

THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES

Morton Deutsch

New Haven and London: Yale University Press

4. Group Formation

In the preceding chapter, we looked at the individual from the inside. From this perspective, he is seen to be composed of interdependent subunits that interact with one another in a manner resembling that of members in a tightly knit group.¹ Just as from the outside the individual can be considered a unit and from the inside he can be viewed as a system of interdependent subunits, so, too, is the group a unit from the exterior and a system of cooperatively interdependent members from the interior. In this chapter, we shall be concerned primarily with the formation of groups or, in other words, with the conditions that determine whether or not cooperation will be initiated among the potential members of a group. First we shall treat the question: What is a group? Then we shall discuss group formation; finally, the relationship between group membership and personal identity will be considered.

WHAT IS A GROUP?

An examination of the different usages of the term *group* suggests that each combines a greater or lesser number of the following distinguishing criteria: a group consists of two or more persons who (1) have one

or more characteristics in common; (2) perceive themselves as forming a distinguishable entity; (3) are aware of the positive interdependence of some of their goals or interests; (4) interact with one another; and (5) pursue their promotively interdependent goals together. In addition, writers concerned with persisting social units indicate that groups endure over a period of time and as a result develop (6) a set of norms that regulate and guide member interaction; and (7) a set of roles, each of which has specific activities, obligations, and rights associated with it.

The term *group* is commonly used to signify at least the first three of the criteria listed above. Several different degrees of "groupness" are often distinguished: "quasi-groups," which have only the first three characteristics listed; "functioning groups," which have the first five attributes; and "organized groups," which have all the criteria listed. This multifaceted usage of the term *group* is consonant with the intuitive notion that minimally a group is an entity consisting of people who are aware of being psychologically bound together by mutually linked interests. Thus a group is to be distinguished from an aggregate, class, category, or type, which consists of people who are classified together because of some common characteristic. "Group" implies a psychological or perceived bond, not merely an objective linkage, between the members' interests or goals. Moreover, the psychological linkage has some cohesive feature to it—i.e., members of a group see that in some respects they sink or swim together. This latter statement is not meant to deny that divisive and disruptive tendencies may exist within a group; rather, it is meant to indicate that, by definition, a group does not exist if its cohesive bonds are not strong enough to contain its disunifying influences.

Our discussion of the concept *group* implies that not all aggregates of people who have something in common or whose interests are positively interrelated will act together in pursuit of their common interests. We shall consider below some of the conditions that affect whether or not a category of people will become an interacting organized group. Surely, it makes a difference whether a collection of people are a group or not; in addition, it makes a difference what characteristics they have as a group. How cohesive are they? How many members are there? What kind of structure or organization do they have? As members of an organized group, individuals are part of a cooperative system, and their behavior toward others in the group

1. To be sure, the individual as a "group" has many special features. I mention only a few: its members cannot survive outside the group and, thus, cannot join other groups; the pressures toward internal consistency are relatively strong; its members are specialized with the consequences that there are highly developed centralized subunits for coordinating and integrating the activities of the specialized components; contact with the outside (in perception or in action) is not directly available to all members but is highly specialized and is controlled by the centralized subunits; the organizational structure, the systems of internal communication, and the relative power of different subsystems is largely determined by biological inheritance.

and toward those not part of the system is affected by their membership in that system and by the particular characteristics of the system.

In chapter 2, some of the features of cooperative relations were delineated; individuals who are part of an organized group are more likely to manifest such features than individuals who do not form one. Thus members of such a group are more prone to attend to and understand one another; communication among them is more effective and more frequent; they are more ready to be influenced by one another, to respond helpfully to others, and to facilitate each other's actions; their attitudes toward one another are more often friendly and trusting; they are more apt to develop similar beliefs, values, and customs and to expect other members to conform to them; they are more inclined to organize themselves so as to pool their specialized skills and responses in a coordinated effort to achieve their interrelated objectives; when conflicts occur, they are more prone to view them as mutual problems to be solved by collaborative effort and are less likely to use coercive techniques to influence one another or to expand the scope of the issues in conflict.

To illustrate the difference between an organized group and an aggregate of people with similar interests, consider tenants in a New York apartment house who are, as individuals, discontent with many aspects of their housing. If they recognize that the discontent is shared and if they interact with the objective of changing conditions in their housing, the tenants will in the process transform themselves into a functioning group. If they cooperate effectively, their relations to one another will change. Instead of remaining strangers who interact rarely and cautiously, they will develop many of the "symptoms" of cooperation outlined in the preceding paragraph.

GROUP FORMATION

In light of the great variety of groups, it is unlikely that there is a single answer to the question of how a collection of individuals comes to be a cooperative system. As Cartwright and Zander (1968, p. 54) point out, a group may be established deliberately by one or more people to accomplish some objective, it may be formed spontaneously by those who become members, or it may be created because other people treat a collection of individuals as a group. Despite the many different ways in which a group can originate, it seems possible to

identify several minimal conditions that must be met before a collection of individuals will turn into a cooperative system.

First, the individuals must be aware of one another's existence. Second, they must have some motives (interests, goals, or values) whose fulfillment they prefer to seek through cooperative interaction with the others—i.e., they must choose to cooperate with the others. Third, cooperative interaction must be initiated and reciprocated in such a way that the interaction serves to confirm for each of the potential group members his expectation of a mutually desired cooperative relationship. Finally, the individuals must become aware of themselves as a distinguishable entity. Factors affecting the realization of each of these basic conditions are discussed below.

Becoming Known to One Another

There has been little systematic study of the many factors, direct or indirect, that influence the likelihood that any collection of individuals will come to know of each other's existence. Propinquity has been the factor most thoroughly investigated, and the overwhelming evidence suggests that propinquity plays a very important role in establishing social relationships (Lundberg and Beasley 1948; Hollingshead 1949; Festinger, Schachter, and Back 1950; Deutsch and Collins 1951). Other ecological factors, such as the availability of communication and transportation facilities, have an influence similar to that of propinquity (Zipf 1949). Propinquity and other physical factors influencing ease of contact may themselves be determined indirectly by demographic variables—i.e., by the tendency of people of similar economic, religious, racial, or occupational backgrounds to live, work, and/or play in close proximity to one another (Form 1951). The existence of various institutionalized settings such as schools, factories, churches, hospitals, shopping centers, recreational centers, bars, and meeting halls will also affect the likelihood that people will get to know one another. In addition, of course, such personal factors as age, health, sex, social position, and personality will influence the individual's ability and willingness to get to know others and to become known. The aged, the disabled, and the poor often are limited in their physical mobility, and thus if they are widely scattered, it will be rather difficult for them to have sufficient contact with kindred people to develop a basis for group formation and effective group action.

Choosing to Cooperate

The choice to cooperate or not is in many respects similar to any other choice. Hence, such general theories of choice as level-of-aspiration theory (Lewin et al. 1944) or utility theory (Edwards 1954) are applicable. A basic assumption in such theories is that an individual will choose, from a set of perceived alternatives, the positively valued alternative that has the highest "effective attractiveness." As applied to the choice of cooperating or not, this statement means that an individual will want to cooperate when he sees that this is the best or only way to achieve a goal (or goals) that he is motivated to attain.

It is obvious that many goals are social in nature and intrinsically require the collaboration of others for their attainment—e.g., to belong to a given group, to achieve racial and sexual equality, to have an intimate relationship, to play a game of tennis, to participate in an interesting conversation, to sell or buy anything, to obtain someone's approval or support. Other goals, though not intrinsically social, may nevertheless be impossible to attain without collaboration of others—e.g., to have a lobster dinner in Chicago, to travel from the United States to Europe, to live in a better house than one could construct oneself. Of course, there are many types of nonsocial goals that can be attained through either individual or collaborative effort—e.g., to build a canoe, to solve a problem, to repaint the living room. There are, moreover, certain types of goals relating to self-expression or self-activity from which it would be intrinsically impossible to gain personal satisfaction through the activities of others alone—e.g., to *make* a painting or to *eat* a lobster. For other types of goals, the activities of others may be entirely self-sufficient—e.g., to see that a blind man crosses a street safely, to have a nursery school organized so that one's children may have an opportunity to engage in supervised activities with other children.

Whether or not one's goals require or permit cooperation for their attainment will obviously be an important determinant of the choice to cooperate or not. If one's goals permit but do not require cooperation, the choice to cooperate will be determined by the effective attractiveness of cooperation as compared to other perceived alternatives. The effective attraction of an alternative is a function of two sets of factors: those that influence its desirability or undesirability

and those that influence the subjective probability that it will lead to the desired result.

The desirability of cooperation is determined by the gains, pleasures, and values one hopes to realize through it; its undesirability by the costs, pains, and disvalues one expects. Clearly, a choice to cooperate is unlikely if it is anticipated that the "negatives" will outweigh the "positives"—unless, of course, cooperation is chosen as the lesser of evils. In addition to the nature of one's objectives, several other major types of determinants influence the desirability of cooperation. Personality dispositions affect both one's general inclination to be cooperative and one's preferences regarding with whom one would like to cooperate (see Terhune 1970 a, b for a review). It is also evident, as Mead (1937) has demonstrated in her classical study of *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, that societal values may be more or less oriented toward cooperation. In addition to the more enduring general influences of personality dispositions and cultural values, the desirability of cooperation is influenced by a host of such specific external factors as the social and personality characteristics of other group members, the reputation of the group, and one's anticipated activities and status within the group.

No matter how desirable the various aspects of cooperation may seem, cooperation is not likely to be undertaken unless there is some hope that what one wants from it will be attained. This is especially the case when unsuccessful cooperation is seen to be costly. There are many determinants of an individual's estimate of his chances of success in a given situation. These include his prior experiences in similar situations, his perceptions of the judgments of others, and his personality. Thus if he has had a prior history of success or if his friends assure him that he will be successful, and if he is inclined to be optimistic, he is likely to be quite confident. There are, of course, considerable differences among individuals in terms of how much confidence of success each requires before he will initiate cooperation. Nevertheless, if one cannot *trust* that the other potential group members will have the motivation and ability to cooperate effectively, one is not likely to enter a cooperative process. Because of the centrality of trust to the initiation of cooperation, a separate chapter (chapter 7) will be concerned with this topic. Trust is, however, only one of the three key problems of *mutuality* that must be resolved if cooperative interaction is to be successfully initiated and reciprocated. The others

are *coordination* and *bargaining*. Each of these problems is discussed below in terms of the question it poses for the potential cooperators.

Problems of Mutuality in the Initiation of Cooperation

No individual, by his choice alone, can successfully initiate cooperation. Cooperation is a mutual endeavor, and for cooperative interaction to occur, the choice to cooperate must be reciprocated. Contrast this with a choice involving inanimate objects. If I choose to have yogurt rather than pastry for dessert, the yogurt does not have to choose me for my choice to be successfully consummated. Arising out of the requirement that cooperation be mutual and reciprocated are the three problems mentioned above: trust, coordination, and bargaining.

Trust. The problem of trust raises the question of whether or not the potential cooperators can trust one another sufficiently to take the risks involved in initiating cooperation. Suppose, for example, that I wish to sell an antique clock and you wish to buy one. There is a possibility that what I am offering you is not a genuine antique but only an imitation; analogously, you may attempt to pay me with a bogus credit card or forged check. For me to sell the clock to you, I must trust that your credit card or check is valid, and for you to buy it, you must trust that I have not misrepresented the clock.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the problem of trust in an abstract form. P_1 has to choose between *C* and *D* and has to announce his choice before he knows what P_2 has chosen. The situation is the same for P_2 . Clearly, unless he can trust that the other will choose *C* rather than *D*, each is forced to choose *D*. If both choose *D* then both will lose, despite the fact that both can gain by cooperating and choosing *C*. Each may, however, feel that the other might be tempted to gain

		P_2	
		<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>
P_1	<i>C</i>	+1, +1	-2, +2
	<i>D</i>	+2, -2	-1, -1

Figure 4.1. The trust problem. This and the following matrices should be read as follows: P_1 chooses between rows *C* and *D*, P_2 between columns *C* and *D*. P_1 's payoffs are the first numbers in the cell; P_2 's are the second numbers. For illustrative purposes, consider that the payoffs are in money and that each person would prefer to gain rather than lose, as well as gain +2 rather than +1, or lose -1 rather than -2.

more by choosing *D*. Or, even if the other can be trusted, it may be difficult to resist the temptation oneself.

Matrices, like the one illustrated in figure 4.1, have been employed in many studies to investigate the conditions affecting "trust" and "trustworthiness." (See chapter 8 for reports of such research done by my associates and myself.) It is well to recognize that a relationship of mutual trust is not always based upon knowledge of the other's personal trustworthiness. Trust may be rooted in factors that are external to the particular relationship, such as confidence that existing social institutions will discourage untrustworthy behavior, confidence in third parties who can vouch for the other, or a general confidence in the trustworthiness of people who are viewed as similar to oneself.

Particularistic trust, which is based upon personal knowledge of the other, is characteristic of small, traditionalistic communities. *Universalistic trust*, which depends upon the social rather than the personal characteristics of the other, seems to be a necessary ingredient in the development and functioning of complex modern societies.

Generalized trust as a norm among individuals in a given society appears to be essential for the operation of large-scale organizations, which must rely heavily on interpersonal relationships among strangers. In the modern, organizational society, one must trust that an unknown mailman will bring your letters conscientiously rather than throw them away, that an unknown worker in a pharmacy will fill your prescription correctly, that a bank clerk will not make incorrect entries into your account, that your physician will have obtained his degree through competence rather than through political influence, and so on. When generalized trust is impaired, one can expect a corresponding increase in suspiciousness, irresponsibility, and untrustworthiness. Public opinion data reported by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in November 1971 indicate that from 1966 to 1971, paralleling the increased involvement of the United States in the Vietnam war, there was a sharp decline, particularly among the youth, in the generalized trust toward the government and other major social institutions. Symptomatic of this decline were more social disorder and disruption, greater apprehensiveness, and an increased sense of lack of participation in a meaningful community.

The level of generalized trust existing in a community determines whether or not the different individual resources existing within it can be shared or combined for mutual benefit. The existence of trust is it-

self a resource of cooperation, and without it the benefits that can be derived from organized cooperative activity are drastically curtailed. The development of revolving credit and mutual loan associations within a community are likely to be inhibited with a low level of trust. Without such institutions, however, economic activity and growth will be cumbersome and, as a consequence, deterred. Similarly, the development and effective functioning of all community institutions and organizations—schools, cultural centers, and community organizations—will be strangled by excessive red tape, meetings, and disruptions if there is little trust. A university, for example, cannot function effectively if faculty, students, and administrators are all suspicious of one another. If each has to monitor the other constantly because of insufficient trust, none will have time to perform its own functions adequately, and its failure to do so will confirm the other's suspicions.

There is a variety of evidence to suggest that levels of trust are usually higher in communities of higher socioeconomic status than in those of lower, and higher among the advantaged groups than among the disadvantaged groups within a community. It is not surprising that blacks and the poor are less trusting than whites and the well-off: they have less reason to be so. However, insofar as the low level of trust is not only characteristic of the relations with the outgroup but also of the relations within the group, it serves to perpetuate and enhance the weakness of the disadvantaged group. If the level of trust within a disadvantaged group is low, the group cannot develop a strong community with effective institutions that would enhance its collective power and enable its members to cooperate effectively to overcome their disadvantages. Of course, an exploitative group that seeks to maintain its advantages will often utilize any tactics necessary to deter the development of group cohesion among the exploited.

Bargaining. The question of mutuality posed by the bargaining problem is whether the potential cooperators can resolve differences in preferences with regard to the terms of their cooperation. The buyer-seller transaction provides an illustration of such problems. The buyer and seller have concordant interests in that they both desire that a sale take place. However, they also have conflicting interests in that the seller would prefer a sale at a high price and the buyer at a low one. If the seller's minimum acceptable sale price is lower than the buyer's maximum acceptable purchase price, a mutually acceptable

agreement is possible. Whether or not the buyer and the seller reach an agreement will be determined by how successfully they bargain together.

Bargaining is not only characteristic of economic transactions but is a feature of all social relationships. Husbands and wives who want to spend an evening out together but have dissimilar preferences on where to go will bargain to determine the nature of their cooperation; similarly, parents and children who have dissimilar views about "bed-time" will often engage in elaborate negotiations in the process of working out an agreement. Students and faculty who may have different preferences regarding the timing of various academic events nevertheless will need to come to an agreement to prevent an academic impasse.

Figure 4.2 presents the bargaining problem in abstract form. It is evident that each side is better off if they can agree.

		P_2	
		x	y
P_1	A	0, 0	+2, +4
	B	+4, +2	0, 0

Figure 4.2. The bargaining problem.

