears and complexes far below the ordinary level of civilized life. Freud's own ex-

that fear of pollution from the shedding of blood, and kindred blood above all, was still very much alive in the fourth century.⁴⁸ One indication is the persistence and emphasis with which the orators repeat the traditional phrase οὐ (μὴ) καθαρὸς τὰς χεῖρας.⁴⁹ The *Tetralogies* ascribed to Antiphon speak constantly of purity⁵⁰ and pollution (μίασμα, μισαρία),⁵¹ even when the killing was accidental.⁵² One of the commonest (and therefore, we judge, one of the most effective) epithets in the vocabulary of the orators, which they hurl against their enemies on every possible and impossible occasion, is μισαρός.⁵³ Demosthenes, attacking his enemy Meidias,⁵⁴ cites it as an incredible piece of vile-ness (ἀκαθαρσία) that Meidias, after laying a charge of murder against Aristarchus, twice went to his house, sat and talked with him, and even touched his hand (actually Demosthenes uses these facts to argue that Meidias cannot have believed Aristarchus to be a murderer). For the man under indictment for murder, whether it be voluntary, involuntary, or 'just,' was promptly debarred by public proclamation

planation of Oedipus (*A General Introd. to Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1920, 174, 286-287; *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* [Modern Library], New York, 1938, 308) is not of much use in interpreting Sophocles' play, and the attempt of his disciple Alfred Winterstein to psychoanalyze the origins of Greek tragedy (*Der Ursprung der Tragödie* [*Imago-Bücher*] VIII], Vienna, 1925), was a sorry performance; see the reviews by K. Kunst, *Phil. Woch.* 46 (1926) 737-741; G. Meyer, *Deutsche Lit.-Zeit.* 47 (1926) 112-116.

⁴⁸ Moulhier, *op. cit.* 179: "... ce que pouvait penser un homme du cinquième ou du quatrième siècle lorsqu'il était en présence d'un meurtre. *Le fait important est qu'il a peur*" (my italics).

⁴⁹ Antiphon, *Herod.* 82: ἄνθρωποι μὴ καθαρὸι τὰς χεῖρας ἢ ἄλλο τι μίσημα ἔχοντες; *Lys. Evandr.* 8; *Andoc. Myst.* 95; *Demosth. De Falsa Leg.* 66; *In Pantaen.* 59; *In Timocr.* 60; *Aesch. De Falsa Leg.* 148. See Moulhier, *op. cit.* 176 (the evidence that follows is taken mainly from this work).

⁵⁰ 1β4; 2γ11; 3α4, 5; 3β9; 3γ7; 3δ10, 11.

⁵¹ 1α3, 10; 1γ1, 11; 2γ12; 3α3, 5; 3γ6, 7; 3δ11; *κηλίς*, 2γ8, 11.

⁵² Thus in the second tetralogy it is agreed by both parties that the killing was an accident (ἀκούσιος, δι' ἀμαρτίαν); yet the plaintiff argues that the pollution exists and will infect the jury also if they do not convict the doer: 2γ11-12.

⁵³ See the citations (50 in all) in Moulhier, *op. cit.* 180 n. 10. Naturally, as Moulhier himself emphasizes, p. 181, in most of these cases there is no direct implication of blood-guilt and μισαρός is only a general imprecation. But that does not invalidate our point. The effectiveness of the epithet presupposes a general belief in pollution, especially blood-pollution. [Thus charges of pollution are prominent among those that fly between Demosthenes and Aeschines in the speeches *On the Crown* and *Against Ctesiphon*.

⁵⁴ *In Meid.* 118-120.

from temples, games, sacrifices,⁵⁵ and all places of public resort such as the market-place⁵⁶ and the Council-chamber,⁵⁷ and no one was to speak to him or associate with him.⁵⁸ In short, he was still under those interdictions of which the best-known and most impressive literary example is the ban pronounced by Oedipus on the unknown murderer, *Oedipus Rex* 236-251; see especially line 241: ὄθειν (·c. τὸν δολοφόνον) δ' ἀπ' οἴκων πάντα, ὡς μίᾱ σμα τος τοῦδ' ἡμῖν ὄντος.⁵⁹ The indicted, not to speak of the proven, murderer is cut off root and branch from his society.

Perhaps the most striking proof of the undiminished power of these taboos in the fourth century is the fact that Plato, who certainly did not believe in blood-pollution as such,⁶⁰ nevertheless follows the traditional prescriptions and interdictions in detail (though not without some alterations) in his legislation for the treatment of homicide in book 9 of the *Laws*, pages 865a-869e, 871a-874d.⁶¹ In the first place Plato assumes that anyone who has taken human life under any circumstances except those of 'just' or legal homicide is somehow polluted and must undergo the prescribed purifications⁶² (that is, essentially, those prescribed by Delphi: see 865b, 871c, 873d). He goes further and explicitly accepts the idea that the presence of a murderer pollutes the city and everything in it: 868b, ὅστις δ' ἂν τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων πάντων μὴ πείθεται τῷ νόμῳ, ἀλλ' ἀκάθαρτος ὢν ἀγοράν τε καὶ ἄθλα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἱερὰ μιαινῇ. This is in fact the basis for the prescription of enforced exile for varying periods of time,⁶³ which along with purifications and fines (that is,

⁵⁵ Antiphon, *Choreut.* 4; cf. Pollux 8. 65.

⁵⁶ Antiphon, *Herod.* 10; Aesch. *De Falsa Leg.* 148.

⁵⁷ Demosth. *Med.* 114; Antiphon, *Choreut.* 45-46.

⁵⁸ Lys. *In Agorat.* 79, 82.

⁵⁹ The ban against an unknown murderer is repeated by Plato, *Laws* 9. 874b. See below.

⁶⁰ The point is emphasized by Moulhier, 397-398, 402-403.

⁶¹ On the following see Moulhier 393-410, esp. 400-410; O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne* (*Éc. Franç. d'Athènes, Travaux et Mémoires*, 6), Paris, 1945, 177-207; R. Maschke, *Die Willenstheorie im griechischen Recht*, Berlin, 1922, 122-128.

⁶² Pollution: μίαισμα, 876b, 871b; μιάειν, 868b, 871a, 872e (twice); μὴ καθαρός, 872a; ἀκάθαρτος, 866a, 868a. Purification: καθαρός, 865b, 868c, 869a, d (twice), 874b, c (thrice), d; καθαίρειν (usually in the middle or passive), 865b, d (twice), 868a, c, e, 869a; κάθαρσις (-εις), 868c, 872e; καθαρμός (-οί), 865c, d, 866c, 868e (twice), 869e, 873d; ἀφοσιούν, 873b, 874a. Note also μὴ καθαρὸς τὰς χεῖρας at the beginning of the whole discussion, 864e.

⁶³ At 865d Plato refers in solemn tones to the "ancient story" that the murdered

compensation to the dead man's family) constitutes Plato's stock-in-trade of normal punishments for homicide.

It would be time-consuming and pointless to review here the whole of Plato's elaborate and carefully graduated scheme of punishments for homicide. In general outline he follows the recognized Attic division into *φόννοι ἐκούσιοι*, *φόννοι ἀκούσιοι*, and *φόννοι δίκαιοι*.⁶⁴ The most significant provisions for us are the extreme cases, where we can see the relations between crime and pollution most clearly. At one end are the varieties of legal or justifiable homicide, 874b-c: killing of a thief caught in the act of breaking and entering at night, killing of an adulterer or rapist caught in the act, etc. One who kills under such circumstances is free of pollution (*καθαρός ἔστω*) from the beginning; he is not even required to undergo purification. Similar is the killing of a man in self-defense, in war, civil war, or like circumstances, *even if he be a brother*: 869c-d. What this means is that such cases are assimilated to the killing of an enemy in war. Finally, the relatives of a citizen who has been killed by his slave may do as they like with the slave—i.e., presumably, kill him⁶⁵—without incurring any pollution, 868b-c.

The significant thing about these rather disparate cases, in which no pollution is incurred at all,⁶⁶ is that they have to do with enemies, slaves, and others who, either naturally or by decree of the law, are *outside the pale of society*. Hence their killing produces no pollution.

At the other end of the scale stand the varieties of willful murder, *φόννος ἐκούσιος*,⁶⁷ for which the regular penalty is death. But we

man (i.e., his ghost) is filled with horror and anger at seeing his murderer walking abroad in his own accustomed haunts; hence it is only right that the latter "keep out of his way" (*ὑπεξελεθεῖν*) for a year or other prescribed length of time.

⁶⁴ He even includes the quaintly primitive provisions dealing with killings by animals and inanimate objects, 873e-874a.

⁶⁵ The relatives of a man slain by another's slave are *required* to put the latter to death when he is surrendered to them, *ibid.*, and are undoubtedly meant to be automatically *καθαροί* like the others. The only exception is that the deliberate unprovoked killing of a slave who was doing no wrong subjects the doer to the same (mild) penalties as the killing of a citizen: 872c.

⁶⁶ See Moulinier 190-192.

⁶⁷ We are speaking here of deliberate murder, *ἐκ προνοίας*, outside the range of the *φόννοι δίκαιοι*; see 871a. Its characteristic motives are desire (especially of wealth), jealousy, and fear of discovery of a previous crime: 870a-d. Plato recognizes, 867a-b, that killings which arise from anger but whose execution is delayed and carried out according to set plan (*μετὰ ἐπιβουλής*; = *ἐκ προνοίας*,

will be selective and look only at the most heinous of all, those involving close blood-kin:⁶⁸ ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις, as Aristotle says; and for this purpose we can take killings in anger and deliberate murder together. The deliberate slaying of any blood-relation is a crime so fearful and so impious above all others⁶⁹ that Plato hesitates to legislate about it (872c); he does so only because it may possibly occur even in the best-regulated of cities. Here he recalls, but in much more emphatic tones and brighter colors, the "ancient tale" he had previously referred to (870d-e) in connection with all deliberate killings of citizens by citizens: that such murders are punished in Hades⁷⁰ and the doer must expect to lose his own life in the same fashion in his next incarnation. For the shedder of kindred blood these terrors are augmented manifold and made much more specific. The guilty one is dogged by the "pursuing justice, avenger of kindred blood" (ἡ τῶν συγγενῶν αἱμάτων τιμωρὸς δίκη ἐπίσκοπος, 872e), which demands that he suffer the same kind of death he has caused, that is, at the hands of a kinsman; for "there is no other possible purification of the common blood that has been defiled, and the pollution cannot be washed out until the guilty soul has paid for murder with murder, like with like, and so appeased and stilled the wrath of the whole clan."

Here the primitive ideas of blood-pollution, the *talion*, and the avenging Erinyes appear unmistakably, though lightly retouched.⁷¹ It is

the Athenian legal term) partly resemble the φόνοι ἐκούσιοι and their legal disposition is a delicate matter, while killings θυμῶ which are carried out on the spot are more like the ἀκούσιοι and are to be treated accordingly, from case to case. Cf. Aristotle's secondary distinction of premeditated and unpremeditated injustice in *E. N.* 5; see above on 13. 53a10. The distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated acts of injustice was also recognized in Athenian law but not applied in a systematic, unambiguous manner to homicide. Plato betrays here that he had no precise legal model to follow.

⁶⁸ See Reverdin, *op. cit.*, 193-202.

⁶⁹ 872d, φόνων τῶν πάντη ἀνοσιωτάτων, where the adjective is very close to meaning 'most polluted'; cf. ἀφοσιούτω τὴν πόλιν ἄλην below, 873b.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Rep.* 10. 615e-616a (the case of Ardiaeus, who among other things was guilty of parricide and fratricide).

⁷¹ The passage causes Moulinier special embarrassment. He argues, pp. 407, 409, that Plato does not actually recognize a "stain in the blood," and that the avenging principle is not actually an *alastor* or Erinyes (on δλάστορες and ἀλιτήριοι see pp. 261-267). But τοῦ κοινοῦ μίανθέντος αἵματος seems clear enough, and the avenging "justice," although by her name (she ought to be capitalized) she is the descendant of the Justice who is daughter of Zeus in

in fact evident that Plato wished to reaffirm the "ancient tale" in all its horror. And the penalty for those who are not restrained by it from "the most unholy of all crimes" is correspondingly drastic (873b-c). The offender is to be killed and his body thrown naked outside the city, at a crossroads (haunt of Hecate, though Plato does not say so), his head stoned, and then finally cast outside the city's borders, unburied.

The same intensity, though in a less hieratic vein, pervades Plato's earlier discussion (869b-c) of parricide or matricide committed in anger. Crimes arising from anger draw, in general, lighter penalties in his codex. But parricide and matricide are such specially monstrous offenses against the very sources of our being that no excuse—heat of anger, self-defense, or any other—can be countenanced.⁷² The penalty, except under one circumstance which we will discuss in a moment, is death (the only other variety of homicide *θυμῶ* which is punishable by death is the killing of a free man by a slave, 868b-c).⁷³ The parricide, then, has so outraged heaven and earth and his city, as well as his own blood, that there is no possibility of purification for him; only death can square the account. His deed stands at the opposite pole from the *φόνοι δίκαιοι* and other cases which incur no pollution at all.

This notable emphasis on the special horror and pollution which attend the shedding of kindred blood, and above all the killing of a parent, corresponds exactly to the thinking of archaic Greece as it survived in tragedy. The crime of Orestes "could not be washed clean by all the rivers in the world, mingling their streams together";⁷⁴ to cleanse it one must resort to the great center and source of all lustration, the sea;⁷⁵ neither Ister nor Phasis could wash the stain from the house

Hesiod, Solon, and Aeschylus, demands exactly the same purification of blood by blood as the Furies in the *Eumenides*.

⁷² Cf. 11. 930e-931e, on the veneration which children are to show to the gods and equally to their parents and ancestors; 9. 880e-881e, on outrages (*αλκίαι*) against parents and the pollution they bring upon the entire community; *ibid.* 877b, 878e (wounding of a parent with intent to kill [*τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας*]: penalty, death; wounding of same in anger: death penalty optional).

⁷³ By contrast, the killing in anger of a brother by a brother, in war, civil war, or other case involving self-defense, is treated no differently from such homicides in general. The extenuating force of the cause (anger) is such that a very special degree of kinship is required to incur the ultimate penalty.

⁷⁴ Aesch. *Cho.* 72-75; cf. *Eum.* 261-262; *Sept.* 681-682; Eur. *Med.* 846-850, 1268-1270; Thuc. 2. 102. 5-6 (Alcmeon).

⁷⁵ Eur. *I.T.* 1193.

of Oedipus.⁷⁶ And yet—paradox which an Athenian would not find particularly baffling—Orestes did find purification and release, first at the hands of Apollo and then (according to Aeschylus) *by due process of law*, through his acquittal by the court which was established to hear cases of φόνος ἐκούσιος like his: the Areopagus.⁷⁷ The conception that the law can release a murderer, even a matricide, from pollution is the definitive breach in the ancient reign of the law of blood; and this breach had been made long before Plato. To quote Moulinier:⁷⁸ “Le fait important est que ce sont les magistrats et les juges qui en décident, mais toujours au nom de la loi. La loi fixe les rites de pureté à exécuter. Elle fixe d’abord s’il y en a [i.e., whether there is any pollution?]. *Le meurtre ne souille que lorsqu’elle le veut* [italics mine]. Elle définit les conditions dans lesquelles son auteur reste καθαρός.” The law does not usurp the place of religion, it offers no substitute for the cathartic rites, if they are required; but it is the authority which decides whether they are required.

The power of a court to determine that impurity, pollution, does or does not exist to begin with: that is the crux of the matter. For the court is a human institution, though established by and under the presidency of gods (in Aeschylus’ play, of Athena in particular, with Zeus behind her), and its right is the right of men⁷⁹ to judge matters that affect their fellow-men, up to and including blood-pollution. Henceforth (and we must remember that these institutions go back at least to Draco in the late seventh century, and probably beyond him) we have to reckon with two different and potentially conflicting principles in the consciousness of Athenians: (1) the immemorial horror of blood-pollution, with all its consequences for the murderer, his family, his γένος, and the whole state; and (2) the positive right of men, in a court of law duly assembled, to judge whether pollution has been incurred, and in what degree. In the battle between these two principles—for

⁷⁶ Soph. *O.T.* 1227-1228; cf. 1424-1429 (Creon: Oedipus’ pollution should be hidden from the sight of earth and sun as well as men; only close relatives should look upon him).

⁷⁷ Sophocles, in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, represents Oedipus too as finding purification and final release, in fact canonization (impurity turning in the twinkling of an eye into holiness), and again in Attica; but through mystical, not legal, means.

⁷⁸ P. 82.

⁷⁹ Murder is beyond the power of man to judge—i.e., unassisted by God: Aesch. *Eum.* 470; but the court Athena establishes is one of citizens, i.e., men, not gods: *ibid.* 487.

it was a battle, or rather a war, with the new one steadily making inroads upon the old⁸⁰—we must regard Plato's *Laws* as marking one station, and Aristotle another.

The pronouncement that a homicide had been *δίκατος*, or that it had been accidental, apparently established the doer at once as *καθαρός*; there was no further requirement of religious purification.⁸¹ But there is a still more striking case of the power of men to annul the blood-pollution. A murderer who was *forgiven by his victim* appears to have been *καθαρός* at once and automatically exempt from the need of purification.⁸² Plato records this special exemption only in connection with parricide. If the victim—in this case the father (or mother)—“before he dies, of his own free will releases the doer from (responsibility for) murder” (869a), the latter shall be *καθαρός* after performing the purifications and other acts required of those guilty of *φόνος ἀκούσιος*.⁸³ This provision is interesting from two points of view: (1) for the heaven-wide difference between it and the absolute penalty of death for parricide under all other circumstances, and (2) because it shows us the victim acting in his own person in the capacity of a court of law, nullifying or mitigating the fearful pollution which would otherwise attach to the slayer. The dying man not only could personally forgive his son, he could cancel the supposedly automatic effects of blood-pollution.

Moulinier rightly emphasizes⁸⁴ the discrepancy between the archaic, even primitive, implications of Plato's law of homicide and the philosopher's own thinking, which was fundamentally averse to the idea of an automatic pollution and insisted that evil is an affair of the individual soul.⁸⁵ But the provisions for homicide are all the more valuable

⁸⁰ Thus the provision (duly included by Plato, 865b) that a physician is to be held *καθαρός* of the death of a patient under his care, is probably a fifth-century amendment, from the first heyday of Greek medicine.

⁸¹ In the latter case Plato is more severe (see Moulinier 402); one guilty of an accidental homicide is still subject to the requirement of purification according to the laws of Delphi, 865b-d.

⁸² Moulinier 84, 185-186, with references to Demosth. *In Pantæen.* 59; *In Aristocr.* 74; Eur. *Hippot.* 1447-1451 (Hippolytus, dying, forgives his father for having caused his death; the technical term *ἀπιέναι* [“releases, frees him from the blood,” i.e., the blood-pollution] reappears in Plato, *Laws* 869a).

⁸³ I.e., the extra requirements which Plato laid down for the *ἀκούσιοι φόνοι* themselves; see above. The inference is that under regular Attic law the parricide or matricide who had been forgiven by his victim was *καθαρός tout court*.

⁸⁴ See pp. 394, 396, 403, 408, and the whole passage 400-410.

⁸⁵ One whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have been sentenced

to us for that, because they show us Plato caught between the ancient, still powerful belief in blood-pollution (in which, he seems to have felt, there was somehow a deep truth) and the conceptions of equity that are characteristic of the fourth century. My reason for dwelling on the ninth book of the *Laws* so long is that I believe it gives us the best and most immediate clue to Aristotle's thinking in the *Poetics*. In the *Ethics*, especially in book 5, we see him striving—following in the footsteps of both Plato and the Attic law—to establish still finer discriminations between degrees of guilt: ἀτόχημα, ἀμάρτημα, ἀδίκημα ἐκ προνοίας, ἀδίκημα μὴ ἐκ προνοίας. In the *Poetics* his problem was different. Here the cases presented for judgment are from the traditional store of Greek legend. As we have seen, the tendency had been to narrow them down progressively to a select list of the most spectacular and 'polluted' crimes: parricide, matricide, and other sheddings of kindred blood. But here we are not in a court of law. The judges are Athenian citizens,⁸⁶ but they are here as human beings, not to pass legal sentence but to be moved by the tragic cases of men 'like themselves' who are involved in parricide, matricide, or other fearful crimes. How will they judge and feel about these men and their deeds?

For, and this is the first point to be seized upon and emphasized, they will and do pass judgment, though not a legal one. *The tragic emotions*—like all emotions, for that matter—comport an element of judgment. On this point Aristotle's psychology differs radically from his master's. One of Plato's heaviest charges against poetry, and especially the theater, had been that it excited and fed the emotions, that is, the irrational part of the soul.⁸⁷ Unfortunately Aristotle nowhere explicitly discusses Plato's thesis and the premise on which it rests, that the desires and feelings are wholly irrational; indeed he himself has not left us a complete theoretical psychology of the emotions. But his revision of Plato's tripartite division of the soul, which is first available to us in the *Eudemian Ethics* and is then repeated and slightly

to death for treason or attempted revolution is to be banished from the city (colony) and sent back to his original home: 865c-d. But there is no death penalty, and Plato does not speak here of pollution. See Reverdin, *op. cit.* 194 n. 5.

⁸⁶ The same, for that matter, who sat in the jury courts on civil cases; and among them would be some who also sat on the Areopagus or at the Palladion or the Delphinion in murder cases.

⁸⁷ *Rep.* 10. 602c-605c; cf. the sketch of the Saturnalia of appetites and desires in the soul of the tyrannical man, 9. 571a-573b.

elaborated in the *Nicomachean*, shows us sufficiently the direction of his thinking. For our purpose the *Eudemian Ethics* will serve still better than the *Nicomachean*, because it betrays the origin and bearing of Aristotle's theory more clearly.⁸⁸

Let us take it as proved (*ὑποκείσθω*),⁸⁹ says Aristotle, *E. E.* 2. 1. 1219b28, that there are two parts of the soul which partake of reason, but in different ways, the one by its natural tendency to command, the other by its natural tendency to listen and obey.⁹⁰ If there is some other part which is wholly irrational, such as the nutritive, we will ignore it here; for we are talking about the soul of *man* and its virtues, and the virtues of that other part are not distinctively human.⁹¹ Thus for our purpose there are just two parts; for man *qua* man must have in him the power to reason, i.e., to govern,⁹² and the power to act; and *what reason governs is not itself but desire and the feelings*: ἄρχει δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων. There are, then, two kinds of virtue in man, the intellectual and the moral, the former belonging to the rational part of the soul *per se*, the latter to the part which is irrational but by its nature obedient to the part possessing reason (1220a10-11). Moral virtue has to do with the pleasant and the painful (*ibid.* 2. 1220a38), and 'character' is its activating principle (1220b3). Character is defined by reference to our faculties of feeling ("the faculties of the feelings," 1220b8: τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων) and our habits, which are fixed modes of reaction to the feelings. As for the feelings themselves, Aristotle leaves no doubt what he means by specifying (1220b11) anger, fear, shame, desire, and in general everything that is inherently attended by felt pleasure or pain.

Thus man, *qua* man, has a soul which is partly reason and partly something else that is irrational but amenable to reason; and this

⁸⁸ Jaeger has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the section of the *Eudemian Ethics* which concerns us is directly based on, in fact almost an extract from, the *Protrepticus*; see *Aristotle's* 246-252, and cf. the reference to "the exoteric discussions" in *E. N.* 1. 13. 1102a26.

⁸⁹ An implicit reference to the fuller discussion and proof in the *Protrepticus*; see the parallel passage quoted by Jaeger, *op. cit.* 249.

⁹⁰ In this summary I have occasionally drawn on the translation by J. Solomon in volume 9 of the Oxford translation of Aristotle.

⁹¹ *E. N.* 1. 13. 1102a32-b12 makes the same point but does not rule out the nutritive 'soul' quite so abruptly or absolutely.

⁹² Reading καὶ ἀρχήν in b40, with the MSS (καὶ secl. Bonitz; ὡς Susemihl; but two items are wanted here, not three).

'something' is the feelings, including appetite. But then *the feelings are potentially rational*—always, to be sure, in the passive sense that they are *capable of following* reason, or, as Aristotle happily puts it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*,⁸³ "listening to reason." Even if we classify Aristotle's psychology as tripartite (recognizing the 'vegetative' as a third, wholly irrational part), the place occupied in it by the feelings has undergone a profoundly significant change as compared with Plato's scheme. In Plato's three-part psychology the appetites and feelings are at the bottom, wholly out of touch with reason.⁸⁴ Their irrationality is dramatized, in the famous image of the charioteer and the two horses (*Phaedrus* 246a-b, 253c-254c), by the figure of the ignoble horse. Alongside him stands his brother the noble horse, whose nature disposes him to obedience and love of reason. What Aristotle has done, essentially, to Plato's scheme is to put in the place of the 'noble horse,' as Plato had defined him,⁸⁵ the whole body of feeling that constitutes the irrational side of man's psychic life, the vacated place at the bottom of the scale being taken by the 'vegetative' or purely nutritive principle. Through this change of status the life of feeling is brought into direct contact with reason, instead of being insulated from it, so that henceforth we can speak of rational aspects of feeling or emotional employments of reason (that is, of the 'practical' or moral reason), depending on our point of view.⁸⁶

⁸³ 1. 13. 1102b32.

⁸⁴ See *Rep.* 4. 439c-e.

⁸⁵ Actually Plato never did define him unambiguously. The tripartite psychology of the *Republic* is notoriously unsatisfactory just because the middle element, which stands between rationality and irrationality, is so vaguely derived. It is supposed to represent a mysterious thing called 'spirit' or the 'spirited' (*θυμοειδής*), which is a kind of feeling but, for reasons Plato never really makes clear, wholly distinct from, even hostile to, the other feelings. Actually this mysterious element is Plato's gesture to the Hellenic past, the aristocratic ideal of courage tempered with *αἰδώς*. But it would not do. In the *Phaedrus* we see the middle element characterized—but again vaguely—as 'inspiration,' aspiration, or Eros. There are stirrings in another direction in Plato's 'later' conception of *δόξα* (see Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, Oxford, 1940, esp. 113-118) as a link between reason and sense, and no doubt Aristotle was influenced and assisted by trends in Plato's thinking that we can only glimpse in the dialogues; but the official theory of the structure of the soul was never rebuilt.

⁸⁶ A striking evidence of the new orientation is Aristotle's remark, *E. E.*, *loc. cit.*, 1220a29 ff., that "virtue is ... produced by the best movements in the soul, and from [it] are produced the soul's best works and feelings (*τὰ ἀρίστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη*): a phrase which is inconceivable in Plato.—There

The practical effect of the new orientation is very clear in Aristotle's definitions of the feelings in the *Rhetoric*. Thus, to take only the two that directly concern us, fear⁹⁷ is a state of mental pain or upset caused by an 'imagination' (*φαντασία*) of an impending evil which will be destructive or painful; and Aristotle goes on to point out that we do not fear all evils but only those that promise major pain or damage, and even those only when they appear to be close at hand. At every step of these calculations—which, be it remembered, are *prerequisite* to our being afraid—a judgment is involved. Similarly pity⁹⁸ is a painful state attendant upon the threat of pain or destruction to one who does not deserve to suffer them, evils *of the kind that one might expect to suffer oneself*, and again if they appear to be close at hand. Once more a judgment is involved at every step. But we have made this point before⁹⁹ and need not labor it again. The difference is that we now have a fuller context in which to place it, one that gives us more hope of understanding how Aristotle conceived the mechanism of the tragic emotions.

To return to our question, then: what will be the judgments and the feelings of a normal spectator or hearer or reader when confronted with a tragic story? First of all, so far as the plot as a whole is concerned, if it is to gain his sympathy and ultimately his fear and/or pity, he must make two judgments (one or the other, and, for the best effect, both): (1) that the hero is 'like himself,' and (2) that he does not deserve his misfortune. These judgments are not after-effects of the spectator's feeling, they are the prerequisites to it, the conditions which must be satisfied *before his psyche* (that is, the rational element in his soul) *will allow the emotions to be felt*.

The analogy between these judgments and those which an Athenian was called upon to make in a murder trial becomes much closer when we bring the question down to the specific issues that are before us

are some residual echoes of the Platonic psychology, i.e., of a special status for 'anger' (*θυμός*), in *E. E.* 2. 7. 1223a26, *ἡ ὄρεσις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον, καὶ πρῶτον κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ...* (1223b18) *ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ*; cf. *E. N.* 7. 7. 1149a24 ff. (Incontinence of anger is less reprehensible than that of the appetites). See also Seneca, *De Ira* 3. 3. 1, *Stat Aristoteles defensor irae et vetat illum nobis exsecari: calcar aut esse virtutis*, and Rostagni, *Stud. Ital. di Filol. Class.*, N. S. 2 (1922) 11 n. 1; 68.

⁹⁷ *Rhet.* 2. 5. 1382a21.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 8. 1385b13.

⁹⁹ See above on 13. 52b34-53a7.

in chapter 14: those, namely, that cluster around the tragic act. Before us is a person—Oedipus, Alcmeon, Medea, Heracles—who has killed or is about to kill a 'dear one': father, mother, children. In itself the act, or even the intention, is impure and abhorrent in the highest degree. We have seen in what solemn and special tones Plato dealt with such crimes against one's own blood, and with what horror they were still regarded, what taboos and perils still surrounded them, even in the relatively enlightened Athens of the fourth century. Such outrages against god and nature are fearful, there can be no mistake about that. But under what circumstances can I bring myself to pity the murderer or would-be murderer? I can pity him if I judge that *he did not intend the parricide, matricide, or whatever, as such*: in other words, if it is established to my satisfaction that he performed or intended the fearful act *δι' ἀμαρτίαν τινά*, because of some error.

Let us be precise. The category "slaying of a close blood-relation because of ignorance of his identity" did not appear as such in Plato's code. Book 5 of the *Ethics* showed us Aristotle striving for a closer definition than Plato's of those cases of wrong-doing (including homicide) which lie between full intent and mere unforeseeable accident. Similarly in book 3 he defined the deed which rates pity and forgiveness, instead of reprobation, as the one performed out of ignorance of details. Beyond these specific parallels lies the general fact of the development of the sense of equity (*ἐπιείκεια*) in the fourth century—a concept to which Aristotle explicitly attached his discussion in book 5. This is the sphere in which we are moving in tragedy. The deeds or intended deeds before us are such as comported the full horror of blood-pollution and stirred even Plato to a severity which was inconsistent with his own ideas. But they are also deeds caused (not merely accompanied) by ignorance, and therefore having a claim upon our sense of equity and pity. The claim might not lie in a court of law, but it will suffice here because we are sitting in judgment as a court of fellow human-beings, fallible and exposed to misfortune as the hero is. We must and do judge, but as men, not ministers of the law.

I would argue, then, that the spectator or reader of the play is the judge in whose sight the tragic act must be 'purified,' so that he may pity instead of execrating the doer. But again let us be precise. The spectator or reader¹⁰⁰ does not *perform* the purification, any more than

¹⁰⁰ I keep adding "or reader" because whatever the catharsis is it must be accessible to him also; see below.

the judges at the Delphinion or in Plato's state did so. The purification, that is, the proof of the purity of the hero's motive in performing an otherwise 'unclean' act, is *presented* to him, and his conscience accepts and certifies it to his emotions, issues a license, so to speak, which says: "You may pity this man, for he is like us, a good man rather than a bad, and he is καθαρός, free of pollution."

But this is not enough either. The hero, who comes before us with hands dripping with his father's or mother's blood, is not merely presented to us by the dramatist on a platter bearing the label "pure." The question is how the catharsis is operated, and the answer is that it is operated ("carried forward, brought to completion": *περαίνουσα*) by the *plot* (the *μύησις*). To some extent this is achieved by all that we see and hear about the hero in the play. All that we see of Oedipus assures us that he is a strong-willed, excitable, hot-tempered man, but also a kind, loving, and public-spirited one. Such a person cannot, we feel, have killed his father and married his mother in cold blood. But these reassurances are not enough. Aristotle himself tells us in book 3 of the *Ethics* (3. 2. 1110b19, 1111a20) what it is that guarantees the innocence of motive of the person who has done wrong *δι' ἀγνοίαν*: it is his remorse when the truth is discovered. And the complex plot offers precisely this kind of certification, in the recognition and the hero's subsequent behavior. It is Oedipus' self-blinding, his transport of grief and remorse when he learns the truth, that finally assures us of his 'purity' and releases our tears.¹⁰¹ Thus recognition is the structural device which makes it possible for the hero to prove that he did indeed act *δι' ἀμαρτίαν τινά* and so deserves our pity. For the *Oedipus*¹⁰² the sequence would be: (*pathos*, i.e., deed of horror, inherently *μαρόν* but performed in ignorance→)¹⁰³ steady augmentation of the

¹⁰¹ It is evident that if the fear in the *Oedipus* is diffused throughout the play, rising to a climax just before the recognition, the pity is concentrated in the final scene.

¹⁰² It should be emphasized that no generalized chart can be drawn for all plots, even all complex plots. Thus in the *Iphigēia in Tauris* the interrelation and sequence of the elements is quite different. Here the *pathos* lies before instead of behind us at the beginning of the play, pity and fear are aroused more or less concurrently, and the recognition and the consequent averting of the *pathos* turns our feelings off in a different channel. On the possible reasons why Aristotle found this ultimately superior to the play with tragic ending, see below, pp. 450-452.

¹⁰³ The parentheses signify that in this case the *pathos* takes place before the drama begins.

horror as the climax approaches→recognition, undoing (reversing) the ignorance→grief and remorse of the doer, certifying the ignorance as cause of the deed and the deed therefore as οὐ μισῶν→pity (→tragic pleasure).¹⁰⁴

Thus the catharsis is not a change or end-product in the spectator's soul, or in the fear and pity (i.e., the dispositions to them) in his soul, but a process carried forward in the emotional material of the play by its structural elements, above all by the recognition. For the recognition is the pay-off, to use a vulgar but expressive modernism; or, in more conventional figure, it is the hinge on which the emotional structure of the play turns. The catharsis, that is, the purification of the tragic act by the demonstration that its motive was not μισῶν, is accomplished by the whole structure of the drama, but above all by the recognition.

This interpretation makes catharsis a transitive or operational factor within the tragic structure itself, precedent to the release of pity, and ultimately of the tragic pleasure, rather than the be-all and end-all of tragedy itself. By so much, it robs our aesthetic vocabulary of one of those "Prachtausdrücke," as Bernays put it, "die jedem Gebildeten geläufig und keinem Denkenden deutlich sind." The great virtue, but also the great vice, of 'catharsis' in modern interpretation has been its incurable vagueness. Every variety of moral, aesthetic, and therapeutic effect that is or could be experienced from tragedy has been subsumed under the venerable word at one time or another. Thus, to cite one obvious example out of many, in Butcher's essays on *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*—which for all their shortcomings are still the best whole treatment of the subject—catharsis rises to the universal plane and ultimately means or implies a notion of "universalising the emotions and ridding them of an intrusive element that belongs to the sphere of the accidental and individual."¹⁰⁵ Bernays' own explanation, for all the revolution it brought in the assessment of Aristotle's doctrine as a whole, was at one with the rest in assuming that catharsis is the 'work' or end, the τέλος, of tragedy. But Aristotle nowhere says or implies this, even in the definition in chapter 6. He

¹⁰⁴ This time the parentheses indicate that we cannot be sure just how the "pleasure peculiar to tragedy" operates. See below.

¹⁰⁵ P. 268. Butcher is aware (same sentence) that this is a modern idea which we have no strict warrant for attributing to Aristotle. But he pleads that "it is at least the natural outcome of his doctrine; to this conclusion his general theory of poetry points."

speaks repeatedly of the need for tragedy to arouse pity and fear, and he alludes three times (14. 53b12; 23. 59a21; 26. 62b14) to the special pleasure it is to give; but nowhere is catharsis said or implied to be the *τέλος*.

Actually, as is well known, Bernays' explanation was not drawn from the *Poetics* at all, but from the 8th book of the *Politics* and certain utterances of Proclus and Iamblichus¹⁰⁶ which may or may not have anything to do with the case. It had the corresponding virtue of explaining or fitting (with some discrepancies and unevennesses) the passage in the *Politics*. But what we have to explain before everything else is the *Poetics*; and neither Bernays' explanation nor any of the others has ever shed any light on the *Poetics* itself or linked catharsis with any other crucial part of Aristotle's theory.¹⁰⁷ And there is another objection to Bernays' interpretation, which would long since have been recognized as fatal if the authority of the *Politics* passage had not been accepted as beyond dispute. His interpretation, no matter how adapted or refined, is inherently and indefeasibly *therapeutic*. It presupposes that we come to the tragic drama (unconsciously, if you will) as patients to be cured, relieved, restored to psychic health. But there is not a word to support this in the *Poetics*, not a hint that the end of the drama is to cure or alleviate pathological states. On the contrary it is evident in every line of the work that Aristotle is presupposing *normal* auditors, normal states of mind and feeling, normal emotional and aesthetic experience.

There is still another fatal objection to Bernays' theory, and to any theory which is based like his on the concept of the *musical* catharsis:¹⁰⁸ that the musical part of tragedy is precisely the one that Aristotle minimizes, not to say ignores, in his theory of tragedy. If the catharsis is in any sense a musical experience, the *Poetics* is the work that least provides a place and mode of operation for it. Connected with this is another deficiency in the reigning explanations of catharsis, not only

¹⁰⁶ Most conveniently available in the "Fragmenta" of the *Poetics* in Bywater, pp. 94-95.

¹⁰⁷ Except Otte's (see above on 6. 49b27), which did at least take into account Aristotle's general theory of the pleasure we get from imitation (4. 48b8 ff). But Otte never managed to connect catharsis with the doctrine of the tragic plot.

¹⁰⁸ E.g., Jeanne Croissant's subtle and highly instructive book *Aristote et les mystères* (*Bibl. de la Fac. de Philos. et Lettres de l'Univ. de Liège*, fasc. 51), Liège and Paris, 1932; see esp. pp. 103-111. M^{lle} Croissant's results are important and relevant, but to the *Politics*, not the *Poetics*.

in that of Bernays but in all the others. They all assume—tacitly, for the most part—that the catharsis is an experience which comes *in the theater*.¹⁰⁹ But Aristotle insists again and again, not merely that tragedies can be read with pleasure or profit, but that “the capacity of tragedy [i.e., its capacity to do its ‘work,’ produce its effect] exists even without a competition [= actual performance] and actors” (6. 50b18); that the plot should be so constructed that one who merely hears it (i.e., not the full play) will feel pity and fear.¹¹⁰ If catharsis has anything to do with the emotional side of tragedy—and we cannot doubt that it has—then it, like the tragic emotions and the tragic pleasure, must be ‘built into’ the plot and thus made available to a reader in the same way, on the same terms, as it is to the spectator in the theater.

The strengths and weaknesses of my explanation are the converse of those of the traditional explanations, including Bernays’. What it does, first and foremost, is to interpret the *Poetics* out of the *Poetics*. In so doing it puts catharsis in the center of a nexus of concepts with which it is organically connected: pathos, hamartia, recognition, pity and fear, and (perhaps) the tragic pleasure. Its most obvious weakness, on the other hand, is that it does not explain the catharsis passage in the *Politics*; for I can see no direct bridge leading from the structural-objective concept of the *Poetics* to the therapeutic-subjective concept of the *Politics*. More specifically, it does not explain Aristotle’s promise in *Politics* 8. 7. 1341b38: “what we mean by the ‘catharsis’ we will explain now in general outline, and later more clearly [i.e., in greater detail] in the discussions on poetry.”

To this objection there are various things to be said. First, and most important, is the question of method. If an interpretation of a detail in a given work is solidly based on the rationale and argument of that work, if it fits firmly into place in a system of thought along with other concepts which it helps to explain and which help to explain it, then it cannot be refuted *merely* by appealing to a reference in another work which seems to imply a different concept, especially if that reference is obscure or controversial in itself. It does seem clear that ‘catharsis’ in the *Politics* means some kind of purgation of the subject’s emotions, or at least some kind of therapeutic treatment of them. And the reference to τὰ περὶ ποιητικῆς would naturally lead one—did in fact lead

¹⁰⁹ If it is anything of a musical nature, this must obviously be the case.

¹¹⁰ See above on 14. 53b3 ff.

Bernays and others—to expect a similar catharsis in the *Poetics*. But the reference (which is the only overt link between the two works)¹¹¹ is capable of explanation in a number of other possible ways. In the first place, Aristotle may never have carried out his expressed intention: he may never have written the fuller explanation of catharsis. In the second place, the reference may be (this was Bernays' inference and is still the prevailing assumption) to the lost second book of the *Poetics*, and we have no way of telling just what Aristotle said there. Or, if there never was a second book of our *Poetics*, as MacMahon¹¹² and Montmollin¹¹³ have argued, he may have expounded the matter in another work *περὶ ποιητικῆς*.

I abstain from canvassing these hypotheses. To do so would lead far beyond the scope of this book. The fact that they are not and probably never can be anything more than hypotheses should not, I think, weigh against our analysis of the possible meaning of catharsis in our *Poetics*. For my point is precisely that the *Poetics* ought to be interpreted out of itself, if possible, and that the consideration of cross-references elsewhere, and of other possible external evidence, must follow the interpretation of the *Poetics*, not precede it. I will, however, offer a purely personal and perhaps gratuitous hypothesis of my own to account for the apparent discrepancy with the *Politics*. Catharsis, as we have analyzed it, forms part of an extraordinarily tight and subtle nexus of ideas concerning the tragic plot. It stands to reason that such a nexus does not spring into being in a man's mind overnight. It is inherently probable rather than improbable, then, that catharsis in the sense we have suggested was not an original part of Aristotle's thinking about tragedy. And in fact we saw reason to mark the catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy as a later addition to the text by Aristotle. On the other hand there is good reason to believe that book 8 of the *Politics* is early.¹¹⁴ It may be, then, that when Aristotle wrote the latter he had in mind a comparatively simple and direct concept of catharsis as a variety of psychic therapy, but that the peculiar, special system of ideas which emerged in time from his study

¹¹¹ This is worth emphasizing. The cross-reference is Bernays' only warrant for importing the therapeutic concept into the *Poetics*. But for it, the obvious answer to Bernays would be that his theory is all very well for the *Politics* passage and perhaps for some others, but has nothing to do with the *Poetics*.

¹¹² *Opp. cit.* (above, c. 13, n. 65).

¹¹³ Pp. 188-193.

¹¹⁴ Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 267-292.

of the tragic plot-structure¹¹⁶ changed all that and necessitated revisions in his promised explanation of catharsis. If so, the explanation when finally written, or rewritten, would have looked very different from what is implied in the *Politics*. It would have had to attack the problem of catharsis again on a broader front, bringing the structural line of thought into harmony somehow with the medical-therapeutic. Whether Aristotle actually wrote such a treatment I do not venture to decide. Perhaps it was too much for him; perhaps it was drafted but never incorporated into any part of the Aristotelian corpus (certainly there is no trace of it in any part that we now possess).

As against these speculations, interesting as they might be if pursued, let us reaffirm that our aim here is to interpret the *Poetics* out of the *Poetics*, if that is possible, and that other tasks and projects must take second place.

There is another defect in our explanation of catharsis: that it turns the latter into a relatively minor operational factor in the poetic economy instead of a major aesthetic (or moral or therapeutic, etc.) concept. But this is not necessarily a very serious fault. As we said earlier, one of the great virtues of the traditional view(s) was its (their) vagueness: a vagueness which made it possible to stretch 'catharsis' to cover almost every conceivable variety of literary experience. We have grown used to feeling—again vaguely—that serious literature is hardly respectable unless it performs some 'catharsis.' 'Catharsis' has come, for reasons that are not entirely clear, to be one of the biggest of the 'big' ideas in the field of aesthetics and criticism, the Mt. Everest or Kilimanjaro that looms on all literary horizons. But all this may be nothing but a self-propagating mirage. Aristotle does not *tell* us that catharsis is so important, that it is the 'biggest' idea about tragedy. If it were, we should expect it to be at least mentioned again by name somewhere in the discussion of tragedy. As it is, pity and fear are men-

¹¹⁶ I do not mean to imply a 'two-strata' theory like Montmollin's. As I see the possible development of Aristotle's thinking about poetry, it does not fall into sharply defined strata separated from each other by a considerable space of time, but may well represent a growth and refocusing of his conceptions within a single, perhaps even a comparatively short, period. Aristotle's pattern of thought in chapters 11-14 is subtle and highly integrated, but none of its premises are such that he could not have had them from the beginning. In other words we seem to have, not successive 'strata,' but several closely related stages of integration of the same ideas. To attempt to recapture the exact chronological sequence of such a development is hopeless.

tioned repeatedly, and the tragic pleasure three times; catharsis never appears again, by name, after its sudden appearance in chapter 6.

The last feature of our explanation which may seem to militate against it is that it limits catharsis to complex plots and thus makes it a special concept, whereas the catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy seems to promise a general one, applicable to all tragedies. To this we must reply that Aristotle does in fact come perilously close to making complex tragedy stand for all tragedy, and that this is especially true so far as the tragic emotions are concerned. Pity and fear were first mentioned in his analysis (9. 52a1) precisely in order to introduce the theory of the complex plot, and the standing justification for each of its features was its effectiveness in arousing pity and fear. Aristotle never says in so many words that a simple plot cannot arouse pity and fear, but the implication does not lie far below the surface. Of the possible modes of outcome which he canvassed in chapter 13, those possible to the simple plot were rejected as untragic, and the mode involving *hamartia* (which as we saw is only possible, or only makes sense, in a complex structure, as the necessary foil for recognition) was put forward as the 'finest.' Similarly in the present chapter, the first two modalities of the *pathos* (no. 1, performed with full knowledge; no. 2, intended with full knowledge, then not performed) are those possible in a simple plot, and they are the poorest.

Actually, if we look back over the *Poetics* from the vantage-point of chapter 14, we see that Aristotle has said very little about the simple plot as such. It is true that chapters 7-9, in so far as they outline the general theory of the aesthetic qualities of the tragic plot, must be applicable to the simple as well as the complex. But these general characteristics serve primarily as a foundation for the superstructure which Aristotle builds in chapters 11-14: the theory of the complex plot. The simple plot is mentioned *as such* only in connection with its worst form, the episodic (9. 51b33-52a1).

Thus everywhere we look we find evidence that for Aristotle complex tragedy is very close to being tragedy *tout court*: as if the simple were another species, not merely an inferior variety of this one.¹¹⁶ And there are other places in the *Poetics* where we can observe a similar tendency: in the classification of the modes of imitation in chapter 3 (the dramatic mode is imitation in the proper or full sense) and in

¹¹⁶ Cf. the section on episodic plots, where they are characterized in a way that practically assimilates them to the epic. See below on 18. 56a10-15.

the 'history' of poetry in chapters 4 and 5 (the drama is poetry, the earlier varieties being essentially attempts to achieve it; the 'dramatization of the ludicrous' is comedy, other varieties being only 'iambic').¹¹⁷ Aristotle's whole theory is permeated by the conviction that the best or perfect specimen is the species in the proper sense. So, from the point of view not merely of perfection of structure but of the emotional 'work' of tragedy (since, as we have seen, the structure is for the sake of the 'work'), the complex plot is *the* tragic plot, is tragedy in the full sense of the word.¹¹⁸ It follows that in restricting catharsis to the complex plot we are not limiting its significance, by Aristotle's standards. It is a post of honor, like that of peripety and recognition.

But it is not merely a question of limitation to complex plots. A complex play may have a peripety but no *hamartia* and recognition; by the same token it will have no catharsis. The total nexus to which catharsis belongs is defined so tightly by the interlocking of its parts—*pathos*, *hamartia*, recognition, and catharsis—that it will actually fit only a few tragedies; and in fact that is precisely the state of affairs to which Aristotle calls attention in chapter 13 (53a17-22) and again at the end of the present chapter (54a9-15). It is clear that he was not troubled by any concern for the statistical average. The six heroes mentioned in 13. 53a20-21, as examples of the "few houses" which have provided suitable stories, account between them for about seventy known tragedies (only six of them extant, as it happens);¹¹⁹ and they do not exhaust the possible list (*loc. cit.*, *καὶ ὄσοις ἄλλοις κτλ.*). But we cannot tell how many of the seventy plays were complex in Aristotle's sense,¹²⁰ though it is reasonable to assume that some of the Sophoclean dramas and most of those by Euripides and later poets were so. Above all, we cannot tell how many fitted the full prescription of *hamartia*—recognition—catharsis.¹²¹ Certainly it is hard to imagine

¹¹⁷ See above on 9. 51b11-15.

¹¹⁸ This is already implicit in the *οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καὶ* of 9. 52a1-2.

¹¹⁹ Aesch. *Cho.*, *Eum.*; Soph. *O.T.*, *El.*; Eur. *El.*, *I.T.* For details on the rest see the notes on the passage, above *ad loc.*

¹²⁰ We can be sure that at least those by Aeschylus were not.

¹²¹ Out of the other complex tragedies mentioned in the *Poetics* we can detect at least two which had a *pathos* involving close kin. One of them, the play cited here (14. 53b34) as the *Τρανματίας Ὀδυσσεύς* (almost certainly identical with the *Ὀδυσσεύς ἀκαρθολήξ* of Sophocles: see Gudeman 263), is an almost exact parallel to the *Oedipus*: Telegonus kills his father, as an oracle had predicted, and only 'recognizes' him afterward. The other, the *Tereus* of Sophocles (16. 54b36),

an Orestes-Clytemnestra drama in which the son kills his mother without knowing who she is; yet Astydamas perhaps accomplished a similar feat with Alcmeon.

The sum of the matter is that we cannot tell what proportion of all Greek tragedies exactly fitted Aristotle's prescription for the best plot, but it cannot have been more than a small fraction: perhaps as much as a tenth.¹²² Among the extant plays the proportion is spectacular: two (*Oedipus Rex* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*) out of 32. The reasons for this glaring disproportion are not certain either; though it seems fair at least to say that the final choice, so far as it was a choice,¹²³ of the tragedies that were destined to survive antiquity was not made on Aristotelian principles. Actually I believe that the fact is a damaging one to Aristotle's credit as a critic, no matter how one looks at it. His principles, which with his characteristic logic he has pushed to a radical conclusion, have led him into a *cul de sac*. They were based too narrowly to begin with, on his exaggerated and one-sided thesis of the overwhelming importance of plot as against all other elements; and their interlocking into the tight nexus we have described had the result of narrowing his scope still more, to two subspecies (our modes nos. 3 and 4) of one variety (the complex plot). It so happened that the knife-edge of his judgment hit square on one masterpiece, the *Oedipus*; but the other play it hit upon, the *Iphigenia*, cannot honestly be called much more than a good melodrama, and meanwhile masterpieces like the *Trojan Women* or the *Bacchae*, to say nothing of the *Oedipus at Colonus* or the *Agamemnon*, remain outside the range of Aristotle's formula. This is not the way one can arrive at an organic comprehension of the best of Greek drama. Tragedy in its greatest days comported things that were not dreamt of in Aristotle's philosophy.

involved *pathé* of the right kind (cutting out of Phylomela's tongue; Itys' flesh served up to his father), but no *hamartia*.

¹²² Estimating, more or less at random, that half of the 70 plays mentioned above may have done so—probably a liberal guess—and setting this against the 387 known titles of tragedies (see Schmid 1. 2. 87 n. 7; the six heroes named by Aristotle do figure prominently in Schmid's list of the commonest titles: *Meleager* 4 times, *Orestes* 5, *Alcmeon* and *Thyestes* 6, *Telephus* 7, *Oedipus* 12).

¹²³ The seven plays each which we have from Aeschylus and Sophocles are 'select.' But ten of the extant plays of Euripides come from a complete alphabetical edition, part of which (two rolls) was somehow preserved long enough to be conflated with a 'select' edition of nine plays; see E. R. Dodds, *Euripides Bacchae*, Oxford, 1944, *Introd.* xlvii-xlviii.

However, our purpose here is to understand the *Poetics*, not to judge it. There is one more thing to be said before we leave the subject of catharsis: that our interpretation of it excludes the possibility of a comic catharsis. Comedy has no tragic *pathē*, no *μιαρόν*, to be cleansed; the idea could not possibly be relevant to it.¹²⁴

With catharsis thus defined and set in a fixed relation to *pathos*, *hamartia*, recognition, and pity, we can perhaps return to the question of the *οἰκεία ἡδονή* of tragedy with better hopes of success. For that pleasure was characterized (53b12) as depending on two factors, (1) pity and fear, and (2) imitation, and we have now attained a little more clarity about the first. We have said that the purification of the *pathos*, that is, the exculpation of the hero's motive from polluted intent, is precedent to our feeling pity for him. The pity has to be authorized by reason before it can be released. It follows that the special pleasure we derive from pity (and fear) must be connected somehow with this release. Pity and fear are painful in themselves, as normal emotions;¹²⁵ how can they be pleasurable? Pleasure is the feeling that follows, or a kind of bloom that supervenes, upon any unimpeded activity;¹²⁶ or perhaps it is the activity.¹²⁷ Moreover, since activities differ in kind, their pleasures also differ in kind:¹²⁸ each has a pleasure peculiar or appropriate, *οἰκεία*, to it.

How can these ideas be applied to tragedy? Tragedy is in the first place a species of imitation and must produce the pleasure appropriate to all imitations: a pleasure which as we already know¹²⁹ is basically

¹²⁴ For speculations on this subject, and an attempt (with negative results) to find evidence for an Aristotelian doctrine of catharsis in comedy, see Lane Cooper, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, New York, 1922, 63-90. The source of the idea is of course the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, with its parody of Aristotle's definition of tragedy (on it see Gudeman 145, on 5. 49a31).—The *hamartia* of comedy is painless; see above on 5. 49a31-37.

¹²⁵ Both are defined as *λύπη τις κτλ.*, *Rhet.* 2. 5. 1382a21; 8. 1385b13.

¹²⁶ For what follows see especially the fifth chapter of book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1175a21-1176a29, in which the phrase *οἰκεία ἡδονή* recurs eight times (1175a31, b14, 21 [twice], 27, 28, 30, 1176a4).

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* 4. 1175a19, *συνεζεύχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα* (sc. pleasure and activity) *φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχθαι*; 5. 1175b32, *αἱ δὲ* (sc. *ἡδοναί*) *σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ*. Cf. 7. 14. 1153b9-17.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 10. 5. 1175a21-28.

¹²⁹ See above on 4. 48b8-19. Otte (see above on 6. 49b27) tried to make this the

intellectual. But tragedy is not merely an imitation, it is a *dramatic* imitation in which representative and significant human beings act and speak to us directly. Hence the pleasure it gives us *qua* imitation must be the purest possible. From it we learn about 'life' and men directly, and enjoy the lesson in proportion. But this is not all. The tragic imitation is of an action or activity, a *πραξις*,¹²⁰ namely one shaped by the poet, and the poet gives it or should give it proper arrangement, length, symmetry, and unity: all qualities which are calculated to make a work of art a source of pleasure.¹²¹

This is the *οικεία ἡδονή* as it seems to be defined or suggested in Aristotle's theory of the epic, 23. 59a19, *περὶ μίαν πράξιν δλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἢ ὡς περὶ ζῶον ἐν δλον ποιῆ τήν οικείαν ἡδονήν*. Whether Aristotle means to imply more for the epic is a question we will take up when we come to that passage. In any case there is another side to the tragic pleasure: the side denoted in our guiding formula (14. 53b12) by *ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου*.¹²² That is, the *tragic* pleasure must have an emotional as well as an aesthetic base: a base, specifically, in the emotions of pity and fear. But here we return to our question of a moment ago. How can pity and fear, which are painful in their own right, give rise to pleasure? The answer must be: through a special setting (not a special quality)¹²³ which the poet gives to them through

sole content of the tragic pleasure, dissociating it from the emotional 'work' or goal of tragedy. But this is short-sighted and one-sided.

¹²⁰ In so far as "the plot is the imitation of the action," 6. 50a3.

¹²¹ The connection of these factors with aesthetic pleasure (the beautiful and our enjoyment of it) is self-evident. The idea of appropriate length is especially relevant, since Aristotle emphasizes (*E. N.* 10. 4. 1175a4) that no (merely human) pleasure can last indefinitely. We would tire of an imitation that was indefinitely long. See below on 26. 62b1.

¹²² My earlier attempt to interpret the *οικεία ἡδονή* ("Aristotle on the Beauty of Tragedy," *Harv. Stud. in Class. Philol.* 49 [1938] 179-204; see esp. 194-199) was hampered by the fact that I still believed the catharsis to be a catharsis of the tragic emotions, which in turn made it impossible to distinguish catharsis from (purified emotion -) pleasure. Also, my obscure feeling that the poet's artistic achievement must be the real ground of both catharsis and pleasure led me to overemphasize the purely artistic side of his work, its beauty.

¹²³ We must beware of smuggling the 'catharsis of the emotions' back into Aristotle's theory after it has been banished. The tragic pity and fear are the regular emotions we know by those names, not a purified version of them. If they have any special quality, they have it by virtue of the fact that tragedy is an imitation: that is, the fact that it is an imitation of life, not the real thing, so that we feel

the shaping of his work. In the first place the action is to proceed according to the law of probability or necessity: the whole tragic *μεταβολή*, and particularly the 'complex' elements in it, peripety and recognition, are to be brought about *δι' ἄλληλα*. But we saw that the logical character of the action is not an end in itself. It is there as a base for the *emotional* structure of feeling in the play. The concepts which Aristotle has added since chapter 9, especially recognition and *hamartia*, are directly subservient to this end. They are preferred structural elements just because they serve to heighten the emotional intensity inherent in the *pathos*. And catharsis belongs to the same system of ideas. The whole complex directly serves the purpose announced in 9. 52a1-4, *οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἢ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλλειπῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα δταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα*: to make the emotional effect of tragedy not only more intense but more solid by making it spring from a logical, apparently inevitable course of action. The man who has committed an act that is pregnant with horror, but in ignorance, and who redeems himself and proves his essential innocence by his own horror when he discovers his mistake, has established an unassailable claim to our pity, and especially if the steps that lead to the discovery, and thus clear the way for our pity, are logically connected from first to last.

Thus the 'special pleasure' of tragedy—that is, of the best tragedy—is neither simply intellectual nor simply emotional, but has its roots in both realms. It is a pleasure springing from emotion, but an emotion authorized and released by an intellectually conditioned structure of action. The emotion flows unimpeded *because* when we feel it we feel it as justified and inevitable. That is the peculiar interlocking system that Aristotle characterizes in his unique, interlocked formula *τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μίμησης ... ἡδονήν*.¹³⁴ Moreover—and this is our last point—the pleasure is not automatic, it has to be *produced*.¹³⁵

the emotions in question for someone else (a dramatic character) and not for ourselves. But Aristotle nowhere emphasizes this factor of 'aesthetic distance'; he harps instead on the directness and immediacy of the dramatic form and the likeness of the tragic hero to us.

¹³⁴ "Interlocked," because the two prepositional phrases are not presented independently (*ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου καὶ διὰ μίμησης*). The first depends on the second, and the whole complex phrase in turn on *ἡδονήν παρασκευάζειν*.

¹³⁵ *Παρασκευάζειν* is a technical term for the conscious production of an effect (emotional or otherwise) by rhetoric. See below on 19. 56b5, *τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*

by the poet through the arrangement of his work. That is the sense of the *καλῶς* in 53b26. Whether the poet uses a traditional plot or invents his own, he is to do it *καλῶς*, that is, in such a way that the *pathos* may be 'purified,' our pity and fear released, and the tragic pleasure attained.¹²⁶ How he is to do this is set forth in the following passage, the one from which we got our clue to the interrelation of *pathos*, recognition, and catharsis (53b26-54a9); it therefore is Aristotle's explanation of *τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμπονητέον* above (b13-14). The poet's task of arousing the tragic emotions and the pleasure that springs from them is a task of construction. "The structure of events is a scaffolding for the structure of meaning."¹²⁷

To return to the text after these long excursions, one problem remains in connection with the last modality of the *pathos* (our no. 4), the one in which the recognition comes before the *pathos* and averts it altogether. This is said here (54a4) to be the best mode, whereas in chapter 13 (53a9, 15) the best outcome was said to be that which ended in unhappiness for the hero. How is the discrepancy to be reconciled? Vahlen's explanation¹²⁸ is the most widely accepted:¹²⁹ that in chapter 13 Aristotle was considering the form of the tragic action as a whole, here only the *pathos* and its immediate antecedents and consequences. The best form of plot-structure as a whole and the best handling of the *pathos* are two different things, and in this case irreconcilable,¹³⁰ just as no one tragedy can exemplify all the 'kinds.' Undoubtedly

ἐπὶ τοῦ λέγοντος (sc. δεῖ) παρασκευάζεσθαι, and cf. *Rhet.* 2. 7. 1285a31. It has already been used plentifully in this chapter, 53b7, 9-10, 12-13, and reappears below, 54a11, *εἶρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις*.

¹²⁶ The sentence *τοὺς μὲν οὖν κτλ.*, b22 ff., reverts to the theme announced in b11-14.

¹²⁷ R. B. West, Jr., and R. W. Stallman, *The Art of Modern Fiction*, New York, 1949, 647.

¹²⁸ *Beiträge*³ 53-54 ('2. 111-113). The attempt of I. Glanville ("Tragic Error", *CQ* 43 [1949] 47-56) to trace the apparent difference to a change in Aristotle's definition of involuntary action, as reflected in the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* respectively, is interesting but, I think, not convincing.

¹²⁹ See Montmollin 338-339 (n. 270).

¹³⁰ Vahlen, *op. cit.* 57-58 ('2. 116-117): "Eine Tragödie, die in ihrem ganzen Verlauf und im Ausgange minder tragisch ist, [kann] Szenen haben, die tragischer sind, als die einer in ihrem ganzen Verlaufe tragischeren Tragödie, und umgekehrt. Das Tragische des einzelnen Momentes deckt sich nicht nothwendig mit dem Tragischen der ganzen Tragödie." Similarly he emphasizes, *ibid.* 53 ('2. 112), that the *pathos* (and/or its climax in a recognition) need not coincide with the climax of the play. See also Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 78-82.

this points in the right direction, but it hardly satisfies one all the way. Let us say rather that tragedy has two different possible focal centers, one the individual tragic act (the *pathos*), the other the *στάσεις τῶν πραγμάτων*. Since both are there for the sake of emotion and subsequent pleasure, this means two different types or levels of emotional involvement, one relating to a man's whole fortune, the other centering around a particular act which is especially rich in potential feeling: more concretely, one that is *μαρὸν*. It is evident that these are different foci of emotion, and particularly that their emotional potentials differ considerably in degree. An act like the killing of a mother, or even the prospect of one, has a direct, concentrated impact upon us¹⁴¹ that the over-all fate of a man, however, appalling, can hardly rival.

It would seem to follow that the ideal combination would be: over-all outcome *εἰς δυστυχίαν*, plus a *pathos* carried through and followed by recognition—that is, mode no. 3 of the *pathos*. And if the *pathos* and/or its recognition is to form the climax of the play, that will indeed be the case; for then the recognition not only carries its own emotional 'punch' but serves as the hinge, emotional as well as structural, of the whole action. But although Aristotle does no doubt recognize this (the *Oedipus*-structure, we may call it) as the best from the point of view of the play as a whole, from the point of view of the *pathos* itself he rates it only second. Why? Another unspoken principle enters here, which Vahlen also points out: that the *μέλλον πάθος* is not less rich in potential pity and fear than the *γεγονός πάθος*. If the deed of horror to come is presented so vividly that we imagine it already performed, but then is cancelled before the blood has actually flowed, the pathetic effect is all the purer. The poet has enabled us, so to speak, to suck the juice without biting the rind. He has given us a *pathos*-in-essence, free from the actual grossness that would otherwise attach to it: an *idea* of the *pathos* which does duty for the thing itself.

It springs to the eye that if the poet can achieve this *tour de force*—can communicate the full emotional impact of a *pathos* without giving us one, or in fact by *not* giving us one—he has achieved the ultimate so far as the *pathos* and its related 'parts' are concerned. That Aristotle has such an idea in mind seems to me to be suggested by another fact which Vahlen did not connect with this question. In the *Oedipus* also, though it belongs to mode no. 3, the poet has found a way to

¹⁴¹ *Ἐκπληκτικόν*, 54a4—a word which is nowhere used to describe the effect of the tragic plot as a whole.

bring us the emotional essence of the *pathos* in 'pure' form: by leaving it *ἔξω τοῦ δράματος* and making the play consist exclusively of its consequences. Thus Sophocles has achieved within the framework of mode no. 3 the nearest thing to the 'purity' of no. 4, while also maintaining the best over-all shape of plot.

But although we can thus explain the apparent discrepancy between the two passages, I think we cannot wholly acquit Aristotle of some casualness in not even taking notice that a discrepancy is present. Perhaps it is rather a case of dissociation: he saw the two things in a sufficiently different light that it did not occur to him to explain just how they were related. In any case there is no reason to think of different 'strata' of the work, embodying different theories or attitudes, *à la* Montmollin.¹⁴² All that we have seen indicates the closest possible affinity of doctrine between chapters 13 and 14. The whole passage, aside from the additions and interpolations we found in 13, belongs together.

54a9-15

- 10 (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλὰ | γένη
αἱ <κάλλισται> τραγωδίαι εἰσίν. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ
τέχνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εἶρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν
ἐν τοῖς μύθοις· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς οἰκίας
ἀπαντᾶν ὄσαις τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβέβηκε πάθῃ.)
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσεως καὶ ποίους
15 τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μύ|θους, εἴρηται ἱκανῶς.

54a9

- (For the cause of the thing that we mentioned some time ago—that the <finest> tragedies have to do with a few
10 | houses—is this. It was because their search was guided by chance, not conscious art, that the poets stumbled upon the production of this kind of effect in their tragedies; hence they have been forced to concentrate upon just those particular families which happen to have suffered this kind of fearful deeds.)

¹⁴² Or Glanville; see above, n. 138. It happens that in this case Montmollin himself (pp. 153-154) ascribes both passages, in fact almost all of both chapters, to the 'recent' or 'late' level and considers the "légère contradiction" between them the result not so much of theoretical differences as of a relative indifference on Aristotle's part to unity of doctrine in his later period.

Well then, concerning the structure of the action and
15 what qualities the | plots should have, enough has been said.

"For this is the reason, as was said some time ago, why our tragedies are about only a few families" (usual version). What is the point of this observation? The fact that certain modalities of the *pathos* are superior to the others does not explain why the poets have been "forced" to hit upon only a few families; for the road of free invention lies open to them, as Aristotle reaffirmed at the beginning of this very passage (53b25). The point of *διὰ τοῦτο* is stated in the following lines, beginning at *ζητοῦντες γὰρ*. The reason why tragedy has been limited to the stories of a few houses is that the poets conducted their search for plots by chance instead of art; for chance could only lead them to the few families which *happen*¹⁴³ to have undergone such experiences. Art, on the other hand, would have taught them to seek out or construct the best pattern or patterns of plot-construction, those which Aristotle has expounded and justified in the last section.

The effect (few families) was mentioned in the passage to which Aristotle refers in *ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται*,¹⁴⁴ viz. 13. 53a17-21, but not the cause (search based on chance instead of art). The latter was, however, implied in *τούς τυχεύοντας μύθους ἀπηρίθμουν*.¹⁴⁵ The inference is clear: the poets have been guided from the beginning, and still are guided (*ἀναγκάζονται*), by chance. And the affinity between the two passages is equally clear. If the first is an addition to Aristotle's original text, so is the second. In the absence of conclusive proof I have not ventured to show this for the present passage either, but have left it, like the other, as a parenthesis.¹⁴⁶

Ζητοῦντες γὰρ ... ἐν τοῖς μύθοις states the reason, then, for the

¹⁴³ *Συμβέβηκε* has its full force; cf. 13. 53a21 and 8. 51a25.

¹⁴⁴ The clause, like all the others of the kind that we have come across, embodies a substantive and not merely a verbal reference: "Because of this the thing which was mentioned some time ago (has happened); the tragedies," etc. *Ὅπερ* summarizes the content of the clause *ὅτι περὶ πολλὰ γένη κτλ.* See below on 24. 60a3.

¹⁴⁵ The description was applied to the earlier stage (*πρῶτον μὲν*); but the present passage makes clear that the procedure in the second stage (*νῦν δέ*) was equally random from the point of view of art. *Ἀπηρίθμουν ~ ἀπαντᾶν* ('run into, stumble upon').

¹⁴⁶ In any case *αἱ <κάλλισται> τραγωδίαι* (Gudeman) is necessary here, as in 13. 53a19 (Vahlen suggested *ναίαι*). As we have seen, it was far from true that all tragedies centered on the "few houses"; but the best ones did. The loss of the adjective is especially easy to explain in an added note.

phenomenon which is described in ἀναγκάζονται ... συμβέβηκε πάθη; and this result is anticipated in οὐ περὶ πολλὰ γένη κτλ. But this still does not explain the first γάρ (διὰ γάρ τοῦτο). Possibly the word should be athetized, with the first Aldine edition.¹⁴⁷ If it is genuine, we can perhaps explain it by looking back a little. Aristotle prefaced his analysis of the modes of the *pathos* by pointing out that the poet might either use traditional plots or invent his own, provided he did his work "artistically." The examples cited in 53b27-54a9, however, seem to be all from παραδεδομένοι μῦθοι.¹⁴⁸ Is Aristotle saying, in effect, "Yes, I said that the poet might invent his own plot, yet all my examples are from tradition. Well, the reason is this...?"

¹⁴⁷ It might easily be a copyist's addition, if the sentence originally had no connective.—All the modern translations conveniently ignore γάρ (even where the translator prints it in his text); so Gomperz, Butcher, Bywater, Albeggiani, Valgimigli, Hardy, Menardos-Sykutris, Epps, Pitcher, Potts. Where the translators give any connective, it tends to be "therefore."

¹⁴⁸ Rostagni suggests that the *Helle* (54a8) is an example of free invention, since the recognition Aristotle describes does not correspond to any known myth. But that is precisely the poet's freedom *within* the traditional myth. If it records no betrayal (~ slaying) of the mother by the son, he is free to invent one, *provided he also forestalls it*. The intended slaying of Orestes by his sister, in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, is of this variety: it is an outright invention by Euripides (see Schmid 1. 3. 521-522), who was perfectly free to imagine such a *pathos* so long as he did not let it be carried through (an Orestes actually killed by his sister would be another matter: that would amount to τὸν μῦθον λύειν). *Helle* has a known mythological name; in default of other evidence we have no right to assume that she is not the person usually designated by it.

CHAPTER 15

54a16-28

- περὶ δὲ τὰ ἤθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι. ἐν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ἦ. ἔξει δὲ ἦθος μὲν εἰάν ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῆ φανερόν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἢ πρᾶξις προαίρε-
 20 σιν, <ἢ τις ἂν> ἦ, χρηστὸν δὲ εἶαν | χρηστήν. ἔστιν δὲ ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει· καὶ γὰρ γυνή ἐστιν χρηστή καὶ δοῦλος, καίτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον τὸ δὲ ὅλως φαῦλόν ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμότιον· ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν <εἶναι> τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμότιον γυναικί [οὐ τῷ† ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινήν εἶναι]. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὁμοίον· τοῦτο γὰρ
 25 ἕτερον | τοῦ χρηστοῦ τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἀρμότιον ποιῆσαι ὡσπερ εἴρηται. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν· κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ἦ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων, καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτεθῆ, ὁμως ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι.

54a16

- In connection with the characters, there are four things that one should aim at. First, and most important, that they be good. Now they will have character if in the way already mentioned their speech or their action clearly reveals a moral choice, <whatever it may> be, and good
 20 character if | a good choice. But goodness exists in each class of people: there is in fact such a thing as a good woman and such a thing as a good slave, although no doubt one of these classes is inferior and the other, as a class, is worthless. Second is appropriateness; for it is possible for the character <to be> brave (manly) but not fitting to a woman [not by virtue of (?) being brave or clever]. Third is naturalness ('likeness'); for this is a different thing from making
 25 the | character good and appropriate in the manner mentioned above. And fourth is consistency; for even if the person being imitated is an inconsistent sort, and that kind of character has been posited, still he should be consistently inconsistent.

