

For my mother, and in memory of my father

David

Discourse and Social Change

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A Social Theory of Discourse

In this chapter I present a view of discourse and a framework for discourse analysis which will be elaborated and illustrated in the rest of the book. My approach is dictated by the objectives set out in the Introduction: to bring together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language, in the form of a framework which will be suitable for use in social scientific research, and specifically in the study of social change. The first two chapters have identified a number of achievements and limitations of previous work, and chapter 3 is written in the light of that discussion without being directly based upon it. I begin with a discussion of the term 'discourse', and go on to analyse discourse in a three-dimensional framework as text, discursive practice, and social practice. These three dimensions of analysis are discussed in turn, and I conclude by setting out my approach to investigating discursive change in its relationship with social and cultural change.

Discourse

My focus is upon language, and accordingly I use 'discourse' more narrowly than social scientists generally do to refer to spoken or written language use. I shall be using the term 'discourse' where linguists have traditionally written about 'language use', 'parole' or 'performance'. In the tradition initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure (1959), parole is regarded as not amenable to

systematic study because it is essentially individual activity: individuals draw in unpredictable ways according to their wishes and intentions upon a language, a 'langue', which is itself systematic and social. Linguists in this tradition identify parole in order to dismiss it, for the implication of the Saussurean position is that any systematic study of language must be a study of the system itself, the langue, and not of its 'use'.

De Saussure's position has come under sustained attack from sociolinguists who have asserted that language use is shaped socially and not individually. They have argued that variation in language use is systematic and amenable to scientific study, and that what makes it systematic is its correlation with social variables: language varies according to the nature of the relationship between participants in interactions, the type of social event, the social goals people are pursuing in an interaction, and so forth (Downes 1984). While this clearly represents an advance on the dominant Saussurean tradition in mainstream linguistics, it has two main limitations. Firstly, the emphasis tends to be one-sidedly upon how language varies according to social factors, which suggests that types of social subject, social relations, and situation exist quite independently of language use, and precludes the possibility of language use actually contributing to their constitution, reproduction and change. Secondly, the 'social variables' which are seen as correlating with linguistic variables are relatively surface features of social situations of language use, and there is no sense that properties of language use may be determined in a more global sense by the social structure at a deeper level – social relations between classes and other groups, ways in which social institutions are articulated in the social formation, and so forth – and may contribute to reproducing and transforming it.

In using the term 'discourse', I am proposing to regard language use as a form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables. This has various implications. Firstly, it implies that discourse is a mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world and especially upon each other, as well as a mode of representation. This is a view of language use which has been made familiar, though often in individualistic terms, by linguistic philosophy and linguistic pragmatics (Levinson 1983). Secondly, it implies

that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure, there being more generally such a relationship between social practice and social structure: the latter is both a condition for, and an effect of, the former. On the one hand, discourse is shaped and constrained by social structure in the widest sense and at all levels: by class and other social relations at a societal level, by the relations specific to particular institutions such as law or education, by systems of classification, by various norms and conventions of both a discursive and a non-discursive nature, and so forth. Specific discursive events vary in their structural determination according to the particular social domain or institutional framework in which they are generated. On the other hand, discourse is socially constitutive. This is the import of Foucault's discussion of the discursive formation of objects, subjects and concepts. Discourse contributes to the constitution of all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and constrain it: its own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities and institutions which lie behind them. Discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.

We can distinguish three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse. Discourse contributes first of all to the construction of what are variously referred to as 'social identities' and 'subject positions' for social 'subjects' and types of 'self' (see Henriques et al. 1984; Weedon 1987). We should, however, recall the discussion of Foucault on this issue in chapter 2 and my observations there about overstating the constructivist position. Secondly, discourse helps construct social relationships between people. And thirdly, discourse contributes to the construction of systems of knowledge and belief. These three effects correspond respectively to three functions of language and dimensions of meaning which coexist and interact in all discourse - what I shall call the 'identity', 'relational', and 'ideational' functions of language. The identity function relates to the ways in which social identities are set up in discourse, the relational function to how social relationships between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated, the ideational function to ways in which texts signify the world and its processes, entities and relations. The identity and relational functions are grouped together by Halliday (1978) as

the 'interpersonal' function. Halliday also distinguishes a 'textual' function which can be usefully added to my list: this concerns how bits of information are foregrounded or backgrounded, taken as given or presented as new, picked out as 'topic' or 'theme', and how a part of a text is linked to preceding and following parts of the text, and to the social situation 'outside' the text.

