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### What Americans really think about foreign policy

Eugene R. Wittkopf<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> R. Downs Poindexter Professor of Political Science , Louisiana State University

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“Internationalism is not a single, all-encompassing idea; instead, internationalism wears two faces: one *cooperative*, the other *militant*. Surprisingly, perhaps, not even the end of the cold war has shattered this durable structure of beliefs . . .”

—*Eugene Wittkopf*

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“American society faces two major dangers against which the vision of a community of communities seeks to guard: first, the danger of tribal warfare; and second, that of cultural impoverishment and rebellion against an obsolescent and imposed creed or canon.”

—*Amitai Etzioni*

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“Despite its symbolic appeal, the Forbes/Armey/Hall/Rabushka version of the flat tax has a fatal cosmetic problem and serious substantive and distributional problems. Together, these flaws suggest that this proposal will never be enacted in pure form.”

—*Rudolph Penner*

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## THE HOME FRONT

It has now become axiomatic that for any great power to have a robust foreign policy, it must be strong at home. This recognition helped elect Bill Clinton in 1992, as he promised a renewed focus on domestic issues after the long cold war preoccupation with foreign policy.

The essays in this section focus on some of the most important elements of American domestic strength, particularly in economic terms. They also discuss the state of public opinion about America's role in the world and the precarious state of its national community. Together, they make one thing clear: Addressing the problems and challenges of America's home front is no less complicated or costly than dealing with U.S. foreign policy.



# What Americans Really Think about Foreign Policy

*Eugene R. Wittkopf*

DURING THE PAST year, articles and op-ed pieces on the appropriate role for the United States to play in world affairs have flooded the pages of the nation's elite foreign affairs journals and influential newspapers. These articles draw on the contest prevalent throughout this century between internationalists and isolationists. Although sparked in part by the conflict between the Clinton administration and the Republican Congress over the size and shape of the foreign affairs budget, the spate of commentary has been fueled by survey data that purportedly show Americans are turning inward, rejecting the burdens of leadership imposed during the past half century in favor of an agenda dominated by domestic concerns.

Liberal internationalists in particular seem drawn to the view that Americans have rejected global activism in favor of political detachment. Two prominent historians cite recent survey data to support their lament. Writing in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Ronald Steel concludes that an extensive 1993 survey reveals "overwhelming support for a domestic agenda in preference to an international one."<sup>1</sup> One survey response he cites as evidence showed that most Americans would oppose promoting democracy abroad if that would risk having democratically-elected but unfriendly governments. Another revealed that only 10 percent believed the United States should be the single global leader. In a similar piece in *Foreign Affairs*, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. castigates the American public for its readiness "to endorse euphonious generalities in support of inter-

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Eugene R. Wittkopf is R. Downs Poindexter Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University.

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nationalism” without a corresponding commitment of “money and lives.” The evidence, according to Schlesinger:

Defending the security of American allies, rated very important by 61 percent of the public in 1990, fell to 41 percent in [1994]. Public support for the protection of weaker nations against foreign aggression fell from 57 percent to 24 percent. There was a 24 percent decline in support for the promotion of human rights and a 19 percent decline in support for efforts to improve living standards in underdeveloped countries.<sup>2</sup>

These data tell only part of the story. True, faced with a choice between an antagonistic but democratically elected government and an undemocratic but pro-American one, many would prefer the latter, but that is nothing new, as the United States often subverted democratic processes during the cold war out of fear of the consequences (President Eisenhower in his memoirs: “I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held . . . possibly 80 percent of the populace would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader”<sup>3</sup>). True, only 10 percent of the respondents in the 1993 survey (a *Times Mirror* study<sup>4</sup>) opted for a role making the United States the single world leader, but fully 80 percent supported a leadership role shared with others—hardly an “isolationist” posture.