The discussion of plot is now finished¹ and we turn to 'character.' But we shall find that the treatment of character necessarily involves some return to plot, because the characters are the source of the action. Conversely, the main aspects of character which are integrally connected with the shaping of the plot, viz., that the hero should be good rather than bad and the catastrophe should be brought on by error rather than wickedness, have already been canvassed in chapter 13. It remains to look at character in its own right. The persons of tragedy "include their characters (along with their actions) for the sake of the actions" (6. 50a21). But since all action is the action of someone—that is, since the agent exists before he acts—it is possible to consider character independently of action. Furthermore, in tragedy one character tends to be of central importance for the plot, but the others are still present and subject to whatever laws may govern the portrayal of character. From both these points of view, therefore, a general discussion of character is still called for. However, for the same reasons it can be brief.

We saw in chapter 6 (50a5 and 50b8) that character is presupposed in tragedy for the same reason as in life, as one of the two factors (the other being *διάνοια*) which condition all acts; but that 'character' as an element in tragedy—i.e., in the art of tragedy—means the expression of character through speech or action. Hence, as Aristotle himself pointed out (6. 50a23 ff.), it is possible for a tragedy to exist "without characters": i.e., without explicit indications of character (not, obviously, without dramatic persons). The point of view here is the same. 'Character' will be present, says Aristotle, when a speech or action reveals a choice, whatever it may be,² and a good one if it reveals a good choice. The subject of *ἐξεῖ*, as well as of *δπως χρηστὰ ἦ* just before it, is *τὰ ἦθη*, understood from the first sentence (*περὶ δὲ τὰ ἦθη*):³ the characters, i.e., the dramatic persons. We have

¹ See below, pp. 558-560, on the apparent resumption in chapters 17-18.

² Vahlen's conjecture (*Poet.*² 173) *ἢ τις ἀν ἦ*, for *τινα ἦ* of the Parisinus, is easier to justify palaeographically than *ὁποία τις ἀν ἦ* (Gomperz), for which Tkatsch argues at length, 2. 147-149. Certainly a reading is required which accounts for *ἦ* in the Parisinus, but I cannot see that Tkatsch has proved that the Arabic version ("*quod est condicio uniuscuiusque e moribus haec*") necessitates *ὁποία*. See Sykutris' critical note *ad loc.*

³ This state of affairs does not seem to have been recognized. Generally, it appears, the subject of *ἐξεῖ* is vaguely assumed to be *ἡ τραγωδία* or the like. Rosagni extracts it from the subject of the subordinate clause itself (*ὁ λόγος ἦ ἢ πρᾶξις*); but this is tautologous and seems to me impossible.

already remarked⁴ on the paradoxicality of this formulation, that the 'characters' have 'character' under certain conditions—which implies that under other conditions they do not have it. Fortunately a precise parallel is at hand in 24. 60a10-11, ("Ομηρος) εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἢ θοος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄηθες ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἢ θοος.

In chapter 15, then, Aristotle is talking about the character to be displayed by the 'characters': i.e., their expression of character through speech or action. The first necessity is that they show themselves 'good.' This is a perfectly straightforward requirement, and entirely consistent with the original definition of tragedy as a *μίμησις σπουδαίων*.⁵

The only reason any difficulty has been found in it is the 'moral flaw' interpretation of *hamartia*, which brought what seemed to be an amendment into Aristotle's definition of the tragic hero. 'Good' does not mean 'perfect, faultless', but on the other hand Aristotle does not allow for any serious moral fault. His hero is to be a good man, though subject to error like all of us; and so are the other characters. We learned from chapter 13 that there is no room for villains in his conception of the best tragedy.⁶

Aristotle adds that goodness has its varieties and degrees: it goes by classes of human beings, men, women, slaves, etc. (We shall see in a moment how this is related to the principle of the 'fitting,' τὸ ἀρμόττον). But his motive in the remark is perhaps not so much to let us know that he is thinking in terms of classes or types, as it is to forestall a possible misunderstanding. We pointed out⁷ that *σπουδαίων* connoted the old heroic and aristocratic code of ἀρετή. The hero will (Greek tragedy being as it is) represent that class and that code. But tragedy also presents us with other people of all ranks and conditions—wives, cousins, friends, slaves—and Aristotle's prescription of goodness is meant to cover them also, each according to his kind.⁸ That

⁴ Above, on 6. 50a5.

⁵ On Aristotle's use of *χρηστός*, *ἐπιεικής*, and *σπουδαῖος* see Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 267-268 ('2. 163-165, in n. 3 to c. 15); C. H. Reeves, *AJP* 73 (1952) 172-188.

⁶ On "necessary villainy" see below, on 54a28 ff.

⁷ Above, on 2. 48a2.

⁸ On the goodness of women and slaves cf. *Pol.* 1. 13. 1259b18-1260b7, esp. 1260a17-20. Further refs. in Gudeman; Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 59-60 ('2. 118-119). In general, in spite of Aristotle's unconscious moral snobbery, one sees the advantage of his abandonment of the absolute Platonic Good. For him good is not a single principle but a system of analogies in which every creature, animal or human, can participate at his level.

he is considering them from the point of view of their kinds, rather than purely as individuals, is clear from the neuters τὸ μὲν ... τὸ δέ, a21, where we must supply γένος.⁹

‘All the characters in tragedy should be good, then, within the limitations of their kinds. We see here the difference between the requirements of the action as such and the general requirements of character. Special obligations are incumbent upon the hero as the fulcrum of the action. He is to be not only heroic but a man of conspicuous rank and prosperity; and on the other hand he is to make a “big” error. The other characters are not subject to these special qualifications. Since their fate does not constitute the play, they are freer to be just ‘characters.’ Each is to be good, but in proportion to his status.

‘In saying all this we have anticipated Aristotle’s second requirement, τὸ ἀρμόττον;¹⁰ for in fact it involves nothing that has not already been implied in a19-22. ‘Appropriateness’ is not really a separate principle but a corollary of Aristotle’s hierarchical view of goodness.¹¹ It provides that no dramatic character is to overstep the bounds of his class, up or down. But since the hero stands by implication at the top of the dramatic hierarchy, and since the rules of character are intended for all the dramatic persons, not merely for him, in the large majority of cases the principle will mean that no one is to show a virtue *above* his level. This is clear in the only example Aristotle gives, that of a woman who is inappropriately courageous (‘manly,’ ἀνδρείαν).¹² But there is some trouble about the text here.

⁹ This explains the phrase δλωσ φαῦλον. Aristotle does not mean that a slave is necessarily a “wholly worthless” person, but that the class of slaves is, in general, φαῦλον in comparison with free men (because, as the *Politics* passage tells us, it lacks the ruling element of reason). See A. W. Gomme, *CQ*, N. S. 4 (1954) 46-49, who also rightly explains the καί’s (καί γὰρ γυνή ... καὶ δοῦλος) as coördinate: “for there is both (such a thing as) a woman (being) good and a slave.”

¹⁰ Τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, the reading of most of the MSS, is of course impossible. Τὸ (Riccardianus; conl. Vahlen, Gomperz) ἀρμόττοντα is superficially better, but makes the participle refer to the wrong antecedent (τὰ ἦθη, a16: a long stretch anyway). It is not the persons who should be appropriate, but their character. Τὸ ἀρμόττον (Ar., Gudeman) is the best reading, if only for the obvious parallel with τὸ ὁμοιον, a24; τὸ ὁμαλόν, a26.

¹¹ This close interdependence is indicated by the phrasing in a24-25 below: τοῦ χρηστοῦ τὸ ἦθος καὶ (N.B.: τοῦ not repeated) ἀρμόττον ποιῆσαι.

¹² The Greek word carries its incongruity on its face: applied to a woman, it connotes something like ‘virago.’

Rostagni's version,¹³ ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρείον μὲν τὸ ἥθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμόττον γυναικί οὕτως ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινήν εἶναι, "for the (her?) character is courageous to be sure, but it is not appropriate for a woman to be courageous or clever in this way," embodies Vahlen's conjecture οὕτως (for the οὐ τῶ of the best manuscripts).¹⁴ But οὕτως has nothing to refer to (no woman has been cited who could be courageous or clever "in this way"). Moreover the difficulty is not limited to the second clause. Τὸ ἥθος as it stands must mean the character of some particular dramatic person; but no such person has been mentioned.¹⁵ Thus if the text of the sentence is sound in general we are hard put to it to avoid Gudeman's conjecture of a lacuna before ἔστιν γάρ, in which the missing example was given.¹⁶ The alternative—and it seems to me preferable—is to seek a constitution of the text which does not necessitate such a reference. Hence I suggest <εἶναι> τὸ ἥθος in the first clause: "it is possible for the character to be courageous, but not appropriate(ly) to a woman." Under the new construction of τὸ ἥθος, γυναικί is close enough to furnish the needed definition:¹⁷ the character in question is that of a woman. But the revision then has to be completed by following Diels's suggestion¹⁸ and recognizing that (οὐ) τῶ ... εἶναι is an interpolation. This assumption is made easier by the uncertainty of the text (οὐ τῶ; οὕτως?) and by the fact that the Arabic version offers an entirely different text here ("neque prorsus etiam, ut appareat in eo," Tkatsch), in which we can recognize οὐ but hardly anything corresponding to ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινήν εἶναι. It is useless to try to recapture the Greek original (οὐδ' ὄλλως ἐν αὐτῇ δεῖ ἐνεῖναι?), but the strange words suggest a more drastic supplement to Aristotle's remark: not only is a certain *degree* of courage inap-

¹³ Identical with Sykutris's except that the latter writes οὕτω.

¹⁴ So in the Riccardianus; Rostagni's critical note, "γυναικί οὕτως B (corruptum in οὐ τῶι)," is misleading. The Parisinus (lacuna of two letters followed by τῶ in rasura) undoubtedly implies οὐ τῶ also, but as a correction. Did the scribe originally write οὕτως (οὕτω), and if so was it a reading or an error? We cannot tell.

¹⁵ Hence Hermann's conjecture μὲν τι ἥθος ("there is such a thing as a courageous character").

¹⁶ It must have been an example (Melanippe?) which involved cleverness (δεινήν) as well as courage, even though this is not provided for in the first clause.

¹⁷ Especially as γυνή ἐστιν χρηστή κτλ. stands in so prominent a position just above, and in view of the close connection we have pointed out between Aristotle's first two principles.

¹⁸ *Sitzungsber.* Berlin 1888, 52.

propriate in a woman, but it is not fitting for her to have that virtue at all.¹⁹

In any case the bracketing of οὐ τῶ ... εἶναι restores the passage to sense and a close connection with what precedes. The tragic characters are to be good, and goodness goes by classes or levels. It is essential, then, that their goodness be held to the appropriate level. Courage, for example, is a virtue (a part of goodness), and a woman may show some of it, but not an amount inappropriate to her status as a woman.

The close affiliation between the first two principles is indicated again by the next clause, which in fact says nothing except that making a character 'like' is different from making it good and appropriate.²⁰ Aristotle's laconic brevity is especially unfortunate just here, because it is not immediately clear what he means by ὅμοιον. The characters are to be 'like,' but like what? There are two possible answers: (1) that they are to be like their mythical prototypes as presented by tradition, and (2) that they are to be like men in general, or, as Aristotle is fond of saying, like "us," i.e., true to life. The first interpretation is represented by the later Peripatetic tradition as we see it, for example, in Horace (A.P. 119-124: *Aut jamam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge, / scriptor. Honoratum si forte reponis²¹ Achillem, / impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer / iura neget sibi nata, nihil non arroget armis. / Sit Medea ferox invictaque, flebilis Ino, / perfidus Ixion, Io vaga, tristis Orestes*). But although this concept of faithfulness to the literary tradition is incontestably Peripatetic,²² it has no points of anchorage

¹⁹ Diels, *loc. cit.*, suggests that Aristotle wrote ὥστε μηδέ φαίρεσθαι καθόλου; a glossator has annotated this with τῶ (lege τὸ) ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινήν εἶναι; and the gloss has then displaced the original clause. But this does not explain the intrusion of δεινήν. Perhaps it was suggested to the writer of the note by a31 below (the famous speech of Melanippe). In any case the corruption is easiest to explain if the original was a note, and written in compendia.

²⁰ See above on the close connection between χρηστόν and ἀρόπτον. — Ὅσαυτε εἶρηται, as always, is substantive in meaning. In this case it is attached closely to ποιῆσαι: "making it good and appropriate in the way aforesaid," i.e., by observing the restrictions of rank and category (γένος) which were alluded to in a20-23. See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 61 (*2. 120).

²¹ "Bring back" (into the repertory, onto the stage; i.e., from the tradition, *jama*).

²² See Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio*, Turin, 1930, 36-39 and Introd. LVI-LVII; O. Immisch, "Horazens Epistel über die Dichtkunst," *Philol. Suppl.* 24. 3, Leipzig, 1932, 100 ff., esp. 105 (on the Hellenistic theory of imitation and its connection with Aristotle).

in the *Poetics* itself. On the contrary, both from the general (ideological) and the specific (terminological) point of view, *ὄμοιον* here should mean 'like us.' In the first place, Aristotle has encouraged the poet to invent his own plots and characters,²³ in which case there is no tradition to be followed. But whether he invents or follows the tradition, he is to proceed in the same way, laying out the plot and the chief characters before he gives them names. In the first conception of an *Iphigenia in Tauris* Iphigenia is not to figure as the particular (mythical or historical) person Iphigenia but as 'sister-priestess,' and Orestes not as Orestes but as 'brother-in-exile.' The name, and whatever traditional characterization may go with it, is strictly secondary in the poet's work.²⁴

Thus there is no real place in Aristotle's doctrine for a principle of adherence to tradition in character-portrayal. On the other side, he has already introduced the concept of the *ὄμοιον* in connection with the tragic hero (13. 53a5), and in such a way that it clearly meant 'like us,' faithful to the normal character of human beings in general. This is certainly a different kind of principle from that of goodness and appropriateness, because its implicit reference is to a broad conception of man as such rather than to a narrow definition by specific types or classes; and for that same reason it is very much in order in Aristotle's scheme, as a balance to the others. How 'likeness' is compatible with goodness and appropriateness we can profitably postpone discussing until Aristotle raises the question himself, in 54b8-14.

Our critic is again deplorably curt and vague in defining his last principle, consistency (*τὸ ὁμαλόν*). In fact he does not speak about it in its own right, but only about the special case of the *imitandus*²⁵ who is "premiered" as inconsistent to begin with.²⁶ Certainly Aristotle is not thinking of an actual individual who happens to embody conflicting traits, but of a 'universal,' a type which is so conceived from the beginning.

²³ See 9. 51b19-21, where he points out that in some tragedies only one or two of the characters are "known," i.e., traditional, and in others, like Agathon's *Antheus*, none at all.

²⁴ See below on 17. 55b1, 13 (*οἰκεῖα*).

²⁵ *Ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων*: an interesting paraphrase by way of surrogate for the missing present passive participle of *μιμεῖσθαι* (incidentally it refutes the old attempt to make *μιμουμένους* passive in 3. 48a24).

²⁶ *Κἄν ... τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτεθῆ*: even if such a character has been 'premiered' by the poet in his original conception of the play.

In the *Problems*, 30. 1, we find a possible clue to what Aristotle had in mind.²⁷ Here the question under consideration is why "all" the men who have been outstanding (περιττοί) in philosophy, politics, poetry, and the other arts, and also some of the heroes—Heracles, Ajax, and Bellerophon are explicitly named, 953a14-21, but there are "many others," a25—appear to have been 'melancholics.'²⁸ The writer proceeds to sketch the leading traits of this class of men. He cites the effects of wine as an analogy, and shows that what characterizes these above all is their wide, even paradoxical, *diversity*. Wine produces πλείστα ἤθη, οἷον ὀργίλους, γιλανθρώπων, ἐλέημονας, ἰταμούς. The varying amount of black bile in a man's constitution, and its different behavior under different conditions of heat and cold, has the same paradoxical effect, 954a11ff.: it is ἀνώμαλος, 954b9, and makes its possessors ἀνώμαλοι, b5. The doctrine is summarized thus, 955a29: ὡς οὖν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς ἀνώμαλοί εἰσιν οἱ μελαγχολικοί.

These expressions seem to me to make it highly probable that when Aristotle, in our passage, speaks of "such a character" being "premiered" as the object of imitation, he means a 'melancholic.' The recommendation that the character be portrayed as ὀμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον will then mean that the individual traits or actions assigned to him should all spring from the common concept of 'melancholy' and thus be accounted for by varying amounts, states, and conditions of the same physiological principle.

As an example of the temperament Aristotle has in mind we need only think of the Homeric Achilles,²⁹ who figures below, 54b14, as an example of irascibility (cf. ὀργίλους in the quotation above from the *Problems*). He is the Achilles who sinks into the blackest depths of depression after the death of Patroclus (see especially his self-reproaches, Σ 79-110) and then rises to awesome heights of berserker fury in books 21 and 22; who welcomes the heralds (A 334) and the embassy (I 197) with the most exquisite courtesy and presides over the funeral games

²⁷ I do not think that M^{lle} Croissant, *op. cit.* (above, c. 14, n. 108) 75-87, has proved the authorship of Aristotle conclusively. W. Muri, *Mus. Helv.* 10 (1953) 21, regards the section as an extract from Theophrastus *On Melancholy*. But it does not matter very much for our purpose. The basic theory is certainly Aristotelian.

²⁸ For a fuller discussion of the concept see below on 17. 55a32-34.

²⁹ Cf. Schol. B Int. (Eustath.) on *Il. Q* 569 (= Ar. Fr. 168 Rose): Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος.

(Ψ) with masterly tact, yet sulks in his hut like a thwarted child; who feels with truest sympathy³⁰ Priam's desolation over the loss of the very son whose body he has just treated with such passionate brutality. These are the marks of the 'melancholic' man, and because they all stem from the same continuing yet widely variable physiological source (so, presumably, Aristotle would explain them), we feel Achilles to be *ὀμαλῶς ἀνώματος*. Something of the same diagnosis might be made for Oedipus, or Sophocles' (not Euripides') Electra, or his Ajax.

54a28-b8

30 ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἦθους μὴ ἀναγκαῖον
οἶον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστη, τοῦ | δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ
μὴ ἀρμότιοντος δ τε θρηῆνος <ὁ> Ὀδυσσεύς ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ
καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι
Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἴσκειν ἡ ἰκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρῃ.

35 | ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἦθεσιν ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγ-
μάτων συστάσει αἰεὶ ζητεῖν ἡ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ τὸ εἰκός,
| ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἡ πράττειν ἡ ἀναγ-
καῖον ἡ εἰκός καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἡ ἀναγκαῖον
ἡ εἰκός.

37 | b1 [φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ
τοῦ | ἦθους συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ
μηχανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ <ἐν> Αὐλίδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλουν.
ἀλλὰ μηχανῆ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἡ δὲ πρὸ
τοῦ γέγονεν ἂ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀνθρώπων εἰδέναί, ἡ δὲ ὑστερον
5 ἂ | δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀπαγγελίας· ἅπαντα γὰρ
ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὄρᾱν. ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν
τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, οἶον τὸ ἐν
τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους.]

54a28

A case of wickedness of character which is not required
by any necessity is, for example, <what> Menelaus (does) in
30 the *Orestes*; of | unsuitability and inappropriateness, the
lamentation of Odysseus in the *Scylla* on the one hand

³⁰ Cf. the feminine tenderness with which he senses Patroclus' mood and expresses it in the marvelous simile of the little girl tugging at her mother's skirts, Π 7-11; note *ἐλεήμονας* in the quotation above.—The Horatian lines quoted above, *A.P.* 120-121, *honoratum si forte reponis Achillem, impijger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer*, etc., do not stamp Achilles as *ἀνώματος*, as Gudeman seems to think; rather the contrary.

and the speech of Melanippe on the other; and of inconsistency, the Iphigenia at Aulis: for the girl who makes the speech of supplication has no resemblance to the later one.

In the characters also one must seek constantly for either the necessary or the probable, in exactly the same way as
 35 in the structure of the incidents, so that it will be either necessary or probable that the kind of person before us say or do a certain kind of thing and either necessary or probable that this incident follow that one.

[It is evident therefore that the dénouements of the plots
 37 | b1 also should come from the | character itself, and not as in the *Medea* from the 'machine' and in the (*Iphigenia at Aulis*) the incidents surrounding the departure of the fleet. Rather the 'machine' should be used for the events outside the play, either whatever has happened beforehand which it is not possible for a human being to know, or what happens
 5 afterward which | requires foretelling or reporting; for we credit the gods with seeing all things. But there should be no irrationalities in the plot, or, if there are, they should be outside the play, like the one in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles.]

"We have an instance of baseness of character, not required for the story, in the Menelaus in *Orestes*" (Bywater). The translation is presumably based on the reading ἀναγκαῖον, which is found in three of the inferior manuscripts,²⁴ but does not make it quite clear whether the adjective is really taken with παράδειγμα or πονηρία;. Our three best sources (Parisinus, Riccardianus, Arabic version) agree on ἀναγκαῖον, which is almost certainly correct. What Aristotle is citing is an "unnecessary example, case, instance," of wickedness. This interpretation is strengthened by two considerations. (1) "Unnecessary" should not be taken as applying only to the first example; they are all unnecessary instances, and Aristotle's call for 'necessity or probability' in the next paragraph is directed against offenses under all the categories of 'character' (except the ὁμοιον; see below), not merely one of them. (2) All the instances are *concrete*: they refer to particular

²⁴ Laurentianus XXX 14, Marcianus 215, Ambrosianus B78 (corr.; fuit ἀναγκαῖον?). Ἀναγκαῖα; (Vorländer, Thurot) would be preferable to ἀναγκαῖον, since Aristotle seems not to use ἀναγκαῖο; as feminine but writes ἀναγκαῖα frequently (Gudeman *ad loc.*, against Bywater).

speeches or actions, not to the portrayal of the given character *en bloc*. This is clear at once in the case of Odysseus (one lamentation) and Melanippe (one speech),³² and clear upon reflection in the case of Iphigenia; for ἡ *Ἰκετεύουσα* refers to her long speech of supplication, lines 1211-1252, and τῇ *ὑστέρᾳ* to the later one in which she announces her decision to welcome martyrdom, 1368-1401.³³

What about Menelaus? He enters the *Orestes* at line 356, mouthing correct but incongruous sentiments (the news of Agamemnon's murder has "filled him and his men with tears," 368; but he has come to Argos expecting to embrace Orestes and his mother ὡς *εὐτυχοῦντας*, 371-373); is shocked by Orestes' haggard, wild appearance (ὡς *ἠγρίωσαι*, 387, etc.) and by the news that Apollo instigated his unlovely and unrighteous deed (417); receives Orestes' tale dryly and not very sympathetically³⁴ (cf. 413, οὐ *δεινὰ πάσχειν δεινὰ τοὺς εἰργασμένους*; though he ends with the correct remark, 447, ὦ *μέλεος, ἦκεις συμφορᾶς ἐς τοῦσχατον*); but is prevented by Tyndareus' arrival (456 ff.) from answering Orestes' appeal for help. Not until after Tyndareus and Orestes have argued the case in set speeches (a complete rhetorical *agôn*) does he announce his decision, in his big speech, 682-715. He would like to help Orestes but he cannot: his forces are inadequate; if persuasion could do anything he would be glad to assist, but as things are—etc., etc. His villainy is chiefly cowardice, as indeed Orestes recognizes in his first outburst, 717: ὦ *πλὴν γυναικὸς οὐνεκα στρατηλατεῖν τᾶλλ' οὐδέν, ὦ κάκιστε τιμωρεῖν φίλοις* (cf. *εὐλαβεῖτε*, 748, 1059).³⁵ There can be no doubt that this speech of Menelaus is

³² I.e., the famous one in the *Μελανίππη ἢ σοφή*; see Schmid I. 3. 412-414.

³³ We need not go into the rather bootless controversy whether Aristotle is right or wrong, but I will record my conviction that he is. The first speech expresses a point of view (1218, *ἡδὲ γὰρ τὸ φῶς βλέπειν*) which is certainly natural and plausible enough for a young girl, and the second expresses one (1390, *ἡ δ' ἐμὴ ψυχὴ μί' οὐσα πάντα κωλύσει τάδε*;) which is at least conceivable in certain strong emotional states; but Euripides has done nothing to convince us that she is in or is capable of such a state. It is simply two different girls speaking in different situations; or, to use Aristotle's own phrase (16. 54b34), Iphigenia in the second speech *λέγει ἃ βούλεται ὁ ποιητής*.

³⁴ Perhaps his clearest trait at this stage is the desire that people be "sensible": cf. *σοφόν*, 415; *ἀμαθέστερος*, 417; *σοφές*, 439; *τοῖς σοφοῖς*, 488; *σοφόν*, 490; *σοφία*, 710; cf. *εὐλαβοῦμενος*, 699 (echoed bitterly by Orestes, 748, 1059).

³⁵ Euripides is of course characterizing the Spartan, who will fight only when he has an overwhelming military superiority on his side; cf. Thuc. 2. 39. 2; 5. 109.

what Aristotle is thinking of. "And they will have 'character' if their speech or action reveals a *choice*."³⁶ Aristotle's objection, then, is not to the 'character' of Menelaus in the play as a whole but to his craven decision not to help his nephew, as expressed in the crucial speech 682-715.

Since Aristotle thus has in mind a speech of Menelaus rather than 'Menelaus' as such, I propose to read *ὁ Μενέλαος* as *δ Μενέλαος* (*sc. λέγει* or *πράττει*, cf. a35 below). This, then, is the *παράδειγμα*. But in what sense is Menelaus' speech, and the villainy it reveals in him, "unnecessary"? The epithet recurs in 25. 61b19-21, where Aristotle says that a charge of *ἀλογία* or *μοχθηρία* in a poem is justified *δταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν χρέσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστη <τῇ> τοῦ Μενελάου*. Here the mention of Aegeus (i.e., the Aegeus-scene, *Medea* 663-763) makes it clear again that Aristotle is thinking of a *part* of the play, not the whole. As for the lack of 'necessity,' a glance at the action of the *Orestes* shows what he means. Menelaus' refusal to help his nephew does not significantly advance or retard the latter's fortunes. Repulsed by his uncle, Orestes is persuaded by Pylades, or persuades himself with the latter's encouragement (773 ff.), to go to the assembly and plead his own case. He does so and loses. This decisive attempt is neither forwarded nor hindered by Menelaus' knavery: he has disappeared from the action meanwhile, to reappear only when the fevered brains of Orestes, Pylades, and Electra conceive the idea of killing Helen and holding Hermione as a hostage. On the other hand the state of affairs in the Argive assembly, as revealed by the messenger's report (866-956)—that is, the fact that it is dominated by a violent and noisy demagogue (902-916, 944-945)—makes it very doubtful whether Menelaus, a foreigner and one newly returned from Troy,³⁷ could indeed have helped Orestes by anything short of military action.³⁸ The significant thing is that *the poet has chosen to decide Orestes' fate through an entirely different mechanism*, the vote in the assembly, and has thereby nullified or neutralized the importance of Menelaus. The latter's pol-

Aristotle may or may not have been aware of the poet's chauvinistic motive; in any case it would not impair his judgment that Menelaus' villainy is unnecessary.

³⁶ The other evidences of M.'s villainy which are accumulated by Werner Krieg, *De Euripidis Oreste* (diss.), Halle, 1934, 18-19, are correct enough so far as they go but do not touch the crucial point.

³⁷ Diomedes is allowed to speak, 898-902, but has no effect.

³⁸ As Menelaus himself had said, 709-715.

troonery is "unnecessary" in view of the premise Euripides himself has laid down for his plot. It decides nothing, and a different characterization of him need not have altered matters essentially.³⁹

Menelaus' villainy, like Iphigenia's inconsistent heroism, is the token of a fault in construction; for in neither case does the unsatisfactory character-drawing help to solve anything. Orestes would have been condemned even if Menelaus had been disposed to help him, and Iphigenia would have been sacrificed (and then saved by Artemis) even if she had continued to protest:⁴⁰ such is the premise the poet has laid down for himself to begin with. Thus the offense against the laws of tragic characterization is not required by the plot and does not contribute to it. Can this test be applied to Aristotle's other two examples also? We do not know enough about the *Scylla* to tell.⁴¹ But the case of Melanippe is very interesting; for it appears that *here too the outcome happened without regard to the "unsuitable wisdom" of Melanippe*. Her speech was clearly a masterpiece of sophistic argumentation, but she was condemned none the less,⁴² just as she would have been if she had been less inappropriately clever, and had to be saved after all by some kind of *deus ex machina*, presumably her mother Hippe.⁴³ The general similarity to the cases of Menelaus and Iphigenia is evident. In all of them the fault criticized by Aristotle is that the particular piece of characterization stands in no organic relation to

³⁹ The *πονηρία* of Menelaus seems to be a reminiscence of that of Jason in the *Medea*, in that it furnishes a motive for the revenge-plot which fills the latter part of the play. But it is a rather feeble reminiscence. The revenge-scenes in the *Orestes*, unlike those in the *Medea*, are 'episodic' in Aristotle's sense, if not actually anti-climactic. The action proper ends with Orestes' condemnation in the assembly; what follows is melodramatic patchwork.

⁴⁰ We have to distinguish: On the one hand a play on Iphigenia at Aulis requires that the sacrifice of Iphigenia be consummated (its deflection by Artemis is another matter): τὸς παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν. On the other hand Euripides has spun a secondary intrigue (the enlistment of Achilles to avert the sacrifice) which threatens to prevent what has to happen. In this dilemma the poet has to present us with a drastically changed Iphigenia. But it was he, not the myth, that created the dilemma; hence he cannot plead 'necessity.' Τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνήρητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γελοῖον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους, 24. 60a33.

⁴¹ In default of other evidence we assume that it was the dithyramb mentioned in 26. 61b32; see Gudeman *ad loc.*

⁴² Fr. 497 Nauck², beginning "Punish this woman" (spoken by Aeolus). See Welcker, *Die griech. Tragödien*, 2, Bonn, 1839, 847-848; Schmid 1. 3. 414.

⁴³ Pollux 4. 141; Welcker, *loc. cit.*

the plot and its outcome. This finding, besides underlining once more the community of theme among Aristotle's examples, prepares us for the next two paragraphs, where the plot is mentioned again. Moreover the fact that all three of the plays—*Orestes*, *Melanippe the Philosopher*, *Iphigenia at Aulis*—ended with a *deus ex machina* should have some connection with the discussion of dénouements and the *μηχανή* below, 54b1-5.⁴⁴

(We can now see, I think, what impelled Aristotle to state, or rather restate, here the principle of chapter 9, τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. The principle is the reverse of the faults he has just criticized. It should follow of necessity or probability that a tragic character, being a given kind of person (viz. under the categories named above: he is, let us say, a good man, a king, and a 'melancholic'), will say or do given kinds of thing. This is no more than a rephrasing of 9. 51b8, τῷ ποῖω τὰ ποῖα ἅττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.) (But something is done here which was not done there, at least explicitly: the principle is stated to hold good for character and plot concurrently *and interdependently*. So far as the hero of the play is concerned, at least, plot and character ought to be not merely parallel structures but one structure, subject in both aspects to the law of necessity or probability. This interdependence, to the point of identity, seems to be indicated by the phrasing of τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα ... ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς, where τοῦτο (= ταῦτα, but distributively) must refer to the same speeches or actions as τὰ τοιαῦτα, so that the second clause dovetails into the first instead of merely following it.

(One more feature calls for comment before we go on. Why does Aristotle cite offenses against only three of his four rules of character-portrayal? Naturally a clause beginning τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου might have been lost in copying, just before one beginning τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου.⁴⁵ But there is another possible explanation. Whereas the other three rules are essentially rules of consistency—generic, specific, and particular—τὸ ὁμοιον implies a different principle. 'Likeness' is not a matter of consistency or probability, but of faithfulness to the aggregate tendencies (δυνάμεις) of human nature, which are far more

⁴⁴ The connection is suggested by Rostagni for the *Iphigenia*, but without mentioning the other two plays.

⁴⁵ Various scholars have assumed a lacuna: Victorius, Vahlen (*Beiträge* 62 [p. 121]), Gudeman.

variable. Goodness, appropriateness, consistency can be defined in logical terms, that is, derived from a premise; 'likeness' has to be observed from life. Thus τὸ ὁμοιον stands over against the other three principles, and Aristotle reserves it for special attention (b8-14).

The third paragraph in our section (a37-b8) has long been recognized as a problem, because it seems to revert to the subject of plot after that had been declared finished at the end of chapter 14. Moreover it uses without explanation a term (λύσεις, a37) which has not appeared before and is not defined until chapter 18, in a passage which we shall find to be a later addition. Hermann in fact proposed to transfer this section to 18. 56a10 (after ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι, or rather ἀρτικρατεῖσθαι). But Vahlen⁴⁶ showed that the transposition creates more problems than it solves, and it has generally been dropped. Our interpretation of the two preceding paragraphs offers a possible basis for explanation of the anomaly, since we have found plot interconnected with character here in a new and tighter fashion. But the question still remains, whether a37-b8 is integrally enough related to the foregoing to be accepted as belonging with it or is a later addition. There is also a choice to be made between μύθου and ἤθους in b1.

We begin with Medea. Her sudden appearance in or with the Sun-chariot at the end of the play (line 1317) is an ἀλογον for which nothing has prepared us. The epiphany does not follow either probably or necessarily; Euripides has not laid the groundwork for it in the preceding incidents. But why has he not done so? He has gone out of his way—conspicuously so—to bring Aegeus to Corinth⁴⁷ and so provide Medea's scheming brain with the thing she needs most in order to carry out her revenge on the royal family and on Jason: a place of refuge afterward. But not a word is said, either in the scene with Aegeus or later, about how she is to escape from the all too probable retaliation of Jason and/or the Corinthians and get to Athens.⁴⁸ Why this glaring omission? Why should a woman whose σοφία is one of the leading themes of the play,

⁴⁶ *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁷ Aristotle notices this scene as an ἀλογον, 25. 61b20. It is neither necessary nor probable that an Athenian should return from Delphi via Corinth, unless special reasons are given.

⁴⁸ See W. Zürcher, *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Eur.* (Schweiz. Beitr. z. All.-wiss. 2), Basel, 1947, 65-66. What follows owes a great deal to Zürcher's whole chapter on Medea, 43-72.

and who assures herself of asylum with such circumstantial care,⁴⁹ neglect the elementary precaution of a means of escape? Because in the great monologue where she wrestles with herself over the plan to kill her children (1021-1080) the decisive argument is (1059-1061)⁵⁰ that death will save them from her enemies in Corinth. This is the plea by which she quiets her own pangs of mother-love. It is obvious that if one word were said about the Sun-chariot, if the idea were even allowed to crop up here, the plea would fall to the ground.⁵¹ If the chariot stands ready and waiting to carry her away, then it can also carry the children with her—and in fact it does carry their bodies.

Thus Medea's sudden epiphany in the chariot not merely is a blemish in the plot but entails a serious flaw in her characterization. She, the cunning, foresighted witch, ought by the law of probability or necessity to have taken thought of her means of escape before now; but the poet has put her (and himself) in a corner from which he can only extricate her by the unprepared introduction of the *μηχανή*.⁵²

The second example (*καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλουον*) cannot be right as it stands. That an epic should be cited in the middle of a discussion of tragedy is of course nothing suspicious in itself.⁵³ But in this case we expect an actual *μηχανή*, parallel to that in the *Medea*, not merely a 'contrivance' or stratagem in the way of divine intervention. Moreover the only incident in the *Iliad* which can qualify, the threatened mass-desertion in book 2, is not a real *ἀπόπλουος* but only an abortive one. What is more serious, it does not belong to the *μῦθος* of the *Iliad* at all, in Aristotle's sense (i.e., to the Wrath), much less to its *λύσις*. It is an episode, and it stands near the beginning of the poem. Finally—and this seems to me the most serious objection

⁴⁹ In the Aegeus scene, 663-758; note especially the legal precision of the oath she administers, 746-755. Aegeus himself compliments her on her *προμηθία*, 741.

⁵⁰ The lines are followed immediately (1062-1063 being obviously an interpolation from 1240-1241) by the announcement that the die is cast: 1064, *πάρτωσ πέπρακται ταῦτα καὶ ἐκφύξεται*.

⁵¹ On the sincerity of the plea itself, and why it is psychologically necessary just here, see Zürcher, *op. cit.* 62.

⁵² M. P. Cunningham, "Medea *ΑΙΤΟ ΜΗΧΑΝΗΣ*," *CP* 49 (1954) 151-160, is right in emphasizing that Medea appears, acts, and speaks here as a *theos* (but not entirely: her taunts at Jason are still all too human). But he has not proved that her characterization throughout the play, up to the murder of the children, is "quite consistent" (p. 155; C. does not refer to Zürcher), and I cannot see that he has accounted for the final miracle in a way that would answer Aristotle.

⁵³ See above on 5. 49b16-20.

of all—this is the only place in the entire *Poetics* where so much as a word of criticism is breathed of Homer, the only direct hint that he ever falls short of perfection.⁵⁴

For these reasons I find it impossible to believe that *ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι* is correct. What other title can be thought of that fits the argument? *Ἐν τῇ <μικρῇ> Ἰλιάδι* is tempting;⁵⁵ the *ἀπόπλους* would then be the actual departure of the Achaeans from Troy.⁵⁶ But the only incident we know of in connection with it that resembled a *θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς* was the appearance of the ghost of Achilles over his tomb, forbidding the Achaeans to depart until his honor had been appeased by the sacrifice of Polyxena; and that feature seems not to be older than the sixth century.⁵⁷ The epiphany of Achilles was represented, and in very impressive form,⁵⁸ in Sophocles' *Polyxena*, but obviously at or near the beginning of the play: i.e., the scene was not a part of the *λύσεις*.

On the other hand the *Iphigenia at Aulis* offers everything we require. We cannot go deeply into the intricate textual question concerning the end of the play, and fortunately it is not necessary. There is all but complete agreement nowadays that the extant exodus with the messenger's speech, lines 1532-end, is not Euripides' work, in fact that he never finished the play.⁵⁹ What concerns us more particularly

⁵⁴ On the apparent contravention of this rule in 28. 62b6-12 see below *ad loc.* — I cannot see that the remark of Porphyry on *Iliad* B73 (— Ar. fr. 142 Rose), *ἔστι δὲ ἀποίητον τὸ μηχανήμα λύειν ἄλλως εἰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μύθου*, is an "obvious echo" of our passage, as Hostagni and others maintain. Porphyry does not cite Aristotle for it, but for other remarks which follow it.

⁵⁵ Suggested, but hesitantly, by Tyrwhitt and Hermann; see Welcker, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁶ On the probable span of action of the *Little Iliad* see Bethe, *Homer* 2^a, Leipzig and Berlin, 1929, 212-215; Schmid 1. 1. 205-207, 213-214 (against the idea that the poem ended with the Wooden Horse). On *ἀπόπλους*, 23. 59b7, see below *ad loc.*

⁵⁷ See Preller-Robert 2^a, 1278-1279; Jebb-Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, Cambridge, 1917, 2. 162. In the epic version the ghost only "tried to dissuade them from departing by foretelling what was going to happen" (Procl. s. v. *Νόστοι*, p. 53 Kinkel)—a procedure which Aristotle's rule (b2-6) would perhaps (?) make permissible.

⁵⁸ "Longin." II. "Υψ. 15. 7, *ἄκρω δὲ καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ θνήσκοντος Οἰδίπουν ... περὶάνασται, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀπόπλουν τῶν Ἑλλήνων προφαινόμενον τοῖς ἀναγομένοις ἐπὶ τοῦ τάφου*. Cf. Soph. fr. 523 Pearson, and see *ibid.*, p. 163.

⁵⁹ Schmid 1. 3. 651-652; Pohlenz *Trag.* 459, Erla0t. 181; E. B. England, *The Iphigenia at Aulis of Eur.*, London and New York, 1891, Introd. xxvi-xxx; D. L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*, Oxford, 1934, 9, 192-199, 208.

is the evidence for the existence of at least one other exodus in antiquity, from which Aelian⁶⁰ quotes the verses (obviously spoken by Artemis):

ἔλαφον δ' Ἀχαιῶν χερσὶν ἐνθήσω φίλαις
κεροῦσσαν, ἣν σφάζοντες αὐχίσσουσι σὴν
σφάζειν θυγατέρα.

Page concludes⁶¹ that this version, although not Euripidean either, dates from some time between 360 and 200 B.C. On the other hand many scholars⁶² have accepted the verses as Euripides' own. In any case there is no visible reason why the exodus to which they belonged, with Artemis as *deus ex machina*, cannot have been in existence as early as the one containing the messenger's speech (lines 1532-1577), which Page dates to 360-350 B.C.⁶³ Aristotle may in fact be referring to Artemis' speech in 25. 60b31, *ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει*. The horned doe appears in Greek literature long before Euripides, but few of the writers we know of who were guilty of the error (Pisander, the author of the *Theseid*, Pherecydes, Anacreon, Pindar, Sophocles)⁶⁴ are as likely to have been present to Aristotle's mind as Euripides.

Thus it seems arguable that Aristotle knew the *Iphigenia at Aulis* in a form which presented Artemis as *deus ex machina*, and that he is referring to that version here. Hence I propose to emend *ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι* to *ἐν τῇ <ἐν> Ἀυλίδι*. The change is not difficult to account for palaeographically,⁶⁵ and offers three distinct advantages: the reference

⁶⁰ *Hist. An.* 7. 39 (= Eur. fr. 857 Nauck³).

⁶¹ *Op. cit.* 200.

⁶² E.g., Porson; Zielinski, *Tragodumenon*, Cracow, 1925, 277-278; Wecklein, *Zeitschr. f. d. Oest. Gymn.* 29 (1878) 721; Robert in *Preller-Robert* 2⁴. 1102; G. Murray, *crit. n. sub fine fabulae* (Oxford Classical Text edition); Gudeman, p. 425 (on 25. 60b31); Pohlenz, *loc. cit.* Contested by H. Weil, *Sept Tragédies d'Eur.*, Paris, 1868, 310-314; see Séchan, *Études sur la trag. grecque*, Paris, 1926, 376-377.

⁶³ *Loc. cit.*—emphasizing, incidentally, the incompatibility of messenger and Artemis. An *Iphigenia* of Euripides, probably the *Aulis* (Schmid 1. 3. 655), was performed by Neoptolemus in 341 (*IG* 2-3². 2. 2320. 2-3), and in any case the play was popular in the fourth century (Page, *op. cit.* 9).

⁶⁴ See Gudeman, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁵ *ENTHIENAYAIΔI* → *ENTHIIAIΔI*. The corruption to the *lectio facillior* *Ἰλιάδι* would be only natural, and *ἐν* would then be dropped. Is there a trace of the double *ἐν* in the Arabic version: *et sicut est (id)* ["s. 'in eo'?" Tkatsch] *quod est ad Iliadem?* *Ἐν τῇ Ἀυλίδι* would perhaps be possible also (as we sometimes say "in the *Colonus*"), since the previous mention of the play is so close (a32).

is (1) to a play, not an epic, (2) to the end (i.e., the *λύσις*), not an early episode, and (3) to an actual *deus ex machina*, so that we are relieved of the necessity of taking ἀπό μηχανῆς literally in the first example (*Medea*) and figuratively in the second.

But the assumption of a *deus ex machina* version of the *Iphigenia at Aulis* is not absolutely necessary anyhow. Under any conceivable ending, Iphigenia is rescued by the miracle of the hind (lines 1581-1589 in the extant exodus), and Aristotle's objection still stands.⁶⁶ He is prepared to tolerate the *deus ex machina* provided no miracles take place in the action of the play itself. The 'machine' is to be used ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, for rehearsing the past or prophesying the future. It is clear that this gives approval to the standard Euripidean use of gods for prologue and epilogue, as contrasted to their employment as an organic part of the action. In the *Aulid Iphigenia*, unlike most of his plays in which gods appear, Euripides has used Artemis (whether in person or through the messenger's narrative is really secondary) to cut an otherwise insoluble knot; for he has left himself no other way to save his heroine and still let the army sail.⁶⁷

Now, to which reading does our interpretation point in b1: *μύθου* or *ἥθους*? The dénouement of the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, whether it was managed by the *μηχανή* or not, offends, like that of the *Medea*, against both the rules laid down in a33-36. But since character took the lead over plot there, in Aristotle's reformulation of the εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον principle, it is perhaps permissible to argue that he is still thinking primarily of it here. The question is also bound up with another, whether the phrase τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων depends on the definition of *λύσις* in 18. 55b28 ff. It seems to me that the connection is undeniable, in which case, since the other passage is a later addition (see below *ad loc.*), ours must be also. Καὶ τὰς λύσεις is perhaps another indication, although not conclusive; at any rate it marks the point as a

⁶⁶ See Rostagni (on b37 ff.), who calls attention to the appositeness of the *I.A.* to Aristotle's general point, but without any suggestion of the kind put forward here.

⁶⁷ To let her actually perish was of course out of the question. Τοὺς παρελημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, and Eur. himself had helped to fix the legend of her miraculous escape firmly in people's minds, by the *I.T.* — The connection of the miracle with the sailing is emphasized repeatedly in the extant exodus: 1575, δὸς γενέσθαι πλοῦν; 1596, πλοῦν σφριον δίδωσιν (sc. Ἄρτεμις) ἡμῖν; 1599, ἡμέρῃ τῆδε δεῖ λιπόντας ἡμᾶς Ἀυλίδος κοίλους μύχους Αἰγαῖον ὁδὸν διαπερᾶν; 1624 (Agamemnon), στρατὸς πρὸς πλοῦν ὄρῃ.

new one. Finally, we shall see that the next passage, b8-14, is an addition, so that ταῦτα in b15 must refer back at least to the present section. But, as we shall also see, it is more likely to refer to the general prescriptions as to probability or necessity, in a33-36, than to the special considerations set forth in our passage. Moreover we shall find a close, organic connection between b15-18 and the first part of chapter 17, and it will become apparent that the whole complex has to do primarily with the presentation of the dramatic characters. It seems likely, therefore, that in the present added note, though the application is to the plot, Aristotle is still giving the central place to character. Hence I have printed ἡθους.⁶⁸

(The thesis that the dénouement ought to spring from the character of the hero leads naturally to the corollary that it ought not to be brought about by the gods.) The problems of the text and its direct interpretation should not divert our attention from Aristotle's attitude on this point. (Considering his poetic theory as a whole, and his theology (God a pure Form; otherwise only the heavenly bodies divine, and they only in a secondary sense), there is nothing surprising about the severe restrictions he places upon the use of the gods; but nevertheless the fact is worth noticing. Plato's polemic against the depictions of the gods in Homer and the other poets⁶⁹ makes it clear that he regarded them at least as serious attempts to portray the divine nature. In other words he recognized that Greek poetry was a representation of men and gods.⁷⁰) (One half of this world has disappeared from Aristotle's

⁶⁸ See also Tkatsch 2. 179-183. Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935) 193, prefers μέθου and thinks that in that case a37-b8 must be a later addition. Montmollin (pp. 74-76) also makes it a later addition and reads μέθου. To his argument, p. 74, that if Aristotle were thinking of character he would have written ἐξ αὐτῶν ... τῶν ἡθῶν the obvious answer is that the dénouement depends, or should depend, on the character of one of the dramatic persons (normally the hero: Medea, Iphigenia), not of all.

⁶⁹ *Rep.* 2. 377d-end.

⁷⁰ Cf. the summary of the subjects of poetry in the *Ion*, 531c. It includes war; all the relations of men, both good and bad, public men and private citizens, with one another; the dealings of the gods with one another and with men; the painful events (cf. Aristotle's πάθος, 11. 52a11) that take place in heaven (e.g., the castration of Uranus and the overthrow of Cronus by Zeus; cf. *Rep.* 2. 378a, τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) and Hades (see *Rep.* 3. 386a-387c); the births (and genealogies) of gods and heroes. In *Rep.* 10. 599c the list of subjects is already more restricted, and in Aristotle's sense: war, generalship, the management of cities, and the education of men.

field of view. It is so much an axiom with him that divinity is something utterly different from anything portrayed by the poets that he feels no need of polemics, only of a warning that the gods are not to be tolerated in the tragic action in any organic capacity. They may be entrusted with prophecy or the recall of the distant past—that is, they may be introduced in the stock Euripidean fashion, to speak a prologue or an epilogue; but tragedy is the representation of *men*.⁷¹ Nothing could show more vividly how things have changed. The gods are gone, except as a curtain-raiser, and there is nothing to replace them except an Aristotelian Prime Mover sitting forever beyond the heavens.)

54b8-14

- [ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησις ἐστὶν ἢ τραγωδία βελτιόνων ἢ <καθ'>
 10 ἡμᾶς, δεῖ μιμῆσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογρά[φους · καὶ γὰρ
 ἐκεῖνοι, ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφήν ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες,
 καλλίους γράφουσιν · οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν, μιμούμενον
 καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας
 [ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν], τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν, [παρά-
 δεῖγμα σκληρότητος] οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα ἀγαθὸν καὶ <ὁμοιον>
 "Ὀμηρος.]

54b8

- [Since tragedy is an imitation of men better than the
 10 average, one should imitate the good portrait-[painters; for
 they, while making their portraits 'like' by rendering the
 individual appearance of the sitters, paint them better-
 looking; so also the poet in imitating men, whether they be
 irascible or easy-going or whatever other traits of that sort
 they may have [in the case of their characters], should make
 them like that but morally good, [example of stubbornness]
 the way Homer made his Achilles good and <'like' (us).>]

The short paragraph bristles with difficulties, yet it is especially important, for here if ever we may perhaps hope to determine what Aristotle means by the *ὁμοιον*. The over-all purpose of the passage is not hard to see: Aristotle is urging that it is possible to make a

⁷¹ *Poet.* 25. 60b35-61a1 allows the traditional tales about the gods on the basis of the established *δόξα*. They may not be edifying, ἀλλ' οὖν φασί: "but that's the story they tell." "Ἀπαντα γὰρ κτλ. means no more.

character both good (*ἐπιεικής*, = *χρηστός*) and *δμοιος*. There must be some apparent incompatibility, then, between the two things, which Aristotle proposes to get around (it is hardly a solution of the problem) by recommending that the poets follow the example of the portrait-painters. What this advice means is a question we shall have to approach slowly.

First of all, something is wrong with the text just after *βελτιόνων*. *Ἡμᾶς*, the reading of most of the Greek manuscripts, is clearly impossible. It has to be taken with *δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι* and makes Aristotle say that "we" must imitate the good portrait-painters, whereas he nowhere else identifies "us" with the poets. "We" is his standard expression for the ordinary or representative man. The needed clue is *ἡ* in the Riccardianus and the Arabic version ("*aut sicut*," Tkatsch), and from there it is only a step to Stahr's emendation *ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς*, which is confirmed by 2. 48a4, *βελτίονας ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς*.⁷³

This leaves us free to supply another subject with *μιμεῖσθαι*, namely *τὸν ποιητὴν* or *τὴν τραγωδίαν*: he or it is to imitate the portrait-painters.⁷⁴ How this can be done is illustrated, or rather sketched, in the following lines. The portrait-painter renders the individual⁷⁴ looks (*μορφῆ*) of the sitter, makes him 'like' (*ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες*), and yet better-looking.⁷⁵ Aristotle does not say just how this com-

⁷³ Whether *aut sicut* actually represents *ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς* (misread as *ἡ καθάπερ* ?), as Tkatsch (2. 174-175) and Gudeman confidently assert, I cannot judge. — "*Ἡ ἡμεῖς* (Riccardianus) seems to be an emendation, not a reading.

⁷⁴ *Τὸν ποιητὴν* is more likely; cf. b11, *οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν κτλ.* — It is very awkward that *μιμεῖσθαι* should change its meaning and change back again within three lines (*μίμησις*, b8, imitation of the poetic object; *μιμεῖσθαι*, b9, imitation of one art by another; *μιμούμενον*, b11-12, imitation of the poetic object). But there is no remedy for it without more drastic emendation: e.g. *δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι <ὡσπερ> τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς <οἱ> εἰκονογράφου.*

⁷⁵ I see no justification for Gudeman's *οἰκεῖαν* (in lieu of *ἰδίαν*). The Arabic version ("*imagines suas et formas suas*," Tkatsch) points to *ἰδίαν*. By the time the Syriac translation was made (fifth or sixth century A.D.), *ἰδίος* had long since come to have practically its modern meaning, 'one's own,' = Lat. *suus*: cf. mod. Greek *ὁ ἰδίος τοῦ πατέρα*, "his own father," and see E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, New York, 1900, 592.

⁷⁶ I take *ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφῆν* as dependent on *ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες* — "making them 'like' by rendering their individual looks" — and the latter in turn, in a lightly adversative sense, on *καλλίους γράφουσιν*: "(while) making them 'like' they (also, nonetheless) paint them (us) better-looking." *Ὅμοίους ποιοῦντες* is the general effect, *ἀποδιδόντες κτλ.* the particular process. The construction below, in b11-13, is similar though not identical. *Μιμούμενον καὶ ὁ-*

bination is effected. Presumably the analogy is supposed to explain itself, since it appeals to a visible result: we can *see* that the portrait is *δμοιος* and yet *καλλίων*, even if we do not see how the result was accomplished.⁷⁶

Portrait-painting is individual portraiture (*ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφήν*). But then how are we to apply the analogy? —for Aristotle has insisted up to now, and most recently in the paragraph just preceding this one (a33-36), that character in poetry is to be drawn along the lines of the universal, not the individual. The only clue to an answer is in the persons he specifies here (b12) as the objects of the poet's imitation: *καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας [ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν]*.⁷⁷ These are not individuals but *types*. But they are types of *natural dispositions*, *δυνάμεις* in Aristotle's sense, rather than of settled character-traits, *ἕξεις*. Anger itself is a feeling, a *pathos*.⁷⁸ But men differ greatly in their natural disposition toward it: some are quick to anger (*ὀργίλοι*), others slow (*πρᾶοι, ῥάθυμοι*).⁷⁹ This natural tendency, when reduced by training to the proper habit or stable attitude towards the indulgence of the feeling in question, becomes a virtue; and conversely, when it hardens into an enduring wrong attitude, it becomes a vice. Thus when we characterize a man as *ὀργίλος* we may mean simply that he has a natural *tendency* to anger, or that he has the settled *vice* of irascibility.⁸⁰ But normally *ὀργίλος* connotes the *dynamis*, not the vice; and certainly that must be the case here, for a man who was viciously irascible could not simul-

γίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας defines the quality (qualities) of the object which the poet is to reproduce. *Τοιούτους ὄντας* depends on *ποιεῖν* but refers back to the preceding for its content. "So too the poet, in imitating even men who are irascible or (too) easy-going or have other such qualities, should, while (though) rendering them as such, make them good" (lit. "should make them, (while still) being such ['like'; — *δμοίους*], good").

⁷⁶ There is a similar vagueness, in connection with another analogy from the visual arts, in 25. 60b31-32.

⁷⁷ I follow Gudeman (and Label) in bracketing *ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν* as a 'Rand-index' (marginal heading; cf. above on *ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων*, 6. 50b6), but not in his implausible change of *τὰλλα* to *τοὺς ἄλλους*.

⁷⁸ *Eth. Eud.* 2. 2. 1220b12; *E. N.* 2. 4. 1105b22; *Rhet.* 2. 2. 1378a31 ff.

⁷⁹ The former are much more numerous: *E. E.* 2. 5. 1222a36-b4; cf. *E. N.* 2. 9. 1109b1 ff. Note the prominence of *ὀργή* in Aristotle's analysis, e.g., *E. E.* 2. 3. 1221b12-17; *E. N.* 2. 4. 1105b26-28, 33-1106a2.

⁸⁰ *E. E.* 2. 3. 1220b38 (irascibility heads the list): *ὀργιλότης* - *ἀναληγσία* (vices) - *πρῶτης* (virtue); 1221a15-17; *E. N.* 2. 7. 1108a4-9.

taneously be portrayed as good. In other words the drift of Aristotle's argument is that *καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ἔραθύμους* refers to the so-called 'faculties' or natural dispositions.

It is with respect to these dispositions, then, that the poet is urged to follow the lead of the portrait-painters. But the model whose "individual physiognomy" he is to render will not be an individual person but an *individual tendency* in the total make-up of man—*ὀργιλότης, ἔραθυμία, θρασύτης, δειλία*, or whatever—a tendency which the poet can observe wherever he meets human beings and distill out of its natural mixture, so to speak, for his purpose. Thus the principle of the *ὁμοιον* means portraiture of men as they are, but not of any single man, and of tendencies which are not virtues⁸¹ but also not actual vices, hence still compatible with a general character-disposition which is good. The *ὁμοιον* has an element of universality, in so far as all men share in the natural tendencies to anger, fear, desire, etc. That is the basis of our fellow-feeling with the hero, our sense that he is 'like us.' But it also has an element of particularity and variability, in so far as different men have different tendencies, or the same ones but in different degrees and under different circumstances.⁸² This, however, does not mean that the poet is tied to the particular faculty, or the particular degree of it, that he finds in a given individual. Whatever aspect or degree he chooses to embody in his 'character,' provided he keeps it consistent and compatible with goodness, will waken the response of 'likeness' in us, his spectators or readers.)

An outstanding example of a hero who is good, on the whole, and yet 'like us' through his natural failings, particularly his irascibility, is Homer's Achilles.⁸³ Aristotle emphasizes in both *Ethics*⁸⁴ that the usual human tendency is towards *ὀργιλότης* rather than its opposite, so that in this respect (unlike his heroic 'goodness,' which is appropriate to him but out of scale with us ordinary *bourgeois*) Achilles is a man like ourselves. But the citation of Achilles here (b13-14) is beclouded by textual difficulties. In the first place, Agathon has nothing to do with the argument. We know of no *Achilles* by him, and Rosagni's conjecture that Aristotle is referring to the character of Achilles

⁸¹ Cf. 54a24, *τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὁμοιον· τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερον τοῦ χρηστὸν τὸ ἦθος κτλ.*

⁸² See esp. *E. E.* 2. 3. 1221b10-15, and cf. *E. N.* 2. 9. 1109b14-18.

⁸³ Cf. *Hor. A. P.* 120-121, *Achilles, impiger, iracundus*, etc.

⁸⁴ *E. E.* 2. 5. 1222a39-b4, esp. b3: *ἐπ' ἐκείνο (sc. anger) δὲ πάντες ἴσχυοναι μᾶλλον; E. N., loc. cit.*

in his *Telephus* is a feeble resource. Actually we owe the name of Agathon to an emendation, for Ἀγάθων in Parisinus 2038 is almost certainly such (anticipating Victorius)⁸⁵—an emendation called forth by the impossible sequence ἀγαθὸν καὶ Ὀμηρος. But this seems to me a valuable indication that καὶ is original.⁸⁶ The question then is: what other predicate can be fitted in before Ὀμηρος, since by rights there ought to be two (one designating Achilles' goodness, the other his 'likeness')? For this purpose Lobel (followed by Sykutris) and Gudeman have transposed παράδειγμα σκληρότητος from where it stands, after ποιεῖν, and written Ἀχιλλέα ἀγαθὸν καὶ π. σ. or Ἀχ. π. σ. καὶ ἀγαθόν. But παράδειγμα σκληρότητος itself inspires no confidence at all. Either it denotes Achilles himself as an 'example,' which is contrary to Aristotle's idiom,⁸⁷ or it is a tag ("example of stubbornness: the way Homer [portrayed] Achilles"), which is not in his manner either. Above all, the sense required for σκληρότης here—it seems to mean 'stubbornness, obstinacy'—is neither appropriate to Aristotle's argument (Achilles is an example of irascibility, not obstinacy) nor consonant with his usage. Σκληρός elsewhere in Aristotle means 'stolid, impervious, insensible,' and is characteristically associated with terms like ταλαίπωρος, κακοπαθητικός, ἄγροικος:⁸⁸ a rustic, 'hard-shelled' quality, then, which is not only bad in itself but a mark of boorishness and social inferiority. It is impossible to imagine Aristotle associating such a trait with the Homeric Achilles, especially by way of praise for Homer's character-drawing. Παράδειγμα σκληρότητος is a marginal tag, like ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν immediately above, and

⁸⁵ Tkatsch's argument, 2. 79-80, 124, that the Arabic version implies Ἀγάθων, is rejected by Seif, *ibid.*, 221, and Gudeman *ad loc.* Ἀγαθῶν (Parisinus 2038) must be a scribe's emendation also. The transmitted reading was obviously ἀγαθόν. See M. T. Herrick, *CP* 40 (1945) 248-249.

⁸⁶ It is in all the manuscripts except the Arabic version, regardless of other variations.

⁸⁷ Cf. the apparent parallel in a28, ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας κτλ. There, as we saw, the example is not Menelaus but what Menelaus does and says.

⁸⁸ *E. E.* 2. 3. 1221a31 (possibly spurious); 3. 1. 1229b2 (contrasted in both places with softness, oversensitivity to pain); *E. N.* 4. 14. 1128a7, οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἄν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοὶ καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι; cf. *E. E.* 7. 5. 1240a1, διὸ ἐνίοτε τοῖς ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον ἀσθηροὶ [= σκληροὶ] εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς [= ὀργίλοι] ἑαθῆμοις, where the two qualities are clearly assumed to be quite different; *Pl. Rep.* 3. 410d, ἀγριότητος τε καὶ σκληρότητος, καὶ αὐτὴ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος; 10. 607b, σκληρότης καὶ ἀγροικία; *Ar. De Mem.* 1. 450b4; *Rhet.* 3. 7. 1408b6, τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρά.

I have followed Ritter, Butcher, and Bywater in bracketing it.⁸⁸ With it out of the way, and holding to the premise that *καί* is original and a second predicate is needed, I propose *ἴμοιον* (*ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴμοιον Ὅμηρος*), which neatly completes Aristotle's thought (*ὁμόλους*, b10; *τοιούτους*, b13) and could easily have been lost just before *Ὅμηρος*. As for the specific question how the *ἴμοιον* is to be achieved by the poet—or was achieved by Homer—we shall find some light on it shortly, from an unexpected quarter.

This interpretation of b8-14 satisfactorily explains the meaning of *ἴμοιον ποιεῖν* in the passage. The phrase means making a character's speeches faithfully reflect the quality of irascibility or easygoingness or whatever is dominant in his make-up, as it is found in human beings generally. But I am afraid we shall have to say that the idea of the *ἴμοιον* as found here is not quite compatible either with Aristotle's original theory in chapter 2 or with the beginning of chapter 15 itself. In chapter 2 he laid down the premise that tragedy imitates good men, and this was reaffirmed at the beginning of 15. The incompatibility of our passage with the others is not in this fact *per se*. Aristotle's argument here is precisely that the dramatic characters can be made both good and 'like.' Rather the difficulty is that in the other passages the poet is assumed to start with the good man as his object and then make him 'like,' whereas here it is assumed that he starts with a faithful picture of reality (irascibility, etc.) and then makes it 'better.' The difference is considerable. In the first case the good man is the existing object which the poet imitates and to which he may add traits of 'likeness'; in the second case ordinary reality is the basic object, which the poet subsequently 'beautifies' in order to make it suitable for tragedy.⁸⁹

Our passage, then, presents a view of the relation between goodness and 'likeness' which cannot be quite squared with the implications of Aristotle's original theory. A half-way house on the road to this new assessment is represented by the section on the proper tragic

⁸⁸ See Bywater, *JP* 14 (1885) 48-49, on the inappropriateness of *σκληρότης* (it should be *ὀργιλότης*).

⁸⁹ There is perhaps a parallel in Aristotle's theory of *λέξεις*, in chapter 22, which assumes that the poet starts with the ordinary words for things (*τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων*, 22. 58a19) and then beautifies or varies them to make them *σεμνά*. The notion that poetic diction is exotic or figurative or elevated to begin with does not appear anywhere.

hero or the "most beautiful" tragic plot, 13. 53a7-17, where it was urged that the hero must be good but not perfect—the reason for this restriction being that he must be 'like us' in order to gain our sympathy and release our tragic feeling. Thus we seem to find evidence of a progression in Aristotle's thinking on the matter, for which I would offer the following explanation. He began with the flat bipartition which we saw in chapter 2: tragedy represents good or superior men, comedy inferior or worthless ones. So far as comedy was concerned this black-and-white formula needed revision almost at once, for true comedy does not imitate all the *φαῦλοι* but only a restricted class of them. This revision of the definition of the object of comedy was already implicit in Aristotle's history of poetry, in the crucial role he assigned to Homer's *μίμησις τοῦ γελοίου*; and it was made explicit at the beginning of chapter 5, in a passage which we argued⁹¹ was a later addition by Aristotle. In the case of tragedy the need for revision of the flat formula *μίμησις σπουδαίων* did not appear so early; it only arose in connection with Aristotle's analysis of the *tragic* side of tragedy, beginning at the end of chapter 9. This analysis gradually made it evident—and, I would urge, only gradually made it evident to Aristotle himself—that the tragic hero must not be merely and simply good, because such a hero cannot awaken in us the basic sympathy required for the tragic emotions. But the formula in chapter 13 (*μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη κτλ.*) did not show any explicit revision of the basic postulate. It only implied a partial change of direction or emphasis; and moreover it only affected the tragic hero, not all the characters. The beginning of chapter 15 shows no break in the basic formula. The first requirement for the characters is still that they be good. It was only, I think, when Aristotle had finished his theory of the tragic plot *and* the characters and came back to it after some interval for reflection, that any real change occurred in his views. Even now he does not specifically revise or disavow his old postulate; but what he writes breathes a different spirit. Ordinary reality—the phenomenology of the passions and *dynameis*—is now assumed as the poet's point of departure; making his characters 'like' it is his first duty, and goodness appears as a secondary, though necessary, beautification.

Even yet, however, Aristotle does not abandon the principle of the universal for that of individuality. The tragic character is to be a representative man, not a portrait of an individual. In fact another

⁹¹ See above *ad loc.*

stimulus to the new approach may have been precisely the theory of the universal as the poetic object. For that theory is inevitably a theory of *types* of character; and irascibility, etc., are types in a sense in which goodness is not. If you define the ideal of character-drawing as making a given kind of man (τὸν τοιοῦτον, 54a35) say or do what that kind of man will naturally say or do, you are already pointing towards the idea of the *ἄμοιον* as a rendering of the Irascible Man, the Sluggish Man, etc. And since Aristotle had taken occasion to reaffirm the universalist principle just above (a33-36), I believe we are safe in inferring that the purpose of his new note is precisely to suggest how that principle may be applied in practice (i.e., in achieving the *ἄμοιον*) without sacrificing the other principle of goodness.

From these considerations it follows that 54b8-14 is a subsequent note appended by Aristotle to his own text.⁹²

But the new orientation towards the *ἄμοιον* is still incompatible with the conventional text at 2. 48a5-6, which establishes a tripartite division of the objects of *μίμησις*.⁹³ In our present passage the poet is to make his portraits 'like' *but* good; in fact the whole point of Aristotle's note is that a combination of the two approaches is possible. The existence of a *separate class of ἄμοιοι as objects of imitation alongside the good* is not stated. In 2. 48a4-6, quite the other way, there are clearly three distinct classes of object, the better, the worse, and the 'like.' This hypostatization of the *ἄμοιον* into a separate category is not Aristotelian; it is a further development of Aristotle's theory. In spite of the new *ἄμοιον* concept implied in the present passage, neither here nor anywhere else does Aristotle recognize three kinds of poetic object.⁹⁴ If he had, he would have had to rebuild his whole theory of poetry (not merely of tragedy) from the ground up.

⁹² My analysis of Aristotle's handling of the *ἄμοιον* coincides in many respects with Montmollin's (pp. 140-142), as does my marking of the present passage as a subsequent addition. But I cannot follow him in thinking that 13. 53a7-10 was already a "tentative de réconciliation" (p. 139) between the two principles (goodness and 'likeness'). As I see it, the demand for a less-than-perfect hero, in that passage, was a corollary of Aristotle's theory of the complex plot and grew upon him unawares while he was absorbed in the latter. Hence I see no need for making 13. 53a7-10 a recent passage (Montmollin 139-140; he in fact makes the whole of chapter 13 recent, except the opening sentence).

⁹³ See above *ad loc.*

⁹⁴ On this point too I am at variance with Montmollin (see pp. 25-29, 138-142), who sees an unresolved inconsistency—as indeed there would be—in the presence of bipartite and tripartite schemes side by side in the same work.

54b15-18

| ταῦτα δὴ διατηρεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ἔστιν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλάκις. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἰκανῶς·

54b15

| Watch out for these things, then, and in addition for offenses against the sense-perceptions that necessarily attend on the poetic art; for it is possible to go wrong frequently with respect to them also. The full account of them has been given in our published dialogue;

Under the traditional constitution of the text, ταῦτα has to refer either to b8-14, which is unlikely (the suggestion made there is hardly a prescription which the poet is to "observe"), or to the whole mass of rules which Aristotle has laid down for the plot and the characters since chapter 6.⁸⁶ But ταῦτα δὴ διατηρεῖν does not look like a statement of such major proportions. Our diagnosis of a37-b8 and b8-14 as later additions sets ταῦτα free to refer to the four prescriptions for character-portrayal (54a16-28) and the principle of the εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον (a33-36).⁸⁶ In this context the contrast with "the things⁸⁷ contrary to (i.e., offenses against) the perceptions that necessarily attend on the poetic art" is easy and natural. Unfortunately Aristotle does not tell us in this sentence what the offenses in question are, but refers to "the published discussions": probably the dialogue *On Poets*, although we cannot be sure. However, we shall find this uncertainty more than compensated by the first part of chapter 17, which will spell out the ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ in highly satisfying detail. Hence we shall have to wait until we have studied 17. 55a22-34 before we can summarize Aristotle's doctrine on this point and the relation of the present passage to what precedes.

⁸⁶ So Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 66 (¶2. 125), Butcher (?), Bywater, Sykutris (?).

⁸⁶ The direct reference also makes δὴ natural and intelligible, since γρη stands so near (a33). Δεῖ (δέ δεῖ, δὴ δεῖ) is a corruption of διατηρεῖν (δέ δεῖ τηρεῖν Riccard.; E?), or may be, in some of the MSS, a deliberate emendation.

⁸⁷ In spite of the wide variations in the MSS (τὰ παρὰ τὰς, τὰς παρὰ τὰ, τὰ παρὰ τὰ, τὰς πάντας), the recent editors — except Butcher — have settled with notable unanimity upon τὰ παρὰ τὰς. See also Tkatsch 2. 125-126. On παρὰ = 'contrary to,' rather than 'according to,' see Rostagni *ad loc.*

CHAPTER 16

Chapter 16, like the latter part of 19 and chapters 20-22 and 25, will not be discussed in this book. The reason is essentially pragmatic. Chapter 16 is self-contained and isolated. It is a supplement to the original treatment of recognition in chapter 11 and has no connection with what precedes or follows. The last words of chapter 14 ("about the construction of the plot ... enough has been said") prove beyond any reasonable doubt that such a supplement was not originally contemplated by Aristotle. Moreover the new discussion is purely technical. It adds nothing on the connection of *anagnorisis* with the structure of the complex plot or on its emotional function, but limits itself strictly to studying the *techniques* of recognition. These it arranges in ascending order of merit,¹ from the most mechanical and least artistic, that by means of 'tokens,' 54b20-30, to the best, that which comes about through the plot-structure itself, 55a16-20. In the latter we recognize the type which Aristotle had praised so highly in chapter 11 (52a36-b3), the one which combines recognition with peripety. But it is evaluated here only from its technical side, as the most artistic form; in contrast with chapter 11, nothing is said about its emotional superiority.

The principle which was enunciated in chapter 11, that the best recognition is that of persons, is tacitly assumed as the basis here; or rather, recognitions of inanimate objects (in this case, tokens) and events are subsumed here as *methods* for the recognition of persons. This shift of focus is significant. For one thing, it betrays a greater interest in dramatic technique as such. For another, it involves a relative dissociation of recognition from the nexus of ideas in which it was embedded before: recognition becomes more purely a structural or plot device. But the chapter interests us chiefly because of its isolation in the sequence of Aristotle's work. The failure to recognize this in the past led to misunderstandings like Vahlen's,² who thought that chapter 16 ought properly to come directly after 14 since it deals with one 'part' of the plot. That it is isolated is evident not only

¹ In this it is like the survey of the modalities of the tragic outcome in chapter 13, and of the *pathos* in 14. See Vahlen, *Beiträge* 55 (p. 114).