P_1 would, however, prefer Bx while P_2 would prefer Ay . What determines whether or not P_1 and P_2 will be able to come to a mutually acceptable agreement in such situations? What are the effects of different methods of attempting to influence the other to yield? These and other related questions are the focus of inquiry in a series of studies reported in chapters 9, 10, and 11. Because of the pervasiveness of threats and promises in bargaining, a theoretical discussion of these modes of social influence is presented in chapter 6.

Coordination. Even if potential cooperators trust one another and agree completely on how to cooperate, they still confront the problem of coordination. For example, suppose a man and woman meet briefly, by chance, at a cocktail party in New York. They immediately are taken with each other and would very much like to meet again. Unfortunately, they forget to exchange last names, addresses, and phone numbers before leaving the party. They want to get to-

gether, but how, when, and where can they meet? They face the problem of coordination. Suppose each of them decides to meet the other by going to some hangout for "singles" for the next several nights. Where should each go and at what time to maximize their chance of meeting?

An abstract version of the couple's problem is presented in figure 4.3. In this version, P_1 and P_2 both want to converge on the same choice, but they do not know what the other is going to choose. In such a situation, P_1 's best course of action depends on the action he expects P_2 to take, which depends in turn on P_2 's expectation of P_1 's action. Each must try to guess what the other thinks he will guess, and so on. What permits the convergence of expectations rather than an endless spiral of "second-guessing"? (See Schelling 1960 for an insightful discussion.)

		P_2		
		A	B	C
P_1	A	+4, +4	0, 0	0, 0
	B	0, 0	+4, +4	0, 0
	C	0, 0	0, 0	+4, +4

Figure 4.3. The coordination problem.

Communication is an obvious way of solving the coordination problem—e.g., P_1 says to P_2 : "You choose column A and I'll choose row A." However, there are many situations in which communication is impossible or too costly, and in these cases coordination has to be accomplished tacitly rather than explicitly. Moreover, even when communication is feasible, there is often some necessity for selecting what one communicates from that limited range of possibilities that are likely to be mutually acceptable. Thus Schelling (1960, p. 70) has pointed out:

Most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possibility outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. . . . The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the other expects the first to expect, and so on. . . . These infinitely reflexive

expectations must somehow converge on a single point, at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.

The problem of coordination encompasses more than the convergence of expectations in situations of tacit communication. Even explicit communication may be misunderstood; the speaker and the listener may not interpret what is said in the same ways. Misunderstandings, of course, are very likely when the speaker and listener are from rather different cultural backgrounds and are not fully aware of their differences. The stock conversation of returning tourists consists of amusing or embarrassing anecdotes based upon misunderstandings of this sort. Even within a given society, unrecognized cultural differences may give the same act or word a different significance to blacks and whites, to men and women, to members of different ethnic groups, to people of different class backgrounds, to scientists and nonscientists.

Thus, for example, only in recent years has there developed some awareness that lower-class black children, when they enter school, often speak a form of English that is different from standard American. Before this was recognized, many teachers assumed that the speech of these students was simply an inferior, impoverished version of standard, middle-class American speech. This faulty view buttressed educators' low expectations regarding the intellectual potential of black children and contributed to a vicious cycle in which the black children became increasingly alienated from their schools.

Although husbands and wives may speak the same form of English, it is not uncommon for a couple to misunderstand one another because their styles of emotional communication differ enormously. There may be differences in what is attended to: the husband may consider *what* is said (the words) to be more important, the wife may attend more to *how* it is said (the tone of voice, the circumstances). There may be differences in amplitude and frequency of emotional expressiveness, the husband expressing his emotions in low key, infrequently, and the wife expressing hers at high intensity, frequently. Each may judge the other's expressiveness in terms of his or her own norms, the husband judging his wife as very emotional, the wife viewing her husband as unemotional. Lack of recognition, lack of understanding, or intolerance of such stylistic differences in communication can create misunderstandings, resentment, and hurt feelings that may impair cooperation.

THE PERCEPTION OF THE GROUP AS A DISTINGUISHABLE ENTITY

In the previous sections, I have considered how potential cooperators get to know one another, some of the determinants of the choice to cooperate, and the problems of mutuality arising from the fact that cooperation can not be consummated unless it is reciprocated. This discussion has assumed that a group is a voluntary cooperative system and, hence, that the development of cooperation and group formation are clearly related topics. However, a group is more than an assemblage of cooperating people. It is composed of members who are aware of themselves as an entity: a group is conscious of itself. In addition, it is evident that membership in many groups (such as family, racial, and ethnic groups) is by inheritance and not choice. In such instances, the development of a positive group consciousness may be the precondition for the development of cooperation, rather than vice versa. Also, the development of cooperation and the growth of group consciousness may each foster the other. Thus it is apparent that the onset of group consciousness may precede, follow, or be concurrent with the development of cooperative relations within the group.

In addition to the experience of successful cooperation, several factors seem to play key roles in the development of group consciousness. They include (1) *the treatment by others*. If others treat members of the group in a similar way and identify them as one group for various purposes, group consciousness will be promoted; (2) *an abrupt discontinuity between the characteristics of members and nonmembers of the group*. Thus if members are rather similar in such matters as beliefs, values, appearances, proximity, past experience, language, customs, and style but sharply different in these respects from the remainder of the people in their surroundings, group consciousness will be heightened; (3) *the use of symbols to represent the group*. The existence of a name, insignia, uniforms, differentiated and labeled statuses within the group, and group ceremonials all intensify group awareness; (4) *differences in rates, types, and styles of interaction between members and nonmembers*. The more members interact with one another about topics and in a manner that differs from the way they interact with nonmembers, the more intense will be their group awareness; and (5) *a history of cooperating together*. The existence of an

historical time perspective, with a sense of continuity of relatedness, and an awareness of shared memories of past events contributes to a heightened consciousness of a group identity. A time perspective that extends from the past to the future is central to a stable group identity.

The operation of these factors in raising group consciousness can be illustrated by a hypothetical example. Suppose that in a large lecture class I wished to create two groups: *the shorties* (those 5'6" and under) and *the longies* (those over 5'6" in height). To do this, I would treat the groups differently: require them to enter and exit the classroom by different doors, give them different assignments and tests, assign different teaching assistants to work with them, allow them to visit me in my office only at clearly different hours, and encourage others to treat them differently. If this were not sufficient, I could assign them to sit in clearly separated areas of the classroom so that the two groups would be quite distinct visually. In addition, I could refer to the groups by different names and give them distinctive collective tasks to perform that would encourage interaction within each group but interfere with interaction between "longies" and "shorties." I would do this over a period of time, creating distinctive histories and memories for the two groups as well as expectations that the future would be continuous with the present. Such behavior on my part would create two groups whose members were highly conscious of their group membership.

Typically, one would expect that the more conscious an individual is of his membership in a group in a given situation, the more likely is his behavior to be affected by his group membership. Moreover, as an individual's group consciousness increases, the probability that his behavior will be affected by the group in more situations also increases. Although the enhancement of group consciousness often raises cohesiveness, the member may become more negative toward the group as its salience increases when his attitude toward it is negative. Such a situation may occur when a person belongs to a group he dislikes but cannot leave because of external restraints.

GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

George Herbert Mead, in his classic work *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934), pointed out that the individual's self as well as his capacity for reflective thought develop in the course of social interaction with the

members of his family and other groups in the community to which he belongs. By taking the role of others and responding to his own actions as they would, the individual learns to anticipate the social effects of his actions. In addition, he learns that he and others are expected to behave toward one another in specified ways as a function of his and their particular personal and social attributes—such as age, sex, social class, race, religion, ethnic background, and nationality.

Thus a black child learns to behave differently toward black than toward white children, and he learns to expect whites to behave differently toward him than they do toward whites. Similarly, children learn that certain activities are “feminine” and others are “masculine” and that disapproval is risked by engaging in behavior that is considered appropriate for the opposite sex but not for one’s own. However, each child’s experience is in some respects unique, and thus the conceptions among a group of what it is to be a member of that group will not be identical. Moreover, the meaning of any particular subidentity, such as “black,” is influenced by the total configuration of social identities of which it is an element. Thus the conception of “black,” like that of “Jew,” is affected by the linking of the two attributes in the configuration “black Jew.” Adding other elements to the configuration, such as “rich,” “young,” “woman,” and “Brazilian,” further alters and defines the meaning of the initially specified subidentity “black.”

Although the meaning of any personal subidentity is influenced by the total configuration of subidentities, it would be a mistake to assume that all elements are equally influential in determining an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. It is evident that situational factors help determine which subidentity will be elicited most strongly at a given time: different subidentities are likely to be most salient and most influential in different social situations. The subidentity of “white” is more likely to be elicited in the presence of blacks than in the presence of other whites—unless the other whites are discussing blacks or interracial relations. A New Yorker and a Texan are more likely to feel a common identity as Americans in China than in the United States. Thus a subidentity is made salient in a situation by contrast with the presence of members of other different or antithetical groups that are used to mark off the boundaries of one’s own group (Herman 1970). It is also made salient by the presence of threats, danger, discrimination, or other potential harm to oneself be-

cause of membership in a given group. If derogatory comments or discriminatory actions are liable to be directed at you or other members of your group at any time from almost anybody, then you will be continuously aware of your membership in this group. A subidentity is also made salient by the prospect of reward or other potential gain resulting from membership in a particular group. More generally, the more eliciting stimuli that are present in a situation—whether those stimuli be negative or positive in implication—the more salient will be the identity in that situation.

It is apparent that subidentities differ in their readiness to be evoked. Some subidentities are more pervasive than others and are readily aroused in many different types of situations. My subidentity as a member of my family group enters into many more situations than my subidentity as a member of the Accabonac Tennis Club. It connects with more people and with more of my other subidentities, and thus it is a more pervasive influence on my thoughts, feelings, and behavior.

Subidentities also differ in how central or important they are to the individual’s self-esteem; the more central a subidentity is, the more likely it is to be evoked, and the more influential it will be when evoked. One measure of the centrality of a subidentity is one’s readiness to resist its derogation or elimination. Thus I am more willing to give up being a squash player than a tennis player, and I would abandon either of these rather than quit my profession. Similarly, I am more ready to resist derogation of my ethnic group than my age group.

The importance of a subidentity to one’s self-esteem is determined by the strength of the different types of bonds binding one to it. Several different types of bonds can be distinguished (McCall 1970): ascribed bonds, bonds of commitment, bonds due to investment, bonds of attachment, and instrumental bonds. The first three types of bonds (ascription, commitment, and investment) are in large measure “restraining bonds”; they restrain one from leaving a group even if he desires to do so. The latter two (attachment and instrumental) are “attracting bonds,” which pull the individual toward the group.

The strongest restraining bonds are those arising out of certain *ascribed* statuses—such as family, sex, racial, ethnic, and national group membership, all of which one acquires by birth rather than by choice. Such statuses can rarely be changed. It is the combination of

their unalterability and their social significance that gives these ascribed statuses their personal importance. One's handedness, left or right, may be as difficult to alter as one's race, but it is by no means as socially significant. Membership in a family, racial, sexual, ethnic, or national group affects one's thoughts and actions in many situations; these effects are pervasive. In addition, by common definition, membership in such groups typically excludes membership in other groups of a similar type. That is, if you are black, you are not also white; if you are male, you are not also female; if you are Jewish, you are not also Christian. Thus being a member is thought to be more or less distinctive, and since membership is linked to experiences from early on in one's life, it is not unusual for one to get emotionally attached to such groups, with the result that these memberships play an important positive role in determining one's sense of identity.

Bonds of *commitment* may also tie one to a group and to the identity connected with it. The commitment may be to other members of the group or to interested outsiders. Thus a girl who is engaged but no longer interested in marrying may be reluctant to break the engagement because of her commitment to her fiancé or because of the expected disappointment of her parents and friends. Similarly, one's *investments* in a given identity—the amount of time, energy, life's chances, money, and emotion previously expended in establishing and maintaining the identity—will generally serve to bind one to continue it even when one might not otherwise choose to do so. Nevertheless, it should be noted that people do break up long-standing marriages or change well-established careers if they expect that continued investments will be costly and not worthwhile. This is particularly likely if they are aware of a more rewarding alternative for their future investments. The restraining bonds of commitment and investment are, however, usually easier to break than those of ascription.

Bonds of *attachment* attract one to a group; such bonds develop when significant personal needs—for security, acceptance, and meaning—have been fulfilled in the group, and the group is thought to be largely irreplaceable or nonsubstitutable as a source of fulfillment for these needs. A group is likely to be viewed as irreplaceable when no readily available alternatives are perceived (as in the case of the small child in relation to the nuclear family), when the feasibility of leaving the group to go to another one is small (as is the case of the citizens of most nations), or when, as a result of an extended history

of participation in the group, the group has taken on a unique significance (as is the case of family and ethnic groups).

Bonds of attachment provide a diffuse, nonspecific form of attraction to a group and to the idea of expressing one's identity by membership in the group. In contrast, *instrumental* bonds arise from the success of the group in providing dependable rewards for fulfilling one's specific roles or functions within the group and for being identified as a member of the group. Instrumental bonds are linked to the specific success of the group in providing specific satisfactions. However, the more success the group has in doing this, and the wider the range of satisfactions it provides, the more likely it is that diffuse bonds of attachment will also develop.

It is evident that an individual who is getting ample instrumental satisfactions from his group and is deeply attached to it will not find himself in conflict, because his investments and ascription will restrain him from abandoning his identification with the group. To the contrary, the more the individual is attracted to a group, the more willing he will be to make investments in it, to make personal commitments to it, and to bind himself irrevocably to it. Conversely, the less he is attracted to a group, the less willing he will be to bind himself so tightly that it would be difficult to leave it if he should choose to do so.

Suppose that one is emotionally attached to one's subidentity as a Jew, woman, or black—and irrevocably bound to it by bonds of ascription, commitment, and investment—but that it places one at a distinct instrumental disadvantage in obtaining many kinds of opportunities and rewards. How one copes with this situation will be largely determined by whether one views the disadvantages to be just or unjust. If those who are disadvantaged by their group identity accept their disadvantages as being warranted, they are unlikely to challenge and conflict with those who are profiting from their relatively advantaged positions. The sense of being treated unjustly because of one's membership in a group to which one is strongly attached and bound is the energizer for much intergroup conflict. The sense of injustice is felt particularly intensely in interracial, interethnic, and intersex conflicts because of the centrality of these group identities to the individual's self esteem. When women or blacks or Jews are devalued as a group, those who are identified and identify with the groups also are personally devalued.

It is evident that those groups who gain from the disadvantaging of other groups are usually the more powerful ones. They are more likely to set the terms of their relationship with other groups and, through their control of the state and other social institutions, to establish the legal and other reigning definitions of "justice." Thus in addition to their gains from exploitative actions, they commonly have the reassurance of the official definition of justice and the support of such major social institutions as the church, the press, and the schools to deaden their sensitivities to the injustices inherent in their relations with the disadvantaged group. The disadvantaged may, of course, be taken in by the official definitions and the indoctrination emanating from social institutions and, as a result, lose their sensitivity to their situation of injustice. Even when they are not brainwashed into accepting their inferior positions as just, a sense of hopelessness about the possibility of change may keep the disadvantaged quiescent. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Deutsch 1972), the process of activating the sense of injustice so that it is a stimulant to intergroup conflict and social change entails falsifying and delegitimizing the officially sanctioned ideologies and myths that "justify" the injustices; exposing the disadvantaged to new ideologies, new models, and new reference groups that justify and give life to the possibilities of change in their status; stimulating hope by successful efforts to improve their situation; and reducing their fear by increasing their relative bargaining strength.

It would be a mistake to assume that the only form of intergroup conflict is that between exploiting and exploited groups. In the next chapter, intergroup conflict is considered more broadly. However, it is well to recognize that deep passions are aroused whenever the value and merit of an individual's personal identity are challenged, and this is quite likely to happen when a group that he is closely identified with is involved in a conflict with another group over such central values as justice and superiority-inferiority.

5. Intergroup Conflict

This chapter, which is concerned with intergroup conflict, is divided into three sections. The first discusses some of the external conditions conducive to conflict. The second deals with several internal properties of groups as they are related to intergroup conflict. In the third section, class conflict and race conflict are considered as examples in an attempt to uncover some general propositions about the resolution of conflict.

EXTERNAL CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Contact

It takes two to tangle. Conflicting, as well as harmonious, interaction requires a partner. Thus one of the factors contributing to the development of discord between groups is the opportunity to interact. People or groups that have little or no contact with one another are unlikely to have either conflicting or harmonious relations.