Even more misleading are the comparisons between 1990 and 1994, both drawn from the quadrennial surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.<sup>5</sup> The 1990 survey was taken between October 23 and November 15—three months into Operation Desert Shield and about the time the Bush administration shifted its mission from defense to offense. Patriotism predisposes Americans to “rally ’round the flag” during times of crisis and peril. Policymakers also have the capacity to “frame” issues, as George Bush did when he portrayed Saddam Hussein as another Hitler. Not surprisingly, then, defending U.S. allies’ security and protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression—the project of the moment in late 1990—enjoyed wider support than would otherwise likely have been the case. If the 1986 Chicago Council survey is used as the baseline of comparison, however, supporting the defense of U.S. allies dropped by only 15 percentage points in 1994, not 20, and protecting weaker nations by 8, not 33.<sup>6</sup>

Not only are these differences less stark, they also are entirely reasonable given the dramatic changes in the security challenges the nation faced in 1994 compared with 1986. In 1986, two-thirds of Americans would have supported the use of force to defend western Europe from attack; by 1994 the proportion had shrunk to 54 percent. Arguably still

high, particularly because the military threat to western Europe is no longer as identifiable (the 1994 survey question did identify Russia as the invading country, however, just as the 1986 survey specifically referred to the Soviet Union), the change between the polling periods shows that Americans can “learn”—or adapt their policy preferences to changing circumstances—as they have previously demonstrated. In 1955, 27 percent of Americans believed nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in the complete destruction of humankind. In 1987, 83 percent believed both the United States and the Soviet Union would be completely destroyed in the event of an all-out nuclear war.<sup>7</sup> Should it be any more surprising that the end of the cold war—which had demanded an extraordinary expenditure of the nation’s material and psychological resources for nearly half a century—would stimulate Americans to rethink the very basics of their nation’s world role?

Rethinking does not mean rejection. Polling organizations have asked Americans since the 1940s if they “think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out.” In 1947, 70 percent said active involvement would be best; in 1994, 69 percent echoed that sentiment. Moreover, in 1976 only 41 percent said the United States “should mind its own business” and “let other countries get along the best they can on their own”; in 1993, 37 percent embraced that view.<sup>8</sup> Critical conflicts—World War II, Vietnam, the cold war, and the Persian Gulf War—are linked to each of these snapshots in time, but none seems to have jolted Americans toward withdrawal from world affairs. “Isolationist” quite simply fails to characterize today’s public temperament.

### Change or Constancy?

That conclusion is supported by other data from the Chicago Council’s periodic surveys. The number of Americans willing to support the use of U.S. troops to defend Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack or Israel from an Arab attack did not change between 1990 and 1994. Nor did the percentage who believe in a sustained commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But the proportion who rated nuclear nonproliferation as a very important foreign policy goal jumped from 59 percent to 82 percent, and those who rated “very important” the protection of U.S. jobs increased from 65 percent to 83 percent. “Learning” perhaps explains the first change, patriotism and “framing” the second, but changes in both cases imply greater U.S. involvement, not less.

The apparent contradiction between Americans’ endorsement of

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“euphonious generalities in support of internationalism” and their evident ability to “learn” is best explained by a structure of beliefs that has weathered dramatic global challenges and changes during the past two decades. Internationalism is not a single, all-encompassing idea; instead, internationalism wears two faces: one *cooperative*, the other *militant*. Surprisingly, perhaps, not even the end of the cold war has shattered this durable structure of beliefs, which explains how and why new issues on the U.S. foreign policy agenda continue to relate to the old.