² *Ibid.*

from its own content, which has nothing whatever to do with the overall argument in this part of the *Poetics*, but even more clearly from the close connection we shall find between the last words of chapter 15 and the first part of chapter 17. We need not hesitate, therefore, to put 16 down as a subsequent note by Aristotle which has been incorporated into the text at a purely arbitrary point.³ Since it has no further significance for the argument as a whole, and to prevent this book from swelling into the *ἀπειρον*, we will leave it at that.

* The suggestion that the chapter is a later addition goes back to Gomperz, *Zu Ar. Poet.* 3. 2-5. But the double mention of Polyidus (16. 55a6-8; 17. 55b10-11), on which Gomperz lays particular stress, has another explanation; see below on the second passage. Montmollin also pronounces 16 recent, pp. 154-155, but the judgment is impaired by the fact that he does the same to almost everything in chapters 13-18; see his "tableau synoptique," tipped in after p. 166. Chapter 16 thus appears simply as one in a massive series of later supplements. Similarly Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935) 193-194 (everything from 15. 54a37 to the end of chapter 18 a jumbled series of notes accumulated by Aristotle over the course of a number of years).

CHAPTER 17

55a22-34

- δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέμενον—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὄρων. ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς
 25 | πραττομένοις, εὐρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λαθάνοι τὰ ὑπεναντία (σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὁ ἐπιτιμᾶτο Καρκίνω· ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνήει, ὃ μὴ ὄρωντα [τὸν θεατὴν] ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν, δυσχερανάντων τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν)—ὅσα δὲ δυνατόν καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν
 30 συναπεργαζόμενον. πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσιν, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα. (διὸ εὐφροῦς ἢ ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν <μᾶλλον> ἢ μανικῶ· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὐπλαστοὶ οἱ δὲ ἐκστατικοὶ εἰσιν.)

55a22

- but one should construct one's plot and work it out with the dialogue while keeping it before one's eyes as much as possible—for in this way, [the one] seeing it most vividly,
 25 as if one were present at the actual | events, one can invent suitable business and is least likely to overlook possible discrepancies (an instance of this is the blame that was leveled at Carcinus: namely, Amphiarauus was discovered coming back from the temple, a circumstance which escaped his [the spectator's] notice because he was not 'seeing' the action, but on the stage the play failed because the spectators took offense at it)—and so far as possible working it out
 30 [with the | patterns (of speech) also. For those who are in the grip of the emotions are most persuasive because they speak to the same natural tendencies in us, and it is the character who rages or expresses dejection in the most natural way who stirs us to anger or dejection. (These are the reasons why the poetic art is an enterprise for the gifted <rather than> the 'manic' individual; for of these types the one is highly adaptable (sensitive), the other is eccentric and unbalanced.)

With these lines we pass to a new stage of the poetic process; or rather, without leaving the previous one entirely behind, we consider a new aspect of it. *Τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι* denotes that process of shaping the structure of the plot which Aristotle has been discussing ever since chapter 7; but *καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργαζόμενον* signifies that *we are now at the stage where the structure is embodied in words*, that is, incorporated in a written text.¹ Not that we have arrived at the question of *λέξεις per se*. The choice of words and grammatical constructions, the use of images, versification, etc.—in short, the whole matter of style, the artistic use of language *qua* language—remains for treatment later.

In transposing his plot-structure into a play, an actual text, the poet is to do two things above all: (1) visualize it (*πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον*, a23), and (2) "work it out with the figures" (*τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον*, a29). What the latter phrase means we shall see when we come to it. But it is important even at the beginning to notice that the two participles (*τιθέμενον*, *συναπεργαζόμενον*) are coördinate, both depending on the two infinitives, so that we have one of those long, burdened sentences which Aristotle is so fond of. We will look first at the concept of 'visualization.'

The poet is to "place his action before his own eyes" (*τιθέμενον*, middle), is to "get with" the events as if he were there himself; in this way he will find "what is suitable" and not fail to notice contradictions or discrepancies. It is evident that the "seeing" involved in this process (*δρῶν*, a24) is the poet's seeing; for Aristotle is laying down a rule for the poet here, not describing the ultimate experience of the spectator. Hence the *δ* before *δρῶν* must come out.² Similarly below (a27), *τὸν θεατῆν* is a gloss.³ Aristotle's whole point is that the spectators did see the anomaly in question and disapproved of it (*δυσχερανάντων*), to such an extent indeed that the play was a failure (*ἐξέπεσεν*). The spectator does not figure here as the beneficiary of the poet's visualization—imagining in turn that he too is 'right there,' seeing the things as they happen—but as its critic. The audience is there

¹ See Gudeman *ad loc.*

² Spengel's *δ <ποιητῆς>* is unnecessary, and it is not certain that "poeta" in the Arabic version supports it. More likely the word is a happy thought of the translator, who for once has understood the meaning of his text. In any case the poet is meant.

³ We are to understand *αὐτόν* (i.e., Carcinus) with *μὴ δρῶντα*, as we do *δ ποιητῆς* with *δρῶν* above.

and can see what goes on on the stage. It is therefore in a position to test the poet's work and reprehend his failure to visualize his action.

Unfortunately we know nothing about Carcinus' play⁴ and therefore cannot be sure precisely what his error was. Nevertheless it may be possible to gain something by careful consideration of the only phrase that gives us a clue: *ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφ. ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνήει*, "Amphiaraus came back⁵ out of a (the) temple." If he came back out of a temple, the anomaly must have been that he had not previously gone into it, so that the audience expected to see him return by one of the *πάροδοι*.⁶ Carcinus' fault, then, was the not unheard-of one among dramatists of mislaying a character, i.e., forgetting where his last exit was made and where he is supposed to have been while offstage.⁷ One can easily imagine such a *contretemps* so prejudicing the effect of the play as to make it fail. Moreover the error is not one of staging as such, which a director could correct in rehearsal. Amphiaraus' entrance from the wrong place—which may well have been intended as one of the high points of the action—was *built into the text* because the poet was not "seeing" the action, the whereabouts of the characters, etc., as he wrote.

Thus there are certain visual aspects of the play which are not merely visual in the sense of falling wholly within the province of the stage-director. The poet is responsible for them because—it is impossible to resist using Aristotle's own words, since they express the idea more precisely than any others—they are "perceptions which necessarily attend upon (follow in the train of) the poetic art" (15. 54b15-16).⁸ A certain amount of visualization is not merely desirable but absolutely essential, inherent in the enterprise of putting a dramatic action into concrete form. This is a moment distinct from the abstract concept

⁴ See Rostagni *ad loc.* and Gudeman on a27, Ἀμφιάραος.

⁵ Probably not "up" (Gudeman's comment that the passage should have been taken into account for the "Bühnenfrage" is curious). One did not go down into normal Greek temples or come up out of them.

⁶ Rostagni's suggestion, that Amph. was hidden in the temple (avoiding the summons to the campaign against Thebes) and then came out when he should have stayed inside, might indeed point to a dramatic weakness in the play, but not to a glaring inconsistency which would outrage the audience.

⁷ It is as if Polonius, after we have seen him hide behind the arras, should suddenly enter from offstage right.

⁸ Bywater, note on 54b15 (p. 233), points to the present passage as "perhaps ... an instance of the kind of fault he [sc. Aristotle] has in mind" there; cf. also Sykutris, 130 n. 3 *in.* But neither indicates what the systematic connection might be.

of the action on the one hand and the staging of the play on the other: visual, yet indefeasibly attached to the "working out of the action in language." As such it is prior to the actual production and represents an obligation which necessarily rests on the poet.

The seamless join which we have thus found between the present passage and the end of chapter 15 is another proof that chapter 16 is a foreign body interposed between 15 and 17. It also gives an entirely satisfactory meaning to τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθοῦσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ (one, however, which remains to be broadened by the second participial clause, a29 ff.), and at the same time throws a new light on the last sentence in 15, εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδομένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς. It now appears that Aristotle's reference to published works did not mean to imply that he was saying nothing about the matter here, but simply that the *full discussion* of it (εἴρηται ... ἱκανῶς) would be found elsewhere, only an extract or summary being incorporated in the present work.

Visualization is one requirement of the intermediate stage of composition.⁹ There is another which runs parallel to it but involves the other leading αἰσθησις: hearing. This is touched on in καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον and what follows. Generally τοῖς σχήμασιν has been understood to refer to the characters' (i.e., the actors') *gestures*.¹⁰ They, it is said, must be worked out by the poet while he is composing his text, so that they will be suitable and effective when the play is performed; and the following sentence (πιθανώτατοι γὰρ κτλ.) is supposed to give further particulars about how and why this is to be accomplished. We get a vivid mental picture of the poet-actor in his study, leaping alternately to his feet and back to his writing-table, throwing himself into each role in turn, miming regal scorn or blank horror, dropping to his knees as the suppliant Polynices only to rise as Oedipus and reject the plea. It as a lively picture, but not a convincing one. What has all this to do with the poet's task? He may happen to be the director also, but even then his concern with acting (gestures, movements, pitch of voice, etc.) begins *after* his job as poet

⁹ "Intermediate" is misleading in one way, since the composition of the text is the final stage so far as the poet's own work (and therefore the poetic art) is concerned. But I use it in order to keep before the reader the important point that this stage lies halfway between the abstract conception of the action ('structuring of the plot') and the concrete production in a theater.

¹⁰ See for example Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 69-70 (v. 2, 128-129); Gudeman and Rostagni *ad loc.*

is finished, not before.¹¹ And in the fourth century, when the great actor-managers dominated the theater and the poet was often perhaps no more than a librettist for them, he was not likely to be asked to sketch out the stage-business in advance. The poet's task is to *write a text*, on the basis of which a good actor can then project gestures, voice-effects, and the like.

Σχήμα is a protean word which gets its closer definition from its context. In a work on geometry it will naturally mean geometrical figures; in one on dancing, dance-figures; in a treatise on grammar or style, some kind of 'figures' of speech. If Aristotle were talking about acting here, *τοῖς σχήμασιν* would mean the actors' (postures and) gestures, as in 26. 62a3.¹² But he is talking about "perceptions that necessarily attend on the poetic art," and the figures must be such as can be embodied in the poetic work: in short, *σχήματα τῆς λέξεως*. But *σχήματα τῆς λέξεως* also is a polysemous phrase.¹³ In the *Rhetoric* alone it denotes: the syllogistic form of the enthymeme (2. 24. 1401a7); the rhythmical or metrical form of speech or verse (3. 8. 1408b21); the antithetical 'form' of discourse (3. 10. 1410b29).¹⁴ In the *Poetics* itself, 19. 56b9, it means the forms of statement: command, prayer, threat, question, etc. In mentioning these, Aristotle immediately adds (56b13 ff.) that they belong to the art of delivery (*ὑποκριτικῆ*), not of poetry. Nevertheless this brings us closer to what we need than anything so far. We shall have to come back to *σχήμασιν* after we have surveyed the following sentence (*πιθανώτατοι γὰρ κτλ.*).

¹¹ So far as I know, only Teichmüller (*Ar. Forsch.* 1. 100-130) has diagnosed and properly characterized the inanity of the usual interpretation. See esp. p. 102, where after duly ridiculing the poet-as-actor-before-the-performance he says: "Aristoteles erinnert aber zu oft, dass der Dichter *durch die Rede* zu wirken habe und nicht durch die *ῥῆσις*. Darum braucht der Dichter auch nicht etwa nur, was er schauspielerisch für die *ῥῆσις* vorgestellt hätte, zu copieren; denn die poetische Inspiration ging ja vorher und nur diese tritt in die Dichtung durch das Wort. Die *ῥῆσις* hat sich nach der Dichtung zu entfalten, nicht die Dichtung nach der *ῥῆσις*." What follows in my analysis owes a good deal to Teichmüller's long discussion, esp. 109 ff.

¹² Cf. *Rhet.* 2. 8. 1386a32, *ἀνάγκη τοῖς συναπεργαζομένοις σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὄλωσι ἐν ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινότερους εἶναι*; quoted by Vahlen, "Z. Kritik Arist. Schr.," *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1861, 74 (= *Ges. Phil. Schr.* 1. 29), as a parallel to our passage, but see Teichmüller, *op. cit.* 102.

¹³ See Vahlen, *Beiträge* 98 (3. 217-218).

¹⁴ Cf. *Soph. El.* 4. 166b10-19 (*σχ. τ. λέξ.* = the grammatical forms of the noun or verb: gender, voice, etc.).

Here the reigning interpretation makes Aristotle speak of the poet and the attitudes or feelings required of him. So for example Butcher: "Those who feel emotion are most convincing through natural sympathy with the characters they represent." A double *rappor*t is presupposed, first between the poet and his characters, then between the latter and the spectator; for "convincing" can only refer to an effect upon the spectator or a judgment made by him. This idea, that the poet lurks behind and in his characters, speaking through them to establish an emotional sway over his audience, is certainly a possible one; it is in fact Plato's assumption in the third book of the *Republic*.¹⁶ But it runs counter to what we have found so far in Aristotle's theory of poetry, and particularly of tragedy, which was built on the premise that the characters speak *instead of* the poet. Let us adopt the hypothesis, therefore, that (1) *οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν* are the dramatic characters, not the poets, and (2) *πιθανώτατοι* denotes a certain relation between the characters and the spectators, and *ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως* the ground of that relation. We will add, however, that the effect of persuasion, belief, has to be achieved *by* the poet, through the use of language. In so far as emotions and emotional responses are in question, then (for the belief is a belief in the 'truth' of an emotion), they are effects achieved by the poet through the speeches he writes for his characters.

This set of relationships is expressed in concrete form in the following coördinate clause, *καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα*. Here we notice first of all the precise symmetry: two substantivized middle participles, each standing as subject of a verb. Even the rhyme, *χειμαίνει - χαλεπαίνει*, hardly seems accidental. Extending our hypothesis to these concrete cases, we assume—and indeed it is obvious—that *ὁ χειμαζόμενος* and *ὁ ὀργιζόμενος* are instances of *οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*.¹⁶ The finite verbs then denote the effect upon the spectator. But precisely what effect? The question is whether the verbs are transitive ("distresses," "angers")¹⁷ or intransitive ("expresses distress," "expresses anger").¹⁸ The difficulty

¹⁶ 3. 392d ff. Cf. *Ion* 533d-e, the image of the magnet and the rings, i.e., of the poet as a source of power which passes outward through the interpreter (rhapsode, actor) to the listener.

¹⁶ The symmetrical contrast between middle and active suggests the contrast between feeling (in this case, expression of feeling) and effect.

¹⁷ So Teichmüller, *op. cit.* 119-120; Gudeman.

¹⁸ So Butcher, Bywater, Hardy, Sykutris. Rostagni hedges: the words are to

of the former view is that neither verb seems to be used transitively in the classical period; of the latter, that Aristotle's statement is reduced to a tautology. For if the two verbs are intransitive the adverb ἀληθινώτατα will naturally go with them rather than with the participles,¹⁹ and the sentence then says no more than that "one who is ... angry rages with the most life-like reality" (Butcher). No cause is left for the "life-like reality," if we are talking about the dramatic characters and not the poet. So far as they are concerned, feeling and expression of feeling are the same thing. There is no further dimension in them in which feeling can be thought of as residing, and which could be set over against their outward demeanor or appearance.²⁰ What they express is what they are.²¹

If we hold fast, then, to the hypothesis that what we have to do with here is the characters and not the poet, we shall have to take ἀληθινώτατα with the participles, as denoting the 'truthful' expression of their feelings. This leaves the finite verbs to designate the effect on the spectator—or the reader—and they will therefore have to be transitive. For the *ground* of the effect we have ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως to fall back on; and to explain this phrase we can point back to our discussion of the ὀργίλοι (N.B.!) and ῥέθυμοι in 15. 54b8-14. We said there that in portraying an irascible man the poet is to choose out of the total matrix of human nature the traits which do in fact characterize that tendency, and that the tendency, within wide limits of variation, is universal. Our passage seems to be treating the same question, but from the more exactly defined point of view of the portrayal of such traits *in language*. Φύσις here is what we called δύναμις there: a broad yet specific tendency of human nature such as

express both meanings; cf. Vahlen, *op. cit.* 76 (= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 30): "wer von Natur zornig ist, setzt am wahrsten in Zorn, d.i. [!?] zeichnet am treuesten den Zornigen."

¹⁹ "He who is angry in the most life-like way rages" is an obvious anticlimax.

²⁰ So long as the ὀργιζόμενος was taken to be the poet, the extra dimension could be smuggled in; for the poet being angry, i.e., feeling real anger, is tacitly contrasted with the poet *not* being angry. Under the former circumstance, it is assumed, he can "rage with the most life-like reality," i.e., most persuasively; under the latter, not. But this tacit contrast will not do for the characters. We can tell *their* feelings only from what they say: the distinction between their really feeling an emotion and not really feeling it has no criterion except how they express it. If they express it convincingly we infer that they feel it, and vice versa.

²¹ See above on 6. 50a3-7.

the tendency to get angry. This, then, is the link between the dramatic character and the spectator (or reader): the latter shares and instinctively sympathizes with the 'nature' or trait which the poet has incorporated in the former. But the link is not automatic. It has to be established through the character's *speech*; and this, if I am not mistaken, is where *σχήμασιν, πιθανώτατοι, and ἀληθινώτατα* find their meeting-point. The character does not convince us of his feeling and induce us to share it merely because we have the capacity (*φύσις*) for the same feeling. *He does it by using the 'forms' of speech which we know from experience to be in fact the true signs of that feeling.* We believe in him because he speaks in the special way in which men do speak when they are angry, or oppressed by misfortune, or whatever.

But what *are* the 'forms' of speech of an angry man or a depressed man? The best commentary is in the *Rhetoric*, 3. 7. 1408a10: τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἵξει ἢ λέξις, εἰ μὴ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἠθικὴ ... (a16) παθητικὴ δέ, εἰ μὴ ἢ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, εἰ μὴ ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβομένου καὶ λέγειν, εἰ μὴ ἐπαινετὰ, ἀγαμένωσ, εἰ μὴ ἐλεεινά, ταπεινῶσ ... πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἢ οἰκεία λέξις · παραλογίζεται τε γὰρ ἢ ψυχῆ ὡσ ἀληθῶσ λέγοντοσ, διτι ἐπὶ τοῖσ τοιοῦτοῖσ οὕτωσ ἔχουσιν, ὡστ' οἶονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτωσ ἔχει ὡσ ὁ λέγων, τὰ πρᾶγματα οὕτωσ ἔχειν, καὶ σννομοιοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶσ λέγοντι, κἄν μὴ θὲν λέγει: "Style will have propriety, if it be made to express feeling and character ... Emotion is expressed, if insult (be what you are describing), by the language of one in anger; if impiety or anything foul or base, by that of indignation and reluctance even to name it; what is praiseworthy, by that of admiration; what is pitiable, in a low tone and language ... This appropriate language (proper or peculiar to the emotion to be represented) also gives a plausible air to the facts: for the mind draws a false inference to the truth of the *speaker* (the reality of his emotion, *and* hence to the truth of his statements), because everyone under similar circumstances feels the same—so that they (the audience) are led to think, even though the fact is not really so, that the things are as the speaker represents them, and (besides this) the listener always has a fellow-feeling with one who speaks with emotion, even though what he says is naught."²²

²² Cope's translation, with a few omissions (E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary*, Cambridge, 1877, 3. 71, 73-74); see also his explanation of the 'paralogism,' p. 74.

This interesting and obviously pertinent passage makes it clear that our response to 'pathetic' speech rests on two things: (1) a natural *sympathy* or direct communication of feeling: *συνομοιοπαθεῖς*; cf. *Politics* 8. 5. 1340a12, ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, and Plato, *Republic* 10. 605c-d, οἱ γὰρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλον τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα [χειμαζόμενος!] καὶ μακρὰν ἔῃσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς, ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἷσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ ἐπέμεθα συμπάσχομεντες. The doctrine is ultimately from Plato, as we see. This then is the 'natural basis' (τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως) that Aristotle speaks of in the *Poetics*. But in the *Rhetoric*, in accordance with the view of the emotions which we have already characterized²³ (viz. that they are semi-rational, or accessible to reason), Aristotle also (2) introduces the notion of a *reasoning process*. We are familiar with the symptoms of the various emotions from our own experience, including *the way we talk when we are in their grip* (ἢ οἰκεία λέξεις); and when another talks in that way we naturally infer—falsely, it may be²⁴—that he is a prey to the emotion in the same way as we have been in the past.²⁵

The *Rhetoric* passage gives, in *δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβουμένου καὶ λέγειν* (i.e., he will tend to use 'aposiopesis' or 'euphemism'), *ἀγαμένως, ταπεινῶς*, hints of the actual turns or 'figures' of speech that characterize various feeling-states. For most of them Aristotle has nothing more specific to offer. But he does remark, *Rhetoric* 3. 11. 1413a29, that hyperbole is a youthful or immature (*μειρακιώδης*)

²³ See above on 14. 53b37-54a9.

²⁴ Aristotle speaks of *παραλογισμός*, false reasoning. In rhetoric it is necessarily or at least usually so, because the speaker has deliberately *whipped up* the symptoms in order to work on his audience. In the drama the situation is different. For the reason we pointed out above, the dramatic character is by definition what he expresses. Hence, if the poet presents him exhibiting the symptoms of an emotion we can rightly infer that he is feeling the emotion (unless in the marginal case of a character behaving like the speaker in a courtroom, i.e., deliberately counterfeiting emotion in order to work on the other characters). That is why Aristotle does not mention 'paralogism' in the passage we are explaining.

²⁵ In form, the inference is the same as the paralogism mentioned in 24. 60a20-25: if A (in this case a feeling) is regularly accompanied by B (customary expression of the feeling), then when B is presented to us we habitually infer the presence of A. However, for the reasons outlined in the preceding note, so far as dramatic characters are concerned the inference is unavoidable and normally reliable.

figure; hence, he says, it is most used by men in anger, and he quotes Achilles' angry speech rejecting Agamemnon's offer of his daughter's hand (I 388-391): "I will not marry Agamemnon's daughter, even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty and Athena in her handiwork."²⁶ The connection is evident. Homer, having observed how men speak in anger, has correctly (plausibly) put a hyperbole in Achilles' mouth; thanks to these and other appropriate 'forms' of speech²⁷ Achilles *ὀργίζεται ἀληθινώτατα*; and we, thanks to our kindred capacity for anger and its expression—*ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως*—find him believable (*πιθανώτατος*) and feel with him.

The forms or figures which the poet is to incorporate in the speech of his characters are 'figures of speech' not so much in the technical sense, i. e., manipulations of language *per se*, as in the broader sense of *modes of the expression of feeling* in language. Their appropriateness is not to be tested so much, therefore, by formal stylistic criteria as by the ear of the spectator or reader, who says to himself, "Yes, this is the way men do talk when they are angry or downcast or full of admiration; I have heard things said just that way many times." Thus the poet's choice of *σχήματα* for his characters, like his visualization of their movements, appeals directly to a sense-perception, but one that has been shaped by reason and experience. Moreover, though issuing into the realm of sense, the choice of proper forms of speech lodges in the poet's conception of his characters in the various situations through which he makes them move. The perception involved "necessarily attends upon the poetic art" and is the poet's concern, not the stage-director's or the actors.' *Their* job will be to make these speeches live hereafter. Thus we find again a realm of poetic construction which is half-way between idea and performance, abstract and concrete; only this one involves an appeal to hearing as the other did to seeing.

It is clear that Aristotle's mind is circling here around the same order of phenomena as in 15. 54b8-14. But the two treatments stem from different points of view, and there is no reason to withdraw our judgment that that passage was a later addition. It was elicited by the special

²⁶ Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 7. 1408b12.

²⁷ It is true that Aristotle does not actually call hyperbole a *σχῆμα*. But the fact is perhaps accidental; in any case it was so called in later rhetoric, and as Teichmüller argues, *op. cit.* 114, Aristotle's use of the word is broad enough to cover this application.

question how one is to combine the *χρηστόν* with the *δμοιον*; here the discussion stands under the sign of the 'intermediate stage,' the transposition of the abstract plot-structure into a sensuous form. Although this implies a closer approach to the poet's practical task, as against the abstract earlier chapters, I see no reason for designating it as late.²⁸

We go on to the famous remark about the poet, *διὸ εὐφροῦς κτλ.* Like so many others in the *Poetics*, it has been too often quoted out of context, as if it were a general contribution to the grand debate over 'inspiration.' Or, alternatively, it has been interpreted in the light of the two or three lines immediately preceding, which were thought to say that the poet himself must feel all the emotions he wants to project through his characters. If mere feeling is required, the *μανικός* might well seem to hold his own with the *εὐφροής*; for by definition he is a man of strong, in fact obsessive, feelings and so naturally equipped, it might seem, to impose them on others. But the moment we observe what *διὸ* refers to, the situation changes. The preceding sentence is a long and complex one, including adjurations to (1) visualize the action, the whereabouts of the characters, etc., and (2) incorporate their expressions of feeling in appropriate 'figures.' *Διὸ* refers to this whole complex. Hence in the light of the second member (*τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον*), but even more in the light of the first (*πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον*), it is evident that what is required of the poet above all is *readiness of mind, keen observation, and adaptability* to an almost infinite variety of human situations. He must, in short, be *εὐπλαστος*, able to follow the line indicated by his plot-conception and his conception of his characters, wherever it may lead.

This interpretation is supported on the other side by *ἐκστατικός*,²⁹ which in Aristotle's usage is predominantly a 'bad' word, signifying eccentricity, abnormality, any kind of deviation from nature, especially madness.³⁰

²⁸ Montmollin does so (see his text, p. 231), but without offering any proof. M. in fact passes over our passage without comment except an oblique reference, p. 157.

²⁹ The reading appears to be established for the Arabic version; see Tkatsch, 2. 116-120, who shows (120) the probable origin of *ἐξισταστικοί* (so all Greek MSS except the Riccardianus) out of *ΕΞΤΑΤΙΚΟΙ*.

³⁰ In this note *ἐξίστασθαι* (*ἐξιστάναι*, *ἐξεστάναι*), *ἐκστασις*, and *ἐκστατικός* are treated together. These words can denote in general any *displacement* which is the result of motion: *De An.* 1. 3. 406b13 (*ἐκστασις*); cf. *Phys.* 6. 5. 235b9; *De Gen. An.* 4. 3. 768b25; *Probl.* 12. 13. 907b15 (*ἐξίσταται*); *Phys.* 4. 13.

Against the numerous Aristotelian passages which mark *μανία* - *ἔκστασις* as a deviation,³¹ we can set only two or three which seem to echo the Platonic doctrine that in literature 'inspiration' (*ἐνθουσιασμός*) or madness attains heights not granted to mere reason. In the *Rhetoric*, 3. 7. 1408b13 ff., speaking of certain kinds of expression

222b16 (*ἐκστατικόν*, 'causing displacement'). But their commonest use, with or without the qualifying phrase (*ἐκ*) *τῆς φύσεως* (*οὐσίας*), is to denote deviations from the natural state or character of a thing. So, without any necessary qualitative implication, *Top.* 6. 6. 145a4, 10 (*ἐξίστησι τῆς οὐσ.*); *Phys.* 8. 7. 261a20 (*ἐξ. τῆς φύσ.*); *De Gen. et Corr.* 1. 7. 323b28; *Pol.* 5. 6. 1306b18. Oftener the notion of deviation from the *right norm* (degeneracy, etc.) is either expressed or implied. The idea is particularly clear in *Hist. An.* 1. 1. 488b18 (~ *Rhet.* 2. 15. 1390b22), *ἐγγενές μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γένους, γενναῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως*. So in the *Politics*, 5. 9. 1309b32 (*ἐξεστηκίας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως*), *ἐξεστηκίας* serves as a synonym for *παρεκβεβηκίας*: 'perverted' or 'deviated' constitutions (on the *παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν* see *Pol.* 3. 6. 1279a20 and Bonitz, *Index* 568a35, 45-50). *E. E.* 7. 5. 1239b39: people at the extremes enjoy *πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξιστάσι τῆς φύσει ἔξεως*, everything that puts them off from the natural condition. Especially interesting is the close association of *ἐκστασις* - *φθορά* and *ἐξιστάται* - *φθειρεῖν* as synonyms: *Meteor.* 4. 11. 389b10 (*φθειρόμενα καὶ ἐξιστάμενα τῆς φύσεως*; cf. b9, *ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν*; b14, *ὅταν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὦσι*); *Phys.* 4. 12. 221b1-3; 6. 10. 241b2; 7. 3. 246a17, b2, 247a3; *Probl.* 19. 38. 920b38; *De Caelo* 2. 3. 286a19, *ὑστερον δὲ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἐκστασις τις ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ γενέσει τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν*. So far as human conduct is concerned, *ἐκστασις* may denote any deviation from the norm. Thus the *ἀκρατής* is *ἐκστατικός παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*, *E. N.* 7. 9. 1151a20. But the terms are employed above all for the momentary madness of *anger* ('seeing red,' *Physiolog.* 6. 812a35; cf. *E. E.* 3. 1. 1229a35; *De Part. An.* 2. 4. 650b34; *Probl.* 30. 1. 953a22) and for real madness: the latter to such an extent that *ἐξίστασθαι* (*ἐξεστηκέναι*) becomes practically a synonym of *μαίνεσθαι*: *E. E.* 3. 1. 1229a3; *Gal.* 8. 9b36-10a1; *Hist. An.* 6. 22. 577a12; *De Memor.* 1. 451a9; *Probl.* 27. 3. 948a9; *De Mir. Ausc.* 18. 831b24. On this usage in Hippocrates and others before Aristotle see J. Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères*, Liège, 1935, 43-43. But the difference of connotation still appears on occasion, e.g., *De Gen. et Corr.* 1. 8. 325a19, *οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μαινομένων ἐξεστάται τοσοῦτον* ("is so far 'off'") *ὥστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον*; *E. N.* 7. 7. 1149b35, certain kinds of animals *ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινομένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

³¹ *Rhet.* 2. 15. 1390b28 is especially interesting. Aristotle is talking about a phenomenon which also interested Plato (*Prot.* 319e-320b; *Meno* 93b-94e): the degeneracy of the sons and descendants of great men. He remarks that good families occasionally produce outstanding men for a time and then "give out," and he continues, *ἐξίσταται* ("degenerate") *δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφραδὴ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη, ὅσον οἱ ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου*. *Μανία* appears here as the *ἐκστασις* of *εὐφραδία*.

(compound words, epithets, exotic words), Aristotle says that they are all right when the speaker has already caught up his hearers in a wave of 'enthusiasm': *ὅταν ἔχη ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς* ("when he 'has' them") *καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάζουσαι*; for example in the peroration of a speech. For, he continues (b17), *φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλονότι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες, διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἤρμωσεν· ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ πόλις*. But in the first place this is said in a passage whose whole point is that the orator should know how to use each kind of *λέξις* at the right time and in the right context (*εὐκαιρως*, b1). It belongs, in other words, to the theory of the *πρέπον* and thereby to the conscious use of art (use 'inspiration' towards the end, when you 'have' them—or, as Aristotle goes on to say, use it ironically, like Gorgias and some of the things in the *Phaedrus*). Moreover the way *διὸ καὶ κτλ.* is introduced implies that *ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ πόλις* describes the *common attitude* towards poetry, not necessarily Aristotle's own.²² Finally, Aristotle hardly seems to have the drama particularly in mind in the *Rhetoric* passage, for in the *Poetics*, 22. 59a8-14, he observes that compound words are especially suited to the dithyramb and exotic words to heroic verse, whereas iambic verse calls for common terms (*τὸ κύριον*), metaphor, and 'ornament' (*κόσμος*). It appears, therefore, that the passage, though often cited, is not especially relevant to ours.

Another passage, from the little work *On Prophecy in Dreams*, 2. 464a24-26, is more promising and leads us into another aspect of the question. Here Aristotle allows that some of the *ἐκστατικοί* have special gifts of foresight because their own mental motions are not so exclusive and demanding as to get in the way of impressions from outside: *τῶν ξενικῶν οὖν μάλιστα αἰσθάνονται*. This trait allies them with the 'melancholics' (if the two classes are not actually identical), of whom Aristotle says not far below (a32) that they are particularly accurate at hitting the mark through dreams, because of the intensity with which they attend to images and the ease with which they can grasp a rapid succession of them. Other passages also speak of the obsession of the melancholics with images: *De Memoria* 2. 453a19,

²² People will accept compound words, etc., in poetry because they associate such expressions with inspired utterance and regard poetry as that kind of utterance. Thus *διὸ καὶ κτλ.* gives the reason why these varieties of *λέξις* are acceptable to the public, as the preceding sentence (*ὥστε καὶ κτλ.*) states the condition under which they are acceptable in oratory.

τούτους γὰρ τὰ φαντάσματα κινεῖ μάλιστα; *Eth. Nic.* 7. 8. 1150b27, οἱ δὲ (*sc.* μελαγχολικοὶ) διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ; their gift for prophetic dreams, *Eth. Eud.* 8. 2. (7. 14.) 1248a39; the wide variety of their visions, *De Div. per Somn.* 2. 463b15-20; their tendency towards genius, but also towards madness, [Ar.?] *Probl.* 30. 1. 953a12-18 (Heracles), 21-22 (Ajax), 954a25; their affinity with the irrational, *Eth. Nic.*, *loc. cit.*

From these passages and others³³ we learn (1) that 'melancholy,' that is, black bile, in different amounts, mixtures, and temperaments, is the chief cause of genius, madness, 'enthusiasm,' and prophetic dreams; and (2) that the common symptom of these widely differing states is the unusual liveliness and strength of the *mental images* (φαντάσματα). In view of the context to which our *Poetics* passage belongs ("the perceptions that necessarily attend on the poetic art"), I suggest that Aristotle is thinking of these phenomena here, and that the difference he intends between the εὐφρεῖς - εὐπλαστοὶ on the one hand and the μανικοὶ - ἐκστατικοὶ (= μελαγχολικοὶ) on the other is not simply that between sanity and madness, but between two degrees or mixtures of 'melancholy,' one having it properly balanced, the other badly out of balance. The novelty of this explanation is that, while it maintains the strong contrast between the two types of men, it also establishes a bond of community between them. The one is healthy, the other sick;³⁴ but they have in common the gift for seeing and hearing vivid images.

A convenient test of this interpretation is the poet whom Aristotle, to all appearance, considered perfect in every department of the art: Homer. Aristotle's admiration for Homer approaches nearer to idolatry than any other attitude we can discern in him towards a mortal;³⁵

³³ See Croissant, *op. cit.* 26-48; W. Murl, *Mus. Helv.* 10 (1953) 21-38; H. Flashar, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 12-48, esp. 39-47; and above on 15. 54a26 (τὸ δμαλόν) and 54b14 (Achilles).

³⁴ *E.N.* 7. 15. 1154b11, οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται δεῖ λατρείας.

³⁵ Except perhaps Plato; see above on 1. 47b11. Jaeger (*Aristotle*³ 108) emphasizes that the altar to which Aristotle refers in his elegy (*fr.* 673 Rose) cannot have been erected to Plato: i.e., Plato was not actually accorded divine honors. Moreover Aristotle is careful to call his master "mortal" (πρῶτος ... θνητῶν). But in the poem Plato certainly stands as a type of the divinity in man and as the prophet of a new religion. He is "the mortal through whom this transcendental Form [*sc.* that of Friendship, the πρῶτον φίλον] has been realized" (Jaeger, *op. cit.* 109).

Homer is in fact the only poet whom he dignifies with the title *θεσπέσιος*, "divine" (23. 59a30). The epithet is not a casual one. I should like to associate it with a discussion of good luck and the 'lucky ones,' *οἱ εὐτυχεῖς*, in the *Eudemian Ethics*, 8. 2. (7. 14) 1246b37 ff. Here Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that the persons we call 'lucky' are not so *διὰ τύχης* (1247a38) but *φύσει* (*ibid.* b28); they are in fact not *εὐτυχεῖς* but *εὐφρεῖς* (a38). The source of their luck is not reason but something better than reason (1248a30-33); it is in fact God (*ibid.* 38).³⁶ Perhaps the most interesting part is (*ibid.*) *τοῦτο* [*sc.* this intuitive faculty] *καὶ εὖ ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ μέλλον*³⁷ *καὶ τὸ ὄν κτλ.*; then follows the remark already quoted about the melancholics.³⁸ The *εὐφρεῖς*, then, *see* things directly, by a vision which bypasses reason. Is this not perhaps what Aristotle meant to suggest in 8. 51a24, *ὁ δ' Ὀμηρος, ὡς περ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικεν καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν*?³⁹ If we add Aristotle's praise of Homer's character-drawing (Achilles: 15. 54b14) and the fact that he admired him above all as a dramatist,⁴⁰ and if we remember that the present passage has to do precisely with the special gifts of visualization (including a 'visualization' of how the characters are to speak) which the dramatist ought to possess, it becomes clear that Aristotle thought

³⁶ That the special gift of the *εὐφρεῖς* (i.e., the so-called *εὐτυχεῖς*) is a divine dispensation (*θεία μοῖρα*) is not said in so many words here, but it is in a clearly parallel passage, *E. N.* 10. 10. 1179b22; cf. *ibid.* 1. 10. 1099b10. The idea is of course Platonic; cf. *Meno* 99b-e, esp. the comparison of the statesmen with prophets and poets, *ibid.* d: *καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἄν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπλους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*; and see Flinsler 172 ff.; Croissant, *op. cit.* 27.

³⁷ Cf. *Poet.* 15. 54b4-6, *ἂ δαίται προαγορεύσειως ... ἅπαντα γὰρ ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὁρᾶν*.

³⁸ The text is corrupt and difficult. Henry Jackson gives an improved version of *E. E.* 8. 1 and 2 (7. 13 and 14) in *JP* 32 (1913) 170-221, with commentary and useful summaries. His reconstitution of the present sentence (p. 199) gives (a37 ff.) *ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι' ἐμπειρίαν ... δύνανται τοῦτο καὶ εὖ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὄν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὕτως* [?: οὕτως Jackson: οὕτως *codd. Graec.*; sic *versio Latina*] *· διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθρόνοιροι*. Disregarding other details, this distinguishes—I think rightly—the melancholics, as men whose reason is dissociated from their other faculties, from the *εὐτυχεῖς* proper, who do not operate by reason at all (*ἄλογοι ὄντες*, a31, 34).

³⁹ Perhaps also in the curiously oblique expression *Ὀμηρος ... μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν*, 24. 60a5-6; and *ὕπεδειξεν*, 4. 48b37.

⁴⁰ See on 3. 48a22; 4. 48b34-38; 8. 51a28-29; 23. 59a30-37; 24. 60a5-11.

Homer possessed just those gifts in surpassing degree. He, then, would be the prime example of the *εὐφροσύνης* and *εὐπλαστος*.⁴¹

That Aristotle considered Homer in some sense divine appears also from the extract from the third book of the dialogue *On Poets* which is quoted in the pseudo-Plutarchian *Life of Homer*, 3, pp. 22-24 Wilamowitz (= fr. 76 Rose), where his mother is described as *κόρην τινὰ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων* [sc. in Ios] *γενομένην ὑπό τινος δαίμονος τῶν συγχορευτῶν*⁴² *ταῖς Μούσαις ἐγκύμονα*, and by implication from the epitaph which Aristotle quotes at the close of the extract:

ἐνθάδε τὴν ἱερὴν κεφαλὴν κατὰ γαῖα καλύπτει,
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων κοσμήτορα θεῖον Ὀμηρον.

The origin from a mortal woman and a *daimon* (and a *daimon* who is "fellow-dancer of the Muses") is a Platonic allegory, inspired undoubtedly by Plato's own allegory of the birth of Love, *Symposium* 203b-204b; for Love too was the son of a mortal and an immortal and carried both natures in him. The most significant thing for us, however, is that the tale was told (probably at the end, like a Platonic myth)⁴³ in the dialogue *On Poets*. We have already pointed to the dialogue as the most probable candidate for the work cited at the end of chapter 15 (*ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις*). In view of the close connection we have established between that sentence and the present passage (17. 55a22-34), all the evidence fits together. "The perceptions that necessarily attend on poetry," the imaginative gifts of the *εὐφροεῖς* and the *ἐκστατικοί* (the 'melancholics'), the half-divinity of Homer, are all parts of the same pattern; and the connection of two of them (in the one case certain, in the other probable) with the dialogue *On Poets* shows that these same matters were discussed there, and at greater length (*ἱκανῶς*, 15. 54b18).⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Εὐπλαστος* especially in his gift for disappearing behind his characters and letting them speak, each in his appropriate fashion: 24. 60a5-11.

⁴² For the idea and the expression cf. Pl. *Laws*. 2, 653d-654a; 665, *θεοῦ δὲ ἔφαμεν ἔλκοῦντας ἡμᾶς συγχορευτάς τε καὶ χορηγούς ἡμῖν δεδωκέναι τὸν τε Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Μούσους, καὶ ... Διόνυσον*—i.e., literature, music, and wine.

⁴³ See Rostagni, *Riv. di Filol.* 55 (1927) 157-158, esp. 158: "Così riceveva simbolica illustrazione la dottrina sovraesposta, secondo cui deve il poeta perfetto essere animato d'*ispirazione geniale*: meglio ancora, riceveva illustrazione il concetto d'*Aristotele*, che, ammettendo l'*ispirazione divina*, la faceva però assistere di cautele e da riguardi terreni."

⁴⁴ Another probable, though not certain, inference is that the *Poetics* stands near the dialogue in time: i.e., is early rather than late.

At the same time, our investigation suggests that the question was not treated by Aristotle under the general heading 'art vs. inspiration,' as it had been by Plato and was to be again in the Hellenistic and Roman period (*ars an ingenium*),⁴⁵ but under the much more specific rubric⁴⁶ of *the poetic gifts that are needed in the 'intermediate stage,'* where the poet's abstract conception, the *σύστασις τοῦ μύθου*, is translated into words. This process calls above all for *imagination*, and it is with respect to that requirement that Aristotle assesses the *εὐφρεῖς* and the *μανικοί*. Both have some share of the 'melancholic' temperament and its special sensitivity to mental images. But one group represents a healthy balance of this gift, the other a morbid obsession:⁴⁷ the *ἐκστατικός* is likely to be ridden by his images instead of controlling them. Even so Aristotle does not entirely reject the *μανικός*; he only prefers the *εὐφρηής* of the type of Homer. The broadly gifted poet can do a better job of immersing himself in the world he has begun to create, watching and listening—*ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις*—for the sensory forms that are appropriate to it.

55a34-b23

- 34 | b1 τοὺς τε λόγους καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους δεῖ καὶ | αὐτὸν
 ποιῶντα ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἰθ' οὕτως ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ
 παρατείνειν. λέγω δὲ οὕτως ἂν θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθόλου,
 οἶον τῆς Ἰφιγενείας. τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης καὶ ἀφανισθεί-
 σης ἀδήλως τοῖς θύσασιν, ἰδρυνθείσης δὲ εἰς ἄλλην χώραν,
 5 ἐν ἣ | νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους θύειν τῇ θεῷ, ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν
 ἱερωσύνην. χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἔλθειν
 τῆς ἱερείας (τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς [διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν, ἔξω
 τοῦ καθόλου] ἔλθειν ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' ὃ τι δέ, ἔξω τοῦ μύθου) ·
 ἔλθων δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς, θύεσθαι μέλλον, ἀνεγνώρισε <τὴν
 10 ἀδελφήν>, [εἰθ' ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἶθ' ὡς Πολύιδος ἐποίησεν,
 κατὰ τὸ εἶκος εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὴν ἀδελφήν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι] καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ
 ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιοῦν. ὅπως δὲ

⁴⁵ See Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio*, Turin, 1930, Introd. LXXII-LXXIII.

⁴⁶ Moreover, as we shall see below, διὸ εὐφροῦς κτλ. is a parenthesis.

⁴⁷ Bywater 243: "In the present passage the poetic imagination is tacitly assumed [assumed, we may add, because it had been treated "adequately" in the "published discussions"] to be a matter of nature, and to be the outcome in some instances of a healthy, and in others, of an unhealthy nature."

15 ἔσται οἰκειὰ τὰ ἐπεισόδια, οἷον [ἐν] τῷ Ὁρέστη ἡ μανία δι' ἧς ἐλήφθη καὶ ἡ | σωτηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως.

20 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασι τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἡ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὀδυσσεύας <οὐ> μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν. ἀποδημοῦντός τινος ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένον ὑπὸ τοῦ <θεοῦ> [Ποσειδῶνος] καὶ μόνου
 20 ὄντος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν οἴκοι οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ χρέη|ματα ὑπὸ μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθεὶς, καὶ ἀναγνωρίσας τινὰς αὐτὸς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς διέφθειρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.

55a34

34 | b1 Also the argument of the play, whether one is taking it 'ready-made' or | is composing it himself, should be first drafted in general terms, then expanded with episodes in the spirit just indicated. I mean that the general outline can be viewed in the following way; that of the *Iphigenia* for example: A certain girl has been sacrificed but spirited away from her sacrificers without their seeing how; she has
 5 been installed in another country, in which | it is the custom to sacrifice all foreigners to the goddess, and has been invested with this priesthood. Some time later the priestess' brother happens to arrive (the fact that the god ordered him to go there [for what reason, is outside the 'general'], and for what purpose, is outside the plot); and having arrived and been captured, is at the point of being sacrificed when
 10 he recognizes <his sister>, [either the way | Euripides made him do it or the way Polyidus did, saying as a man naturally might, "So, not only my sister but I too was destined to be sacrificed!"] and from that comes his salvation. After this, and not until then, one may assign the various names and expand with episodes. But see to it that the episodes be germane, as for example to [in the] *Orestes* the madness
 15 through which he is captured and his | salvation through the purification-ritual.

Now in dramas the episodes are of restricted proportions, while it is through them that the epic gets its bulk. The argument of the *Odyssey*, for example, is <not> long. A man has been away from home for many years, is being blocked from returning by <the god> [Poseidon], and is alone;

furthermore things at home are in such a state that his |
 20 wealth is being consumed by suitors and a plot is being laid
 against his son. He himself arrives in depressed circum-
 stances, but after recognizing certain people, personally
 launches an attack and survives, but destroys his enemies.
 This is the core; the rest is episodes.

The connection between this passage and the preceding has been overlooked as completely as the one between that and the end of chapter 15. Yet *τε* can only be a sentence-connective (it cannot go with the following *καί* because the two *καί*'s are coördinate with each other).⁴⁸ *Τούς τε λόγους κτλ.*, then, is correlative with *δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους*, a22.⁴⁹ What does this correlation mean?

"The story, whether (the poet takes it) already 'made' [i.e., by tradition]⁵⁰ or is making it himself, should first be outlined in general terms, then 'episodized' and expanded along these lines." At first glance we seem to be retracing old ground here. That the plot should be a nexus of 'universals'—was that not canvassed sufficiently in chapter 9? The general point was made there, to be sure; but here it is introduced in a new context and to serve a new purpose, in direct connection with the problems of the 'intermediate' or writing stage of the poet's work. We are considering what he needs to watch out for in producing an actual text. How much material shall be included in the play as a whole, and how shall it be handled? Or, to put it another way, what is the proper relation between the plot and the 'episodes' or added material? In order to gauge the latter the poet must take precise account of the former: he must be sure just what does belong to the basic plot and what does not.⁵¹ For this purpose Aristotle recommends that he actually draft (*ἐκτίθεσθαι*, "auseinandersetzen, lay out for himself")⁵² an outline of his plot and then expand it by adding

⁴⁸ Hermann, following "codex quidam Victorii," conjectured *δέ*.

⁴⁹ Hence I have shown *διὸ εὐφροῦς ... ἐκστατικοί*, just above, as a parenthesis.

⁵⁰ It is difficult to understand how Sykutris and Rostagni can take *πεποιημένους*, when it stands in explicit contrast with *αὐτὸν ποιῶντα*, to mean "made by the poet." The idea (and the construction: *καὶ ... καί* where we should expect "either ... or") is exactly that of 14. 53b25, *q. v.*

⁵¹ Gomperz's version appears to bring this out, although it involves a slight mis-translation of *ἐκτίθεσθαι*: "Von den Fabeln ferner ... soll der Dichter sich den Wesenskern klarmachen, dann erst (im letzteren Falle) die Zuthaten beifügen und den Umfang erweitern."

⁵² See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 272-273 ('2. 169-170, in n. 4 on c. 17).

(further) 'episodes.'⁵³ *Ὅτως* defines the way in which this is to be done: namely, following the principles set forth in the preceding section ('visualization' and the proper use of 'forms' of speech). They come into play at this stage of the dramatist's work, not in his original concept of the plot.

The orientation of Aristotle's remarks is further indicated by *θεωρεῖσθαι*, b2, which is often taken as if it meant that he is outlining the plot of the *Iphigenia*⁵⁴ for our benefit ("the general plan may be illustrated by the *Iphigenia*," Butcher). On the contrary, Aristotle means the poet: this is the way *he* can get a view of the general or 'universal' structure of his own plot. This special purpose is proved again by the parenthesis *τὸ δὲ δτι κτλ.* below (b7), which points out a feature that is *not* a part of the *καθόλου* but may be utilized for 'episodes' (for the details see below); but above all by the tenor of the rest of the chapter. The emphasis is on the episodes, their length and character in relation to the plot, not on the plot for its own sake.

It was clear that the poet must 'see' his action and hear his characters if he is to produce a coherent and convincing play. It may not be so immediately clear why he needs an abstract of his plot beside him during the actual process of composition. The reason is that without such an outline the particularities of the tradition about his characters, or of his mental associations with them, *may lure him into by-paths: inorganic episodes, stirring but irrelevant speeches, details which do not contribute to the whole.* In other words, without that safeguard he may end by writing an 'episodic' play of the kind described in 9. 51b33-52a1. It is obvious that the danger is particularly acute when the dramatist has borrowed his plot instead of inventing it; for then the 'historical names' (9. 51b15) come along with it, and he may become entangled in them and forget the *καθόλου*. Moreover, under the con-

⁵³ The process is the same as that implied in 9. 51b38, *παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες τὸν μῦθον*. That phrase denoted an *excessive* 'stretching out' of the plot ("beyond its capacity") by the addition of too much episodic material. That *ἐπεισοδιοῦν* here refers to 'episodes' in the strict sense of the word, i.e., the addition of extra scenes or speeches, and not simply to the dividing up of the plot itself into acts or scenes ("fill in the episodes," Butcher), is proved by the particular *ἐπεισόδια* mentioned below, b14-15; by the specification that they are brief in the drama and bulkier in the epic; and above all by the example of the *Odyssey*, b23: everything *outside* the central plot is 'episodes.'

⁵⁴ So, not "the story (tradition) of *Iphigenia*," as Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 71 (2. 180), and others have it. *Τῆς Ἰφιγενείας* here can only mean the play, or a play.

ditions that obtained in the Athenian drama, where the poets drew their material predominantly from the epic Cycle and other poems like it rather than from the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, the temptation to become 'episodic' without limit was especially strong; for these works were totally and irresponsibly episodic: see below on 23. 59a37 ff. Aristotle explicitly warns against this danger in 18. 56a10-19, a passage which like the present one belongs to his prescriptions for the 'writing stage.'

The example Aristotle chooses is of this general kind, for Euripides' play was based on the *Cypria* and seems to have been the first to draw its material from that source.⁵⁵ On the other hand the *Cypria* did not, we can be pretty sure, bring Orestes into the story of Iphigenia's translation to the land of the Taurians or tell of a second translation of her to the temple at Halae. What Euripides has done is to 'contaminate' the story of Iphigenia with that of her brother's wanderings in search of purification, and with the cult-legends of Halae and Brauron. This contamination is guided and excused by the *names* of Iphigenia and Orestes. But with these traditional names other names, personalities, and incidents are also connected. One needs only to recall the traditional linking of Orestes with Apollo; and this connection is precisely the one that Aristotle points to as *not* a part of the 'universal' (b7-8). In short, under such circumstances a thousand and one other associations may obtrude themselves upon the poet's mind and make him lose track of what he is about. So Euripides might have shown us Orestes suffering a fit of madness on the stage, instead of merely reporting it in a messenger's speech; he might have brought on Apollo himself, or the Furies; etc., etc.⁵⁶ The corrective is to 'lay out' the story in abstract form, *without the names*. The plot now has to do with a 'girl,' who through certain circumstances becomes a 'priestess,' and with her 'brother'; everything that could or would happen only to the particular persons Iphigenia and Orestes is excluded by hypothesis and may only be brought in later, in the form of 'episodes'.

The details of Aristotle's sketch do not particularly concern us.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Schmid 1. 3. 521.

⁵⁶ That he does bring on Athena at the end, to prophesy the future, falls within the allowable use of the gods, 15. 54b2-6.

⁵⁷ Ἀφανισθείσης ἀθλῶς τοῖς θύσασιν is interesting as showing how the exclusion of particular persons also excludes the gods as active agents. That the disappearance of Iphigenia was managed by a goddess, and in particular by the goddess Artemis, is not a part of the καθόλου; it is enough that "those who performed the sacrifice" (N.B.: *not* "Agamemnon" and "Menelaus") did not see how it was done.

But at b7-8 (τὸ δὲ ὅτι κτλ.) there is a notorious *crux* which has to be dealt with.⁵⁸ The most commonly accepted emendation, Bekker's deletion of ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ,⁵⁹ disposes of one apparent repetition (ἐλθεῖν τῆς ἱερείας—ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ) but leaves another and more egregious one (ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου—ἔξω τοῦ μύθου). On the other hand the proposal of Vahlen and Düntzer, to bracket ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου, though closer to the mark, does not heal the weakness of διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν, which feebly duplicates ἐφ' ὅτι δέ. The surgery needs to be one degree more drastic. Διὰ τίνα⁶⁰ αἰτίαν, ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου, is a double gloss on ἐφ' ὅτι δέ, ἔξω τοῦ μύθου,⁶¹ but has gotten slightly out of place in being taken into the text. Its removal leaves an unobjectionable sentence: "but the fact that the god commanded him (told him through an oracle) to go there, and for what purpose, (is) outside the plot." The god's action, and his motive for it, are not a necessary part of the plot; which is not to say that they may not be *alluded to* in the play, as indeed they are (Orestes, line 85 ff., speaking to Apollo: σὺ δ' εἰπας [the command] ἐλθεῖν Ταυρικῆς μ' ὄρονος χθονός, ... λαβεῖν τ' ἄγαλμα θεᾶς, ... λαβόντα δ' ... Ἀθηναίων χθονὶ δοῦναι ... (92) καὶ ταῦτα δρᾶσαντ' ἄμπνοᾶς ἔξεῖν πόνων [the purpose]). In fact it seems clear that Aristotle had this sentence in mind when he wrote his own.⁶²

Why should Apollo and his purposes be excluded from the καθόλου? For one thing because, as we have already indicated, his connection with the plot is through the particular individual Orestes. The moment

Aristotle is not so successful with Poseldon (below, 55b18): he cannot very well avoid mentioning him, though he does not name him.

⁵⁸ See Vahlen, "Zur Kritik Arist. Schr.," *Sitzungsber. Vienna*, 1861, 78-79 (— *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 32-33); *Beiträge* 274 (2. 170-171, in n. 4 on c. 17); Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 130-132; Bywater *ad loc.*

⁵⁹ Similarly Gudeman's transposition (ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου).

⁶⁰ So originally, I assume, then naturally corrupted to διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν because when the phrase was incorporated into the text the interrogative no longer had any construction. E. Lobel, *CQ* 23 (1929) 79, proposed to bracket διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν and ἔξω τοῦ μύθου. I. A. Mackay, *AJP* 75 (1954) 301, suggests τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν, ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου· καὶ ἐφ' ὅτι δέ [ἔξω τοῦ μύθου] — an attractive reading in some ways, but it does not dispose of the doublet διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν — ἐφ' ὅτι δέ.

⁶¹ For ἔξω τοῦ μύθου (instead of ἔξω τοῦ δράματος) cf. ἔξω τοῦ μυθώματος, 24. 60a29.

⁶² Cf. also 937: to Iphigenia's question, "Why did you come to this land?" Orestes replies, "I came commanded (κελευσθεὶς) by oracles of Phoebus."

the plot-structure is sketched without names we are no longer—or rather not yet—concerned with Orestes, but only with “the brother of the priestess.” For another thing, the ἀρχή of the plot, its actual starting-point, is to be an event “which does not necessarily come after something else” (7. 50b27). Hence Orestes’ arrival must just happen—σὺν ἔβη ἔλθεῖν—not as a necessary consequence of something else that has happened before. But above all the plot is an imitation of *men*, a nexus of human actions; there is no room in it for intervention by gods (15. 54b2-6). Apollo’s role in the *Iphigenia*, as Aristotle sees it, is to be limited to prediction; the action itself, in the play, is neither begun nor carried forward by his will.⁶³

Again, there is an old dilemma about ἀνεγνώρισε in b9.⁶⁴ On the face of it the word refers to Orestes’ recognition of his sister: that is, to the first half of what Aristotle in 11. 52b5-8 characterized as a double recognition. But that is the less decisive half for Orestes. His escape from execution (καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία, b12) is not brought about by his recognition of her but by her recognition of him. Hence we might expect ἀνεγνωρίσθη, which in fact Vahlen once proposed but later withdrew. On the other hand the Arabic version offers an unimpeachable object for ἀνεγνώρισε, namely τὴν ἀδελφὴν. But although this heals the grammar it does not cure the sense. The anomaly is emphasized, not mitigated, by the mention of Polyidus; for it is evident from the parallel passage 16. 54b31-34, as well as from the one before us, that the recognition which was achieved by Polyidus’s device was that of Orestes by Iphigenia.⁶⁵ Thus ἀνεγνώρισε does something like

⁶³ It must be admitted that there is some lack of clarity here; but it seems to me inherent in Aristotle’s attempt to divorce the tragic action entirely from any organic connection with the gods. Moreover it is not entirely clear in what sense a given event (supernatural or otherwise ἀλογον) is “outside the plot” if it is a part of a total nexus of events some of which actually take place during the play while others are only alluded to in it. We shall come back to this question in discussing the first section of chapter 18.

⁶⁴ Most recent discussion by Tkatsch, 2. 197-201, in the middle of a larger discussion (190-207) embracing the two other crucial passages (16. 54b32 and 17. 55b21) where the use of an active form of ἀναγνωρίζειν seems, or seemed, to be anomalous. Of these, the passage in chapter 16 has been healed by the recognition (1) that Ὀρέστης, 54b31, is a gloss and the subject of the verb is Iphigenia.

⁶⁵ Actually, under that arrangement, the two recognitions must have happened almost simultaneously. The exchange following Orestes’ outcry must have been, in essentials, “Why, who was your sister?” “Iphigenia.” “But I am Iphigenia—and you must be Orestes!” The lead in the recognizing process falls to Iphigenia,

justice to Euripides' management of the scene, in which Orestes' recognition of his sister comes first and is better managed than the counter-recognition which follows;⁶⁶ but it is thoroughly inadequate, not to say misleading, as to Polyidus's. To do justice to both, the text would have to read at least *ἀνεγνώρισε καὶ ἀνεγνωρίσθη*, which, however, is still crude and unsatisfactory.

The difficulty is not merely in the meaning of *ἀνεγνώρισε*; it has substantive aspects. And now we may notice another fact, which for some reason has escaped attention. The particular way in which the recognition is managed is quite irrelevant to Aristotle's purpose here; it is no more a part of the *καθόλου* than the particular way in which Iphigenia got to the land of the Taurians (*ἰδρονθεισης εἰς ἄλλην χώραν*, b4) or how or why Orestes got there (*συνέβη ἔλθεῖν*, b6), or how he was captured (*ληθφείς*, b9).⁶⁷ Moreover this outline purported to be an outline of the *λόγος* of Euripides' play: we saw that *τῆς Ἰφιγενείας* could not mean anything else. Finally, *we have no warrant except this passage itself for assuming that Polyidus was a dramatist or ever wrote an Iphigenia*. In 16. 55a6 he is called "the sophist," which is at least a curious way of identifying him if he was also a playwright, and the terms of Aristotle's reference to him there make it clear that he did not write an *Iphigenia* but a *criticism of the Iphigenia*,⁶⁸ namely that of Euripides.⁶⁹ The clinching proof is *εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν Ὀρέστην συλλογίσασθαι κτλ*: "for (he said) it is likely that Orestes (would have) reckoned," etc.⁷⁰ In our passage, on the other hand, Polyidus

since she has the knowledge which Orestes' cry serves to unlock. The realization necessarily flashes over her first.

⁶⁶ Euripides' second recognition, of Orestes by his sister (800-802), is characterized as *ἄτεχνος*, 16. 54b31-32, because he is "made to say what the poet, not the plot, wants him to say."

⁶⁷ The manner of his capture, viz. through an outbreak of his malady, belongs to an 'episode': b14.

⁶⁸ See Bywater 237, on 16. 55a6.

⁶⁹ "About Iphigenia," i.e., the person, makes no sense. Polyidus' suggestion had to do with Orestes, not Iphigenia.

⁷⁰ *Εἰκὸς γὰρ* is the familiar Sophistic tag. Usually it is taken as a piece of commendation by Aristotle: "And the method of recognition used by P. the Sophist (was a good one); for it was natural that Orestes should reckon," etc. But Aristotle is not dispensing commendations, he is merely saying that Polyidus' suggestion (should *ᾗ* be *τό*?) about the *Iphigenia* involves a process of reasoning, like that of Electra in the *Choephoroe*. Thus *εἰκὸς γὰρ* is a part of Aristotle's summary of Polyidus, not a comment on his suggestion.

is a poet (*ἐποίησε*) and his version and that of Euripides are presented as alternative solutions by two dramatists (*εἶθ' ὡς ... εἶθ' ὡς*) of a common problem.

I submit that the net tendency of the facts, when they are all viewed together, is to prove *εἶθ' ὡς Εὐριπίδης ... ἔδει τυθῆναι* an interpolation (based, naturally, on the references to Euripides and Polyidus in chapter 16).⁷¹ This conclusion not only explains the clause itself but makes the loss of the true object of *ἀνεγνώρισε* (i.e., *τὴν ἀδελφήν*) easier to understand: it was crowded out by the beginning of the note when the latter was interpolated into the text.⁷² Thus Vahlen's and Susemihl's implausible attempt to interpret *ἀνεγνώρισε* as "caused himself to be recognized" ("gab sich zu erkennen")⁷³ falls to the ground. Above all, Aristotle's sentence, when retored to its original state, gives an entirely satisfactory meaning: *ἀνεγνώρισε τὴν ἀδελφήν, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία*, "he recognized his sister, and from that (stemmed) his deliverance." *Ἐντεῦθεν* is now a suitable specification, because in Euripides' play (and only in it, not in Polyidus' suggested reconstruction) the recognition of Iphigenia by Orestes is in fact the beginning of the train of events which leads to his deliverance. Thus the athetesis (1) removes the anomaly of Polyidus being brought into a context which has to do only with Euripides, (2) restores a satisfactory train of ideas to the passage, and (3) disposes of the alleged anomalous use of *ἀναγνωρίζειν*.

At first glance it looks as though *ἡ σωτηρία* refers to the escape of Orestes and Iphigenia by ship at the end of the play. But that escape is explicitly classified just below, b14, as an 'episode.' Hence I infer that Aristotle's summary of the plot ends at Orestes' deliverance *from execution*, which we can locate approximately at line 994 (Iphigenia: "For I will stay my hand from your execution").⁷⁴ We are then faced

⁷¹ It is possible that the note is from Aristotle himself. But in that case its motive is hard to divine, and (if we have interpreted τοῦ σοφιστοῦ correctly) he would not have made the error of thinking Polyidus a poet. Similarly κατὰ τὸ εἶκος εἰπὼν is a natural interpretation of εἶκος γὰρ τὸν Ὁ. συλλογίσασθαι, 16. 55a7, for one who did not know the facts, but not for Aristotle.

⁷² Its preservation in Σ (the hypothetical archetype of the Arabic version) is one more sign that the latter still had important traces of an older state of the text which have not survived into our extant Greek MSS. See above on 5. 49b6.

⁷³ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 275-276 (2. 171-172); Tkatsch, *loc. cit.* (n. 64 above).

⁷⁴ Characteristically, Aristotle pays no attention to the other half of Iphigenia's decision, which is integral with the first (τε ... τε): "... and save our house." That

with the paradox that the last third of the play (995-1496) does not belong to the *λόγος* proper, any more than Orestes' *Sendung* by Apollo belongs to it. We shall find some evidence in the first section of chapter 18 to show that Aristotle had done some further thinking on this problem, or a related one, but nothing to indicate that he had reached a wholly satisfactory solution. Meanwhile, so far as the *Iphigenia* itself is concerned, we must conclude that in Aristotle's eyes the play proper is over at about line 1000. He might have said of it what he says of the *Odyssey* below (b23): τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.⁷⁵

It is only *after* writing out his abstract,⁷⁶ says Aristotle, that the dramatist should proceed to 'supply' ⁷⁷ the names and fill out, expand, his play with 'episodes.' The guiding principle for the latter is that they are to be *οἰκειά*. But in what sense can an episode be *οἰκεῖον*, since by definition it is not an integral part of the plot? ⁷⁸ Fortunately Aristotle gives us the clue in *οἶον τῶ*⁷⁹ *Ὀρέστη* (*sc. οἰκειά ἐστίν*) ἢ *μανία* *κτλ.* The relevance is relevance *to the individual character*. Once he has been named,⁸⁰ the poet is free, within limits, to add further material that has to do with him specifically.

Aristotle's examples reveal another trait which may not seem significant at first glance. The two 'episodes' he mentions not only are appropriate in a special way to Orestes (the man hounded with madness by the Furies, the man in search of final purification); they are both *reported by messengers*, not represented on the stage.⁸¹ The bearing of this fact (not noticed before, so far as I know) will appear presently.

is not a part of the *καθόλου*: it belongs too closely to the individual persons Iphigenia and Orestes.

⁷⁵ Lines 1-1000 (994) are the *tragic*, the serious, part of the play; the rest is romantic melodrama. In the same way the summary of the *Odyssey* omits the 'romantic' part, the Wanderings; see below.

⁷⁶ *Ἡδὲ* strongly emphasized.

⁷⁷ For *ὑποθέματα* and its suggestion of casualness or arbitrariness see above on 9. 51b13.

⁷⁸ See above on 9. 51b34.

⁷⁹ The suppression of *ἐν* (*ἐν τῶ*) is necessary in any case (so Victorius and others), since Aristotle is talking about the *Iphigenia*, not the *Orestes*; and it seems to be guaranteed by the Arabic version; see Tkatsch, 2. 187.

⁸⁰ I.e., in particular, the hero. Incidentally Aristotle's remark, taken with his summary of the plot, shows that for him Orestes is the hero of the *Iphigenia*. He is the *tragic* figure.

⁸¹ To be sure, the first part of Iphigenia's intrigue (the outwitting of Thoas)

We shall wait to assess the remark that "in dramas the episodes are brief, while the epic gets its bulk through them," until we have commented on the details of Aristotle's summary of the *Odyssey*. Here again, as with the *Iphigenia*, what he omits is even more significant than what he includes. In the first place the ambush laid by the suitors for Telemachus (δ 842-847) is referred to, but nothing else in the *Telemachia* except the state of things in Ithaca, which is much more vividly described in the later books, after Odysseus returns. The situation implied in ἀποδημοῦντος κτλ. is specifically that of book 5. Odysseus has been absent from home for many years; he is being kept away by the god (i.e., Poseidon,⁸² who did *not* pursue him in his early wanderings); he is alone, i.e., all his men are gone.⁸³ Nothing is said about the Laestrygonians, the Cyclops (the cause of Poseidon's wrath), Aeolus, Circe, Hades, in short about any of the Wanderings as such; and what is even more significant, nothing about the Phaeacians. The present participles describe a situation, not a series of events, namely *Odysseus' situation as it is at its lowest ebb*, just before the first important change in his fortunes begins. Things at home in the worst posture imaginable, with his possessions being wasted away and his son the object of a conspiracy; the hero himself alone and naked, without friends or resources, and under the ban of a god—that is the state of affairs that Aristotle outlines in b17-21. Why this selection of items? Because these circumstances⁸⁴ represent the premise on which the action is built, the pole of 'unhappiness' from which Odysseus' fortunes will shift (unexpectedly for everyone but him) to the opposite: enemies destroyed, home, possessions, and family regained.⁸⁵ The λόγος of the *Odyssey*, stripped of all episodes, is the definition of this μεταβολή.

is transacted on stage; but the actual escape (ἡ σωτηρία) is reported in the long messenger's speech, lines 1327-1419 (Orestes' attack of madness in 260-339).

⁸² Ποσειδῶνος is undoubtedly a gloss which has displaced θεοῦ; see Gudeman *ad loc.* (although I doubt that Christian ideas had anything to do with the substitution). Aristotle's own principle stringently excludes any mention of names, divine or human, in the λόγος itself. Note τῆ θεῶ, above, b5; δ θεός, b7.

⁸³ Calypso is not necessarily excluded by μόνου. But Odysseus is even more totally alone at the end of book 5, naked on the beach of Scheria.

⁸⁴ Plus his arrival in Ithaca (books 13 and 14), still alone and χειμασθείς ("in a depressed state": i.e., of fortune, not necessarily of mind). Athena is not mentioned. Poseidon was necessary as one of the 'given' factors, a static element so to speak; but no god is allowed to figure in the action itself. It is all *Odysseus'* doing: αὐτός ... αὐτός.

⁸⁵ These secondary consequences are not mentioned, however. For Aristotle the

We are confronted with a paradox similar to that in the *Iphigenia*. There the latter third of the play was dismissed as 'episodes'; here, everything early except book 5 (which is as it were the prologue of the drama)⁸⁶ and a few details from book 1 or 4; that is, almost the entire first half of the poem. For Aristotle, the action of the *Odyssey* begins essentially with book 13. Furthermore, the most conspicuous and massive 'episode' which is thus passed over, namely Odysseus' tale of his Wanderings, which fills books 9-12, is (1) a series of *personal adventures*, specifically associated with Odysseus and no other in the tradition,⁸⁷ and these are (2) *reported* by a character in the poem, not by the poet.⁸⁸

If we nowadays tend to think of the Wanderings as an integral, central part of the *Odyssey*, it is because we do not look at the poem in Aristotle's way. We think of it as *a narrative of a part of the life of Odysseus*, telling "everything that happened to him during a single period of time" (23. 59a23). But this is just what Aristotle insists an epic should not do and Homer does not do. It should not be a narrative of a man's life, or a part of it, but an imitation of a single *action* that has a beginning, middle, and end; and it was precisely for that that Aristotle praised Homer so glowingly in chapter 8 (51a22-29). We tend to read the *Odyssey* as a chronicle; Aristotle saw it as a drama with a large addition of 'episodes.'

λόγος ends with book 22, the slaying of the suitors.—The general parallel with Orestes (in the *Iphigenia*) is striking. He too arrives *χειμασθείς*, subject to fits of madness, alone and resourceless but for one friend; and he leaves, having found his sister, on the way to recover his sanity and his inheritance. He has passed from deepest 'unhappiness' to complete happiness.

⁸⁶ Just as the details summarized in *τυθείσης ... Ιερωσύνην*, b3-6, represent Iphigenia's prologue-speech, *I.T.* 1-66. We may note that in each case the 'prologue' details are given mainly in genitive absolutes; the finite verbs (except *ἔσχε*, b5) are reserved for the action proper. In the summary of the *Odyssey* this is all the more striking because the subject is the same throughout the sentence (except in *ἔτι δὲ ... ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι*): viz. Odysseus.

⁸⁷ I am referring to the Greek tradition as Aristotle knew it, not to possible ulterior sources for some of the tales incorporated into the Wanderings, such as the folk-tale of Bear's Son (Rhys Carpenter, *Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics* [*Sather Class. Lects.* 20], Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946, 136-156) or Woodhouse's "deep-sea yarns" (W. J. Woodhouse, *The Composition of Homer's Odyssey*, Oxford, 1930, 41-45).

⁸⁸ The long stories told by Nestor and Menelaus, which bulk so large in books 3 and 4, likewise have a close personal reference (they are told to Odysseus' son and teem with praises of Odysseus) and are reported indirectly.

