Optimal Control with Constraints

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- Suppose that a party has just won the election at t = 0, and the next election is to be held T years later at t = T.
- The incumbent party then has a total of *T* years in which to impress the voters with its accomplishments in order to win their votes.
- At any time in the period $t \in [0,T]$, the pair of realized values of U and p will determine a specific value of v.
- Such values of v for different points of time **must** all **enter into** the **objective functional** of the **incumbent** party.
- If the voters have a short collective memory and are influenced more by the events occurring near election time, then the v values of the later part of the period [0, T] should be assigned heavier weights.

- The political-business-cycle model
 - Maximize $V = \int_0^T v(U,p)e^{rt}dt$ $p = \phi(U) + a\pi$ (31) Subject to $\dot{\pi} = b(p \pi); \qquad (b > 0)$ $\pi(0) = \pi_0; \quad \pi(T) = free; \quad (\pi_0, T \text{ given})$
- contains an equality constraint
 - (32) $p = \phi(U) + a\pi$ [Augmented Phillips Curve]
 - $\phi' < 0; \qquad 0 < a \leq 1$
- U is the unemployment rate; p is the inflation rate; π is expected inflation rate.

(33) v(U,p); $v_U < 0$; $v_p < 0$

- v is the aggregate vote function; a measure of the vote-getting p(%)power of the incumbent party.
- r > 0 denotes the rate of decay of memory. It shows that the values at later points of time are weighted more heavily.
- Figure 1 captures the tradeoff between U and p.
- U and p are both conducive to vote loss



• Expectations are assumed to be formed adaptively, according to the differential equation

(34) $\dot{\pi} = b(p - \pi);$ (**b** > **0**)

- For a variable to qualify as a **state variable**, it **must come with** a given **equation of motion** in the problem.
- Since (34) constitutes an equation of motion for π , we can take π as a state variable.
- The variable U, on the other hand, does not come with an equation of motion. But since U can affect p via (32) and then dynamically drive π via (34), we can use it as a control variable.

- To use **U** as a control variable, however, requires the implicit assumption that the government in power does have the ability to implement any target rate of unemployment it chooses at any point of time.
- As to the remaining variable, p, (32) $p = \phi(U) + a\pi$ shows that its value at any time t will become determinate once the values of the state and control variables are known.
- Now that p is retained in the model, it ought to be taken as another control variable. Thus the constraint equation

$$(35) \quad p - \phi(U) - a\pi = 0$$

• is in line with the general format of $g(t, y, u_1, u_2) = c$, although there is no explicit t argument in it.

• We can write **the Lagrangian**

(36) $\mathcal{L} = v(U,p)e^{rt} + \lambda b(p-\pi) + \theta[\phi(U) + a\pi - p]$

• If the following specific functions are adopted:

(37)
$$v(U,p) = -U^2 - hp;$$
 $(h > 0)$
(38) $\phi(U) = j - kU$ $(j,k > 0)$

- Using these specific functions, the Lagrangian becomes: (39) $\mathcal{L} = (-U^2 - hp)e^{rt} + \lambda b(p - \pi) + \theta[j - kU + a\pi - p]$
- Accordingly, the maximum principle calls for the conditions

The political-business-cycle model

$$\mathcal{L} = (-U^2 - hp)e^{rt} + \lambda b(p - \pi) + \theta[j - kU + a\pi - p]$$
(40) $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial U} = -2Ue^{rt} - \theta k = 0 \quad \Rightarrow U = -\frac{1}{2}\theta k e^{-rt}$
(41) $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial p} = -he^{rt} + \lambda b - \theta = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \theta = \lambda b - he^{rt}$
(42) $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \theta} = j - kU + a\pi - p = 0$
(43) $\dot{\pi} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = b(p - \pi)$
(44) $\dot{\lambda} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \pi} = \lambda b - \theta a$

• By using (41) into (40):

(45)
$$U = -\frac{1}{2}(\lambda b - he^{rt})ke^{-rt} \Rightarrow U = \frac{1}{2}k(h - \lambda be^{-rt})$$

The optimal costate path.

• From (44)
$$\dot{\lambda} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \pi} = \lambda b - \theta a$$

 $\dot{\lambda} = \lambda b - \theta a = \lambda b - (\lambda b - he^{rt})a = \lambda b(1 - a) + ahe^{rt}$
(46) $\dot{\lambda} - b(1 - a)\lambda = ahe^{rt}$

- Equation (46) is readily recognized as a first-order linear differential equation with a constant coefficient but a variable term.
- The general solution of (46) is:

(47)
$$\lambda(t) = Ae^{b(1-a)t} + \frac{ah}{B}e^{rt}$$

• Where B = r - b(1 - a) and A is an arbitrary constant.

The optimal costate path.