### The Faces of Internationalism

With roots in the immediate post-Vietnam War climate and continuing throughout the cold war, the cooperative and militant faces of internationalism are revealed in a set of continuing concerns whose particulars change but whose challenges to the nation's ethos and perceptions of its security do not. As revealed in systematic analyses of the six Chicago Council surveys of the mass public taken since 1974, core elements include differences of opinion about how broad or narrow the range of U.S. foreign policy goals should be; about the particular countries in which the United States has vital interests; and about the use of force to protect others. Differing propensities to support the use of foreign aid as a policy instrument are also evident in the 1990 and 1994 surveys, while spying on friends as well as foes figures prominently in the most recent one.<sup>9</sup> In earlier surveys, a fear of communism and contention over the wisdom of *détente*, implying a lack of willingness to “trust the Russians,” were particularly important. *Détente's* post-cold war variants, which are similarly controversial, include extending NATO's protective umbrella eastward and normalizing relations with today's adversaries, notably Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Vietnam (now an accomplished if controversial fact).<sup>10</sup>

The intersection of the two faces of internationalism reveals four clusters of individuals (of roughly equal size) with distinctive foreign policy beliefs, identifiable as *internationalists*, *accommodationists*, *hardliners*, and *isolationists*. As during the past half century, internationalists today are willing to cooperate with other nations to solve global and national problems, but they are also willing to intervene in the affairs of others to promote and protect U.S. interests. Isolationists, on the other hand, reject most if not all forms of global involvement. Thus internationalists embrace cooperative and militant internationalism, while isolationists shun both.

Accommodationists and hardliners also are internationalists, but they



are *selective* internationalists; they differ about *how* the United States should be involved in world affairs, not *whether* it should be involved. Accommodationists tend toward “trusting” foes as well as friends. They prefer multilateralism over unilateralism as a means of conflict management and resolution, and they typically eschew the use of force. Accommodationists would choose sanctions over force, for example, and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping over U.S. peace enforcement. Hardliners, on the other hand, believe in the utility of forceful persuasion and in projecting the United States to the forefront of the global agenda. For them, “sole remaining superpower” is a label to be embraced, not shunned. Thus, unlike “true believer” internationalists, who join issues of cooperation and conflict as they consider and act upon global challenges and opportunities, accommodationists and hardliners are divided by these issues. *Engagement* describes the preferences of both, but their interpretation of the *rules of engagement* typically differs markedly.


### The Elements of Cooperative and Militant Internationalism

Because internationalism wears two faces, building coalitions of support for (or provoking opposition to) particular policy alternatives is necessarily affected by the nature of the issue itself. That is easily shown by examining the way U.S. opinion varies on the particular items that define not only cooperative and militant internationalism but also other closely related issues.

Consider how divided Americans are on three key multilateral issues: whether to extend NATO's security guarantees eastward to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; whether to take part in UN peacekeeping operations “in a troubled part of the world”; and whether to accept a UN-appointed commander for such operations or to insist on a U.S. commander. Only 42 percent of Americans polled in the latest Chicago Council survey supported the equivalent of NATO's Partnership for Peace program (the rest either opposed the proposition or expressed no opinion), but nearly two-thirds of those who fall into the internationalist quadrant supported the venture, while only one in seven isolationists did. The differences between accommodationists and hardliners are equally stark, as Figure 1 illustrates.

Figure 1 also charts Americans' views on the other two multilateral issues, both of which have been prominent since Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was handed over to the United Nations in May 1993. The patterns of support and opposition generally mirror those regarding NATO, but, as the length of the bars indicates, whether to join UN peacekeeping operations (i.e., *whether* the United States should be

**Figure 1**  
**Americans' Support for Post-Cold War Multilateralism**  
**(Percent below or above national level\*)**



\* National level of support for

NATO expansion: 42%

UN peacekeeping: 55%


UN commander: 44%

Source: Author's analysis of 1995 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey.

involved abroad) splits the American people more clearly along the traditional internationalist-isolationist divide than does the UN commander issue (which sparks divisions about *how* to be involved). Despite these differences, one message is clear: Leaders must appeal to the proponents of cooperative internationalism to be able to build a “winning” multilateral coalition.