With this we return to the remark with which Aristotle prefaced his summary: that "in the drama the episodes are but brief, while the epic gets its bulk through them." This is the most important statement in this part of chapter 17; for, as we saw, Aristotle's purpose here is not to redefine the plot as such but to give the poet practical guidance in choosing and shaping his 'episodes' *after* the plot has been constructed. What should be their character, and how long should they be? The answer is that they should be 'relevant' to the hero and that in the drama they should not bulk very large, while the epic has license to pad itself with them (how much license, we shall see later).

This formulation as to the relative length of the episodes in tragedy and epic has a direct connection with what we learned earlier, in chapters 5 and 7, about the length of poems.⁸⁹ In the second of those passages we were told that the length of a properly made tragedy is a direct outward reflection of its unity of structure; in the first, that tragedy has an innate tendency to keep its length constant (*μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν*), whereas the epic is "unlimited in its time (length)." In chapter 24, 59b18-22, we shall find Aristotle wishing that the tragic 'limit of length' could be applied to the epic also, but admitting that the latter has a special trait (*ἴδιον*) of swelling its bulk very greatly. It is clear that these passages have more than a little to do with the one before us, in fact that it supplies an invaluable link between them. What it shows is that *the difference in length between epic and tragedy is not a function of the central plot or λόγος*—if the epic has a proper λόγος to begin with—but *of the added 'episodes.'* The λόγος of the *Odyssey* is "not (too) long";⁹⁰ that is to say, *it is comparable to the length fixed by Aristotle for tragedy.* Gudeman⁹¹ tried the experiment of reckoning up the parts of the *Odyssey* which Aristotle indicates as belonging to its 'core' (*ἴδιον*), and found to his astonishment that they do in fact come to almost exactly 4000 lines, or the mean length of a tragic trilogy. This finding (whose implications Gudeman did not see) is, it seems to me, conclusive. If the *Odyssey* were stripped of its episodes, the central action could be read or recited in the same time as a tragic trilogy.⁹² Its effect on the hearer

⁸⁹ See above on 5. 49b12-16 and 7. 51a11-15.

⁹⁰ Vulcanus' emendation <οὐ> μακρός, now confirmed by the Arabic version, is too obvious to need discussion.

⁹¹ P. 402, on 59b21.

⁹² For the objection that this takes care of the trilogy but not the single play, see below on 24. 59b20-22.

would then be attained in a single waking period and would amount to a single aesthetic experience like that of tragedy. What prevents this from happening, in the case of Homer's epics, is not the plot itself but the indefinitely large bulk of episodes that has been added to it; and, for reasons which Aristotle will explain later, the epic has a special license to do this. If the tragedian, on the other hand, should attempt to emulate the epic on this score, the episodes will overshadow the main action and his play will be 'episodic,' i.e., bad, and a failure.⁹³

Finally, what connects this passage with the first part of chapter 17 and our theme-phrase at the end of 15 ("the perceptions that necessarily attend upon the poetic art")? The connection is that the episodes are what determine the total length of a poetic work, over and above the basic length fixed by the plot itself, and that *length is a sense-category*.⁹⁴ The total bulk of a literary work necessarily affects our apprehension of the work; we feel it as a direct sensuous experience ("What, over so soon?"; "How intolerably long!", etc.). And it is an effect that is inherent in poetry, as an art which operates through time, just as surely as we receive a direct impression of insignificance (tininess) or disorganized vastness from a work of graphic or plastic art.⁹⁵

Thus the topic of 55a34-b23 is organically affiliated not only with the main argument of the *Poetics* but with the particular theme which was announced at the end of chapter 15. It belongs to the prescriptions and suggestions for the 'writing stage,' when the plot is growing into a poem, and should not under any circumstances be detached from the nexus of Aristotle's work.⁹⁶

It remains to add a brief note on ἀναγνωρίσας, b21. We disposed of the suggestion that ἀνεγνώρισε in b9 meant "got himself recognized." In the present case, since the participle already has an object (τινάς), there is no grammatical difficulty but only one of sense. The important recognitions in the *Odyssey*, we should think, are those of Odysseus, by Eumaeus, Telemachus, Eurycleia, etc.; so that we expect ἀναγνωρισθεῖς ὑπὸ τινῶν or the like.⁹⁷ However, Aristotle hammers throughout

⁹³ See below on 18. 56a10. This would be one of the offenses alluded to in 15. 54b15; see the next paragraph.

⁹⁴ See above, on 7. 51a12-15.

⁹⁵ Cf. 7. 50b34-51a3.

⁹⁶ As Montmollin does (see pp. 156-158: all of chapter 17 a later addition, or rather two separate ones).

⁹⁷ E.g., ἀναγνωρισάντων τινῶν (Gudeman).

the sentence upon what *Odysseus* does: *αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται... αὐτὸς²⁸ ἐπιθέμενος, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη*. The purpose behind this, especially when we consider the preceding exposition of *Odysseus*' hopeless state, is undoubtedly to underline the stunning paradoxicality (the *θαυμαστόν*) of his feat. Arriving alone, resourceless and friendless, he lays out his campaign in successive stages until finally he, one man, personally destroys the whole cabal of his enemies. The recognitions Aristotle means are those involved in *Odysseus*' campaign: finding out gradually who are his friends and who are his foes, who can be trusted and who can not. The recognitions of him are secondary to his purpose, to be reckoned with merely as possible helps (*Eumaeus*, *Telemachus*, the neatherd) or hindrances (*Penelope*, the suitors) to his plan. I think, therefore, that we can let *ἀναγνωρίσας τινάς* stand. If so, the last case of the alleged meaning 'cause oneself to be recognized' is disposed of.²⁹

²⁸ I see no sufficient reason for striking out this *αὐτὸς*, with the Riccardianus, the Arabic version, and the corrector of the Urbinas 47. The omission is easy to explain, in a sentence containing two other *αὐτὸς*'s. Aristotle is emphasizing the single-handed way in which *Odysseus* organizes and carries through the plan for the attack: he is its sole mover (as we said, *Athena* is systematically ignored).

²⁹ The only other possible instance, *ἀναγνωρισθέντος* in 16. 55a15, belongs to a passage whose whole meaning is much too obscure to permit any confident assertions one way or the other. Suffice it to say that interpretations seem possible there (e.g., that of Tkatsch, 2.90-94, and Gudeman) which give the verb its normal meaning.

CHAPTER 18

55b24-31

- [ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγωδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις · |
 25 τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν, καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις, ἢ δέσις, τὸ
 δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ λύσις. λέγω δὲ δέσιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς
 μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους ὃ ἔσχατόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνει
 εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς ἀτυχίαν, λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς
 30 τῆς μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους · ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ τῷ
 Θεοδέκτου | δέσις μὲν τὰ τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 παιδίου λῆψις, καὶ πάλιν ἡ αὐτῶν δῆ<λωσις, λύσις δ' ἡ>
 ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου μέχρι τοῦ τέλους.]

55b24

- [One part of every tragedy is the tying of the knot, and
 25 the other the untying (dénouement); the events | outside,
 and in many cases some of those inside, are the tying, the
 rest is the untying. By 'tying' I mean the part reaching
 from the beginning (of the story) to the scene which is the
 last before the shift to good or bad fortune begins, and by
 'untying' that from the beginning of the shift to the end
 30 (of the play): for example in the *Lynceus* of Theodectes | the
 'tying' is the previous events plus the capture of the little
 boy, and again the <bringing to light> of the couple, <and
 the untying the part> from the accusation of murder to
 the end.]

This is the first we have heard of 'tying' and 'untying.' The basic terms in the passage are familiar (*ἀρχή*, *τέλος*, *μετάβασις*¹ *εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς ἀτυχίαν*), but they are incorporated into a new pattern which is both more specific and more comprehensive than anything before. In the phrase "that section which is the last after (from) which the shift takes place² to prosperity or unhappiness" we detect a new topographical precision. Not that the *μετάβασις* has not already been identified with a specific part of the play: see what was said above

¹ = *μεταβολή*; see 10. 52a16, 18.

² *Μεταβαίνει*, impersonal, = ἡ *μετάβασις γίνεται*.

on the peripety of the *Oedipus*, 11. 52a24 ff. What is new in our passage is that it is located not merely with respect to the action of the play, *but with respect to the whole out of which that action is excerpted*. For the ἀρχή here is not the ἀρχή of chapter 7; it is the beginning of the story. The play and the antecedent events which it presupposes (τὰ ἔξωθεν, a25; τὰ προπεπραγμένα, a30) are now surveyed as integral, almost co-equal, parts of a larger structure. For want of a better term (since Aristotle himself offers none here), we will call this larger structure the 'whole story.'

The concept of things "outside" the play is not new either: see 14. 53b32 and 17. 55b8;³ but it has not previously appeared as a correlate to τὰ ἔσωθεν, the two of them together constituting a whole. Where did this idea of the two correlates come from? It must have arisen out of Aristotle's thinking about the epic, at the end of chapter 17; for *the epic is precisely that structure in which a mass of parts "outside" the action can nevertheless be incorporated into the poem*, in the form of episodes. The epic, whether of the Homeric or the chronicle type, brings to the fore a problem which tragedy is less well fitted to pose in concrete terms: that of the structural relation of the poem to the 'whole story.' We shall see (in chapter 23) that in Aristotle's eyes Homer's problem, and his achievement, was precisely that of selecting an action *out of* the 'whole story' and delimiting it against the other parts thereof. On the other hand the formal treatment of the epic in chapters 23 and 24 shows no trace of the δέσις-λύσις theory.

The δέσις - λύσις scheme comports a relation between the 'whole story' and the plot which, so far as we can see, was not in Aristotle's mind when he defined the 'norm of length' in chapter 7. There τὰ ἔξωθεν formed no part of his calculations. The whole progress of the story, from ἀρχή through μεταβολή to τέλος, was assumed to lie within the plot and, by the same token, within the play. The play and its action were congruent entities, jointly and equally defined by the δρος. Chapter 17 allowed for episodes, but stipulated that the rule of length could not be stretched very far for tragedy, though it could for the epic. In the present passage, on the other hand, we are told that "every tragedy" ⁴ is partly δέσις and partly λύσις, and that the

³ Τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, 15. 54b3 and 7, was in a passage which we diagnosed as a later addition and affiliated with the present one.

⁴ Note πάσης τραγωδίας, every tragic play; not πάσης τῆς τραγωδίας, the genre 'tragedy' as a whole (6. 50a8).

δέσις includes "the things outside, and in many cases some of the things inside." How far outside? Where does the Oedipus story really begin? With the exposure of Oedipus as a baby? With the oracle to Laius?⁵ Or does it go back to Labdacus, or beyond? That way lies an Aeschylean, not a recognizably Aristotelian, conception of tragedy. Within the indefinitely extensible chain of *προπεπραγμένα* the poet's choice of an *ἀρχή* for his play begins to seem arbitrary. He may begin with "that part which is the last before the *μετάβασις*," as in the *Oedipus*,⁶ or—apparently—at some previous point: where, is not stated. The new theory embraces the *προπεπραγμένα*⁷ and the *πραττόμενα* in one span; hence the poet is in some way responsible for both, not merely for the latter. But how is his responsibility to be activated, so to speak, and at what point in the story is he to commence? The answer, which is only implied, not stated, must be that he is still to begin his play with "the part which is the last before the *μετάβασις*," but may incorporate as much of the *προπεπραγμένα* as he thinks appropriate, in the form of 'episodes.' We saw that Aristotle implied this for the tales of Odysseus' wanderings; and in fact it is possible that the whole idea may have come to him from pondering on the structure of the *Odyssey* in particular.⁸ In any case, if our suggestion is correct, the episodes now begin to appear in a new light, as something more than a device for varying and "stretching out" the central action. They begin to appear as semi-organic parts of the play: not actually parts of the action itself, but nevertheless standing in a calculated relation to it. They are under the poet's control and constitute a subordinate but useful part of his total structure.

The outlines of a new and broader theory of dramatic structure begin to rise before our eyes here. But they remain suggestions: there

⁵ Aeschylus' Theban trilogy, of which the *Seven Against Thebes* was the last play, probably began with the birth of Oedipus, that is, with the evidence of Laius' defiance of the oracle: Schmid 1. 2. 210; C. Robert, *Oedipus*, Berlin, 1915, 1. 252-254.

⁶ This 'part' at least must be represented in the play. It is the *πῶς σῶ* at which the leverage of the action is applied, the pole of fortune from which, by definition, it swings to the opposite.

⁷ We noticed that in the sketches of the *Iphigenia* and the *Odyssey*, in chapter 17, these were expressed by genitive absolutes, as opposed to finite verbs and attendant participles for the action proper.

⁸ In chapter 23 Aristotle cites only the *Iliad*, in which the 'episodes' less clearly represent the *προπεπραγμένα*. But see below on 59a30-37.

is no sign that Aristotle developed them into a complete doctrine embracing all the elements in the play. Still the new idea, so far as it goes, subsumes elements which under the old scheme were simply 'outside' and yet of capital importance for the things 'inside': for example Oedipus' killing of his father (14. 53b32). Perhaps even more significantly for Aristotle's motive, it can subsume *irrational* elements such as Oedipus' ignorance of what had happened to Laius (15. 54b7; 24. 60a30), and the action of the gods (15. 54b3). Thus in 17. 55b3-4 Iphigenia's miraculous *Entrückung* and translation to another country are given as a part of the abstract, and we gather that Aristotle has no serious objection to such matters being referred to in a prologue or an episode, although they are not to be dramatized in the play itself. But their presence in the *καθόλου* (even though the miraculous element is played down and no god is named) was an anomaly, especially as Aristotle explicitly excluded the oracle to Orestes and Apollo's reason for sending him to the land of the Taurians. Divine interventions, oracles, and other *ἄλογα* of various sorts are an indefeasible part of the background of almost every Greek tragic plot, and the concept of the *δέσεις* makes it possible to assign them a systematic place in the total economy of tragedy without giving up the ban on irrationality in the action proper. However, the gain is not possible without the anomalies we spoke of. There is no sign that Aristotle ever thought the implications of the *δέσεις* - *λύσεις* scheme all the way through. If he had, he would have had to modify his whole theory of the tragic action.

For these reasons I suggest that 55b24-31 is a later addition by Aristotle.

In the *Oedipus* and the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, where we can test the application of Aristotle's idea with the greatest confidence, the *δέσεις* would appear to end during or just after the prologue. The prologue of the *Iphigenia* brings us Iphigenia's recital of the *προπεπραγμένα* (= *τυθείσης ... ἱερωσίνην*) and Orestes' arrival (*ἐλθών*):⁹ that is, the presentation of him at the nadir of his fortunes; for his capture and appearance before Iphigenia (*ληφθείς, θύεσθαι μέλλον*) belong to the sequence of the *λύσεις*. They are the beginning of the reversal. The prologue of the *Oedipus* serves a similar function: (1) it presents the hero at the zenith of his fortune, but also (2), through Creon's report of the oracle, sets in motion the machinery which will run until the catastro-

* Also, for that matter, the report of Apollo's oracle and purpose, which Aristotle ruled out as "outside the plot."

phe. In the *Lynceus*, which Aristotle himself cites as an example, it appears that more of the play was devoted to the *δέσεις*. Our text is damaged at b31, and the most probable restoration is that of Christ, Tkatsch, and Gudeman: ἡ αὐτῶν δὴ <λώσεις, λύσεις δ' ἡ> ἀπὸ κτλ., which happens also to be the reading of the Parisinus 2038.¹⁰ Αὐτῶν, with the indications supplied by *Λυγχεῖ* and *τοῦ παιδίου*, must refer to Lynceus and Hypermnestra.¹¹ The last events in the *δέσεις* would then be the capture of the child Abas and the unmasking of his parents' clandestine marital relations. This in turn was followed, it seems, by an accusation of murder, which Aristotle designates as the beginning of the *λύσεις*. We cannot be sure about the exact circumstances of the accusation. But we know that Lynceus must have been the accused, since it was he who was being led away to execution when the peripety occurred (11. 52a27); and the accuser, or at least the instigator of the accusation, must have been Danaus, because he is the one on whom the tables were finally turned. Furthermore, since at least a semblance of legal procedure appears to have been maintained (Lynceus is actually accused or indicted, not simply garroted), and since in Attic law¹² the death penalty lay only against murderers of close blood-kin, we may hazard the conjecture that Danaus hid Abas in turn, or spirited him away temporarily, and accused Lynceus (now brought into the open) of murdering him. The peripety could then be managed by contriving

¹⁰ Vahlen's ἡ αὐτῶν (δὴ?) ἀπαγωγῆ, λύσεις δ' ἡ ("Zur Kritik Arist. Schr.," *Sitzungsber. Vienna* 1861, 81 [= *Ges. Philol. Schr.* 1. 36]) presupposes the same sentence structure and the same general sequence of events. But δὴλώσεις is more obviously appropriate, since a discovery (viz. of Lynceus and his marital relations with Hypermnestra) must have preceded any arrest of the pair. Rostagni's text and interpretation seem to me impossible.

¹¹ Rather than to the *προπεπραγμένα*, a reference which is oblique and strained with another phrase (*καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις*) intervening. The 'absolute' use of αὐτός is not uncommon in Aristotle, either where a concept as such is being opposed to another or where the reference is clear from the context; see Bonitz, *Index* 125a14-39. In English, without being philosophers, when we have heard one or the other of a married pair mentioned we have no difficulty in understanding a following "them" to refer to the couple.--An alternative interpretation of αὐτῶν is Lynceus and Abas, the identification of the latter (after his capture) having led somehow to the identification of his father as still living. See also T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 304.

¹² See above on 14. 53b37-54a9. In the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, we can assume that the law and legal procedure presupposed in a tragedy are Athenian.

some plausible means of bringing Abas back on stage in the nick of time to save his father, whereupon Danaus, hoist by his own petard, is executed and the happy family are reunited and take over the kingdom. Such a plot has everything to recommend it that we are familiar with from our own melodramas of the last century. In the language of Mr. Alfred Jingle: handsome young couple—clandestine romance—tragic business about in-laws—dastardly father-in-law—marriage blessed by manly little son—consternation when same turns up missing—followed by discovery of young father—latter accused by old rascal of doing in own child—on way to gallows when alleged victim reappears, crying "Papa!"—general sensation, arrangements quickly made to substitute father-in-law's neck for son-in-law's—young couple reunited amid huzzas of populace—happy future of kingdom assured—very affecting, very.

Beyond such speculations we can hardly go, except to point out that in any case the *λύσις* begins with precisely that event (the accusation of murder) which threatens destruction to the hero. In this respect the *Lynceus* furnishes an exact parallel to the *Iphigenia*, where the first event of the *λύσις* is Orestes' capture, and the *Oedipus*, where the news from Delphi seems calculated only to reaffirm Oedipus' unchallengeable supremacy in Thebes. This coincidence suggests what indeed is obvious enough from the mere idea of *δέσις-λύσις* (shift in movement from one direction to the opposite, beginning at a definite moment): that the theory was made for complex plots. 'Tying' and 'untying' have little or no meaning for a simple action.

55b32-56a10

[τραγωδίας δὲ εἶδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα· τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ
μέρη ἐλέχθη· ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἣς τὸ ὄλον ἐστὶν περι-
34 | πέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, ἡ δὲ παθητικὴ, ὅλον οἱ τε Αἴαν-
a1 | τες καὶ οἱ Ἰξίονες, ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ, ὅλον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ
Πηλεὺς, [τὸ δὲ τέταρτον] <ἡ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδης, ὅλον αἱ
τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν Ἄιδου. μάλιστα
μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ μέγιστα
5 | καὶ πλεῖστα, ἄλλως τε | καὶ ὥς νῦν συκοφαντοῦσιν τοὺς
ποιητὰς· γεγονότων γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἀγαθῶν ποι-
ητῶν, ἐκάστου τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦσι τὸν ἕνα ὑπερ-
βάλλειν. δίκαιον δὲ τραγωδίαν καὶ ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν
λέγειν οὐδεν<ι> ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ. τοῦτο δέ, ὣν ἡ αὐτὴ
10 | πλοκὴ καὶ λύσις. πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ | λύουσι κα-
κῶς· δεῖ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω ἀρτικροτεῖσθαι.]

55b22

[There are four species of tragedy, for that is also the number of 'parts' that have been discussed: the complex, which is peripety and recognition throughout; the fatal,
 34 | a1 like the | *Ajax* plays and also the *Ixions*; the moral, e.g.,
 the *Women of Phthia* and the *Peleus*; [and the fourth species]
 <and the episo>dic, e.g., the *Daughters of Phorcys* and also
 the *Prometheus* and all the actions in Hades. Now prefer-
 ably one should try to have all (the 'parts'), or at least
 the most important ones and as many of them as possible,
 5 especially | considering the unjust criticisms they level
 against the poets nowadays; for we have had poets who
 were good in each department, but they now expect the
 individual poet to surpass the particular *forte* of each one.
 Whereas the only fair method is to call a tragedy either
 different from another or the same <by> no criterion so
 much as its plot. That means, plays which have the same
 tying and untying. But many poets, after doing a good
 10 job with the tying, | untie badly; whereas the two things
 must be fitted smoothly together.]

The passage, or at least the first part of it, is one of the most notorious *crucis* in the *Poetics*. We cannot be sure of a solution where the path is so overgrown; all we can do is try to point toward a solution. The first essential, as we have found so often, is to see that the passage is a whole. The proof of this will have to come from the detailed interpretation, but it may be well to begin by noting some external signs. *Mèn οὖν*, 56a3, indicates a connection with the foregoing, and *ἅπαντα* indubitably refers to either *εἶδη*, 55b32, or *μέρη*, b33. It follows that Aristotle's defense of the poets against unfair critical demands (a3-7) is linked in some way with his classification of the kinds of tragedy. Again, *δίκαιον* (a7) is a strong word, not (at least in this construction) a cliché.¹⁸ Since Aristotle has just been protesting against an unjust demand, we may surely infer that *δίκαιον δὲ κτλ.* sets a "just" critical principle over against it. We may also notice that this line of interpretation, if successful, will obviate any neces-

¹⁸ That is, we cannot take it as a mere variation on *χρηή* or *δεῖ*. Bonitz gives no references for *δίκαιον* (*δίκαιον*) followed by infinitive, whereas the idiom is common in Plato; see Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum*, 1. 532. Cf. 1. 47b19.

sity for transposing b7-10 to 55b31, just after *μέχρι τοῦ τέλους*.¹⁴

To return to the beginning of the passage, the cardinal difficulty, as everybody knows, is the statement that there are four kinds of tragedy because there are four 'parts.' These latter cannot be the four quantitative parts named in chapter 12 (52b16: *πρόλογος, ἐπεισόδιον, ἔξοδος, χορικόν*), even if chapter 12 were genuine; and neither can they be any four of the original six 'parts' of tragedy in chapter 6,¹⁵ if for no other reason than that the *pathos*, the required basis for the 'pathetic' variety, is not among those. Nor, finally, can we equate the four kinds in any one-to-one fashion with the 'parts of the plot' mentioned in 11. 52b9-10; for the latter are only three, not four, and anyhow the first two of them (peripety and recognition) are preempted by the first kind, the complex, and *pathos* by the 'pathetic,' leaving no parts to correspond to the other two kinds. It would appear, then, that there is no list of four 'parts' previously given in the *Poetics* to which Aristotle can be referring here, and that Vahlen¹⁶ is therefore right in saying that Aristotle did not base his four kinds upon any set of four parts.

While we are noticing difficulties, we may take cognizance of another parallel which does not quite fit. At the beginning of chapter 21 Aristotle remarks that the epic ought to have the same kinds as tragedy, and he names them: simple, complex, 'ethical,' and 'pathetic.' Again the list does not check exactly with ours. But this time there is some hope: three of the four items in the two lists do coincide and we are left only with the problem of the *ἀπλή*. Vahlen¹⁷ felt with some justice that it was called for in our passage also, and proposed to indicate a lacuna after *ἀναγνώρισις*, b31: <ἡ δὲ ἀπλή ...>. But although the loss of a phrase beginning with *ἡ δέ* is perfectly conceivable here, the emendation is obviously unsatisfactory. Unless we are content to end with five kinds, it forces us to bracket the whole of *τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ... ὅσα ἐν Ἄιδου* or otherwise dispose of it. If the *ἀπλή* is to be found anywhere, it ought to be at the end. And in fact

¹⁴ With Susemihl (followed by Butcher and Bywater).

¹⁵ See Rostagni's summary of the arguments against this identification, p. 106.

¹⁶ *Beiträge*² 77 ('2. 137). The attempt of Ernst Howald and his pupil Max Lienhard (see above, c. 6, n. 37) to make the four 'parts' — (1) peripety, (2) *pathos*, (3) *ethos*, and (4) recognition, and to find the systematic discussion of them in chaps. 13, 14, 15, and 16 respectively, glosses over so many fundamental difficulties that refutation is hardly necessary; but see Montmollin 371-374.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.* 74-75 ('2. 134).

Bursian long ago proposed τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ἢ ἀπλῆ (accepted by Gudeman). But the leading emendations in that place have been Schrader's τὸ δὲ τερατώδες and Bywater's τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψεις. Palaeographically, the latter is seductive;¹⁸ otherwise it is hard to account for its popularity with recent editors and translators.¹⁹ Quite aside from our conclusion that ὄψεις in the *Poetics* does not mean the stage 'spectacle' in general, it is inconceivable that Aristotle would have based one of the four kinds of tragedy on an element which he has explicitly declared (6. 50b17; cf. 14. 53b1-3) to be "least artistic and least proper to poetry" of all the six 'parts.'²⁰

In this impasse we can perhaps get some help from another look at the related passage in chapter 21. There (59b14-16) the *Iliad* is described as simple and 'pathetic,' the *Odyssey* as complex and 'ethical.' Moreover the phrase ἀναγνωρίσεις γὰρ δι' ὄλου, used of the *Odyssey*, is clearly parallel to the one here, ἣ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἥ δὲ τὸ ὄλον ἐστὶν περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις. From this we gain the suggestion that a complex tragedy might also, like the *Odyssey*, be 'ethical': in other words, that the four 'kinds' are not exclusive rubrics but are capable of cross-combination. If so, the classification of a given play would be determined *a priori*, by the element that was *dominant* in it: it might be classed as complex, for example, though it was also 'ethical', or perhaps as 'ethical' though also complex. This decisive role of the dominant element seems to be what Aristotle means to emphasize in τὸ ὄλον, δι' ὄλου. The *Odyssey* (that is, the part of it which Aristotle recognizes as belonging to the *λόγος* proper: books 13-22 or parts of them)²¹ has "recognitions all the way through," whereas the 'ethical'

¹⁸ ΟΨΙΣ → ΟΗΣ; cf. 21. 58a5 (οης for ὄψ).

¹⁹ ὄψεις is read by Sykutris and Hostagni and (by implication) by Cooper, Fyfe, Epps, Potts, and Valgimigli.

²⁰ On the unsatisfactoriness of ὄψεις see also L. A. Post, *TAPA* 69 (1938) 17 (on the emendations he proposes see below, n. 24); A. H. Gilbert, *AJP* 68 (1947) 366-368. Gilbert's own proposal, *ibid.* 374-379, that Aristotle's fourth kind is the "tragedy of thought," is based on the *Prometheus Bound* alone. So far as that particular play is concerned the 'dianoetic' element is indeed prominent; whether it would have impressed Aristotle so highly is another question. But Gilbert makes no plausible suggestion for a text which could bear the meaning he wants. Νόησις, which he reports (n. 40, p. 379) as a friend's suggestion, is certainly impossible; Aristotle would have written δὲ ἀνοητικῆς.—The objection to ὄψεις holds *a fortiori* against τὸ τερατώδες, which "has nothing whatsoever to do with tragedy," 14. 53b10.

²¹ See above on 17. 55b17-23.

feature is concentrated at the end (see below). We shall see in a moment what comes of applying this idea to Aristotle's classification of tragedies; meanwhile we are still trying to identify his fourth 'kind.'

What element or structural feature is dominant in the *Prometheus*? The reader may recall our mentioning²² Tyrwhitt's suggestion that it is above all an episodic tragedy, one in which the 'episodes' are so long and so prominent as to determine the structure of the play. The same would be true, by the very nature of the case, in 'Hades-tragedies' (*δραμα ἐν Ἅιδου*, 56a3). We happen to have none extant, but the *Néκυνια* in the *Odyssey* and the sixth book of the *Aeneid* show us what form an underworld-tragedy would almost inevitably take: a more or less unrelated and indefinitely prolonged string of interviews with the spirits of the dead.²³ I suggest, therefore, that the fourth kind of tragedy is the episodic: ἡ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδης, οἷον αἱ τε Φορκίδες κτλ.²⁴ Palaeographically the emendation seems to me relatively easy. It fits well into the remaining traces (*όης*, i.e., *-όης*), and it happens that ἡ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώ- has precisely the same number of letters as τὸ δὲ τέταρτον. The latter is unquestionably a gloss,²⁵ and we can perhaps infer that it was written exactly above Aristotle's phrase, so as to leave three letters over, thus:

τὸ δὲ τέταρτον
ΗΔΕΠΕΙΣΟΔΙΩΔΗΣ

²² Above, c. 9, n. 88.

²³ Socrates, at the end of the *Apology* (41a-c), imagines what a delight it would be actually to go to Hades—if all the dead are indeed there—and meet the true judges and jurymen, Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus and Triptolemus and all the other demi-gods who lived just lives on earth; and Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer; and Palamedes and Ajax and all the rest who died as the result of an unjust judgment; and Agamemnon and Odysseus and Sisyphus and all the countless other men and women one could meet and talk to there. We have to make some allowance for Socrates' personal φιλολογία, but the long string of names is significant: eternity as an endless chain of conversations. It is the idea immortalized in John Kendrick Bangs' *Houseboat on the Styx*.

²⁴ I arrived at this idea before I was aware of L. A. Post's proposal in *TAPA* 69 (1938) 17: τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὁ ἦσ<ύχιος μῦθος καὶ ἐπεισοδιώδης>. This emendation, which presupposes the loss of a line, was later dropped by Post himself (*TAPA* 78 [1947] 243) in favor of ὄγκος—a move in the wrong direction, in my opinion, although there is no reason to suppose a whole line lost and ἡσύχιος was an unsuitable way of describing the *Prometheus*. But Post's remarks on the play are good.

²⁵ It breaks into Aristotle's sequence of ἡ δὲ's without discernible reason. We

The next step in the corruption would have been that a scribe—a brainless one, to be sure—thinking the gloss a correction of the text, copied it in, conscientiously added the meaningless $\delta\eta\varsigma$, and went on. Later, when the work was transcribed into minuscule, $\delta\eta\varsigma$ could easily have become $\delta\eta\varsigma$ ($\sigma\eta\varsigma$).²⁶

I take it that there can be no argument over the episodic character of the *Prometheus Bound*,²⁷ and that our inference about $\delta\sigma\alpha \epsilon\nu \text{ "Αιδου}$ can stand or fall on its own merits. As for the Aeschylean play *Phorcides*,²⁸ Boehlau and Robert²⁹ have made it highly probable that it represented Perseus as receiving the cap of darkness and the winged sandals from Hermes³⁰ (and Athena?), then stealing the one eye of the Graeae,³¹ the guardians of the Gorgons, and then finally attacking the Gorgons, no doubt with Athena's help.³² Aristotle's allusion has gener-

have found other glosses of the same character: $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon$ (ϵ') in 6. 50b16, $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\nu$ in 14. 53b34.

²⁶ The omission of $\delta\eta\varsigma$ or $\sigma\eta\varsigma$ by some manuscripts, including the medieval Latin version (lacuna after *autem*), shows merely that different scribes handled the meaningless letters differently.

²⁷ See Post, *loc. cit.* There is no good reason to suppose that Aristotle has any other *Prometheus* in mind. Nor is there any need to make the title plural (Bergk, Gudeman). The *Prom. Bound* was much more popular than the *Prom. Unbound*, even before Aristotle: Schmid 1. 3. 307.

²⁸ Cited in Athen. 9. 402b (= Aesch. fr. 261 Nauck²); [Eratosth.] *Catast.* 22 and Hygin. *Poet. astr.* 2. 12 (fr. 262). There is no warrant for identifying the play with the anonymous satyr-drama *Phorcides* which was presented in 340/39 (*IG* 2-3^a. 2. 2320. 31), as Nauck and Steffen (V. Steffen, *Satyrograph. graec. reliq.*, Poznan, 1935, XIII) wished to do. Gudeman mistakenly speaks of the inscription as ascribing the play to Aeschylus.

²⁹ J. Boehlau, *Athen. Mittheil.* 11 (1886) 365-371; Preller-Robert 2^a. 225-226. See further, esp. for pictorial representations of the subject, L. Séchan, *Études sur la trag. gr.*, Paris, 1926, 107-113; T. P. Howe, *AJA* 57 (1953) 270-271.

³⁰ Not, as in the version which goes back to Pherecydes (Schol. Ap. Rh. 4. 1515, = *FGH Hist* 3F11; cf. Apollodor. *Bibl.* 2. 4. 2. 4-5), from the Nymphs or Naiads. See also Jacoby on 3F11. According to pseudo-Eratosthenes, *loc. cit.*, Perseus further received the *harpē* from Poseidon (from Hermes acc. to Apollodor., *loc. cit.*), and this detail also seems to stem from Aeschylus; see Preller-Robert 228. Hermes, Athena, and Poseidon all appear on the late fifth-century pyxis-lid first published by Boehlau, *op. cit.* (Athens, N. M. 1956; most recently figured by K. M. Woodward, *Perseus*, Cambridge, 1937, 80, fig. 27a), which it seems to me clearly reflects the chief motifs of Aeschylus' play: the three gods who helped Perseus, and the central incident (theft of the Graeae's eye).

³¹ Cf. [Aesch.] *Prom.* V. 795.

³² Cf. the well-known archaic relief from Sellus.

ally been thought to accord with the emendation *τερατώδες*; and certainly the Gorgons fit the description. But the final encounter with them, and the killing of Medusa, were probably narrated, not enacted; and there is no evidence that Aeschylus presented the Graeae as monsters,³³ except for the detail of the single eye and—probably—their white hair. On the other hand the plot was obviously as episodic as that of the *Prometheus*: a series of visits of the hero to Hermes (in the company of Athena?), to Poseidon, then finally to the Graeae and the Gorgons, and no doubt a final scene with Athena.³⁴ At least two changes of scene are implied (Hermes→Poseidon→Graeae—Gorgons), perhaps three. The method is the converse of that in the *Prometheus Bound*,³⁵ where the hero stands still while a succession of gods and mortals comes to see him. Thus the two plays appear to complement each other as examples of episodic structure.³⁶

The titles cited by Aristotle point very strongly to Aeschylus as the prime representative of the 'episodic' class. Thus we know of an Aeschylean *Phorcides* and no other except the anonymous satyr-play mentioned above; either three or four Prometheus plays by Aeschylus—*Prometheus Bound*,³⁷ *Prometheus Unbound*, *Prometheus the Fire-bringer*³⁸

³³ See Howe, *loc. cit.*

³⁴ [Eratosth.] *loc. cit.*: ἀφείλετο τῆς Μεδουσίας τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἣν ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ περὶ τὰ στήθη ἔθηκεν αὐτῆς, κτλ.

³⁵ And also in the lost *Prometheus Unbound*.

³⁶ But why cannot the succession of events in the *Phorcides* be justified as causal (Perseus first goes to Hermes and Poseidon for the necessary equipment, then steals the eye of the Graeae because the guards must be put *hors de combat*)? Because the causal sequence is purely external and based on irrational premises: cap of darkness, one-eyed demons, etc. None of it is necessary or probable, springing from the character of the persons. This is the kind of thing that happens when gods, or any supernatural elements, are intruded into an action; see above on 15. 54b2-6.

³⁷ I myself tend to accept Schmid's view that the *Prometheus Bound* is not by Aeschylus. But there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle doubted its genuineness. Schmid speaks of such reasons, 1. 3. 307 n. 4, but without specifying them, and in his *Untersuchungen zum Gefesselten Prom.* (Tüb. Beitr. z. Alt.-wiss. 9), Stuttgart, 1929, 20, he admits that Aristotle's citation of *Phorcides* and *Prom.* in the same breath implies that he thought both plays Aeschylean.

³⁸ On the reasons for identifying the *II. πυρφόρος* of the Medicean catalogue with the *II. πυρκαεύς* mentioned by Pollux (9. 156), and for considering it a satyr-play (viz. the *Προμηθεύς* which ended the trilogy that included the *Persians*: Arg. Aesch. *Pers.*) see Schmid, *op. cit.* 1. 2. 203 n. 13 and 107-108; V. Steffen, *loc. cit.*—The reading (οἱ) *Προμηθεῖς* would fit the circumstances well, especially as the *Prometheus Unbound* obviously had the same general structure as the *Bound*

—and none by any other tragedian; and two Hades dramas, *Ψυχαγωγοί* and *Ψυχοστασία*, against which we can set *Peirithous* tragedies by Achaëus³⁹ and Critias,⁴⁰ but no others.⁴¹ Thus in Aristotle's selection of titles and subjects which particularly lend themselves to episodic treatment, or at least have been so treated, there appears to be a special innuendo against Aeschylus. And indeed, considering Aristotle's principles—his almost total neglect of the musical side of tragedy, and of the effects of staging and costuming, his lack of sympathy with any organic use of the gods, and above all his fixation on the complex plot, with its apparatus of *hamartia*, *pathos*, peripety, and recognition, and his concomitant emphasis on pity as the supreme tragic emotion—it could hardly be otherwise. Far from seeing Aeschylean tragedy as a different kind of drama, with aims and methods of its own, as Mr. Kitto has so ably argued in our day, Aristotle could only measure it by the technically perfected, 'complex' drama of Sophocles and Euripides (and not even all of that, but certain 'perfect' examples). Assessed by such standards, Aeschylus' tragedies fall into the lowest category. For it goes without saying, if Aristotle had not already said it (9. 51b34), that the 'episodic' is the poorest kind. His list of the kinds is also a rank-list.

One more peculiarity seems to present itself here. Aeschylus' *Phorides* was not a satyr-play, but we know of another that was; and *Pro-*

(hero fixed in one spot, visited by a series of persons: the chorus of Titans, Gaia, Heracles, Hermes [?]). But as was said above (n. 27), there appears to be no compelling reason for writing the plural.

³⁹ Perhaps a satyr-play; see Steffen, *op. cit.* 182.

⁴⁰ On the latter (attributed by Satyrus and others in antiquity to Euripides) see Schmid 1. 3. 177 n. 6.

⁴¹ The "Hades-haunting" (*ἄδοφοῖται*) tragedians mentioned by Rostagni are a figment, the result of a misinterpretation of Aristophanes' *Gerytodes*, fr. 149-150 Kock. The speaker from the upper world says there that the Athenian assembly has chosen a delegation consisting of one representative from each art (i.e., each of the three arts included in the dramatic contests: tragedy, comedy, dithyramb), "those who we knew were Hades-haunters and glad to hang out there regularly." The appointees are Meletus (one of Aristophanes' old butts), Sannyrion, and Cinesias respectively. Thus there is no group of *ἄδοφοῖται* tragic poets, but only Meletus. The passage is simply a variant on one of Aristophanes' favorite jokes, that so-and-so is "one of the walking dead" or "food for the crows." The three poets elected to the delegation to Hades were those who were already nearest dead (for Meletus cf. Sannyrion, fr. 2 Kock, *Μέλητον τὸν ἀπὸ Ἀηναίου νεκρόν*). So the jibe has nothing to do with "Hades-tragedies." The same is true, as Gudeman points out, of Rostagni's reference to Pl. *Rep.* 1. 330d.

metheus the Fire-bringer almost certainly was. Moreover we know of several satyr-dramas which probably were laid in Hades or involved visits there: four *Sisyphus* plays (Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Critias),⁴² and a *Cerberus* and a *Heracles at Taenarum* of Sophocles.⁴³ If we add that descents to Hades, or reports from returned travelers, were also popular in comedy (Pherecrates' *Κραπαταλοί, Μεταλλῆς*;⁴⁴ Eupolis's *Δῆμοι*;⁴⁵ Aristophanes' *Gerytades, Frogs*), it becomes evident that the underworld was no longer a distinctively tragic subject in the later fifth century. Whether Aristotle intends this implication also, we cannot say. But in any case the apparent reference to satyr-plays is curious. It is possible that Aristotle tacitly includes the satyr-drama under 'tragedy'?⁴⁶ We can only ask the question, not answer it.⁴⁷

It remains to ask why, in naming the fourth kind, Aristotle fixes on the term 'episodic' rather than 'simple.' The reason is that, as we said, each kind is named from the element that is dominant in it, and simple structure merely as such is a *negative* factor which cannot dominate a play.⁴⁸ In a simple plot-structure the strongest feature must necessarily be, not the structure itself, but some feature in or alongside it. One such is an excessive bulk of episodes, which tend to "dislocate the continuity" of the main action (9. 52a1), or to "dilute" it (26. 62b7). What others there may be we shall see in a moment.

The lower end of Aristotle's scale, then, is occupied by the 'episodic' kind, the poorest one. The upper end we need not dwell on; it is occupied by the best type, the complex. What about the two types in the middle?

⁴² We cannot be sure that the scene was Hades in all of these. Sisyphus with his stone seems a more promising satyric subject than Sisyphus in the upper world; but see Snell, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 1-11, on S. in Aeschylus' *Isthmiasai*.

⁴³ Perhaps also the *Tantalus* of Phrynichus (p. 722 Nauck²)?

⁴⁴ Schmid 1. 4. 104-105.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 124-133.

⁴⁶ See Gudeman 300, on 16. 55a12, for a suspicion that the *Ὀδυσσεὺς γενεὴ ἀγγελος* also may have been a satyr-play; and cf. below on Sisyphus, 56a22.

⁴⁷ Our proposal to athetize 4. 49a18-21, including *ἐκ τοῦ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν κτλ.*, has no bearing on the question one way or the other.

⁴⁸ E. Howald, *Philol.* 76 (1920) 217; A. H. Gilbert, *AJP* 68 (1947) 364; Lane Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*², Ithaca, 1947, 60: "Where the course of the drama is 'uninvolved,' not to say 'episodic,' any tragic effect a play may have is likely to arise from some element other than plot—for instance, from the 'spectacle.' The principle of division being positive, according to the actual source of the defect, we must not look for a species of tragedy called 'uninvolved.'" See also above on 10. 52a12-14.

Following our hypothesis, we expect that *παθητικῆ* means the kind which is dominated by the *pathos* or tragic deed,⁶⁰ and *ἠθικῆ* the kind which is dominated by 'character.' But this is not fully satisfactory. The *Odyssey*, we said, is complex and 'ethical.' What feature of it is denoted by the latter word? The clue is in the other characterization of the *Odyssey*, 13. 53a32, as having the 'double' plot-structure, ending in triumph for the good people and discomfiture for their opposites.⁶¹ Not only is the *Odyssey* full of the character of Odysseus—'wise,' brave, enduring, just, faithful—but *that character wins the success it deserves*. The ending of the *Odyssey* is *in accordance* with character; it is, as we say, 'moral.'⁶² An example in tragedy would be the *Iphigenia*. Then would the 'pathetic' represent the kind of tragedy which has the 'single' structure and an unhappy outcome for the hero?⁶³ Undoubtedly this lies in the contrast with the 'ethical'—which, by the way, we will call from now on (using L. A. Post's term) the 'moral.' But we have to guard against confusing the 'pathetic' with the complex, which Aristotle defines as a separate category. The *Oedipus*, for example, ends unhappily for the hero, and yet there is no doubt that Aristotle considered it to belong to the complex type rather than the 'pathetic.'

Fortunately Aristotle has given examples of what he means by 'pathetic.' One of them is extant: the *Ajax* of Sophocles; and it has unmistakably a simple plot, by Aristotle's criteria. In fact it is clear that no *Ajax* tragedy could be complex in his sense.⁶⁴ *Ajax* is not among the

⁶⁰ Not merely by 'feeling' or emotion. The complex type is the best arouser of tragic feeling.

⁶¹ Cf. 17. 55b22, τοῦ δ' ἐχθροῦ διεφθίρει.

⁶² This is the conclusion reached by S. E. Bassett, *Class. Stud. presented to E. Capps*, Princeton, 1936, 3-9, with whose findings I am in general though not total agreement, and L. A. Post, *TAPA* 69 (1938) 3-4, 7-15. The main point on which I diverge from Bassett and Post is their assertion that 'moral' tragedy appeals to the *φιλόνηρον*, which I do not believe is the 'moral sentiment'; see above on 13. 53a2 ff., and cf. W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemos.* 3rd Ser. 12 (1944-45) 255-256. I cannot subscribe, however, to the rest of V.'s critique of Bassett and Post (*Ibid.* 254-255); see Post's rejoinder in *TAPA* 78 (1947) 247-249.

⁶³ So Gudeman, p. 317: "Ich ... bin ... der Überzeugung, dass es sich bei der *παθητικῆ* τραγωδία einfach um eine *μετάβασις ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν* handelt, während die *ἠθικῆ* einen glücklichen Ausgang hatte."

⁶⁴ The plural *Αἴαντες* indicates that Aristotle has a type rather than a particular play in mind. *Ajax* was dramatized by Aeschylus in the trilogy *Ὀπλων κρίσις*, *Θρηῖσσαι*, *Σαλαμῖναι* (also by Carcinus, Theodectes, and Astydamas). The middle play, which dealt with the suicide, was no doubt very different from Sophocles' (see Schmid 1. 2. 331-334), but in any case it had a simple, not a complex, plot.

heroes named in 13. 53a20-21: his *pathos* (i.e., suicide) is of a kind that has meaning only as a deliberate act. Moreover any Ajax tragedy must necessarily be dominated by the act itself. The fatal sword—the “executioner”—casts its shadow in both directions, before and after.⁵⁴ Similarly, although Euripides’ *Ixion* is lost, any play with that title⁵⁵ must have concentrated on the hero’s offenses (deliberate ones) and his fearful punishment on the wheel.⁵⁶

But *παθητική* does not get its definition merely from the dominance of the *pathos*. It is also defined in part by the two neighboring ‘kinds’; for as against ‘complex’ it suggests a simple plot-structure, and as against ‘moral’ it connotes an unhappy ending. Such a nexus of ideas is hard to render by any single English word. The best I can suggest is ‘fatal.’⁵⁷

If the ‘moral’ kind is to be distinguished from the complex, it would appear that we must recognize it too as belonging to the general category of simple plots. The *Iphigenia*, for example, is ‘moral’ in its outcome, and yet Aristotle made it clear in chapter 14 (54a5-7) that he regarded its major effect as the result of its complex plot. It belongs therefore to the complex kind.⁵⁸ Thus a one-to-three scheme seems to emerge:

⁵⁴ Actually the much-debated second half of Sophocles’ play is perhaps an attempt comparable to that in the *Oedipus*—but how much less perfect!—to ‘unburden’ the play of the direct weight of the *pathos*, to get away from the reek of ‘blood into a sphere where we can view the hero’s mingled greatness and suffering. But this is not the place for such *paralipomena*.

⁵⁵ There were such by Aeschylus, Sophocles, Callistratus, and Timotheus. The latter two poets may have dealt primarily with Ixion’s murder of his father-in-law Eloneus, but can hardly have made a *hamartia*-plot out of the material, since the crime was notoriously *ἐξούσιος*. Euripides’ play emphasized the attempt on Hera. According to Plut. *De aud. poetis* 4. 19e, Euripides defended himself against charges relating to the avowed immorality of his hero by saying that “he had not let him off the stage until he was nailed to the wheel.” The scene was popular in vase-painting; see Séchan, *op. cit.* (above, n. 29) 389-395, esp. 391.

⁵⁶ The *Prometheus* offers an instructive contrast; for there, in spite of the possibilities of a Euripidean exploitation of the hero’s physical suffering, the play emphasizes rather his loneliness, his need for sympathy and admiration, his awareness of what still remains before him, and his unconquerable defiance—all mental and spiritual traits. The play is in fact not predominantly ‘pathetic.’

⁵⁷ ‘Bloody’ would be crude but perhaps expressive. The obvious analogue in English drama is the ‘Spanish tragedy’ of Kyd and his imitators.

⁵⁸ It is unfortunate that we know so little about the examples Aristotle cites for the ‘moral’ type. Welcker, *Die griech. Tragödien*, 1, Bonn, 1839, 205-210, identified the *Phthioides* with Sophocles’ *Peleus*, but this still leaves a *Peleus* of Euripides.

one complex 'kind' against three varieties of the simple. But this would, I think, be carrying our analysis too far. Rather we should say that any tragedy of complex plot-structure belongs to the complex kind but may *also* be 'fatal' or 'moral'—or possibly even 'episodic,' though that is unlikely—but that a simple tragedy cannot be complex and must necessarily be classified, according to its dominant feature, as 'fatal,' 'moral,' or 'episodic.' Thus the kinds would be partly interconnected and partly not.

Before we consider how this can be, we must return to the question of what 'parts' are meant in 55b32 (*τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη*). Susemihl's athetesis of the clause is tempting: it looks like the remark of a well-meaning but inept reader, influenced no doubt by 24. 59b9-10. But perhaps it is just possible to make out an Aristotelian meaning for it, if we are willing to take *ἐλέχθη* in as broad a sense as we have done a number of times for *ὡσπερ εἴρηται*. Looking back over the preceding six chapters of the *Poetics* (11 through 17, excluding 12 as spurious), we can say without serious misrepresentation that they have been devoted mainly to four things: (1) the 'parts' of the complex plot, peripety and recognition (and the best recognition was stated in chapter 11 to be that associated with a peripety, so that perhaps on a very broad view we can take them as a single 'part'), (2) the *pathos*, (3) character, and (4) the 'episodes.' All of these might be called—not, to be sure, from Aristotle's original point of view, but from a later, higher point of vantage—'parts' of tragedy.⁶⁹ The 'episodes' in particular, which might seem to have the least claim to the title, are repeatedly called *μέρη* (i.e., of the *poem*) in later chapters.⁶⁹ Thus we may conjecture that in considering the prime needs of poetic (especially dramatic) composition Aristotle was led to emphasize these four 'parts'

pides. L. A. Post, *op. cit.* (above, n. 51) 14, identifies the *Phtholides* with the *Andromache* of Euripides, which does not seem very probable. Gudeman's attempt to make the citation into a double title, *αἱ Φθιώτιδες ἢ ὁ Πηλεΐς* (instead of *καὶ ὁ Πηλεΐς*), seems ill-advised, since at least two plays each are mentioned for the 'fatal' and the 'episodic,' and since Aristotle does not seem to cite by double titles (see also below on 23. 59b5-7). In any case the emendation would have to run *ἢ Πηλεΐς*, without article.

⁶⁹ Not 'parts of the plot,' as they were defined in chapter 11, but parts of the play, the poem.

⁶⁹ 23. 59a35; 24. 59b25-27; 26. 62b9. In the first of these passages the central action (the 'plot') of the *Iliad* is *ἐν μέρει*, the 'episodes' are *αὐτῶν* (= τῶν μερῶν; see below *ad loc.*).

above all others. In this way the list of the four kinds can be taken not as an aberration but as, in a broad sense, a summation of Aristotle's theory of tragic composition.

But it cannot belong to his original theory, which set up plot alone as the decisive structural feature of tragedy. The new point of view is still structural. Each of the four kinds is defined by the dominance of one structural element or tendency: complex arrangement, happy or unhappy outcome, predominance of 'episodes' over the main action. But that the point of vantage is different appears from the fact that the last kind is defined by an element which is outside the plot but a 'part' of the play.⁶¹ This new angle of approach clearly has affiliations with the one we found in the preceding section, where the plot, in Aristotle's original sense, was likewise viewed as one part of a total complex extending outside the play. The affiliation will become evident again in 56a7-10, where 'plot' will be extended to include the poet's handling of *all* his material, under the rubric of *δέσεις-λύσεις*, rather than merely the action proper in the old sense.

The change of front which we are trying to characterize is hard to grasp and formulate in precise terms. It does not represent an abandonment of the older theory but an enlargement of it. The indications are that it may be a reflex of Aristotle's thinking about the epic, upon a doctrine which was originally tailored for tragedy. The epic is and has something more than tragedy, and the theory of the tragic action, although Aristotle managed to apply it to Homer, does not do full justice to that something more. Considered sympathetically and in its own terms, the epic encourages us to think of the *whole story* out of which the poet has selected and arranged his material, and therefore to regard the 'plot' or main action as one part of that whole. Our assessment of the poem will then rest, not simply on the qualities of the action proper, but on the arrangement of material which the poet has achieved for the whole story (*δέσεις* and *λύσεις* plus 'episodes'),

⁶¹ It may be said that if the present passage is later, 9. 51b33-52a1 must be so also, or conversely this one must be original. But that passage, although it offers the term 'episodic,' does not really jibe with Aristotle's thinking here. The 'episodic' plot appears there only as one type of simple plot. The 'moral' and 'fatal' types are not mentioned, and one does not see how they could be fitted in, since they partly overlap with the complex. Moreover the definition of 'episodic' as that in which "the episodes do not follow each other probably or necessarily" does not bring out explicitly the *structural* characteristic which we have enucleated as the chief one: the predominance of episodes over plot.

including the action in the narrower sense as one part along with the others.⁶² And this is a maturer, because a broader and more comprehensive, idea: it does more justice to the poet's total accomplishment. But there is no sign that Aristotle ever thought it all the way through, and it only appears in a few places, all of them (possibly) interconnected.

Aristotle now continues (56a3): "Well then, if possible⁶³ one should have all of them; if not, the greatest and most (that are possible)." All, or greatest and most, of which: the kinds or the 'parts'? The answer depends on whether we supply τὸν ποιητὴν or τὴν τραγωδίαν as the subject of ἔχειν; and this seems to be settled by what follows: "especially (considering) the way they pick flaws in (lit., play the informer on) the poets nowadays; for we have had poets who are good in each 'part' (μέρος), but they expect the same individual to surpass the particular excellence of each one." Aristotle makes it clear by the verb συκοφαντοῦσιν, which had especially ugly connotations at Athens, and the following δίκαιον δὲ κτλ., that he is not in sympathy with this demand.⁶⁴ But he seems to be saying to the aspiring dramatist, "Here is the kind of 'reviewing' that a playwright gets these days. It is unfair and myopic, but it exists, and you had better prepare for it by developing excellence in as many departments of your art as you can, especially the most important ones. *Mediocribus esse poetis*, etc."⁶⁵ Thus it appears that we are to supply τὸν ποιητὴν with ἔχειν and that ἅπαντα, etc., refers to the μέρη, not the εἶδη. This confirms our hesitant decision to leave τῶσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη in the text; but it also confirms our proposal to interpret μέρη in a new and broader spirit. The μέρη are 'parts,' not in the more formal and analytical sense of the six 'parts of the tragic art' in chapter 6, but in the more comprehensive sense of *parts of the total activity of writing the dramatic poem*. The six parts were derived, as we saw,⁶⁶

⁶² The formulation in 23. 59a35—ἐν μέρος (viz. the Wrath) ἀπολαβῶν (i.e. out of the War: what we have called the 'whole story') ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν μερῶν: the total stock of available 'parts', as it were) πολλοῖς—might be regarded as the matrix out of which the new attitude developed.

⁶³ Or, "preferably" (μάλιστα, = *potissimum*).

⁶⁴ Vahlen well remarks that the statement illustrates Aristotle's mildness in the actual judgment of plays, notwithstanding the rigor of his critical principles.

⁶⁵ Ἄλλως τε καὶ indicates that for the immediate purpose in hand (i.e., advice to the practicing poet) Aristotle accepts the caviling criticism as an existing entity that has to be reckoned with. His rejection of it comes below, a7, and on another plane.

⁶⁶ Above, on 6. 49b31, 36 ff., 50a10-12.

by systematic deduction from the principle *δρῶντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίαν*: that is, from the premise that tragedy is a serious action directly enacted by its characters. Here Aristotle has his eye not on the *characters-in-action* but the *poet-in-action* and the major 'departments' of his task.

It is possible, then, for the poet to achieve excellence in several of the 'parts,' if not in all, and he is to strive for it especially in "the largest and most of them," that is, in as many of them as possible. Naturally this is said in the spirit of Aristotle's rank-list. The first and greatest thing is to master the art of complex plot-construction; on this point his opinion has not changed. Next comes the handling of the *pathos*, with the tragic aura that emanates from it; next the handling of character; and last the proper selection and management of 'episodes.' But can all these elements be accommodated in one play? Certainly. A single play cannot be classified under all the kinds, but it can have a due share of all the 'parts.' The *Iphigenia* is the best example. As we said, it has to be classified under the complex variety. But it also has a threatened *pathos*, with the tragic feelings that appertain to it; it has character-drawing and a 'moral' outcome; and it has a judicious selection of pertinent episodes (17. 55b14). The *Oedipus*, it must be said, shows a narrower range: it is complex and 'fatal,' has character-drawing but no happy ending, and nothing that can properly be called episodes, unless Oedipus' recital of his life at Corinth and the encounter with Laius (774-833) be so labeled. This difference between the two plays is perhaps provided for, however, in Aristotle's alternative *ἀπαντα* (*Iphigenia*)⁸⁷ — *τὰ μέγιστα* (*Oedipus*).

One is tempted to extrapolate Aristotle's scheme and apply it to other tragedies, because it offers a broader and more balanced set of criteria for evaluating a play as a whole than the original theory of the six 'parts.' Thus, to take examples entirely at random, the *Persians* and the *Trojan Women* would be 'fatal' tragedies with strong episodic elements;⁸⁸ the *Ion* would be complex with a 'moral' cast; the *Electra* of Sophocles would be complex and 'moral,' with one outstanding 'episode' (the false tale of the chariot race, 680-763, to which Aristotle himself alludes below, 24. 60a31); and so on. It is an

⁸⁷ We might perhaps see a connection between this and the rating of highest which was given to the *Iphigenia* plot in 14. 54a5 ff.

⁸⁸ Or would Aristotle rate the *Persians*, like the *Prometheus*, as 'episodic,' with incidental attention to the *pathos*?

interesting game, if we had time to play it here. It seems unwise, however, to try to impose a strict bilateral scheme like that in 24. 59b14-16: that is, to assign each tragedy to two and just two classes, as Aristotle does with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (*Oedipus* complex and 'fatal,' *Iphigenia* complex and 'moral,' etc.). In chapter 24 Aristotle has just two poems to deal with;⁶⁰ here the phenomena are much more numerous and complicated, and we cannot be sure exactly how he would have analyzed them.

More significant is the obvious inference that, of the three great tragedians, Aristotle would award the palm to Sophocles in the highest class, the complex, and to Euripides in the 'fatal' (perhaps the 'moral' also), while Aeschylus would draw up in the rear as an 'episodic' dramatist. Certainly Aristotle is in no sense letting down the bars and admitting that all the kinds and 'parts' are equally good. His ranking of them does in fact supply, I think, the clue we need for the difficult lines b7-10. An unjust demand has been made of the poets, and Aristotle has recommended that they take cognizance of it as a matter of tactics. His reply to the demand comes now (contrast *δίκαιον* with *συκοφαντοῦσιν* and *ἀξιοῦσι* [sc. *ἀδίκως*]). What was the real sin of the carping critics? That they lumped all the kinds and parts together and called on every poet to match *all* the achievements of the past in all of them. The reason for this malleasance in office, so to speak, is that the critics lack any standard of *what is properly comparable between one poet's work and another's*. You cannot judge two specimens of the same species until you know what common traits they may be expected to have, by which they can be compared, and which are the decisive ones. Otherwise you will be in the position of judging the merits of two trotting horses by the color of their coats, or the set of their teeth, instead of the action of their legs.

This notion of comparability is expressed, I think, by *καὶ*⁷⁰ *ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτήν*. As to the standard itself, it is indicated by *οὐδεν*<*ι*>⁷¹

⁶⁰ We shall see that the classification does not apply to other epics.

⁷⁰ I have emended by transposing *καὶ* and *τραγωδίας*. Aristotle is not offering an additional just principle (*δίκαιον δὲ καὶ κτλ.*), but a criterion by which one can determine both (either) that a given tragedy is the same as another and (or) that it is different. Sykutris' interpretation of *ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτήν* as referring to (dis)unity and) unity of plot (i.e., of *δέσεις* and *λύσεις*) within the same play, though ingenious, misses the connection with the preceding passage through the idea of comparability.

⁷¹ There does not seem to be any reading which makes sense of the passage

ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ: "But (the) fair (procedure is) to declare a tragedy both (either) different and (or) the same by (virtue of) nothing equally to (i.e., so much as) the plot; and this (means tragedies) which have the same 'tying' and 'untying.'" In other words identity or difference⁷² of plot, in the broader sense we have been discussing, is a fairer gauge of relative merit⁷³ than any other. Thus, concretely, let us say that a dramatist has produced a new *Iphigenia*. Instead of descending upon him with Euripides' play in hand, pointing out that his prologue is not equal to the old one, Orestes is not as plausibly characterized, the recognition is not as convincing, Thoas is too barbarous, etc., etc., the judicious critic will confine himself in the first instance to the *πλοκή* καὶ λύσις, because that is the central arena of the poet's activity, the ground on which it is fair and proper to match one dramatist against another. Criticisms on other grounds are not excluded, but they are to be secondary, and separating them from the main issue will save the critic from one of those blanket judgments, "Not equal to Euripides in any department."

Thus the poet's work is not to be subjected to random comparisons; it is to be measured above all *structurally*, against the pattern of events he himself chose or invented when he undertook the job of composition. In this sense Aristotle's principle defends the poets' creative autonomy. But on the other hand it presupposes that the autonomy has been used to produce a poetic structure of events, something that is objective, measurable, potentially common to other works. That evidence of creativity is to be taken as an index which is *least private and personal*. It is just at this point that we can measure how far Aristotle falls short of underwriting mere subjectivism, the creation of private worlds.⁷⁴

On the scale of comparability, Aristotle's list of the kinds and parts shows the same relative ranking as before. Two highly episodic tra-

except Tyrwhitt's emendation. L. A. Mackay's suggestion (*AJP* 75 [1954] 301-302), οὐ μὲν ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ· ταὐτὸ δὲ κτλ., establishes an *antithesis* between plot and δέσις (*πλοκή*)—λύσις which seems to me implausible.

⁷² Καὶ (ἢ) ἄλλη is to be understood with *πλοκή* καὶ λύσις, to complement ἢ αὐτῆ.

⁷³ The whole section makes sense only as offering a gauge of the relative merit of two plays. Sameness and difference as absolutes have nothing to do with the case.

⁷⁴ Or of saying that the poet's work "must be judged in its own terms," or "in terms of what the author was trying to do"—which often means in practice what he says afterward he was trying to do.

gedies, even about the same hero, may or may not have anything in common; for 'episodes,' being by definition not a fully organic part of the play, may vary widely in length, content, and dramatic effect. The two *Prometheuses* (*Bound* and *Unbound*) are a case in point, with the same hero but two entirely different sets of visitors and undoubtedly a considerable difference in the total weight and bearing of the episodes in the two cases. They could not therefore, Aristotle would say, be compared very profitably. A pair of 'moral' tragedies is in much the same case. They are alike in the happy ending; but a happy ending can be brought about in any number of ways and at the end of very different sorts of plot. The *pathos*, on the other hand, when it dominates the play, is more restrictive and definitive: it gives its tone to the whole play and must by definition govern the outcome (otherwise the play becomes 'moral'). And the complex structure, when successfully attained, most closely defines the content and pattern of the whole play. Freedom and measurability join hands here, at the apex of the pyramid. Sophocles was supremely creative when he made the *Oedipus*, but he also produced the most 'necessary' structure.

We need hardly add that the present passage, based as it is on the *δέσεις - λύσεις* scheme, cannot be of earlier date than 55b24-31, where the scheme was first promulgated. That is shown, for good measure, by the implied definition of *μῦθος* in b8 as including the *λύσεις* as well as the *δέσεις*. That is, the 'plot' now includes what we have called the 'whole story.'⁷⁵ The poet is to be judged not merely by the shaping of his action—the events that actually take place during the play—but by the selection and arrangement of its premises as well: in other words, by the shape he has given to the 'whole story.' Aristotle indicates that of the two halves the *λύσεις* remains the more difficult assignment, but that the main thing is their adjustment *to each other*: "Many do the 'untying' badly after doing the 'tying' well; and yet the two things ought to be fitted together."⁷⁶

Aristotle's later theory, incomplete and sketchy though it is, shows him (if we have interpreted it correctly) at the farthest reach of his critical penetration. It is the nearest he came—and nobody else in

⁷⁵ As it did in 15. 54a37-b1 (*καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων κτλ.*), in a passage which we concluded was a later addition and dependent on the present one (see above *ad loc.*).

⁷⁶ Immisch's emendation *ἀρτισροτεῖσθαι* (for *ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι*) is a stroke of genius, but I cannot see that its implications have been followed up all the way.

antiquity came within hailing distance of him—to a truly comprehensive grasp of the drama in its multiplicity and variety as well as its underlying unity. It is a far reach from the clear but limited theory of chapter 6. But for better or worse it remains a torso.

56a10-25

χρῆ δὲ ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις μεμνήσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν
 ἐποποικὸν σύστημα τραγωδῖαν· ἐποποικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ
 πολύμυθον, ὅσον εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιοῖ μῦθον.
 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος λαμβάνει τὰ μέρη τὸ πρόπον
 15 μέγεθος, ἐν | δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν
 ἀποβαίνει. σημεῖον δέ· ὅσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὄλην ἐποίησαν
 καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης Ἑκάβην (καὶ μὴ
 ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος), ἢ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἢ κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται,
 20 ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς
 περιπετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς | ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζονται
 ὧν βούλονται, <τῶν> θαυμαστῶν. [τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο
 καὶ φιλόπλοον.] ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ
 πονηρίας <δὲ> ἐξαπατηθῆ, ὥσπερ Σίσυφος, καὶ ὁ ἀν-
 25 ὄρειος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἠττηθῆ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ εἰκὸς
 ὥσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει· εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ | καὶ
 παρὰ τὸ εἰκός.

56a10

But one should remember what we have said frequently, and not try to compose an epic mass as a tragedy; by 'epic' I mean 'containing many stories,' as for example if someone should try to compose (as a tragedy) the story of the *Iliad* whole. For there, because of its length, the parts
 15 assume their due bulk, | while in dramas they turn out very much contrary to the poet's assumption. A sign of this: all the poets who have composed the sack of Troy whole, rather than part-wise the way Euripides handled Hecuba (not the way Aeschylus did), either fail entirely or make a poor showing in the competition, and in fact Agathon failed in this (play?) alone. But in their peripeties and in
 20 their | simple plots they secure the effects they want, <those of> surprise. [For this is tragic and humanitarian.] This happens when the man who is clever <but> has a touch of villainy is fooled, like Sisyphus, or the courageous but unjust man is worsted. And this is in fact plausible in the

sense of Agathon's remark: i.e., it is plausible that many
25 things should | also happen contrary to plausibility.

Our designation of the preceding part of the chapter as a later addition, or a pair of them, is strengthened by the direct connection which it reestablishes between the present passage and the end of chapter 17.⁷⁷ There Aristotle warned (55b15-16) that the 'episodes' are properly brief in the drama but bulkier in the epic. Then, to prove that the latter does indeed get its greater bulk from the episodes, not from the central action, he pointed out by means of a brief summary that the *λόγος* of the *Odyssey* is "not long"; we saw, in fact, that it covers a good deal less than half of the poem, all the rest being 'episodes.' Now we find him explicitly drawing the moral of this exposition: the dramatist should not try to "compose an epic *σύστημα* as a tragedy," because the episodes turn out to be out of proportion. The join with chapter 17 is direct and seamless.

According to the usual interpretation of the text, Aristotle says that this warning has already been given several times (*ἄπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις*). Where are these other warnings, outside of the one in chapter 17 itself (55b15-16)? They are in 5. 49b12-14, 7. 51a12-15, and 9. 51b33-52a1; even though in the latter two passages there is no reference to the epic. For what the poet is to remember is not something about the epic but something about tragedy, namely that it has a limit or norm of length. Any attempt to "compose"⁷⁸ an epic mass⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Montmollin forfeits this very considerable gain by making *all* of chapter 18 (like 17) a later addition, or rather a series of them (pp. 156-158; cf. p. 155: "Ces deux chapitres contiennent une série d'observations plus au moins *décousues* [italics mine] sur le *μῦθος*"). Similarly Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935) 193.

⁷⁸ *Ποιεῖν* with its usual active meaning, referring to the poet's activity. Not "make (i.e., turn) an epic (i.e., an epic poem) *into* a tragedy." See below on *ἐποίησαν*, 216.

⁷⁹ Not an "epic structure" (Butcher). The epic, i.e., the epic poem, has no structure *as a whole*, though it may have a structure (a central action or plot like that of tragedy) *within* it; see below on 23. 59a30-37. *Σύστημα* does not connote structure or organization but simply 'mass,' 'body'; it is not so much that which has been put together as that which has come together, *συνέστηκε*. Thus in *De Gen. An.* 3. 1. 752a7, τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ᾠῶν σύστημα is a mass (obviously not a structure but a conglomerate) of eggs being heated in a pan over a fire; *E.N.* 9. 8. 1168b32, (πόλις) ... καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, "(a city)... or any other body"; cf. *De Gen. An.* 2. 4. 740a20, τοῦ ζῴου καὶ τοῦ συστήματος. *Σύστασις* is often used in a similar way of bodies or physical states, e.g., *De Part. An.* 2. 9. 654b29, οἱ πλάττοντες ἐκ πηλοῦ ζῴων ἢ τινοσ ἀλλης ὀργᾶς συστάσεως. The concept is

(as) a tragedy"—that is, to compose an 'episodic' tragedy—will contravene that fundamental principle and lead to incurable troubles. What these are is implied rather than said here: "There (i.e., in the epic), because of its (total) length, the episodes take on their proper bulk, whereas in plays⁸⁰ they turn out much contrary to the assumption." Generally this latter phrase is translated "contrary to his (the poet's) expectation," i.e., his expectation that his play will be successful, and is connected with the following 'sign,' which argues that on the contrary such attempts have led to failure. But a 'sign,' just because it is a sign and not a proof, does not bear on a problem in exactly the same way as an argument: it only supplies concrete evidence in support of a generalization. Thus it is preferable to keep *ὑπόληψιν* on the level of Aristotle's own argument and understand it to refer to a mistaken *assumption* or premise in the tragic poet's mind with respect to his art.⁸¹ What assumption it is is not difficult to see if we recall the discussion that led up to the *ἄριστος τοῦ μεγέθους* in chapter 7, especially the remark (51a10) that the longer the plot the more beautiful—up to the point where it ceases to be *σύνδηλος*. The unwary tragedian may overlook this reservation, observe that episodes, in the manner of the epic, add bulk, and assume *tout court* that bulk makes beauty.⁸² The result is that his episodes outrun their "proper length." It is not a question of the length of the individual episodes, but of their total bulk in the play in relation to the main action. If they bulk too large *in toto*, the latter is 'dislocated' and 'stretched beyond its capacity.'⁸³ Nor can the poet help himself by cutting down the length of the central

wholly different from the active process of *forming* implied in, e.g., *ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις*. (Vahlen's note on the two words, *Beiträge*³ 238 [1. 297, in n. 1 to p. 266], is misleading.) — In 24. 59b17, 21, 60a3, *σύστασις* means the whole bulk of the epic poem, like *σύστημα* here.

⁸⁰ Note the direct echo of 17. 55b15, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασι*.

⁸¹ On the meaning of *ὑπόληψις* see Waitz on *Anal. Priora* 2. 21. 66b19; R. D. Hicks on *De An.* 3. 3. 427b16. *ὑπόληψις*, like *δόξα* with which it is sometimes synonymous (see Bonitz, *Index* 800b5 ff.), can designate something true or false (cf. *ibid.* 799b33, on *ὑπολαμβάνειν*), but in any case the term is used particularly of *general* assumptions or beliefs, cf. *Metaph.* A1. 981a7; *E. N.* 7. 5. 1147b4. Thus the Platonic theory of Ideas is *ἡ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ὅτι*, *Metaph.* A8. 1073a17; cf. A9. 990b23.

⁸² The correct form of the assumption is implied in 17. 55b1-2. Some 'episodizing' and 'stretching out' of the plot is normal and desirable; the question is, how much.

⁸³ See above on 9. 51b38-52a1.

action to leave more room for the episodes: that would only emphasize the disproportion.⁸⁴ What the tragic dramatist cannot do, just because he is writing a drama, is to incorporate an epic richness and variety of episodes into his work, because it upsets the necessary balance of the dramatic structure.

