



Saúde Única "One Health Approach"

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Saúde Única



"É um enfoque para desenhar e implementar programas, políticas, legislação e pesquisa com a integração de diferentes setores trabalando juntos para a obtenção de melhores desfechos em saúde pública" (WHO, 2020)

- Segurança alimentar
- Controle de zoonoses (influenza, raiva, Febre do Nilo Ocidental)
- Resistência a antibióticos

Saúde Única

Qual a importância do enfoque da Saúde Única?

Muitos Patógenos Infectam tanto o homem como animais, sendo que existe um ecossistema compartilhado entre estes.

O compartilhamento de informações entre diferente atores contribui para a detecção precoce de potenciais riscos à população humana, desencadeando uma rápida e adequada resposta.


Fatores associados à interação entre Homem-Animais-ambiente


Crescimento e expansão das populações humanas a novas áreas geográficas (Pressão agrícola na Amazônia).





Globalização: Aumento do transporte de animais e pessoas.





Modificação da paisagem:

Nossa relação com animais vem mudando estando cada vez em contato o que aumenta a possibilidade de transmissão de patógenos de animais ao homem.






Fragmentação da paisagem

Fatores associados à interação entre Homem-Animais-ambiente

Mudanças climáticas e no uso da terra (monocultura, redução da diversidade ecológica).



"Land use change directly and indirectly drives the loss, turnover and homogenization of biodiversity (including through invasions and rare species losses), modifies the structure of the landscape in ways that modulate epidemiological processes (for example, fragmentation and resource provisioning) and can increase contact between humans and wildlife (for example, through agricultural practices and hunting)".

H₁N₁

The burden of influenza A H1N1pdm09 virus from 2009 - 2018

CDC estimates that from **2009** through **2018**, influenza A H1N1pdm09 has caused at least:









nature

Vol 459 25 June 2009 doi:10.1038/nature08182

LETTERS

Origins and evolutionary genomics of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic

Gavin J. D. Smith¹, Dhanasekaran Vijaykrishna¹, Justin Bahl¹, Samantha J. Lycett², Michael Worobey³, Oliver G. Pybus⁴, Siu Kit Ma¹, Chung Lam Cheung¹, Jayna Raghwani², Samir Bhatt⁴, J. S. Malik Peiris¹, Yi Guan¹ & Andrew Rambaut²

In March and early April 2009, a new swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) emerged in Mexico and the United States1. During the first few weeks of surveillance, the virus spread worldwide to 30 countries (as of May 11) by human-to-human transmission, causing the World Health Organization to raise its pandemic alert to level 5 of 6. This virus has the potential to develop into the first influenza pandemic of the twenty-first century. Here we use evolutionary analysis to estimate the timescale of the origins and the early development of the S-OIV epidemic. We show that it was derived from several viruses circulating in swine, and that the initial transmission to humans occurred several months before recognition of the outbreak. A phylogenetic estimate of the gaps in genetic surveillance indicates a long period of unsampled ancestry before the S-OIV outbreak, suggesting that the reassortment of swine lineages may have occurred years before emergence in humans, and that the multiple genetic ancestry of S-OIV is not indicative of an artificial origin. Furthermore, the unsampled history of the epidemic means that the nature and location of the genetically closest swine viruses reveal little about the immediate origin of the epidemic, despite the fact that we included a panel of closely related and previously unpublished swine influenza isolates. Our results highlight the need for systematic surveillance of influenza in swine, and provide evidence that the mixing of new genetic elements in swine can result in the emergence of viruses with pandemic potential in

H3N2 viruses (A/Port Chalmers/1/1973-like)¹¹. It is noteworthy that, until now, there has been no evidence of Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 circulating in North American pigs. In Asia, the classical swine influenza lineage circulates, in addition to other identified viruses, including human H3N2, Eurasian avian-like H1N1, and North American triple-reassortant H3N2 (Fe 12. 13).

Using comprehensive phylogenetic analyses, we have estimated a temporal reconstruction of the complex reassortment history of the S-OIV outbreak, summarized in Fig. 1 (Methods). Our analyses showed that each segment of the S-OIV genome was nested within a well-established swine influenza lineage (that is, a lineage circulating primarily in swine for >10 years before the current outbreak). The most parsimonious interpretation of these results is therefore that the progenitor of the S-OIV epidemic originated in pigs. Some transmission of swine influenza has, however, been observed in secondary hosts in North America, for example, in turkevs14. Although the precise evolutionary pathway of the genesis of S-OIV is greatly hindered by the lack of surveillance data (see later), we can conclude that the polymerase genes, plus HA, NP and NS, emerged from a triplereassortant virus circulating in North American swine. The source triple-reassortant itself comprised genes derived from avian (PB2 and PA), human H3N2 (PB1) and classical swine (HA, NP and NS) lineages. In contrast, the NA and M gene segments have their origin in the Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 lineage. Phylogenetic analyses from the early days of the outbreak, on the basis of the first publicly available sequences, quickly established this multiple genetic origin

SARS



Beta-Coronavirus Paguma larvata

Epidemiology, transmission dynamics and control of SARS: the 2002-2003 epidemic.