The internationalist-accommodationist coalition is also evident concerning the post-cold war equivalent of *détente*—normalizing relations with today's adversaries—but here accommodationists and hardliners are particularly sharply split, as Figure 2 shows. Regarding relations with Vietnam, 85 percent of the accommodationists would have supported normalization in late 1994, but 62 percent of the hardliners would have opposed it. These are the kinds of divisions that continue to dog the Clinton administration even after its decision to establish diplomatic ties. In the case of Cuba, just under half of the American electorate in 1994 was willing to normalize relations, but less than one in seven hardliners would have supported that path. These sharp differences reflect an underlying ideological component: Accommodationists are inclined toward liberalism, hardliners toward conservatism. Contrary to

**Figure 2**  
**Americans' Support for Normalizing Relations with Adversaries**  
 (Percent below or above national level\*)



\* National level of support for normalization with  
 North Korea: 50%      Vietnam: 58%  
 Cuba: 46%              Iran: 37%


Source: See Figure 1.

what some pundits would have us believe, then, old labels continue to have currency.<sup>11</sup>

Attitudes toward foreign aid reflect the convergence of political ideology and foreign policy beliefs, just as they did during the cold war: Liberals and accommodationists are more likely to support this time-worn foreign policy instrument than conservatives and hardliners. The differences are especially acute when contemplating aid to Russia. Just over half of the respondents in the 1994 Chicago Council survey supported continued or increased aid to Russia; 40 percent would either cut or stop it. But a majority of hardliners proved negative on the issue, while more than two-thirds of the accommodationists would either continue or increase U.S. aid. Figure 3 illustrates these stark disagreements. It also shows a recurrent theme: When cooperation with others is the issue, support emerges from a convergence of those with accommodationist and internationalist beliefs.

There is another pattern: When the issue emphasizes not the olive branch but the arrows—those symbolically clenched in the eagle's talons

**Figure 3**  
**Aid to Russia: Patterns of Support and Opposition**  
 (Percent of total in each category: Stop, Decrease, Keep same or Increase)




Source: See Figure 1.

in the great seal of the United States—policy support emerges when hardliners and internationalists join forces. Typically these are traditional national security issues believed to require force or other forms of intervention. The classic case is Western Europe, where for half a century the threat of U.S. military force anchored the strategy of containment.

As noted earlier, Americans understandably are less willing today than previously to support the use of force to defend Western Europe. Still, the *patterns* of support (and potential opposition) are strikingly similar to those at the height of the cold war (1986) and in the transition (1990) to a “new world order” (see Figure 4). Most Americans today would willingly defend Europe with U.S. troops, but that conviction is less strong among those who place greater emphasis on cooperation than coercion as a mode of conflict resolution, and it is least strong among isolationists (large numbers of whom would nonetheless concur in such a decision).


Americans’ views of Europe find a parallel in their responses to the more generic question, which Arthur Schlesinger found so disquieting, about defending U.S. allies’ security. As Figure 5 shows, internationalists and hardliners have consistently been more disposed than others to defend the nation’s allies (i.e., they regard this as a salient foreign policy

**Figure 4**  
**Defense of Europe During and After the Cold War**  
 (Percent willing to use U.S. troops)



*Source:* Author's analysis of 1995, 1991, and 1987 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Surveys.

**Figure 5**  
**Defending Allies' Security as a U.S. Foreign Policy Goal**  
 (Percent who responded 'Very Important')



*Source:* See Figure 4.

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goal); that they are less so today is hardly surprising. More interesting is the notable spike in accommodationists' and isolationists' support for this foreign policy goal in 1990—the time of Operation Desert Storm—compared with their preferences previously and since. The Gulf war was an aberration: Patterns of U.S. support for and opposition to the tenets of militant internationalism enjoy a history that transcends the cold war just as they transcend transient challenges. Particular preferences do change in response to patriotic challenges and “framing” by political leaders, but there is an undeniable consistency as well.