In our discussion of group formation in the preceding chapter, we considered some of the factors that influence the chances that two or more people will become known to one another. Such "pair attributes" as proximity, communication facilities, interdependence, and similarity and such "individual attributes" as physical and social position, the amount of resources available to overcome distance, and various personality characteristics affect the likelihood that contact will occur. Pairs of groups that are physically close to one another, are functionally interdependent, share common facilities, are easily able to communicate with one another, and are similar are more likely to find themselves in contact than are pairs lacking these characteristics. A group has more "contact potential" if it is centrally located, power-

ful, large, expansive, and has a high need for interaction with other groups because of its lack of self-sufficiency.

Paradoxically, if contact leads to the development of a cooperative relationship, this will as a consequence promote more frequent interaction, which will in turn increase the chances of conflict. In other words, cooperative relations provide a greater opportunity for the occurrence of conflict than the absence of interaction. Conflicts do occur frequently in the course of cooperative interrelations, but such conflicts are often less problematic and hence less dramatic than the conflicts arising in a noncooperative context. The cooperative surroundings often enable the conflict to be resolved productively rather than destructively (Deutsch 1969), because the attitudes of the conflicting parties and the pressures and resources of the cooperative system facilitate a cooperative rather than a competitive process of conflict resolution.

Contact and interaction provide an opportunity for intergroup conflict. But what other factors help determine whether the relations between groups become conflicting or not? Williams (1947), in a survey of research on intergroup relations, has indicated that the necessary conditions for conflict include "visibility" and "competition" in addition to contact. He quotes Young (1932, p. 586) to this effect: "Group antagonisms seem to be inevitable when two peoples in contact with each other may be distinguished by differentiating characteristics, either inborn or cultural, and are actual or potential competitors. Only by eliminating the outward evidences of distinction such as color, dress, or language, or by removing the competitive factor, may racial antagonisms be destroyed."

Visibility

The distinction between "ingroup" and "outgroup" is obviously a necessary condition for intergroup relations; the outgroup must be visible and in some way distinguishable from the ingroup. But it would be a mistake to stress physical differences as the primary determinants of the differentiation between ingroup and outgroup members. If one considers the many different circumstances in which intergroup conflict occurs—such as between a sales and an engineering department within a factory, between psychologists and physicians about the practice of psychotherapy, between different religious groups—it is evident that intergroup conflict can occur even in the absence of distin-

guishing physical characteristics between the members of the different groups. Differentiation is often made on the basis of social and psychological criteria such as the nature and degree of interdependence within each group as compared to those between the groups, the types of activities each engages in, the beliefs and values that each espouses, the people or groups with whom each interacts, the treatment each receives from other people or groups, the nature of the past experiences and cultural heritage of each, and the types of locales and settings in which each engages in its activities. Distinctions between groups that arise on one basis may be maintained on another basis. Thus skin color may come to distinguish groups that were initially differentiated in terms of their positions in the master-slave relationship because of the association between skin color and social caste.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that the categorization of people into groups on the basis of any distinguishing characteristic commonly has the result that, perceptually, the differences between each category tend to be enhanced (Tajfel 1969). Thus if people are categorized into groups of "black" and "white" on the basis of skin color, the differences between "black" and "white" will be perceptually accentuated or exaggerated, while the differences among "white" and among "black" will be deemphasized. This phenomenon is often more generalized. If a person has the view that certain features (e.g., skin color, social class, conduct, intelligence, and attitudes) are highly correlated, and if he categorizes people into groups according to one of the characteristics such as skin color, then he is likely to accentuate the differences *between* the groups on the other attributes that he believes to be associated with skin color.

Is the existence of a recognized difference between two categories of people enough, by itself, to lead the people in each category to think of themselves in terms of ingroup and outgroup? Research (Chase 1971; Deutsch, Thomas, and Garner, in manuscript) indicates that the mere recognition of a difference between two categories of people is not a sufficient condition for the formation of distinctive beliefs and attitudes toward the different categories, unless the difference is utilized by a prestigious authority to classify the people into distinctive groups. Experiments by Rabbie and Horwitz (1969), Rabbie and Soutendijk (1967), and Tajfel (1970) have shown that classification of people into two groups by a respected experimenter who makes dis-

tinctions between them leads to a significant ingroup-outgroup differentiation. Clearly, the type of difference among a collection of people and its significance to the people involved are important in determining whether an aggregate of individuals will be polarized into an ingroup and an outgroup.

Although the existence of differences does not necessarily lead to ingroup-outgroup formation, one may wonder whether clearly recognized differences between people who think of themselves as groups will increase the likelihood of intergroup conflict. There is a considerable body of theoretical writing that suggests that similarity leads to favorable attitudes while dissimilarity leads to unfavorable attitudes. (See Rokeach 1960; Byrne 1969; Tajfel 1970.) Such theorizing implies that visible differences between groups enhance group conflict. There is a good deal of research support for this proposition. Yet it seems too simplistic to accept the view that similarity is always positive and dissimilarity always negative in result.

It seems more reasonable to assume that the attributes of another group may be viewed as potentially beneficial, neutral, or harmful to one's own group and that similarity and dissimilarity are not invariably associated with benefit and harm, respectively. A complementary dissimilarity (male and female) could be positive while an oppositional similarity (both seeking possession of the same thing) could be negative. An experiment by Stenbridge and Deutsch (1972) documents this. Dissimilarity of beliefs and values is often oppositional because it precludes effective cooperation; it also challenges the objectivity and, hence, the validity of one's own beliefs and values. On the other hand, dissimilarity between groups in the types of skills and resources that they possess is often positive because it makes cooperation between them valuable.

Competition

If not contact or the awareness of intergroup differences, what, then, are the characteristics of relations between groups that are both necessary and sufficient to produce a sense of opposition? Almost all scholars include the real conflicts of interest that arise from the competition for such scarce resources as wealth, power, prestige, and territory. Others also stress the opposition that arises from ideological and cultural differences, differences in beliefs and values about what is universally true and right. Still others would indicate that it is not the

"real" conflict of interest or "real" ideological differences that create opposition but rather the "perception" of such conflict.

Perception may be incorrect: no real opposition exists, but there is nevertheless the perception that it does. Sometimes misperception can be benevolent rather than malevolent: real opposition is not recognized as such. Attention to the possibilities of misperception and misunderstanding as contributors to intergroup conflict suggests a variety of other "real" factors, in addition to real conflict of interest and real ideological difference, which may be pertinent to consider. These are the factors that influence perception and communication—such factors as the properties of the communication system between the interacting groups. One wants to know, for example, what distorting characteristics are introduced in the communication of messages as a result of the encoding, transmission, and decoding processes. Some perceptual and communication systems seem to be conflict-enhancing and some conflict-dampening.

Social Change

A further general source of intergroup conflict that has been singled out by many scholars is social change. As Mack and Snyder (1957, pp. 225–26) have suggested:

Social change affects conflict in a number of ways. Changes are constantly shifting the bases of potentially antagonistic interests and the relative power positions of individuals and groups. As the value potentiality of the social environment shifts, new demands, new frustrations, and new incompatibilities arise. Population growth, invention, urbanization, mobility—indeed all the changes which result in and are resultants of greater social complexity—affect the sources of conflict, the nature and number of parties to conflict, the instrumentalities of conflict, modes of settlement, and so on.

Moreover, it is evident that social change often brings with it conflict between age groups—the "generation gap." Many people acquire their basic value orientations and cognitive schemes for viewing the world from the educational experiences and social conditions to which they were exposed in their youth. In a rapidly changing world, these may undergo profound alterations within a generation. The education and other formative experiences of parent and child in modern societies, in contrast to traditional ones, may have little in common

and may, indeed, have incompatible implications. Youths are apt to be better educated than their parents. They are more likely to challenge some of the assumptions that were unquestioned by their parents—in such fundamental areas as sexual behavior, the relation of men and women, economic achievement and aspirations, patriotism, and race relations. The challenges from youth arising from social change and the responses to them by those in authority can rejuvenate a social order or produce tragedies such as those that have occurred at the Kent State and Jackson State massacres.

INTERNAL PROPERTIES OF GROUPS AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Groups differ in countless ways. Among the many different internal characteristics that distinguish groups from one another, three have been mentioned most frequently in the literature on intergroup relations. They are cohesiveness, structure, and power. Each is discussed below.

Group Cohesiveness

In everyday usage, "cohesiveness" refers to the tendency to stick together; its usage in social psychology is much the same. It refers to the strength and types of linkages that bind the members of a group together. Since group cohesiveness is central to the existence of groups, it is natural that its determinants and also its consequences have been studied extensively (for summaries see Hare 1962; Collins and Guetzkow 1964; McGrath and Altman 1966; Cartwright and Zander 1968). Research findings, in general, indicate that cohesiveness (as measured by interpersonal congeniality, the desire to remain a member of the group, positive attitudes toward the group's functioning, or similar measures) is associated with greater communication between group members, greater readiness of group members to be influenced by the group, more consensus among members on attitudes and beliefs that relate to group functioning, more sense of responsibility toward each other among group members, and so forth. Also, task effectiveness is generally positively correlated with cohesiveness if high accomplishment of the task is valued by the group (some groups restrict performance to achieve their objectives) and if the task is such

that its performance is likely to be enhanced by increased group effort. It should be noted that the causal arrow is bidirectional: group cohesiveness not only increases intragroup communication and group success, but group success and intragroup communication increase group cohesiveness.

The connection between ingroup cohesion and outgroup relations has been a topic of considerable interest to social scientists since Sumner, in his *Folkways* of 1906, asserted that "the relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are correlative to each other. . . . Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all grow together, common products of the same situation." Sumner coined the term *ethnocentrism* to characterize the syndrome of pride in one's own group combined with a sense of its superiority over other groups and an antipathy toward outgroups. Some writers (e.g., Rosenblatt 1964) indicate that nationalism and ethnocentrism overlap in that each stresses the association between ingroup loyalty and antipathy toward outgroups.

Rosenblatt (1964), Campbell (1965), and LeVine and Campbell (1972) have prepared extensive summaries of the social science literature dealing with ethnocentrism. In the comments that follow, I am heavily indebted to their summaries, even though my analysis of the issues involved departs from theirs. Most social scientists would agree that Sumner was correct in noting the pervasive association between ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility; some, however, contend that the association, while pervasive, is far from universal. Furthermore, there are disagreements about the conclusions to be drawn from this association. Some assert that the causal arrow points from ingroup cohesion to outgroup hostility, others say the arrow points in the opposite direction, while still others stress the bidirectionality or even circularity of the causal process involved.

Ingroup cohesion as the cause of outgroup hostility. One point of view emphasizes that outgroup hostility is a consequence of the processes involved in maintaining or increasing ingroup cohesion. There are many different versions of this viewpoint. One prominent version centers around the concept of *displacement*: ingroup cohesion is fostered or preserved by displacing internal conflict and internal frustration onto other groups, thus reducing internal dissension. Group leaders may deliberately foster antipathy to another group as a ploy to

maintain or increase ingroup loyalty to their leadership. Also, antipathy may be employed to discredit internal opposition by identifying the opponents with the hated outgroup. The reader will have no difficulty supplying illustrations of these methods if he brings to mind relations between the United States and the Communist nations during the Cold War or current relations between Israel and the Arab countries.

As the psychoanalytic origin of the term suggests, displacement may reflect unconscious rather than deliberate processes. In its extreme and most pessimistic form, as articulated by Freud in his *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), the displacement theory posits that outgroup hostility is an inevitable consequence of the restraints and inhibitions inherent in civilized group life. Group cohesion and survival require obedience to authority, restraint on covetousness, willingness to delay immediate gratification for future gains, and inhibition of aggressiveness toward the perceived sources of the frustration. However, due to the protracted helplessness of the human infant and the strong mutual dependence of adult group members, it is dangerous to act upon or even harbor conscious ill feelings toward one's own group or its leaders; doing so might lead to rejection and ostracism or to the disruption of the group upon whom one is dependent. Projection of one's repressed urges (such as rebelliousness toward authority, unrestrained sexuality, covetousness, aggressiveness) onto an outgroup and, simultaneously, attack of the outgroup dissociate the group member from his feelings of alienation toward his own group and enable vicarious satisfaction of some of his repressed urges. According to this view, outgroup hostility is necessary to preserve ingroup cohesion and also to maintain the inner equilibrium of the inevitably frustrated participant in organized group life.

More recent and less fatalistic versions of what LeVine and Campbell term the *frustration-aggression-displacement* theory offer several new emphases. Thus while group life may be acknowledged to be frustrating, groups differ in how much frustration they impose upon their members, and different segments, positions, and individuals within a group can vary in how much frustration they experience. A group that is experiencing considerable deprivation and difficulty has more need for outgroup hostility; similarly, members of a group who are frustrated, marginal, or under considerable pressure are more likely to be ethnocentric and nationalistic. Moreover, groups, sub-

groups, and individuals differ in how they manage frustration. In many instances, frustration is not likely to lead to aggressiveness; hence the need for its repression and displacement onto outgroups becomes less compelling. Finally, there is an increasing awareness that displacement of repressed hostility onto an outgroup is not a simple, automatic process. For such a displacement onto a particular outgroup to occur in a unified manner, there must be a socially institutionalized mechanism for identifying an appropriate target and for channeling the displaced hostility in a socially coordinated fashion. In effect, outgroup hostility as a displacement mechanism becomes less likely when it is difficult to achieve internal consensus about the appropriateness and safety of engaging in particular expressions of hostility toward specified outgroups.

Although the frustration-aggression-displacement theory is the most widely discussed explanation for the assumed causal sequence that posits that outgroup hostility is an effect of the processes involved in attempting to achieve ingroup unity, there are other possible explanations for such a causal sequence. Thus one might suppose that ingroup loyalty would be enhanced if members conceive their group to be unique and superior to the other groups available and relevant for purposes of comparison. However, a sense of superiority implies a derogation of other groups, and to the extent that the derogated outgroup does not acquiesce in the judgment of its inferiority, one may also expect hostility toward the outgroup. Another ingroup process that might result in outgroup hostility could be described as follows: intragroup communication leads to familiarity, a sense of similarity, and convergence in beliefs and values among group members. This, in turn, leads to a preference for and a discrimination in favor of ingroup members; the necessity to maintain and justify the ingroup favoritism produces the sense of one's own superiority and a derogation of the outgroup.

Intergroup conflict as the cause of ingroup cohesiveness. Many social science theorists reject the view that intergroup conflict is an inevitable product of the intragroup process. Instead, they postulate (see Campbell 1965) that real conflicts of group interests cause intergroup conflict and pose a real threat which is correctly perceived. The perception of threat from an outgroup, whether the threat is real or not, is hypothesized to have a number of consequences: it causes hostility toward the outgroup; it increases ingroup solidarity; it magnifies in-

group virtues and exaggerates outgroup vices; it increases the tightness of group boundaries; and it increases the punishment and rejection of deviants. A further hypothesis suggests that when external threat is reduced or nonexistent, a group will become less unified, member loyalty will diminish, and the group will tend to break up into smaller units.

There is much evidence from history and from the research laboratory (Deutsch 1949; Blake and Mouton 1962; Fiedler 1967) illustrating the views that intergroup competition enhances ingroup cohesiveness and ethnocentrism and that the diminution of external threat reduces group unity. Thus conflict with the colonial powers allowed many emerging African nations to overcome tribal rivalries and achieve a temporary unity; with the withdrawal of the colonial powers, retribalization has occurred in several of these new nations. The retribalization has often led to considerable internal conflict and a loss in national cohesion (Mazrui 1969).

Although war often leads to an upsurge of nationalism and patriotism, it frequently also has divisive effects. Consider the internal dissension in the United States associated with the war in Vietnam and recall the internal effects of Russia's involvement in World War I. In fact, many writers on revolution suggest that war may lead to conditions that are particularly conducive to revolutions (Laqueur 1968). The conditions under which real conflict between groups has divisive rather than cohesive effects are not yet definitively established. However, it seems likely that external conflict will be internally disruptive rather than unifying when its costs are clearly perceived to outweigh its potential gains, when the costs are viewed as being borne unjustly and disproportionately by only certain segments of the group, when important segments of the ingroup have strong ties with the conflicting outgroup, when the conflict persists over an extended period of time, or when the conflict violates traditional beliefs and values of the ingroup.

Ingroup cohesion and outgroup hostility as factors influencing one another. It seems evident that intergroup conflict can promote ingroup cohesion and, also, that the need to increase ingroup cohesion can stimulate ethnocentrism and outgroup hostility; the causal arrow is bidirectional. After all, the knowledge is widespread that external threat can increase ingroup loyalty. So it is not surprising that group leaders often resort to the tactic of attempting to increase the sense of

external danger as a means of inhibiting internal dissension. However, not every outgroup can be "used" in this manner. One can state as a general principle that the more unresolved opposition in values and interests there has been between an ingroup and an outgroup in the recent past, the more useful will the outgroup be as a target. In other words, the tactic of whipping up hostility to an outgroup is most likely to work when there is an existing active predisposition to perceive the outgroup in terms of well-established hostile or fearful stereotypes. Intergroup conflict and differences give rise to outgroup stereotypes, and these, in turn, can be used to promote or activate intergroup conflict.