Discursive practice is constitutive in both conventional and creative ways: it contributes to reproducing society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet also contributes to transforming society. For example, the identities of teachers and pupils and the relationships between them which are at the heart of a system of education depend upon a consistency and durability of patterns of speech within and around those relationships for their reproduction. Yet they are open to transformations which may partly originate in discourse: in the speech of the classroom, the playground, the staffroom, educational debate, and so forth.

It is important that the relationship between discourse and social structure should be seen dialectically if we are to avoid the pitfalls of overemphasizing on the one hand the social determination of discourse, and on the other hand the construction of the social in discourse. The former turns discourse into a mere reflection of a deeper social reality, the latter idealistically represents discourse as the source of the social. The latter is perhaps the more immediately dangerous pitfall, given the emphasis in contemporary debates on the constitutive properties of discourse. Let us look at an example to see how this pitfall can be avoided without compromising the constitutiveness principle. Parent-child relationships in the family, the determination of what positions of 'mother', 'father' and 'child' are socially available as well as the placing of real individuals in these positions, the nature of the family, and of the home, are all constituted partly in discourse, as cumulative (and in fact contradictory) outcomes of complex and diverse processes of talk and writing. This could easily lead to the idealist conclusion that realities of the social world such as the family merely emanate from people's heads. However, there are three provisos which together help to block this. First, people are always confronted with the family as a real institution (in a limited number of variant forms) with concrete

practices, existing relations and identities which have themselves been constituted in discourse, but reified into institutions and practices. Second, the constitutive effects of discourse work in conjunction with those of other practices, such as the distribution of household tasks, dress, and affective aspects of behaviour (e.g. who gets emotional). Third, the constitutive work of discourse necessarily takes place within the constraints of the dialectical determination of discourse by social structures (which in this case include but go beyond the reality of family structures), and, as I shall argue below, within particular power relations and struggles. Thus the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas in people's heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material social structures.

A dialectical perspective is also a necessary corrective to an overemphasis on the determination of discourse by structures, discursive structures (codes, conventions and norms) as well as non-discursive structures. From this point of view, the capacity of the word 'discourse' to refer to the structures of convention which underlie actual discursive events as well as the events themselves is a felicitous ambiguity, even if from other points of view it can be confusing. Structuralism (represented, for example, by Pêcheux's approach described in chapter 1 above) comes to treat discursive practice and the discursive event as mere instantiations of discursive structures, which are themselves represented as unitary and fixed. It sees discursive practice in terms of a model of mechanistic (and therefore pessimistic) causality. The dialectical perspective sees practice and the event as contradictory and in struggle, with a complex and variable relationship to structures which themselves manifest only a temporary, partial and contradictory fixity.

Social practice has various orientations – economic, political, cultural, ideological – and discourse may be implicated in all of these without any of them being reducible to discourse. For example, there are a number of ways in which discourse may be said to be a mode of economic practice: discourse figures in variable proportions as a constituent of economic practice of a basically non-discursive nature, such as building bridges or producing washing machines; there are forms of economic practice which are of a basically discursive nature, such as the stock

market, journalism, or writing soap operas for television. Moreover, a society's sociolinguistic order may be at least in part structured as a market where texts are produced, distributed and consumed like commodities (in 'culture industries': Bourdieu 1982).

But it is discourse as a mode of political and ideological practice that is most germane to the concerns of this book. Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological practice constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations. As this wording implies, political and ideological practice are not independent of each other, for ideology is significations generated within power relations as a dimension of the exercise of power and struggle over power. Thus political practice is the superordinate category. Furthermore, discourse as a political practice is not only a site of power struggle, but also a stake in power struggle: discursive practice draws upon conventions which naturalize particular power relations and ideologies, and these conventions themselves, and the ways in which they are articulated, are a focus of struggle. I shall argue below that Gramsci's concept of hegemony provides a fruitful framework for conceptualizing and investigating political and ideological dimensions of discursive practice.