In this sentence the words *οἶον εἶ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὅλον ποιοῖ μῦθον* present a difficulty. The clause is offered as an illustration of the term *πολύμυθον*, yet it seems a paradox to say that the *μῦθος* of the *Iliad* is *πολύμυθος*. We have not yet found *μῦθος* in the sense of a large complex story (an "action with many parts," 23. 59b1), except in passages which we have designated as later additions. Must we conclude that *μῦθος* here means the 'whole story' in the new sense which we enucleated above (e.g., for *τῶ μύθῳ* in a8), and therefore that the present passage also is a later note by Aristotle? No, the expression, though seemingly anomalous, finds a perfectly satisfactory explanation in the parallel passage 23. 59a30-34. There Aristotle remarks that Homer's divine superiority to all other epic poets is shown by his decision "not to 'compose'⁸⁵ the (Trojan) War as a whole, though it had a beginning and an end; for (in that case) the *μῦθος* would have been too long and not easily 'surveyable.'" The concatenation of ideas in this sentence, where Aristotle speaks not of the *Iliad* but of the War, makes it clear what he means. The *μῦθος* in question is not that of the *Iliad* as Homer has composed the poem, but the raw material he started with, the 'story' of the War; and what the poet is commended for is his decision not to 'compose' that material *as a whole*. *Ὅλον* is clearly predicative, with *ποιεῖν*, not attributive; it is not a question of the 'whole story' but of composing, or rather of not composing, the material in a certain fashion, namely "as a whole." *Ὅλον* has the same construction in our passage,⁸⁶ although unfortunately the fact has been concealed by the word order, so that *ὅλον* has been taken

⁸⁴ *Τὸ πρέπον μέγεθος* here (b14) and *τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα* in 17. 55b15 both refer to an implied proportion between central action and episodes, not to the length of the individual episodes in themselves, or even to their total length merely as such.

⁸⁵ Note that *ποιεῖν* has the same active, strong meaning here, and indeed everywhere else in the *Poetics*; see above, n. 78, and below on 24. 50a3.

⁸⁶ This disposes of Gudeman's emendation *ὅλης*, which misplaces Aristotle's point completely. The emendation did, however, spring from a correct though obscure feeling that *τῆς Ἰλιάδος* must somehow mean in this case the material of the poem rather than the poem itself.

as attributive in the same way as τῆς Ἰλιάδος, beside which it stands. If Aristotle had written εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος μῦθον ὄλον ποιοῖ, as he might equally well have done, the construction would not have been ambiguous. As it is, we can confirm our interpretation by πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὄλην ἐποίησαν below (a16), which will also reveal the full meaning of ὄλον ποιεῖν.

Τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος μῦθον, then, means in this case the story out of which Homer has carved and shaped his poem, not the central 'plot' of the poem (viz. the Wrath), as we might have expected. We can perhaps accuse Aristotle of ambiguity in using τῆς Ἰλιάδος and μῦθον in this way, but he is certainly not speaking of the 'whole story' in the later, systematic sense, as a whole composed of δέσεις and λύσεις.⁸⁷

We now come to Aristotle's 'sign': the sad case of poets who have failed in the competitions because they have tried to make an epic body of incident serve for tragedy. Here there are problems of text and interpretation clustering especially around the word Νιόβην; but we will begin with πέρσιν Ἰλίου. The recent editors all print πέρσιν with a small π, as if agreed that Aristotle is not talking about the Cyclic epic of that name but about the story, the events, of the sack of Troy in general.⁸⁸ This is certainly correct, as we see from the parallel in 24. 59a32, "composing the (story of the) War as a whole." But we still need more light on ὄλην and the contrast that Aristotle intends between it and κατὰ μέρος. Here chapter 24 comes to our aid once again. In 59a35, immediately after the passage quoted above, Aristotle describes Homer's method of composition as follows:⁸⁹ "Actually he has taken out one 'part' [viz. the Wrath] and used many of them [i.e., the other 'parts'] as episodes—for example the Catalogue of Ships and other episodes—with which he intersperses his composition." That is, the method is to take one 'part' or strand of incidents as a core and group other 'parts' of the War around it, or rather in

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⁸⁸ None of them says this explicitly, but the translations are clear enough. Bywater: "all who have dramatized the fall of Ilium in its entirety"; Gomperz: "welche den Stoff von 'Iliens Zerstörung' als ein Ganzes ... behandelt haben"; Gudeman: "die Zerstörung Iliens als Ganzes dramatisierten" (G. translates ὄλην correctly here, as a predicate, but misses the force of ὄλον above: "den ganzen Stoff der Ilias dramatisieren").

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the intervals of it, as 'episodes.' Such a procedure secures (a) unity and centrality, (b) variety, and (c) massive bulk for the poem as a whole. The whole of the War is represented, as it were, but not on its own terms, not the way the incidents come in the tradition: the poet has regrouped them with a sovereign art for his own purpose.

In applying this lead to our passage, let us follow Aristotle's own indication and consider how Euripides has chosen and arranged the incidents of the fall of Troy, using the *Trojan Women* as our example. The play happens to be one of the two extant tragedies by Euripides (the other of course being the *Hecuba*) based on this part of the Trojan story. The core of the play is the fate of Andromache and her son, or rather of Hecuba and her grandson, in which the whole infinite tragedy of the war is compacted. We see everything through the eyes of Hecuba, and what we see is not a part of the sack of Troy, in any chronological sense, but *the whole of it focused in one 'part.'* Moreover the 'episodes' that are interspersed into this part—Cassandra, Menelaus and Helen, the dark glimpses of the fall itself, and of the future—are 'relevant' or proper to Hecuba, they belong to her personal suffering as well as to the fall of Troy.⁹⁰ Thus Euripides has achieved something of what Homer had achieved for the story of the War as a whole; the method is essentially the same.

This, I suggest, is the point of the antithesis *δλην - κατὰ μέρος*. The contrast is not simply between dramatizing the whole story and dramatizing one chronological part of it,⁹¹ but between dramatizing it 'whole,' in the raw chronological form in which the tradition presents it, and 'part-wise,' by the selection of one 'part' as a core around which others are grouped as episodes.

Can we apply these results to the problem of Aeschylus and the *Niobe*? The title is a notorious *crux*; for the story of Niobe does not offer sufficient material to begin with to give any point to its mention here;⁹² and our interpretation makes the incongruity greater, if anything, not less. The fact that we know of no epic of Niobe, or called *Niobe*, is not so critical, since we have recognized that *πέποιτ' Ἴλιον* does not denote a poem either, but a body of story material.⁹³ In fact it now

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becomes evident that we ought *not* to look for a title where *Νιόβην* stands, but for some general designation of a body of material from which Aeschylus had drawn one or more plays. But here we run into a more serious difficulty. We saw that Aristotle's examples for the 'episodic' kind of tragedy, a2-3, were mainly Aeschylean, and concluded from that fact that in his eyes Aeschylus was probably the outstanding representative of the episodic class. Is it likely that he would be citing him here as an example of how to write tragedies that are *not* episodic?⁹⁴

We must bear in mind further that the *ἤ* which stands after *Εὐριπίδης* in all the modern editions is purely and simply an emendation (by Vahlen), without manuscript authority of any kind. In other words there is no external warrant for the assumption, universal though it has become, of two parallel clauses in which Euripides and Aeschylus are cited as twin examples of composition *κατὰ μέρος*.⁹⁵ On the face of it the second *καὶ μὴ* could be taken either as parallel to the first or—without Vahlen's *ἤ*—as expressing a new contrast after *ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης* ("part-wise, the way Euripides did it, and *not* the way Aeschylus did it"). Finally, we ought to take notice of the reading *Ἐκάβην* which is implied by Valla's Latin translation. It is of course absurd in a clause dealing with Aeschylus. But it is not absurd if it belongs with Euripides (*ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης Ἐκάβην*), while on the other hand *Νιόβην* is impossible in that position.

In the light of these facts, several of which have been disregarded in recent years, I suggest that *Ἐκάβην* is the correct reading and *Νιόβην* a would-be correction which has displaced it in almost our entire manuscript tradition. "All those who have composed the story of the sack of Troy as a whole, instead of part-wise the way Euripides (composed, treated) Hecuba." The remaining phrase, *καὶ μὴ ὡσπερ Αἰσχύλος*, will be a parenthesis. It cannot and need not refer specifically to a tragedy entitled *Hecuba*, since so far as we can tell Aeschylus did not write one; but it can refer very properly and appropriately to

appear to assume that *πέρσιν Ἰλίου* is not a title, but all with one accord look for a title of some kind (*Θηβαΐδα*, etc.) in the (allegedly) parallel clause.

⁹⁴ It is true that we diagnosed that passage as belonging to a subsequent note. But there is no visible reason for supposing that Aristotle had changed his mind radically in the meantime.

⁹⁵ Supplying *κατὰ μέρος* with *ὡσπερ Αἰσχ.*, from the supposedly parallel phrase *κατὰ μέρος ὡσπερ Εὐρ.* I see no warrant for Gudeman's assertion that the prevailing view has been the contrary: i.e., that Aristotle has been understood to be stating a contrast between the two poets.

Aeschylus' handling of the 'sack of Troy' material, namely in his Ajax-trilogy ("Οπλων κρίσις, Θρηῆσσαι, Σαλαμίνιαi).⁹⁵ Certainly Aeschylus' tragic procedure was closer to the spirit of the Cycle than Euripides' concentration upon Hecuba; or at least after Aristotle's Aeschylean examples of 'episodic' tragedy we can well believe that he thought so.

The proposal to read *Ἐκάβην* need not exclude a reference to the *Trojan Women*, which we took as an example above, or perhaps even to the other plays of the so-called "Alexander-trilogy."⁹⁷ But *πέρισιν Ἰλίου*, in combination with *Ἐκάβην*, indicates that Aristotle is thinking primarily of the two Hecuba plays,⁹⁸ in which Euripides has concentrated the whole tragedy of the Sack in the fate of Hecuba—a concentration which does not prevent him from "using many of its (other) parts as episodes."⁹⁹ In short, Aristotle sees Euripides as following the true Homeric method, exemplified in the *Iliad*, while Aeschylus adopted the episodic manner of the Cycle.

It is unfortunate that we know too little about Agathon's work to interpret the phrase *ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ*. In any case it cannot mean that Agathon failed¹⁰⁰ "per questo solo vizio di composizione" (Rostagni) or "from this one defect" (Butcher). *Ἐν* is not *διὰ*, and *τούτῳ* looks very definite, as if it referred to a particular play. But none of the few titles known to us (*Aerope*, *Alcmeon*, *Antheus*, *Mysians*, *Telephus*, *Thyestes*) has a particularly episodic air, and none belongs to the 'sack of Troy' material.¹⁰¹ Certainly the passage does not

⁹⁵ There is also a possible reference to *Μέμνων* and *Ψυχοστασία*, which may have belonged to a connected trilogy (Wilamowitz, *Aischylos Interpretationen*, Berlin, 1914, 59 n. 1); or even—taking *ᾠσπερ* in a still broader spirit—to the Achilles- or 'Iliad'-trilogy of *Myrmidons*, *Nereids*, *Phrygians*; on it see Schmid 1. 2. 260-261.

⁹⁷ See Snell, *Eur. Alexandros* (*Hermes Einzelschriften* 5), Berlin, 1937, esp. 64-68. Schmid says, 1. 3. 486: "Aristoteles, der die Troerinnen öfter zitiert, lobt es, dass Euripides, dem Wesen des Dramas (im Unterschied vom Epos) entsprechend, den Stoff der *Ἰλίου πέρισσις* auf verschiedene Stücke verteilt habe." And note 7 reads: "Aristot. poet. 18 p. 1456a 16 ff.; gemeint sind *Ἐκάβην* und die Alexandros-Trilogie."

⁹⁸ Aristotle cites *Trojan Women* four times and *Hecuba* once (Bonitz, *Index*), but does not mention either *Alexander* or *Palamedes*.

⁹⁹ The weakness of construction (cf. 13. 53a29) of the *Hecuba*, i.e., its tendency to fall into two tragedies (Polyxena and Polydorus), does not invalidate Aristotle's general point. However, he is probably thinking mainly of the *Trojan Women*.

¹⁰⁰ On the separate problem as to the meaning of *ἐκπίπτειν* see Gudeman 305, on 17. 55a28. For *ἐν τούτῳ* cf. 9. 51b22.

¹⁰¹ *Telephus* and *Mysians* (tragedies of the same title by Aeschylus; *Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος* and *Mysians* by Sophocles, plus a satyr-play *Telephus*; *Telephus* by

authorize us to postulate an Ἰλλίον Πέρσις by Agathon.¹⁰² Just one thing is clear: Agathon tried the experiment of using Cyclic material in the Cyclic fashion only once (ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ).

The following lines, a19-25, bristle with new difficulties. Before we ask how they are connected with what precedes, some clearing of the ground is necessary. The vulgate text offers στοχάζονται ὧν βούλονται θαυμαστῶς · τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλόανθρωπον, which is impossible on two counts: (1) θαυμαστῶς is a wholly implausible outburst of enthusiasm on the part of Aristotle, especially as the scorers of this "marvelous success" are not even named; and (2) τοῦτο has no referent and γὰρ no visible meaning. What is needed even more than an identification of the poets in question is an identification of what they achieve through peripeties and simple plots; for τραγικὸν γὰρ κτλ. does not identify the achievement but merely characterizes it.¹⁰³ But this latter clause is also objectionable in its own right; for the examples given in the next sentence (deception of the clever rogue, e.g., Sisyphus; defeat of the brave but unjust man) cannot possibly illustrate Aristotle's conception of either the τραγικὸν or the φιλόανθρωπον. We saw above¹⁰⁴ that in his usage the latter word means kind-heartedness, human feeling, a rudimentary prototype of pity; and we cannot feel this for a clever rogue. As for τραγικὸν, it is clearly impossible: the genuine Aristotle does not admit that we can feel pity, or even fear, for a villain.¹⁰⁵ Τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλόανθρωπον bespeaks a concept of poetic justice which is distinctly Platonic, if not Christian. It is, as Gudeman suggests,¹⁰⁶ a marginal note.

With this secondary obstacle out of the way we can focus our attention on θαυμαστῶς. The anomalies here can be removed by Tyrwhitt's simple emendation θαυμαστῶν, to which however I would prefix <τῶν>.¹⁰⁷ "They hit (attain) the things they want, (namely) the

Euripides; see above on 13. 53a21) are derived from the *Kypria*: Preller-Robert 2^a. 1139. But Agathon's *Teiephus* is not even certain: *ibid.* 1153 n. 3.

¹⁰² So Dieterich, PW 1. 761; Rostagni.

¹⁰³ To mean anything, the clause would have to run τοῦτο γὰρ (sc. ὁ βούλονται, from ὧν βούλονται; but there is still the discrepancy between singular and plural) τὸ τραγικὸν καὶ (τὸ?) φιλόανθρωπον (sc. ἐστίν).

¹⁰⁴ On 13. 52b38 ff.

¹⁰⁵ The only Sisyphus plays we know of, by Aeschylus and Critias (Euripides?), were in fact satyr-dramas, not tragedies. See above on 56a3 (ἄσα ἐν Ἀιδου).

¹⁰⁶ N. *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁷ Τῶν is not absolutely essential. Στοχάζονται ὧν βούλονται θαυμαστῶν,

effects of surprise (the marvelous); and this¹⁰⁸ is (happens) when," etc. The pertinence of the observation is clear; for whether or not the outwitting of a clever but wicked man is tragic or 'philanthropic' or edifying, it is certainly *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*, unexpected.

With these results we can return to the question how the passage is related to the foregoing. It can hardly be accidental that the poets are said here to succeed in what they want, whereas two lines above they were failing (a18, *ἢ ἐκπίπτονσιν ἢ κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται*). Our inference is that they wanted the same thing there as here, namely τὰ θαυμαστά, but chose the wrong method for attaining it. Why did poets attempt to compose epic material 'whole'? The answer would seem to be: because they wanted the effects of variety and surprise which admittedly belong to the epic in special measure: 24. 60a11, *δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄρεσθαι εἰς τὸν πρῶτον τ ο ν τ α*. The unfortunate poets who tried to make 'epic structures' into tragedy just as they came, without any major reshaping of the material, wanted to achieve the effect which they knew was achieved by the epic. But in this endeavor they overlooked a crucial difference. The θαυμαστόν which can and should be achieved in tragedy is not the same as the ἄλογον which is the specialty of epic. Tragedy has to gain surprise by logical means, through plot-structure: *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα*. Mere irrationality cannot be tolerated in tragedy, at least in the 'structure of events' that actually takes place within the drama: 15. 54b6-8; 24. 60a29 ff. Epic, on the other hand, can digest actual miracles—provided they are handled properly: 24. 60a35-b2—because thanks to its narrative method *we do not actually see them*.¹⁰⁹

Thus the craving of the dramatic poets for the θαυμαστόν,¹¹⁰ though

"they achieve the effects of surprise that they want." Sykutris' τῶ θαυμαστῶ is a step in the right direction but still does not specify what it is that the poets want to achieve.

¹⁰⁸ Τοῦτο, referring not to οὖν βούλονται or τῶν θαυμαστῶν but to the whole clause *στοχάζονται κτλ.*

¹⁰⁹ The 'sack of Troy' material especially abounded in wonders and miracles: the Amazons, Memnon and the supernatural translation of his body by his mother Eos, the slaying of Achilles in spite of his invulnerability, his translation to Leuce, the Laocoön episode, the Wooden Horse. See Schmid 1. 1. 205, 220, on the propensity of the Cycle (especially *Aethiopsis* and *Telegony*) towards the exotic and fantastic.

¹¹⁰ There is another motive which is closely connected with the desire for

admissible in itself, has gotten them into trouble in this case, because they have confounded the distinctive methods and capacities of the two genres. They have not seen that a dramatic poet must get surprise by *dramatic* means. That is what Aristotle holds up to them in a19 ff. They can and do achieve their desire in both complex plots (= 'peripeties') and simple ones: that is, by regular dramatic means. Here Susemihl's athetesis of *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασιν* is tempting but probably to be resisted. Even the simple plot can achieve some surprise, though not as effectively as the complex. In any case the poet's obligation is to gain his end through the dramatic structure he gives to his material, not by borrowing marvels wholesale from the epic.

It is to be noticed that Aristotle makes no allusion here to the four-fold division of tragedies into complex, 'fatal,' 'moral,' and episodic. What we find is still the old, straightforward dichotomy 'complex-simple.'¹¹¹ Perhaps more significant, but harder to assess, is the fact that in speaking of the poets' aim he does not allude to the tragic emotions or the tragic pleasure. *Τὸ θαυμαστόν* seems to figure here as an end in itself, independent of deeper purposes. I do not doubt that this reflects something about the aim of tragedy as the poets themselves actually conceived it in Aristotle's day. No doubt many of them were no longer trying for the old total involvement of the emotions but were content with the cooler effects of astonishment, 'admiration.' But whether this closer reflection of current aims also represents a new, more 'practical' approach on the part of Aristotle himself is doubtful. It seems rather to be in keeping with the changed focus of these chapters, concerned as they are with the problems of the 'writing stage.' It is natural that Aristotle should be closest just here to the facts of life in the theater of the mid-fourth-century. There is nothing in the passage that forces us to overrule its direct connection with chapter 17 and, through it, with Aristotle's basic draft.

marvels: the desire for variety. 24. 59b29, *τὸ μεταβάλλειν ... καὶ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις*: τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ταχὺ πληροῦν ἐκπίπτειν ποιεῖ τὰς τραγωδίας. Aristotle does not explicitly mention this motive here as a factor in the writing of episodic, epic-like tragedies, but surely we can assume it.

¹¹¹ Aristotle does not even call tragedies of epic structural type 'episodic,' as he might have done. Rather, complex and simple both seem to be distinguished as proper dramatic forms from that which imitates the epic. If this is an inconsistency with 9. 51b33-52a1, it is not quite serious enough to justify a distinction of date. We may recall, incidentally, that Vahlen wanted to transfer that passage here, after *παρὰ τὸ εἶκόσ*: *Beiträge*⁸ 29-30, 88-89 (¹1. 294-295, ²2. 148-149).

The last remark in the passage is hardly more than a *jeu d'esprit*—interesting perhaps more as an added testimony to Aristotle's weakness for the witty Agathon than for its serious content. How much he relished it is shown by the fact that he quotes it twice elsewhere, 25. 61b15¹¹³ and *Rhet.* 2. 24. 1402a10 (direct quotation). But the latter passage also shows in what sense the *bon mot* is to be taken. It is an 'apparent' or pseudo-enthymeme (*φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα*), like the eristic argument that Not-Being is also Being since it is Not-Being (a6). Aristotle justly remarks that this is the kind of *εἰκός* that formed the backbone of Corax's art of rhetoric. Agathon is playing on two senses of *εἰκός*, absolute (*ἀπλῶς εἰκός*) and relative or limited (*τὶ εἰκός*), and trying to make us take the latter for the former. In short, his epigram is nothing more than a specious plea¹¹³ which the poet can press into service to defend his work. Considering this, and the fact that Sisyphus appears to have been a satyr-play subject rather than a genuinely tragic one, one cannot repress a suspicion that the whole of a19-25 may be ironical.¹¹⁴

56a25-32

καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἕνα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ
 μόριον εἶναι τοῦ δλον καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ
 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ἠδόμενα <οὐδὲν>
 μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης τραγωδίας ἐστίν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα
 30 ἤδουσιν, πρώτου ἄρξαν|τος Ἀγάθωνος [τοῦ ποιητοῦ], καί-
 τοι τί διαφέρει ἢ ἐμβόλιμα ἤδειν ἢ ῥῆσιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο
 ἀρμόττειν [ἢ ἐπεισόδιον δλον];

56a25

And one should go on the premise that the chorus also is one of his actors: it should be a part of the whole enterprise and an aid to him in winning the competition, not the way it was to Euripides but rather the way it was to Sophocles. So far as the rest of the poets are concerned, the songs that

¹¹³ All the more significant because Agathon's name is not mentioned there.

¹¹⁴ See Vahlen, *Beitrag*³ 87 ('2. 146). It is very much in the advocate's spirit of chapter 25, where the aim is not so much to understand poetry as to defend the poet by whatever means one can.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Vahlen, *op. cit.* 88 ('2. 148). "Ὅσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει, like ὥσπερ εἴρηται wherever we have noticed it, has a substantive, not a verbal reference: not "this is probably, as Agathon says" (Agathon was not talking about the cases cited by Aristotle here), but "this is probable in the sense of Agathon's remark."

- get sung are <no> more integral to their plot than to some other tragedy; hence nowadays they sing 'imported' songs, a practice which was begun by | Agathon [the poet]. And yet what is there to choose between singing 'imported' songs and fitting a speech from one play into another [or a whole scene]?

The passage is famous, mainly because it is the only one in the entire *Poetics* where Aristotle has even this much to say about the chorus. Like so many others, however, it has been quoted too much in isolation from its context.

Καὶ τὸν χορὸν δέ, "And the chorus also..."—not the usual transition. What is the connection with the foregoing? In the last section we found ourselves getting very close to the question of practical success or failure on the stage. I believe that this theme is continued in our passage. We may notice first of all that the actors are mentioned here: the only place in the *Poetics* where they are alluded to in any positive spirit.¹¹⁵ The chorus is to be "premiered"—that is, by the poet, not by us—as one of the actors. What this means concretely we shall consider in a moment. But the theme continues. *Συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ*. There is a universal tacit conspiracy to make *συναγωνίζεσθαι* mean "take a share in the action" (Bywater, Butcher), supplying presumably *τῇ πράξει* or *τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει* out of *τοῦ δλον*. But this creates a syntactical difficulty with the following datives, which then have to be translated as if *παρά* stood before them: "in Euripides, in Sophocles." The anomaly has not escaped attention. "*Ὡσπερ <παρ'> Εὐριπίδῃ ... ὥσπερ <παρὰ> Σοφοκλεῖ* is as old as the Aldine edition (*ὡς παρ' ... ὡς παρὰ* Bekker), and Gudeman has recently revived the emendation on the basis of the Arabic version. But the latter actually supports the manuscript text,¹¹⁶ and that text makes perfectly good

¹¹⁵ In 4. 49a16 the introduction of the second actor was cited only as the external sign of the growing predominance of dialogue over choral parts. In 19. 56b-10 knowledge of the 'forms of discourse' is assigned to *ὑποκριτικῆ* rather than to poetry (cf. 20. 57a21). In 26. 62a5 the acting art is distinguished from the poetic art, just as in 6. 50b18 the 'power' of tragedy was said to exist "without contests and actors." The actors are to blame for good poets writing episodic tragedies, 9. 51b37. 24. 59b26 is a special case; see below *ad loc.*

¹¹⁶ "*Et quod certat contra eum [sc. αὐτῷ: him, the poet] simul [συν-] non ut cum Euripide, sed sicut certant cum Sophocle,*" Tkatsch. The version shows indisputably

sense without twisting the meaning of *συναγωνίζεσθαι*. *Ἀγωνίζεσθαι* in the *Poetics*, like *ἀγών*, always refers concretely to the poets' competition at the Dionysia or Lenaea: so just above (*κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται*, a18).¹¹⁷ *Συναγωνίζεσθαι* here has precisely the same reference. With it we are to supply *τῷ ποιητῇ*,¹¹⁸ which is immediately spelled out by *Εὐριπίδῃ* and *Σοφοκλεῖ*: "and help (the poet) in the competition, not the way (it did) Euripides but the way (it did) Sophocles."

We notice further that *τὸν χορόν* is concrete, the 'chorus,' and *τὰ ῥηθόμενα* are *τὰ χορικά*, the songs it sings. The chorus is to throw its weight into the competition, help the poet win; and naturally it has to do this with its songs. How is it to do so? By singing songs which are clearly a part of *his* play and not someone else's. And since the play is essentially its plot (6. 50a38), this is equivalent to saying "organically connected with his plot and not someone else's." In short, the poet is urged here to make his chorus pull its weight in the boat and help him win the race, instead of letting it remain a dead load of passengers. He is to "regard it as one of his actors"; it is to "be an (active) part of the whole," i.e., of the whole performance in the competition.

Thus we arrive at essentially the old understanding of the passage—viz. that the choral songs are to be organically connected with the plot—but by a different route. Relevance in his lyrics is urged upon the poet not as a principle of the poetic art but as a practical recipe for success in the theater. It is clear how well this approach to the matter accords with the preceding passage, where likewise the talk was of success and failure in the competitions. And it accords equally well with Aristotle's consistent attitude toward the musical side of tragedy. Song-composition is "the greatest of the sweetenings," 6. 50b16; music is the element "through which the (audience's) enjoyment is produced most vividly," 26. 62a16. Far from contradicting these Pythian utterances by announcing a higher function for the chorus, our passage confirms them. Aristotle is not saying to the poets, "The choral odes are

that the Syriac translator had the same text as we and understood the datives in the normal way after a verb compounded with *συν-*, although he did not quite grasp Aristotle's meaning. See J. B. O'Connor, *Chaps. in the History of Actors and Acting in Anc. Greece*, Chicago, 1908, 28-31, on *συναγωνιστής*.

¹¹⁷ 24. 60a8-9 is significant. The other epic poets *αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὄλον ἀγωνίζονται*, are on stage (American vernacular: "in the act"), *before the audience*, all the way through.

¹¹⁸ Just as we are to supply *τὸν ποιητῆν* above, with *ἐπολαβεῖν*.

a vital part of your play, co-equal with the plot. Look to them therefore; build them and the plot into one harmonious, perfect structure." He is saying, "The part of tragedy that appeals most directly and vividly to the crowd is the music. You are overlooking this most potent of all sources of audience-appeal by writing songs, or letting your chorus sing songs, which have no clear and obvious connection with *your* play: that is, with your plot. Such songs are dead weight; they are not helping you to win the competition. Wake up and cultivate this neglected resource."

Can we mistake the irony which we half-sensed in the previous paragraph? It is a question, though, whether the irony does not do Aristotle more damage than credit. Nowhere is his blindness to the real *raison d'être* of the chorus in Greek tragedy more dreadfully apparent than here. But perhaps this is measuring him by an unfair standard. Tragedy had long since ceased to be a religious art when he first saw it and began to think about it seriously. Moreover his recommendation of Sophocles no doubt betrays a latent appreciation—perhaps mainly unconscious—of values in Sophocles' odes which could not be fobbed off simply as musical 'sweetening.' In any case we see Sophocles at the head of a list of four stages or levels in the relevancy of the choral odes to the action, viz:

1. Sophocles: high degree of integration;
2. Euripides: looser fabric, less integration;¹¹⁹
3. "The rest":¹²⁰ no connection at all;
4. *Ἐμβόλιμα*: songs from some other source entirely.

In most of the modern translations (Bywater and Potts are exceptions) the distinction between the third and the fourth stage is blurred or obliterated. What Aristotle means is that after Euripides the poets wrote choral songs which had nothing at all to do with the plays they accompanied, and that in consequence the choruses¹²¹ (i.e., the chorus-

¹¹⁹ For examples see Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.*⁴ 139-140.

¹²⁰ Gudeman's objection to *τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς* is purely *a priori* and does not hold water. The substitute *τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις*, which he prints, must be a slip (not typographical, since he refers to it again in his note); he must have intended *πολλοῖς*; (so Gomperz in 1897), since his translation reads "Bei zahlreichen (Dichtern)." Actually *τοῖς λοιποῖς* is a true dative: "for the rest of them the songs that are sung no more belong to the (their) plot than to another tragedy."

¹²¹ Not the poets. The subject (understood) of *ᾄδουσιν* is *οἱ χοροὶ* or *οἱ χορευταί*. It should be noted, incidentally, that Aristotle takes no notice of the ques-

masters) took up the practice of singing *other* songs, from other sources, in lieu of those actually written for the particular play.¹²² He does not say that all the songs sung in tragic performances were of this "intercalary" (Bywater) nature, and obviously that was not the case. The poets continued to provide odes for their plays, but as these were quite independent of the play to which they happened to be attached, the chorus-directors felt no compunctions about substituting other songs (which would be no more and no less irrelevant). These latter were called, from their arbitrary 'insertion,' *ἐμβόλιμα*. Obviously they might come from a source outside tragedy altogether: say from a dithyramb.¹²³ But they would perhaps more often be taken from other tragedies, in many cases no doubt from other plays of the same poet. Thus a popular song would become common property and might have a 'run' of several plays, whether the latter were from their original composer or not.

Aristotle's remark gives us a valuable, if tantalizing, glimpse into the musical practice of the fourth century; a practice which the poets perhaps did not actually carry on themselves, but for which they had made themselves indirectly responsible by writing odes which were so neutral in content that they could easily be 'lifted' from one play to another. The details of the *Betrieb*, as we have inferred them, lend added point to Aristotle's ironical remonstrance: "See here, if you are really so breathlessly eager to win prizes, you have let your most effect-

tion what the chorus should do in the drama or what part it should play, if any, in the dialogue (through the coryphaeus). That is not the sense of *ἐνα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν*. He is concerned only with what it sings—in itself a sufficient hint as to the position of the chorus in the fourth century.

¹²² Cf. Hesych. s.v. *ἐμβόλιμα* ἔπη: τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν ὡς ἀλλότρια καὶ νόθα ἀθετούμενα. The decisive criterion is that the verses or songs in question are somebody else's work, not the poet's (naturally they are the work of another poet or musician). I see no ground whatever for Gudeman's assertion that *ἐμβόλιμον* means "eine chorische Einlage des Dichters selbst." On the contrary, it clearly means something 'thrown in' from outside. Flickinger, *op. cit.* 144-146, suggests that this is the meaning of *ΧΟΡΟΥ* in the MSS of certain comedies (also in a papyrus fragment of an *Oeneus* tragedy: D. L. Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.*, London and New York, 1942 [Loeb], no. 28); see also A. Körte, *Hermes* 43 (1908) 39-41; K. J. Maidment, *CQ* 29 (1935) 8, 11-12; Pick.-Camb., *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens*, Oxford, 1946, 160-163; W. Beare, *Hermath.* 74 (1949) 26-38; E. W. Handley, *CQ*, N. S. 3 (1953) 55-61.

¹²³ Can the inappropriate lamentation of Odysseus in the *Segilla* (15. 54a30) have been used in this way?

ive weapon slip into other men's hands. Reassert yourselves and make your choruses work for *you*."

The statement that Agathon began the practice of 'throwing in' odes¹²⁴ can only mean, as Flickinger saw,¹²⁵ that Aristotle found no choral odes written out in the manuscripts of Agathon's plays which were available to him. On the other hand there is no reason to infer, as Flickinger seems to do, that Agathon did not even write odes for his plays. The practice of writing songs, even though irrelevant ones, must have continued;¹²⁶ otherwise Aristotle could not have made the observation *τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς κτλ*. But there was a difference between Agathon and the dramatists of Aristotle's own time. Aristotle heard and appraised the work of the latter from personal acquaintance, and therefore (we presume) knew that at least part of the time they wrote odes for their plays. Agathon's work, on the other hand, he knew only from manuscript, and since in his manuscript he found no odes but (presumably) only the notation *ΧΟΡΟΥ*, he appears to have concluded that Agathon began the custom of using *εμβόλιμα*—a practice known to him from his own days, but as one carried on by the directors or chorus-masters, not the poets themselves.¹²⁷

The last sentence (*καίτοι τί διαφέρει κτλ*) caps the irony. "And yet what is the difference between singing borrowed *intermezzi* and 'fitting' a speech from one play into another?"¹²⁸ Again the practice referred

¹²⁴ I follow Hardy and Gudeman (Crit. Appendix, p. 469, and ap. Tkatsch, 2. 220) in bracketing the words following *Ἀγάθωνος* as a gloss, and in assuming that they were originally *τοῦ ποιητοῦ* (Ar.: "*Agathon poeta*"), later corrupted to *τοῦ τοιοῦτου* in the archetype or archetypes of our Greek MSS. Their origin as a gloss (whose position was not precisely marked) is perhaps confirmed by the variant order in the Riccardianus: *τοῦ τοιοῦτου Ἀγάθωνος*. For the gloss itself—a natural enough one in view of the potential ambiguity of *ΑΓΑΘΩΝΟΣ*—cf. above on *Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητής*, 3. 48a33.

¹²⁵ *Loc. cit.*: repeated by Sykutris.

¹²⁶ Flickinger himself emphasizes this, p. 148.

¹²⁷ The fact is that we do not know who was in charge of the music in the fourth-century theater or just how it was managed. The inscriptions show that the choregic system was in use down to some time in the reign of Demetrius of Phaleron (see Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 92-93), but the choregus certainly did not choose the music (text or air) for the performance. Presumably that was the business of the *διδάσκαλος*, who was at best only nominally under the control of the poet (*op. cit.* 90); but no doubt the great actor-impresarios like Neoptolemus and Theodorus had the final say, even though the chorus was not technically under their direction.

¹²⁸ Again I follow Gudeman, reading *ἢ ὄψιν* (so Ar., without *εἰ*) ... *ἀρμόττειν* (also Ar.) and bracketing *ἢ ἐπεισόδιον ὄλον*, which is likewise missing in the Arabic

to is not one carried on by the poets themselves; this time it is a trick of the *actors*:¹²⁹ an exact parallel, then, to the chorus-trainers' or impresarios' trick of throwing in *intermezzi*, but one that comes still closer home to the poets. They had had to suffer this kind of interpolation in a part of their work by which they did set some store: the dialogue.¹³⁰ The implication is evident: "You groan because the actors fob off a speech by some other dramatist in the performance of your play; why are you so complaisant about others stealing your choral thunder, which makes even more impression on the public?"

Finally we come back to the question how the remarks about the chorus are connected with the preceding. Both passages are 'practical.' They deal with factors which have or are thought to have a great deal to do with the winning of prizes. The poets who try to compose an epic story 'whole' are impelled by an estimate of what appeals most to the audience. They think—and not without reason—that what is wanted is *variety* and *paradox* (surprise, astonishment). But they confound the epic way of attaining these goals with the dramatic: they assume that they must give the public more episodic material, whereas actually the *θαυμαστόν* is best achieved in the drama by its own dramatic means, and variety through episodes is desirable but necessarily limited by the dramatic form.¹³¹ Conversely the passage on the choral odes touches on a factor in public success which *does* belong to the drama,¹³² but to which the poets have *not* given sufficient thought: the music. This also is, strictly speaking, an extra, an accessory; but it is a powerful one and it has been neglected.

Thus the theme common to the two passages can be formulated as

version. To Gudeman's arguments against the latter phrase (p. 329) we can add that this is the only place in the *Poetics* outside the spurious c. 12 where *ἐπεισόδιον* certainly means 'scene, act.' See above on 9. 51b33 ff. We have no other evidence for *contaminatio*—i.e., the borrowing of whole scenes from other plays—before the New Comedy.

¹²⁹ See D. L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*, Oxford, 1934, 89, on actors lifting a speech from one play and incorporating it into another, either deliberately or spontaneously (i.e., during a performance).

¹³⁰ Aristotle's remark has no point unless the two cases are parallel: that is, unless the interpolation in each case comes from outside. Hence *ῥῆσιν ἀγούρευεν* cannot refer to borrowing by the poets themselves (the occasional echoing of a line or phrase is a different matter).

¹³¹ See below on 24. 59b24-26.

¹³² See below on 26. 62a16.

the proper assessment and use of 'extras' in the drama, with particular reference to their effect on success in the public competitions.

Looking back now over chapters 17 and 18, what can we say of their rationale and connection with Aristotle's argument as a whole? There is no need to weary the reader with a long summary. But the constantly reiterated clichés (for they are no more) that the two chapters are a loose jumble of notes, and that Aristotle takes up the *μῦθος* over again here, call for some answer. Vahlen made the essential points long ago:¹³³ "Die beiden Kapitel 17 und 18 bilden ein in sich geschlossenes Ganzes und sollten bei einer vernünftigen Kapiteleintheilung, an der es in der Poetik überall fehlt, nur eines ausmachen. Aristoteles ertheilt ... in diesem Abschnitt dem tragischen Dichter eine Reihe von Vorschriften und Rathschlägen, die derselbe bei der Ausführung einer Tragödie zu beobachten hat ... Diese unter sich, soweit dies bei dieser Absicht erforderlich ist, wohl verknüpften Vorschriften setzen alle ... die Ausführung *einer ganzen Tragödie* [italics mine] voraus, zu der alle Theile der Tragödie mitwirken, und wollen schlechterdings nicht theoretische Lehren über irgend einen besonderen Theil der Tragödie geben. Nur der Umstand, dass der Mythos, ausgeführt, den Körper der Tragödie vergegenwärtigt, konnte den Schein erwecken, als ob wir es hier nur mit einer Fortsetzung der Theorie vom Mythos zu thun hätten."

What we have to contribute to this summary (a fine example, by the way, of Vahlen's marvelous gift for *Einführung* into Aristotle's thought) is corrections and elaborations in detail, and perhaps a better view of the connection of the two chapters with what goes before. At this point a short table may be useful.¹³⁴ We have found six sections or passages (in a pinch they could be reduced to five):

1. 17. 55a22-34. Visualization of the action and shaping of the 'forms of expression' of the characters.
2. 17. 55a34-b32. Central plot and episodes: their relative length in tragedy and in epic.
3. [18. 55b24-31. *Δέσις* and *λύσις*; the new concept of the 'whole story.']¹³⁵

¹³³ *Beiträge* 91 (2. 151).

¹³⁴ The reader may compare it with the one in Montmollin, p. 156, which distinguishes eight sections or "themes."

¹³⁵ I have indicated added passages by the same symbol as in the text-lemmata.

4. [18. 55b32-56a10. The four kinds and 'parts' of tragedy; their relative value.]
5. 18. 56a10-25. Handling of epic material 'whole' and 'part-wise'; the *θανμαστόν*.
6. 18. 56a25-32. Unwise neglect of the choral odes.

Section 1 we found to be introduced by the last words in chapter 15, as treating of "offenses against the perceptions that necessarily attend upon the poetic art." It dealt with the visualization of the action, i.e., where the characters are and what they are doing at any given moment, and with the plausible reproduction of the way they would naturally speak.

Section 2 took up a closely related topic, the balance which the poet is to maintain in the expansion of his plot into a poem: that is, the balance he should maintain between plot and episodes. The latter should bulk relatively small in tragedy; they may bulk large in the epic.

Section 5, as we saw, attaches directly to 2. It warns against the error of confusing epic with tragic structure—that is, it urges poets to remember the distinction made in 2. The chief reason they try to write epics-in-tragic-compass is their desire to please the public (and win prizes) by achieving surprise; but this can and should be done by the means proper to the drama.

Section 6 reminds the poets, on the other hand, of a distinctive feature of the drama as a whole which they have neglected to their own cost: the music.

Into this sequence two later notes—or perhaps they are really one—have been inserted:

Section 3 introduces the new concept of the 'whole story' as a fabric existing partly inside, partly outside the actual play (i.e., the action of the play).

Section 4 similarly introduces a new classification of tragedies (not merely of their plots, in the old restricted sense) and urges the dramatist to incorporate the virtues of each, or at least the best of them, into his work. In this connection it maintains, though in new form, the old doctrine that the plot is the most important thing in tragedy. The reason for the insertion of these notes just here is that they comport a new approach to the problem of the relation between plot and episodes, with which sections 2 and 5 were concerned.

It remains only to say that there is nothing about sections 1, 2, 5,

and 6 which would require us to assign them to a different date than the bulk of the earlier chapters. They *may* have been written later, or parts of them may; indeed it stands to reason that even the original draft of the *Poetics* was not written in one sitting. But the idea of advice and warnings about the 'writing stage' of tragedy, the incorporation of the skeleton (or, to use Aristotle's more dignified language, the soul) into a body, can have belonged, indeed ought to have belonged, to Aristotle's conception of an 'art of poetry' from the beginning. Execution is the destined end and test of poetry; for poetry too, we must remember, is one of the 'practical' arts in Aristotle's scheme of things.

CHAPTER 19

56a33-b8

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

- 35 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν | τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς
 κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.
 ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ
 38 | b1 παρασκευασθῆναι. μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύουσι
 φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα [καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρό-
 τητας]. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
 ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ, ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰ-
 5 κότα, δέη παρασκευάζειν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι
 τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
 ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον
 γίνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαίνοιτο
 ἢ ἰδέα καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

56a33

Well then, the other constituent elements have now been discussed, and it remains to speak about dialogue-composition and 'thought.'

- 35 Well then, let the discussion of what pertains to thought
 be sought from | our work on *Rhetoric*; for this element is
 a particular specialty of that branch of study. 'Thought'
 includes all those effects which have to be deliberately pro-
 duced by speech. The categories under this heading are
 (1) proof and refutation, and (2) the producing of emotions,
 38 | b1 such as | pity, fear, anger, and the like [and also exagger-
 ation and depreciations]. And it is clear that in tragic actions
 also one must use 'thought' under the same categories,
 when it is a question of producing feelings of pity or fear,
 or convictions of importance or plausibility; except there
 5 is this much | difference, that the former (pair) should be
 'brought home' without explicit exposition, while the latter
 must be deliberately produced in speech, by the speaker,

and emerge as a result of his speech. For what need would there be of a speaker if the category were 'brought home' even without his speech?

"The other constituent elements have now been discussed, and it remains to speak of dialogue-composition¹ and 'thought.'" Some students of the *Poetics* have been distressed that only two of the other four εἶδη (plot and character) have been discussed in a full and formal manner. But ὄψεις and μελοποιία have received all the attention that Aristotle deemed them worthy of, the former at the beginning of chapter 14, the latter at the end of chapter 18. Hence no inferences as to the composition of the *Poetics* are to be drawn from his words here.

The order λέξεως καὶ διανοίας is a further hint, slight but valuable, of the relation which we saw established in chapter 6 between these two 'parts.'² Both have to do with speech: λέξις is the linguistic composition of the dialogue, διάνοια is the management of whatever argumentation or expression of general points of view is involved in the dialogue. Together, then, they represent the *speech-writing* part of the poet's task. Furthermore, within this total 'linguistic' part of his enterprise λέξις figures as the more comprehensive and pervasive, διάνοια as the more limited³ and less specifically poetic activity. Hence λέξις is mentioned first but διάνοια is treated first, to get it out of the way. The treatment itself consists simply in a reference to the *Rhetoric*, and a further discrimination which is connected with the reference.

The referral of 'thought' to the *Rhetoric* is nothing new. Aristotle pointed out in chapter 6 (50b6) that it is the affair of the 'political' art and/or rhetoric, and that in his day rhetoric had in effect taken over the job. The statement here, then, looks like no more than a repetition, except that Aristotle's own work on rhetoric is referred to, not merely the discipline as such. But this citation brings with it some possible ambiguities, and Aristotle devotes the following lines to them. The point he wishes to make is that διάνοια, though a rhetorical element in the tragic art, is not identical with the scope of rhetoric *per se*. 'Thought' in tragedy has to do with effects that are produced and can only be produced *by the (deliberate) use of speech* (ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, a36-37;

¹ For λέξις see above on 6. 49b34 and below on cc. 20-22.

² See above on 6. 50b5, 12.

³ Λέξις has to do with all the speeches in tragedy, διάνοια only with certain kinds of speech, or parts of speeches.

ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι⁴ καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι, b6-7). So far it is like rhetoric, or a part of rhetoric. But tragedy, unlike rhetoric, is not merely speech; it is also an action, and an action performed by dramatic characters. The public speaker has to produce whatever effects he produces through his speech alone, while tragedy has other resources. What are these effects? *Rhetoric* 1. 2. 1356a1 tells us: "Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word [διὰ τὸν λόγον] there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself" (Oxford translation, by Rhys Roberts). The second mode is further defined just below (56a14) as meaning "when the hearers are induced to feel emotion." Thus the three facets of the orator's task can be summarized under the rubrics ἦθος, πάθος, ἀπόδειξις. Of these Aristotle clearly indicates that he, unlike most of the writers on rhetoric in his day (*ibid.* 17), regards the means of proof as the most important (see *Rhetoric* 1, chapter 1), and in fact he devotes the greater part of the first two books to the modes and methods of argumentation. 'Character' is not treated in any great detail in the *Rhetoric*, because it is or should be something that the orator brings with him, not something that the rhetorical art can produce or counterfeit;⁵ the art of rousing the emotions, however, is analyzed in detail (book 2, chapters 2-11).

These three departments of the speech-maker's task are all represented in tragedy; but they do not all fall under 'thought.' Character is a rubric by itself (although we have seen that it too has to be communicated in large part through speech); hence it is not mentioned here at all.⁷ 'Proof' and 'emotion' are left as ingredients of the tragic *διάνοια*. But here Aristotle's distinctions, and our difficulties, begin. The 'parts' of the effects to be produced by speech, he says, are (1) proving and disproving, (2) excitation of emotions, and further (ἔτι) (3) "the suggestion of importance [i.e., that a thing is important] or its opposite" (Butcher). Then, as the passage is usually interpreted, he goes on to

⁴ Παρασκευάζειν (πάθος, δόξαν, etc.) is a technical term which recurs with notable frequency (four times) in the present short passage; cf. also 14. 53b7, 9, 12, 54all. The connotation is 'produce consciously, by the use of art'; cf. *Rhet.* 2. 7. 1385a31; κατασκευάζειν, 2. 1. 1378a19; 3. 19. 1419b11, 18, 19.

⁵ The discussion of character in *Rhet.* 2. 12-17 is a typology for the orator's use in gauging the character of his audience and adapting his speech to it. Cf., however, 3. 7. 1408a25-32.

remark that the same effects must be produced in the events of the drama (*ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν*), and along the same lines (*ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν*); and finally that whereas the incidents speak for themselves, "the effects aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech"—a conclusion so inane that one wonders to see it attributed to Aristotle, for how *can* an effect be produced in speech except by the speaker and as a result of his speech?

The trouble is that *τὰ μὲν* and *τὰ δέ* (b5) have been misinterpreted. But the roots of the error lie further back. We shall have to return to the beginning of Aristotle's exposition and pick up the threads. He says there that for all matters pertaining to 'thought' we must refer to* the *Rhetoric*. The next sentence defines these matters (*ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν* = *τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν*) as "every (effect) that has to be produced by speech." The remark is entirely general, not limited to either tragedy or rhetoric specifically, and so is the following specification of the 'parts.' The last of these, *καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας*,⁷ is an anti-climax and does not really belong in the list at all; for exaggeration and depreciation are a particular *τόπος* under the heading of argumentation.⁸ Moreover the *τε* in b37 (*τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι*) is an unmistakable hint of binary structure: proof and disproof, and the excitation of feeling. *Καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας* is a gloss.⁹ Any doubt on this score will be disposed of by our analysis below, which will show that there were originally only two sets of items in Aristotle's list, not three.

Now Aristotle makes the application to tragedy. "It is clear that in (tragic) actions also one should use...." *Τοῖς πράγμασιν* is hypo-

* *Κεῖσθαι*: "exposita sunt et inde petantur" (Bonitz, *Index*).

⁷ In spite of Tkatsch (2. 115), it cannot be regarded as certain that Σ had *μικρότητα*. What is certain is that Aristotle would have written the singular; but the MSS unanimously offer the plural. It is however possible, since the words are a gloss (see below), that the plural is the result of mistranscription of a compendium, as with some other wrong endings we have discovered in glosses; see for example above on 5. 49b6.

⁸ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 95 (13. 214-215).

⁹ Further indication: nouns in place of Aristotle's articular infinitives. The nouns are tacked on hit-or-miss to the names of emotions following *παρὰσκενάξεν*. — The motive of the gloss is clear enough. The writer found *μεγάλα* below (b4) and thought it was missing here. He knew just enough about Aristotle's rhetorical theory to know that *αὐξάνειν καὶ μειῶν* belonged to it, but not enough to realize that it was included in *τὸ ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λίσεν*. A reminiscence of Pl. *Phaedr.* 268c may have helped also.

stasized, as it were, out of *ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις* (cf. 18. 56a20). It is harsh but understandable and should not be emended (e.g., to *δράμασιν*). Nor should *ἐν* be omitted (Spengel). The dative to be supplied with *χρησθαι* is *αὐτῇ* (sc. *τῇ διανοίᾳ*): "and one should employ (it) under the same categories in (dramatic) actions also." Here we begin to reap the fruits of our athetesis. For the *ιδέαι* are the two types or modes of employment of *διάνοια* named above, viz. (1) proof and disproof, and (2) the arousing of emotion.¹⁰ For good measure, these are now alluded to again: *ὅταν ἢ (2) ἔλκεινὰ ἢ δεινά, ἢ (1) μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα, δέη παρασκευάζειν*. For some reason—probably because there appeared to be three categories just above, not two—this correspondence has not been noticed. The chiasmic order is eminently characteristic of Aristotle, and moreover it has a particular motive here, as we shall see in a moment.

Now we are ready to tackle *τὰ μέν* and *τὰ δέ* in b5. They refer to *ἔλκεινὰ ἢ δεινά* and *μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα* respectively. Pathetic and fearful things "must be brought home (to the spectator)¹¹ without (explicit) exposition." *Διδασκαλίας* is a pregnant word. The emotions are often conveyed through speech also, but *unconsciously*. Their expression, as we know from 17. 55a30-32, must come from 'nature,' i.e., from the universal human tendency to feel certain emotions under certain circumstances; and in writing down their utterances the poet must give ear to that same nature: he must make his persons express their feelings "truthfully," the way we all express them under like circumstances. For this the dramatic persons are not bound to rhetoric. They are not orators making a speech before an assembly or a law-court, but human beings like ourselves. They can speak from the heart, and we respond to them "from the same nature," as one human being to another.

Quite different is the situation of the dramatic character when he is actually arguing a case: Medea fighting her verbal duel with Jason, or Hecuba accusing Helen before Menelaus. Now the character is a public speaker; he is in the same position vis-à-vis another character or characters as the orator in an assembly. He has to muster

¹⁰ So also below, b7-8, *εἰ φαίνοιτο ἡ ἰδέα* (Tucker; Gudeman from the medieval Latin translation), "if the point (i.e., the category of argument, the kind of proof being attempted) were plain." For *φαίνοιτο* see next note.

¹¹ *Φαίνεσθαι* here and in b8 has the same sense as in 13. 53a28, 30: 'get across' (to the audience); cf. 24. 60a34.

his arguments, prove and disprove, augment or depreciate, with conscious art: διδασκαλίᾳ. This time the effect—as with the orator—has to be *produced deliberately by him, in his speech, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*¹² ἐπὶ τοῦ λέγοντος π α ρ α σ κ ε ν ἄ ζ ε σ θ α ι, and through his speech alone, παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι; whereas emotion is “revealed” (φαίνεσθαι), not “produced,” and may be betrayed by action also.

It is apparent that Aristotle's point, though briefly made, is one of major importance. He was surrounded by a brand of tragedy which was rhetorical through and through, manipulated by men who had been professional rhetoricians (*vide* Astydamas and Theodectes). Moreover Aristotle was not unsympathetic to rhetoric; after all, he had taught it himself. But he is as severe with its claims in the *Poetics* as he is in the *Rhetoric*. The writers of handbooks, like the practising orators, set store by the arousing of emotion above all else.¹³ From the present passage we can safely infer, what is likely enough anyway, that the writers of rhetorical drama wanted to *make the communication of feeling the main thing in tragedy also, and to claim this function for rhetoric*.¹⁴ Against this tendency (although good friends of his, like Theodectes, may have represented it) Aristotle sets his face firmly. Under these conditions the injunction to “imitate nature” is no mere cliché, as it tended to become later, but a counsel of health and sanity for the poet.

Thus the purpose of the passage is to define more precisely than was done in chapter 6 exactly what in the domain of tragedy does and does not belong to rhetoric. This clarification of Aristotle's purpose also removes, I believe, any suspicion we might have that the passage is ‘late.’ It belongs integrally to the original draft of the *Poetics*.

56b8-19

See below on chapters 20-22.

¹² Predicative. Customarily ἐν τῷ λόγῳ is taken as an attributive phrase with τὰ δέ (“the effects aimed at in speech,” Butcher; “les effets attachés au langage,” Hardy), the whole being balanced against τὰ μὲν, which is taken as — τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: verbal effects gotten through action. This is what has reduced the passage to the inanity we spoke of earlier.

¹³ *Rhet.* 1. 1. 1354a15, b19 ff.; *ibid.* 2. 1356a16-17.

¹⁴ See T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 294-308; *id.*, *Art and Lit. in Fourth Cent. Athens*, London, 1956, 58-69.

CHAPTERS 20-22

The three and one-half chapters (including the second half of chapter 19) which deal with *λέξεις* are omitted from this study for three reasons: (1) they are technical to a very high degree (especially chapters 20 and 21) and bristle with special problems, so that any cogent discussion of them would have to be inordinately long and complex; (2) to a degree unequalled by any other part of the work they have to be considered (again chapters 20 and 21 particularly) in a special context, that of the development of 'grammatical' study in Greece; and (3) they have very little—astonishingly little—connection with any other part of Aristotle's theory of poetry.

It would be well worth knowing whether chapters 20 and 21 in particular are early or late,¹ and how much of them is genuine. These strictly grammatical definitions and discussions offered a more tempting field for emendation and interpolation than any others in the *Poetics*, because grammar—unlike the theoretical understanding of poetry—did in fact make great strides after Aristotle. Any Graeculus with a tincture of *γραμματική* might feel himself qualified to annotate or improve here.²

Thus to study these chapters adequately would swell an already long book intolerably (between them they account for almost a third of the bulk of Vahlen's *Beiträge*) and yet bring relatively little gain for our purpose. There is just one point to be made that is germane to our earlier discussions, and it can be made very briefly. In Aristotle's treatment of style (chapter 22), outside of one very general allusion to the dithyramb (59a9), *there is no mention of and no citation from any kind of lyric verse*. All the examples are from hexameters and trimeters: that is, from spoken *μέτρα*.³ In particular, there is no allusion of any kind to the lyrics of tragedy. Surely we can regard this fact as substan-

¹ See Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935) 195-196.

² Cf. above on the 'grammatical' character of chap. 12.

³ See above on 1. 47b20. *Ἐρμολογικός* *ἄνθος*, 21. 57a35, which seems not to be metrical, is probably an epithet of Zeus taken from the religious life of Massilia (so Rostagni) rather than from a poem (Diels thought of an epic, Bywater and others of a dithyramb).

tiating the conclusion we arrived at in chapter 6, that *λέξις* in Aristotle's usage means exclusively dialogue-composition, the composition of spoken verses. *The style of the choral lyrics of tragedy is not treated in the Poetics.*⁴ As a part of the total activity of *μελοποιία*, Aristotle presumably regarded what we would call their 'diction' as a musical element; in any case he did not regard it as belonging to the theory of *λέξις*.

⁴ Their *content* was touched on—though even that only for a particular purpose—in 18. 56a25-32.

CHAPTER 23

59a17-30

περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὅτι
 δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις συνιστάναι
 δραματικούς καὶ περὶ μίαν πράξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχον-
 20 σαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἵν' ὡσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὅλῳ ποιῆ-
 τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δηλον, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίαις τὰς
 συνθέσεις εἶναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι
 δῆλωσιν ἀλλ' ἐνός χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα
 ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. (ὡσ-
 25 περ | γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένε-
 νετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἢ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη, οὐδὲν
 πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς
 χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θατέρον ἐξ ὧν ἐν οὐδὲν
 30 γίνεται τέλος.) σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο
 | ὁρῶσι.

59a17

Now about the kind of imitative art which is narrative
 and works in verse, it is clear that one should give the plots
 dramatic construction in the same way as in tragedies, that
 is, center them around a single action which is whole and
 20 complete and | has beginning, middles, and end, so that
 like a single whole creature it may produce its proper pleas-
 ure, and that epic works should not be made like histories,
 in which an account is necessarily given, not of a single
 action but of a single period of time, i.e., all the events
 that happened during that time involving a single man or
 a number of men: each of which events has a merely acci-
 25 dental relation to the rest. (For | as the naval battle at
 Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took
 place during the same period, though not at all directed
 toward the same result, so also over successive periods of
 time it often happens that one event takes place at the same
 time as another without any single result emerging from
 30 them.) But nearly all the poets do | just this.

The discussion of tragedy is now officially ended (22. 59a15, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως ἔστω ἡμῖν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα*) and that of the epic is ready to begin. But this simple statement is far from exhausting Aristotle's meaning. The transition recalls the one at the beginning of chapter 6: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ κωμῳδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν· περὶ δὲ τραγωδίας κτλ.* Just before that transition, at 5. 49b9-16, stood the discussion of the three *differentiae* of tragedy and epic: the differences with respect to *μέτρον* (49b10-11), method (narrative versus dramatic, *ibid.*), and length (49b12-16). The first and third of these *differentiae* will be discussed in chapter 24, 59b17-60a5. The other, the difference in method, is the most fundamental. In fact we shall find that in chapter 24 *all* the peculiarities of the epic, including its greater capacity for representing the marvelous, are derived from it, just as in chapter 6 the six 'parts' of tragedy were all derived from the concept of dramatic method (*δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας*).¹ Method is the dominant concept here also: epic is categorized as *διηγηματικὴ* (as opposed to *ἐν τῷ πράττειν*, = *δρώντων*).

The other attribute, *ἐν μέτρῳ*, is less clear. We can reject the modern emendations with some confidence.² Heinsius' *ἐν <ἑξα>μέτρῳ* was inspired by *ἐν ἑξαμέτροις* in chapter 6; but the specific character of the epic verse is not significant here, though it will be in chapter 24. As for Butcher's *κἂν* (καὶ Gudeman) *ἐν<ι> μέτρῳ*, it is disposed of by our discovery³ that in Aristotle's usage *μέτρον* has nothing to do with lyric rhythms, so that in his eyes tragedy is just as much a one-verse genre as the epic. A more promising clue is that suggested by *ψιλοῖς ... τοῖς μέτροις*, 1. 47a29, and *τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν*, 5. 49b11: i.e., that the epic has *μέτρον only*, while tragedy has music as well.⁴ But then we must take *ἐν μέτρῳ* as standing for *ἐν μέτρῳ μόνῳ* (*ψιλῶ*, = *ἄνευ μέλους*): a rather awkward brachylogy. On the whole I think Rostagni and Sykutris are right in taking the phrase⁵ as expressing an implied contrast with narrative imitations *in prose*. The difficulty is to say what kind of works these would be. The genres which Aris-

¹ See above on 6. 50a10-12.

² See Montmollin 239, n. 231.

³ See above on 1. 47b20; 4. 48b31 ff.; 5. 49b11.

⁴ So Vahlen, *Beiträge*⁸ 304 (3. 325-326, n. 16 to p. 276).

⁵ But Rostagni writes *ἐμμέτρον*, which is surely wrong. The art in question (Lobel's *μιμήσεως* is gratuitous) is not itself in verse, i.e., versified; it *operates* in verse, uses verse as its medium.

totle specified in chapter 1 as examples of "the art which uses speech(es) 'bare,' " viz. the Socratic dialogues and the mimes of Sophron, were dramatic; and in fact we saw⁶ that in that chapter he had dramatic instances in mind almost exclusively (except for the epic). Moreover nothing has been said since chapter 2, and nothing is said here, about poetic imitations in prose. We need another clue, to give point to *ἐν μέτρῳ*. I suggest that it is in the sentence now before us, in *ἱστορίαις*. In 9. 51a38-b5 Aristotle remarked that the difference between the poet and the historian is not *τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα*; that Herodotus' history would be no less a history *μετὰ μέτρον* (~ *ἐν μέτρῳ*) ἢ *ἄνευ μέτρων*, because it deals with particulars and not with universals. The burden of the present passage is the same. Most epics are simply histories-in-verse. They relate what happened to happen to one man or a number of men during a given period, instead of presenting a single, unified action with a beginning, middle, and end. That is, they give us particulars instead of universals. The sentence before us is a plea for the converse of this practice. Thus *ἐν μέτρῳ* appears to have thematic significance. *Διηγηματικὴ καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ* might lead us to expect chronicles in verse. But this natural assumption is corrected by Aristotle. Epic is to follow the pattern of tragedy, not history, in its structure. It is *not* to be merely a versified narrative, a prose story *ἐν μέτρῳ*, but a poetic action.

This interpretation not only gives point to *ἐν μέτρῳ*, but helps to account for the seemingly abrupt injection of history into the discussion. The fact is that Aristotle's treatment of the epic is oblique and foreshortened from the beginning. (We indicated before⁷ that the long section on tragedy (chapters 6-22) gives his basic doctrine for the epic also, leaving a brief summary of the likenesses and differences between the two genres to serve as a discussion of the latter. But Aristotle does not quite carry out even this plan. Chapter 23, plus 24. 59b8-17, looks like a statement of the likenesses, followed in the rest of chapter 24 by a corresponding statement of the differences. But upon inspection it turns out that the likenesses are ideal, not real. Epics *ought* to have a dramatic structure, like tragedies. But in fact the only epics that do have such a structure are Homer's; all the rest are indeed just narratives-in-verse. Thus Aristotle's treatment of the epic is 'skewed' from the beginning. What it gives is not really a theory of what the epic is, but of what

⁶ Above on 1. 47b11-13, 20-22.

⁷ Above on 5. 49b16-20.

it ought to be—or, to put the same thing in another way, it gives a *theory based on the Homeric epic*.⁸ Moreover the thing that Aristotle admires most in Homer is precisely his dramatic, not any specifically epic, quality. But there is no use complaining about these paradoxes. They do not merely spring from Aristotle's idolatry of Homer, they are consistent with his view of poetry in general. He measures the epic not by criteria of its own but by the standard of tragedy, i.e., of poetry at its peak, just as everywhere else he assesses the imperfect and partially developed by the standard of the perfect and fully developed.

One of the valuable indirect *testimonia* to this point of view—all the more valuable because indirect—is the phrase *τοὺς μύθους συνιστά- ναι ... δραματικούς. Δραματικός*; is one of those compounds and derivatives of *δρᾶν* — *δρᾶμα* which, so far as we can tell, were invented by Aristotle himself.⁹ Properly it ought to refer, as it did in 4. 48b35 (*μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν [sc. Ὅμηρος]; cf. δραματοποιήσας, ibid. 37*), to the dramatic principle *per se*: *δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀταγ- γελλας*. In 24. 60a5-11 Homer is lauded for his awareness of the principle; but that is not what Aristotle means here. 'Dramatic' here means 'having the structural qualities which are characteristic of dramas.'¹⁰ Aristotle had found these qualities in tragedy above all, and they were closely and specifically associated in his mind with the dramatic principle itself. Thus the concepts of 'drama,' aesthetic excellence (unity, etc.), and perfection (complete *energeia*) of poetry form a constellation of ideas for which 'dramatic' can serve as a label. Dramatic method and dramatic form go hand in hand.

Μίαν πρᾶξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μίσα¹¹ καὶ τέλος, and the phrase

⁸ The arbitrariness only differs quantitatively, not qualitatively, from that in his theory of tragedy: the one-sided emphasis on the complex plot, with *hamartia*, recognition, and catharsis; the setting up of a few plays as models, above all the *Oedipus*; the virtual ignoring of Aeschylus; etc. But in tragedy Aristotle grants at least some virtues to Euripides and Agathon (even to a few others on occasion); we do not feel the same absolute insistence on one author and one model.

⁹ See above on 3. 48a28; 4. 48b35, 37.

¹⁰ In the first instance, unity. *Περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν κτλ.* defines *δραματικούς*; the *καὶ* is epexegetic (so Gudeman *et al.*).

¹¹ We should not follow Tkatsch (2. 127-128), Gudeman, and Montmollin in restoring *μέσον* from the Arabic version (= Ald.; why Sykutris ascribes it to the Riccardianus also I do not know). The assimilation of number to the preceding and following nouns (not to the parallel passage in 7. 50b26) is too easy a corruption on the part of a translator to count as an attested reading, and the plural is en-

ζῶον ἐν ὄλον, take us back to the argument of chapters 7 and 8; they amount in fact to a quotation. To be sure, nothing was said there about an *οἰκεία ἡδονή*. But the idea was implied in the concept of *beauty* which, as we saw, dominated that argument (*καλόν*, 50b34, 37, 38; *καλλίον*, 51a11). A more serious problem is presented by the only other place where an *οἰκεία ἡδονή* has been mentioned, 14. 53b11; for there the pleasure was integrally connected with the *emotional* content of tragedy, its representation of pathetic and fearful incidents. There is nothing of the kind here; in fact, *pity and fear are not mentioned in chapters 23 and 24, and it is doubtful whether they play any part at all in Aristotle's theory of the epic.* Why this should be so, if it is so, is a difficult question. We will come back to it again in connection with 26. 62b13 (*δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην*), but will not be able to give a conclusive answer even there. In any case, so far as the present passage is concerned, we can only note that the 'inherent' or 'proper' pleasure is not explicitly given any emotional content. It appears to be purely an aesthetic matter, depending solely on the unity and structural perfection of the epic (= the dramatic) plot.

We have already said that the reference to history is in the spirit of the first section of chapter 9. There it was said that the poet "speaks of" universals, the historian of particulars. Here the idea is given a new turn by the introduction of a new concept: time.¹² The poet imitates, or should imitate, a single *action*; the historian makes a report¹³

tirely in place here. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have a number of 'middles,' not one (for that matter, so has the *Oedipus*); see above on 7. 51a12-15. The Platonic *μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος* (*Phileb.* 31a; *Lysis* 4. 715c) proves nothing, as Tkatsch rightly says (quoting Spengel); but still Aristotle may have had the phrase in his mind.

¹² The difference can be gauged by comparison with chapter 8, where Aristotle likewise refers to epics, and specifically to epics about a single man (cf. 8. 51a17, *πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῶ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει*; *ibid.* 25, *ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῶ συνέβη*; 23. 59a23, *ὅσα ... συνέβη περὶ ἑνα*), but without mentioning time.

¹³ Aristotle chooses the neutral, colorless word *δήλωσιν*, instead of *μίμησιν*, just as in 9. 51b1, 4, 7 he used *λέγειν* instead of *μιμῆσθαι*, because properly speaking history is not a branch of imitation. See B. L. Ullman, *TAPA* 73 (1942) 26: "It is clearly implied [*sc. in Poet.* 9] that history does not imitate action ... in [Aristotle's] view history sets forth facts and does not imitate actions, i.e., it does not make up plots." But in practice (whether in theory also, we cannot be sure) at least some Peripatetics, or men who had some connection with Aristotle, broke down the distinction, or rather turned its flank, by writing a kind of history

of a single *time*. What does this antithesis mean? Are not all actions performed in time? The answer must be that *universals are timeless*, and so far as the poet deals with them and not with particulars he is presenting us with events which are not in time, at least in the usual sense. Obviously this cannot mean that poetic actions appear out of time altogether, without sequence or order. One thing must still happen after another, and the whole action must still move forward. The contrast between 'single action' and 'single time' is rather a contrast between the 'necessary,' the *logical* bond that unites the parts of a true *πραξις*, and the arbitrary, merely *chronological* bond that unites most¹⁴ actual events. 'Action' and 'time' here express the antithesis between necessity and accident. Concretely, the eschewing of time as a principle of poetic composition must mean that the poet has a

that *did* imitate action, i.e., was deliberately dramatic. The concept of 'Peripatetic tragic history' was formulated primarily by Eduard Schwartz, *Hermes* 32 (1897) 560-561; 44 (1909) 491-492; he attributed its invention to Callisthenes in particular. Ullman, *op. cit.* 33-37, denies the ascription and calls the whole development Isocratean, on the ground that (p. 37) "it was a betrayal of Aristotle's creed to apply his pronouncements about tragedy to history." But Ullman himself recognizes, in fact emphasizes, the Aristotelian note in the fragment of Callisthenes quoted by Athenaeus *Mechanicus* (ed. R. Schneider, *Abh. Gött. Ges. d. Wiss.*, N. F. 12 [1912] no. 5, p. 12; *FGrHist* 124F44): *δεῖ τὸν γράφειν τι πειρώμενον* [including history, of course] *μη' ἀστοχεῖν τοῦ πρὸς ὁσῶπον, ἀλλ' οἰκτιρώως αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς πρὸ γυμνασίου τοὺς λόγους θεῖναι*. That is the Aristotelian *πρέπον* (*ἀρμόδιον*), as Schwartz pointed out, *op. cit.* 491 n. 1; on the verbal parallels with *Poet.* 15 see Ullman 36 (actually Callisthenes' formulation is a blend of Aristotle and Thucydides [1. 22. 1]; see Jacoby, *PW* 10. 1691). But Callisthenes had more than the conception of the historical personage as a dramatic character. Schwartz speaks of him (*Hermes* 35 [1900] 107) as "einem von künstlerischen Gesichtspunkten geleiteten Geschichtschreiber, der *eine innere, den Stoff beschränkende Einheit* [italics mine] im Gegensatz zu der einen unendlich fortspinnenden Weltgeschichte verlangte." Ullman has not distinguished sufficiently between *rhetorical* history (Isocratean, at least in style) and *dramatic* history, which is an Aristotelian idea played against Aristotle: not a betrayal, but a new creation. This invasion of history by poetry is matched by the counter-invasion of poetry by history, i.e., the whole-hearted admission of historical facts as poetic material, which is as serious a departure from Aristotle's views, but one which we know to have been Peripatetic (Neoptolemus of Parium; see Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio*, Turin, 1930, *Introd.* LXXXIII, XCII-XCIV; on Philodemus' polemic against the idea, *ibid.* C-CI).

¹⁴ Not all; for "there is nothing to prevent some of the things that have happened from being the kind of things that might happen" (9. 51b30). Logical sequence can exist in history, though usually it does not.

sovereign freedom to *put events in the order he feels to be 'necessary,'* regardless of when they happened in history or might happen in real life. In other words the poet is free to play fast and loose with chronology; and we shall see that Aristotle probably held just that view of Homer's procedure in the *Iliad*.