Group Structure

Group structure refers to the ways in which the parts or elements of a group are interrelated. Since there are many different types of relations connecting the parts of a group, it would be more apt to use the term *structures* rather than *structure*. One could characterize the relations among the parts in terms of their physical proximity, the amount and types of communication that take place among them, the domain and scope of the power and authority each has over the other, their affective relations, their similarities in value orientation, their interconnectedness in relation to work, the flow of people between subgroups, their relative access to such advantages as prestige, education, and well-being.

For each of the ways in which the parts of a group may be interrelated, one could ask how variations in that type of relation within a group are likely to affect or be affected by the character of the group's relations with other groups. Unfortunately, such questions have rarely been asked; as a consequence, there is little systematic information available with which to answer them. There has, however, been some suggestion that such structural characteristics as type of leadership and the degree of structural disequilibrium within the group might be relevant to intergroup relations. These characteristics are considered below.

Leadership. There are two widely held propositions about the relationship between ingroup leadership and intergroup relations. The first is that authoritarian leadership tends to produce internal frustration and hostility which is likely to be displaced onto outgroups. The second is that stress, whether it be the internal stress of ingroup frus-

tration or the external stress of intergroup conflict, creates a demand for authoritarian, highly structured leadership (see Korten 1962).

The first proposition implicitly rests on the frustration-aggression-displacement theory of ethnocentrism, which we have discussed in the section on group cohesion. Embedded in it is the assumption that authoritarian forms of leadership are intrinsically more frustrating than democratic forms. The most direct evidence in support of this assumption comes from a series of research studies comparing democratic and authoritarian leadership; these were stimulated by the pioneering investigation of Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939). The studies (see Likert 1961 for a summary of many studies of leadership), in general, support the views that group members are less frustrated and more productive when they can participate in making the decisions that affect them and that leaders who exercise a participative rather than authoritarian leadership are more commonly liked by the group members.

Fiedler (1964), on the other hand, has shown that the effectiveness of different types of leaders is very closely related to the situation confronting the group. His findings indicate that controlling, authoritarian leaders tend to be more effective than democratic leaders in situations where the group and task conditions are either very favorable or very unfavorable. In the former, the leader-member relations are positive, the task is clear and well structured, the leader has well-defined authority and power; in unfavorable situations, the leader-member relations are not good, the task is unclear, the leader's role is ill-defined. In the favorable situation, the leader can assume that the group will go along with his decisions willingly because what is required is self-evident, and little difference of opinion among the members is expected: discussion would be ritualistic and a waste of time. In the unfavorable situation, the leader can assume that the distrust and lack of clarity among the group members is so great that no consensus is likely and that the group would get bogged down in bickering and strife, to the detriment of the possibilities of effective action, if it were involved in the decision-making process.

Fiedler's results would suggest that democratic leadership is less frustrating than authoritarian leadership only when the conditions are neither extremely favorable nor extremely unfavorable to obtaining a group consensus on the course of action to take. In the former instance, democratic leadership is not necessary, and in the latter, pre-

sumably, it would not work. Thus the aforementioned proposition about the effects of authoritarian leadership should perhaps be modified to read that leadership that is inappropriate to the group's situation is likely to induce frustration: under extreme conditions authoritarian leadership is more likely to be effective than democratic leadership; under most other conditions, the reverse is likely to be true. It also seems probable that the particular characteristics of given situations will tend to induce leadership that is situationally appropriate. This last statement implies that leadership change or political instability is likely until a congruence between type of leadership and type of situation has been achieved.

The Feierabends (1966) have constructed for many nations indices measuring the coerciveness of the political regime, the degree of frustration of the "wants" of the population, the degree of political stability, the extent of external aggression, and the like. Their data indicate a significant association between the coerciveness of the political regime and the amount of socioeconomic frustration within the country. Thus sixteen out of twenty-two countries that are considered to have a high rate of satisfaction of the wants of their people have permissive regimes; none of the seventeen countries with a low rate of satisfaction has this type of government. Further, of the sixteen nations that have permissive regimes and a satisfied populace, fifteen are considered to be highly stable; on the other hand, less than half of the countries that have both a socioeconomically satisfied population and a coercive regime exhibit a high degree of political stability.

Although it is impossible to state causal directions from such data as the Feierabends have presented, one may speculate that when the leadership is not as permissive as it should be, given the internal conditions within the group, there will be attempts to change the leadership. A parallel process seems to occur under conditions of high frustration of the wants of the population: a highly coercive regime induces more political stability than a moderately coercive regime. It should be noted, however, that the political equilibrium reached even by highly coercive regimes with frustrated populations is considerably less stable than that reached by permissive leaders dealing with satisfied populations. None of the former is rated as highly stable, but more than 90 percent of the latter are so considered. Thus political equilibrium for a satisfied population is associated with a permissive leadership; relative political equilibrium for a highly frustrated popu-

lation is correlated with a highly coercive regime. Hence it seems reasonable to conclude that group tranquility is not simply a function of either the extent of internal frustration or the type of group leadership, permissive or coercive. Rather, internal stability results from the appropriate match between the two.

Their results for external aggression (which omit the data for the major powers) lead the Feierabends to suggest that the country that is sufficiently frustrated to be politically unstable has the strongest possibility of also being externally aggressive. While the satisfied country has the greatest probability of being both internally stable and externally nonaggressive, external aggression is more closely related to political instability than it is to internal frustration. Other investigators (e.g., Rummel 1969) have not found evidence of a significant relationship between domestic and external conflict such as obtained in the Feierabend study. This may be due to the fact, as Wilkenfeld (1969) has suggested, that the relationship between internal and external conflict may differ for different types of nations. Lumping all nations together for statistical analysis may obscure these underlying differences. However, even more importantly, most analyses of the relations between internal and external conflict make the obviously false assumption that the nature of a group's external environment can be disregarded. Consider Israel, a nation with much external conflict but one whose populace is relatively satisfied and whose government is relatively stable and permissive. Is it not apparent that attempts to characterize the relationship between a group's internal properties and its external conflict are bound to be incomplete and distorted unless its external environment is meaningfully delineated?

Structural disequilibrium. There is often a correspondence among the positions that an individual (or subgroup) holds in the different structures of a group. An individual who holds a central position in one structure (e.g., the communication structure) is likely to hold a central position in other structures (power, friendship, and prestige). The research of Galtung (1964) in Norway indicates that this is the case for Norwegian society: people who are more central on social variables (income, education, occupation, residence, age, and sex) are also more central in the communication and power structures. To explain the tendency for the different statuses of an individual to be congruent with one another, Benoit-Smullyan (1944), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Homans (1961), and many others (see Berger, Zel-

ditch, and Anderson 1966) have advanced the *status-equilibration* hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that when the ranks or positions of a person or group in different status structures are dissimilar, a state of disequilibrium exists, and forces arise to induce the changes necessary to make the statuses similar. In an experiment, Burnstein and Zajonc (1965 a, b) manipulated, at different times, the individual's status within the group and his task performance. Their results demonstrated that when an individual's performance rank improved, the group increased the importance of his position within the group; similarly, when the importance of his position within the group was increased, his performance improved.

However, status equilibrium is not always achieved. Research with air crews by Adams (1953) demonstrated that lack of congruence on such status dimensions as age, military rank, education, reputed ability, popularity, combat time, and position importance was related to poor morale, less friendliness, and lack of mutual confidence. Exline and Ziller (1959), working with experimentally created groups, found that groups constructed so as to have incongruent status hierarchies manifested more interpersonal conflict and less productivity than congruent groups.

Galtung (1964, pp. 95-119) has outlined a *structural theory of aggression* which is based on the hypothesis that "aggression is more likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium. In a system of individuals it may take the form of crime, in a system of groups the form of revolutions, and in a system of nations the form of war." He points out that the extreme forms of aggression are unlikely unless other methods of equilibration have been tried and failed and unless, in addition, the culture predisposes to violence. From Galtung's hypothesis, such interesting corollaries follow as: aggression is less likely from those who are the underdogs in all respects than from those who are the underdogs in some characteristics but not in others; social change that improves an underdog's position in some respects (education) but not in others (political influence, affluence) is likely to increase the amount of aggression; the smaller the number of dimensions on which social units are ranked and the smaller the number of social units being ranked, the more disruptive is any rank-disequilibrium to the system of units.

If one assumes that progress toward social equality of the races is uneven and that such progress initially increases the structural dis-

equilibrium, one will predict more open interracial conflict in the United States than in South Africa, and more in the North than in the South. Similarly, analysis of many revolutionary situations suggests (Davies 1962) that they often occur when there is an improvement of the underdog's position in some respect (e.g., education) and a worsening in other respects (availability of suitable employment, etc.). Himmelstrand (1969), in a discussion of the relation between tribal conflict and rank-disequilibrium in the positions of the various tribes in Nigeria, indicates that the strains induced by the disequilibrium were conducive to the development of the intertribal conflict that led to their civil war. However, he suggests that other rank-equilibrating responses than intergroup aggression were possible, but he does not define the conditions that led to strife rather than to other types of equilibrating actions.

The hypothesis that aggression may arise from structural disequilibrium is intriguing. However, as Hernes (1969) points out, it needs to be more precisely specified before it can be adequately tested. This is true not only with regard to the meaning and measurement of its key concepts but also with regard to the conditions under which aggression (rather than other actions) will occur as a response to rank-disequilibrium. Rank-disequilibrium is, obviously, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the occurrence of aggression. It is probably more fruitful to conceive of structural disequilibrium as providing a motivation to produce an upward change in one's disequibrated statuses rather than as producing a motivation to aggress. Aggression may result as a reaction to the resistance of others to a change in one's status, but it is unlikely without the experience of resistance and the resulting frustrations. But even resistance and frustration do not necessarily lead to aggression, except under rather specific conditions. Some of these have been touched upon in our prior discussion of the frustration-aggression-displacement theory of outgroup hostility.

Pyramidal-segmentary and cross-cutting structure. In most societies, people are members of more than one group. They are likely to be members of a kinship group, a political association, a recreation group, and many others. LeVine and Campbell (1972) point out that social anthropologists have characterized two basic types of social structures, the pyramidal-segmentary and the cross-cutting. In the *pyramidal-segmentary* type, each smaller unit that an individual belongs

to is included as a segment of each larger group that he is a member of. Thus in some folk societies, an individual may live in a small family group, in a small farming community, which is part of a larger kinship group, which, in turn, is a segment of a larger ethnic group, which is one component of a larger society. In the *cross-cutting* type, as the name implies, the groups to which a member belongs cut across rather than nest in one another. His residence group is not necessarily included in his kinship group, and his work group may be composed of people from many different ethnic groups. These two types, of course, rarely exist in their pure forms. Most social structures tend to be mixtures, with one or the other predominating.

There is considerable evidence from the anthropological literature (see LeVine and Campbell for a summary and references) that the pyramidal-segmentary structure is more conducive to destructive intergroup strife within a society than the cross-cutting type. The reason for this is easy to see. If, for example, in a society which has a pyramidal-segmentary structure, a conflict arises between two ethnic groups in the society (e.g., about which group's language shall be paramount in the total society), then the individual's membership in all the groups that are nested within his ethnic group (his neighborhood, his recreation group, his kinship group, etc.) will strengthen his loyalty to his ethnic group's position. But this will happen on both sides, making it more difficult to resolve the differences between the two groups. On the other hand, in a cross-cutting social structure, members of the conflicting ethnic groups are likely to be members of common work groups, common neighborhood groups, and so on. Their common memberships will make it difficult to polarize individual attitudes about the ethnic conflict. Doing so would place the individual in the dilemma of choosing between loyalty to his ethnic group and loyalty to his other groups that cut across ethnic lines. Thus cross-cutting memberships and loyalties tend to function as a moderating influence in resolving any particular intergroup conflict within a society.

Thoden van Velsen and van Wetering (1960), in a study of a sample of fifty folk societies, provide some relevant evidence. They found that intrasocietal violence was considerably higher in patrilocal as compared to matrilineal societies. Since matrilineal societies involve a change of residence for the male, so that he moves from the community in which he was born to a different community, it is reasonable to suppose that the difference in internal violence may be due to the

possibility that the change of residence encourages the growth of cross-cutting loyalties which, in turn, dampen the development of destructive conflict. More generally, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that population mobility, whether it be residential or social, would lead to the development of cross-cutting ties and would serve to prevent the polarization of intergroup conflict into a struggle between groups that feel they have no mutual interests.

Yet it would seem logical to assume that mobility would increase rank-disequilibrium and that, according to Galtung's hypothesis of structural aggression, this would give rise to social conflict. The contradictory predictions may both be correct, each for a different stage of the total process. Thus before there has been an erosion of the primary segmental loyalties (which are characteristic in the pyramidal-segmental type of social structure) and before the growth of cross-cutting loyalties, residential and social mobility might enhance social conflict. However, after mobility has led to the development of cross-cutting loyalties, the scope of intergroup conflict might be narrowed. Cross-cutting memberships might also be expected to individualize the social elements in the society and thus to increase their numbers, since fewer individuals might be expected to have parallel memberships in cross-cutting groups. As a consequence of the individualization and proliferation of the social units, rank-disequilibrium might be expected to have only minor consequences for intergroup relations. Nevertheless, insofar as rank-disequilibrium is individually frustrating, the frustration-aggression-displacement theory would predict that interpersonal tension and conflict would be enhanced.

Power

As Dahl (1968) has pointed out, there is little consensus about this widely employed concept other than that it is a useful one in the analysis of behavior. I shall not attempt to summarize the many different conceptions of "power" but will, instead, offer some notions of my own which have been stimulated by the writings of many others (e.g., Lasswell and Kaplan 1950; Cartwright 1959).

An actor (a term used here to refer to either a group or an individual) has power in a given situation (*situational power*) to the degree that he can satisfy the purposes (goals, desires, or wants) that he is attempting to fulfill in that situation. Power is a relational concept; it does not reside in the individual but rather in the relationship of the

person to his environment. Thus, the power of an actor in a given situation is determined by the characteristics of the situation as well as by his own characteristics. It follows that an actor has more power to satisfy his desires when his environment is "facilitative" rather than "resistive" to his goal achievement; that is, he has more power to overcome another when the other's resistance is weak. Also, he has more power when his wants are readily satisfied as, for example, when his aspirations are low or when, in Hindu or Zen fashion, he can exercise control over his own desires.

Many theorists who have been concerned with power have focused on it as an attribute solely of the actor. This neglects its relational aspects and implicitly assumes that it remains constant across situations, an assumption which is clearly false. However, it would be equally incorrect to assume that power is determined only by situational characteristics. It is obvious that the resources of the actor play an important role in determining his power in a given situation. Such resources as wealth, physical strength, weapons, health, intelligence, knowledge, organizational skill, respect, and affection are ingredients of power in many situations, and they may be possessed, to a greater or a lesser degree, fairly constantly by a given actor. Thus it is possible to compare individuals, groups, or nations with one another in terms of their possession of the ingredients of power, even though their relative rankings on situational power may vary from situation to situation. Moreover, doing so is more useful than might be anticipated from a situational perspective, because there is a tendency for rank-equilibrium with regard to access to different capabilities and resources and also across different situations. As Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, p. 57) have stated: "The rich tend also to be the healthy, respected, informed, and so on, and the poor to be the sickly, despised, and ignorant." Thus there is some meaning to the abstract statement that "A is more powerful than B," even though the statement is not qualified in terms of specific contexts.

There are three distinct meanings of *power* submerged in the statement "A is more powerful than B": *environmental power*, or "A is usually more able to favorably influence his overall environment and/or to overcome its resistance than is B"; *relationship power*, or "A is usually more able to influence B favorably and/or to overcome B's resistance than B is able to do with A"; and *personal power*, or "A is usually more able to satisfy his desires than is B." Although these dif-

ferent forms of power are usually positively correlated, this is not inevitably so.

Let us look at one of the possibilities. B has so little environmental power that he has little expectation of satisfying large wants, and thus he wants little. A, on the other hand, has high aspirations because of his high environmental power. As a result of A's high aspirations and B's low aspirations, A is more vulnerable to B's threats of noncooperation or antagonistic behavior than B is to A's. Thus despite A's superior environmental power, he may be in an inferior bargaining position to that of B. Experienced bargainers know that the best way to get a merchant in a Turkish market to lower his price is to appear to have no interest in what he is offering to sell. And Karl Marx knew that workers could increase their power if they recognized that they had nothing to lose but their chains. More generally, by being devoid of wants and beyond "costs," one can place himself in a powerful position to influence anyone who wants anything from him. A depressed child who does not want to eat or an apathetic adult who does not care whether he lives or dies, by emptying himself of desire, makes those who care about his well-being feel helpless and very responsive to any possibility of arousing the depressed person's interest. Unfortunately, in establishing the credibility of his apathy and depression, the depressed person may lose touch with the wants that initially gave rise to this bargaining tactic.