Rather than particular types of discourse having inherent political or ideological values, I shall say that different types of discourse in different social domains or institutional settings may come to be politically or ideologically 'invested' (Frow 1985) in particular ways. This implies that types of discourse may also come to be invested in different ways – they may come to be 'reinvested'. (I shall give an example at the end of the discussion of discursive change below.)

How we conceive of the discursive conventions and norms which underlie discursive events is an issue of some importance. I have already alluded to the structuralist view that there are well-defined sets of conventions or codes which are merely instantiated in discursive events. This extends into a view of sociolinguistic domains as constituted by a set of such codes in complementary distribution, such that each has its own functions

social

and situations and conditions of appropriacy which are sharply demarcated from those of others. (I have criticized views of sociolinguistic variation based upon the concept of 'appropriacy' in Fairclough forthcoming b.) Approaches of this sort trace systematic variation within speech communities according to sets of social variables, including setting (e.g. classroom, playground, staffroom, and assembly are different school settings), types of activity and social purpose (e.g. teaching, project work or testing in a classroom), and speaker (e.g. teacher as opposed to pupil). In this view, the code is primary, and a set of codes is merely a sum of its parts.

A position which is more fruitful for the historical orientation to discursive change in this book is that of French discourse analysts who suggest that 'interdiscourse', the complex interdependent configuration of discursive formations, has primacy over its parts and has properties which are not predictable from its parts (see the discussion of Pêcheux in chapter 1 above). Interdiscourse is furthermore the structural entity which underlies discursive events, rather than the individual formation or code: too many discursive events manifest an orientation to configurations of code elements and to their boundaries for the existent (but special case) of the discursive event built out of normative instantiation of a single code to be regarded as the rule. An example would be 'mixed genres' which combine elements of two or more genres, such as 'chat' in television chat shows, which is part conversation and part entertainment and performance (see Tolson 1990 for an analysis of 'chat'). I shall however use the Foucaultian term 'order of discourse' rather than interdiscourse, because it suggests more clearly the sorts of configuration envisaged.

Let us use the looser term 'element', rather than code or formation, for the parts of an order of discourse (I shall come to the nature of these elements below). In contrast with accounts based upon theories of 'appropriacy', where a single and constant relationship of complementarity between elements is assumed, I assume that the relationship may be or become a contradictory one. The boundaries between elements may be lines of tension. Consider, for instance, the diverse subject positions for a single individual across different settings and activities of an institution, along the lines of the dispersion of the subject in the formation

of enunciative modalities, in Foucault's terms (see pp. 43-5 above). It is feasible that boundaries between settings and practices should be so naturalized that these subject positions are lived as complementary. Under different social circumstances, the same boundaries might become a focus of contestation and struggle, and the subject positions and the discursive practices associated with them might be experienced as contradictory. For instance, pupils may accept that narratives of their own experience in their own social dialects are 'appropriate' in designated discussion sections of lessons, but not in designated teaching sections or in written work; or again, the contradictions between what is allowed in one place but not in another may become a basis for struggle to shift boundaries between discussion, teaching and writing. The acceptability of personal experience narratives, even in a strictly delimited part of classroom activity, may be a compromise outcome of earlier boundary struggles to get them into the classroom in the first place.

What applies for boundaries between subject positions and associated discursive conventions applies generally for elements of orders of discourse. It applies also for boundaries between distinct orders of discourse. The school and its order of discourse may be experienced as being in a complementary and non-overlapping relationship with adjacent domains such as the home or neighbourhood, or on the other hand perceived contradictions between such domains may become the basis for struggles to redefine their boundaries and relationships, struggles to extend the properties of the parent - child relationship and its discursive conventions to the teacher - pupil relationship or vice-versa, for example, or to extend peer relationships and practices in the neighbourhood and the street into the school.

The outcomes of such struggles are rearticulations of orders of discourse, both of relations between elements in 'local' orders of discourse such as that of the school, and of relations between local orders of discourse in a societal order of discourse. Consequently, boundaries between elements (as well as local orders of discourse) may shift between relatively strong or relatively weak (see Bernstein 1981) depending upon their current articulation: elements may be discrete and well-defined, or they may be fuzzy and ill-defined.