Negatively, it may be worth remarking that a principle of 'unity of time' has at last turned up here in the *Poetics*, but as a *false* principle. Time-unity can only be a pseudo-unity, because time is an accidental, not an essential, principle with respect to poetic actions.¹⁵

"One time" is such a vague expression that one expects some explanation of it. And indeed the following sentence (*ὡσπερ γὰρ κτλ.*) does tell us something. It shows that the term is elastic and can cover shorter or longer periods; for *κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους* implies contemporaneity, if not simultaneity, while *ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις* appears to embrace a longer span. But again Aristotle's language is deplorably vague. Herodotus reports (7. 166) a Sicilian tradition that the battles of Salamis and Himera took place on the same day. Is that what Aristotle is referring to? If so, why does he substitute something so inexact as *κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους* for Herodotus's precise *τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας*? Moreover Herodotus makes nothing of the coincidence, whereas Aristotle's phrase *οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος* makes us suspect that he is speaking against somebody who did make something of it. Under these circumstances it is natural to think of Ephorus, for Ephorus did assert a causal connection between the attack of the Persians on Greece and that of the Carthaginians on Sicily, namely that Xerxes proposed to Carthage an alliance *and a simultaneous preparation and attack*. Diodorus 11. 1. 4: *ὁ δὲ Ξέρξης ... διεπρεσβεύσατο πρὸς Καρχηδονίους περὶ κοινοπραγίας καὶ συνέθετο πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς μὲν τὴν Ἑλλάδα*

¹⁵ I have not attempted to push the question farther. Aristotle does not give any metaphysical basis for the status of time in poetry, any more than he offers a metaphysics of poetry (if there is such a thing) in general. The treatment of time in the *Physics* (4. 10-14) has no discernible relation to our problem, and Callahan, in his analysis of Aristotle's theory (J. F. Callahan, *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, 38-87), makes no reference to the *Poetics*. It may perhaps be relevant to point out, however, that for Aristotle time is merely a *physical* principle, the measure and correlate of motion. "He [Aristotle] does not begin with the broad world-view that we have seen employed in the *Timaeus*, into which time enters as an essential ingredient in the universe as a whole" (*Ibid.* 40).

κατοικοῦντας Ἑλλήνας στρατεύειν, Καρχηδονίου; δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις μεγάλας παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις καὶ καταπολεμῆσαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς περὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας; *ibid.* 20. 1: Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ συντεθειμένοι πρὸς Πέρσας τοῖς αὐτοῖς καιροῖς καταπολεμῆσαι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν Ἑλλήνας.¹⁶ Here we find not only a verbal parallel but a satisfactory background of meaning for Aristotle's broad phrase κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους; for in Diodorus' account τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις (καιροῖς) refers to the whole joint plan of campaign: the preparations (according to Diodorus [i.e., Ephorus], 11. 1. 5, they took three years) were to be synchronized as well as the attack.

Thus Ephorus presented the perils of Greece in 480 as the result of a world-wide, coördinated pincer movement aimed at all the Greeks simultaneously: πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος.¹⁷ I suggest that this is what Aristotle refers to, and that for some reason not known to us he has taken this occasion to register a dissent against Ephorus' combination.¹⁸ In this he has some modern support, although a majority of Greek historians in the last half century or more have accepted

¹⁶ Schol. Pind. P. 1. 146b (= *FGrHist* 70F186) gives the same account, but with less detail and without the significant phrase τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις.

¹⁷ The idea is in keeping with the rationalistic yet ambitious spirit of the would-be world historian. See G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus*, Cambridge, 1935, 18-19; E. Schwartz, *PW* 6. 12-13 (one-sided). On the other hand the synchronism Himera-Thermopylae, which appears a little later in Diodorus (11. 24. 1), and which Gudeman for example ascribes to Ephorus, is probably not his. The added remark ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες τοῦ δαιμονίου περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν [τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ just above] ποιήσαντος γενέσθαι τὴν τε καλλίστην νίκην καὶ τὴν ἐνδοξατάτην ἤτταν, with its combination of officious piety and Sicilian local pride (Sicily records the most glorious victory on the same day that Greece suffers a—most honorable, to be sure—defeat), smells unmistakably of Timaeus. So R. Laqueur, *PW* 6A. 1199-1200, with citation of other Timaeian synchronisms of equally edifying purport; on T.'s special idolatry of Gelon, *ibid.* 1086-1087, 1196. Laqueur shows in detail, 1083-1087, how Diodorus' chief source or 'frame' for the account of the battle of Himera (11. 20-26) is Ephorus, but with constant additions ('enrichments') from Timaeus. Cf. also E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* 4.² 1, Stuttgart, 1939, 376 n. 1, who extends the debt to Timaeus back to 11. 1. Thus we cannot ascribe either precise synchronism (Himera-Salamis, Himera-Thermopylae) to Ephorus with certainty; but he probably followed Herodotus in this matter as in others. If he did make Himera contemporaneous with Salamis, Diodorus had to choose, and he chose Timaeus, undoubtedly because the pious—and patriotic—explanation of the latter appealed to him more.

¹⁸ That he is replying to E. is stated as a fact by R. Hackforth, *CAH* 4. 378.

the alliance as a fact.¹⁹ Fortunately we need not try to settle the question here. But there is nothing impossible, psychologically or chronologically, in Aristotle's having criticized Ephorus.²⁰

Another parallel, this time with *ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις*, makes it arguable that Aristotle has Ephorus in mind here too. The prologue to the 16th book of Diodorus makes an elaborate and self-conscious proclamation of method, which unfortunately we shall have to quote at length: *ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἱστορικαῖς πραγματείαις καθήκει τοὺς συγγραφεῖς περιλαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς βίβλοις ἢ πόλεων [= περὶ πλείους!] ἢ βασιλείων [= περὶ ἓνα] πράξεις αὐτοτελεῖς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους· οὕτως γὰρ μάλιστα διαλαμβάνομεν τὴν ἱστορίαν εὐμνημόνευτον καὶ σαφῆ γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν. (2) αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡμιτελεῖς πράξεις, οὐκ ἔχουσαι συνηχῆς ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τὸ πέρασ, μεσολαβοῦσι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν φιλαναγνωστούντων, αἱ δὲ τὸ τῆς διηγήσεως συνεχῆς περιλαμβάνουσαι μέχρι τῆς τελευτῆς ἀπρητισμένην τὴν τῶν πράξεων ἔχουσαι ἀπαγγελίαν ... (3) διόπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς παρ<ι?>όντες ἐπὶ τὰς Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντου πράξεις πειρασόμεθα τούτῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ πραχθέντα περιλαβεῖν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ βίβλῳ. In the prooemium to book 17 the idea and its execution are alluded to again: ἡ μὲν πρὸ ταύτης βύβλος, οὐσα τῆς ὅλης συντάξεως ἐξκαιδεκάτη, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔσχεν ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντου βασιλείας· περιελήφθησαν δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πρᾶ-*

¹⁹ For: E. A. Freeman, *History of Sicily*, 2, Oxford, 1891, 166-169, 510-513; G. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* 2, Gotha, 1888, 258-259; G. B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War*, New York - London, 1901, 249-250, 254-256; How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, Oxford, 1912, 2. 201; E. Meyer, *op. cit.* 335 n. 1; H. Bengtson, *Gr. Gesch. (Handb. d. Alt.-wiss.* 3. 4), Munich, 1950, 154-155; J. B. Bury, *Hist. of Greece*² (rev. R. Meiggs), London, 1951, 301. Against: R. W. Macan, *Herod., the Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books*, 2, London, 1908, 186; E. Schwartz, *PW* 6. 15, 58-61; Hackforth, *loc. cit.*; K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 2. 1, Strassburg, 1914, 72 n. 2; Wilcken.

²⁰ Jacoby, *FGrHist* 2C (1926), p. 88, on 70F186, rightly says that our passage does not justify Niese's inference (*Hermes* 44 (1909) 171) that Aristotle knew nothing about the idea of an alliance. On the relation between Aristotle and Ephorus see Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, Berlin, 1893, 1. 305-307; Jacoby, *op. cit.* 32.—Since we do not know that Ephorus gave an exact synchronism of Himera and Salamis, while Herodotus does, it is possible that Aristotle is thinking of Theopompus, who wrote (probably in his youth; see Laqueur, *PW* 5A. 2188) a two-volume epitome of Herodotus (*Suid. s.v. Θεόπομπος*; *FGrHist* 115F1-4), and who had a marked taste for wonders and marvels (see the fragments of the separate or separable book of his *Philippica* entitled *Θαυμάσια*, *FGrHist* 115F64-76). But the idea *schwebt in der Luft*, as the Germans say.

ξεις αἱ μὲν τοῦ Φιλίππου πᾶσαι μέχρι τῆς τελευτῆς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων τε καὶ ἔθνῶν καὶ πόλεων ὅσαι γεγόνασι κατὰ τοὺς τῆς βασιλείας ταύτης χρόνους. Laqueur has shown²¹ that at least the first of these *prooemia* (that of 17 may be a *réchauffée* by Diodorus out of the other) is from Ephorus, and²² that it contains a self-justification by Ephorus of his new principle of arrangement, against the annalistic principle of Thucydides (and, we can add, of the continuators of Thucydides: Xenophon, Oxyrhynchus historian, Theopompus). For Ephorus did consciously adopt a new principle, not absolutely disregarding chronology but subordinating it to a thematic treatment of history, giving each book so far as possible a single main theme as well as a separate preface.²³ For the middle of the fourth century this appears to have meant, for example, that Philip's career was narrated in book 27, while 28 and 29 were devoted to Sicily (the two Dionysii; Timoleon), and Ephorus' son Demophilus added a 30th book on the Sacred War.²⁴ In this manner each book could and did carry a single narrative (e.g., the deeds of Philip) through a number of years, instead of interrupting it constantly to take notice of contemporary events elsewhere.

The idea that Aristotle is referring to Ephorus' thematic method, through which larger sequences of events could be told continuously, gives for the first time some point to ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις, and to the antithesis between it and κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους. The burden of Aristotle's critique is then not so much that Ephorus' method is wrong as that *no historiographical method, whether synchronistic (annalistic) or thematic, can get around the arbitrariness of chronology. History must tell all that happened in a given time, to one man or many. Whether that time is the relatively short frame of a year (or Thucydides' winters*

²¹ *Hermes* 46 (1911) 161-206, esp. 196-200.

²² *Ibid.* 321-354, esp. 339-342.

²³ Diodor. 5. 1. 4, "Ἐφορος δὲ ... οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐπιτέτευχε· τῶν γὰρ βιβλῶν ἐκάστην πεποίηκε περιέχειν κατὰ γένος τὰς πράξεις. So Diodorus, in conscious imitation, announces, *ibid.* 2. 1, that his fifth book will be a *νησιωτική*; the 16th deals with Philip; the 17th with Alexander; etc. On his difficulty in combining Ephorus' thematic principle with his own essentially annalistic procedure see Laqueur, *loc. cit.* On Ephorus' method see Schwartz, *PW* 6. 4; Barber, *op. cit.* 17-24, 47-48; Jacoby, *op. cit.* 26-27 (though Jacoby's suggestion that κατὰ γένος refers to a separation according to the four great regions—Greece, the Orient, the West [Sicily], Macedonia—is not very plausible).

²⁴ Barber, *op. cit.* 39, 45-47.

and summers) or the longer one of a great war²⁵ or a great man's career,²⁶ the historian must still relate many events that have no causal connection with each other. The sad thing, however, is that the poets, who do not have to proceed so, should abdicate their rights and imitate the historians, who do. When Aristotle says, 59a29-30, "By and large, most of the poets do this," he is certainly referring back to a21 ff., *ιστορίαις... ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη* (i.e., it is *not* necessary in poetry) ... *ποιεῖσθαι δῆλωσιν ... ἐνὸς χρόνου κτλ.*, not to the sentence *ὥσπερ γὰρ ... οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος*. The latter is in fact not an integral part of the discussion of poetry but a special comment on historiography. As such it is at the very least a parenthesis, and I have so marked it in the text-lemma. Actually there is no reason why it could not be a later note by Aristotle; but there is also no compelling reason for designating it as one.²⁷

One small textual question remains. In a28 *θάτερον μετὰ θατέρου* is the better attested reading,²⁸ but seems out of place here since it

²⁵ The Persian War appears to have come in Ephorus' tenth book, though the matter is not certain: Barber 18-19, 31.

²⁶ What has been said about Ephorus could be also applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to Theopompus' *Philippica*, in which *ὅσα συνέβη περὶ ἑνα* was taken as the framework for the history of a whole period. But again there are no specific indications of a reference to Theopompus.

²⁷ One cannot find an external reference like this without wishing that it could be exploited for the dating of the *Poetics*. But it is impossible to say anything conclusive. The date (and manner) of publication of Ephorus' work has been much discussed, and the extreme estimates are half a century apart (Schwartz, *Hermes* 44 [1909] 481 ff.: before 356/55; Max Mühl, *Klio* 29 [1946] 111-113: end of the 4th century). But the most reasonable hypothesis is that he began after 360 and before 338 (probably in the earlier rather than the later part of this period, since he seems to have been a slow worker) and died with the work still unfinished, about 330: see Barber 7-13. Since he almost certainly published as he went along, book by book or, more probably, by groups of books (Jacoby), Aristotle might have taken notice of his method and the problem it presented at any time after, say, 350. My own feeling is that Aristotle's note may have been written a considerable time after the first draft of the *Poetics*, perhaps around or after 330 when most or all of Ephorus' history had appeared. But of course this is no more than an unverifiable guess.—One would also like to know whether Aristotle already had these ideas in mind in chapter 9. The fact that the only historian he mentions there is Herodotus may possibly—just possibly—indicate that the problems raised by mid-fourth-century historiography were not yet vividly present to him; or that the histories in question were not yet published when he wrote the chapter.

²⁸ *Μετὰ θατέρου* only Parisinus 2038. Why Gudeman ascribes it to Σ is a

appears to re-inject the point of the first clause (κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους) into the second. If our surmise was correct, however, that the defining phrases κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους and ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις refer to different historical methods (synchronistic or annalistic vs. thematic) and the time-spans with which they characteristically operate (year by year, or season by season, vs. longer periods), we may take θάτερον μετὰ θατέρον as referring to longer but still contemporaneous developments or sequences of events in two or more different places. On the other hand, if our over-all interpretation of the sentence is rejected we must almost certainly read θάτερον μετὰ θατέρον.²⁹

59a30-b7

διὸ ὡσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανεῖν Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μὴδὲ τὸν πόλεμον, καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος, ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον. λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι ὁ μῦθος ἢ, τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα, καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ. |
 35 νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβῶν ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις, οἷς δια-
 37 λαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἓνα ποιοῦσι καὶ
 | b1 | περὶ ἓνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πράξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας μία τραγωδία ποιεῖται ἑκατέρως, ἢ δύο μόναι, ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς
 5 | Ἰλιάδος [[πλέον] ὀκτώ, οἷον δπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτίτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος, πτωχεῖα, Λάκαιναι, Ἰλίον πέρις, καὶ ἀπόπλους [καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες]].

59a30

Hence one can see Homer's divine superiority to the rest, in the sense we have already mentioned, from this fact also: that he did not attempt to compose the War 'whole' either, although it had a beginning and an end. For the story was bound to be either too long and not easy to view as a whole, or, if it observed the norm of length, too jumbled

mystery, since at least μετὰ θατέρον (-ου), if not also the first θατέρον, is missing in the Arabic version. See Tkatsch 1. 196a; 2. 20, n. 52 to p. 275.

²⁹ For the latter cf. 8. 51a27, ὧν οὐδὲν θατέρον γενομένου (note *corist*) ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θατέρον γενέσθαι; 9. 51b34, λέγω δ' ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπεισόδια μετ' ἀλλήλα οὐτ' εἰκὸς οὐτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

35 by its kaleidoscopic variety. | As it is, he has picked out
 one portion of the story and used many of the others as
 episodes, with which he intersperses his composition. But
 37 | b1 the other poets compose their work around one man | or
 one period of time, i.e., one action containing many parts:
 so for example the man who composed the *Kypria* and the
Little Iliad. Hence from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* one tragedy
 apiece can be made, or at most two, but from the *Kypria*
 5 and *Little Iliad* a large number [[more] eight, viz., the
 Award of the Arms, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, Eurypylos,
 beggar-expedition, Spartan Women, sack of Troy, and de-
 parture of the fleet [and *Sinon* and *Trojan Women*]].

Now for the concrete example. The commentators and translators
 unanimously assume that *ὡσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη* refers to 8. 51a22 ff.
 (*ὁ δ' Ὀμηρος κτλ.*), and indeed the reference is unmistakable. But
 there is still a difficulty. "Hence, as we have already said, Homer
 shows his divine superiority ... in this way also." But Aristotle has
 not already said this; he is about to say it now. *Καὶ ταύτη* refers to
 the new matter which follows (*τῷ μηδὲ κτλ.*), none of which was dis-
 cussed in chapter 8. This discrepancy is the result, as so often,³⁰
 of taking *ὡσπερ εἶπομεν* as a verbal citation, whereas it is a substantive
 reference. Homer's divine superiority was attested before by his uni-
 fied construction of the *Odyssey*; it will appear again here from his
 unified construction of the *Iliad*. Thus *ὡσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη* refers to
 the *idea* of 8. 51a22 ff.: "Homer's divine superiority to the others in
 the way we have already stated can be seen from this also."

That this is what Aristotle means is proved by the fact that it ex-
 plains *μηδὲ (τὸν πόλεμον)* for the first time. Most of the translators
 and commentators ignore the word, and those who do notice it make
 nothing sensible of it.³¹ What we need in order to give it meaning is
another poetic subject which was also "too large and not εὐσύνοπτος"
 (a33), and which Homer handled with equal genius; and that subject
 was precisely the life of Odysseus, *ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη* (8. 51a25).

³⁰ See below on 24. 60a3.

³¹ Susemihl, "hat nicht einmal versucht." But Aristotle says *μηδὲ τὸν πό-
 λεμον*, not *μηδ' ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν*. Bywater, "did not attempt to deal even with
 the Trojan war." But why "even"? Is Aristotle comparing the Trojan war with
 other wars? Butcher, "never attempts to make the whole war"; etc.

Homer did not undertake to "compose it whole"; and he did not attempt the feat with the Trojan War *either*.

Thus the life of Odysseus and the War stand as coördinate examples of subjects unsuitable for treatment 'whole.' They represent the alternatives Aristotle put in a23-24: ἐνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα (Odysseus) ἢ πλείους (the War). The division appears yet again in a37-b1, περὶ ἕνα ποιοῦσι (*Heracleïds, Theseïds, etc.*: 8. 51a20) καὶ περὶ ἕνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν προᾶξιν πολυμερῆ (*Kypria, Little Iliad*, but also the Trojan War as it would have been handled by another poet; see below *ad loc.*). Homer has shown in the *Odyssey* how to avoid the biographical epic, in the *Iliad* he has shown how to avoid the chronicle; the two achievements together attest his "divine" superiority.³² All the other (epic) poets³³ are either biographers- or chroniclers-in-verse; they undertake to relate all the events of a given 'single time.' What the *Iliad* would have been, if Homer had been an ordinary poet, is indicated by the next clause, τῷ μηδὲ κτλ. The Trojan War had a beginning and an end: that is, it represents a 'single time.' Had Homer been like the rest, he would have "composed the War whole"; that is, he would have set forth all its events as they came, in chronological order. We saw above, in connection with 18. 56a13, 16, what 'composing whole' means; and the present passage, with its complement (a37 ff.), furnished the confirmation. Thus the sentence does two valuable things: (1) it supplies an actual example of a 'single time,' from which we see that the term can cover a period as long as ten years—or, no doubt, still longer—provided it has a recognizable beginning and end, and (2) it helps to clarify the idea of 'composing whole.'

If Homer had proceeded in this fashion, "the story"³⁴ would have

³² Θεσπέσιος, though in itself no more than an echo of the standing cliché ὁ θεῖος Ὀμηρος, is a fearfully strong word for Aristotle (no other case in Bonitz, *Index*). To reduce it to "marvellous" (Bywater), or even to "transcendent excellence" (Butcher), is not permissible. In this case Aristotle actually sees divinity—not necessarily however, 'inspiration': see above on 17. 55a32-34—in a human being.

³³ Gudeman lays stress on σχεδόν, a29. But the limitation is not worth much. When it comes to the real confrontation, a37, Homer stands against "the others," i.e., all the others. Cf. 24. 60a6, μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν; *ibid.* 18-19 (Homer has taught "the others" how to lie *comme il faut*).

³⁴ Ὁ μῦθος (Riccardi., Ar.) is not absolutely necessary: cf. 18. 56a16, πέρσαι Ἰλίου ὄλην ἐποίησαν, with 56a13, τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιοῖ μῦθον, where in both cases the material, the story, is meant. But the word clarifies Aristotle's

been bound to be³⁵ too long and not easy to grasp as a whole, or, keeping³⁶ to the norm in its size, encumbered (entangled) by its multiplicity." Aristotle is considering two alternative possibilities, both predicated on 'composing the war whole.' Homer might have spread out his work to a length corresponding to the bulk of his story, or he might have compressed it considerably. What has not been noticed is that *λίαν μέγας* and *μετριάζοντα* imply between them the norm of length which was set up in 7. 51a12-15. To be sure, that was a norm for tragedy. But the whole point of the present chapter is that epics should have dramatic structure (a18-20) and produce the artistic effect of a *ζῶον ἐν ὄλον*. Homer is the man who achieved this: how, we shall be told in a moment. Meanwhile we have already seen, in connection with 17. 55b15 ff., that the tragic norm of length is applicable to epic in a certain way and to a certain extent, namely, to the central action of a *Homeric* epic; and we shall find the applicability indirectly reaffirmed in the next chapter (24. 59b18-22).

The passage before us sketches, by way of contrast, how the *Iliad* would have come out if Homer had followed the usual procedure. The 'story' would either (1) have been too long and difficult to grasp as a whole, or (2) if it had held to the norm of length, it would have been encumbered, entangled,³⁷ by the multiplicity of its details. But would the poem actually have been longer than the *Iliad*, or would it necessarily have contained a greater mass of details? No, the thing for which Aristotle praises Homer is not that his *poem* holds to the norm of length, but that its 'story' or plot does so; and not that a multiplicity of details is excluded, but that they are set apart from the main story as 'episodes.' A chronicle-type *Iliad* would have been too long if it had been only half the length of the actual poem, and it would have been too 'entangled' if it had had fewer incidents than

meaning, and its loss in our Greek MSS perhaps accounts for the anomalous endings *μετριάζοντα, καταπεπλεγμένον*.

³⁵ *Ἄν ... ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι* seems to be a conflation of *ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι* (putting the matter from the poet's point of view as he considered how to arrange his work: "It's going to be too long") and *ἄν ... εἴη*, or rather *ἄν ... γένοιτο*.

³⁶ The anomalous shift of case from nominative to accusative is not too harsh to be borne, and (this against Rostagni's parenthesis) the two clauses before and after *ἤ* imperiously demand parallel construction. They both represent not what the war *was* but what its treatment *might have been* at Homer's hands. Moreover the counterpart of *μετριάζοντα* is clearly not *ποιεῖν ὄλον* but *λίαν μέγας*.

³⁷ No one metaphor in English will quite render *καταπεπλεγμένον*.

the *Iliad* but had strung them out in purely serial order. In both cases the 'story' would have been identical with the poem. Everything in the poem would have belonged to the *μῦθος*, and would therefore have contributed to (1) lengthening it or (2) complicating it.

Homer's genius led him to another solution: he separated *μῦθος* and *episodes*. This method has already been characterized in 18. 56a16-17 as *ποιεῖν κατὰ μέρος*. We are now told concretely what this means. Homer 'took' or 'picked out' one 'part' from the whole congeries of incidents that made up the War, and "has used many³⁸ of them³⁹ as episodes,⁴⁰ ... with which he intersperses⁴¹ his composition." The episodes stand in the intervals between the successive incidents of the Wrath and "hold them apart." Thus Homer has done precisely what the tragic poet was warned not to do in 9. 51b33-52a1, "dislocated the continuity" of his main action by the insertion of episodes (numerous and bulky ones, in fact; see 26. 62b9-12) at the joints.⁴² What is forbidden to tragedy, or allowed only within narrow limits (17. 55b15), is freely permitted to the epic—why, we shall see in 24. 59b22-30—provided the structure into which the episodes are inserted has the right unity and length: i.e., provided it is of the Homeric type.

We can now begin to see why Aristotle admired Homer so immoderately. It was because he had solved an apparently insoluble problem.⁴³

³⁸ Not all. The secret of the method is twofold: selection and arrangement.

³⁹ *Ἀντῶν*, sc. τῶν (ἄλλων) μερῶν. See Rostagni *ad loc.*

⁴⁰ An episode, then, is a 'part' (cf. 18. 56a14; 26. 62b9), but with a difference: It is a part of the poem which is *not* a part of the central action.

⁴¹ Not "diversifies" (Butcher), or "relieves the uniformity of his narrative" (Bywater). Vahlen proposed the correct interpretation, *Beiträge*² 307 ('3. 328-329, in n.¹⁸ to p. 277): "durch die er die Dichtung auseinanderhält [my italics], dass sie nicht so kurz und karg ausfällt," and compared *Phys.* 4. 6. 213a33; 5. 4. 228-b5, ὥστ' εἴ τις κίνησις στάσει διαλαμβάνεται ("is interrupted"), οὐ μία οὐδέ συνεχῆς· διαλαμβάνεται δὲ εἰ μεταξὺ χρόνος; 8. 8. 264a20. Cf. also Pl. *Phaedo* 81c, διειλημμένην ... ἐπὶ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, "(the soul) interpenetrated [see Archer-Hind's note *ad loc.*] by the bodily"; *ibid.* 110b. Of the recent editors, only Hardy and Sykutris have caught Aristotle's point.

⁴² *Διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν*, though said from a different point of view, refers to the same procedure as *διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς*, 9. 52a1. In connection with tragedy Aristotle stresses the interruption of the continuity; in connection with the epic, where such interruptions are permissible, even desirable, he merely states the fact.

⁴³ In chapter 26, the final *σύγκρισις* of epic and tragedy, we shall find this judgment, not set aside, but modified. Homer's personal achievement remains as great as ever, but the genre he worked in was irredeemably defective.

A poem, to be beautiful, must have unity; yet the epic must and should strive for variety. A poem, to be beautiful, must stay within a certain range of length; yet it is a special trait of the epic that it is free from this limitation. Homer, with the sovereignty of god-given or god-like genius, has combined the incompatible. He has secured unity-in-diversity and limitation-within-freedom by his invention of the central plot. The main action can be unified and *εὐσύνοπτος*; the poem remains free to cultivate diversity and almost unlimited length. Moreover this duplex scheme brings the needful epic variety into full play for the first time; for the central action provides a background against which we can properly measure and enjoy the diversity of the episodes, while the great length of the poem gives the latter their "due length" (18. 56a14) and obviates the feeling of choking or entanglement that ensues when they jostle each other at too close quarters (26. 62b6). Thus Homer has exploited the very defects of the epic to set off its potential virtues; he has realized the essential beauties of the drama without curtailing the special qualities of his own genre. Viewed thus, his achievement is indeed a miracle, and we need not blame Aristotle for crying *θεσπέσιος*.

So far we can go with confidence. But perhaps there is still another inference to be drawn from Aristotle's description of Homer's method. We saw that 'composing the war whole' meant following it from beginning to end, narrating its events in chronological order. Homer, on the other hand, chose one 'part' as his central theme and used "many of them (i.e., the other 'parts')" as episodes. This necessarily means abandoning chronology; for no single 'part' can be co-extensive with the whole duration of the war. Speaking concretely, the Wrath lasts a few weeks, not ten years. It follows that *if the poet was to incorporate many other 'parts' into his structure he must take them from other (alleged) times during the war.* And that is in fact what Homer did. Modern scholarship has pointed out again and again that although the action of the *Iliad* ostensibly takes place during a month or two in the last year of the war, many of the episodes, especially in the early books—e.g., the Catalogue of Ships, the *Teichoskopia*, the duel between Paris and Menelaus, the Marshalling of the Host in book 4—are such as would naturally come at the beginning of hostilities.⁴⁴ Had Aris-

⁴⁴ See for example A. Gemoll, *Der homerische Schiffskatalog*, Progr. Striegau, 1904; W. Schmid, *Philol.* 80 (1925) 73; G. M. Bowra, *Tradition and Design in the Iliad*, Oxford, 1930, 110-113; J. van Leeuwen, *Commentationes homericae*, Lelden,

totle noticed this too? In the light not only of his characterization of Homer's method,⁴⁵ but of the explicit contrast he draws between *μία πρᾶξις* and *εἰς χρόνος* as principles of composition, it seems impossible that he had failed to notice it. Surely it is striking, if not probative, that the one 'episode' he mentions by name—the Catalogue of Ships—is the one which most obviously belongs, by its very nature and purpose, to the beginning of the war rather than its last stages.⁴⁶ I think therefore we may conjecture that Aristotle saw what modern scholarship has rediscovered: that Homer selected episodes from the whole course of the war and incorporated them into a story which, chronologically speaking, is incompatible with them.⁴⁷

In putting forward this conjecture I am not suggesting that Aristotle actually reckoned up the number of days that are supposed to elapse during the *Iliad*. There is nothing to indicate that the thought ever occurred to him. The alleged duration of the poetic action is no more to the point here than it was in chapter 5.⁴⁸ Homeric art, like the true art of tragedy, is un- and anti-chronological. It deals with universals, not with events in time as such; that is precisely the reason why we can risk the inference that Aristotle saw Homer as ignoring and flouting chronology.

The antipodes of Homer's method is that of the other epic poets.

1911, 17-30 (= *Mnemos.*, N. S. 34 [1906] 193-211). Van Leeuwen argued from various indications in the poem that the *Iliad* really is laid in the first summer of the war, and that the common view which places it in the last year stems from the *Odyssey* and later poetry. The idea is ingenious but mistaken: it converts Homer's unchronological method into a new chronological procedure. Moreover, to establish his paradox van L. had to athetize nine lines (B 134-135, 295-296, 313, 325, 327-329).

⁴⁵ Especially *αὐτῶν πολλοῖς*, which must refer to the rest of the mass of incidents scattered over the whole war, not just a few which happened to be concentrated at the end.

⁴⁶ It may be noticed, for what it is worth, that Aristotle does not regard the Catalogue as a later interpolation.

⁴⁷ J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (*Acta Reg. Soc. Lund.* 45), Lund, 1949. 91: "This poem [the *Iliad*] arranges its material around one single incident, Achilles' wrath, and covers only a very few days; and yet it is the 'Iliad,' in other words the story of the whole Trojan war." Incidentally, this concentration on a few days, if Aristotle noticed it at all, would bring the *Iliad* very close to tragedy with respect to 'dramatic time' and further weaken the contrast which he is supposed to have drawn between epic and tragedy on this point in 5. 49b12-14. See below on 24. 59b22-28.

⁴⁸ See above on 5. 40b14.

They, without exception,⁴⁹ have written either biographical epics (*περὶ βίαι*; cf. 8. 51a20, *Ἡρακλήϊδα καὶ Θησηΐδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα*) or⁵⁰ chronicles of a given period, namely⁵¹ a single 'many-part' action: everything that took place during a given time. The examples are the pre-history of the Trojan War, which was told in the *Kypria*, and the sack of Troy (18. 56a16), which was the subject of the *Little Iliad*;⁵² another would be the War 'composed whole,' as it would have been by any poet but Homer.

The remark which follows—that only one tragedy each, or at most two, can be made from *Iliad* and *Odyssey*—seems to stand in flat contradiction with 26. 62b4-5, where it is said that any (kind of) epic gives rise to a number of tragedies.⁵³ Moreover Aristotle has already spoken of the *Iliad* as a *πολύμυθον σύστημα*, 18. 56a11-12 (~26. 62b7-9). The discrepancy can only be reconciled in the way that Gudeman suggests: one or two tragedies could be made out of the *central plot* of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, though a number⁵⁴ were drawn from the *episodes*. But even this is not quite true. Aeschylus made a whole trilogy (*Myrmidons*, *Nereids*, *Phrygians*) out of the Patrokleia and the slaying of Hector. Unless we take the adventurous

⁴⁹ We have already noticed that the limitation implied in *σχεδὸν οἱ πολλοί* (a29) is tacitly dropped here.

⁵⁰ *Καὶ* = *ἤ*; i.e., not necessarily implying that the same man wrote both kinds. Some wrote biographical epics, others wrote chronicles; taken as a whole, the group has written both. Cf. *Ἡρακλήϊδα καὶ Θησηΐδα* in the passage just quoted. Aristotle often uses *καὶ* in this fashion; see above on 14. 53b25; 17. 55a34-b1.

⁵¹ The second *καὶ* is epexegetic.

⁵² Aristotle does not mention the *Ἰλίου πέρις* ascribed to Lesches. By his time, apparently, it was already overshadowed by the *Little Iliad*; see Schmid 1. 1. 207, 213. On the chronicle character of the latter, Schmid, *loc. cit.*; on that of the *Kypria*, *ibid.* 207-209; E. Bethe, *Homer* 2¹, Leipzig and Berlin, 1929, 287-288. — We cannot be sure that the absence of *ὁ* before *τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα* is significant (*ὁ τὴν κοινὴν*. Schömann; Gudeman's ascription of *ὁ* to *Σ* has no warrant: see Tkatsch 1. 189a). For the supposed brachylogy Sykutris compares *De Gen. et Corr.* 1. 2. 316a10, *ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες*. Nevertheless it is at least possible that Aristotle anticipated Bethe's theory that *Kypria* and *Little Iliad* (actually, according to B., the whole Cycle) were conceived by the same brain. If so it was because Aristotle, like Bethe, saw *Kypria* and *Little Iliad* as particularly clear and parallel embodiments of the same idea: a complete chronicle of the War.

⁵³ See below *ad loc.*

⁵⁴ See Gudeman's list, p. 304.

course of assuming that Aristotle regarded a connected trilogy of this kind as a single play—or unless we assume that he is again ignoring Aeschylus—I see no satisfactory way out of the contradiction. The explanation may perhaps be the different points of view of chapters 23 and 26. Here Aristotle is laying all possible stress on the unity of Homer's work and the magnitude of his achievement; there he is pitting the epic as such against tragedy and so is forced to admit that even the Homeric poems lack unity in comparison with the drama. Even so, the discrepancy remains.⁵⁵

A more insistent difficulty confronts us in the last part of the sentence, *ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων κτλ.* Here the words *πλέον ὀκτώ* have long aroused suspicion, and the list of tragedies which follows (ten, not eight) presents a series of anomalies. We will begin with *πλέον ὀκτώ*. The Arabic version perhaps implies *πλέον ἢ ὀκτώ*;⁵⁶ but a translation-device so simple as this (supplying a connective where it is obviously understood) can surely be ascribed to the Syrian or the Arab. In any case, whether *πλέον ὀκτώ* or *πλέον ἢ ὀκτώ*, the question is how the remark squares with the list. Hermann suggested long ago that the latter originally contained just eight titles, and that *πλέον* and the last two titles (*Sinon* and *Troades*) are later additions—by Aristotle himself, as he believed. The idea has been revived by Montmollin, with what seem to me conclusive arguments⁵⁷—conclusive, that is, so far as the thesis of a subsequent addition is concerned, but not necessarily so for the author. Against Aristotelian authorship we may ask why Aristotle would have added two more titles, and in particular these two. Hardly to make the list complete, for in that case there are a number of other plays, at least some of which he must have known, which ought to have been included.⁵⁸ Actually the fact that the *Hecuba*,

⁵⁵ Ritter bracketed everything from *τοιγαροῦν* to the end of the chapter, urging among other things that Aristotle would have written *τῆς Ἰλιάδος καὶ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας* and that *ποιεῖται* (present) is inept. But I have not ventured to follow him so far.

⁵⁶ Gudeman confidently ascribes *ὀκτώ καὶ πλέον* to Σ; but see Tkatsch 1. 175a. The medieval Latin version certainly has *plus quam octo*: see now the text of Franc.-Min.-Pal. But how else *would* a medieval translator render *πλέον ὀκτώ*? Similarly *ἢ* (*πλέον ἢ ὀκτώ*) in the Riccardianus need not be anything more than a natural emendation.

⁵⁷ Montmollin 91-93, pointing out that the first eight titles are in chronological order but the last two are not, and that the first eight are listed *asyndetically* while the last two are connected by *καί*.

⁵⁸ See Gudeman, p. 397, on *Ἰλίον πέρσις* (b6); also p. 395, on *οἶον* (b5).

which Aristotle had included by implication in 18. 56a17 as an example of how to adapt the 'sack of Troy' material to tragedy, is missing here is enough to prove that he was not aiming at completeness—or that he is not the author of the additions.

I regard it as established, then, that *πλέον* and *καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδεις* are later additions to the sentence, but not established that they are from Aristotle.⁵⁹ An inspection of the main list, to which we now turn, will show that it almost certainly is an interpolation (i.e., not Aristotelian); from which it follows *a fortiori* that the extensions we have been considering cannot be Aristotle's. In the first place, the list includes at least two titles (*πρωχελία* and *ἀπόπλους*) which are not attested anywhere else as titles of tragedies. Gudeman suggests that *πρωχελία* is an alternative or sub-title for Sophocles' *Λάκαιναι*; but there is no evidence for this. Séchan accepts the two titles as representing two different plays, but admits that we know nothing about a *πρωχελία* except from the present passage.⁶⁰ As for *ἀπόπλους*, Welcker thought that it might be a reference to Sophocles' *Polyxena*, or at any rate had to do with the events at the end of the war. The assumption is certainly more probable than that of Vahlen, that it refers to the temporary withdrawal of the Achaeans to Tenedos during the affair of the Wooden Horse.⁶¹ But the fact remains that *ἀπόπλους* is not attested as a tragic title.

In all the fuller discussions of the list, Proclus' summary of the contents of the *Little Iliad*⁶² has been faithfully cited as a control on the titles and the order in which they are mentioned; but it seems not to have occurred to anyone to investigate Proclus as a possible source. Yet his narrative turns up all ten titles, or very close approximations

⁵⁹ In the early nineteenth century the prevailing view seems to have been that the words were an interpolation, and not by Aristotle. So Welcker, Spengel, Schöll, and Ritter (refs. in Welcker, *Die Griech. Trag.* 3, Bonn, 1841, 1148-1149 n. 1); also Susemihl (n. 286, p. 203) and Tucker (T. G. Tucker, *Ar. Poetica*, London, 1899, *ad loc.*).

⁶⁰ *Études sur la trag. gr.*, Paris, 1926, 156. Welcker, *op. cit.* 951, suggested that *πρωχελία* might be identical with the *Φρουροί* of Ion of Chios. On possible new archaeological evidence for a *πρωχελία* tragedy see Pohlenz *Trag.*³ Erläut. 185-186.

⁶¹ *Beiträge*³ 163 (13. 283-284). Vahlen himself admits that his motive for the suggestion is to get *ἀπόπλους* in before *Σίνων*: i.e., to get a chronological order.

⁶² Most conveniently available in the 5th vol. of the Oxford (OCT) ed. of Homer, pp. 106-107.—It is unfortunate that A. Severyn's studies on the *Chrestomathy* have only reached the stage of paleographical analysis (*Recherches sur la Chr. de Pr.*, vol. 3, Paris, 1953).

to them, and in a manner and an order which satisfactorily account not only for the main list but for the supplement at the end. Unfortunately we shall have to copy out Proclus in full; but the quotation itself, with notes as we go along, will supply the best support for our argument.

Ἐξῆς [i.e., after the *Aithiopsis*] δ' ἐστὶν Ἰλιάδος μικρᾶς βιβλία τέσσαρα Λέσχεω Μιτυληναίου περιέχοντα τάδε. ἢ τῶν (1) ὄπλων κρίσις γίνεται, καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ βούλησιν Ἀθηναῖς λαμβάνει, Αἴας δ' ἐμμανῆς γενόμενος τὴν τε λείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν λυμαίνεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀναιρεῖ.⁶³ μετὰ ταῦτα Ὀδυσσεὺς λοχίσας Ἐλενον λαμβάνει, καὶ χρήσαντος περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τούτου Διομήδης ἐκ Δήμων (2) Φιλοκτήτην⁶⁴ ἀνάγει. ἰαθεῖς δὲ οὗτος ἐπὶ Μαχάονος καὶ μονομαχίσας Ἀλεξάνδρω κτείνει, καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἐπὶ Μενελάου κατακισθέντα ἀνελόμενοι θάπτουσιν οἱ Τρῶες.⁶⁵ μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Διήφοβος Ἑλένην γαμεῖ. καὶ (3) Νεοπτόλεμον Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐκ Σκύρου ἀγαγὼν τὰ ὄπλα δίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς· καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς αὐτῷ φαντάζεται.⁶⁶ (4) Εὐρύπυλος δὲ ὁ Τηλέφου ἐπίκουρος τοῖς Τρωσὶ παραγίνεται, καὶ ἀριστεύοντα αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνει Νεοπτόλεμος.⁶⁷ καὶ Τρῶες πολιορκοῦνται, καὶ Ἐπειὸς κατ' Ἀθηναῖς προαίρεισιν τὸν

⁶³ Ὅπλων κρίσις in our list (i.e., in the *Poetles*) is taken from here as a rubric covering the whole story of the madness and suicide of Ajax; hence not Αἴας, which it would have been more natural to Aristotle to cite (he certainly knew Sophocles' play better and/or valued it more highly than that of Aeschylus); this as a first indication that our titles refer to subjects, i.e., sections of the epic material, rather than to plays as such.

⁶⁴ Again a rubric which covers a whole section of the epic material (beginning with the capture of Helenus), not a reference to a particular play. The excerptor gaily goes on to *Νεοπτόλεμος*, unconcerned by possible ambiguity from the latter's prominence in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.

⁶⁵ This part of the story was dramatized by Sophocles in the *Philoctetes at Troy* (see Jebb-Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, Cambridge, 1917, 2. 307-308); but the excerptor gives no sign that there were two dramas with different subjects. For him *Φιλοκτήτης* covers the whole story from Lemnos to the burial of Paris.

⁶⁶ *Νεόπ.* in the *Poetles* refers, then, neither to Neoptolemus's role at Lemnos (Sophocles), nor to the duel with Eurypylos, nor to his killing of Priam, nor to his own murder by Orestes at Delphi (Soph. *Hermione*, Eur. *Andromache*), but to his arrival at Troy. It was dramatized by Sophocles and Nicomachus; see Welcker, *op. cit.* 1015-1016.—A new frag. of Soph.'s *Skyrioi* in *POxy* 2077 (*Oxyrh. Pap.* 17, London, 1927, p. 30; D. L. Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.*, Camb. and London, 1942 [Loeb], 20-21).

⁶⁷ We now know, thanks to *POxy* 1175 (*Oxyrh. Pap.* 9, London, 1912, p. 86; Page, *op. cit.* 16-21), that Sophocles wrote a *Eurypylos*; see Jebb-Pearson, *op. cit.* 1. 146-149; Schmid 1. 2. 423-424.

δούρειον Ἴππον κατασκευάζει,⁶⁸ Ὀδυσσεύς τε (5) αἰκισάμενος
 ἐαυτὸν κατὰ σκοπὸς⁶⁹ εἰς Ἴλιον παραγίνεται, καὶ ἀναγνω-
 ρισθεὶς ὑφ' Ἑλένης περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τῆς πόλεως συντίθεται, κτεί-
 νας τέ τινας τῶν Τρώων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀφικνεῖται.⁷⁰ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα
 σὺν Λιομήδει (6) τὸ παλλάδιον ἐκκομίζει ἐκ τῆς Ἰλίου.⁷¹
 Ἐπειτα εἰς τὸν δούρειον Ἴππον τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐμβιβάσαντες τὰς τε
 σκηνάς καταφλέξαντες οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς Τένεδον ἀνάγον-
 ται· οἱ δὲ Τρῶες τῶν κακῶν ὑπολαβόντες ἀπηλλάχθαι τὸν τε δούρειον
 Ἴππον εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσδέχονται, διελόντες μέρος τι τοῦ τείχους,
 καὶ εὐωχοῦνται ὡς νενικηκότες τοὺς Ἑλληνας.⁷²

At this point Proclus ends his summary of the *Little Iliad* and begins that of Arctinus' *Iliou Persis*. We need not go into the ticklish question of the relation between the two poems and the accuracy of Proclus' report.⁷³ What concerns us is that the author of our list, whoever he

⁶⁸ Here the excerptor ignores or overlooks the *Epeius* of Sophocles. Perhaps he did not know there was a play on the subject; or more likely he was beginning to skip.

⁶⁹ For these descriptive phrases the excerptor has substituted *πτωχεία* out of *Od.* δ 247-248, ἄλλω δ' αὐτὸν φρωτὶ κατακρίπτων ἤϊσκε δέκτην, to which the schollast says that the *κυκλικός* (i.e., presumably Lesches in the *Little Iliad*; see Allen on fr. 11 of the poem) took *δέκτη* as a name (*Dectes*), Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ *δέκτη* μὲν ἐπαίτη—i.e., 'beggar'; see Liddell and Scott* s.v. Cf. also Apollodor. *Epit.* 5. 13, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐαυτὸν αἰκισάμενος καὶ πενιχρὰν στολὴν ἐνδυσάμενος ἀγνώστω εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσέρχεται ὡς ἐπαίτης; Eur. *Rhes.* 503, ἤδη δ' ἀγέτης πτωχικὴν ἔχων στολὴν ἐσῆλθε πύργους; Eur. *Hec.* 240, δυσχλαινία τ' ἄμορφος. All these sources would be easily available to a late or Byzantine annotator. The two plays belonged to those which were included in the late-antique and Byzantine school-edition of Euripides and have come down to us with scholia.

⁷⁰ The only known play that could correspond to this section is the *Φροντοί* of Ion (but see n. 60 above). But our excerptor is not listing play-titles, he is rubricking sections of the epic material.

⁷¹ Here, by way of exception, we have in the *Poetics* what can only be a tragic title (*Λάκαιναι*), and therefore a stumbling-block to our hypothesis of an interpolation based on Proclus. On the play see Jebb-Pearson, *op. cit.* 2. 34-36. There can be no reasonable doubt that it had to do with the theft of the Palladion, and that Helen (and presumably the "Laconian women," who must have been her attendants) was in league with Odysseus and the Achaeans; see Séchan, *loc. cit.* How could this have been known to a late annotator? The three explicit citations from the *Lacuenae* are by Pollux, Priscian, and Herodian, so that some knowledge of the play may well have been still current in late antiquity.

⁷² Again the excerptor has skipped. On *Sinon* see below.

⁷³ See Bethe, *op. cit.* 212-216; Schmid 1. 1. 205-207, 212-213.

was, has ignored the alleged boundary between *Little Iliad* and *Iliou Persis* and taken his next two titles from Proclus' summary of the latter.⁷⁴ Moreover he has done his excerpting in a broader and lazier fashion than ever, picking up only (7) Ἰλίου πέρσις from the heading of this section of Proclus' narrative (ἔπεται δὲ τούτοις Ἰλίου πέρσιδος βιβλία β' Ἀρκτίνου κτλ.) and (8) ἀπόπλους from the end (ἔπειτα ἀποπλέουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ φθορὰν αὐτοῖς ἢ Ἀθηναῖα κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος μηχανᾶται). Or, equally possible and perhaps more likely, he has indicated in completely general fashion the contents of *Iliou Persis* and *Nostoi*, as related by Proclus,⁷⁵ as a kind of dessert to the meal.

I believe that the order of titles, and their peculiarities (except *Λάκαιναι*), can be better explained by the hypothesis of Proclus as a source than by any other. And the same is true of the last two titles (the added ones). Under Ἰλίου πέρσις Proclus reports the reception of the Horse; Laocoön and the two snakes; the withdrawal of Aeneas and his followers to Ida; καὶ Σίνων τὸν πυρσοῦς ἀνίσχει τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, πρότερον εἰσεληλυθῶς προσποιήτος; the storming of the city; Neoptolemus and Priam; Menelaus, Helen, and Deiphobus; Ajax and Cassandra; Polyxena; καὶ Ὀδυσσεύς Ἀστυνάκτα ἀνελόnton Νεοπτόλεμος Ἀνδρομάχην γέρας λαμβάνει; Aethra; the departure. Out of this sequence a second annotator has selected two additional well-known subjects, Σίνων and Τρωάδες,⁷⁶ and noted at the beginning, opposite "eight," the correction "more." Why these two? Sinon was more prominent in the later epic tradition (Vergil, Quintus Smyrnaeus)⁷⁷

⁷⁴ So T. W. Allen, *CQ* 2 (1908) 85—naturally he ascribes the carelessness to Aristotle—"It seems to me probable that Aristotle, speaking more or less from memory, ran these two little verse-chronicles together, and having begun to pick out subjects from the Little as distinguished from the Great Iliad, went on with the story as far as its natural end, forgetting he had transgressed the artificial boundary of the *Μικρὰ Ἰλιάς*. I leave the question of likelihood to the reader." We may leave it to the reader in turn whether such a piece of awkwardness is more likely in Aristotle or an annotator at the end of antiquity who had never seen either poem, or any poem of the Cycle.

⁷⁵ Proclus' account of the *Nostoi* brings ἀποπλέω and equivalents repeatedly: Ἀθηναῖα Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ Μενέλαον εἰς ἔρω καθίστησι περὶ τοῦ ἔκπλου ... Διομήδης δὲ καὶ Νέστωρ ἀναχθέντες ... μεθ' οὗς ἐκπλεύσας ὁ Μενέλαος ... τῶν δὲ περὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀποπλεόντων. Most of the content, in fact, is ἀπόπλους.

⁷⁶ Hence—what has always caused remark—they are out of the chronological order. Καὶ Σ. καὶ Τρω. : "also *Sinon* and *Troades*" (actual titles).

⁷⁷ See also Apollodor. *Epil.* 5. 15, 19. These seem more plausible sources than

than Proclus makes him, in fact he along with Odysseus dominates the story of the Wooden Horse; and the *Troades* was, together with *Ajax* and *Hecuba*, the only tragedy dealing with the Trojan part of the Cycle which was still a part of the common property of educated men—i.e., still a part of the school curriculum—at the end of antiquity. In the light of what we have already found, these facts seem to me adequate to stamp *πλέον* and *καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες* as interpolations within an interpolation.⁷⁸

One final argument: *ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος*, b4, leaves no room for a second quantitative expression referring specially to the second title: we have to take *πολλαὶ* with both genitives. If Aristotle meant to go on with (*πλέον*) *ὀκτώ κτλ.*, he would have had to write *καὶ ἐκ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος*; but there is no trace of *ἐκ* in the manuscript tradition.⁷⁹

It is no light matter to propose the athetesis of a passage which has always been accepted (save by Ritter) as genuine, and upon which so many inferences as to literary history have been based. But it seems to me that the evidence is sufficient. The names in our list—except *Lacaenae*, *Sinon*, and *Troades*—are not play-titles but designations based on Proclus, referring to sections of the epic Cycle which would be suitable for tragedy.

If our conclusion is correct, at least three further results follow: (1) Aristotle nowhere refers to the *Iliou Persis* of Arctinus (since *πέρσιν Ἰλίου* in 18. 56a16 meant the story as a whole, not a particular poem); (2) the titles *πρωχέια* and *ἀπόπλους*⁸⁰ should disappear from the history of Greek tragedy; and (3) the use of Proclus by the interpolator is interesting and probably significant for the *Poetics* text. Unfortunately we cannot pursue that question further here.

the grammatical tradition (very thin) about Sophocles' *Sinon*; but see above on *Lacaenae*.

⁷⁸ As Ritter suggested in 1839; except that, as we said above, he bracketed everything from *τοῖγαροῦν* through *Τρωάδες*.

⁷⁹ Gudeman's ascription of it to *Σ* (see his crit. note *ad loc.*) has no warrant: "*quod autem (attinet ad) Iliada parvam*," Tkatsch; and the natural addition of an *ex* in the medieval Latin translation proves nothing. Incidentally, neither does the omission of *Eurypylos* and *Lacaenae* by the Arabic version suffice to prove Gudeman's theory that they were the two extra names in the list.

⁸⁰ See Nauck, *TGF*² pp. 840, 837, among the *Adespota*.

CHAPTER 24

59b8-17

- [ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτά δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τρα-
γῳδίᾳ· ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῆν <εἶναι> ἢ πεπλεγμένην, ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ
10 παθη|τικὴν· καὶ τὰ μέρη [ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως]
ταῦτά· καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ
παθημάτων. ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς.
οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς. καὶ
γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον συνέστηκεν, ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς
15 ἀπλοῦν | καὶ παθητικόν, ἢ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον—
ἀναγνωρίσεις γὰρ δι' ὄλου—καὶ ἠθικόν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν.]

59b8

- [Further, the epic ought to have its species the same as
tragedy, i.e., <be> either simple or complex, (and) either
10 moral or | 'fatal'; and its 'parts' [outside of song-com-
position and spectacle] the same; for in fact it needs peri-
peties and recognitions and tragic acts. Also that the
thoughts and the verbal expression be satisfactory. Homer
not only was the first to use all these but has used them in
the proper way. In fact each of his two poems has a certain
15 construction, the *Iliad* simple | and 'fatal,' the *Odyssey*
complex—with recognitions all the way through—and moral;
and in addition he has surpassed all (others) in expression
and thought.]

Once more the chapter division is misleading. The passage before us belongs to the argument of chapter 23, while b17 broaches a new theme, the cardinal differences between epic and tragedy.¹

The difficulties of the passage are such that Solmsen² and Montmollin³ were led to the hypothesis of two strata, one dealing with the εἶδη, the other with the μέρη. The most critical points are, in brief,

¹ See Montmollin 148.

² *CQ* 29 (1935) 195.

³ Pp. 146-148.

that (1) the four kinds as they are stated here do not quite tally with those in 18. 55b32-56a3,⁴ and (2) it is difficult—as it was in chapter 18—to make out the relation between the 'kinds' and the 'parts.'

These troubles can be met only by a new appraisal of the passage as a whole; and this can best begin with the neglected but all-important word *δεῖ* in the first line. The commentators and interpreters have assumed that Aristotle is presenting here a classification of the epic, that is, a list of the classes into which epics actually fall. The parallel with the beginning of chapter 23 has been overlooked: *ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις συνιστάναι δραματικούς κτλ.—ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν ... τῇ τραγωδίᾳ.* Both remarks are *recommendations*, and interconnected recommendations (*ἔτι δέ*); and in both chapters (23. 59a30 ff.; 24. 59b12) it turns out that Homer, and Homer alone,⁵ fulfills them. But the connection is still closer; for as we shall see, the 'kinds' of epic, like those of tragedy in chapter 18, depend essentially on differences with respect to plot. Thus the present passage is an extension of 23. 59a17-21: the epic should have a plot like that of tragedy, and it should show the same *εἶδη*, based on plot, as tragedy.

We saw in chapter 18 that the four 'kinds'—complex, 'fatal,' 'moral,' and episodic—could only be understood structurally; so here also. Further, the 'kinds' in 18 were defined by the predominance of some element in the plot (peripety and recognition, *pathos*, happy ending) or, in the case of the last 'kind,' by the predominance of something else (the episodes) *over* the plot. A tragedy which had no plot at all, i.e., was a mere string of episodes,⁶ could not belong to any 'kind.' But we learned in the last chapter that this is precisely the character of all epics except Homer's: that they are all, or virtually all, mere strings of episodes told 'whole' (i.e., in chronological sequence). They have no plot, only a story or set of stories. It follows that they do not belong to any 'kind.' In short, Aristotle is asking here, as he did in 23, that the epic come up to the standard of tragedy, which only Homer has attained heretofore.⁷

⁴ Even after our emendation *ἢ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδης* there.

⁵ This is implied (especially by *καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς*), rather than argued explicitly, in the present passage.

⁶ We saw in 9. 51b32 ff. that this is not what Aristotle meant by an 'episodic' plot.

⁷ Tragedy has four kinds, 18. 55b32; the epic *ought* to have four kinds. "Must"

Naturally, however, we must explain the discrepancy between the two lists of 'kinds,' especially as we have put *ἐπεισοδιώδης* into the earlier list instead of *ῥησις* or *ἀπλή*. The answer is essentially this: In tragedy, as we said before,⁸ 'simple' would be a purely negative criterion, useless because it does not refer to any *dominant* factor. A simple tragedy will necessarily be either 'fatal' or 'moral' or 'episodic,' according to what predominates in it. In the epic, on the contrary, thanks to its enormously greater capacity for episodes, it is the category 'episodic' that would be useless. Or, if used, it would actually be invidious, because Homer, of all epic poets, has the most episodes⁹—or, to speak more precisely, he is the only one who has episodes, since he alone has a central plot which turns the other 'parts' of the poem into episodes. Thus the term 'episodic' either would not be *εἰδοποιόν* or would hit at precisely the man whom Aristotle is recommending as the all-sufficient model for writing epics. *Iliad* and *Odyssey* would have to stand under the same rubric as the worst tragedies (*χειρίσται*. 9. 51b33).

There is another fact still. Whatever the case may be in chapter 18, the kinds are listed here by pairs (*ἢ ἀπλήν ἢ πεπλεγμένην, ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν*), and *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are explicitly said (b13-15) to exemplify two kinds each, one from each pair: the *Iliad* is simple and 'fatal,' the *Odyssey* complex and 'moral.' Since *ex hypothesi* the scheme is not applicable to any other epics, it is useless to ask whether an epic might be simple only, or 'moral' only. Presumably it could not, since any epic with a real plot must have one type of structure (simple or complex) or the other and also one kind of outcome ('fatal' or 'moral') or the other.¹⁰

If this explanation of the 'kinds' is accepted, we are ready to tackle the 'parts.' This is the problem which moved Solmsen and Montmollin to the hypothesis of two redactions of the passage by Aristotle, the earlier one offering only the 'kinds,' the later one adding the 'parts.' The real difficulty, as in chapter 18, is to determine what parts are meant; but here it takes a more concrete form. In the earlier case

(Butcher, Bywater, *et al.*) will not do as a translation: Aristotle does not say *ἀνάγκη ἔχειν*.

⁸ Above, c. 18, n. 48.

⁹ See below on 59b22 ff.

¹⁰ We suggested with some hesitation that the same double-entry scheme might be applicable to tragedy also; see above on 18. 55b33 ff.

we had the embarrassment that no previous list of *μέρη* would exactly fill the bill; here, on the contrary, the passage itself seems at first blush to give us the necessary indications. *Καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταῦτά:* the 'parts' we want, then, are plot, character, thought, and 'diction' (verse-composition). But one has only to list them to see that they will not do here any more than in chapter 18. For one thing the very next clause, *καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν κτλ.*, brings the three 'parts of the plot' into the reckoning, and in some kind of logical relation with *καὶ τὰ μέρη κτλ.*; for another, thought and diction are twice listed below as extras (b12, *ἔτι*; b16, *πρὸς τούτοις*).

These signs of maladjustment are distressing. Meanwhile it may be useful to observe the construction of the passage, watching for any sign of connection between the kinds and the parts. Several of the recent editors print or at least interpret *καὶ τὰ μέρη ... ταῦτά* as a new, independent sentence, with *ἔστιν* understood.¹¹ This does not make very much difference so long as *δεῖ ἔχειν* above is understood to mean that the epic necessarily has ("must have") the same 'kinds' as tragedy. But the moment we interpret *δεῖ ἔχειν* in its proper sense, it springs to the eye that *καὶ τὰ μέρη ... ταῦτά* is exactly parallel to *τὰ εἶδη ... ταῦτά:* not that the epic has the same 'parts' also, but that it ought to have them. And then *καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν κτλ.* follows in perfect order: "for in fact there is need of peripeties and recognitions and *pathê*." Why the need? The obvious answer is, sc. that the epic may have an emotional effect comparable to that of tragedy. But let us hold to our course a while longer. The grammatical structure is symmetrical: two clauses (*ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ... καὶ τὰ μέρη ...*) depending on *δεῖ ἔχειν*, and an explanatory clause (*ἢ γὰρ ἀπλήν ... καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν...*) attached to each of them. It follows that since the first explanatory clause names the 'kinds,' the second should name the parts, or some of them. The 'parts' in question, then, include peripety, recognition, and *pathos*, the trio we know from 11. 52b9-13. Following the parallel in chapter 18, 'character' and episodes ought to be included also; but since 'episodic' does not

¹¹ Hardy, Sykutris, and Rostagni print it as a new sentence, Butcher and Bywater as a new clause (both, I think, understand *δεῖ*: Bywater, "must be the same"; Butcher, "The parts also ... are the same"). Moutmolin, following Solmsen, makes the clause part of a sequence of later additions—this time within a whole (b8-17) which is itself an addition.

figure here as a 'kind,' no doubt we can pass over the episodes. We are left with the three 'parts of the plot,' plus character.¹²

These considerations show that Aristotle cannot have written *ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως*, because he did not have the six 'parts' of tragedy from chapter 6 in mind to begin with. The phrase is a note from an honest reader (perhaps our old friend of the early chapters) who remembered 5. 49b16, *μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς τραγωδίας*, and/or 26. 62a14, *πάντ' ἔχει (sc. ἡ τραγωδία) ὄσαπερ ἢ ἐποποιία ..., καὶ ἔτι ... τὴν μουσικὴν [καὶ τὰς ὄψεις]*.

Does Aristotle mean to imply that peripeties, recognitions, and *pathē* were entirely lacking in all epics except Homer's? Probably that would be pressing his remark too far. But poems which had no real plot-structure, much less a complex one, cannot have made much of peripeties and recognitions in Aristotle's sense. And the same consideration holds for the *pathē*. Who can believe that the death of Memnon, for example, in the *Aithiopsis*, or even that of Achilles, or of Priam or Polyxena in the *Little Iliad* (or *Iliou Persis*), had the tragic quality that Homer has given to the deaths of Patroclus and Hector (not to speak of minor heroes)? That quality springs in part from characterization—of Achilles as well as Patroclus and Hector—but even more from the tragic construction which makes the deaths come as inevitable yet fearful and pathetic climaxes in a long sequence.¹³ Undoubtedly what Aristotle means to say is "The epic needs more peripeties, recognitions, and *pathē* managed like Homer's." The Cycle had dramatic *material* in profusion; what it did not have was dramatic *use* of the material.

It is hard to say whether the last clause in the sentence (*ἔτι τὰς διανοίας κτλ.*) is genuine or not. Its grammar is awkward to a degree,¹⁴

¹² That Aristotle judged character-drawing to be needful but lacking in most epics outside of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is thoroughly consonant with his general attitude, and especially with 24. 60a5-11.

¹³ Similarly, what scene of battle or adventure in the Cycle can have been as heart-shaking as the moment when Odysseus throws off his rags, leaps to the dais, and pours out his arrows before him? (For the effect on a Greek audience see Pl. *Ion* 535b.) Its incomparable power is due precisely to the fact that it has been so well prepared and must happen so, yet has been so long in coming and in spite of all is so unexpected when it does come. These are the virtues of construction as Aristotle saw them.

¹⁴ **ἔχειν καλῶς* casting back to the original *δεῖ* (where *ἔχειν* had a different construction — or is *τὴν ἐποποιίαν* to be understood as subject here too?), over the head of the intervening *δεῖ* + gen. (b11).

and 'thought' and 'diction' have nothing to do with Aristotle's main idea. But they are mentioned again in b16, likewise as extras, and so the clause may be allowed to stand.¹⁵

What, now, are we to say of the theory of Solmsen and Montmollin that the sentence *ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ... ἔχειν καλῶς* contains two strata, one (the original) dealing with the *εἶδη*, the other with the *μέρη*? Our interpretation makes it unnecessary. The alternation between the two categories, which Solmsen thought he found in the passage, does not exist, since the *μέρη* Aristotle has in mind are not those of chapter 6 but the ones we inferred in chapter 18: i.e., those which constitute the *εἶδη*. On the other hand, and by the same token, we cannot avoid Montmollin's conclusion that the whole passage is a subsequent addition by Aristotle. *Καὶ τὰ μέρη ταῦτά*, referring to peripety, etc., is not conceivable in the same draft with 5. 49b16, *μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτά*, which refers to an entirely different list of 'parts.' Moreover we concluded that the parallel passage 18. 55b32-56a10—the only other place in the *Poetics* where the four 'kinds' are mentioned—was a subsequent addition. Our passage (including of course the next lines, b12-17) is a pendant to the other, reflecting Aristotle's new and more complex analysis of plots. Or, as we suggested before,¹⁶ although the present passage seems to refer to that in 18, taking tragedy as the standard (*τὰ εἶδη ταῦτά δεῖ ἔχειν ... τῆ τ ρ α γ ω δ λ α*), general considerations make it more likely that the new theory developed in Aristotle's mind as he brooded further over the epic—above all, the Homeric epic—and its relation to tragedy. The Homeric epic brought home to him with special force the problem of *how the plot*, as defined in the earlier chapters, *is related to the whole poem*. It is in this context, as we said, that the *δέσις - λύσις* theory is most likely to have arisen. Moreover the list of kinds as it is given in the present chapter is more lucid and symmetrical (two pairs of antithetical categories),

¹⁵ Montmollin argues, pp. 146-147, that *οἷς* (b12) cannot include *διανοίας καὶ ... λέξιν*, and (p. 334, n. 255) that the last clause, *πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτοις κτλ.* (so in all MSS, he says), likewise refers back beyond what immediately precedes, to *οἷς ἄρασις ... ἰκανῶς*; so that both clauses referring to thought and diction must be later additions (by Aristotle). But *πρὸς δέ* is unmistakably implied by the Arabic ("et una cum his"; see Tkatsch 2. 108) and is also found in Laur. XXXI 14, Marc. 215 (see Gudeman's crit. note). Moreover, under our interpretation of the text, *οἷς* can include *διανοίας καὶ ... λέξιν*: see below, n. 18. Thus there is no conclusive index of interpolation for either clause.

¹⁶ Above, *ad loc. cit.*

and its application is clearer. The contrast of simple and complex was indeed a part of Aristotle's intellectual equipment very early (chapter 10); but its exemplification can have come to him at least as easily from the contrast between *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as from that between *Oedipus* and *Ajax*. And as for the other antithesis: is not the duality of death and life, tragedy and 'comedy,' failure and success, *pathos* and *êthos*, more brilliantly and symmetrically illustrated by Homer's two poems than by any two tragedies?

What I am suggesting is not that the new scheme of the four 'kinds' and the corresponding 'parts' was first written down here and then introduced into chapter 18, but that the two passages both reflect a revised and elaborated view of literary structure which came to Aristotle as he rethought the analogies between tragedy and the best epic, i.e., Homer; from which it follows that the passages may well have been written together, and some time after Aristotle's first draft was completed. The new view can then be characterized as a sophistication of the earlier one (4. 48b34-38) that Homer "sketched the forms" of tragedy (and comedy).

Certainly, however we interpret our passage, its real purport is another *laus Homeri*.¹⁷ Homer was the first to employ *all* the 'kinds' and the corresponding 'parts,'¹⁸ and he has used them perfectly.¹⁹ Again he stands alone. In particular, as we have already said, his two poems are the only epics that show the structural categories simple-complex and 'fatal'-moral.

¹⁷ Hence our conclusion that 59b8-17 is a later addition does not in the least contradict our earlier assertion that the passage is a complement to chapter 23. Homer is in the center of the stage in both places; both stand under the sign of *dei* (all epics ought to be dramatic—in all the senses of the word—as Homer's are). Actually the connection in idea between c. 23 *init.* and c. 24 *init.* is closer, not more distant, if the latter is a supplementary note.

¹⁸ I see no compelling reason why *oîç*, especially with *ânasiv* added, cannot embrace thought and diction as well as the *εἶδη* and the *μέρη* we have suggested. Those *μέρη* (peripety, recognition, *pathos*, and character) virtually represent the first two of the six 'parts' from c. 6, and we need not demand that Aristotle eschew all mention of the next two, even though they no longer figure as determinative (i.e., structural) parts in his new theory.

¹⁹ Castelvetro, "*perfettamente*." Not merely "adequately." "Due use" (Bywater), "sufficient model" (Butcher), water down the meaning, for which see my article, *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.* 49 (1938) 193 n. 1; and cf. above on 4. 49a8; 7. 51a14; and just below, b19. Homer is the only one who has used them all as they can and should be used. *Κέλρηται* (perfect), because Homer is still the model.

The sentence b13 ff. offers two textual problems. Gudeman proposed a very seductive emendation, *ἐκάτερον* <*ἐκατέρως*>, which has been adopted by Rostagni. But *ἅπασιν* seems to be sufficient preparation for Aristotle's characterization, and nothing has been said to which *ἐκατέρως* could properly refer. Aristotle has not indicated in advance that the *εἶδη* can be combined, or that there are two and just two patterns for the combination; whereas *ἐκατέρως* should mean "in each of the two ways (aforesaid)." Hence I hold to the established text. In the other case, b15, the manuscripts offer *ἀναγνώρισις*, but the plural (Arabic version, anticipated by Christ) seems desirable if not mandatory, to avoid a rather harsh metaphor (the *Odyssey* is not a recognition through and through but *has* recognitions from beginning to end: see the list in Gudeman's note).³⁰

59b17-31

- διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἢ ἐποποιία
καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὄρος ἰκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος ·
20 δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν | καὶ τὸ τέλος.
εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττους αἱ συστάσεις
εἴεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγωδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν
τιθεμένων παρήκοιεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέ-
25 γεθος πολὺ τι ἢ ἐποποιία ἴδιον, διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγω-
δίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα | πολλὰ μέρη μιμῆσθαι,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον, ἐν δὲ
τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα
ποιεῖν περαινόμενα, ὅφ' ὧν οἰκείων ὄντων αὔξεται ὁ τοῦ
30 ποιήματος ὄγκος. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθόν [εἰς μεγα-
λοπρέπειαν], καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν [τὸν | ἀκούοντα] καὶ
ἐπεισοδιῶν ἀνομοίους ἐπεισοδίους · τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον, ταχὺ
πληροῦν, ἐκπίπτειν ποιεῖ τὰς τραγωδίας.

59b17

- But the epic differs (from tragedy) with respect to (1) the length of the poem and (2) the verse. Now so far as length is concerned the norm previously mentioned is the proper
20 one; for the beginning | and the end should be capable of

³⁰ The little clause could be an interpolation. It seems a (not really necessary) reminiscence of 18. 55b33, *ἥς τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶν περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις*; and we have found instances of confusion of endings in other intrusive notes. But there is no decisive indication against it.

being seen together. And this would be the case if the poems could be shorter than those of the ancients and approach the length of the mass of tragedies which are set before us for one hearing. But the epic has a marked special capacity for extra extension of its length, because of the fact that in tragedy there is no possibility of imitating a
 25 number of incidents | at (as of) the time of their occurrence, but only the part enacted on the stage by the actors, while in the epic, because it is a narrative genre, it is possible to present many parts at (as of) the time they take place, and by these, if they are germane, the bulk and weight of the poem are increased. So that it has this advantage [for
 30 grandeur], and that of varying [the | listener], i.e., interspersing (the poem) with diverse episodes; for similarity, because it quickly satiates, is what makes tragedies fail in the competitions.

So far Aristotle has talked of the likenesses that ought to exist between epic and tragedy, and commended Homer as the perfect model. These basic orientations do not change as our critic turns to the differences between the two genres: Homer is still the all-sufficient model, and the dominant purpose is to show what the *necessary and legitimate differences* are.

We pointed forward to this passage when we were discussing 5. 49b9-14. There Aristotle distinguished three *differentiae* of epic as against tragedy: (1) in mode of expression (verse 'plain' - verse plus music), (2) in method (narrative-dramatic), (3) in length (indeterminate-determinate). Here, on the other hand, he mentions only two.²¹ Why this discrepancy? There are two reasons: (1) the argument is focused on Homer, and Homer is of all epic poets the one who was most a dramatist and least bound to mere narration; (2) more important, the narrative method is taken in this chapter as the basic character of the epic (cf. *διηγηματικῆς*, 23. 59a17), from which the specific *differentiae* are deduced. These two principles are partly contradictory; but that does not prevent both of them from being operative in Aristotle's discussion.

When Aristotle says that a *ἰκανός*²² *ἔργος τοῦ μήκου* would be the

²¹ *T*_ε in b17 is decisive.