The preceding discussion suggests that in a relationship between A and B, A does not necessarily have more influence over B when B is in a situation of low environmental power. It is also true that it is not always favorable to A's environmental and personal power for him to be in a dominating rather than an equal relationship with B. In some instances, A may be even better off if he increases B's power in the relationship rather than his own. Thus a faculty that shares some of its resources and decision-making powers with students may find that the students are more responsible and cooperative in efforts to improve the educational quality of the university than they would be if these powers were not shared.

In many discussions, the concept of power is linked only to the ability to overcome resistance; in such discussions (e.g., Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, p. 98), "the exercise of power is simply the exercise of a high degree of coerciveness." This seems too narrow a view. It overlooks the possibility that power can be facilitative as well as coercive,

that it can liberate as well as restrain, that it can be "for" as well as "against." The emphasis on the coercive aspects of power possibly arises from the attempt to distinguish "power" from "influence": power is defined by Lasswell and Kaplan as, in essence, being coercive influence. I suggest that it would be more appropriate to conceive of power as *deliberate* or *purposive* influence. Without intending to do so, one may influence another's values, beliefs, or behaviors. One may even be powerless to prevent another from being influenced by oneself—as is the case with many parents who do not want their children to imitate their bad habits. Power is purposive influence; it may be coercive but it need not be. Coercion is only one of several forms of power.

It is useful to distinguish six types of power to influence another (see French and Raven 1959; Cartwright and Zander 1968): *coercive power*, which uses negative incentives, such as threats to physical well-being, wealth, reputation, or social status, to influence the other; *reward or exchange power*, which employs positive incentives, such as promises of gain in well-being, wealth, and the like, in exchange for what is desired from the other; *ecological power*, which entails sufficient control over the other's social or physical environment to permit one to modify it so that the modified environment induces the desired behavior or prevents the undesired behavior (e.g., erecting a fence may stop rabbits from eating one's vegetable garden); *normative power*, which is based on the obligations that the other has to accept one's influence as a result of the social norms governing the relationship; *referent power*, which uses the other's desire to identify with or be similar to some person or group in order to alter his attitudes and values; and *expert power*, which is grounded in the other's acceptance of one's superior knowledge or skill.

It is reasonable to suppose that the different types of power are likely to produce more or less alienation in those subjected to the power (Etzioni 1968). The most alienation could be expected to result from the use of coercive power and the least from the employment of expert and referent power. The tendency to alienation is also undoubtedly affected by whether the power is perceived to be employed legitimately or illegitimately. If the power user is perceived to have no right to use the type of power, if he is perceived to be using it excessively, or if he is perceived to be using it inappropriately (e.g., at the wrong time or in the wrong manner), resistance to his influence and

alienation from his purposes are the probable consequences. In summary, illegitimate use of threat or reward that is inappropriate and excessive is most likely to elicit resistance and alienation. However, when the coercion or bribery is of sufficient magnitude to elicit overt compliance, inauthentic cooperation with covert resistance is the likely outcome.

The preceding discussion suggests that the use of power may entail costs and that the costs may differ for different types of power and as a function of how the power is employed. Alienation is one type of cost; it reduces the powerholder's resources for the future employment of normative, referent, expert, and possibly also reward power by making the other less trusting of and less receptive to the powerholder. Without the other's trust as an asset, power is essentially limited to the coercive and ecological types, the types that require and consume most in the way of physical and economic resources. Moreover, it must be recognized that once the other has become alienated, untrusting, and unreceptive, a considerable expenditure of time and resources may be required to reestablish more favorable attitudes. In the short run, the use of coercive and ecological power may be more effective in producing compliance from the alienated than the attempt to develop the attitudinal resources that underlie the effective employment of noncoercive power. Nevertheless, because it seems likely that the costs of maintaining effective coercive and ecological power far outweigh the costs of maintaining the noncoercive forms, it is generally a short-lived economy to employ coercion as a substitute for the effort involved in developing a trusting relationship with the other.

It is a commonly held view about groups, as well as about men, that they tend to be shortsighted and that they value coercion as the primary form of power. Thus it is not surprising that the most widely accepted proposition about power is the one articulated by Michels, the political theorist (1911, p. 207): "Every human power seeks to enlarge its prerogatives. He who has acquired power will almost always endeavor to consolidate it and to extend it. . . ."

The assumption implicit in this proposition is that power relations are intrinsically coercive and competitive; the more power A has, the less power available for B. A corollary of this is that there is always a struggle for power. The struggle may be *latent* because both sides agree on its probable outcome or agree that the resulting changes would not be worth the costs; the struggle may be *regulated* and *con-*

trolled so that it takes place under rules that limit its destructiveness, as in a boxing match; or the struggle may be *unregulated* and *overt* as in a no-holds-barred fight.

The earlier discussion of environmental power and personal power implies that power is not intrinsically competitive. While power is often gained at another's expense, in many situations it can only be enhanced cooperatively. And when the relations are cooperative, enhancement of the other's power also enhances one's own. Clearly it is possible for A's influence over B to increase at the same time as B's influence over A grows. This is what happens when two strangers, who have little influence over one another, become acquainted and fall in love. They develop great power over one another. This mutual increase in power to affect the other is a typical consequence in a cooperative relationship.

Why is it, then, that a competitive view of power is so widespread? This is probably a result of the fact that differential rankings of statuses, status hierarchies, are universal characteristics of human societies. As Barnard (1946) has suggested, status distinctions and associated distinctions of authority (the right to exercise influence in certain matters over certain statuses) are necessary for the effective functioning and survival of any group above a certain size. The competitive drive for superior rank and power, to the extent that it exists, probably derives from the existence of status hierarchies: the greater advantages usually associated with high as compared to low status provide the incentives to seek high relative power.

However, it would be unreasonable to assume there is an innately determined human tendency for everyone to want to be "top dog." Most people would rather not be President! While the striving for changes in power is usually upward rather than downward in direction, there are notable exceptions. The desire to avoid the responsibilities of high position and the fear of achieving competitive success are well-established phenomena. However, even when striving is upward, it is rarely directed to a rank beyond one's range of social comparison. Aspirations are generally determined by comparing oneself with others whose opinions or abilities are similar to one's own, rather than widely discrepant (Festinger 1954) and by comparing one's position with the other available opportunities (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Thus it would be reasonable to assume that the power aspirations of most people are by no means unlimited.

It is well to note that the desire to increase power can be directed toward increasing the resources that underlie power (such as wealth, physical strength, organization, knowledge, skill, respect, and affection), or it can be directed toward increasing the effectiveness with which the resources of power are employed. Potential power may not get converted into effective power for two primary reasons. There may be little motivation to use the power; some potentially powerful groups and people prefer not to exercise it. Or, the conversion of power resources into effective power may be made inefficiently and unskillfully, so that much power potential is wasted. This may occur, for example, when power is used inappropriately or excessively. Thus effective power depends upon the following key elements: the control or possession of resources to generate power; the motivation to employ these resources to influence others; skill in converting the resources into usable power; and good judgment in employing this power so that its use is appropriate in type and magnitude to the situation in which it is used.

After this introduction on various aspects of power, we must turn to the question of how a group's powers are likely to affect its relationship with other groups. By definition, the possession of great power increases a group's chances of getting what it desires. Therefore, one would predict that the members of very powerful groups would be more satisfied with their groups and less personally discontent than members of low-power groups. Studies in industry (Porter and Lawler 1965) and of the people in various nations (Cantril 1965) provide strong support for this proposition. Second, one would expect more powerful groups to have a longer time perspective, to plan further into the future, and to have more freedom to initiate activities without consultation with others. Third, powerful groups are more likely to take actions that affect others and are more likely to influence the welfare of other groups than are less powerful groups.

Low-power groups face a situation that has many inherent disadvantages and potential frustrations. Their welfare is dependent upon the actions of others, they cannot plan far ahead, and there is likely to be discontent among their members. In such a situation, a low-power group has a limited number of alternative courses of action open to it. First, it may attempt to change the power relation itself by increasing its share of the resources at the base of power, by increasing its own resources and its effectiveness in using them, by finding allies, and/or

by decreasing the resources or increasing the costs of the more powerful group. Or it may seek to induce the high-power group to use its power benevolently through such techniques as ingratiation, the arousal of guilt, the appeal of helplessness, or the appeal to general norms of equity or justice. Finally, it may try to withdraw from interaction and insulate itself from the high-power group by changing its objectives so that it will be less dependent on the high-power group and less noticeable to it.

It is difficult to predict which alternative will be taken by a low-power group. However, it is reasonable to assume that such a group is unlikely to attempt to change the power relations unless it is an effectively organized, cohesive group with a high level of frustrated aspiration, a significant degree of optimism about the possibilities of change, and considerable freedom from fear of the high-power group. Also, one might assume that if a low-power group considers itself helpless and powerless, it is likely to seek to ingratiate itself in a submissive relationship with the high-power group rather than attempt to change that group.

The frustrations inherent in the situation of the low-power group act as an instigator for change. The same is not true for the situation of those in high power. It is evident that those who are satisfied with their roles in, and the outcomes of, an interaction process often develop both a vested interest in preserving the existing arrangements and appropriate rationales to justify their position. For those in high power, these rationales generally take the form of attributing greater competence (more ability, knowledge, skill) and/or superior moral value (greater initiative, drive, sense of responsibility, self-control) to oneself than to those of lower status. From the point of view of those in power, lack of power and affluence is little enough punishment for people so deficient in morality, competence, and maturity that they have failed to make their own way in society. The rationales supporting the status quo are usually accompanied by corresponding sentiments that lead their possessors to react with disapproval and resistance to attempts to change the power relations and with apprehension and defensiveness to the possibility that these attempts might succeed. The apprehension is often a response to the expectation that the change will leave one in a powerless position under the control of those who are incompetent and irresponsible or at the mercy of those seeking revenge for past injuries.

If such rationales, sentiments, and expectations have been developed, those in power are likely to employ one or more defense mechanisms in dealing with the conflict-inducing dissatisfactions of the subordinated group: *avoidance*, which seeks to minimize human contact with those in low status by establishing a social distance that permits contact only under conditions of clear status differences; *denial*, which is expressed by a blindness and insensitivity to the dissatisfactions and often results in an unexpected revolt; *repression*, which pushes the dissatisfactions underground and often eventuates in guerrilla-type war; *aggression*, which may lead to masochistic sham cooperation or escalated counteraggression; *displacement* which attempts to divert the responsibility for the dissatisfactions onto other groups and, if successful, averts the conflict temporarily; *reaction-formation*, which allows expressions of concern and guilt to serve as substitutes for action to relieve the dissatisfaction of the underprivileged and which, in doing so, may temporarily confuse and mislead those who are dissatisfied; *tokenism*, which attempts to appease the frustrated group by providing it with token benefits and gains; *sublimation*, which attempts to find substitute solutions—e.g., instead of increasing the decision-making power of Harlem residents over their schools, those in power provide more facilities for the Harlem schools.

Although defensiveness is a common reaction by those with high power to the efforts of low-power groups to decrease the power differences, it is well to recognize that other reactions can and do occur. Those in high power sometimes voluntarily give up or share their power: political leaders leave office, parents often reduce their power and increase the decision-making responsibilities of their children as they grow up, some administrators and faculties willingly share their powers with students. Little is known about the conditions under which a high-power group will be willing to share its power with those in low power rather than attempt to defend and maintain the status quo. However, it seems reasonable to assume that such a group is most likely to do so when it expects that this course will increase rather than decrease its environmental and personal power. Thus if the group members believe that there will be gains in their assets or decreases in their costs due to an increased cooperativeness of the other group, they may feel that the sharing of power will be beneficial rather than harmful to them. A dean of students may, for example, feel that students will be more committed to obeying dormitory rules

and regulations if they participate in formulating and enforcing them; he may consider their increased commitment an important asset which more than compensates for the inconveniences of sharing power. Of course, if those in high power expect to be humiliated or frustrated in major ways by a redistribution of power, they will resist it and seek to defend or extend their superior position.

CLASS AND RACE CONFLICT

Although it is evident from everyday life as well as from research that intergroup conflict can arise between groups of equal power, the most pervasive form of social conflict is between dominant and subordinate groups, between the "haves" and the "have-nots." Such conflict is latent in any social system, large or small, whenever there are differences in authority, power, or other forms of advantage associated with different social categories—e.g., employee-employer, black-white, students-faculty, women-men, homo-heterosexual, Catholic-Protestant, aged-young, disabled-nondisabled. We shall discuss class conflict and racial conflict to see what light such conflicts can throw upon the conditions affecting the course of conflict.

It is well to recognize that not all latent intergroup conflicts become actualized. Nor, of course, do they inevitably become competitive struggles. The members of a disadvantaged social category may not feel actively frustrated by their relative lack of hope, or they may have accepted their inferior status as natural and legitimate, not having conceived of any other possible state of affairs. Neither beasts of burden nor their masters are likely to conceive the possibility that a conflict could exist between them. In the past, conflict between slaves and masters was sometimes latent rather than active because the slave, as well as the master, could not conceive that another type of relationship between them was natural or possible. Similarly, women in many traditional societies view their subordinate relationship to men as a natural one, and the idea of challenging it is unlikely to occur to them. To be actively disturbed with one's social position requires more than unhappiness or dissatisfaction. There must also be a recognition that change is possible, and that such change would not be a violation of the natural order.

Even if there is a painful discrepancy between the aspirations of people in a particular social category and their reality, they may have

little opportunity to interact with others in a similar plight, little possibility to develop consciousness of common interests and grievances, and little chance to develop into a "group." Intergroup conflict, however, requires more than an awareness of common grievances and the definition of common objectives if it is to be manifested in group actions. It requires, in addition, the resources and talents necessary to develop the organizational structures, normative controls, institutional facilities, and group procedures that permit coordinated group action. However, there is essentially a self-reinforcing cycle at work. As Karl Marx stressed, individuals form a class (or group) only insofar as they are engaged in a common struggle with another class. In other words, intergroup conflict stimulates the development and organization of each of the conflicting groups, and this, in turn, permits latent intergroup conflict to be expressed in overt struggle. It is likely that the ability of a group to engage in an intergroup struggle is a function of how well organized it is, as well as a function of its resources. And it is also likely that a struggle will aid a group to mobilize and organize its resources and will contribute to the group's development if the struggle is oriented toward objectives that are perceived to be attainable rather than hopeless.

Latent social conflicts over authority or power, thus, are likely to be actualized when the disadvantaged become acutely frustrated by their disadvantaged position, when they develop a group identity, and when they organize themselves for group action. However, not all such conflicts inevitably result in a competitive process of conflict resolution, even though it seems likely that most such conflicts will take a competitive form in their initial phases. Dominant groups, as we have pointed out in the preceding section, are rarely discontent with the power relations that exist between themselves and a subordinate group, and they often believe that an increase in the power of a disadvantaged group will result in a decrease in their own power. As a consequence, the disadvantaged group may perceive no other effective way to motivate the members of the powerful group to accept the possibility of significant social change except that of threatening harm to the powerful group's security and vital interests.

As our earlier discussion of structural disequilibrium would suggest, small gains by the disadvantaged—i.e., gains large enough to raise aspirations but too small to satisfy them—may be more provocative of active competitive conflict than a more stagnant intergroup sit-

uation that both offers and promises little. In the latter case, the conflict may remain latent until it is activated by changing circumstances that either increase aspirations or worsen current realities.

Below, we shall consider class conflict and then racial conflict, two widespread forms of the conflict between the "haves" and "have-nots," to obtain generalizable insights into the factors that influence whether the course of a conflict will be productive or destructive.

Class Conflict

One of the most fully developed theories of intergroup conflict was presented by Karl Marx in his theory of class conflict. His theory assumes that class conflict typically gives rise to a competitive process that spirals into an increasing intensity of conflict until a revolutionary change occurs in the power relations of the conflicting classes. Marx postulated that class conflict arises because there is a category of persons who possess private property (ownership of capital or the means of production), which is the basis of power, and another category of persons who have no such property or power and who must, as a consequence, hire themselves out as wage laborers to those who own capital. The inherent conflict of interest with regard to the distribution of the fruits of production gives rise to classes as individuals within one category engage in a common struggle against individuals from another category. As the struggle proceeds, "the whole society breaks up more and more into two great hostile camps, two great, directly antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat." The classes polarize so that they become internally more homogeneous and more and more sharply distinguished from one another in wealth and power. The initial power advantage of the ruling class is used to augment its power vis-à-vis the working class, leading to a progressive impoverishment of the working class and the swelling of its ranks by the impoverishment of groups (the petite bourgeoisie, the small industrialists, the farmers) that were previously marginal between the two classes. The increasing intensity of the conflict and the resulting class homogenization leads the enlarging oppressed proletariat to unite in effective action to overthrow the ruling minority.