The continuity of Americans' beliefs, the predictable changes in their preferences regarding the defense of Western Europe, and the salience they attach to the goal of defending their allies' security repeat themselves across a broad range of national security issues, including, for example, CIA intervention against unfriendly governments. But does it extend beyond geopolitics to geo-economics?

### A New Agenda?

The Clinton administration's emphasis on reinforcing the U.S. position in the global economy arguably has produced its most notable foreign policy achievements. The administration's achievements in support of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), its initiatives toward free-trade zones in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Basin, and its market-opening postures toward China and Japan also are consistent with liberal internationalism's emphasis on free trade. Still, as Stanley Hoffmann wrote in a recent issue of *Foreign Policy*, “the main Clinton objective has not been free trade *per se*, but a return to growth, hence to fuller employment at home. The president is more interested in the liberal vision at home than the liberal vision abroad. Or rather, the latter serves the former.”<sup>12</sup>

The general public's belief in the importance of protecting the jobs of American workers—83 percent regard this as a very important goal in the most recent Chicago Council survey (up from 77 percent in 1986 and 66 percent in 1990)—suggests that the Clinton strategy rests on a firm domestic base, but Hoffmann claims that the base looks more inward than outward. If so, it is not surprising that equal numbers of internationalists and isolationists share this priority.

A companion Chicago Council survey of American leaders reveals a wide discrepancy of opinion between elites and the general public on the jobs issue. As with the general public, the number of leaders who

attach priority to protecting jobs jumped markedly—to 50 percent in 1994 from 39 percent in 1990—but the gap between elites and masses remains as wide today as during the Reagan administration. Equally discrepant are the views of leaders and the general public on the wisdom of tariffs: Three out of every five respondents in the mass survey (who expressed an opinion) believe tariffs are necessary to protect jobs from less expensive foreign imports (as opposed to eliminating tariffs to reduce the cost of imported goods for everyone); only one in five leaders share that view. The yawning gap between elites and masses on the free-trade question has surfaced in every Chicago Council study since the question was first asked of both groups in 1978.<sup>13</sup>

Although support is high among all groups, as in the past accommodationists are somewhat less sensitive than others about protecting jobs either as a foreign policy priority or through tariffs. Three issues cast these differences more sharply: (1) whether NAFTA is mostly good or bad for the United States, (2) whether Europe engages in fair or unfair trade practices, and (3) whether Japan does. Nearly two-thirds (of those with opinions) believe NAFTA is mostly good, but more than 70 percent of the internationalists and accommodationists subscribe to this view, compared with 53 percent of the hardliners and less than 45 percent of the isolationists. The picture is similar to that in Figure 1 on extending NATO and joining UN peacekeeping operations.

A similar pattern emerges on the question of Europe's trade practices. Just over half (of those with opinions) in the sample expressed the view that the European Union engages in unfair trade practices. The perception is greatest among isolationists (71 percent), followed by hardliners (61 percent) and internationalists (46 percent), but only a third of the accommodationists share that conviction. Turning to Japan, however, the overwhelming proportion of Americans, regardless of their foreign policy beliefs, think Japan's trade practices are unfair. At 72 percent agreement, the accommodationists are the only ones who fall below the 81 percent national level.

Apprehension of Japanese economic prowess finds expression in other ways. Nearly two-thirds in the 1994 survey responded that Japanese economic competition would pose a critical threat to vital U.S. interests in the next decade. Neither the rise of China as a world power nor the spread of Islamic fundamentalism provoked a similar response. Similar findings emerge from the 1990 Chicago Council survey, when fewer Americans saw the rise of China, Soviet military power, or the European Community's economic challenges as more critical to future U.S. interests than Japan's economic competition. Thus concern about Japan

figures prominently in Americans' thinking, arguably bridging the geopolitical issues prominent in the past with the geo-economic issues prevalent today.<sup>14</sup>