Nor should it be assumed that these 'elements' are themselves

internally homogeneous. A consequence of the articulatory struggle I am envisaging is that new elements are constituted through the redrawing of boundaries between old elements. An element may therefore be heterogeneous in its origins, and while that historical heterogeneity may not be experienced as such when conventions are highly naturalized, it may be experienced in different conditions as a contradiction within the element. An example would be a familiar teaching style which consists of the teacher engaging in a structured question – answer routine with pupils to elicit from them predetermined information. This style is not necessarily experienced in terms of a contradiction arising from teachers purporting to ask their pupils when they are actually in the business of telling them, but it is open to being experienced in this way. If we apply the concept of investment here, we can say that elements, local orders of discourse, and societal orders of discourse are potentially experienced as contradictorily structured, and thereby open to having their existing political and ideological investments become the focus of contention in struggles to deinvest/reinvest them.

The elements I have referred to may be very variable in 'scale'. There are cases where they appear to correspond to a conventional understanding of a fully-fledged code or 'register' (Halliday 1978), as a bloc of variants at different levels with distinctive phonological patterns, vocabulary, grammatical patterns, turn-taking rules, and so on. Examples of such cases are the discourse of bingo sessions, or cattle auctions. In other cases, however, the variables are smaller scale: particular turn-taking systems, vocabularies which incorporate particular classification schemes, scripts for genres such as crime reports or oral narratives, sets of politeness conventions, and so forth. One point of contrast between orders of discourse is the extent to which such elements do solidify into relatively durable blocs. I shall suggest (pp. 125–8 below) a small number of different types of element: genres, styles, activity types, and discourses.

It may be enlightening at this point to recall a quotation from Foucault (p. 42 *above*) referring to the rules of formation of objects in psychopathology. The 'relations' which Foucault identifies as having been adopted in psychiatric discourse to enable the formation of the 'objects' he refers to, can be interpreted as relations between discursive elements of different scales:

'planes of specification' and 'planes of psychological characterization' are at least partially constituted in vocabularies, whereas the 'judicial interrogation' and the 'medical questionnaire' are discursive elements of a generic type (on genre, see p. 126). Note, however, that they are not just discursive elements. Police investigation, clinical examination, and therapeutic and punitive confinement may have discursive components but they are not *per se* discursive entities. Foucault's descriptions highlight the mutual imbrication of the discursive and the non-discursive in the structural conditions for social practice. In this light, orders of discourse may be regarded as discursive facets of social orders, whose internal articulation and rearticulation have the same nature.

The focus so far has been mainly upon what makes discourse like other forms of social practice. I now need to correct the balance by addressing the question of what makes discursive practice specifically discursive. Part of the answer is evidently language: discursive practice is manifested in linguistic form, in the form of what I shall refer to as 'texts', using 'text' in Halliday's broad sense of spoken as well as written language (Halliday 1978). If being an instance of social (political, ideological, etc.) practice is one dimension of a discursive event, being a text is another.

However, this is not enough. These two dimensions are mediated by a third which focuses on discourse as a specifically discursive practice. 'Discursive practice' does not here contrast with 'social practice': the former is a particular form of the latter. In some cases, the social practice may be wholly constituted by the discursive practice, while in others it may involve a mixture of discursive and non-discursive practice. Analysis of a particular discourse as a piece of discursive practice focuses upon processes of text production, distribution and consumption. All of these processes are social and require reference to the particular economic, political and institutional settings within which discourse is generated. Production and consumption have a partially socio-cognitive nature, in that they involve cognitive processes of text production and interpretation which are based upon internalized social structures and conventions (hence the 'socio-' prefix). In the account of these sociocognitive processes, one concern is to specify which (elements of) orders of discourse (as well as other

social resources, called 'members' resources') are drawn upon, and how, in the production and interpretation of meanings. The central concern is to trace explanatory connections between ways (normative, innovative, etc.) in which texts are put together and interpreted, how texts are produced, distributed and consumed in a wider sense, and the nature of the social practice in terms of its relation to social structures and struggles. One can neither reconstruct the production process nor account for the interpretation process purely by reference to texts: they are respectively traces of and cues to these processes, and can be neither produced nor interpreted without members' resources. A way of linking this emphasis on discursive practice and processes of text production, distribution and consumption to the text itself is to focus upon the intertextuality of the latter: see the section 'Discursive Practice' below.