The Marxian theory of class conflict seems to be a perfectly reasonable description of what might have happened in several places if such conflict had followed the dynamics of a strictly competitive process of conflict resolution. But class conflict generally did not turn

into such a process despite the widespread violence that occurred in industrial disputes in the United States and other countries (Roberts 1969; Taft and Ross 1969). However, industrial violence continued until the ruling groups recognized the rights of workers to organize themselves into unions and to bargain collectively. Much of the violence was initiated by employers, or by government forces acting in behalf of the interest of the employers, in an attempt to discourage workers from organizing and taking such collective actions as strikes and picketing. While employer-initiated violence was sometimes successful in intimidating workers, it was not generally a useful intimidating tactic in the hands of labor. Thus Taft and Ross (1969, p. 362) state: "There is little evidence that violence succeeded in gaining advantages for strikers. Not only does the roll call of lost strikes confirm such a view, but the use of employer agents, disguised as union members or union officials, for advocating violence within the union testifies to the advantage such practices gave the employer." Despite its ineffectiveness, large-scale, worker-initiated violence in labor disputes persisted as long as employers refused to recognize the legitimacy of labor unions and engage in collective bargaining. However, when violence occurred, it did not escalate into class war. Many factors were operating to make such a polarization unlikely. It is of interest to consider what prevented this development and, hence, reduced the possibility of a violent class struggle.

Marx's theory of the political and economic development of the capitalist society was incorrect in several major respects (Dahrendorf 1959). First, the growth of capital did not occur at labor's expense, nor did it lead to labor's absolute or relative pauperization as Marx predicted. Rather, it helped to increase the productivity of labor—which resulted in a general improvement of living standards. Thus gains by both sides lessened the intensity of conflict.

Second, the nature of economic and technological development in industrial society did not produce an increasing homogeneity within the so-called bourgeoisie and proletariat as Marx assumed. Rather, it led to an increasing heterogeneity within each class and some blurring of class distinctions in their common roles as consumers and citizens. Within the bourgeoisie there is not only the distinction between owners or shareholders and managers, there are also many different types of owners and managers. Moreover, the meaning of "capital" itself became more differentiated. There is ownership or control of: the physi-

cal means of production, different kinds of knowledge and expertise, the techniques of persuasion, the techniques of violence, and so on. Similarly, there was the development of different forms of labor, requiring different skills and training, rather than the predicted leveling of workers into an undifferentiated, unskilled uniformity. Thus differences within and similarities between classes restrained the polarization process.

Third, contrary to Marx's prediction that social mobility would be primarily downward from the bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie to the working class, social mobility has been upward as well as downward. The continuous expansion of industry has required the recruitment of many workers for managerial positions. The possibility of upward mobility from class to class has interfered with the development of allegiances to one's class of origin.

Fourth, for reasons that are partly economic, partly educational, partly technological, and partly resultant from the struggle by various interest groups competing for the allegiances of large audiences, the status of citizenship has been endowed with a growing array of rights, which has to some extent led to the dissociation between political power and industrial power. This has also served to reduce the polarization of conflict by enabling individuals to obtain economic gains through the political process as well as through direct confrontation. In addition, it has led to the institutionalization of patterns of conflict regulation, which serve to limit the destructiveness of conflict when it occurs.

Finally, conflict resolution within industry has been progressively institutionalized through the recognition of labor unions and the development of procedures for collective bargaining, mediation, and arbitration; thus conflict between labor and management is conducted under an increasingly wide area of norms shared by both sides in the conflict. This institutionalization not only reduces the likelihood of destructive conflict but gives the conflicting parties a common interest in maintaining the institutionalized system of rules for dealing with conflict.

This analysis of why class conflict did not develop into the intensely competitive process predicted by Marx's theory can be generalized so as to suggest some propositions that may be applicable to all forms of intergroup conflict and, possibly, to conflict at the interpersonal and international levels as well.

PROPOSITION 1. *Any attempt to introduce a change in the existing relationship between two parties is more likely to be accepted if each expects some net gain from the change than if either side expects that the other side will gain at its expense.*

The enormous growth of capital and the rapid development of technology would have been resisted more bitterly had they not been accompanied by an improvement in the living standards of laborers as well as of capitalists.

It is, of course, true that both sides in a conflict may gain because they may form an implicit or explicit coalition against a third party, who suffers a loss as a consequence. This is the thesis advanced by some Marxists in underdeveloped countries to explain the relative lack of conflict between labor and capital in the advanced industrial nations. Namely, labor and capital in the industrialized countries are both profiting from the exploitation of the underdeveloped nations. Thus the basis for conflict between the exploiters and the exploited is reduced *within* the industrialized nations, and the basis for conflict *between* the exploiting and exploited nations is enhanced. Whether or not this view is accurate, it is apparent that agreement between labor and management is often facilitated when the costs of the agreement (higher prices, reduced service, and the like) can be passed on to a powerless third party such as the consumer.

However, even when the two potentially conflicting parties do not form a coalition to the detriment of a third party, it may be possible for both sides to gain from a change in their existing relationship. The gains may be economic, or there may be gains in other values such as psychological or physical well-being, respect, affection, moral rectitude, knowledge, prestige, or the power to elicit authentic cooperation. The nature of the gains may be different for the initially opposed parties. One may gain economically while the other may gain morally.

The emphasis on the possibility of mutual gain—for one's opponent as well as for oneself—underlies the approach to intergroup conflict of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many other advocates of nonviolence. Essentially, the Gandhian system of ethics (Naess 1958) postulates that an agreement that injures the other or is arrived at by coercing the other is self-defeating because it negates the full realization of one's capacity to relate lovingly to the other. Such agreement

is also unstable because the other will not cooperate, authentically and reliably, in relation to an agreement he dislikes. In addition, it is conducive to future violence, since coercion begets violence by the attitudes it creates and the model it provides as a guide to future behavior.

The Gandhian approach assumes a fundamental decency in mankind, and it assumes that an individual and his opponent share this common decency. Thus it is supposed that one will only advocate just causes and that one's opponent can be persuaded by an intelligent, respectful, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause. History has, of course, recorded many rebuffs to well-argued appeals in favor of good causes. It is evident that, at least in the short run, the appeal to the nobler motives or to conscience may not be sufficiently persuasive. This is particularly likely to be the case when the other does not include you in the community toward whom the norms governing his customary moral conduct apply.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that a change that is accomplished by gains for both sides—even if the gains involve satisfaction of the less altruistic motives—is more likely to produce authentic cooperation than a change that is coercively imposed. Moreover, it seems reasonable to suppose that the complement to the preceding proposition is valid: namely, that any attempt to introduce a change in the existing relationship is more likely to be resisted if one side expects to be disadvantaged as a result. Thus if an agreement implies a loss of "face," a humiliation, a loss of wealth, a loss of virtue, a loss of well-being, a loss of legitimacy, or a loss of power, it is likely to be achieved only if one side can successfully coerce or intimidate the other.

PROPOSITION 2. *Conflict is more likely to be resolved by a competitive process when each of the parties in conflict is internally homogeneous but distinctly different from one another in a variety of characteristics (such as class, race, religion, political affiliation, area of residence, and group memberships) than when each is internally heterogeneous and both have overlapping characteristics.*

Heterogeneity within each group is likely to be reflected in a diversity of interests and values among group members—with the consequence that the differences between the conflicting groups may be smaller than the differences within each group. The intragroup differences may individualize the separate components of the group and

make it difficult to obtain their allegiance to the group goals that are involved in an intragroup conflict. The differences within each group may also increase the sense of overlapping interests with elements of the other group, if the other group is also seen to be composed of heterogeneous units. The lack of unified support for group goals and the awareness of intergroup common interests are not conducive to the development of an intergroup struggle.

Our discussion in a preceding section of cross-cutting and pyramidal-segmentary types of social structures essentially led to much the same conclusion as stated above. The cross-cutting ties that restrain destructive intergroup conflict are also encouraged by permeable group boundaries that permit social mobility from one group to another. The fact that more than two-thirds of the sons of unskilled workers (the lowest occupational category) have moved into a higher occupational status than their fathers is undoubtedly one of the factors moderating class conflict in the industrialized nations of the West (see Goldhamer 1968 for a presentation of some relevant data). On the basis of similar reasoning, one would expect that racial conflict is likely to be more destructive than class conflict because of the strong caste-like barriers that restrict social mobility from occupations or neighborhoods associated with one race to those associated with another race.

Generally, the free and continuing exchange of members between groups increases the likelihood of cooperative management of conflict between them, while the existence of impermeable boundaries between them fosters a competitive process when conflict occurs.

PROPOSITION 3. *The greater the number and the stronger the concurrent competitive links between the two groups, the less likely it is that a conflict will be resolved cooperatively; the greater the number and the stronger the concurrent cooperative bonds between the groups, the less likely it is that they will resolve their conflict by a competitive process.*

In other words, conflict is likely to be resolved cooperatively in situations where the parties involved perceive that they have less at stake in the conflict than they have in the continuing relationships between them or in the community, institutions, procedures, and facilities they share.

The growth of a superordinate community with institutions and

procedures for promoting general welfare and resolving conflicts and the development of allegiances and loyalties to the superordinate community and its institutions serve to reduce the likelihood of disruptive conflict. Too much of value would be lost if a conflict destroyed worthwhile cooperative bonds or shattered an encompassing community. Thus there is little doubt that the development of an effective national political community, which commands the loyalty of its citizens, serves to inhibit destructive conflict between classes within that community. (Thus there may be merit in the Marxist view that nationalistic ideologies serve the interests of the bourgeoisie by enabling challenges to existing relations within the nation to be labeled as divisive and unpatriotic.) Likewise, conflict between different groups within a university tends to be resolved cooperatively as long as each of the groups values the university as a community and wishes to preserve the existing cooperative bonds. However, when there is widespread disenchantment and alienation and a sense of betrayal of the community's values by its authorities, there are likely to be few common bonds and allegiances to inhibit the occurrence of the destructive forms of conflict.

PROPOSITION 4. *The institutionalization and regulation of conflict decreases the likelihood that conflict will take a destructive course.*

One of the most pertinent facts about the history of industrial conflict in the industrialized nations of the West is that such conflict has become increasingly institutionalized and subject to regulation. As a consequence, industrial conflict is characterized by much less personal violence and damage to property than used to be the case. Because of the central significance of the regulation of conflict, we consider it in greater detail in chapter 13.

Interracial Conflict

The emergence of a racist ideology. Across different societies there are clear variations in the way dominant groups treat subordinate ones. A major variable explaining differences among societies in this regard seems to be the ideological residue of social revolutions. As Stinchcombe (1968) points out, egalitarianism was not as prevalent in the United States before as after the Revolutionary War. And certainly it was not as prevalent in Russia or China before their revolutions. The egalitarian ideals spread initially by the American and French

revolutions made it difficult for the newly emerging dominant classes to maintain that the members of subordinate classes were innately inferior, that their origin and thus their biological constitution inherently made them unfit to have liberty and equality.

In one of the great paradoxes of history, racism as an ideology of biological superiority was a child, albeit a foster child, of egalitarianism. Although an elaborately developed system of racial exploitation was in existence in the United States and other parts of the New World by the beginning of the seventeenth century, racism as an ideology came of age only in the third or fourth decade of the nineteenth century, achieving its fullest development approximately between 1880 and 1920. As Myrdal (1944, p. 89) has written: "The fateful word *race* itself is actually not yet two hundred years old. The biological ideology had to be utilized as an intellectual explanation of, and moral apology for, slavery in a society which went out emphatically to invoke as its highest principles the ideals of the inalienable rights of all men to freedom and equality of opportunity."

The democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian ideals of the Enlightenment spread by the American and French revolutions were reconciled with slavery by restricting the definition of humanity to apply only to whites. Thus Chief Justice Taney concluded in his notorious Dred Scott decision of 1857 that Negroes were "beings of an inferior order . . . so far inferior that they had not rights which the white man was bound to respect." (van den Berghe 1967, p. 78).

With the publication in 1859 of Darwin's epochal work, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: or The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life*, and the subsequent vulgarization of his ideas in the form of "social Darwinism," the basis for an intellectual rationale for racism was at hand. Such ideas as "survival of the fittest," "hereditary determinism," and "stages of evolution" were eagerly misapplied to the relations between different human social groups—classes and nations as well as social races—to justify existing exploitative social relations and to rationalize imperialist policies. The influence of evolutionary thinking was so strong that, as a critic suggested, it gave rise to a new imperialist beatitude: "Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak" (Banton 1967, p. 48). The rich and powerful were biologically superior; they had achieved their positions as a result of natural selection. It would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the

poor and weak. Imperialism was patriotism "in a race endowed with the genius for empire," or the "manifest destiny" of those superior peoples meant to lead inferior people. Negroes were slaves as a result of their being at a lower stage of evolution, closer to the apes, than whites, who presumably were at the highest evolutionary stage. Unfortunately, much of today's racial folklore is a derivative of the pseudoscience of fifty to a hundred years ago.

Social race. The term *race* in popular usage is applied to such diverse groups as the Jews, the Germans, the Negroes, the Chinese, and the Gypsies. It is evident that such usage has little in common with the somewhat unsuccessful attempts by biologists and anthropologists to classify the human species into subspecies or races that differ in their frequencies of certain genes. Nevertheless, the folk and scientific usages share the conception that membership in racial groups derives principally from inheritance. One becomes a member by descent rather than by choice. Many social scientists, similarly, employ the term *social race* to refer to any human group that defines itself, or is defined by other groups, by rules of descent (Harris 1968). In addition, social races are usually conceived (by themselves or others) to have distinctive physical, intellectual, moral, or cultural characteristics as a result of their unique descents.

Social races are socially defined groups; they may, in fact, differ little or not at all in their biological or genetic characteristics from other groups. Similarly, rules of descent are socially defined codes that vary from society to society and from time to time. Thus in Nazi Germany people who had one or more Jewish grandparents were defined as "Jews" even though their parents and they, themselves, were members of the Catholic church. Similarly, in the United States many people with white skins are considered "black" because one or more of their ancestors were classified as "Negroes."

It is apparent that the rules of membership by descent for any particular social race may not originate in the group itself but may be foisted upon it by a more dominant group. Also, it is evident that the rules employed by the group itself to define its membership may differ from those employed by outgroups and, further, that the individual who is being categorized as a member may or may not himself be following a different set of rules than either the ingroup or the outgroup. Moreover, the rules defined by the individual, the ingroup, or the outgroup may be internally inconsistent or consistent, clear or ambigu-

uous, complete or incomplete. It is evident that for a system of race relations to endure, there must be some correspondence among the rules of descent that are employed to define an individual's membership by the outgroup, the ingroup, and the person being classified. The system will break down if people can readily pass from one social race to another or if they can be disowned or can disown their own group. Thus continuation of a system of interacting racial groups implies that marriages will be within rather than between groups and that there will be a high level of agreement about the rules defining membership in the social races. A high level of agreement presupposes that each of the groups and their potential members are motivated to agree to the rules and that the rules can be so clearly defined that they are unambiguous in their interpretation and application.

A high level of agreement can be imposed by a dominant and powerful group which employs severe sanctions if the rules that it prefers are not followed. Thus in South Africa the dominant white minority has enforced regulations that require a person's race to be on his identity card; falsification of the identity card or failure to carry it can lead to imprisonment. As a result of being categorized together and being treated in a like manner by the dominant group, an aggregate of people may develop a group consciousness and a sense of group identity that it otherwise would not have had. This happened with Africans in the New World who, prior to their enslavement, often came from different tribal groups in Africa—groups that did not think of themselves as belonging to one people.

At first, an imposed group identity may be negative, an acceptance of the dominant's group conception or a reaction against it. At a later stage, the sense of common problems and common attempts to cope with them will often lead to a feeling of belonging to a group that is distinct from and morally superior to the dominant group. In this latter period, there may be mutual desire between the two groups to have a clear separation between them and unambiguous methods of identifying their members. The motivation of the dominant and subordinate groups will, of course, have different bases. The dominant group will want high identifiability and segregation to perpetuate its dominance. The subordinate group will want these things because it hopes that such conditions will enable it to mobilize itself more effectively or change the power relations between the groups—or because it hopes to insulate itself from the constant exposure to the indignities of its relationship with the dominant group.