### **Turning Inward?**

Nonetheless, more Americans (74 percent in 1994) perceive the influx of immigrants and refugees as critical to future U.S. interests than view Japanese economic competitiveness as critical (64 percent). A nearly identical number see controlling and reducing illegal immigration as a very important foreign policy goal. In combination with apprehensions about job security, the welfare and other social burdens illegal aliens generate, and concern about multiculturalism generally, these numbers may signal an inward turn among the general public. (Fewer than one in three elites regard either immigration matter as highly salient.) It is noteworthy, for example, that most Americans (82 percent) would support increases in federal spending programs to combat violence and crime, but the proportions run even higher among those who regard the tide of refugees and immigrants as a critical threat. This is true across nearly all political and ideological groups. And it is especially prominent even among accommodationists, whose foreign policy beliefs would generally make them less likely than others to regard immigrants and refugees as a threat: Eighty-eight percent of the accommodationists who see immigrants and refugees as a critical threat would support increased federal spending on crime compared with 67 percent among those who see them as something less than critical. Such differences reflect sensitivity to the intersection of the foreign and domestic policy agendas.

A large proportion of Americans (71 percent) expressed a willingness in the 1994 Chicago Council survey to increase federal health care spending. Increased aid to education also enjoyed wide support as in prior surveys (ranging from 59 percent in 1982 to 75 percent in 1994), but support for expanded social security programs declined from its 60 percent peak in 1986 to 49 percent in 1994 (the same level as in 1982, when the question was first asked). These tidbits provide little more than a glimpse of Americans' priorities, but they hardly point toward a reordered agenda that places domestic priorities first, as is commonly claimed.

Support for increased aid to education is consistent with Clinton administration claims about what is needed to enhance U.S. competitiveness in the world economy. Thus it is noteworthy that in both 1990 and 1994, internationalists supported increased aid over steady-state or reduced education spending (statistical procedures control for the effects



of partisanship and political ideology<sup>15</sup>). Other domestic programs fared less well, however. In 1990, internationalists opposed spending more on social security; in 1994 the selective internationalists opposed two prominent domestic programs: Hardliners opposed increased spending on health care, and accommodationists opposed increased spending on social security. The upshot of these analyses is that when faced with a trade-off between global activism and domestic spending, large numbers of Americans do not automatically turn inward.

### Who Are They?

Can these divergent foreign policy postures within the American polity be further defined and identified?

Liberals are more likely to embrace accommodationist foreign policy beliefs, and conservatives hardline beliefs, as noted earlier. Partisan identifiers fall along similar lines, with Democrats more likely to be accommodationists and Republicans hardliners. The polarization is sharpest between liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, as would be expected. Interestingly, however, if the effects of partisanship are held constant (using statistical procedures), those who in the latest Chicago Council survey describe themselves as either very conservative or very liberal both reveal strong *isolationist* tendencies—the only political groups that do. The numbers are comparatively small (less than 18 percent of the total sample), but not inconsequential. Thus both Pat Buchanan and Jesse Jackson seemingly have their fingers on a part of the U.S. foreign policy pulse.

Other sociodemographic characteristics differentiate Americans along fairly predictable lines.<sup>16</sup> Attentiveness to news, for example, divides people along the internationalist–isolationist fault. Similarly, Catholics and Jews generally embrace internationalist values. Those born since Vietnam (the 18-to-24-year-old segment of “Generation X”), on the other hand, tend toward isolationism more than other political generations (although the distinction does not hold up when other factors are also considered, such as education and attentiveness to news events).

Education clearly differentiates people along the accommodationist–hardline divide. College-educated people generally espouse accommodationist values, while those with less education tend toward either isolationist or hardline dispositions. Most regions of the country also embrace accommodationist views; the South, where hardline views predominate, is the notable exception. Men are more likely than women to support the tenets of militant internationalism, although, as with the generational divide, the differences do not hold up when other factors

are considered. Interestingly, there are no meaningful differences in the foreign policy beliefs of whites, on one hand, and Hispanics and African-Americans, on the other.