²² Here again *ἰκανός* is not merely 'adequate', satisfactory for immediate purposes, but 'perfect, fully adequate.'

one previously mentioned, there cannot be any doubt that he means the one defined in 7. 51a11-15.²³ But that norm was for tragedy, and in 5. 49b14 the epic was explicitly said to be *ἀόριστος*. How then can it have a *δρος*? One more the answer is in the meaning of *δεῖ*: not "must," but "ought." The norm is perfect, and the epic ought to observe it. Why it cannot do so, and has license not to, we will learn in a moment. Meanwhile Aristotle goes on to do something he had not done in chapters 5 and 7: he gives the norm a concrete definition in terms of the length of the (tragic and epic) poem as a whole.²⁴ "This would be (achieved) if the (bulk of the) poems²⁵ should be less than (that of) the old poets and approximate the mass of tragedies that are presented for a single hearing." Notice first of all the future-less-vivid construction. The goal is a desirable one, but it is doubtful whether it can be attained. As for the definition itself, since 'tetralogies' (including a satyr-play) were no longer presented in Aristotle's time,²⁶ he must mean the time occupied by three tragedies,²⁷ i.e., say, ± 4200 lines or 5-7 hours.²⁸ This would leave room for a six- or seven-book *Iliad* and a seven- or eight-book *Odyssey*: a reduction in bulk of from three-fourths to two-thirds.

Drastic though this seems, what it actually means is *stripping away the episodes, or most of them, and leaving only the central action*. We have already noticed that Gudeman, impelled by Aristotle's remark in 17. 55b16-17 that the central plot of the *Odyssey* is "not long," made the experiment and came out, to his astonishment, with a residue totaling just about 4000 lines.²⁹ A similar trial on the *Iliad* would

²³ *Δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος*; cf. *σύνδηλος*, 51a10.

²⁴ I.e., not merely in terms of the natural day (c. 5) or the dramatic action (c. 7).

²⁵ For the meaning of *σοστάσεις* cf. above on *σύστημα*, 18. 56a11-12.

²⁶ Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.* 80.

²⁷ In 340 B.C. only two tragedies were presented by each poet, but this seems to have been an exception: *ibid.*

²⁸ This is assuming that tragedies averaged about the same length in the fourth century as in the latter part of the fifth. Leaving aside Aeschylus, all of whose extant plays except the *Agamemnon* (1673 lines) are short (between 1047 and 1093), the median length for Sophocles is that of the *Philoctetes* (1471), the extremes being *Trach.* (1278) and *O. C.* (1779, the longest extant Greek play); for Euripides, excluding *Cyclops* (satyr-play), *Heracleidae* (defective), and *I. A.* (incomplete), the median falls between *Medea* (1419) and *Herc. Fur.* (1428), the extremes being *Alc.* (1163) and *Phoen.* (1766). Taking Soph. and Eur. together, the median is around 1450 lines. But the *Rhesus* (996) perhaps indicates that the norm in the fourth century was shorter.

²⁹ See his note, p. 402.

come very close to the same figure.³⁰ The proof that these results are not merely accidental is the way in which Aristotle approaches the subject. After fixing the ideal limit of length he goes on to say, "But the epic has a very marked special capacity for *extra* extension of its length," and he proceeds to show why the epic can add so many more episodes—for it is a question of episodes—than tragedy. The notion of extra length is in ἐπ-(εκτείνεσθαι). The prefix has generally been ignored; but when we compare the verb with παρατείνειν in 17. 55b2, which denoted the normal amount of extension or padding (i.e., for tragedy), we see that Aristotle is talking here about an increase in bulk which goes beyond the normal.³¹

We must emphasize that such a view of the matter—a core approximating to the limit of length, which is then expanded more or less without limit by the addition of episodes³²—is applicable only to the two *Homeric* epics; for only they have a definable core to start with. The Cycle, or any other biographical or chronicle epic, cannot qualify for Aristotle's formula. This can be confirmed by still another observation, à propos of the remark about the epics of "the ancients." Who are these ancients? How many Greek epics did exceed 7-8 books or 4200 lines? The facts are these:³³

EPIC	NO. OF BOOKS	NO. OF LINES	AUTHORITY
<i>Titanomachia</i>	2 (at least)	(1300) ³⁴	Ath. 7. 277d
<i>Oidipodeia</i>		6600	<i>Tab. Borgiana</i> ³⁵

³⁰ Books *A, I, Σ, T, Φ, X,* and *Ω* total 4295 lines. This is a crude and unsatisfactory way of proceeding, since the book-division is Alexandrian and we cannot be sure just where Aristotle would have drawn his line. Moreover his norm itself is not a precise, mechanical limit. But other attempts would not vary from the mark by more than a few hundred lines.

³¹ Not merely beyond the norm, the ὄρος. Tragedy too is allowed some 'extension.'

³² The order of events corresponds to that in the sketch of Homer's method in 23. 59b35-37: he first "picked out" his central plot and *then* added the episodes—a procedure, as Aristotle was at pains to emphasize, wholly unlike that of the other poets.

³³ I have excluded Hesiod, Parmenides, and Empedocles, as not being poets in Aristotle's sense.

³⁴ The figures in parentheses are estimates based on the equation 1 book = 650 lines. The books of the *Iliad* average 654 lines, those of the *Odyssey* 579. Even if the figure should be too high or too low, the relative proportions would not be altered very appreciably.

³⁵ O. Jahn and A. Michaelis, *Griechische Bilderchroniken*, Bonn, 1873, Tab. VI (K⁹); cf. *ibid.*, p. 76.

<i>Thebaïs</i>		7000	<i>Cert. Hom. et Hes.</i>
<i>Epigonoi</i>		7000	<i>Cert. Hom. et Hes.</i>
<i>Kypria</i>	11	(7150)	<i>Procl. Chrest.</i>
<i>Iliad</i>	24	15,693	—
<i>Aithiopsis</i>	5	(3250)	<i>Procl. Chrest.</i>
<i>Little Iliad</i>	4	(2600)	<i>Procl. Chrest.</i>
<i>Iliou Persis</i> (?)	2	(1300)	<i>Procl. Chrest.</i>
<i>Nostoi</i>	5	(3250)	<i>Procl. Chrest.</i>
<i>Odyssey</i>	24	12,105	—
<i>Telegony</i>	2	(1300)	<i>Procl. Chrest.</i>
<i>Danaïs (-ides)</i> (?)		6500	<i>Tab. Borgiana</i> ³⁶
<i>Herakleia</i> (Pisander)	2 (+ ?)	(1300) (+ ?)	<i>Suid. s. v. Πελσ.</i>
<i>Herakleia (-as)</i> (Panyassis)	14	9000	<i>Suid. s. v. Παν.</i>
<i>Persika (-eïs)</i> (Choerilus)	2 (+ ?)	(1300) (+ ?)	<i>Herodian Π. μον. λέξ.</i> 2. 919 Lentz
<i>Thebaïs</i> (Antimachus)	24+	(15,000) (+ ?)	<i>Porph. on Hor. A. P.</i> 146

From these figures one thing stands out with stark clarity: *no other Greek epic before the Thebaïs of Antimachus was remotely as long as the Iliad or the Odyssey*. In particular, no other poem of the Trojan Cycle except the *Kypria* was as long as a normal trilogy, and two (*Iliou Persis*, *Telegony*) were no longer than a single play.³⁶ The notion that most early Greek epics were long is an optical illusion foisted upon us by Homer, and assisted by vague ideas of the *total* length of the Cycle. Their defect was not excessive length, it was lack of structure. When Aristotle speaks of the "ancients," then, he means—Homer! The word perhaps betrays his embarrassment; here, as always, he cannot bring himself to an outright criticism of his idol.

The whole structure of thought in our passage, with its peculiar angle of approach to the question of excessive length and—as will become apparent hereafter—its oblique attempt to excuse it or even justify it, is dictated by the awkward fact that Aristotle's two ideal epics were also by far the longest.³⁷ And this is not the only place where the dif-

³⁶ Even if *Iliou Persis* was simply the last part of the *Little Iliad*, the total work was no longer than a trilogy. The very name of the latter warns us not to expand it too far.

³⁷ Except Antimachus, whom Plato valued so highly (*Cic. Brut.* 51. 191; *Plut. Lysand.* 18; *Procl. on Pl. Tim.* 21b ff., 1. 90 Diehl). Aristotle of course knew him (*Rhet.* 3. 6. 1408a2; fr. 676 Rose), but pays no serious attention to him; see Schmid 1. 2. 545.

ficuity shows through. In chapter 5 we noticed some signs of a conflation of two different views on the epic: (1) that it tended to be much *longer* than tragedy, and (2) that it was purely *indeterminate* in size, i.e., might be any length from very long to very short. We can now see that (1) particularly represents Homer (*Iliad* and *Odyssey*) while (2) covers the rest of the epic repertory, which varied all the way from 2 books to 11 (or 14: Panyassis). This enormous range, compared with the relatively narrow one of tragedy,³⁸ is quite sufficient to justify ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ; but it does not account for the present passage. Aristotle's insistence on basing his account of the epic on Homer and Homer alone has forced him to distort or ignore some of the facts.

One more question before we go on: Does τὸ πλῆθος τραγωδιῶν κτλ. imply a *connected* dramatic trilogy, like the *Oresteia*, or simply any group of tragedies (normally three) presented in competition? We cannot be sure. One would expect this to be a reference to the connected trilogy; for how can one predicate συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος of three unconnected plays? But πλῆθος (mass, 'plurality') and τιθεμένων do not favor the idea,³⁹ and Aristotle's neglect, not to say depreciation, of Aeschylus makes it *a priori* unlikely that he is thinking of the *Inhaltstrilogie*. Moreover it is not at all probable that connected trilogies were being written for the competition in Aristotle's time (to which τιθεμένων must refer), or that Aeschylean trilogies were then being revived on the stage.⁴⁰ Thus we can only say that Aristotle does not seem to be thinking of the connected trilogy, although his language does not absolutely exclude it. The question remains a minor mystery.

To resume our forward progress: The sense of the passage is that the ideal demands of unity, i.e., the norm of length, would require the epic to stay within the normal span of a trilogy, about 4200 lines plus

³⁸ The shortest extant tragedy (*Rhesus*) is 996 lines, the longest (Soph. *O. C.*) 1779: a ratio of considerably less than 2 to 1. But most of the extant (and measurable) tragedies of the latter half of the fifth century (16 out of 21) fall within the range 1300-1700 lines: a notably consistent average.

³⁹ Τιθεμένων smacks of arbitrary selection. See Teichmüller, *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 184 n. 2.

⁴⁰ The so-called *Fasti* prove that the regular fare was *one* 'old' tragedy per competition, beginning in 386 B.C.: see Pick.-Camb. *Dr. Fest.*, Index, s. v. 'Old Tragedies.'

or minus; and we have seen that this requirement is in fact satisfied by the central action of the two Homeric epics. But, Aristotle goes on to say, the epic has a special trait or capacity (*ἴδιον*) of *extra* extension, and this special trait has its advantages too. In the light of our discussion we can translate this to mean: "Homer, at least, composed central actions which meet our requirements beautifully, both in quality [*δραματικούς*, 23. 59a19] and in quantity. But then he went on and added great masses of 'episodes' which expanded his poems far beyond the mark. Well, this is something the epic poet has a special opportunity and license to do, because he is a *narrator*, and certain advantages do accrue from it."

The usual interpretation of the reason given by Aristotle does not hold up very well under close scrutiny. He is supposed to say that the epic can present "many events simultaneously transacted," whereas tragedy "cannot imitate several lines of action carried on at one and the same time; we must confine ourselves to the action on the stage and the part taken by the players" (Butcher). But is this true, and if so how is it accounted for by the difference between narrative and dramatic method? In the first place, it is not true that we are "confined to the action on the stage," etc. Greek tragedy often, in fact habitually, presents things that have happened off-stage, through messenger's speeches. Has Aristotle forgotten or chosen to overlook this standing practice? It is not likely, since in 17. 55b14-15 he explicitly mentioned Orestes' attack of madness and the final escape, both of which are so reported in the *Iphigenia*. It is true that he calls those reports 'episodes'; but in any case he recognized that tragedy can and does report events that are not enacted on the stage. Nor is there anything to prevent an event which is so reported from having taken place simultaneously with one which is actually performed. Thus, for example, if we insist on exact chronology (I am not implying that Aristotle did), the fall and sack of Troy which is reported by the Herald in the *Agamemnon*, 525 ff., is obviously contemporaneous with the lighting of the beacon-signal (and therefore, roughly, with its reception) at the beginning of the play.⁴¹ What is true is that tragedy cannot present simultaneous events *simultaneously*;⁴² but then neither can the epic or any other

⁴¹ Note, for good measure, Clytemnestra's Imagined account of the capture, 320 ff., which is a kind of oblique messenger's report. The fact is that the sack of Troy is *virtually present* to us throughout the whole first half of the play.

⁴² I lay no stress on the act that tragedy, even Greek tragedy with its relatively

literary form. It is perfectly capable of presenting simultaneous events consecutively, and the epic can do no more.

We could try to improve the traditional interpretation by exploiting our recognition that Aristotle is really talking about Homer here, not the epic in general: that is, we could take *ἄμα* as referring to *simultaneity between the central action and the 'episodes.'* This reorientation seems superficially to be recommended by *τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος*, which does in effect denote the central action. But we have already seen that tragedy can subsequently report an event contemporaneous with a *previous* part of the main action just as easily as it can report (at different times) two independent 'episodes.'

If the passage presented no other difficulty, we would of course take *ἄμα πραττόμενα* and *ἄμα περαινόμενα* as the normal, everyday idiom (*ἄμα* + present participle): "at the moment of their happening, as soon as they happen."⁴³ And this interpretation is decidedly favored by the inversion *ἄμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα*, which brings the adverb into especially close proximity to the governing verb.⁴⁴ I propose to take the two participial phrases in this natural sense. Aristotle is then saying that "in tragedy it is not possible to imitate a number of developments⁴⁵ *at (as of) the time they are happening*, but only the one (that is taking place)⁴⁶ on the stage and (involves) the actors, while in the epic, thanks to its being narrative, it is possible to 'compose'

fixed stage-set, *could* change scenes during a play. The clear cases are few (see Flickinger, *Gr. Theat.* 235, 247-249), and anyhow that is certainly not Aristotle's point. On the Renaissance 'unity of place' and its connection with the present passage see below, n. 53.

⁴³ See Kühner-Gerth 2^a. 2. 82 n. 4 for examples.

⁴⁴ Cf. Pl. *Rep.* 7. 536c, *λέγων γὰρ ἄμα ἐβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν*; Ar. *Hist. An.* 6. 20. 574b4, *ἣ δ' ἐν τοῖς τόκοις κάθαρσις γίγνεται ἄμα τοῖς σκυλακίσις τικτομένοις* (slightly different idiom, with dat., but same effect). For other Aristotelian examples in normal order see Bonitz, *Index* 37a2-6. The apparent inversion is perfectly natural, since *ἄμα* really modifies the verb along with the participle: *ἄμα λέγων ἀνέστη*, "at the same time, (while) speaking, he stood up."

⁴⁵ *Μέρη* is used in the same broad sense as in 23. 59a35 (cf. 26. 62b9), denoting not merely single events but whole sequences, like the Wrath, the various *aristotai* in the *Iliad*, the *Telemachia*, etc.

⁴⁶ Naturally we are to understand *ἄμα πραττόμενον* with *τὸ ... μέρος* also. This is a distinct recommendation for our interpretation, since our natural impulse would be to take *πολλὰ μέρη* and *τὸ ... μέρος* as fully parallel in construction.

(give poetic expression to, incorporate into the poem) many events *at (as of) the time they are being carried forward.*"

What would this mean? To the narrator, *just because he is a narrator*, all events lie open and immediately accessible; they are all equally present at the time they are related. If in telling a story I jump back ten years, the time jumps with me; the event I am now narrating is just as much present to me and my auditors at this moment as the other one (the later one) was a moment ago. Narrative is a magic carpet which can transport us anywhere in the twinkling of an eye and then take up its course; or it is like a stop-watch, which can be halted and re-set and then begins over again exactly as before. The dramatist, *because his method is dramatic*, cannot do this. For better or worse, the strand of events that is being presented on the stage (not necessarily the whole of it, but at least each part that takes place as a consecutive action: in modern parlance, each act or scene) establishes an overriding time-priority which cannot be ignored. Other events now get their time defined from this action: they are past, present, or future in relation to it. In particular, all past events (even though when they happened they may have been contemporaneous with some previous part of the present action) have to come before the bar of this 'now.' The Herald in the *Agamemnon* may relate the same action that Clytemnestra saw as present, but when he relates it he must relate it as happening 'then.' Or, when Oedipus recalls the events of his youth in Corinth, the narrative poet could whisk us there and invite us to be present with him while they unroll, but the dramatic poet has inevitably fixed his time-scheme by the action and cannot break it: Oedipus has to tell us here and now what happened then.

This fixing of the past as past is inherent in the dramatic form, because the 'part on the stage' supplies an ineluctable point of reference for all other actions. Nor is it a matter of the stage *per se*: that is, it is not one of those external factors which Aristotle had rejected (7. 51a6) as *πρὸς τὴν αἰσθησιν*. It is inherent in the *idea* of the drama as a continuous action going on in a certain place and enacted by a given set of people,⁴⁷ whether the play is ever performed—or even written

⁴⁷ Aristotle says "stage" and "actors" because he has no other terms to represent the two entities in question in their abstract form. We have already seen how awkward it is that he lacks a consistent term for the dramatic 'characters,' the *dramatis personae* (later the stage-term *πρόσωπα*, of which *personae* is a translation, perhaps a derivative, took over this duty). Similarly he has no word for the dramatic 'place' as such, in the abstract. Certainly *τόπος* would not have

to be performed—or not. The modern drama has inherited from its medieval and Elizabethan forebears a freedom of which Aristotle would not have dreamed, an incomparably greater capacity for changes of time and scene within a play.⁴⁸ But this only limits the span of operation of the principle, it does not annul it. So long as the dramatic setting and continuity of action are retained, they imperatively establish a single time-perspective.

Nor is the distinction between narrative and dramatic method impaired on the other hand by the fact that the narrative poet can employ direct speech whenever he chooses. Aristotle himself points to this facility with all possible emphasis in the case of Homer, 24. 60a5-11. No matter how far the narrator may go by way of dissolving his story into dialogue, the narrative frame remains and vindicates his sovereign freedom to move backward and forward in time, from one scene or conversation to another. His method imposes no rigid time-scheme, though in a broad sense he will tend to move forward.⁴⁹

In the light of all this we can supply the missing link in Aristotle's argument. The narrative poet can present his episodes, any number of them, as directly as his main action. Witness the long parade of battle-scenes in the *Iliad*, the long roll of adventures in the *Odyssey*.⁵⁰

occurred to him, any more than it occurred to him to make any connection between the abstract problem of 'time' and the problems of time that inhere in literary forms (see above on 7. 51a12-15; 23. 59a23).

⁴⁸ Cf. the specifically modern capacity for abrupt leaps or discontinuities of style, even within a single work, in painting and music; leaps which would have been incomprehensible—in fact still are—to those reared in older traditions.

⁴⁹ Actually, as Zieliński showed ("Die Behandlung gleichzeitiger Ereignisse im antiken Epos," *Philol. Suppl.* 8 [1899-1901] 405-449; cf. H. Fränkel, *Zeitschr. f. Ästh. u. allg. Kunstwiss.*, Beilageheft 25 [1931] 99 [= *id.*, *Wege u. Formen frühgr. Denkens*, Munich, 1955, 2-3]; W. Schadewaldt, *Die Antike* 12 [1936] 188; P. Mazon, *Introd. à l'Iliade*, Paris, 1942, 29), Homer (i.e., the poet of the *Iliad*) always moves forward, never back. When he has two contemporaneous series of events to relate he jumps back and forth from one to the other, in each case going on in time and ignoring what went before; or he narrates an action which from the nature of the case must have been contemporaneous with another as if it were subsequent—this even at the cost of obvious improbabilities. But Aristotle need not have noticed this peculiarity, and in any case it does not annul the principle of the freedom inherent in the narrative method.

⁵⁰ The technique here is super-sophisticated: a narrative (itself containing many direct speeches) within a direct speech within a narrative. But Odysseus' tale is so long that during it he becomes, for all practical purposes, the narrator-poet—or rather the narrator-poet becomes Odysseus. See J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Research-*

The absorption-quotient for episodes, so to speak, is almost unlimited. In the drama, on the other hand, every episode is qualified, by the very form in which it has to be introduced, *as past*, not present, and so constitutes a drag on the forward movement of the main action. If the dramatist introduces very many of these retardations he will slow it to a complete halt or lose direction; he will, as Aristotle said in 9. 52a1, "be forced to dislocate the continuity frequently." Thus the present passage and the one on 'episodic' tragedies illustrate and reinforce one another, although the basic difference between epic and drama is only clarified and explained here. The same is true of 5. 49b12-15, and of 17. 55b15-16, where Aristotle said that the episodes in tragedy should be brief,⁵¹ while the epic gains its bulk through them, but gave no reason. Thus all the passages where the relative length of tragedy and epic is touched on, directly or by implication, are consistent with each other (with the reservation mentioned above) and receive their final explanation from the inherent contrast between narrative and dramatic method.⁵²

It remains to touch on the connection between our passage and the Renaissance 'unity of place.' That it contains an implication pointing in that direction (*τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς*) is so clear that it is surprising to find Butcher and Spingarn saying that there is no trace of such a thing in the *Poetics*.⁵³ But it is no more than a hint. Aristotle does not actually say that the locale of the action cannot be changed during the play. The assumption that it does not may have been present more or less unconsciously in his mind: he was accustomed to plays in which in fact the scene did not change. But the implication is indirect at best, and it is not essential to his argument. If Aristotle had been told of the 'unity of place,' he would probably have said that he had no great objection to it, but that it did not matter very much. As for the 'unity of time,' it is implied, if at all, only in the same distant manner as that of place and has nothing particularly to do with the question

ches (*Acta Reg. Soc. Lund.* 45), Lund, 1949, 91-93, on the time-scheme of the two epics.

⁵¹ I.e., their total bulk, not necessarily each individual episode; see above on the latter passage.

⁵² There is a general parallel between this deduction and the process by which the six 'parts' of tragedy are derived in chapter 6.

⁵³ Butcher 291; J. E. Spingarn, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, New York, 1908, 93.

in hand.⁵⁴ We still have found no evidence that Aristotle ever thought of counting the number of days in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*.

To proceed: the only restriction which Aristotle lays upon the addition of episodes to the epic is that they be 'relevant,' 'germane.' It is the same proviso he made for tragedy, 17. 55b13. But it is clear that the line must be more broadly drawn for the epic, if great masses of episodes are to be admitted. In the earlier passage we saw that *ὀκείος* meant personal relevance to the hero as an individual. But although this idea may be applicable to the *Odyssey*, where the adventures of Odysseus (and for that matter of Telemachus) all tend to have a certain quality because they are *his* adventures, it can hardly be stretched to fit the *Iliad*. We should have to say here that the episodes are germane to the War as a whole,⁵⁵ not to Achilles. The truth is that *ὀκείων δυνάων* does not mean a great deal except that Homer's episodes, like everything else about his work, are the best possible.

Very well then, "if the episodes are relevant, the bulk and weight⁵⁶ of the poem is augmented by them;" and this is a good thing (*τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθόν*). The sentence beginning with *ὥστε*, b28, is more than usually awkward, especially the limping phrase *εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν*. The use of the word itself is suspicious, since for Aristotle⁵⁷ *μεγαλοπρέπεια* is an ethical and social, not a literary, category. But the real objection is to the construction. If *τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν* (substantive) *εἰς*, with the name of a virtue following, can be tolerated at all, it is hard to put up with the nonsense which necessarily follows from the fact that we have to make *εἰς* govern the infinitives also: "so that it [*sc.* the epic] has this advantage for (purposes of) grandeur and for changing (diverting?) the listener and enriching the play with

⁵⁴ It would have if we interpreted *πραττόμενα* as "going on at the same time as the central action." Proceeding in this direction, and bearing in mind what we said in the last chapter about the poetic foreshortening of time in the *Iliad*, we would arrive at a view which minimized instead of exaggerating the difference in dramatic time between, say, *Iliad* and *Oedipus*: a kind of 'unity of time' for the epic also.

⁵⁵ In 23. 59a35 the *μέρη* were parts of the War.

⁵⁶ On the meaning of *ὄγκος* in Aristotle see E. Arleth, *WS* 22 (1900) 11-17; L. A. Post, *TAPA* 78 (1947) 244-246. I think it is clear that here at least it means only 'weight, massiveness,' and not necessarily 'grandeur.'

⁵⁷ See *E. E.* 3. 6; *E. N.* 4. 4-6; *Rhet.* 1. 6. 1362b13; 1. 8. 1366b2, 18. In *Rhet.* 3. 12. 1414a19 ff., Aristotle objects to superfluous or over-fussy specifications for style, e.g., that it should be *ἡδεῖα* or *μεγαλοπρεπής*.

diverse episodes." ⁵⁸ Now it is all very well to say that an increase in the bulk and weightiness of the epic is a good thing for its grandeur; but how does the gain in weightiness *per se*⁵⁹ contribute to diverting the listener (if that is what the phrase means; see below) and diversifying the content? Clearly the infinitives ought to be objects of *ἔχει*: the gain in mass or weight is a good thing, and so are they: "so that it has this virtue and (also) (that of) diverting," etc.

Everything points, then, to *εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν* being an intrusion into the text. It is a gloss on *ἀγαθόν* and *δγκος*.⁶⁰ Its motive is not hard to discover if we bear in mind that in later antiquity *δγκος* was predominantly used in a pejorative sense, = 'pompousness, tumidity, bombast.'⁶¹ The writer of our note is calling attention to the good sense which it is obviously required to have here; for this purpose he paraphrases it by the customary term of his day.

We conclude, then, that the increase in bulk has three advantages (*ἀγαθά*). Actually, however, there ought to be only two; for the lack of an article with *ἐπεισοδιοῦν* suggests that the *καί* joining the two infinitives is epexegetic.⁶² But here again there is a difficulty. *Μεταβάλλειν* in the sense 'divert,' with a personal object, is unexampled;⁶³ and anyhow, "diverting the listener" and "interspersing the work with diverse episodes" are two quite different things: one is an *effect* of the poem on the recipient (and a very transient one at that), the other is a part of the process of composition.⁶⁴ Moreover, if one infinitive is

⁵⁸ Hardy and Sykutris keep *εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν* but still make the infinitives objects of *ἔχει*, coordinate with *τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν*. But this leaves *εἰς μεγ.* dangling entirely.

⁵⁹ I.e., *τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν* (*sc.* αὔξεται δ ... *δγκος*).

⁶⁰ Or perhaps it was intended directly for the latter and has been displaced: *εἰς μεγ.*, *sc.* λέγεται: "(the word is used) in the sense of 'grandeur.'" The omission of *μέρη ἅμα ... δγκος* in the Arabic version (see Tkatsch) could possibly be due, at least in part, to confusion caused by a note *εἰς μεγ.* standing near (marginal) or over (interlinear) *δγκος*.

⁶¹ Refs. in Gudeman *ad loc.*; Post, *loc. cit.*

⁶² So Gudeman, Sykutris, and—by implication—Rostagni.

⁶³ The "parallels" cited by Bywater (*Probl.* 30. 1. 953a39, *θεωρῶν ὡς μεταβάλλει* [*sc.* δ οἶνος] *τούς πίοντας*; "for the idea," *Pol.* 8. 5. 1340a22, *μεταβάλλομεν* [intrans.] *γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τούτων* [*sc.* rhythms and melodies]) tell against him; for in those passages Aristotle is talking about actual changes in the soul (though in the first case it is only a temporary one), of which there can be no question here.

⁶⁴ See above on 17. 55b1; 23. 59a36.

to be epexegetic of the other they must have the same object, and clearly this can only be τὸ ποίημα, which can easily be supplied from a line or so above.⁶⁶ Hence I have ventured to bracket τὸν ἀκούοντα also as a gloss, though I confess that I cannot quite account for its motive. Without it, μεταβάλλειν refers directly to the content of the epic and can very well be expanded by ἐπεισοδιοῦν: "and (also the advantage of) varying it (the poem), i.e., enriching it by dissimilar⁶⁶ episodes."

Thus the two advantages which accrue to the epic⁶⁷ from its length are (1) weight and massiveness, and (2) variety. Such is Aristotle's attempt to justify—or to excuse—the enormous length of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. It is an *ex parte* argument, and in chapter 26 he will confess that in the last analysis, against tragedy, it does not hold.

59b31-60a5

- τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἥρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἤρμοκεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγηματικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο, ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο. τὸ γὰρ ἥρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ | ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν (διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα), περιττὴ δὲ καὶ ἢ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων· τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ 37 | a1 τετράμετρον | κινητικὰ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον εἰ μινγνοὶ τις αὐτά, ὥσπερ Χαιρήμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἢ τῷ ἡρώῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἶπομεν αὐτῇ ἢ φύσις δι- 5 δάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ αἰρεῖσθαι.

59b31

As for the heroic verse, the fitting of it to the genre has been the result of experiment. For if anyone should compose a narrative imitation in some other form of verse, or in many, the procedure would strike us as inappropriate.

- 35 For the heroic is the slowest-moving and | weightiest of our verses (that in fact is why it is particularly receptive of 'glosses' and metaphors (similes)), and narrative imi-

⁶⁶ Cf. *loc. cit.*, διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν.

⁶⁶ Dissimilar, that is, from the *central action* (not necessarily from each other). The episodes serve as 'relief.'

⁶⁷ Always, be it remembered, the Homeric epic. A poem that has no central action cannot give a really sharp feeling of variety: there is no fixed point of reference for the contrast.

37 | 60a1 tation also is a form distinct from the others; whereas the
 iambic (trimeter) and (trochaic) tetrameter are | full of move-
 ment: specifically, the one is suited to dancing, the other
 to action. And it would be still more absurd if one should
 mix them (all), as Chaeremon did. Hence nobody has com-
 posed a long poem in another verse than the heroic; on the
 contrary the very nature of the genre, in the way we have
 5 stated, teaches one to choose the verse appropriate | to it.

We come to the second *differentia* specified in the program (59b17). In chapters 1 and 5 the difference was that the epic uses verse alone, 'bare',⁶⁸ while tragedy also has music. Here Aristotle speaks only of the *kind* of verse and ignores music entirely. That is natural, perhaps, in the middle of a special discussion of the epic, but not quite consistent. Also, since this time he approaches the question quasi-historically, we should like to know how the primitive hymns and *encomia* came to lose their musical accompaniment. On the other hand Aristotle does repair one omission in his former account,⁶⁹ by telling us why the epic adopted the hexameter. The explanation should be compared in detail with those in 4. 48b30-31 and 49a21-28. The step was taken,⁷⁰ Aristotle says here, as a result of trial and error (*πειρα*). Later in the passage, a3-5, we are told that "Nature herself, as we have said, teaches the choice of the proper measure" (Butcher). Gudeman finds a contradiction here between "Nature" and "experiment," and even emends *φύσις* to *πειρα* in a4. But in the first place, as in all the similar cases in the *Poetics*, *ὡσπερ εἶπομεν* contains a substantive, not a verbal reference;⁷¹ and in the second place *αὐτῇ ἢ φύσις* is not the goddess

⁶⁸ *Τοῖς μέτροις (ψιλοῖς χρωμένῃ); τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν.*

⁶⁹ See above on 4. 48b32-34.

⁷⁰ *Ἡρμῶκεν*, "has (been) fitted (to the epic genre)."

⁷¹ This, being the last occurrence of the phrase and its congeners in the *Poetics*, is a suitable place to call the roll:

ὡσπερ εἶπομεν, 5. 49a32; 23. 59a30; 24. 60a3

ὡσπερ εἴρηται, 6. 50b13; 11. 52a35; 13. 53a26; 15. 54a25

καθ' ἃπερ εἴρηται, 11. 52a23

ὅπερ εἴρηται, 14. 54a9; 18. 56a10

ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη, 15. 54a18

ὡσπερ ὤρισται, 10. 52a15

ὡσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει, 18. 56a24

In all these cases the meaning is not: "Such-and-such is true, as we said (was said) before," but: "Such-and-such is true (is meant, should be done, etc.) in the

Nature but *the nature of the poetic genre*. Aristotle had related in 4. 49a23 ff., in exact parallel with the present passage, how "once speech had come in, the nature (i.e., of tragedy)⁷² itself found the appropriate meter," viz. the trimeter. And in the following lines he went on to explain why this happened: iambic is indeed the verse most closely akin to the rhythms of speech in real life. There the 'nature' of the genre was speech, direct address, the dramatic method; here it is narrative (*διηγηματικὴν μίμησιν*, b33), the narrative method; and as the one led men eventually⁷³ to the trimeter, the other led them to the hexameter. "But in the manner we have indicated⁷⁴ the nature (of the genre) itself teaches (men) to choose the verse-form suitable to it."⁷⁵

Thus the passage is perfectly consistent. But there is still another apparent discrepancy. In b33 and 36 Aristotle speaks of 'narrative imitation'; in a2-3, just before the final remark we have been studying, he says, "Hence no one has composed a *long* poem [not: "a narrative poem"] in another verse than the heroic, but," etc. Why this divergence? Because, as we have just learned above, 59b22-31, the epic has the special characteristic of augmenting its bulk very greatly by adding episodes, and it has this faculty because it is a narrative genre. Hence for Aristotle's immediate purpose 'narrative poem' and 'long poem' are interchangeable terms.

With this we can turn to the special argument, b34 ff., about the qualities of the hexameter. *ὄγκωδέστατον* is clear, coming so close after *ὄγκος*; in b28; but what of *στασιμώτατον*? "Stateliest" (Butcher) or "gravest" (Bywater) is not to the point; "most deliberate" (Potts) is better. *Στασιμώτατον* has its antithesis in *κινήτικα*, a1: iambic and trochaic meters are full of movement, while the dactylic in comparison with them is slow, stationary.⁷⁶ The reason is of course the inner constitution of the dactyl (1 : 1, the *γένος ἴσον*).⁷⁷ The hexa-

way previously mentioned." The only place in the *Poetics* where such a phrase serves merely to make a citation is 3. 48a25, ὡς (N.B.: not ὡσαυτ) εἴπομεν κατ' ἀρχαίς.

⁷² See *ad loc.* on the significance of *λέξιως γενομένης* and *φύσει*.

⁷³ After experiment (*πειρα*) with the tetrameter.

⁷⁴ The reference is both to 4. 48b30, 49a23 ff., and to the beginning of the present section.

⁷⁵ It is apparent how much *αὐτῇ* gains in clarity from this interpretation.

⁷⁶ Cf. *Pol.* 8. 5. 1349b9; *ibid.* 7. 1342b13 (on the Dorian 'harmony').

⁷⁷ Antiquity speaks unanimously of the *σεμνότης*, *gravitas*, of the hexameter: see A. Roszbach, *Gr. Metrik*² (*Theorie d. mus. Künste d. Hellenen*², 3. 2), Leipzig, 1889, 23-26; G. Amsel, *De vi atque indole rhythmorum quid veteres iudicaverint*

meter is the *slowest-moving* of the regular μέτρα. And this quality also accounts for its special receptivity to metaphors (i.e., similes, for is not Aristotle thinking of the leisureliness and breadth of the Homeric simile, especially in the *Iliad*?).⁷⁸ The receptivity to 'glosses'⁷⁹ (i.e., archaic or dialectal words; see 21. 57b4-6; 25. 61a10-16), on the other hand, has to do more with the weightiness and dignity of the epic verse: cf. *Rhetoric* 3. 3. 1406b2-3, αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς (sc. χρῆσιμώταται εἰσιν)· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὐθαδέες.

Following on to the next clause, b36, it seems to me that we must write περιττὴ δέ rather than περιττὴ γάρ. As we have seen, the choice of the hexameter was dictated ultimately by the narrative character of the epic. Hence the most likely reason for the repetition of διηγηματικὴ μίμησις here (from b33) is that Aristotle wishes to point to a parallel between the nature of the verse and the nature of the genre. This parallel consists in (1) slowness, lack of haste, and (2) weightiness, impressiveness. Aristotle has already shown, for the genre, that the latter quality springs from its narrative method, and he has just said that the heroic meter is στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέσ-

(*Bresl. Philol. Abh.* 1. 3), Breslau, 1887, 78-88, esp. 80-84. Aristotle himself calls it σεμνός in the *Rhetoric*, 3. 8. 1408b32. But here that idea is rather connoted by ὀγκωδέστατον. The slowness of the hexameter is not mentioned after Aristotle; the reason appears to be that the so-called 'cyclic' pronunciation of dactyls (i.e., the way they are still read by most moderns, with slurring of the initial long; cf. the usual reading of Longfellow's "Evangeline") became standard in the schools and probably in most recitation. See Rossbach, *op. cit.* 23: "Wir werden anzunehmen haben, dass in der älteren Zeit die isische Messung in dem feierlichen und langsamen [italics mine] Vortrage der Rhapsoden strenger festgehalten wurde als in dem späteren"; cf. *ibid.* 14: "mit langsamerem Tempo als in der prosaischen Rede."

⁷⁸ There is an apparent contradiction with 22. 59a10 and *Rhet.* 3. 3. 1406b4, where metaphors are said to be especially suitable to iambic verse. But Aristotle is thinking there primarily of the content of metaphors; cf. 59a6-8, on the intellectual quality which is required for—and revealed by—their apt use. Far from being fatal to our argument, the discrepancy with our passage seems to me to prove beyond doubt that here Aristotle is thinking particularly of the Homeric simile.

⁷⁹ Gudeman adds <καὶ ἀπάσους ἐπεκτάσεις> after μεταφοράς, on the basis of the Arabic version. But the extra words in the latter ("et tractationes et omnia augmenta valde") may be simply a reminiscence of 22. 58a22, γλῶτταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κέρριον. In contrast to most of the content of the *Poetics*, this is something 'grammatical,' i.e., something the Syrian and the Arab could understand and might remember.

τατον; now he adds, "And narrative poetry too is peculiar, special" (viz. in these respects),⁸¹ in comparison with the other (branches of imitation)." Now, so far as slowness or lack of haste is concerned, what can justify the parallel except the great *length* of the epic, its almost unlimited capacity for pausing to take in extra episodes?⁸² Thus epic poetry itself is *στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον*, because it is a narrative genre; and that is why it has "taught men to choose" a verse-form that has the same qualities.

Τὸ γὰρ ἥρωικὸν κτλ. and *περιττὴ δὲ κτλ.* are parallel clauses, then, and *διὸ καὶ κτλ.* is a parenthesis to the former.⁸³ The whole represents an attempt to derive the twin qualities of 'weight' and slowness from the narrative character of the epic. Psychologically, we can perhaps ascribe them to the greater *distance* of the narrator from his theme, as compared to the direct implication of the dramatic characters in the action.⁸⁴ This idea, modern though it may sound, gains plausibility from Aristotle's description of certain traits of the 'great-souled' man, *E. N.* 4. 8. 1125a12-15; for he emphasizes that they spring from his aloofness from the hurly-burly of everyday life: *καὶ κίνησεις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξεις στάσιμος.*⁸⁵ *οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς; ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, κτλ.:* "for the man who takes few things seriously is not apt to be in a hurry."

We have already seen trochaic verse (i.e., the tetrameter) characterized as *ὀρχηστικόν*, in 4. 49a22-23.⁸⁶ *Τὸ δὲ (sc. λαμβεῖον) πρακτικόν* does not contradict the earlier passage either; for it is mainly through speech that men act, and conversely, in the practical sphere, the purpose of speech is action. Rhetoric, for example, as an "offshoot of

⁸⁰ Cf. *Ἰδίον*, b23.

⁸¹ Tucker's *καὶ <τηδί>*, which is accepted by Gudeman (*καὶ ταύτη* Twining, Butcher), misplaces the point. It is not a new ground of comparison that is being added, but the other *comparandum*.

⁸² The genre can absorb long episodes, just as the verse can absorb long similes.

⁸³ Rather than a main clause, with *περιττὴ κτλ.* following as a parenthesis (Rostagni), or a part of the parenthesis along with the latter (Butcher).

⁸⁴ Cf. above on 17. 55a30-32.

⁸⁵ Surely not "a level utterance" (Ross, in the Oxford translation), but "an unhurried way of speaking."

⁸⁶ Cf. *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b36, *ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος καρδιακώτερος.* — The present passage helps to confirm our argument that *διὰ τὸ σατυρικὸν εἶναι τὴν ποιήσιν* in c. 4 had nothing to do with satyr-play but referred to a general characteristic of the genre (early tragedy): i.e., of its *poetic form*.

politics" (*Rhet.* 1. 2. 1356a25-27), belongs to the 'practical' arts. Iambic verse is closest to the rhythm in which men actually transact their business,⁸⁷ hence best for the most direct representation of them in the act of doing so.

"And (it would be) still more absurd⁸⁸ if one should mix them, as Chaeremon did." We have already discussed this statement,⁸⁹ and need only add one or two supplementary remarks. *Ἀότᾶ* can only include the hexameter, the trimeter, and the tetrameter, since only those verses have been mentioned, and thus proves our earlier contention that "all the meters" meant just those three.⁹⁰ It also proves that the whole complex above, b34-a1, was felt by Aristotle as a single sentence. Finally, the mention of Chaeremon here need not be taken to prove that his *Centaur* was an epic. As we suggested before, Aristotle must have had very few examples at command for a poem which used all three μέτρα.⁹¹

60a5-11

10 | "Ὀμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιός ἐπαινεῖσθαι, καὶ δὴ
καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ ὁ δεῖ ποιεῖν [αὐτόν].
αὐτόν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ
κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὄλου
ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ, ὀλίγα
| φρονημασάμενος, εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο
τι ἦθος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄηθες ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθος.

60a5

Homer deserves our admiration for many reasons, but particularly because he alone of the (epic) poets is not unaware what it is one should be composing [himself]. Namely, the poet himself ought to do as little talking as possible; for it is not by virtue of that that he is a poet. Now the

⁸⁷ *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408b33, ὁ δ' Ἰαμβος αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν.

⁸⁸ I.e., than writing an epic in trimeters or tetrameters alone.

⁸⁹ See above on I. 47b20-22.

⁹⁰ Gudeman's emendation πάντα for αότᾶ is a touching demonstration of confidence in the standard interpretation. That Chaeremon used "all the 'meters,'" in the modern sense of the word (i. e., including all the lyric rhythms), is out of the question.

⁹¹ The *Margites* mixed hexameters and trimeters. But the *Margites* was a comic work: 4. 48b30, 38.—One of course thinks of—but rejects—the idea that ὄσπερ X. may be an interpolation.

others are on stage themselves, in competition, the whole time, and imitate but little and occasionally, whereas he,
 10 | after a few words by way of preface, immediately brings on stage a man or a woman or some other character, and not one characterless but (all) having character.

So far Aristotle has tried consistently to deduce the particular characteristics (the *differentiae*) of the epic from its generic character as narrative: so its length and its special meter. However, we have also pointed out that in the present chapter Aristotle is really discussing Homer alone, the other epic poets having been cleared from the decks as mere historians-in-verse. Now Homer had indeed composed extremely long poems, and he had used the hexameter. But the concept of epic as narrative collides head-on with another fact which we noticed as long ago as chapters 3 and 4,⁹² namely that to Aristotle's mind *Homer is not really so much a narrator as a dramatist*. He is just that epic poet who narrates least and dramatizes most. Aristotle does not dodge the paradox, he states it boldly—even, perhaps, with a little too much *insouciance*. Homer, he says, uses straight narrative only for a brief⁹³ prologue, then immediately "brings on stage"⁹⁴ a "character" (who then takes over and speaks for himself). The other poets remain on the stage themselves all the way through. But how else, after all, *should* a narrative poet behave? The paradox is certainly not a sign of different 'strata' in the *Poetics*.⁹⁵ It is inherent in Aristotle's conception of Homer as a man between two worlds: epic poet, but also precursor and in a sense inventor of the drama. If this is treason to the epic as such, it springs from allegiance to a greater cause, that of poetry as a whole, of which tragedy is the exemplar and Homer was the first prophet.

That this is Aristotle's meaning, and that he is perfectly conscious

⁹² See above on 3. 48a22; 4. 48b34 ff.

⁹³ Note the play on *ὀλίγα ... ὀλιγάκις ... ὀλίγα*.

⁹⁴ *Εἰσάγει*, a technical term from the theater (cf. *Pol.* 7. 17. 1336b29, *προεισάγειν*; Hippocr. *Lex* 1, *τοῖσι παρεισαυγομένοισι προσώποισιν ἐν τῆσι τραγωδίῃσιν*); and so also, perhaps, *ἤθος*. On the paradox implicit in the following remark (Homer's 'characters' have 'character,' which certainly implies that those of the Cyclic poets did not) see above on 6. 50a5, b8, and 15. 54a16-20. — I have written *οὐδὲν ἄγθεζ*, following Gudeman (who however accentuates *ἀγθεζ*). The reading seems to be implied both by the Arabic version and by the medieval Latin (*neque unum morem*); its appearance in Paris. 2038 carries less weight.

⁹⁵ Montmollin 159.

of it, is shown clearly by *οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖν*, a6: "(Homer) is the only one of the (epic) poets who is not unaware what one should compose." The point has suffered from the dittography *αὐτόν αὐτόν*,⁹⁶ of which the Arabic version shows no trace. I follow Spengel in deleting the first *αὐτόν*. The subject of *ποιεῖν* is not the individual Homer, but *τὸν ποιητὴν* understood, which we can easily supply from *τῶν ποιητῶν* just before and which is then expressed and reinforced by *αὐτόν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν* in the following sentence. What Aristotle means is that the other epic poets (although they may have been guided by some glimmering notion of 'epic') had no conception of the poet's duty *qua* poet: what one must do in 'composing.' *Ποιεῖν* is the key word. Here, as everywhere in the *Poetics*, notably in the exactly parallel remark 3. 48a22, *ὡσπερ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ*,⁹⁷ it has its own full and proper meaning (not merely = 'do'). Homer, then, is the only epic poet who understood the *poet's* duty: that is, to imitate (*μιμεῖσθαι* = *ποιεῖν*),⁹⁸ not merely to talk (*λέγειν*).

In this case we see the demands of Poetry itself cross the demands of the particular species. How the resulting paradoxes⁹⁹ are to be answered it is useless to ask. They are inevitable, given Aristotle's determination to define the epic by the poet who was its least typical representative.

60a11-b5

- δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα. ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ | τὴν Ἑκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηπῆς
15 ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανεῖν—οἱ μὲν ἐστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων—ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεισιν λανθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστόν ἡδύ. σημεῖον δὲ πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὀμηρος
20 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. | ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τοῦδὲ ὄντος τοδὲ ἧ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ πρό-

⁹⁶ Cf. *ἔτι δὲ ἔτι δέ* in the Parisinus, 59b8. The Riccard. has *αὐτόν δεῖ γὰρ αὐτόν*.

⁹⁷ See above *ad loc.*; and just below, a12: *ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν*.

⁹⁸ See above on 9. 51b27-32.

⁹⁹ E.g., how is it that Homer wrote such very long poems, if he was not merely narrating after all?

τερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι (τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος) · διὸ δεῖ<ν>·
 ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι
 ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ, προσθεῖναι · διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθές·
 25 ὄν | παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν.
 παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου τὸ ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων.

προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ
 ἀπίθανα, τοὺς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων,
 ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ
 30 μυθεύματος, ὡσπερ | [Οἰδίπους] τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι πῶς ὁ Λάιος
 ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ δράματι, ὡσπερ ἐν Ἡλέκτρᾳ οἱ
 τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλοντες ἢ ἐν Μυσοῖς ὁ ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας
 εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἦκων. ὥστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνήρητο ἂν ὁ
 μῦθος γελοῖον · ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιοῦτους·
 35 ἂν δὲ θῆ, καὶ φαίνεται εὐλο|γωτέρας, ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄτο-
 πον. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν,
 36 | b1 ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτὰ δῆλον ἂν | γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος
 ποιητῆς ποιήσειε · νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητῆς
 ἀφανίζει ἡδύτων τὸ ἄτοπον. τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν
 ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσιν καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς μήτε διανοητικοῖς ·
 5 ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἢ λίαν λαμπρὰ | λέξεις τὰ τε ἦθη
 καὶ τὰς διανοίας.

60a11

Now then, one should try to incorporate the astonishing
 in tragedies, but the epic has more room for the irrational
 (which is the chief source of astonishment), by reason of
 the fact that we cannot actually see the person who is per-
 15 forming the action. Because the incidents in | the pursuit
 of Hector would show themselves to be absurd if they were
 put on a stage—the Achaeans standing there, not pursuing
 him, and (Achilles) signaling to them to stand back—whereas
 in the epic we do not notice this. And the astonishing does
 give pleasure. A token of this: everybody exaggerates a
 story when he tells it, thinking that he is pleasing the listener.
 But Homer more than anyone else has taught the other
 20 poets also how to tell untruths in the right way. | This is
 a matter of false reasoning. Namely people think that if
 a certain thing (B) exists or happens when another thing (A)
 exists or has happened, then if the second thing (B) is true,
 the first (A) must be true or be happening also (but it is
 untrue); hence they feel, if the first item is untrue but some-

thing else must necessarily be true or happen if it is true, <that they> must add it (A); for because we know that
 25 the later thing is true | our mind reasons falsely that the first one is true also. An example of this is the incident in the Foot-bath (*Odyssey* 19).

One should on the one hand choose impossibilities that are (made) plausible in preference to possibilities that are (left) implausible, but on the other hand one's *plots* should not be made out of irrational incidents; preferably there should be nothing irrational about them, or if there is it
 30 should be outside the plot-structure, like |[Oedipus] not knowing the manner of Laius' death, rather than *in* the drama, like the report of the Pythian games in the *Electra* or the person in the *Mysians* who has come all the way from Tegea to Mysia without saying a word. Hence it is absurd to say that otherwise the plot would be destroyed; for plots should not be constructed that way to begin with. But if the poet does choose to put them in, and they are
 35 'put across' in such a way as to make them more | persuasive, one can risk even a strong improbability. Take the irrationalities in the *Odyssey*, in connection with the setting ashore of Odysseus: it would become evident that they
 36 | b1 were intolerable if a poor poet composed them; | as it is, the poet makes the irrationalities hard to see by 'sweetening' them with the other good things he has to offer. But one should reserve special pains with one's language for passages where nothing is happening and which involve neither character nor thought. For over-brilliant language
 5 has a backhand effect: it tends to | conceal both character-portrayals and expressions of thought.

If the last section seemed to contradict—in Homer's honor—what was said earlier about the narrative character of the epic, the present passage returns to that theme. The epic also has a particular capacity for the marvelous, or one species of it, and again because it is a narrative genre (a14, *διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄρεσθαι εἰς τὸν πρῶτοντα*). As it turns out, this opens up a large subject.

We learned in chapter 9¹⁰⁰ that the *θαυμαστόν* is desirable, even

¹⁰⁰ 52a4 ff.

necessary, for the best tragedy. But that was a *θαυμαστόν* based on or compatible with logic (*παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἄλλήλα*), and its place was in the heart of the tragic action. The variety of *θαυμαστόν* that is especially available to the epic is a different sort: it is the *ἄλογον*, the irrational, and its proper home is *outside* the main action (a29). We heard something about this kind of *θαυμαστόν* in 18. 56a10-25: it was the will-o'-the-wisp that lured tragic poets into writing plays of epic (i.e., episodic) cast. Aristotle resumes the topic here from the special point of view of the epic, and discusses how the irrational should and should not be managed.

The 'irrational' resembles epic length and the epic verse in two respects: (1) the epic has a special capacity for it by virtue of being a narrative mode, and (2) it has certain advantages and gives a certain pleasure, but one which upon mature scrutiny turns out to be inferior to that offered by the drama. Epic length brings 'weight' and variety, but is incompatible with the norm of length and therefore with the finest aesthetic experience; the epic verse is impressive but not suited to the direct presentation of human action, that is, to poetry in its highest embodiment. Just so the pleasure which springs from the irrational-marvelous is an advantage to the poet,¹⁰¹ but a low and transient one, a sign of our unregenerate, childish nature¹⁰² (a17-18, on the universal human trick of playing up a story when one retells it). But this shadow-side is not dwelt on here, any more than Aristotle has expatiated (in this chapter) on the drawbacks of length and variety or the shortcomings of the hexameter. His self-imposed mission here is to justify Homer, and Homer is among other things a master of the *ἄλογον*.

There are two kinds of wonder. One is essentially intellectual, a manifestation of the desire to know. It is the kind that begot philosophy and the other liberal arts.¹⁰³ We met its cousin, the instinct for imitation, at the beginning of chapter 4, and saw that it similarly begot the genres of poetry and was at bottom intellectual. Poetry too is a manifestation of the desire to know and to communicate knowledge,

¹⁰¹ That it was one, or was thought so, is proved by the eagerness with which dramatic poets copied epic models in order to secure it; see above on 18. 56a20.

¹⁰² Cf. E. A. Forster's amusing description of the primitive, gaping "shock-heads" who were—and are—interested only in the story: "And then what?" *Aspects of the Novel*, New York, 1927, 46.

¹⁰³ *Metaph.* A2. 982b12 ff. (note esp. 18-20; the lover of stories is in a sense a philosopher, for 'myth' is made up of marvels); cf. *Rhet.* 1. 11. 1376a31 ff.; fr. 668 Rose; Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 321 n. 1.

but in the practical sphere: knowledge of *how and why men act*. Such learning brings as many wonders and paradoxes before us as any Marco Polo, but it is aimed at the typical and significant—the *καθόλου*—rather than the merely peculiar. Against this philosophical impulse and the wonders that are appropriate to it stands the irrational-marvelous. That the pleasure it gives is irrational is confirmed by Aristotle's 'sign.' When we embellish a tale¹⁰⁴ to please the next hearer (a17), we keep him from learning the truth; obviously, then, the pleasure we think we are giving him (*ὡς χαριζόμενοι*) is illusory and false.

In what follows, a18-26, Aristotle appears to be going over to the philosophical brand of *θαυμαστόν* and commending Homer for employing it. But this is only a passing impression engendered by his talk about paralogism. In actual fact, Homer is the old magician who by his art makes us overlook the improbabilities in the pursuit of Hector (a14-17) or the setting ashore of Odysseus on Ithaca (a35-b2). When Aristotle says that Homer has taught the others too¹⁰⁵ "how to lie *comme il faut*," and adds, "(The secret of) this is false reasoning," he is consciously bringing to the fore only one brand of Homeric 'lie.' Unfortunately, although his exposition of the fallacy itself is clear enough on the whole,¹⁰⁶ his example is not. We cannot tell just what episode he has in mind. From 16. 55a12-16, which refers to a paralogism apparently connected with the Stringing of the Bow, Rostagni infers that the reference here is the same. But the details in that passage are very uncertain, and anyhow the instance is cited from an otherwise unknown play (perhaps a satyr-play), *Odysseus the False Messenger* (?), not from the *Odyssey*, and almost certainly does not fit the latter. The more usual view is that Aristotle means the speech (τ220-248) in which Ody-

¹⁰⁴ *Προσιθέντες*, "exaggerating." See Vahlen, *Poet.* 284, on 26. 61b29.

¹⁰⁵ Not only epic poets, but tragedians and others.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Soph. El.* 5. 167b1-8; *Rhet.* 2. 19. 1392b15 ff.; *ibid.* 24. 1401b20-30. I have written *διό δεῖ<ν>* in a22 and taken the following (*ὄν τὸ πρῶτον... γενέσθαι ἤ*) as a new clause, parallel with *ὅταν τοῦδ' ... γίνεσθαι*, rather than a new sentence. I take it that what Aristotle is talking about is not what *the poet* should add—he does not need to add anything, his hearers stand ready to do it for him (cf. *προσιθέντες*, a18)—but what *they* feel obliged to add, and that the content of the addition is that the premise is true *also* (i.e., as well as the consequent): cf. below, *καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν*. All the poet needs to do, then, in order to put over a lie 'properly,' is to present his listeners with a false antecedent and a true consequent; they will do the rest. I.e., he need not affirm the lie, he only tells it. Perhaps the same idea could be conveyed by *διό δὲ* (all MSS except Riccard.), without emendation.

seus, by means of some true details about himself, tricks Penelope into believing his preceding cock-and-bull story (165-202). This incident is at least closer to the actual 'Bath-Scene' than the Stringing of the Bow. The difficulty is that the hearer is not taken in by the speech (we know all the time that it is Odysseus speaking), but only Penelope. Thus the reference is not only unclear but suspicious; I would suggest the possibility that it is an interpolation.¹⁰⁷

The famous remark that follows, a26, *προαιρείσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα*, has suffered like so many others from being wrenched out of its context and quoted in isolation, as if Aristotle were commending 'plausible impossibilities' *per se*. If he were, he would be involving himself in a contradiction with his own previous statement, 9. 51a37 ff., that the poet's function is to tell us *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. But, in the first place, it is evident upon consideration that 'possible' is not said here from the same point of view as in chapter 9. Here it means quite simply that which is *physically* possible, under the ordinary laws of reality. A thing which is impossible according to those laws might well be (though it will not necessarily be) *δυνατὸν κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. Secondly, we should not think of *ἀδύνατα εἰκότα* and *δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα* as phrases *en bloc*, = "things (which are) impossible (but) plausible" and "possible (but) implausible." In each case the first adjective denotes the natural status of the thing or event, the second the plausibility or implausibility *which the poet gives to it by the way he handles it*: "things (which are) impossible (but which the poet has made) plausible (to us)," "things (which are) possible (but which the poet has left) implausible (to us)."¹⁰⁸ Thirdly, Aristotle is not stating an absolute choice here but a conditional alternative:¹⁰⁹ one should choose an impossibility which one can make convincing, in preference to a possibility which he cannot, *if* such a choice has to be made. It is not said that the choice always, or even normally, has to

¹⁰⁷ An argument against this is that later antiquity cited Homer by books, not rhapsodies. For it, perhaps, are the textual variations (*τούτου, τοῦτο, τούτων; νίττω* Paris.), which involve *endings*; cf. above on 5. 49b6. But there is nothing decisive.

¹⁰⁸ Such a distinction between the two levels or statuses is indicated by the preceding discussion (a18-26), which has brought home to us what a sovereign power the real poet (Homer) has over our souls, regardless of facts.

¹⁰⁹ One that faces the poet, not us.

be made. In many or most cases the poet will give us *δυνατὰ πιθανά*; only there his art is not put to so critical a test.

We have to consider also the coördinate construction of the sentence (*τε ... τε*), which has been all but universally neglected. On the one hand the poet should choose his impossibilities according to what he can make of them, and on the other hand he should not introduce them into the central action¹¹⁰ of his poem but only, *if at all*, into the episodes. Aristotle explicitly says that it is better for the poem to contain *no* irrationalities (impossibilities),¹¹¹ but that if it does they should be kept "outside the (central) story."¹¹² Thus the poet's first choice is whether he will have impossibilities (*ἀδύνατα*, *ἀλογα*, marvels) at all; then, if he feels he must have them, he is to confine them to the episodes;¹¹³ and at the same time he is to consider that an impossibility made convincing to the reader is better than a possibility left unconvincing. The two halves of the sentence exactly balance each other and define between them the poet's range of choices.

We will not spend time discussing the examples in a29-32,¹¹⁴ but go on to the next significant statement, a33 ff., which supplies the confirmation for what we have said so far. "Hence to say that the story would have been destroyed [i.e., if *ἀλογα* had not been used] is absurd; plots should not be constructed that way to begin with." This restates *τούς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος*: preferably no impossibilities at all, but in any case not in the central plot. At the same time it reaffirms by implication the poet's freedom—and responsibility—to shape his work as he will. If he pleads, "My plot would have been ruined, would have had no point left, without the *ἀλογα*," the critic will retort, "Then you should not have made¹¹⁵ a plot like

¹¹⁰ *Τούς λόγους*; cf. 17. 55b1, 17, and see Sykutris and Rostagni on the present passage.

¹¹¹ *Ἄλογα = ἀδύνατα*.

¹¹² One is tempted to supply *τούς λόγους* as the subject of *ἔχειν*; but that ends in a contradiction, since *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος = ἔξω τοῦ λόγου*. Rather we must supply *τὸν ποιητήν*, or even, if need be, *τὸ ποίημα*.

¹¹³ Aristotle implies—and it is true for the most part—that Homer uses *ἀλογα* only in episodes (e.g., Odysseus' tale of his wanderings; see above on 17. 55b16-23).

¹¹⁴ The fact that they are all from tragedy has misled interpreters into the idea that *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος* likewise refers only to tragedy, whereas Aristotle is also thinking of Homer's central actions (cf. previous note). See Sykutris 225 n. 6.

¹¹⁵ It does not matter whether *συνίστασθαι* is a middle here and a passive above, in a28 (see Bywater *ad locc.*). Plots do not just grow, they are made,

that in the first place." The next remark is thoroughly consistent with this: "But if he puts them in,¹¹⁶ and they are made [*sc.* by him] to take on a more plausible look¹¹⁷ [i.e., than they have in their own natural character], even a wild impossibility¹¹⁸ is permissible." It is not explicitly said that this permission extends to the inclusion of such an impossibility even in the central action, but that seems to be implied by the rationale of the sentence and by the example which follows.¹¹⁹

Before we go on to the example, however, let us take stock. Aristotle has made it plain that (1) the poet ought preferably not to use impossibilities at all; (2) he ought in any case to keep them out of his central plot;¹²⁰ but (3) if he does choose to employ them he must make them plausible, for an impossibility which is made plausible is better, if it comes to that, than a possibility which is not. As to *how* an *ἄλογον*

and made by the poet. Cf. 1. 47a9, *πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους*, and 9. 51b27.

¹¹⁶ *Sc.* τὰ ἄλογα οὐ τὸ ἄλογον; not τοιοῦτον μῦθον (Bywater). Ἐῆ again implies the poet's freedom (and responsibility); cf. above on *ὑποκείμενῃ*, 15. 54a27.

¹¹⁷ *Φαίνεται* again refers to the poet's handling, the way he *makes* his subject appear. Cf. above on 13. 53a28, 30; 19. 56b5, 8; below on 26. 62b6.

¹¹⁸ *Ἄτοπον*, stronger than *ἄλογον* (notice *καί*). Gudeman's punctuation and interpretation of the passage are incomprehensible to me.

¹¹⁹ The pursuit of Hector (a14-17) also belongs, presumably, to the central action; and so, apparently, does the "example from the *Νέπτρα*," a25-26.

¹²⁰ So far as tragedy is concerned, the injunction that they be kept out of the central plot implies that they may be tolerated in episodes, i.e., in the *narrative* portions of the play (messenger's speeches and the like; see above on 17. 55b14-15, the 'episodes' in the *Iphigenia*). So in all instances mentioned in the present passage, even in the *Oedipus*. That in the *Electra* occurs in the Pedagogue's (= Messenger's) speech, 680-763; and the locale of Aeschylus' *Mysians* was obviously Mysis, so that the "voiceless" journey of Telephus must have been narrated, not presented on the stage. The impossibility in the *Oedipus*, viz. that Oedipus had never learned the manner of Laius' death, is alluded to in lines 112 ff. of the play, where Creon figures, so to speak, as Messenger, and 729 ff., where Jocasta has the same function. In none of these cases do we see the *ἄλογον* take place. But then why does Aristotle accept the instance in the *Oedipus* as *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος* (*ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας*, 15. 54b7) and reprobate the others as *ἐν τῷ δράματι*? For the *Mysians* we can only guess; but in the *Electra* the pedagogue's narrative has a decisive effect upon the action, is in fact a calculated part of Orestes' plan. It completely alters the feelings of both Clytemnestra and Electra, and so leads on to the next stage. In the *Oedipus*, on the other hand, Oedipus' ignorance of the manner of Laius' death is presupposed by the action but does not change anything in the action: it is not a 'part' of the plot.

can be made plausible, the model is Homer. And, finally, the impossible or marvelous is more feasible in epic than in tragedy, because the epic is a narrative and we do not actually see the impossibilities but only hear about them.

Now for the example, the setting ashore of Odysseus on Ithaca in book 13 of the *Odyssey*. Aristotle is thinking of course of the magic ship of the Phaeacians, Odysseus' magic slumber (lines 79-80), and the miracle worked by Poseidon (159-164). These wonders are not a case of παραλογισμός, and Aristotle does not try to explain Homer's procedure that way. The poet charms us into overlooking these impossibilities: he "conceals" them from us by "sweetening" them. Here ἀφανίζει (cf. ἀποκρύπτει below) and ἡδύνων (cf. ἡδυσμένω λόγῳ, 6. 49b25; ἡδυσμάτων, *ibid.* 50b16) strongly suggest that in this case the trick is accomplished mainly by Homer's language. The ἔκθεσις is in fact a 'part' which contains no action in Aristotle's sense (Odysseus does not do or decide anything), and it expresses neither character nor 'thought.'¹²¹ I will not venture to guess what particular beauties of style Aristotle saw in the passage, but every reader can feel them, especially in the marvelous lullaby-sequence, 88 ff.: ὧς ἡ ῥίμφα θεούσα θαλάσσης κόματ' ἔταμνεν

Although the landing on Ithaca has the quality of an interlude, it belongs to the main action of the *Odyssey*: the hero arrives (ἀφικνεῖται, 17. 55b21) in his native land. The arrival is in fact the "last 'part' after which the shift to happiness takes place" (18. 55b27).¹²² Now we have seen that the main action ought not to include ἄλογοι: that it "ought not to have been constructed that way to begin with." Could Homer plead that he had to put Odysseus ashore in this particular way, that it could not have been done otherwise? The plot of the *Odyssey*, as the poet has arranged it, requires that the hero arrive on his native shore at the very nadir of his fortunes, alone and "tempest-tossed" (17. 55b21), ready to begin the up-swing which will lead him to success (the μεταβολή εἰς εὐτυχίαν). The premise of the whole second part of the poem is that Odysseus cannot simply walk ashore

¹²¹ Contrast the hero's meeting with Athena, 221 ff. (if the engagement of a goddess in the action is compatible with Aristotle's principles; see 15. 54b2-6), where important action is inaugurated (Odysseus is set on the path which will lead him home) and there is thought and character aplenty (Athena to Od., 291 ff.: "Clever and sly you certainly are, you rascal [σχέτλιε, 293]; that's why I like you so much").

¹²² Cf. above *ad loc.*

in the harbor of Ithaca. Before he can act appropriately he has to be apprised how things stand; and for this orientation he must go first to the hut of Eumaeus (not to his wife, who is alone and beset by his enemies, or to anyone else in the town). Even if he were cast ashore by a storm in a secluded spot, as he was on Phaeacia, it is imperative that the right person meet him first and set his feet on the right path. Thus no natural and inherently probable mode of arrival could bring Odysseus into the right posture for what is to come (there is no Nausicaa on Ithaca). The plot itself requires a miracle as an *ἀρχή*,¹²³ after that it can proceed *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. It may be for some such reason as this that Aristotle does not blame Homer for introducing his *ἄλογον* to begin with (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ κτλ.*). But the ulterior justification is the way he has handled it. He has, for better or worse, chosen to introduce it (*ἂν δὲ θῆ*); and he has brought it off: *εὐλογωτέρως φαίνεται*. This is the other way of "telling lies *ὡς δεῖ*."

Looking back over our passage (60a11-b5) as a whole, we are struck by how far it goes in the direction of glorifying the poet's skill purely for its own sake—*l'art pour l'art*. 'Probability' here is not the austere goddess of chapter 9, presiding over the universal, but a legalized trick played on the reader by the poet—provided he has the skill. The end justifies the means; and the end is after all nothing but a low form of pleasure (a17). It is just in this passage that Aristotle accepts the old accusation of Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Plato, that Homer has told lies. In fact he not merely accepts it, he improves on it: Homer has taught the rest of the poets too (if they are willing to learn) how to tell lies *ὡς δεῖ*. But this immoralism is only marginal and apparent. The real, major virtues of Homer lie in quite other fields: in plot-construction, dramatic presentation, character-drawing, style. "Lying *comme il faut*" is a tolerated exception to the rule (of which Homer is in fact the grand exemplar) that poetry tells the truth about man and his actions. It is tolerated because the marvelous is after all a real source of pleasure, though an inferior one, and poets and audiences alike desire it. Far from authorizing a large expansion of it, Aristotle is concerned to draw its due limits and show how and where it should be handled:

1. It is more feasible and allowable in epic than in tragedy, because it is particularly suitable to narrative.

¹²³ See above on 17. 55b21 ff. (book 13 the real beginning of the *Odyssey*).

2. Whether in epic or in tragedy, it should be used, if it is used at all, in episodes, not in the main action.

3. If it is used it must be well done, following the model of Homer.

Finally, the question arises whether the passage belongs to the original stock of the *Poetics* or is a later addition.¹²⁴ Montmollin makes it (plus 60a5-11) recent.¹²⁵ But the only argument he offers is a set of four correspondences or analogies between parts of the passage and passages elsewhere which he claims to be late; and none of these proves his point.¹²⁶ I see no reason to declare this part of chapter 24 (or any part except the first section, 59b8-17) recent.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ There can be no question that 59b17-60a11 are original. They belong to the program laid out in 5. 49b10-16, though not without some variations, and 60a5-11 is absolutely in accord with Aristotle's first classification of Homer, 3. 48a21-22.

¹²⁵ P. 159. He excludes the last sentence, 60b2-5.

¹²⁶ 1) 60a11-18~25. 60b24-26, which M. claims as a recent part of chapter 25f Ingenious though it is, I believe that M.'s whole theory of a double recension of c. 25 is fundamentally wrong; that on the contrary it is all of a piece and older than the rest of the *Poetics*. Unfortunately my own analysis of the chapter has had to be omitted from this book (see below).

2) 60a18-26~16. 55a12-16. I too think that c. 16 is recent (see above *ad loc.*). But the correspondences between the two passages are too slight to prove anything; they consist, in fact, in nothing but the use of the word *παραλογισμός*. Moreover M. bases his dating of c. 16 in part on the alleged parallel in c. 24, which he says we are certain is not original (p. 155, with a ref. to p. 159), then uses the alleged lateness of c. 16 as one argument to prove the lateness of this part of c. 24 (p. 159, with a ref. to p. 155). This kind of circular reasoning is too common in M.'s work.

3) 60a26-27~25. 61b11-12. See above under 1.

4) 60a27-32~15. 54b6-8. The parallel is by no means close enough to prove that the passages must belong to the same stratum.

¹²⁷ Similarly for M.'s suggestion, p. 159, that our passage might perhaps be a series of alternating fragments, "mais le décousu des idées ne nous permet pas de trancher la question."

CHAPTER 25

Chapter 25 notoriously presents one of the thorniest problems of interpretation in the *Poetics*. The newest attempt, that of Montmollin,¹ is elaborate and in many ways sharp and impressive; yet it leads to a conclusion—the thesis of a double recension of the chapter—which seems to me unacceptable. My own analysis, which was completed at the same time as the rest of the manuscript, would have swollen this book by another fifty pages; hence I omit it here, with the hope of publishing it elsewhere at a not too distant date. The omission can be justified, or at least excused, by the fact that chapter 25, like the others we have passed over, is relatively independent and not likely to have a major effect upon the interpretation of the rest of Aristotle's work.² For I cannot accept Montmollin's assertion that the alleged double recension in 25 is the decisive clue to a similar state of affairs in the *Poetics* as a whole. *Sed de his rebus amplius alias disputabimus.*

¹ Pp. 99-116, 306-322 (n. 197). The long note gives a very valuable survey and critique of the chief interpretations by others.

² Only a few parallels or correspondences offer any considerable problem:

25. 60b15-20, 61b11-12~24. 60a26ff. (impossibilities)

25. 60b26~24. 60a14-17 (the pursuit of Hector)

25. 61b21~15. 54a29 (the badness of Menelaus)

On these see above, c. 24, n. 126. It will be noticed that two of them relate to the immediately preceding passage, near the end of chapter 24.

CHAPTER 26

61b26-62a4

πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἢ ἐποποιικὴ μίμησις ἢ ἡ τραγικὴ,
 διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἥττον φορτικὴ βελτίων,
 τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστίν, δῆλον ἂν εἴη
 [δῆλον] ὅτι ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτικὴ. ὥς γὰρ οὐκ
 30 αἰσθανομένων ἂν | μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῆ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κιν-
 οῦνται, ὅλον οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι, ἂν δίσκον δέξῃ
 μιμείσθαι, καὶ ἔλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον, ἂν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶ-
 σιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγωδία τοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὥς καὶ οἱ πρότερον
 τοὺς ὑστέρους αὐτῶν ᾤοντο ὑποκριτὰς· ὥς λίαν γὰρ ὑπερ-
 35 βάλλοντα πύθηκον ὁ Μυννίσκος | τὸν Καλλιπιδὸν ἐκάλει,
 35 | a1 τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πιν|δάρου ἦν. ὥς δ' οὗτοι ἔχουσι
 πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. τὴν
 μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασὶν εἶναι, <οἱ> οὐδὲν
 δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους.
 εἰ οὖν φορτικὴ, χείρων δηλονότι ἂν εἴη.