- Note that the two constants A and B are fundamentally different in nature; B is merely a shorthand symbol we have chosen in order to simplify the notation, but A is an arbitrary constant to be definitized.
- To definitize A, we can make use of the transversality condition for the vertical-terminal-line problem, $\lambda(T) = 0$.
- Letting t = T in (47) $\lambda(T) = Ae^{b(1-a)T} + \frac{ah}{B}e^{rT}$, applying the transversality condition, and solving for A, we find that $A = -\frac{ah}{B}e^{BT}$.
- It follows that the definite solution **the optimal costate path is** (48) $\lambda^*(t) = -\frac{ah}{a}e^{BT}e^{b(1-a)t} + \frac{ah}{a}e^{rt} = \frac{ah}{a}[e^{rt} - e^{BT+b(1-a)t}]$

48)
$$\lambda^{*}(t) = -\frac{an}{B}e^{BT}e^{b(1-a)t} + \frac{an}{B}e^{rt} = \frac{an}{B}\left[e^{rt} - e^{BT+b(1-a)t}\right]$$

- Now that we have found $\lambda^*(t)$, all it takes is to substitute (48) $\lambda^*(t) = \frac{ah}{B} \left[e^{rt} e^{BT + b(1-a)t} \right]$ into (45) $U = \frac{1}{2}k(h \lambda be^{-rt})$ to derive the optimal control path.
- The result is

$$U^{*}(t) = \frac{1}{2}k\left\{h - \frac{ah}{B}\left[e^{rt} - e^{BT + b(1-a)t}\right]be^{-rt}\right\}$$

$$U^{*}(t) = \frac{1}{2}k\left\{h - \frac{ah}{B}\left[e^{rt}e^{-rt} - e^{BT + [b(1-a)-r]t}\right]b\right\}$$

$$U^{*}(t) = \frac{1}{2}\frac{hk}{B}\left\{B - ab\left[1 - e^{B(T-t)}\right]\right\}; \qquad B = r - b(1-a)$$

(49) $U^{*}(t) = \frac{hk}{2B}\left[(r-b) + abe^{B(T-t)}\right]$

- Equation (49) is this control path that the incumbent party should follow in the interest of its reelection in year *T*.
- What are the economic implications of this path?
- First, we note that $U^*(t)$ is a decreasing function of t. Specifically, we have $\left\{ U^*(t) = \frac{hk}{2B} \left[(r-b) + abe^{B(T-t)} \right] \right\}$ (50) $\frac{dU^*}{dt} = -\frac{1}{2} abhke^{B(T-t)} < 0$
- because *k*, *h*, *b*, *a* and exponential expression are all positive.
- The vote-maximizing economic policy is to set a high unemployment level at t = 0, and then let the rate of unemployment fall steadily throughout the electoral period [0, T].

- In fact, the optimal levels of unemployment at time 0 and time *T* can be exactly determined. They are $\left\{ U^*(t) = \frac{hk}{2B} \left[(r-b) + abe^{B(T-t)} \right] \right\}$ $U^*(0) = \frac{hk}{2B} \left[(r-b) + abe^{BT} \right]$; and $U^*(T) = \frac{hk}{2B} \left[(r-b) + ab \right] \Rightarrow U^*(T) = \frac{hk}{2B}$
- Note that the terminal unemployment level, hk/2, is a positive quantity.
- Since $U^*(T)$ represents the lowest point on the $U^*(T)$ path, the $U^*(T)$ values at all values of t in [0, T] must uniformly be positive.
- This means that not imposing any restriction on U does not cause any trouble regarding the sign of U in the present case.

- However, to be economically meaningful, $U^*(0)$ must be less than unity or, more realistically, less than some maximum tolerable unemployment rate $U_{max} < 1$.
- The typical optimal unemployment path, $U^*(t)$, is illustrated in Fig. 2, where we also show the repetition of similar $U^*(t)$ patterns over successive electoral periods generates political business cycles.

Figure 2 – The Political Business Cycles



The optimal state path

- The politically inspired cyclical tendency in the control variable U must also spill over to the state variable π , and hence also to the actual rate of inflation p.
- The general pattern would be for the optimal rate of inflation to be relatively low at the beginning of each electoral period, **but undergo a steady climb**.
- In other words, the time profile of p^* tends to be the opposite of that of U^* , since the Phillips Curve depicts a trade-off between the two: $p = \phi(U) + a\pi$; $\phi' < 0$; $0 < a \leq 1$.

- When the constrained problem involves a discount factor, it is possible to use the current-value Hamiltonian H_c in lieu of H.
- In that case, the Lagrangian ${\cal L}$ should be replaced by the current-value Lagrangian ${\cal L}_c.$
- Consider the inequality-constraint problem

| | Maximize | $\mathbf{V} = \int_0^T \Phi(t, y, u) e^{-\rho t} dt$ |
|------|------------|--|
| (51) | Subject to | $\dot{y} = f(t, y, u)$ |
| | | $g(t, y, u) \leq c$ |
| | and | boundary conditions |

• The regular Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are

(52)
$$H = \Phi(t, y, u)e^{-\rho t} + \lambda(t)f(t, y, u)$$

(52) $\mathcal{L} = \Phi(t, y, u)e^{-\rho t} + \lambda(t)f(t, y, u) + \theta(t)[c - g(t, y, u)]$

• And the maximum principle calls for (assuming interior solution):

(53)
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial u} = 0;$$
 for all $t \in [0, T]$
(54) $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \theta} = c - g(t, y, u) \ge 0;$ $\theta \ge 0;$ $\theta \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \theta} = 0$
(55) $\dot{y} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda}$ [equation of motion for y]
(56) $\dot{\lambda} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y}$ [equation of motion for λ]

• Plus an appropriate transversality condition.