Agreement on identification of ingroup and outgroup members may also originate in the separate interests of both groups. Both groups, and not merely the dominant one, may desire to maintain separate identities in order to preserve their unique traditions and cultures. However, whether such a situation is enforced by the dominant group or sought by both groups, it is inherently unstable if the dominant group utilizes the other's distinctive characteristics as a means of successfully exploiting or rationalizing its exploitation of the less powerful group. Under such circumstances, the members of the subordinate group will be motivated to change or destroy the system that exploits them or to escape from their own group if they see little possibility of overcoming their oppression. Masochistic submission to overwhelming force does, of course, occur. However, over time it tends to turn the subordinated group into sullen, lethargic, and ineffectual individuals who harbor a seething volcano of unerupted rage under their apathetic exterior. Such a group provides only marginal gains to their exploiters. As Genovese (1965) has documented, the Negro slaves worked badly, without interest or effort, and their use retarded the economic development of the slaveholding South.

Color and race. The need for relatively unambiguous methods of membership identification has two common consequences. It may lead to the definition of the two groups in terms of physical characteristics, which are easily discernable and not readily changed or falsified, and it may also lead to the creation of external conditions that permit the groups to be quickly and reliably distinguished. By the latter, I mean such devices as the physical segregation of the races; the differential access to places, institutions, and occupations; the development of a distinctive outward appearance through dress and insignia; the use of identity cards; and the development of distinctive cultural characteristics, including special dialects and patterns of speech. Such modes of group identification are often used when there is an absence of distinguishing physical characteristics or when physical characteristics are an unreliable sign of social race because of the prior occurrence of considerable miscegenation.

Skin color is, of course, a highly visible characteristic and it is one of the prime bases for distinguishing social races. However, skin color is not the only genetically determined physical trait on which people differ. A race classification based on characteristics such as head shapes, height, or eye color would give rise to different groupings than those based on skin color. The advantage of skin color as a basis of

social classification is that it is more easily observed and less readily disguised than other physical characteristics.

Although in the Western world dark skin came to be a stigma of inferior status, a mark of a group that had been in the brutish and degraded position of the slave, it was not always thus. As Snowden (1970, pp. 216–17) has written: "Xenophanes, the first European to contrast the physical characteristics of Negroes and Whites, described Ethiopians and Thracians as he saw them and implied nothing as to the superiority or inferiority of either, whether physical, aesthetic, mental, or moral. . . . In short, those Greeks who first described and depicted dark or Negroid peoples did so without bias. . . ." Similarly, Davidson (1961, p. 5), in summarizing European attitudes toward Africans prior to the development of the massive African slave trade, comments: "They supposed no natural inferiority in Africans, no inherent failure to develop and mature. That was to be the great myth of later years: the central myth of European expansion that first took shape on the deck of a slaving ship."

The myth that associated dark skin with inferiority grew slowly. The first twelve slaves plucked from the western coast of Africa in 1441 by Goncalvez, a youthful Portuguese adventurer, were not considered a different order of human. Nor were the African chieftains and traders with whom the European slave merchants negotiated the purchase of slaves considered to be inferior humans by their white counterparts.

White slavery, after all, had not yet disappeared from western Europe by the time the Spanish were setting foot in the New World. In fact, Queen Isabella, Christopher Columbus's benefactress, allowed the export of white slaves only to the West Indies because of the fear that the rebelliousness of the African slaves would be transmitted to the Indian natives. However, the decimation of the Indian natives by disease, the limited supply of white slaves (mostly criminals, debtors, orphans, infidels, and prostitutes), and the ever-increasing need for manual labor to help with the very profitable sugar, tobacco, and cotton crops, soon led to a rapidly increasing importation of African slaves. By the end of the seventeenth century, white slavery had almost completely disappeared in the New World.

There is reason to believe that the end of white slavery was one of the ingredients necessary to solidify the distinction between the freeman and the slave. If it were difficult to distinguish a slave from a

freeman, it would be hard to keep the slaves in bondage in lands with sufficient cities and distances to permit easy disappearances. As Banton (1967, pp. 117–18) has written:

Extreme subordination could not be maintained on the plantation if the slaves could easily escape. . . . But the slaves and employers could not be isolated from local life outside the plantation. Therefore the planters—who held the political power—were obliged to see that similar principles of racial subordination obtained outside. The status distinctions on the plantation (which coincided with the colour line) were generalized to the wider society where the criterion of colour did not fit so well. . . . White supremacy and solidarity became a political doctrine, sometimes overlooked in private relations but never in public matters. Part of the price of the support of the non-slaveholding White was the maintenance of the status gap between White and Black. If the equation of status with race was to be enforced, intermediate groups who fitted in neither of the major categories were troublesome anomalies whose very existence called into question the basic assumptions of the system; therefore they could not be tolerated. Free Negroes appeared dangerous so they had to be reduced to subjugation whenever possible. Children of mixed parentage could not be accepted as intermediates, but had to be assigned to the lower category.

The progress of the immigrants compared to the lack of progress of the former slaves. There can be little doubt that the character of the relations between blacks and whites in the New World has largely been determined by the fact that the Africans came involuntarily, as slaves with neither rights nor resources, arriving under conditions that typically destroyed their families, their group identities, and their self-esteem. In contrast, other low-ranking minorities such as the Italians, the Irish, the Polish, and the Jews came to the Americas voluntarily with rights and social resources, under conditions that enabled them to preserve their group identities and families and to maintain their self-respect. Their political bargaining power in relation to the dominant groups was enormously higher than that of the enslaved Africans because of the cohesiveness of their own internal communities.

As the Italians, the Irish, and the Jews rose from the impoverished low-status positions of "newly-arrived immigrants," their skin color could not be used as a reliable mark of social inferiority. As a conse-

quence, members of these initially low-ranking groups could more readily move into the vacant positions in the rapidly expanding socioeconomic frontiers of the New World than could the descendants of the African slaves. The greater opportunities available to the European immigrants kept the hopes with which they came to the New World alive. These opportunities also motivated them to persist in sustained attempts to better their social positions. In addition, it provided them with the resources and circumstances, such as money, successful experience, group pride, and education, to improve their capabilities for making progress in the socioeconomic sphere. The progress itself, in a self-reinforcing benevolent spiral, served to make further progress easier. It did so by reducing their objective "social inferiority" and thus diminishing the prejudice and discrimination against them; it also did so by increasing their motivation and capabilities to achieve further progress in the social and economic spheres.

The African slaves, on the other hand, came to the New World with no hope and few resources, and their circumstances as slaves were not conducive to the development of either the motivation or the capabilities for advancing themselves socially or economically. The abolition of slavery raised hopes, but the lack of resources of the former slaves and their descendants—in education, in experience as freemen, in community and family organization, in material possessions—gave them little possibility of overcoming the barriers of prejudice and discrimination. The few who were able to advance themselves despite the stigma of color were never sure of the permanence of their step forward, nor could their enhanced resources wipe out for themselves or for their children the stigma of social inferiority embedded in their skin color. Thus, for the former slaves and their descendants, a vicious cycle existed: their lack of progress lowered their hope and their motivation to advance themselves, and it limited their resources for overcoming the barriers that kept them in a socially inferior status. These consequences of the prejudice and discrimination against them, in turn, served to provide rationales (such as "they are lazy and incapable") for the perpetuation of the racial barriers erected by the dominant white group. Thus, because dark color serves as a mark of racial inferiority as well as of group membership, it makes the prevalent social and economic barriers imposed against low-status groups more difficult for blacks to overcome than for whites.

In addition to the extra difficulties imposed by their skin color and

their legacy of social deficits inherited from their experience in slavery, blacks have not been as lucky as white immigrants. When white immigrants were arriving in large numbers, America was becoming an urbanized, industrial society that needed great pools of unskilled labor. The European immigrants were easily able to gain an economic foothold and to help their children move up the socioeconomic ladder. In contrast, the black migrants from the rural South have, since the end of World War II, found that there is little demand for the unskilled labor they possess. America's urban-industrial society requires more and more skilled labor in its technologically advanced industries but provides few opportunities for advancement for those with inadequate education and few skills.

Although skin color has been an important factor in making the progress of blacks more difficult, it would be a mistake to overemphasize its role as an independent causal factor. The Chinese and Japanese, who are also distinctively different from whites in physical appearance, have had much less difficulty than the blacks in improving their social and economic positions. They came to the United States, like the European immigrants and unlike the African slaves, out of choice and under conditions that enabled them to preserve their group cultures and self-esteem. The initial antipathy and color prejudice against these groups arose largely as a result of competition in mining and agriculture with white European immigrants. The Chinese and Japanese, under hostile and often brutal attacks, withdrew from competitive forms of labor and business and segregated themselves from the hostile white community. They entered occupations and businesses not sought by whites and made considerable progress because of the mutual support that derives from family and group cohesion. Because of their relatively small numbers, a large proportion of them have been able to move out of the "Chinatowns" unobtrusively since World War II. In doing so, the color prejudice that they have had to face has been much smaller than that facing blacks. It seems likely that color prejudice has played a more pervasive and persisting role in relation to Africans, as compared to Orientals, because of slavery and the difference in numbers of their different population groups. Elaborate rationales and a complex network of institutional arrangements necessary to the maintenance of blacks in a subordinate role were developed and embedded in the American culture and society—much more so than with regard to the various groups from the Far East. In

addition, slavery stripped the Africans of their cultural, group, and family resources, and such resources have been of enormous help to the Chinese and Japanese in overcoming the color barriers to economic and social progress.

The paradox of race relations in the United States. Despite the obvious progress made in the United States since World War II in eliminating legally sanctioned segregation and discrimination, it is evident that racial conflict and polarization have increased in recent years. Many explanations have been offered for this seeming paradox. Basically, the explanations are of three types: racial progress causes or increases racial tensions; racial tensions cause or increase racial progress; and racial progress has been illusory or minimal, and the increased racial tension is a result of the lack of significant improvements. These explanations are not mutually exclusive; each undoubtedly contains an element of truth.

It seems reasonable to suppose that *racial progress will increase racial tensions* because those who favor the status quo in race relations are likely to be upset by racial change and to resist such change. The giving-up of long-held, elaborately rationalized attitudes and customs rarely comes about without defensiveness and resistance—except when careful and extensive efforts are made to help reduce the apprehensions of those who must change and to help them see the advantages that may result from the changes. It is evident that very little systematic effort has been made to reduce the prejudices and discriminatory practices of the white majority in a way that would be least likely to elicit their defensiveness and resistance. Unless such efforts are made, one may expect that tension will increase as changes occur and that, as the modifications become more extensive, it will continue to increase until it is apparent that the new policies and practices are irreversible.

Increased tension with racial progress may also be apparent in the subordinate group, which, presumably, should be happy that change is occurring. The occurrence of reform may whet the group's appetite for further change by signifying that progress is more possible than it initially thought. However, the resistance of whites may increase the subordinates' suspicions and hostility toward whites even as their aspirations are increasing. In such circumstances, the racial gains may well be perceived as the result of the pressures of the blacks against the resistance of the whites rather than as the consequence of enhanced

cooperation between the racial groups. Such an interpretation is likely to lead to increased ill will between the races. The white liberals who have supported reforms will feel unappreciated and devalued; the blacks who have been optimistic about the goodwill of whites will be embittered and disillusioned.

A second explanation of the association between racial progress and racial tension is that *racial tension is necessary to achieve racial progress*. As we have indicated earlier in this and the preceding chapter, the impetus for a move toward equality is unlikely to come from the dominant group in a dominant-subordinate relationship. It is, after all, improbable that the dominant group will be dissatisfied with its superior status; hence it is not very likely to initiate attempts to alter the status quo. The subordinate group is, thus, often faced with the necessity of motivating the dominant group to want a modification of the existing state of affairs. However, by the very nature of its lower status, it is rarely in the position to persuasively offer the more powerful group increased rewards and benefits to renounce their superior position. This is, of course, less true when the subordinated group is able to form alliances with powerful elements of the dominant group or when it is able to enlist the cooperation of powerful third parties. Nevertheless, the methods most available to low-status groups are the ones that challenge or disrupt the existing exploitative relationships and that make attempts to continue such relationships unrewarding to the dominant group. These methods include: the withdrawal of cooperation from all forms of unequal relationship; the confrontation of the dominant group when it acts exploitatively; the harassment of the dominant group if it seeks to insulate itself from the discontent of the subordinate group; and the use of obstructive and destructive techniques if the dominant group is unresponsive and repressive.

There are, of course, many instances that demonstrate that the threat of increased racial tension or its actual occurrence may lead to racial progress. Thus President Roosevelt in 1941 issued an executive order establishing the federal Fair Employment Practices Commission in order to avert a threatened mass Negro convergence on Washington. College student sit-ins achieved the desegregation of lunch counters in many communities during the winter and spring of 1960. Various bills protecting civil rights were passed by Congress under the pressure of massive confrontations between demonstrators and repressive local authorities. Boycotts, street demonstrations, and other direct ac-

tion techniques have compelled employers, from supermarkets to banks, to add many Negroes to their work force.

Riots have sometimes served as a "signaling device" to indicate to those in power that changes must be made or further destructiveness will occur. Moreover, as Skolnick (1969, pp. 341-42) has pointed out, ". . . one need not be fond of revolutions to observe that riots are sometimes the preface to an even more organized overthrow of existing arrangements with the substitution of new regimes. And one need not admire the consequences of the Russian revolution to appreciate those of America or France. All three began with rioting."

The reaction of the dominant group to pressures for changes from a subordinate group may lead to progress, but under certain circumstances it may also lead to reaction and repression. Little scientific knowledge exists about the conditions that determine whether progress or reaction will be the outcome. However, one may speculate that "tension" follows the general rule for motivation: namely, enhancement of tension will have facilitating effects until an optimal level is reached, and beyond this level additional increases will acceleratingly have interfering effects. One may further speculate that the height of the optimal level is inversely related to the defensiveness of the dominant group: the higher the defensiveness, the lower the optimal level. Presumably, the defensiveness of the dominant group would be greater the more it expects to lose as a result of gains by the subordinate group. In addition, one would expect the extent of defensiveness to be inversely related to the perceived legitimacy of the methods of pressuring for a change and the perceived justifiability of the grievances instigating the pressures. The amount of tension resulting from any pressure from the subordinate group would be a function of the extent of change that that group is attempting to induce in a given period of time. The larger the amount of change or the more frequent the number of changes pressed for in a given period of time, the more tension that one can expect.

If these speculations have merit, progress in race relations would occur when the tensions due to pressures from the subordinate group are high and the defensiveness of the dominant group is low. Reaction or revolution, if the pressures are strong enough to overwhelm the dominant group, would be the outcome when the pressures and defensiveness are both high. Neither progress nor reaction (or revolution) could be expected if tensions are low. In other words, pressure from

the subordinate group is necessary to alter a relationship with which it is discontent and with which the dominant group is satisfied. Yet the more discontent the subordinate is, the greater changes it presses for, and the quicker it seeks such change, the more likely these pressures are to be perceived as threatening the interests of the dominant group and the more defensive and resistive the latter is likely to become. The defensiveness and resistance is, in turn, conducive to a sense of frustration and desperation in the group seeking a change and may propel it to employ pressure tactics that are perceived to be illegitimate and that have the effect of further alienating the already defensive dominant group.

In such circumstances the development of an escalating spiral of force and counterforce is not uncommon. Unless a neutral authority can intervene to reverse the upward spiral of violence, it will continue until one side exhausts, vanquishes, or persuades the other or until the costs of the escalating hostilities become intolerable to both sides. Although the usual response to violence is the employment of counter-violence, in some rare instances the resort to violence may be persuasive of the seriousness and intensity, and also of the legitimacy, of the grievances of the subordinate group. This is most likely when the violence is seen as an act of desperation, as irrational, and as having no chance of significantly harming or intimidating the more powerful party. Under such conditions, the violence may be regarded as an urgent cry for help and may be responded to as such, rather than as a threat. (See chapter 6 for a further discussion of the effects of threat.)

Although it is useful for certain purposes to treat the dominant white group and the subordinate black group as though each were internally homogeneous, doing so is a considerable oversimplification. It is well to recognize that the extent and types of grievances and the potential for protest vary in the different segments of the black population as a function of such factors as age, sex, locale, class, and education. Thus the young black males have more protest potential and more economic grievances than older blacks of either sex. Similarly, the extent of defensiveness varies among the white population as a function of how much each segment expects to lose from black progress or from instituting the conditions necessary to achieve such progress. While it is beyond the present purposes to analyze the white American society from this perspective, the questions that must be asked to achieve such answers include: What groups believe that they

would be adversely affected by a reordering of American priorities such that a greater proportion of the national, state, and municipal budgets would be spent on improving the education, employment, housing, community services, etc. that are available to the black and other disadvantaged groups? What groups believe that they would be harmed if more blacks voted and otherwise exerted political influence? What groups feel that they would lose if blacks could enter the various occupations as freely as whites? What groups think that their mortgages and the quality of their children's education will be threatened if blacks moved into their residential areas?