This three-dimensional conception of discourse is represented diagrammatically in figure 3.1. It is an attempt to bring together three analytical traditions, each of which is indispensable for discourse analysis. These are the tradition of close textual and linguistic analysis within linguistics, the macrosociological tradition of analysing social practice in relation to social structures, and the interpretivist or microsociological tradition of seeing social practice as something which people actively produce and make sense of on the basis of shared commonsense procedures. I accept the interpretivist claim that we must try to understand how members of social communities produce their 'orderly' or 'accountable' worlds. I take analysis of the sociocognitive processes within discursive practice to be partly dedicated to this objective (though I suggest below that it has 'macro' as well as 'micro' dimensions). I would argue, however, that in so producing their world, members' practices are shaped in ways of which they are usually unaware by social structures, relations of power, and the nature of the social practice they are engaged in whose stakes always go beyond producing meanings. Thus their procedures and practices may be politically and ideologically invested, and they may be positioned as subjects (and 'members') by them. I would also argue that members' practice has outcomes and effects upon social structures, social relations, and social struggles around them, of which again they are usually unaware. And finally, I would argue that the procedures which members use are




Figure 3.1 Three-dimensional conception of discourse

themselves heterogeneous and contradictory, and contested in struggles which partly have a discursive nature. The part of the procedure which deals with the analysis of texts can be called 'description', and the parts which deal with analysis of discourse practice and with analysis of the social practice of which the discourse is a part can be called 'interpretation'. (See further pp. 198-9 below on this distinction.)

Discourse as Text

For reasons which will become clear later, one never really talks about features of a text without some reference to text production and/or interpretation. Because of this overlap, the division of analytical topics between text analysis and analysis of discursive

practice (and so between the analytical activities of description and interpretation) is not a sharp one. Where formal features of texts are most salient, topics are included here; where productive and interpretative processes are most salient, topics are dealt with under analysis of discursive practice, even though they involve formal features of texts. What I give under these two headings is a broad analytical framework or model; selective more detailed accounts of analytical topics will be found in chapters 4 and 5.

It is a sensible working hypothesis to assume that any sort of textual feature is potentially significant in discourse analysis. This raises a major difficulty. Language analysis is a complex and sometimes quite technical sphere in its own right, which incorporates many types and techniques of analysis. Although a background-in-linguistics may in principle be a prerequisite to doing discourse analysis, discourse analysis is in fact a multidisciplinary activity, and one can no more assume a detailed linguistic background from its practitioners than one can assume detailed backgrounds in sociology, psychology or politics. In these circumstances, what I have set out to do is (i) offer in this chapter a very general analytical framework which is intended to give readers a large-scale map of the terrain; (ii) identify for more detailed treatment and illustration in chapters 4-6 selective analytical focuses which seem especially fruitful in discourse analysis; (iii) dispense as far as possible with forbidding technicality and jargon; and (iv) provide references for those who wish to pursue particular lines of analysis.

Some of the categories in the framework for text analysis below appear to be oriented to language forms, while others appear to be oriented to meanings. This distinction is a misleading one, however, because in analysing texts one is always simultaneously addressing questions of form and questions of meaning. In the terminology of much of twentieth-century linguistics and semiotics, one is analysing 'signs', that is words or longer stretches of text which consist of a meaning combined with a form, or a 'signified' combined with a 'signifier' (see de Saussure 1959). Saussure and others within the linguistics tradition have emphasized the 'arbitrary' nature of the sign, the view that there is no motivated or rational basis for combining a particular signifier with a particular signified. As against this, critical approaches to discourse analysis make the assumption that signs are socially

motivated, i.e. that there are social reasons for combining particular signifiers with particular signifieds. (I am grateful to Gunther Kress for discussions on this issue.) This may be a matter of vocabulary - 'terrorist' and 'freedom fighter' are contrasting combinations of signifier and signified, and the contrast between them is a socially motivated one - or a matter of grammar (see examples below), or other dimensions of language organization.