Few surprises are revealed in this brief excursion through the political and sociodemographic correlates of Americans' foreign policy beliefs. Still, these factors do not divide the American people very sharply; most differences along internationalism's cooperative and militant fault line remain comparatively impervious to these demographic variables. It is the nature of the issue itself—its measure of amity or enmity toward others, distinctions between "we" and "they," and the unilateral versus multilateral content—that evokes differing responses among Americans.

### Leaders and Leadership

Leaders have the ability to shape public perceptions of the means appropriate for the realization of policy ends, and thus to shape their coalitions of support. Anti-Sovietism and anticommunism became core values during the cold war, stimulating internationalist attitudes among leaders and followers alike and helping to frame issues in compelling ways. Now these guideposts are gone. Leadership is thus more important if structure and purpose are to guide U.S. foreign policy.

The Clinton–Congress contest reflects the absence of structure and purpose. Leaders in Washington, like Americans themselves, are divided: sometimes about *whether* to be involved abroad—as in Rwanda—but more often about *how*—as in Bosnia, where geopolitical issues are at stake, or in China, where geo-economics also figures prominently. And divisions among American elites extend beyond the Washington Beltway; several recent surveys of those in prominent leadership positions (including the Chicago Council's companion leader survey) reveal divisions not unlike those evident in the mass public.<sup>17</sup> Patriotism predisposes Americans to follow leaders' initiatives as much today as during the cold war, but the messages they now receive are decidedly mixed. The recent cacophony of internationalist and isolationist voices testifies to the continuing search for structure and purpose in the new world (dis)order. But Americans are not afloat in uncharted seas; for good or ill, their foreign policy opinions remain firmly anchored to a structure of largely internationalist beliefs that has proven remarkably resilient.

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*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not reflect the opinions of Louisiana State University.*

## Notes

1. Ronald Steel, "The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1995, p. 85.
2. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (July/August 1995), p. 7.
3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 372.
4. Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press, *America's Place in the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public About International Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: Times Mirror Center, 1993).
5. The surveys are summarized in John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), and *idem*, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).
6. *Idem*, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987).
7. Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harman, *Starting with the People* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), p. 49.
8. Times Mirror Center, *America's Place in the World*, p. 31.
9. The findings are based on a statistical procedure known as principal components factor analysis, which groups individuals' responses to particular attitude questions and scales them together based on their intercorrelations. For details of the statistical procedures used here and elsewhere in this paper, see Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990). The statistical results for the most recent Chicago Council survey are available from the author on request. Results for the 1990 survey may be found in Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (September 1994); all previous Chicago Council surveys are in Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*.
10. See Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*; and Wittkopf, "Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment," pp. 376-401.
11. For a contrary view, see Alan Tonelson, "Beyond Left and Right," *The National Interest* 34 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 3-18.
12. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995), p. 176.
13. See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1979* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979), and *idem*, *American Public Opinion 1987*.
14. In 1986 and 1990 the Chicago Council asked respondents if they would support the use of troops to defend Japan from a Soviet invasion. Fifty-three percent responded favorably in 1986 and 39 percent in 1990. In both years support was greatest among internationalists and hardliners and least among accommodationists and isolationists.
15. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between federal spending preferences and the cooperative and militant internationalism dimensions while holding partisanship and ideology constant. Detailed statistical results are available from the author on request.
16. The demographic correlates of Americans' foreign policy beliefs are examined using analysis-of-variance statistical procedures. Detailed statistical results are available from the author on request.

*Eugene R. Wittkopf*

17. See Steve Farkas, *Mixed Messages: A Survey of the Foreign Policy Views of American Leaders* (New York, N.Y.: Public Agenda, 1995); Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders After the Cold War: Persistence or Abatement of Partisan Cleavages?" in Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., *The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 127-147; and Times Mirror Center, *America's Place in the World*.