If such questions were asked and adequately answered, it would be evident that different segments of the white population are defensive about different issues. The members of the so-called military-industrial complex may prefer to spend money on the development of the antiballistic missile (ABM) rather than on improving the educational and employment opportunities of blacks; yet they may not oppose the elimination of discrimination in suburban housing. The lower-middle- and working-class whites who have most of their limited savings invested in their homes may fearfully resist the entrance of blacks into their neighborhoods but may not be supporters of the ABM. The point is that pressures for racial progress need not elicit the defensiveness of the entire white population (and, in fact, can draw support from major elements of the dominant group) if the pressures are aimed at specific objectives rather than formulated in terms of a basic opposition between blacks and whites.

A third explanation for the seeming paradox of the odd concurrence of racial progress and racial tension is contained in the view that racial progress has been minimal and that the *increased racial tension is a result of lack of significant changes* at a time when the expectation of improvement is high. *The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (the so-called Kerner report, 1968), in explaining the causes of recent disorders, places its primary emphasis on the lack of significant racial progress. It states: "White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II" (p. 203).

Although the Kerner report emphasizes the role of white prejudice and discrimination in determining the conditions that have given rise to the recent racial disorders, it is clear that other factors are also at work. Public-opinion data clearly indicate a marked and continuing

decrease in racially prejudiced attitudes among the white population since 1940 (see Skolnick 1969, chapter 5, and Campbell 1971 for a summary of research on racial attitudes of whites), and certainly there has been a decrease in recent years in many forms of officially supported discrimination. Moreover, recent census data (Bureau of Labor Statistics Report #394, July 1971) indicate that there has been a substantial improvement in the real income of Negro families, even though the gap between the income of whites and blacks still remains large—black families have only 61 percent of the income of white families.

Although the objective circumstances of life for urban Negroes are on the average considerably more modest than those of white urban residents, most of the dissatisfactions that black people express in interview surveys are not directly related to their economic, educational, or occupational attainments. More than their socioeconomic status, black people are dissatisfied with their housing, with the services they receive from the city—their schools, the police, the garbage collection, the parks—and with the stores and merchants in their neighborhoods (see Campbell 1971).

These dissatisfactions are the outcome of a process that was accelerated by World War II. The war produced an unprecedented increase in opportunities for workers with little or no prior industrial experience, and this, in turn, induced a flood of northward migration by southern Negroes whose means of livelihood had been undermined by the long decline of southern agriculture. The migrating Negroes were drawn to the big, established cities of heavy industry in the north central regions and on the East and West coasts. The seeking of their own kind and the patterns of segregated housing led to their concentration in the central cities. After the Korean War, the demand for less-skilled workers in manufacturing began a sharp, continuing decline, in part due to a shift in the nature of defense spending to more sophisticated, complex, space-age weaponry, and in part due to a general shift in industry toward more-skilled, white-collar employment with a relative decline in blue-collar jobs. Connected with these industrial changes was an increasing decentralization of manufacturing activity and an associated exodus of whites to the suburbs—to the disadvantage of the old industrial centers and the Negroes who were massed in them. Deterioration of public transportation facilities and the barriers to housing for Negroes increased the Negro's isolation from the growing

suburbs. At the same time, the central cities entered a period of sharp decline which was accelerated by the increasing gap between the financial resources available to them and the needs of their population for such public services as schools, police protection, garbage collection and street cleaning, welfare assistance, and the like. Thus there is reason to suppose that the quality of life for blacks in urban areas has worsened as the cities have deteriorated. This impairment of the quality of everyday life has undoubtedly increased the sense of dissatisfaction among blacks, despite the improvement in their educational status and income.

What can be done? The diagnosis is clear. The legacy of centuries of slavery and decades of prejudice and discrimination have left large segments of the black population with handicaps and deficits for playing the American success game. As Coleman (1969) has pointed out, the Afro-Americans have relative deficits in freedom, economic power, political power, community cohesion, and family cohesion and in such personal resources as education, health, and self-esteem. Their comparative deficiency in these important resources means that they have an impaired ability as a group, and as individuals, to obtain their fair share of the goods and goodies of the American way of life. Even if racial prejudice and discrimination were to be suddenly wiped out, they would still be at a relative disadvantage. But, alas, the racial barriers are still high in many areas of American life and are not likely to disappear immediately. The problem is, thus, two-headed: the resources of the black people have to be increased, and the racial barriers have to be eliminated.

Discrimination and prejudice against blacks as blacks are not the only barriers to be removed. Blacks are now often discriminated against because they are "poor risks." And, in fact, they are more likely to be lower class, uneducated, ill, unstable, criminal, and otherwise "socially undesirable" in terms of middle-class standards than are whites. As a consequence, blacks are apt to be poorer risks as employees, tenants, borrowers, students, and law-abiding citizens. Employers, landlords, banks, stores, teachers, and the police—even if they are color-blind and acting solely in terms of economic self-interest—are inclined to discriminate against those they consider to be poor risks. Not to do so would place them at a competitive disadvantage. Moreover, others who are affected by the decisions—such as other employees, other tenants, and share owners—are likely to protest if the risks

are taken, since they are predisposed to feel that they would be adversely affected. In addition, the American myth of equal opportunity provides a rationale for discriminating against those who are poor risks. In this land of "equal opportunity," poverty must be due to the deficient character and motivation of those who are poor. Thus self-interest, social pressure, and ideology combine to perpetuate the victimization of those who are poor risks.

Even if a white with a keen sense of injustice were able to perceive the "self-fulfilling prophecy" in discriminating against poor risks, he might nevertheless consider it a futile, hopeless gesture to disregard the common beliefs about the greater riskiness of transactions with blacks. Doing so would not make a significant impact upon the situation of the blacks unless many other whites were also engaged in similar actions. Moreover, an instance of failure—a housing development "tipping" so that it becomes all black, loans not being repayed, etc.—would make his action demonstrate to others that nondiscrimination is unwise.

It has long been recognized that without governmental action to pass and enforce laws to prohibit racial discrimination, the unbiased landlord or employer would find it difficult to survive unless he conformed to the practices of his business rivals and also discriminated. More recently, it has also begun to be recognized that if there is discrimination against the poor (as in the zoning regulations of many suburbs or the inadequately supported schools in poor districts) or against those who are poor risks (as in the case of inadequately prepared high school graduates seeking admission to college), then many blacks will remain disadvantaged despite strict enforcement of laws prohibiting racial discrimination.

This insidious form of color-blind racism is unlikely to disappear quickly. Its early demise would require governmental enforcement of racial quota systems in all areas of community life. It is obvious that there would be much resistance to the imposition of group quotas from those who would be displaced or disadvantaged by them and from many who feel that it would be counter to basic values in American society. Even without a quota system, much could be done to change the situation of the "poor risks" if we could achieve an expanding economy with full employment. Such an economy could find a place for even poor risks. And those who have a rewarding place are not likely to continue to be poor risks. The remedial programs for

the unskilled, the school dropout, the drug addict have often flourished because an economy with considerable unemployment lacks positions even for those who are not considered to be poor risks. To succeed, such programs need a flourishing, receptive economy. However, since much racism in the United States is not color-blind, a healthy economy is not sufficient. There is also the need for vigorous enforcement of nondiscrimination laws to ensure that blacks as well as whites will be actively recruited for positions at all levels. In addition, intense effort is required to guarantee that they will not be barred from such positions either by the lack of particularistic ties (such as those of family, school, or neighborhood) to the controllers of such positions or by irrelevant requirements such as credentials unrelated to job competence.

It is evident that the pressure for improvement of the situation of blacks will largely have to come from blacks. The problems facing a low-power, minority group in bringing about social change are manifold. In the last section of chapter 13, the strategy and tactics available to low-power groups are discussed. Here, I wish to point out that the power of a victimized minority to compel social change by itself is limited. It cannot afford to be without allies. To be effective, it must be for others as well as for itself. Being for oneself is the first responsibility of every person and every group: unless one is for oneself, others are not likely to be. However, one can define being for oneself so that one is either for or against others. As a permanent definition of self, the latter is inherently self-defeating for a group that needs allies.

What generalized insights into the resolution of conflict can be gained from the study of race relations? After this extended discussion of interracial conflict, I turn to a consideration of some general propositions that are suggested by our analysis of it. From the author's perspective, the basic fact about interracial conflict is that it originated in the New World context of nearly complete opposition between the interests of the two parties involved, the white master and the black slave. The prime shared interest was the survival of the slave through his productive years, but some slaves were sufficiently dependent about their circumstances to have little interest in survival. Slavery was, thus, almost a pure case of competitive conflict in which "cooperation" was coerced from the slave by the superior, indeed overwhelming, power of the master.

Although there is considerable evidence indicating that the cooper-

ation of slaves was minimal (Genovese 1965) and that passive resistance in such classical forms as laziness, slowness, ineptness, clumsiness, stupidity, inattentiveness, and misunderstanding was common, it is apparent that slavery and slave trading were initially profitable (Davidson 1961). Slavery's continued profitability depended upon several interrelated factors: the availability of a large supply of slaves or potential slaves so that the costs of acquiring or "growing" slaves were low; the availability of simple, profit-producing tasks, requiring neither special skills nor special equipment, that could be done by large numbers of unmotivated workers; a reasonably stable and assured market for the products of the slave labor; the ability to keep the costs of sustaining the productive slaves at a low level; the ability to keep the costs of supervision and coercion at a low level; and the lack of effective competition from well-motivated, skilled, and equipped workers producing rival products.

The large, single-crop plantations of the South were able to meet these conditions of profitability for many years but, in so doing, they gradually undermined their own economic position and the economy of the South, which they dominated politically. Slavery prevented significant technological and industrial progress; it led to agricultural methods that depleted the soil; it hampered the development of a home market for southern products; it made the South increasingly dependent upon the more industrialized and technologically advanced North; and it gave rise to an aristocratic style of life that concentrated power in the hands of relatively few large-plantation owners whose interests were antagonistic to those of the emerging industrial society (Genovese 1965).

As Genovese (1965, p. 16) points out: "Slave economics normally manifest irrational tendencies that inhibit economic development and endanger social stability." More generally, it seems reasonable to consider these propositions:

PROPOSITION 1. *Cooperation that is elicited by coercion is likely to be minimally productive and less economical as well as less reliable than cooperation that is self-chosen.*

Although there is no doubt that the powerful have often profited from the coercive exploitation of the less powerful, these gains occur only under conditions that are found less and less in complex, industrialized societies. To the extent that the required cooperation calls for

skill, judgment, initiative, and a shared loyalty, it is not likely to be elicited successfully by force. On the other hand, constructing an economy that will permit the use of coerced labor produces systematic distortions in one's way of life and inefficiencies with respect to economic development that may far outweigh any immediate gains obtained from the exploitations. Genovese (1965) has made this point about the effects of slavery on the economy and society of the South. Myrdal (1944) and Clark (1967) have similarly shown how discrimination and segregation are not only a perversion of American ideals of liberty and justice but also a drag on American prosperity generally.

PROPOSITION 2. More generally, any form of social relationship, as a function of its importance and duration, tends to influence and mold the characteristics of the participants.

One develops attitudes toward himself, as well as toward the other, that reflect the typical interaction between oneself and the other. Whites who are used to interacting with blacks in inferior positions often think of themselves as superior to blacks. And it is not uncommon for blacks in such relationships to regard themselves as inferior. There is, of course, an asymmetry. People, in general, prefer to view themselves as superior rather than inferior. Thus people are more likely to seek explanations that will challenge a position of inferiority than they are to try to question a superior status. Hence it is not surprising that the subordinate often does not share a superior's exalted view of himself with its underlying condescension toward the subordinate. Nevertheless, when a subordinate group has little power and is very dependent upon a punitive superior, it may yield its self-esteem in order to ingratiate itself and to avoid the possibility of being brutalized for being "uppity." Not so long ago, Negro children in the South were trained by their parents to think of themselves as being inferior to whites in order to avoid trouble. A masochistic defense of this sort usually covers a great deal of rage, which is often expressed in a disguised form such as an exaggerated self-deprecation and submissiveness that subtly mocks the pretensions of those claiming superiority.

PROPOSITION 3. Insofar as an interaction tends to develop habits, customs, institutions, attitudes, and ideologies in the interacting parties that are congruent with their positions in the interaction, there will

be a tendency for the interaction to persist in its initial forms, despite objective changes in the situations of the interacting parties.

People and groups get committed to, and invested in, the actions they have taken; the actions are rationalized and justified in the face of challenge or doubt; and the justifications are themselves supported and valued and become, in turn, the basis for further actions. We have seen how those who were exploiting the Africans developed a racist ideology to rationalize their exploitation and how this ideology served to support additional exploitation. This self-perpetuating, autistic cycle might not have persisted had it not been for the self-confirming effects of the actions taken on the basis of racist attitudes. Thus if, despite the degradation, exploitation, and discrimination to which they were exposed by whites, the blacks had been able to accumulate sufficient educational, economic, political, and community resources to become part of the "middle-class way of life"—if they had been able to achieve the upward social mobility of the European immigrant groups—it seems likely that the racist ideology, and the discrimination it justifies, would have largely faded away by now. Unfortunately, the relatively rigid color barriers, the handicaps deriving from the legacy of slavery, and the misfortune of entering the urbanized economy at a time when unskilled labor was not so much in demand—all these made middle-class respectability an elusive goal for most blacks.

In our earlier discussion of class conflict, it was pointed out that permeability of class boundaries served to discourage violence in class conflict. It is evident that the class boundaries are less permeable for blacks than for whites because of the relatively rigid color barriers to upward social mobility. As a consequence, race and class are intertwined in determining the attitudes of whites and blacks toward one another. Research (see Hyman 1969 for a summary) suggests that antipathy toward the lower class contributes substantially to prejudice against blacks and that the desired social distance from blacks decreases as the social status of blacks increases. These results suggest that if the color barrier to upward class mobility were somehow circumvented much white prejudice toward blacks would disappear. The common experience of middle-class blacks, however, is that they are not fully accepted and are repeatedly exposed to invisible barriers that constantly remind them of the existing distinctions between blacks

and whites. Although it may be possible that color barriers would disappear if a sufficiently large percentage of the black population could escape from lower-class status, it is evident that the individual black person who improves his class status does not automatically find that his skin color is not a stigma. That is, the individual black cannot "make it" by himself; his group also has to "make it" before his skin color loses its stigmatizing quality.

Nor is it self-evident that, even if blacks do improve their social status, color will be eliminated as an impediment to natural, friendly social relations. So long as there is not an effective integration in neighborhoods, housing, school, work, leisure, and religion, then blacks and whites will not be able to relate to one another as individual human beings but only as members of different groups. This does not imply that integration should have priority as a goal for blacks over the accumulation of black power. It is evident that until the political, economic, community, and educational resources of the black population are increased, there can be no authentic cooperation between the two groups, and integration can only be partial and limited.

PROPOSITION 4. *The status of a subordinate ethnic, religious, or racial group is determined by the resources it has for adapting to and competing within the socioeconomic framework established by the dominant group.*

As Wagley and Harris (1958, p. 272) have suggested, ". . . minority groups with the greater measure of cultural preparedness have been the ones least subject to extreme forms of hostility and exploitation." The African slaves, who were stripped of their cultural, community, and family resources, were the most severely handicapped of all groups coming to the New World and were, as a consequence, the least able to resist the exploitation of the dominant group.

Racism was a particularly pernicious ideology because it assumed an inherent, irreversible difference in the value of different groups of human beings. It made it difficult for the dominant white group to recognize the legitimacy of organized black groups acting on behalf of the black population and mediating black grievances. This, in turn, has hampered the development of institutions and procedures for regulating interracial conflict and has reduced the possibilities of peaceful political bargaining between the conflicting racial groups.

PROPOSITION 5. *The claim to inherent superiority (whether it be of legitimacy, morality, authority, ability, knowledge, or relevance) by one or another side in a conflict makes it less likely that a conflict will be resolved cooperatively.*

If the "superiority" is mutually recognized, it need not be claimed; if it is not, the claim increases the scope of the issues in dispute. The mystique of superiority associated with various positions—"white," "employer," "faculty member," "president," "adult," "male," "under thirty"—is being questioned; the claim to inherent superiority is being rejected; and demonstrations of trustworthiness and competence are increasingly being called for instead.