Another important distinction in relation to meanings is between the meaning potential of a text, and its interpretation. Texts are made up of forms which past discursive practice, condensed into conventions, has endowed with meaning potential. The meaning potential of a form is generally heterogeneous, a complex of diverse, overlapping and sometimes contradictory meanings (see Fairclough 1990a), so that texts are usually highly ambivalent and open to multiple interpretations. Interpreters usually reduce this potential ambivalence by opting for a particular meaning, or a small set of alternative meanings. Providing we bear in mind this dependence of meaning upon interpretation, we can use 'meaning' both for the potentials of forms, and for the meanings ascribed in interpretation.

Text analysis can be organized under four main headings: 'vocabulary', 'grammar', 'cohesion', and 'text structure'. These can be thought of as ascending in scale: vocabulary deals mainly with individual words, grammar deals with words combined into clauses and sentences, cohesion deals with how clauses and sentences are linked together, and text structure deals with large-scale organizational properties of texts. In addition, I distinguish a further three main headings which will be used in analysis of discursive practice rather than text analysis, though they certainly involve formal features of texts: the 'force' of utterances, i.e. what sorts of speech acts (promises, requests, threats etc.) they constitute; the 'coherence' of texts; and the 'intertextuality' of texts. Together, these seven headings constitute a framework for analysing texts which covers aspects of their production and interpretation as well as formal properties of text.

The main unit of grammar is the clause, or 'simple sentence', for example the newspaper headline 'Gorbachev Rolls Back the Red Army'. The main elements of clauses are usually called 'groups' or 'phrases', for example 'the Red Army', 'Rolls Back'. Clauses combine to make up complex sentences. My comments here will be restricted to certain aspects of the clause.

Every clause is multifunctional, and so every clause is a combination of ideational, interpersonal (identity and relational), and textual meanings (see pp. 64–5 above). People make choices about the design and structure of their clauses which amount to choices about how to signify (and construct) social identities, social relationships, and knowledge and belief. Let me illustrate with the newspaper headline above. In terms of ideational meaning, the clause is transitive: it signifies a process of a particular individual acting physically (note the metaphor) upon an entity. We might well see here a different ideological investment from other ways of signifying the same events, for example 'The Soviet Union Reduces its Armed Forces', or 'The Soviet Army Gives up 5 Divisions'. In terms of interpersonal meaning, the clause is declarative (as opposed to interrogative, or imperative), and contains a present tense form of the verb which is categorically authoritative. The writer-reader relationship here is that between someone telling what is the case in no uncertain terms, and someone being told; these are the two subject positions set up in the clause. Thirdly, there is a textual aspect: 'Gorbachev' is topic or theme of the clause, as the first part of a clause usually is; the article is about him and his doings. On the other hand, if the clause were made into a passive, that would make 'the Red Army' the theme: 'The Red Army is Rolled Back (by Gorbachev)'. Another possibility offered by the passive is the deletion of the (bracketed) agent, because the agent is unknown, already known, judged irrelevant, or perhaps in order to leave agency and hence responsibility vague. The Critical linguistics approach is particularly interesting on grammar (Fowler et al. 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979). Leech, Deuchar and Hoogenraad (1982) is an accessible introduction to grammar, and Halliday (1985) is a more advanced account of a form of grammar particularly useful in discourse analysis.

'Vocabulary' can be investigated in a great many ways, and the comments here and in chapter 6 are very selective. One point that needs to be made is that it is of limited value to think of a language as having a vocabulary which is documented in 'the' dictionary, because there are a great many overlapping and competing vocabularies corresponding to different domains, institutions, practices, values, and perspectives. The terms 'wording', 'lexicalization' and 'signification' (on these and other aspects of

vocabulary, see Kress and Hodge 1979; Mey 1985) capture this better than 'vocabulary', because they imply processes of wording (lexicalizing, signifying) the world which happen differently in different times and places and for different groups of people.