Roy M Anderson, Christophe Fraser, Azra C Ghani, Christl A Donnelly, Steven Riley, Neil M Ferguson, Gabriel M Leung, T H Lam, and Anthony J Hedley

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ABSTRACT


This paper reviews current understanding of the epidemiology, transmission dynamics and control of the aetiological agent of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). We present analyses of data on key parameters and distributions and discuss the processes of data capture, analysis and public health policy formulation during the SARS epidemic are discussed. The low transmissibility of the virus, combined with the onset of peak infectiousness following the onset of clinical symptoms of disease, transpired to make simple public health measures, such as isolating patients and quarantining their contacts, very effective in the control of the SARS epidemic. We conclude that we were lucky this time round, but may not be so with the next epidemic outbreak of a novel aetiological agent. We present analyses that help to further understanding of what intervention measures are likely to work best with infectious agents of defined biological and epidemiological properties. These lessons learnt from the SARS experience are presented in an epidemiological and public health context.

Guangdong China 2002: 791 Casos 31 mortes 8.000 casos 774 mortes Controlado em 2003.

Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2004 Jul 29; 359(1447): 1091–1105.


doi: 10.1098/rstb.2004.1490

MERS



Reportado em 2012 na Arábia Saudita





COVID-19







The origin of SARS-CoV-2

The fact that severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 derived from bat coronaviruses highlights inherent issues of the way we interact with the environment. Talha Burki reports.



Researchers examining coronaviruse and bats are used to working wit large numbers. A 2017 study o 12333 bats from Latin Americ Africa, and Asia found tha almost 9% carried at least one 91 distinct coronaviruses. The author estimated that there are at leas 3200 coronaviruses that infect bats Moreover, there are over 1400 specie of bat. Figuring out which ones ar susceptible to which coronaviruse is no small task. Bats are incredible varied and successful creatures. evolutionary terms, fruit-eating bat diverged from insect-eating bat some 50 million years ago.

The picture becomes even mor complicated when we start t consider which bat viruses are likel to pose a threat to human being: "Going after bats will only give yo partial information—the viruses yo are looking at may or may not ge the additional mutations they nee to be transmissible among humans explains Stanley Perlman, professo of microbiology and immunolog at the University of lowa, IA, USA "There has almost always been a

irus Research, Scotland, UK, and co- of confidence that this lvir

"The major thing is to change our behaviour", adds David Morens, senior advisor to the director at the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. "That means stopping deforestation, perturbing the environment, bat cave tourism, and intensive farming." Prompt detection of new viruses is also crucial. But the places where new zoonotic diseases tend to emerge do not typically have strong public health surveillance systems. "We have to invest in infrastructure that would

Outros exemplos

- •Raiva
- •Salmonella
- Vírus do Nilo Ocidental
- Brucellosis
- Doença de Lyme
- •Ebola
- Vírus Mayaro
- •Febre amarela

A transição demográfica e as doenças infecciosas



"A transição demográfica

- Crescimento da população
- urbanização rápida
- Desorganizada
- Desmatamento
- Globalização
- Mudanças climáticas
- Instabilidade política

tem importante efeito na dinâmica de doenças infecciosas que são mais dificeis de predizer"

Betford et al. 2019. Nature. 2019 Nov;575(7781):130-136. doi: 10.1038/s41586-019-1717-y.

Novos enfoques

Áreas chaves para integração na resposta a epidemias no século XXI

Área	Áreas chave ou disciplinas
Governabilidade e infraestrutura	Organizações Locais, nacionais e internacionais, Transparência das múltiplas parte interessadas, melhoria no compartilhamento de informações, logística e administração de crises.
Engajamento e comunicação	Engajamento de resposta lideranças comunitárias e diplomacia em saúde (Ex: Situação médicos e enfermeiras na epidemia da cólera 1830 vs Covid 19)
Ciências sociais	Antropologia, ciências políticas. (Humanização da resposta)
Ética	Consentimento, desenho de ensaios clínicos
Tecnologias emergentes	Genômica de patógenos, metagenômica, ciência de dados, geografia humana etc. (smartphones, dados de conexão, monitoramento da mobilidade)
Pesquisa e desenvolvimento	Diagnóstico, terapia e vacinas
Saúde única	Ecologia e ciências ambientais, veterinária e agricultura

Betford et al. 2019. Nature. 2019 Nov;575(7781):130-136. doi: 10.1038/s41586-019-1717-y.

Novos enfoques

Resistência a antibióticos





Fig. 1 | Complex AMR interactions across one-health sectors. A potential schematic for complex transmission paths between human, environmental, agricultural and clinical reservoirs of AMR genes and drug-resistant pathogens. Dashed lines indicate putative transmission paths.




doi: 10.1038/s41564-018-0208-5, PMID: 30046173.

doi:10.1128/microbiolspec.ARBA-0009-2017

Resistência a antibióticos

Novos enfoques



doi:10.1128/microbiolspec.ARBA-0009-2017.

Novos enfoques




Fig. 1 | An ecosystem of interactions. The tightly interconnected nature of human, animal and environmental health makes the emergence and decline of epidemics difficult to predict. One Health integrates multiple perspectives in a framework that emphasizes the need to consider any particular aspect in this broader context.

Saúde única na Vigilância em saúde

• "One Health surveillance describes the systematic collection, validation, analysis, interpretation of data and dissemination of information collected on <a href="https://www.humans.com/