- By introducing new multipliers
 - (57) $m(t) = \lambda(t)e^{\rho t}$ [implying $\lambda(t) = m(t)e^{-\rho t}$] (57) $n(t) = \theta(t)e^{\rho t}$ [implying $\theta(t) = n(t)e^{-\rho t}$]
- we can introduce the **current-value versions of H** and \mathcal{L} as follows: (58) $H_c = He^{\rho t} = \Phi(t, y, u) + m(t)f(t, y, u)$ (58') $\mathcal{L}_c = \mathcal{L}e^{\rho t} = \Phi(t, y, u) + m(t)f(t, y, u) + n(t)[c - g(t, y, u)]$
- It can readily be verified that

(59)
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_c}{\partial u} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial u} e^{\rho t}; \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_c}{\partial n} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \theta}; \text{ and } \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_c}{\partial m} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda}$$

• Therefore, conditions (53), (54), and (55) can be equivalently expressed with \mathcal{L}_c , and the new multipliers m and n as follows:

(60)
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c}}{\partial u} = 0;$$
 for all $t \in [0, T]$
(61) $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c}}{\partial n} \ge 0;$ $n \ge 0;$ $n \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial n} = 0$
(62) $\dot{y} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c}}{\partial m}$ [equation of motion for y]

- The only major modification required when we use \mathcal{L}_c in the equation of motion for the costate variable, (56).
- To revise the equation of motion for the costate variable, (56) $\dot{\lambda} = -\partial \mathcal{L}/\partial y$, we shall transform each side of this equation into an expression involving the new variable m.

- For the left-hand side, by differentiating (57) $m(t) = \lambda(t)e^{\rho t}$: (63) $\dot{m} = \dot{\lambda}e^{\rho t} + \rho\lambda e^{\rho t} = \dot{\lambda}e^{\rho t} + \rho m \Rightarrow \dot{\lambda} = \dot{m}e^{-\rho t} - \rho m e^{-\rho t}$
- Using the definition of \mathcal{L} in (58') $\mathcal{L}_c = \mathcal{L}e^{\rho t}$, we can rewrite (56) $\dot{\lambda} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y}$ as

(64)
$$\dot{\lambda} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_c}{\partial y} e^{-\rho t}$$

• Equating (63) and (64):

(65)
$$-\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_c}{\partial y}e^{-\rho t} = \dot{m}e^{-\rho t} - \rho m e^{-\rho t}$$

(66) $\dot{m} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_c}{\partial y} + \rho m$ [equation of motion for m]

- The Mangasarian and Arrow sufficient conditions, previously discussed in the context of unconstrained problems, turn out to be valid also for constrained problems when the terminal time T is fixed.
- Let us use the symbol u to represent the vector of control variables. As before, let H^0 denote the maximized Hamiltonian, the Hamiltonian evaluated along the $u^*(t)$ path.
- The Hamiltonian is understood to **be maximized subject to** all the constraints of the g(t, y, u) = c form **or** the $g(t, y, u) \leq c$ form present in the problem.
- Besides, since every integral constraint is reflected in H via the new costate variable μ , it must also be similarly reflected in H^0 .

- For simplicity, we can consolidate the Mangasarian and Arrow sufficient conditions into a single statement.
- The maximum-principle conditions are sufficient for the global maximization of the objective functional if:
 - (67) Either the concavity of \mathcal{L} is in (y, u), jointly, for all $t \in [0, T]$; or Arrow's condition that H^0 is concave in the y variable alone for all $t \in [0, T]$, for a given λ .
- These conditions are also applicable to infinite-horizon problems, but in this case, the λ must satisfy

(68)
$$\lim_{t\to\infty}\lambda(t)[y(t)-y^*(t)]\geq 0$$

- A few comments about (67) may be added here.
- First, the concavity of \mathcal{L} is in (y, u) means concavity in the variables y and u jointly.
- Second, since H and L are composed of the F, f, g, and G functions as follows:

(69)
$$H = F + \lambda f - \mu G$$

- (70) $\mathcal{L} = H + \theta[c g]$
- it is clear that (67) will be satisfied if the following are simultaneously true:

- 1) F is concave in (y, u)
- 2) λf is concave in (y, u)
- 3) μG is convex in (y, u)
- 4) and θg is convex in (y, u) for all $t \in [0, T]$
- In the case of an inequality integral constraint, however, where μ is a nonnegative constant, the convexity of μG is ensured by the convexity of G itself.
- Similarly, in the case of an inequality constraint, where $\theta \ge 0$, the convexity of θg is ensured by the convexity of g itself.
- Finally, if the current-value Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are used, (67) can be easily adapted by replacing \mathcal{L} by \mathcal{L}_c and H^0 by H_c^0 .