61b26

The question may be raised which is superior, the epic
 or the tragic form of imitation. For if the less vulgar art
 is superior, and the one which is addressed to a better class
 of spectators is of that description, it would be clear that
 the one which imitates anything and everything is vulgar.
 For it is because they assume that the public will not 'get it'
 30 unless | (the actor) himself exaggerates that they indulge
 in a plethora of movement, like the bad flute-players who
 writhe when they have to represent a discus-throw, or pull
 and haul at the chorus-leader when they are rendering the
Scylla. So (they say) tragedy is like that, the way the
 earlier actors used to consider the later ones: Mynniscus,
 for example, used to call Callippides "ape," on the ground
 that he exaggerated too much, and a similar opinion used
 35 | 62a1 to be current about | Pindarus too. As the latter stand in
 relation to them (the older actors), then, so the whole art
 stands in relation to the epic. So people maintain that

necessary, for the best tragedy. But that was a *θαυμαστόν* based on or compatible with logic (*παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἄλληλα*), and its place was in the heart of the tragic action. The variety of *θαυμαστόν* that is especially available to the epic is a different sort: it is the *ἄλογον*, the irrational, and its proper home is *outside* the main action (a29). We heard something about this kind of *θαυμαστόν* in 18. 56a10-25: it was the will-o'-the-wisp that lured tragic poets into writing plays of epic (i.e., episodic) cast. Aristotle resumes the topic here from the special point of view of the epic, and discusses how the irrational should and should not be managed.

The 'irrational' resembles epic length and the epic verse in two respects: (1) the epic has a special capacity for it by virtue of being a narrative mode, and (2) it has certain advantages and gives a certain pleasure, but one which upon mature scrutiny turns out to be inferior to that offered by the drama. Epic length brings 'weight' and variety, but is incompatible with the norm of length and therefore with the finest aesthetic experience; the epic verse is impressive but not suited to the direct presentation of human action, that is, to poetry in its highest embodiment. Just so the pleasure which springs from the irrational-marvelous is an advantage to the poet,¹⁰¹ but a low and transient one, a sign of our unregenerate, childish nature¹⁰² (a17-18, on the universal human trick of playing up a story when one retells it). But this shadow-side is not dwelt on here, any more than Aristotle has expatiated (in this chapter) on the drawbacks of length and variety or the shortcomings of the hexameter. His self-imposed mission here is to justify Homer, and Homer is among other things a master of the *ἄλογον*.

There are two kinds of wonder. One is essentially intellectual, a manifestation of the desire to know. It is the kind that begot philosophy and the other liberal arts.¹⁰³ We met its cousin, the instinct for imitation, at the beginning of chapter 4, and saw that it similarly begot the genres of poetry and was at bottom intellectual. Poetry too is a manifestation of the desire to know and to communicate knowledge,

¹⁰¹ That it was one, or was thought so, is proved by the eagerness with which dramatic poets copied epic models in order to secure it; see above on 18. 56a20.

¹⁰² Cf. E. A. Forster's amusing description of the primitive, gaping "shock-heads" who were—and are—interested only in the story: "And then what?" *Aspects of the Novel*, New York, 1927, 46.

¹⁰³ *Metaph.* A2. 982b12 ff. (note esp. 18-20; the lover of stories is in a sense a philosopher, for 'myth' is made up of marvels); cf. *Rhet.* 1. 11. 1376a31 ff.; fr. 668 Rose; Jaeger, *Aristotle*² 321 n. 1.

but in the practical sphere: knowledge of *how and why men act*. Such learning brings as many wonders and paradoxes before us as any Marco Polo, but it is aimed at the typical and significant—the *καθόλου*—rather than the merely peculiar. Against this philosophical impulse and the wonders that are appropriate to it stands the irrational-marvelous. That the pleasure it gives is irrational is confirmed by Aristotle's 'sign.' When we embellish a tale¹⁰⁴ to please the next hearer (a17), we keep him from learning the truth; obviously, then, the pleasure we think we are giving him (*ὡς χαριζόμενοι*) is illusory and false.

In what follows, a18-26, Aristotle appears to be going over to the philosophical brand of *θανμαστόν* and commending Homer for employing it. But this is only a passing impression engendered by his talk about paralogism. In actual fact, Homer is the old magician who by his art makes us overlook the improbabilities in the pursuit of Hector (a14-17) or the setting ashore of Odysseus on Ithaca (a35-b2). When Aristotle says that Homer has taught the others too¹⁰⁵ "how to lie *comme il faut*," and adds, "(The secret of) this is false reasoning," he is consciously bringing to the fore only one brand of Homeric 'lie.' Unfortunately, although his exposition of the fallacy itself is clear enough on the whole,¹⁰⁶ his example is not. We cannot tell just what episode he has in mind. From 16. 55a12-16, which refers to a paralogism apparently connected with the Stringing of the Bow, Rostagni infers that the reference here is the same. But the details in that passage are very uncertain, and anyhow the instance is cited from an otherwise unknown play (perhaps a satyr-play), *Odysseus the False Messenger* (?), not from the *Odyssey*, and almost certainly does not fit the latter. The more usual view is that Aristotle means the speech (τ220-248) in which Odys-

¹⁰⁴ *Προστιθέντες*, "exaggerating." See Vahlen, *Poet.* 284, on 26. 61b29.

¹⁰⁵ Not only epic poets, but tragedians and others.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Soph. El.* 5. 167b1-8; *Rhet.* 2. 19. 1392b15 ff.; *ibid.* 24. 1401b20-30.

I have written *διὸ δεῖ<ν>* in a22 and taken the following (*ἄν τὸ πρῶτον... γενέσθαι ἦ*) as a new clause, parallel with *ἔταν τοιοῦτ'... γίνεσθαι*, rather than a new sentence. I take it that what Aristotle is talking about is not what *the poet* should add—he does not need to add anything, his hearers stand ready to do it for him (cf. *προστιθέντες*, a18)—but what *they* feel obliged to add, and that the content of the addition is that the premise is true *also* (i.e., as well as the consequent): cf. below, *καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ἔν*. All the poet needs to do, then, in order to put over a lie 'properly,' is to present his listeners with a false antecedent and a true consequent; they will do the rest. I.e., he need not affirm the lie, he only tells it. Perhaps the same idea could be conveyed by *διὸ δὴ* (all MSS except Riccard.), without emendation.

seus, by means of some true details about himself, tricks Penelope into believing his preceding cock-and-bull story (165-202). This incident is at least closer to the actual 'Bath-Scene' than the Stringing of the Bow. The difficulty is that the hearer is not taken in by the speech (we know all the time that it is Odysseus speaking), but only Penelope. Thus the reference is not only unclear but suspicious; I would suggest the possibility that it is an interpolation.¹⁰⁷

The famous remark that follows, a26, *προαιρείσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα*, has suffered like so many others from being wrenched out of its context and quoted in isolation, as if Aristotle were commending 'plausible impossibilities' *per se*. If he were, he would be involving himself in a contradiction with his own previous statement, 9. 51a37 ff., that the poet's function is to tell us *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. But, in the first place, it is evident upon consideration that 'possible' is not said here from the same point of view as in chapter 9. Here it means quite simply that which is *physically* possible, under the ordinary laws of reality. A thing which is impossible according to those laws might well be (though it will not necessarily be) *δυνατὸν κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. Secondly, we should not think of *ἀδύνατα εἰκότα* and *δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα* as phrases *en bloc*, = "things (which are) impossible (but) plausible" and "possible (but) implausible." In each case the first adjective denotes the natural status of the thing or event, the second the plausibility or implausibility *which the poet gives to it by the way he handles it*: "things (which are) impossible (but which the poet has made) plausible (to us)," "things (which are) possible (but which the poet has left) implausible (to us)."¹⁰⁸ Thirdly, Aristotle is not stating an absolute choice here but a conditional alternative:¹⁰⁹ one should choose an impossibility which one can make convincing, in preference to a possibility which he cannot, *if* such a choice has to be made. It is not said that the choice always, or even normally, has to

¹⁰⁷ An argument against this is that later antiquity cited Homer by books, not rhapsodies. For it, perhaps, are the textual variations (τούτου, τούτο, τούτων; *νίστηρω* Paris.), which involve *endings*; cf. above on 5. 49b6. But there is nothing decisive.

¹⁰⁸ Such a distinction between the two levels or statuses is indicated by the preceding discussion (a18-26), which has brought home to us what a sovereign power the real poet (Homer) has over our souls, regardless of facts.

¹⁰⁹ One that faces the poet, not us.

be made. In many or most cases the poet will give us *δυνατὰ πιθανά*; only there his art is not put to so critical a test.

We have to consider also the coördinate construction of the sentence (*τε ... τε*), which has been all but universally neglected. On the one hand the poet should choose his impossibilities according to what he can make of them, and on the other hand he should not introduce them into the central action¹¹⁰ of his poem but only, *if at all*, into the episodes. Aristotle explicitly says that it is better for the poem to contain *no* irrationalities (impossibilities),¹¹¹ but that if it does they should be kept "outside the (central) story."¹¹² Thus the poet's first choice is whether he will have impossibilities (*ἀδύνατα*, *ἄλογα*, marvels) at all; then, if he feels he must have them, he is to confine them to the episodes;¹¹³ and at the same time he is to consider that an impossibility made convincing to the reader is better than a possibility left unconvincing. The two halves of the sentence exactly balance each other and define between them the poet's range of choices.

We will not spend time discussing the examples in a29-32,¹¹⁴ but go on to the next significant statement, a33 ff., which supplies the confirmation for what we have said so far. "Hence to say that the story would have been destroyed [i.e., if *ἄλογα* had not been used] is absurd; plots should not be constructed that way to begin with." This restates *τούς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος*: preferably no impossibilities at all, but in any case not in the central plot. At the same time it reaffirms by implication the poet's freedom—and responsibility—to shape his work as he will. If he pleads, "My plot would have been ruined, would have had no point left, without the *ἄλογα*," the critic will retort, "Then you should not have made¹¹⁵ a plot like

¹¹⁰ *Τούς λόγους*; cf. 17. 55b1, 17, and see Sykutris and Rostagni on the present passage.

¹¹¹ ἄλογα = ἀδύνατα.

¹¹² One is tempted to supply *τούς λόγους* as the subject of *ἔχειν*; but that ends in a contradiction, since *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος* = *ἔξω τοῦ λόγου*. Rather we must supply *τὸν ποιητήν*, or even, if need be, *τὸ ποίημα*.

¹¹³ Aristotle implies—and it is true for the most part—that Homer uses *ἄλογα* only in episodes (e.g., Odysseus' tale of his wanderings; see above on 17. 55b16-23).

¹¹⁴ The fact that they are all from tragedy has misled interpreters into the idea that *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος* likewise refers only to tragedy, whereas Aristotle is also thinking of Homer's central actions (cf. previous note). See Sykutris 225 n. 6.

¹¹⁵ It does not matter whether *συνίστασθαι* is a middle here and a passive above, in a28 (see Bywater *ad locc.*). Plots do not just grow, they are made,

that in the first place." The next remark is thoroughly consistent with this: "But if he puts them in,¹¹⁶ and they are made [*sc.* by him] to take on a more plausible look¹¹⁷ [i.e., than they have in their own natural character], even a wild impossibility¹¹⁸ is permissible." It is not explicitly said that this permission extends to the inclusion of such an impossibility even in the central action, but that seems to be implied by the rationale of the sentence and by the example which follows.¹¹⁹

Before we go on to the example, however, let us take stock. Aristotle has made it plain that (1) the poet ought preferably not to use impossibilities at all; (2) he ought in any case to keep them out of his central plot;¹²⁰ but (3) if he does choose to employ them he must make them plausible, for an impossibility which is made plausible is better, if it comes to that, than a possibility which is not. As to *how* an *ἄλογον*

and made by the poet. Cf. 1. 47a9, πῶς δεῖ ἀνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους, and 9. 51b27.

¹¹⁶ *Sc.* τὰ ἄλογα or τὸ ἄλογον; not τοιοῦτον μῦθον (Bywater). Θῆ again implies the poet's freedom (and responsibility); cf. above on ὑποτιθεῖν, 15. 54a27.

¹¹⁷ Φαίνεται again refers to the poet's handling, the way he makes his subject appear. Cf. above on 13. 53a28, 30; 19. 56b5, 8; below on 26. 62b6.

¹¹⁸ Ἄτοπον, stronger than ἄλογον (notice καί). Gudeman's punctuation and interpretation of the passage are incomprehensible to me.

¹¹⁹ The pursuit of Hector (a14-17) also belongs, presumably, to the central action; and so, apparently, does the "example from the *Nίκτρα*," a25-26.

¹²⁰ So far as tragedy is concerned, the injunction that they be kept out of the central plot implies that they may be tolerated in episodes, i.e., in the narrative portions of the play (messenger's speeches and the like; see above on 17. 55b14-15, the 'episodes' in the *Iphigenia*). So in all instances mentioned in the present passage, even in the *Oedipus*. That in the *Electra* occurs in the Pedagogue's (= Messenger's) speech, 680-763; and the locale of Aeschylus' *Mysians* was obviously Mysia, so that the "voiceless" journey of Telephus must have been narrated, not presented on the stage. The impossibility in the *Oedipus*, viz. that Oedipus had never learned the manner of Laius' death, is alluded to in lines 112 ff. of the play, where Creon figures, so to speak, as Messenger, and 729 ff., where Jocasta has the same function. In none of these cases do we see the *ἄλογον* take place. But then why does Aristotle accept the instance in the *Oedipus* as ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος (ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, 15. 54b7) and reprobate the others as ἐν τῷ δράματι? For the *Mysians* we can only guess; but in the *Electra* the pedagogue's narrative has a decisive effect upon the action, is in fact a calculated part of Orestes' plan. It completely alters the feelings of both Clytemnestra and Electra, and so leads on to the next stage. In the *Oedipus*, on the other hand, Oedipus' ignorance of the manner of Laius' death is presupposed by the action but does not change anything in the action: it is not a 'part' of the plot.

can be made plausible, the model is Homer. And, finally, the impossible or marvelous is more feasible in epic than in tragedy, because the epic is a narrative and we do not actually see the impossibilities but only hear about them.

Now for the example, the setting ashore of Odysseus on Ithaca in book 13 of the *Odyssey*. Aristotle is thinking of course of the magic ship of the Phaeacians, Odysseus' magic slumber (lines 79-80), and the miracle worked by Poseidon (159-164). These wonders are not a case of *παραλογισμός*, and Aristotle does not try to explain Homer's procedure that way. The poet *charms us into overlooking these impossibilities*: he "conceals" them from us by "sweetening" them. Here *ἀφανίζει* (cf. *ἀποκρύπτει* below) and *ἡδύνων* (cf. *ἡδυσμένω λόγῳ*, 6. 49b25; *ἡδυσμάτων*, *ibid.* 50b16) strongly suggest that in this case the trick is accomplished mainly by Homer's *language*. The *ἐκθεσις* is in fact a 'part' which contains no action in Aristotle's sense (Odysseus does not do or decide anything), and it expresses neither character nor 'thought.'¹²¹ I will not venture to guess what particular beauties of style Aristotle saw in the passage, but every reader can feel them, especially in the marvelous lullaby-sequence, 88 ff.: *ὦς ἦ ἑίμψα θεούσα θαλάσσης κύματ' ἔταμνεν*

Although the landing on Ithaca has the quality of an interlude, it belongs to the main action of the *Odyssey*: the hero *arrives* (*ἀφικνεῖται*, 17. 55b21) in his native land. The arrival is in fact the "last 'part' after which the shift to happiness takes place" (18. 55b27).¹²² Now we have seen that the main action ought not to include *ἄλογα*: that it "ought not to have been constructed that way to begin with." Could Homer plead that he had to put Odysseus ashore in this particular way, that it could not have been done otherwise? The plot of the *Odyssey*, as the poet has arranged it, requires that the hero arrive on his native shore at the very nadir of his fortunes, alone and "tempest-tossed" (17. 55b21), ready to begin the up-swing which will lead him to success (the *μεταβολή εἰς εὐτυχίαν*). The premise of the whole second part of the poem is that Odysseus cannot simply walk ashore

¹²¹ Contrast the hero's meeting with Athena, 221 ff. (if the engagement of a goddess in the action is compatible with Aristotle's principles; see 15. 54b2-6), where important action is inaugurated (Odysseus is set on the path which will lead him home) and there is thought and character aplenty (Athena to Od., 291 ff.: "Clever and sly you certainly are, you rascal [*σχετίλις*, 293]; that's why I like you so much").

¹²² Cf. above *ad loc.*

in the harbor of Ithaca. Before he can act appropriately he has to be apprised how things stand; and for this orientation he must go first to the hut of Eumaeus (not to his wife, who is alone and beset by his enemies, or to anyone else in the town). Even if he were cast ashore by a storm in a secluded spot, as he was on Phaeacia, it is imperative that the right person meet him first and set his feet on the right path. Thus no natural and inherently probable mode of arrival could bring Odysseus into the right posture for what is to come (there is no Nausicaa on Ithaca). The plot itself requires a miracle as an *ἀρχή*,¹⁸³ after that it can proceed *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. It may be for some such reason as this that Aristotle does not blame Homer for introducing his *ἄλογον* to begin with (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ κτλ.*). But the ulterior justification is the way he has handled it. He has, for better or worse, chosen to introduce it (*ἂν δὲ θῆ*); and he has brought it off: *εὐλογωτέρως φαίνεται*. This is the other way of "telling lies *ὡς δεῖ*."

Looking back over our passage (60a11-b5) as a whole, we are struck by how far it goes in the direction of glorifying the poet's skill purely for its own sake—*l'art pour l'art*. 'Probability' here is not the austere goddess of chapter 9, presiding over the universal, but a legalized trick played on the reader by the poet—provided he has the skill. The end justifies the means; and the end is after all nothing but a low form of pleasure (a17). It is just in this passage that Aristotle accepts the old accusation of Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Plato, that Homer has told lies. In fact he not merely accepts it, he improves on it: Homer has taught the rest of the poets too (if they are willing to learn) how to tell lies *ὡς δεῖ*. But this immoralism is only marginal and apparent. The real, major virtues of Homer lie in quite other fields: in plot-construction, dramatic presentation, character-drawing, style. "Lying *comme il faut*" is a tolerated exception to the rule (of which Homer is in fact the grand exemplar) that poetry tells the truth about man and his actions. It is tolerated because the marvelous is after all a real source of pleasure, though an inferior one, and poets and audiences alike desire it. Far from authorizing a large expansion of it, Aristotle is concerned to draw its due limits and show how and where it should be handled:

1. It is more feasible and allowable in epic than in tragedy, because it is particularly suitable to narrative.

¹⁸³ See above on 17. 55b21 ff. (book 13 the real beginning of the *Odyssey*).

2. Whether in epic or in tragedy, it should be used, if it is used at all, in episodes, not in the main action.

3. If it is used it must be well done, following the model of Homer.

Finally, the question arises whether the passage belongs to the original stock of the *Poetics* or is a later addition.¹²⁴ Montmollin makes it (plus 60a5-11) recent.¹²⁵ But the only argument he offers is a set of four correspondences or analogies between parts of the passage and passages elsewhere which he claims to be late; and none of these proves his point.¹²⁶ I see no reason to declare this part of chapter 24 (or any part except the first section, 59b8-17) recent.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ There can be no question that 59b17-60a11 are original. They belong to the program laid out in 5. 49b10-16, though not without some variations, and 60a5-11 is absolutely in accord with Aristotle's first classification of Homer, 3. 48a21-22.

¹²⁵ P. 159. He excludes the last sentence, 60b2-5.

¹²⁶ 1) 60a11-18~25. 60b24-26, which M. claims as a recent part of chapter 25f. Ingenious though it is, I believe that M.'s whole theory of a double recension of c. 25 is fundamentally wrong; that on the contrary it is all of a piece and older than the rest of the *Poetics*. Unfortunately my own analysis of the chapter has had to be omitted from this book (see below).

2) 60a18-26~16. 55a12-16. I too think that c. 16 is recent (see above *ad loc.*). But the correspondences between the two passages are too slight to prove anything; they consist, in fact, in nothing but the use of the word *παραλογισμός*. Moreover M. bases his dating of c. 16 in part on the alleged parallel in c. 24, which he says we are certain is not original (p. 155, with a ref. to p. 159), then uses the alleged lateness of c. 16 as one argument to prove the lateness of this part of c. 24 (p. 159, with a ref. to p. 155). This kind of circular reasoning is too common in M.'s work.

3) 60a26-27~25. 61b11-12. See above under 1.

4) 60a27-32~15. 54b6-8. The parallel is by no means close enough to prove that the passages must belong to the same stratum.

¹²⁷ Similarly for M.'s suggestion, p. 159, that our passage might perhaps be a series of alternating fragments, "mais le décousu des idées ne nous permet pas de trancher la question."

CHAPTER 25

Chapter 25 notoriously presents one of the thorniest problems of interpretation in the *Poetics*. The newest attempt, that of Montmollin,¹ is elaborate and in many ways sharp and impressive; yet it leads to a conclusion—the thesis of a double recension of the chapter—which seems to me unacceptable. My own analysis, which was completed at the same time as the rest of the manuscript, would have swollen this book by another fifty pages; hence I omit it here, with the hope of publishing it elsewhere at a not too distant date. The omission can be justified, or at least excused, by the fact that chapter 25, like the others we have passed over, is relatively independent and not likely to have a major effect upon the interpretation of the rest of Aristotle's work.² For I cannot accept Montmollin's assertion that the alleged double recension in 25 is the decisive clue to a similar state of affairs in the *Poetics* as a whole. *Sed de his rebus amplius alias disputabimus.*

¹ Pp. 99-116, 306-322 (n. 197). The long note gives a very valuable survey and critique of the chief interpretations by others.

² Only a few parallels or correspondences offer any considerable problem:

25. 60b15-20, 61b11-12~24. 60a26ff. (impossibilities)

25. 60b26~24. 60a14-17 (the pursuit of Hector)

25. 61b21~15. 54a29 (the badness of Menelaus)

On these see above, c. 24, n. 126. It will be noticed that two of them relate to the immediately preceding passage, near the end of chapter 24.

CHAPTER 26

61b26-62a4

πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἢ ἐποποικὴ μίμησις ἢ ἡ τραγικὴ,
 διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἥττον φορτικὴ βελτίων,
 τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστίν, δῆλον ἂν εἶη
 [δῆλον] ὅτι ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτικὴ. ὥς γὰρ οὐκ
 30 αἰσθανομένων ἂν | μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῆ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κιν
 οῦνται, οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι, ἂν δίσκον δέη
 μιμῆσθαι, καὶ ἔλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον, ἂν Σκύλλαν ἀλῶ
 σιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγωδία τοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὥς καὶ οἱ πρότερον
 τοὺς ὑστέρους αὐτῶν ζῶντο ὑποκριτὰς· ὥς λίαν γὰρ ὑπερ
 35 βάλλοντα πίθηκον ὁ Μυννίσκος | τὸν Καλλιπιδῆν ἐκάλει,
 35 | a1 τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πιν|δάρου ἦν. ὥς δ' οὗτοι ἔχουσι
 πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡ δὴ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. τὴν
 μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασιν εἶναι, <οἱ> οὐδὲν
 δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους.
 εἰ οὖν φορτικὴ, χείρων δηλονότι ἂν εἶη.

61b26

The question may be raised which is superior, the epic
 or the tragic form of imitation. For if the less vulgar art
 is superior, and the one which is addressed to a better class
 of spectators is of that description, it would be clear that
 the one which imitates anything and everything is vulgar.
 For it is because they assume that the public will not 'get it'
 30 unless | (the actor) himself exaggerates that they indulge
 in a plethora of movement, like the bad flute-players who
 writhe when they have to represent a discus-throw, or pull
 and haul at the chorus-leader when they are rendering the
Scylla. So (they say) tragedy is like that, the way the
 earlier actors used to consider the later ones: Mynniscus,
 for example, used to call Callippides "ape," on the ground
 that he exaggerated too much, and a similar opinion used
 35 | 62a1 to be current about | Pindarus too. As the latter stand in
 relation to them (the older actors), then, so the whole art
 stands in relation to the epic. So people maintain that

the latter is addressed to a cultivated audience, <who> have no need of the dance-figures, while the tragic art is addressed to a low and worthless one. If then it is vulgar, it must obviously be inferior.

Aristotle's final chapter on serious poetry takes up the question he had raised and postponed in chapter 4, 49a6-8:¹ namely, whether epic or tragedy is the better genre; or, as it was put there, whether "even tragedy (i.e., in comparison with epic) is fully adequate to the (master-) forms or not." The failure to recognize this connection has been due not only to misapprehension of Aristotle's point in the earlier passage (*ἡδῆ* being taken as a chronological reference to his own day), but to the fact that when the question is resumed here it is taken up in a different form. But this is purely a matter of the angle of approach. Here Aristotle poses the issue in the form that has been given to it by certain unnamed critics of tragedy, viz. that the art is vulgar and appeals to a vulgar audience. When he comes to his rebuttal, however—i.e., to the real *σύγκρισις* of the two arts—in 62a5 ff., he considers the question under the double heading he had announced in chapter 4: <δ> αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτὸ κλίνεται καὶ πρὸς τὰ θεάτρα. What we have in the present passage, then, is not a complete statement of the issue but simply an opening gambit. The lines are in fact nothing but a condensed summary of the enemy's indictment.²

This indictment has a curiously limited scope. As Aristotle himself says at the beginning of his rebuttal, what it really hits at is not the art of tragedy (poetry) but the art of acting. Its points can be summarized thus:

1 (b27-28). The less vulgar and therefore the better art is that which appeals to the better audience.

2 (b28-32). Tragedy appeals to a vulgar audience, so stupid that the actors feel they must exaggerate everything they do.

3 (b32-a2). Thus tragedy as a whole stands in the same position towards the epic as the later generation of tragic actors (who were called "apes," etc.) toward the earlier.

4 (b2-4). Tragedy, then, is vulgar, whereas the epic appeals to an audience which has no need of (exaggerated) motion; hence tragedy is inferior to epic.

¹ See above *ad loc.*

² The compression is evident from the short space within which *οὗν* recurs: b32, a2, 4.

The reasoning is clear enough at every point³ but one. "The art that imitates everything" (a29) seems at first sight not directly relevant. Bywater proposed <πρός> ἅπαντα (masc.) which Gudeman improves to <πρός> ἅπαντας: "an art addressing any and every one." But ἅπαντα (neuter) is essential to the argument. Tragedy is vulgar because it imitates *everything*—as Rostagni says, not only action but gesture, voice, posture, movement, the whole range of visible and audible phenomena; and the reason it does so is that it addresses itself to people who need such external helps to understanding. "They wouldn't see (what is going on)" if the actor⁴ does not pile it on thick.⁵ An art addressed to such an audience has to be like that—so runs the implication—but then it also has no claim to being taken as a high art.

It is noticeable that no evidence is cited for the counter-assertion that the epic audience has no need of the 'dance-figures'⁶ used by tragedy. Either the unnamed critics (or critic) gave none, or Aristotle did not feel it necessary to quote it.

In spite of this apparent loophole, and the very obvious strong bias, I think the indictment has to be taken seriously—as an indictment of the fourth-century tragic stage. The best indication is that Aristotle does not for a moment try to refute it, in fact he gives covert signs of agreeing with it;⁷ he only sets it aside as irrelevant to the real issue, which lies, he says, between the *art* of tragedy *per se* and the epic art. Thus we get here a valuable glimpse into the strange, over-paid (and perhaps, like its modern counterparts, over-strung and over-

³ Gudeman and Tkatsch (2. 134-136) are certainly right in rejecting the senseless *δειλίαν* of the MSS (b28) and Vahlen's ingenious but unconvincing *ἀεί, λίαν*. The reading suggested in the text-lemma is predicated on the following hypothesis: *δειλίαν* is so "wild" that it is only conceivable as a corruption of *δῆλον* or something like it. Aristotle does not sympathize with the reasoning given here, but merely reports it; hence he probably wrote *δῆλον ἂν εἶη*, as he does below (a4). Somehow (through detachment or loss of *εἶη*?) the phrase became corrupted, or began to be. *Δῆλον* (following *δειλίαν*) is an attempt to restore the corrupt word, but the gloss, instead of healing the corruption, was merely copied in alongside it. The medieval Latin version comes closer to the mark. It has a lacuna in place of *δειλίαν*, followed by "*patam*" (*δῆλον*): i.e., William, or his archetype (Φ), copied the gloss but held *δειλίαν* suspect.

⁴ *Ἀπόδος*, absolute, or defined by the general context rather than a specific word. Note that the *actor* is meant, not the poet.

⁵ *Προσθεῖν*, also absolute. 24. 60a18 is a parallel; 60a24 (*προσθεῖναι*) is not.

⁶ The word is a sneer. Tragic actors were not supposed to be *ὀρχησασαί*.

⁷ Cf. *Pol.* 8. 6. 1341b10-18.

commercialized) world of the Athenian theater in Aristotle's time. But even more significant, perhaps, is another implication. *In defending the tragic art, Aristotle was defending something that hardly existed in his day.* Where, in fact, was it to be found? 'Tragic poets' still appeared for the competitions, but we hardly know their names, much less anything about their work. *They* were not the ones who became ambassadors and confidants of kings.⁸ No doubt in many cases the poets wrote to order; some may even have been dependent on commissions from the great actor-managers who dominated the theatrical world. Aristotle himself tells us that in his day the actors were more important than the poets;⁹ and we can see from the *Poetics*, as well as from other evidence, that the 'tragedians' were drawn towards rhetoric,¹⁰ towards epic marvels,¹¹ towards Grand Guignol shockers¹²—in short, towards anything and everything but the art of tragedy. If we want to visualize the situation of the tragic dramatist in the fourth century, we must remember that 'tragedy' had given way to 'theater.' The best analogue would be the 'writer' in Hollywood, in his position vis-à-vis actors, directors, and production magnates.

It seems to me not too bold, then, to picture Aristotle as championing the cause of an art that was practically dead. But the question in our passage is: who is the critic, or who are the critics, whose attack Aristotle is summarizing here? So far as the general spirit of the *κατηγορία* (a5) is concerned, it is clearly Platonic. Plato had stigmatized the *πάντα μιμουμένη τέχνη* in the *Republic*, in words which one was not likely to forget: 3. 397a,¹³ (the vulgar man) *πάντα ἐπιχει-*

⁸ As the great actors did. See the evidence assembled by J. B. O'Connor, *Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece* (Princeton diss.), Chicago, 1908, Appendix: "Prosopographia Histrionum Graecorum," under nos. 13 (Athenodorus), 62 (Aristodemus), 230 (Theodorus), 239 (Thettalus), 274 (Callipides), 359 (Neoptolemus), 421 (Polus).

⁹ *Rhet.* 3. 1. 1403b33.

¹⁰ *Poet.* 6. 50b8. See Christ-Schmid, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.* 1^a, Munich, 1912, 393; T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes* 82 (1954) 297, 306; for Theodectes in particular, *id.*, *Art and Lit. in Fourth Cent. Athens*, London, 1956, 67; Solmsen, *PW* 5A. 1729-1734; and above, p. 566.

¹¹ See above on 18. 56a20.

¹² 14. 53b8-10.

¹³ Cf. 395d-396b; 398a, *ἄνδρα ... δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας ... μιμῆσθαι πάντα χρήματα*. Parmeno's (he was a comic actor, to be sure) rendition of a pig's squeal gave rise to a proverb, *οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν Παρμένονος ὄν*: *Plut. Quaest. Symp.* 5. 674b; see *Pick.-Camb. Dr. Fest.* 169.

ρήσει μιμῆσθαι, ... καὶ δ' ἄνδρῶν ἔλεγον [i.e., utterances of all kinds of men—and women—under all possible circumstances], βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων ... καὶ σαλπύγγων καὶ αὐλῶν ... καὶ ἔτι κενῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων φθόγγους· καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τοῦτου λέξις [‘delivery, expression’: not limited to speech here] ἅπανα διὰ μιμῆσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν. In the *Laws* Plato perhaps emphasizes this point less,¹⁴ but displays in return a preference for epic over tragedy which was not apparent in the *Republic*.¹⁵ The reason he gives for it is the same as that alleged in our passage, namely that it appeals to a better class of listeners: see *Laws* 2. 658e, especially ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ἥτις τοῦς βέλτιστους ... τέρεται. These “best citizens” are, Plato says, the *old men*. I suggest that this supplies a clue to the otherwise unexplained remark in our passage (62a3) that the better listeners “have no need of the figures.” The old men are the best educated, in Plato’s view, and they have the least interest in bodily movement *per se*.¹⁶

When we add that Plato also shows the pessimism about the decline of the arts which speaks in b33 ff.,¹⁷ we have accounted for all the essential points in our passage except the specific examples¹⁸ and the exact shape of the argument. I suggest, therefore, that the unnamed critic of tragedy is Plato himself, but that Aristotle is not referring to the

¹⁴ But see 2. 669c-d. Plato maintains his conviction as to the lasting influence that music and other forms of imitation have on character: see 2. 656a ff., and *passim*.

¹⁵ Homer’s mixed method is very nearly as bad—and as attractive to the public—as the unmixed one of the drama, *Rep.* 3. 397d; he and Hesiod are the archliars from whom the other poets have drawn their immoral stories, 2. 377b; he is the teacher and leader of the tragic poets, 10. 595b-c.

¹⁶ Plato emphasizes repeatedly, *Laws* 2. 653d-e, 657d, 664e, 672c, that it is the young who cannot help leaping, skipping, and dancing, whereas the old begin to lose their spryness and are content to watch the young folk, 657d.

¹⁷ Cf. *Laws* 2. 669c-670a, on the present state of music and poetry; 3. 700a-701c, on the lawless spirit of ‘theatrocracy’ which has infected the drama and spread from the theater into other parts of life.

¹⁸ The flute-players; Mynniscus, Callippides, Pindarus. Even these names may be an indication. The first two were certainly, and the third probably, great actors of the *fifth* century, long before Aristotle was born (see O’Connor, *op. cit.*, nos. 351, 274, 399); and the anecdotes smack of personal reminiscence: ὁ Μύννισκος ... ἐκάλει and τοιαύτη δόξα ... ἦν (“they used to say the same kind of thing about Pindarus too”). Note καὶ νῦν in Aristotle’s rejoinder, a9: then it was Callippides, nowadays it is others.

Laws or any written work,¹⁹ but to conversations in which the master had discussed the relative merit of the two genres in a similar spirit, and with illustrations from the theatrical world of his youth. This would account for the way in which the criticism is introduced (*διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις*),²⁰ and for the indirectness with which it is reported (the only hint of a source is *φασιν*, a2). We can then interpret the indirectness as a sign of respect—or tact.²¹

62a4-b12

- 5 πρῶτον μὲν | οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς, ἐπεὶ ἔστι περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημεῖοις καὶ ῥαψωδοῦντα, ὅπερ ἐποίει Σωσίστρατος, καὶ διδάδοντα, ὅπερ ἐποίει Μνασίθεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἅπασα ἀποδοκιμαστέα, εἴπερ μὴδ' ὄρχησις, ἀλλ' ἢ φαύλων, ὅπερ
- 10 καὶ Καλλιππίδῃ ἐπετιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν | ἄλλοις, ὥς οὐκ ἐλευθέρως γυναικάς μιμουμένων. ἔτι ἡ τραγωδία καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερὰ ὅποια τίς ἔστιν. εἰ οὖν ἔστι τά γ' ἄλλα κρείττων, τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῇ ὑπάρχειν.
- ἔπειτα διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐποποιία (καὶ γὰρ τῷ
- 15 | μέτρῳ ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι) καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν μέρος, τὴν μουσικὴν [καὶ τὰς ὄψεις], δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται ἐναργέστατα· εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. ἔτι τῷ ἐν ἐλάττωι μήκει τὸ τέλος τῆς
- 18 | b1 μιμήσεως | εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ ἀθροώτερον ἡδίων ἢ πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ· λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τις τὸν Οἰδίπουν θεῖη τὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσιν ὄσοις ἢ Ἰλιάς. ἔτι ἦττον
- [4-5] ἢ μία μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν, [σημεῖον δέ· ... γίνονται] ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, ἢ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μείονρον φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει
- <4- ὕδαρῆ. (<σημεῖον δέ· ἐκ γὰρ ὅποιασούν μιμήσεως πλείους
- 5> | τραγωδίαί γίνονται·> λέγω δέ οἷον ἐὰν ἐκ πλείονων

¹⁹ So far Finsler (210 n. 2) is certainly correct.

²⁰ One can even imagine the topic as the theme of a 'seminar' discussion, in the manner of the one which Plato has dramatized in the *Philebus*.

²¹ If the σύγκρισις of epic and tragedy began as an *Auseinandersetzung* with Plato, we are carried back to the aura of Platonic reminiscence and Platonic thinking (especially echoes of the *Laws*) which we seemed to notice in chapter 1 (see above on l. 47a18-20). Aristotle does not hesitate to disagree with Plato openly from the Assos period on. My suggestion would then be an indication of early date.

- 10 πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη, ὡσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα
μέρη [καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσεια], ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει μέγεθος,
καὶ [καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ποιήματα] συνέστηκεν ὡς ἐνδέχεται
ἄριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μιᾶς πράξεως μίμησις.

62a4

- 5 In the first place | the accusation is not against the art
of poetry but against that of acting; because it is possible
to exaggerate with one's gestures in epic recitation also,
which is what Sosistratus used to do, or in lyric competition,
as Mnasiheus of Opus used to do. Secondly, not all dram-
atic movement is to be censored out either, if not all dancing
is, but only that of low characters, which is what Callippides
10 was criticized for and others are | nowadays: for imitating
low women, as they say. Further, tragedy does its work
even without movement (performance), like the epic; for
it can convey its qualities through reading. If, then, it is
superior in its other aspects, this reproach does not neces-
sarily attach to it.
- Then further, because it has everything the epic has (it can
15 | even use its verse), and no small element besides: the music
[and the effects of spectacle], through which the spectator's
enjoyment is most vividly aroused; and then it also has the
element of vividness, in reading as well as in performance.
Again, by virtue of the fact that the end of the imitation
18 | b1 comes | in a shorter span. For a thing is more enjoyable
in concentrated form than when diluted by a great deal
of time: I mean for example if someone should put the
Oedipus of Sophocles in as many verses as the *Iliad* (has).
Still less (enjoyable) is the (kind of) unified imitation
[4-5] produced by the epic poets, [A sign ... are made] so that
when they do compose a single plot, either it is presented
in brief form and gives the impression of being curtailed
or it follows the length of the norm and strikes us as heavily
<4- diluted. (<A sign of this: from any (epic) imitation, | no
-5> matter what its qualities, a number of tragedies are made: >
I mean if it is composed of a number of actions; for example
the *Iliad* has a number of parts of that kind [and the *Odyssey*],
10 which have bulk in | themselves too—and it [and some such
poems] is as well constructed as the epic permits, i.e., is,
as much as it can be, an imitation of a single action.)

The first sentence states the issue sharply: the criticism does not lie against the art of poetry (note that Aristotle says ποιητικῆς, not τραγωδίας), but against the art of acting. Is this a fair rejoinder to Plato? With all due respect for Plato's genius and the different orientation of his treatment of poetry (never for itself, always in the multiple context of morals, politics, education, and metaphysics), I think it is fair to say that he never effectively distinguished the art, that is, the composition, of poetry from its recitation or performance. If he had been challenged on the point—as he is here—he might well have hardened his omission into a deliberate refusal. Plato was not interested merely in poetry *in abstracto*, as a genre, nor merely in the process that goes on in the poet's mind when he produces it—though he himself had some experience and sympathetic understanding of that process. Nor was he interested in poetry merely as a personal experience of the individual spectator or reader.²² Poetry was a problem to him in its social character: in the school, in the theater, in the public recitations, in every context where it *impinges upon people* and affects them for good or ill. Hence Plato has little to say about the drama in itself and much about the drama as it is performed in theaters and witnessed by audiences. He knows the difference between the poet and his intermediary, the actor or reciter, but seldom chooses to emphasize it, because what counts for him is literature as it comes to the public. Thus in *Republic* 3 the issue is not really how poetry shall be written but what kind of poetry shall be *licensed for performance* in the ideal city, for the guardians or the general public.

In this attitude Plato was faithful to the traditions of Hellas, for which literature had always been, in one way or another, a public concern. But he was also—no doubt deliberately—behind his time. In the fourth century literature was ceasing to be a public, civic affair and was more and more being addressed to a reading public of individuals. Plato also 'read', as an individual,²³ but the practice did not make any significant mark on his theory. His only explicit comment

²² Plato himself had two particular favorites, Sophron (Diog. Laert. 3. 18, and see Kalbel, *CGF* 152, *Test.* 3) and Antimachus (Plut. *Lysand.* 18; Cic. *Brut.* 51. 191; Procl. on *Tim.* 21b ff.), but the self-imposed laws of his genre precluded mention of them in his writings, and we cannot see that either influenced his official view of poetry very much.

²³ See preceding note, and cf. esp. the well-known story about the mimes of Sophron being found under his pillow.

on the writing and reading of books is hostile (*Phaedrus* 274b-277a). Naturally our brief remarks here can do no more than skirt the edges of the problem, but they may be enough to show that Aristotle had warrant for an attack on his master's position. He had said in chapter 4 that the question of the superiority of tragedy over epic must be considered *αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτό καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα*. From his point of view, Plato had judged it only *πρὸς τὰ θέατρα*.²⁴ To judge it *αὐτό καθ' αὐτό* means distinguishing the art from its external presentation, that is, considering it as it comes to the educated and judicious individual direct from the poet. The decisive thing is the *author's text*.

Aristotle presents seven counter-arguments, some brief and relatively less important, some (especially the next to the last) much more elaborate and decisive:

1 (a4-7). The charge lies against the art of acting, not that of poetry, and can be made with the same justice in other fields beside tragedy, including the epic itself.

2 (a8-10). Not all 'movement' is undesirable anyway, but only that which imitates low characters.

3 (a10-12). Tragedy can do without 'movement' (performance) entirely, just as the epic can.

4 (a14-16). Tragedy has everything the epic has, and music besides: an especially enjoyable feature.

5 (a17-18). It has vividness when read, as well as on the stage.

6 (a18-b12). It is more compact and unified, and therefore proportionately more enjoyable, than any epic.

7 (b12-15). It is better at performing the 'work' (the 'proper' or inherent pleasure) which is common to both genres.

The first argument establishes the major distinction *αὐτό καθ' αὐτό* (*τῆς ποιητικῆς*)—*πρὸς τὰ θέατρα* (*τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς*), and the second and third arguments are closely connected with it. Together they form the negative part of Aristotle's rebuttal,²⁵ ending with *εἰ οὖν κτλ.* (which should be printed as a separate sentence): if tragedy is superior in other respects, the alleged defect need not be held against her. The second round of arguments (4-7) then addresses

²⁴ Most clearly in *Laus* 2. 658a, where in order to lead up to his judgment that the epic is superior Plato imagines a grand *agón* and public performance of all the genres at a single festival.

²⁵ See Vahlen, *Beiträge*² 224 (4. 396).

itself to proving that tragedy *is* superior in the "other respects"; and these are, as we shall see, *πρὸς τὴν τέχνην* (= *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*). We will take up the seven arguments in turn:

1. *Ὑποκριτική* means 'delivery,' public presentation, in any genre; cf. *Rhet.* 3. 1. 1403b22. Exaggeration in movement (*περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημείοις*, = *πολλὴν κίνησιν*, 61b30) is also possible in epic recitation (*ῥαψωδοῦντα*) and lyric performance (*διάδοντα*):²⁸ that is, in the presentation of all the main branches of poetry.

2. Not all movement is to be rejected, any more than all dancing, but only that involved in the portrayal of low characters (*ἢ φαύλων*).²⁷ This is a direct hit at Plato, who had expressly allowed, in fact advocated, imitation of the speech *and* movements of good characters through dancing.²⁸ *Ἀποδοκιμαστέα* in particular sounds like an allusion to the censorship of music and dancing in *Laws* 7. 801b-802d; for although these arts are under the general supervision of the appropriate 'lawgivers' and the Superintendent of Instruction (801d), there is also a special body of *δοκιμασταί*, 'censors' (802b), consisting of elders over fifty (!), whose duty it is to scrutinize and accept or reject the right poems *and* dances from the inherited stock. *Ἀποδοκιμάζειν* implies a formal procedure (like the well-known *dokimasia* in Athenian public life), not mere informal rejection.

3. *Ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτῆς* looks at first sight like an anticipation of the final argument (no. 7). But I think there is no allusion to the *ἔργον*, but simply to the composition of the work itself: its quality communicates itself²⁹ through reading alone, without any 'movement' at all.

The summary of the negative round of argument (*εἰ οὖν τὰ γ' ἄλλα κτλ.*) is a little obscure, but seems to mean that if tragedy can indeed surpass the epic in other respects—and Aristotle intends to show that it does³⁰—it need not rely on performance to convey its quality to

²⁸ Exact sense not certain, but probably 'sing in competition'; see Gudeman *ad loc.*; Gomperz in *Eranos Vindob.*, Vienna, 1893, 76.

²⁷ *Φαύλων* must denote the characters represented; see Sykutris; Gomperz, *loc. cit.* The phrase is picked up just below by *οὐκ ἐλευθέρας* (= *φαύλας*) *γυναῖκας*.

²⁸ *Rep.* 3. 396c-d, 397b, 399e, 400d; but esp. *Laws* 2. 655a-b, 656d-e, 660a, 670d; 7. 814e-816c. The beneficial effects of good dancing are the recurrent theme of the second book.

²⁹ *Φανερά* (sc. *ἔστιν*) = *φαίνεται*. See above on 13. 53a28, 30; 24. 60a34; for the idea, 6. 50b18; 14. 53b1-8.

³⁰ The "other respects" are of course those to come, those that concern the art itself.

the public (the accuser had said that the actors exaggerate in order to "get it across," 61b29). But the quality (*ἁπορία τις*) must be that of the genre as such (not of a single play): i.e., its quality as a *μίμησις σπουδαίων*. For that it does not need *πολλήν κίνησιν*. This again, it would seem, is a retort direct to Plato, who had said (*Republic* 3. 397b) that the representation of good men is naturally simple and uniform, not requiring the "imitation of anything and everything."

4. The first positive argument seems, as Vahlen remarks, more eristic than philosophical. Having just said that tragedy does not essentially require performance, Aristotle ought not in decency to drag in its external trappings. Moreover the remark that "it can even use the (epic) verse" is a dubious one, after his demonstration that both tragedy (4. 49a24) and the epic (24. 59a32) had hit upon their respective meters as the only really suitable ones. We shall have to leave this as an unsolved minor puzzle.³¹ But at least we can tidy up the next line. *Δι' ἧς* (the unanimous reading of the manuscripts) *αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται ἐναργέστατα* so clearly corresponds to 6. 50b16, *ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων*,³² that we cannot doubt that it refers to *τὴν μουσικὴν* alone. Moreover *μικρὸν μέρος* cannot naturally refer to more than one 'part.' Hence we must follow Spengel and bracket *καὶ τὰς ὄψεις*. It is a note, perhaps by the same honest reader who felt it incumbent on him to add *ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως* in 24. 59b10 in order to make up the full list of 'parts.'

5. The second positive argument looks like a duplication of no. 3 (*ἔτι ἡ τραγωδία κτλ.*). Actually, however, it implies a different approach. In 17. 55a22 ff. we saw that visualization of his action (*πρὸ ὀμμάτων*, *ibid.*), or 'vividness' (*ἐναργέστατα*), was an obligation upon the poet in connection with "the perceptions that necessarily attend upon the poetic art." Here Aristotle exploits the idea for his controversial purpose, not as an obligation but as a virtue of the art. Tragedy (when properly composed) *has* 'vividness.' It is inherent in the dramatic method (*δρῶντων*)³³ and will communicate itself even to a reader, because it is written into the text, i.e., into the actions,

³¹ Sykutris' suggestion that *μέτρῳ χρῆσθαι* refers to the use of verse in narrative passages, i.e., in messengers' speeches and the like (he compares *ἐν μέτρῳ*, 23. 59a17), is ingenious but not convincing. Dare one think of *τῷ μέτρῳ* <μότρῳ> or <ψιλῶ>? Aristotle would then be saying explicitly what we thought he was hinting at in 1. 47b11 ff.; see above on Chaeremon's *Centaur* (47b21).

³² Also *Pol.* 8. 5. 1339b20, *τὴν μουσικὴν ... τῶν ἡδίστων*.

³³ See Vahlen, *Beiträge* 228 (14. 399-400).

feelings, etc., directly implied by the text. This is something the epic, as a narrative art, does not have inherently, although a poet like Homer may achieve it.

If we now look back, we see that *καὶ τὸ ἐναργές κτλ.* fills the gap which was wrongly filled by *καὶ τὰς δφεις* above. "Tragedy has everything that the epic has ..., and also a not insignificant 'part,' the music ...; and then it *also*³⁴ has the quality of vividness..." Aristotle could not exploit *δφεις* directly against the epic, after having declared so roundly (6. 50b17) that it is not really a part of the tragic art at all. What he does exploit is the inherent visual quality ('visualizableness,' so to speak) that corresponds to it in the art. Thus *εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργές κτλ.*, though independent enough that we can still count it as a separate argument, is an integral part of the sentence that began in a14, and all the 'parts' of tragedy have been included after all.

6. The third positive argument is the longest and most elaborate of the whole series; it would seem to follow that Aristotle considered it the most important. *Τῶ* has caused some difficulty, and *τό* has been adopted by some editors to fit the construction of the preceding clause (*εἶτα ... ἔχει, sc. ἡ τραγωδία*). But our discovery that that clause is an integral part of the sentence beginning at a14 enables us to carry the construction of *τῶ* back to that point: *ἔπειτα (sc. κρείττων ἐστίν³⁵ ἡ τραγωδία) διότι ἔχει ... ἔτι τῶ ... εἶναι*. Tragedy is also superior "by virtue of the fact that the end of the imitation (i.e., the poem) is (comes) in less length." Some commentators, e.g., Rostagni, take *τέλος* as = *ἔργον*, the 'work' or function of poetry. But the *ἔργον* is introduced below, b12 ff. (*τέλους, b14-15*), as a further consideration; the present passage does not deal with it. The 'end' here is simply the end of the poem, and Aristotle's phrase is simply a restatement of what he had said in 5. 49b14; 17. 55b16; 24. 59b22 ff., that the epic is much longer than tragedy.³⁶ This was recognized by Teichmüller,³⁷ who also pointed out that *μήκει* and *χρόνω* mean exactly the same thing here as in 5. 49b12-14, namely the length of time occupied by the poem. Their equivalence in the present pas-

³⁴ This connection gives a meaning to *καὶ (καὶ τὸ ἐναργές)*, which is otherwise unexplained.

³⁵ Or *διαφέρει*; cf. b12, which continues the same construction.

³⁶ For *τὸ τέλος εἶναι* cf. 5. 49b13, *ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι*, and my note *ad loc.*

³⁷ *Ar. Forsch.* 1. 177-180.

sage is obvious from ἀθροώτερον (= ἐν ἐλάττοντι μήκει, so that πολλῶ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ = ἐν μείζονι μήκει), and from Aristotle's hypothetical example of the *Oedipus* (N.B.: the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, not the *Oedipus* story in general) being put in as many verses as the *Iliad*; for if that were done the length of the poem would be increased many times, but not the alleged or dramatic time of the action. The material, the action, is assumed to remain the same; but it will be more enjoyable in condensed than in 'dilute' form.³⁸

But Aristotle seems to have forgotten what he had implied, if not actually said, in chapters 17 and 21: that a proper epic—i.e., a Homeric epic—does have a central action which keeps within a suitable limit of length, even though the poem as a whole does not. There the great length of the *Iliad* was presented as something extra, a *plus* which corresponded to a special character of the epic and was even, if rightly handled, an advantage. Unless our philosopher has become an outright eristic, we should expect him to take some account of that special feature in this final accounting.

It begins to seem likely that he has done so when we view the following passage (ἐτι ἤττον κτλ.). Generally this is supposed to be a new argument for the superiority of tragedy: the epic is "less unified" (ἤττον μία). But in the first place the grammatical form of the supposed new argument does not square with that which prevails throughout the others. It starts from the epic, they all start from tragedy (a14, ἔπειτα δίοτι ...; a18, ἐτι τῶ ...; b12, εἰ οὖν ... διαφέρει). In the second place, the concept 'less unified' rests solely on an emendation by Spengel; the manuscripts unanimously offer ἡ μία, not μία ἡ.³⁹ Thirdly, it is not apparent why a tendency to less unity in the epic should make an epic which *is* unified (ἐνα μῦθον, b5) seem "dock-tailed" or "watery" (b6-7). Does our philosopher mean that an epic audience is shocked and dissatisfied when confronted by an epic which really does have unity?

We could go on to canvass the other inconsistencies and inconcinnities in the argument, for there are a number of them. But I prefer to put forward a positive solution and take up the anomalies as they

³⁸ The metaphor of course is from the mixing of wine with water; see below on ὕδαρῆ, b7.

³⁹ Unfortunately the Arabic version (which breaks off in the next line) shows no trace of the words at all. The medieval Latin version (*adhuc minus una imitatio que epopoiorum*) is compatible with either ἡ μία or μία ἡ. For ἡ μία μίμησις cf. 8. 51a30, where the context and thought are essentially the same as here.

arise, in connection with it. I suggest, then, that *ἔτι ἤττον κτλ.* is a continuation of the previous argument: that is, that it has to do primarily with the *length* of epics as compared with tragedies.

Let us begin again with the only attested text: *ἔτι ἤττον ἢ μία μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν*. Aristotle has just said that the same material is more enjoyable in concentrated than in 'dilute' form, e.g., an *Iliad*-sized *Oedipus*. Such an *Oedipus* would, however, still be a drama. "Still less (enjoyable⁴⁰) is the 'single' imitation of the (made by the) epic poets." Whether *μία* means anything is a question. We might think of deleting it⁴¹ as a product of dittography (*HMIMHΣIΣ* → *HMIMIMHΣIΣ* → *HMIAMIMHΣIΣ*), or of emending to *ἡδεῖα*. But perhaps the word can stand as a piece of irony: "the (so-called) 'single' imitation." In any case the predicate is not *μία* but *ἡδύ* or *ἡδεῖα* understood. An actual epic is even less enjoyable than an outsized *Oedipus* would be. Why? The reason must be that it not only is too long (beyond the range of the *εὐσύνοπτον*) but also lacks the unity of tragedy.⁴² But Homer? Had he not found a solution in his central plot, which did obey the norm of length? Here a fatality comes into play which had been hinted at rather than stated earlier (24. 59b22 ff.). *An epic, by its very nature, is not content merely to have a central plot. It craves something besides, namely episodes. If we apply this to what follows, b5-7,⁴³ a new point begins to emerge. "So that if they compose a single plot, either it is briefly displayed and appears 'dock-tailed' ⁴⁴ or, following the length of the μέτρον, watery." What do these alternatives mean? Usually μέτρον is taken as 'verse,' which gives a very weak sense ("following the length of the verse": i.e., the length felt to be proper to the verse?),⁴⁵ or emended to μετρίον (But-*

⁴⁰ Understanding *ἡδύ*—or *ἡδεῖα*—from *ἡδίων* just above.

⁴¹ Gudeman does so in his *Corrigenda*, p. 496, but gives no indication how the resulting text is to be interpreted. His translation of 1921 is based on *μία ἢ*.

⁴² In other words length and unity are being considered together here, as they were in the definition of the norm of length itself (7. 51a12-15), rather than as separate factors.

⁴³ We will come back to b4-5 (*σημείον δέ ... γίνονται*) in a moment.

⁴⁴ Or 'mouse-tailed': we cannot tell for sure which Aristotle means. I have written *μείουρον*, following Gomperz (*Eranos Vindob.*, 1893, 81), Bywater, and Gudeman. See P. Von der Mühl, *Glotta* 10 (1919) 143-146 (favors *μει-*); T. F. Higham in *Greek Poetry and Life*, Oxford, 1936, 303-306 (favors *μν-*). *Μύουρα καὶ βραχέα* appears in Aesch. *Thebæroi ἔ Isthmiastai* (sat.-play), *POxy* 2162, fr. 1(a), col. I, line 29.

⁴⁵ Cf. 24. 60a2-5. But there the verse follows the lead of ("fits into," 59b32) the genre, the mode of imitation, not the other way round.

cher). I propose to keep μέτρον, but to take it as referring to Aristotle's ὄρος τοῦ μήκους. Ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρον μήκει is surely contrasted with βραχέως δεικνύμενον; the two phrases will then mean (1) going up to the full length allowed by the norm, and (2) falling short of it, respectively. Aristotle had indicated in 7. 51a10-11 that too short a plot or central action cannot be beautiful. In the *Rhetoric*, 3. 9. 1409b17-22, he gives the reason,⁴⁶ and in terms which seem to me illuminating for our passage: δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μειούρους (sic *codd.*; *μν-* Bekker, Roemer) εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίνει πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν. ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἔτι ὀρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόνερον καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὗ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῆ παυσάμενον, ὅσον προσπταίνειν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. "The members, and the whole periods, should be neither curt nor long. A member which is too short often makes the listener stumble;⁴⁷ he is still expecting the rhythm to go on to the limit his mind has fixed for it" (Roberts, Oxford translation).

The 'single plot,' then, which is "briefly displayed"—say in 2000 lines—appears to the epic audience curt or curtailed: it has not the length of the μέτρον, the ὄρος in their minds. The example must be hypothetical, since Aristotle has said previously that no other epic but Homer's had a 'single plot.'⁴⁸ But the other example is not hypothetical; it is Homer himself. "Following the length of the norm": that, as we have seen, is precisely what Homer's central action does (it comes to 4000 lines or a little more). But although the central action may be of the appropriate length, it is dogged by the fatality we have already mentioned. Being an epic, the poem will have episodes besides. And the episodes are not only long in themselves (ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει μέγεθος, b9), they are interspersed in the intervals of the main action.⁴⁹ Thus, as Aristotle says, borrowing his own metaphor from just above, they 'dilute' it, make it 'watery.'

Thus a peripety has overtaken the Homeric epic, whose great length and encumbrance with episodes was presented in chapter 24 as an

⁴⁶ The passage has to do with the length of cola and periods, but the principle is the same.

⁴⁷ Read "makes the listener stumble frequently." See above on 9. 52a1.

⁴⁸ Or were some tentative experiments in the 'epyllion' already being made in Aristotle's day—experiments which he did not think of, or did not choose to recognize, in chapter 23?

⁴⁹ Οἷς διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν, 23. 59a36. See above *ad loc.*

advantage. Even though Homer has attained the norm of length for one part (the central part) of his poem, the laws of the genre rob him of the potential benefit. This is an embarrassing conclusion, and Aristotle does not come straight out with it. He cites instead a 'sign,' and then Homer as an illustration of the point made by the sign. For, I suggest, *σημείον δέ ... γίνονται* belongs between *ύδαρη* and *λέγω δέ ολον*. The reasons are that (1) it has no direct connection with the point of *ἔτι ἤττον κτλ.* (i.e., that epic is less enjoyable, etc.); (2) it fills satisfactorily the gap which most editors have recognized here;⁵⁰ (3) it supplies a much-needed reference noun for *συγκειμένη*, b8; and (4) it gives a meaning to *τοιαῦτα μέρη*, b9. The 'sign' is in fact not limited to *σημείον δέ ... γίνονται*; the rest of the passage, down through *μίμησις*, belongs to it. Its sense is: "You can see the 'wateriness' of the long epic from the fact that the tragedians split it into several tragedies.⁵¹ Now this is the case if the epic⁵² in question is made up of several actions,⁵³ like the *Iliad*"; etc.

The conduct of the argument here betrays a certain embarrassment: naturally, since it implies a criticism of Homer.⁵⁴ Aristotle does not reveal this at once.⁵⁵ He begins with the indirect evidence from tragedy and only brings in the *Iliad* obliquely, *exempli causa* (*λέγω δέ ολον ... ὡσπερ ...*). Thus the critique of Homer is not—Aristotle carefully keeps it from being—the main business of the passage.

But to continue. "As the *Iliad* for example has many such sections"

⁵⁰ Lacuna marked by the Aldine, Hermann, Vahlen, Teichmüller, Usener, Überweg, Christ, Gomperz, Butcher, Sykutris (list not complete); denied or doubted by Bywater, Hardy, Gudeman, Rostagni.

⁵¹ The evidence is indirect, as befits a 'sign.'

⁵² *Συγκειμένη* now has a noun close at hand (*μιμήσεως*) to rest on. Under the standard arrangement it has to depend on *μίμησις* in b3, five lines away.

⁵³ Note the correspondence *πλείους τραγωδίας - πλείονων πράξεων*.

⁵⁴ Homer's poems are the only ones that really fit the description *ἔνα μὲν θοῦν ... ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρον μήκει*. The *Wrath* in itself has only the size of a trilogy, but as we actually find it it stretches from one end of the poem to the other. Counting the episodes with which it is 'diluted,' the *Wrath* is 15,000 lines long.

⁵⁵ *Ὅποιασούν* (effectively ignored by the commentators and translators) is a straw in the wind. Why "an imitation of any quality whatever" (i.e., no matter how good or bad)? Because Aristotle is thinking of Homer, but is not quite ready to mention him. Below, in b10-11, after he has been mentioned, the implication of *Ὅποιασούν* comes out: even a poem as good as the *Iliad* is ultimately found wanting.

—namely such as could be developed into separate tragedies⁶⁶—“which have bulk in themselves also”—that is, in addition to the bulk of the main action—“and the *Odyssey*.” This last remark is more than an awkward afterthought, breaking into Aristotle’s construction and word order; it is an interpolation, and so are the words customarily written as ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα in the next line. Since these allegations may seem shocking, and since the whole passage is involved, we shall have to argue the matter. The really decisive proof is a small but irreducible grammatical fact: the singular noun μίμησις at the end of the sentence. It is not reconcilable with the mention of two poems, especially as μιμήσεως in b5 already virtually means ‘poem.’ The fact has been uneasily recognized but side-stepped by several editors;⁶⁷ only Gudeman had the courage to emend to μιμήσεις. Secondly, ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα is nothing more than an emendation. It is found in Parisinus 2038 (and the Aldine), but otherwise the manuscripts unanimously offer τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα ποιήματα.⁶⁸

To account for these phenomena, and also for the general omission of δ in b9 (δ καὶ καθ’ ἐναντὰ κτλ.) by the manuscripts, I suggest the following hypothesis. The archetype was interpolated like this:

ΠΟΛΛΑΤΟΙΑΥΤΑΜΕΡΗΑ	(17 let-	MANY SUCH PARTS WHICH
καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια καὶ	ters)	Also the <i>Odyssey</i> and
ΚΑΙΚΑΘΕΑΥΤΑΕΧΕΙΜΕ	(17)	ALSO IN THEMSELVES HAVE
τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα ποιήματα		some such poems
ΓΕΘΟΣΚΑΙΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΚΕΝ	(18)	SIZE AND IT IS COMPOSED

At a certain stage in the history of the text the note (like the others we have found) was copied into the text. When this occurred, (1) δ was omitted, since it made no sense between τοιαῦτα μέρη and καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια; and (2) the καὶ after ἡ Ὀδύσσεια was passed over as a doublet.

It will be noticed that this solution posits 17 or 18 letters per line in the uncial archetype—an hypothesis which accords with the conclu-

⁶⁶ Τοιαῦτα defined by the whole of ἐκ γὰρ ... πλείους τραγωδίας γίνονται, not merely by πλείονων πράξεων.

⁶⁷ Butcher tacitly acknowledges it by translating “each is ... an imitation of a single action.” But “each” is not in the text.

⁶⁸ Cf. the med. Lat. version: *et talia quedam poemata*.

⁶⁹ J. L. Ussing, “Observat. crit. ad Ar. librum De Arte poet. et Rhet. libros,” in *Opusc. philol. ad Madv.*, Copenhagen, 1876, 221 ff. See, however, the dissent of K. Horna, *WS* 52 (1934) 140-142.

⁷⁰ *Zu Ar. Poet.* 1. 30 (= *Sitzungsber.* Vienna 1888, 570-571).

⁷¹ *PQ* 19 (1940) 321-327.

sions of Ussing,⁵⁹ Gomperz,⁶⁰ and Flickinger.⁶¹ It also supplies once more, at the very end of the extant portion of the *Poetics*, evidence of the kind of interpolation which took place in Aristotle's work. The intention of the annotator is clear, although the exact purport of his note is not. "And the *Odyssey* (has such parts), and some poems of that kind." What other poems are meant, we cannot tell. Perhaps simply the other poems of the epic Cycle: we found another interpolation at the end of chapter 23 which was based on Proclus' summary of them. In any case the annotator was dissatisfied by Aristotle's mention of the *Iliad* alone, and has filled the supposed gap according to his lights.

We are left with a text which mentions only the *Iliad*.⁶² This seems perfectly consistent both with Aristotle's purpose here and with his previous characterizations of the poem, 23. 59a35 and 24. 59b14. The *Iliad* consists of one 'part' of the War with a number of the others grouped around it. The latter, then, are more like the individual sections of a Cyclic epic—which were in fact made into tragedies in great numbers—than the episodes of the *Odyssey*. And the *Iliad* is 'simple,' i.e., not so perfectly constructed (not so highly unified) as the *Odyssey*. These indications, though slight, are enough to make it plausible that if Aristotle wanted to acknowledge some lack of absolute perfection in a Homeric poem he would prefer to do it for the *Iliad*. And especially in a passage dealing with length, since the *Iliad* is the longer of the two poems.

The implied reservation of the *Odyssey*, and the praise heaped on the *Iliad* at the end, suggest that Aristotle was determined not to be drawn into a general admission of inferiority for Homer. He wants to prove the superiority of tragedy without allowing his ideal poet to be involved in the defeat of his genre.

62b12-18

εἰ οὖν τοῦτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης
 ἔργῳ (δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτάς ἀλλὰ
 τὴν εἰρημένην), φανερόν ὅτι κρείττων ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον τοῦ
 15 τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἐποποιίας.

⁶² καὶ συνέστηκεν κτλ.: "As for example the *Iliad* has many such 'parts,' ... and it is composed as well as (an epic) can be...." Καί is stronger than καίτοι, not weaker: "A 'sign': out of a(n epic) poem of whatever degree of excellence (can) come several tragedies; I mean when it is made up of several actions; as for example the *Iliad* has many such 'parts' ..., and it is constructed as well as (an epic) can be...."

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ ἐποποιίας, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἢ μὴ τίνες αἰτίαι, καὶ περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων, εἰρήσθω τούτα. <περὶ δὲ ἰάμβων καὶ κωμωδίας...?>

62b12

If, then, tragedy is superior in all these respects and with respect to the function of the art besides (for the two arts should produce, not any chance pleasure, but the one proper to them), it is evident that it must be superior, since it attains the | goal more than the epic (does).

Well, then, concerning tragedy and epic, both the genres themselves and their species and parts, how many these are and what the differences between them are, also the causes of artistic excellence and the opposite, and concerning criticisms and defenses against them, let us end our discussion here. <Now as to 'iambics' and comedy...?>

7. The last argument is, to our sorrow, not an argument but an allusion, and an unclear one at that. What is the "(previously) stated (pleasure)" which the two genres compete in producing? We can assume that the antithesis with τὴν τυχοῦσαν establishes τὴν εἰρημένην (ἡδονήν) as = τὴν οἰκείαν. But the word still has two possible references: (1) to the οἰκεία ἡδονή which was defined in 14. 53b11-13 as "the pleasure produced out of pity and fear by means of imitation," or (2) to the one which was defined with equal explicitness in 23. 59a21 as derived from the unity and structural perfection of the plot. In that passage pity and fear were not mentioned. The two pleasures are certainly not identical, though they are not necessarily incompatible, and we have no absolutely certain way of choosing between them. Finsler⁴³ thinks that Aristotle ought to mean the first pleasure, the one based on pity and fear. That is my feeling also; but a conclusive proof is hard to find. All we can do, I think, is to draw up the arguments on either side and strike a probable balance.

First, the indications that the pleasure is solely aesthetic, based on structure:

1. Nowhere in Aristotle's discussion of the epic does he mention the words 'pity' and 'fear.' There is nothing in chapters 23 and 24

⁴³ P. 212.

to correspond to the analysis of plot-outcomes in chapter 13 or of the *pathé* in chapter 14.

2. More specifically, the *θαυμαστόν* is discussed at length in chapter 24 (60a11-b2), but without any suggestion that it is to contribute to feelings of fear and pity, as it is said to do in 9. 52a1-4.

3. At 13. 52b32 the imitation of fearful and pitiable happenings was said to be a specialty (*ἴδιον*; cf. 24. 59b23) of tragedy (*τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεως*).

But these arguments can be countered with what appear to be somewhat stronger ones tending the other way:

1. Although pity and fear are not explicitly mentioned in chapters 23 and 24, they must be implied, at least in some degree, by the concepts 'complex' and 'pathetic' in 24. 59b9.⁶⁴ The chief virtue of the complex plot, as we learned in chapters 11 and 13, is that it supplies the best mechanism for raising the emotional 'charge' of tragedy; and any *pathos*, even one not involving *φίλοι*, has at least some minimal quality of fear *κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος* (14. 53b18).

2. In general, Aristotle's insistence that Homer anticipated all the leading traits of tragedy would lead us to suppose that he anticipated its emotional effects also.

3. The argument before us (26. 62b12-15) presents itself as something *additional* (*καὶ ἔτι*) to the one based on unity, i.e., structural perfection. The aesthetic qualities which Aristotle had called for in chapters 7 and 8, and whose sum he has just drawn in his verdict against the epic (62a18-b12), should therefore be different from the *ἔργον* he is now speaking of.

4. Against 13. 52b32 and 14. 53b11-13, which seem to claim pity and fear, and the pleasure derived from them, as specific to tragedy, one must set *δεῖ ... ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ... τὴν εἰρημένην* in the present passage, which on any candid interpretation means that the two genres work—or are to work—at producing the *same* pleasure, but with different success.

I conclude, but without insistence, that by *τὴν εἰρημένην (ἡδονήν)* Aristotle means the pleasure based on pity and fear. Both genres aim

⁶⁴ And by the demand for peripeties, recognitions, and *pathé* (b11). These lines belong to a passage which we have diagnosed as late: perhaps an indication that the idea of epic having the same emotional 'work' as tragedy—and therefore the present passage—is also late.

at it, or should aim at it, but tragedy succeeds where the epic in general fails. Even Homer's epic cannot achieve the concentration of emotion, and therefore of pleasure based on emotion, which tragedy achieves.

In the last paragraph, after noting that the superiority of tragedy follows from his arguments,⁶⁵ and after giving the briefest possible 'sum' of his whole discussion of serious poetry, Aristotle turns to 'iambic' and comedy.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ ἄν εἴη, 'philosophical' or logical optative.

⁶⁶ It does not seem to me that either McMahon (*Harv. Stud. in Class. Philol.* 28 [1917] 1-46) or Montmollin (188-193) has disproved the existence of a second book of the *Poetics*. On the other hand the traces discovered by Landi in the Riccardianus (*Riv. di Filol.*, N.S. 3 [1925] 551-555) are not absolutely conclusive in themselves. It is perhaps curious that such traces of a second book (i.e., a second roll) would be preserved at the end of the first. The problem is large and complicated; fortunately it lies outside the scope of this book. What we can say is that *περὶ μὲν οὖν... εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα (ταῦτα)* is Aristotle's standard formula of transition from one major topic to another and calls for a following *περὶ δὲ κτλ.* And we have no *a priori* reason to suppose that he did not carry out the promise made in 6. 49b21: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ κωμῶδίας ἕσπερον ἐροῦμεν.*

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