One focus for analysis is upon alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance, upon such issues as how domains of experience may be 'reworded' as part of social and political struggles (the example of rewording 'terrorists' as 'freedom fighters' or vice-versa is well known), or how certain domains come to be more intensively worded than others. Another focus is word meaning, and particularly how the meanings of words come into contention within wider struggles: I shall suggest that particular structurings of the relationships between words and the relationships between the meanings of a word are forms of hegemony. A third focus is upon metaphor, upon the ideological and political import of particular metaphors, and conflict between alternative metaphors.

In looking at 'cohesion' (see Halliday and Hasan 1976; Halliday 1985), one is looking at how clauses are linked together into sentences, and how sentences are in turn linked together to form larger units in texts. Linkage is achieved in various ways: through using vocabulary from a common semantic field, repeating words, using near-synonyms, and so forth; through a variety of referring and substituting devices (pronouns, definite article, demonstratives, ellipsis of repeated words, and so forth); through using conjunctive words, such as 'therefore', 'however', 'and' and 'but'. Focusing upon cohesion is a way into what Foucault refers to as 'various rhetorical schemata according to which groups of statements may be combined (how descriptions, deductions, definitions, whose succession characterizes the architecture of a text, are linked together' (see p. 46 above). These schemata, and particular aspects of them such as the argumentative structure of texts, vary across discourse types, and it is interesting to explore such variations as evidence of different modes of rationality, and changes in modes of rationality as discourse practices change.

'Text structure' (see de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Coulthard 1977; Brown and Yule 1983; Stubbs 1983) also concerns the 'architecture' of texts, and specifically higher-level design features of different types of text: what elements or episodes are combined in what ways and what order to constitute, for example, a crime

report in a newspaper, or a job interview. Such structuring conventions can give a lot of insight into the systems of knowledge and belief and the assumptions about social relationships and social identities that are built into the conventions of text types. As these examples suggest, we are concerned with the structure of monologue and dialogue. The latter involves turn-taking systems and conventions for organizing the exchange of speaker turns, as well as conventions for opening and closing interviews or conversations.

Discursive Practice

Discursive practice, as I indicated above, involves processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors. For example, texts are produced in specific ways in specific social contexts: a newspaper article is produced through complex routines of a collective nature, by a team whose members are variously involved in its different stages of production – accessing sources such as press agency reports, transforming these sources (often themselves already texts) into a draft report, deciding where to place the report in the newspaper, and editing the report (for a detailed account, and more generally on discourse processes, see van Dijk 1988).

There are other ways in which the concept of 'text producer' is more complicated than it may seem. It is useful to deconstruct the producer into a set of positions, which may be occupied by the same person or by different people. Goffman (1981: 144) suggests a distinction between 'animator', the person who actually makes the sounds, or the marks on paper, 'author', the one who puts the words together and is responsible for the wording, and 'principal', the one whose position is represented by the words. In newspaper articles, there is some ambiguity about the relationship between these positions: the principal is often a 'source' outside the newspaper, but some reports do not make that clear, and give the impression that the principal is the newspaper (its editor, or a journalist); and texts which are collectively authored are often written as if they were authored by an individual journalist

(who might at best be animator). (See Fairclough 1988b for an example.)

Texts are also consumed differently in different social contexts. This is partly a matter of the sort of interpretative work which is applied to them (such as close scrutiny, or semi-focused attention in the course of doing other things), and partly of the modes of interpretation which are available; recipes, for instance, are not usually read as aesthetic texts, or academic articles as rhetorical texts, though both kinds of reading are possible. Consumption like production may be individual or collective: compare love letters with administrative records. Some texts (official interviews, great poems) are recorded, transcribed, preserved, re-read; others (unsolicited publicity, casual conversations) are transitory, unrecorded, thrown away. Some texts (political speeches, textbooks) are transformed into other texts. Institutions have specific routines for 'processing' texts: a medical consultation is transformed into a medical record which may be used to compile medical statistics (see pp. 130–3 below for a discussion of such 'intertextual chains'). Furthermore, texts have variable outcomes of an extra-discursive as well as a discursive sort. Some texts lead to wars or to the destruction of nuclear weapons; others to people losing or gaining jobs; others again change people's attitudes, beliefs or practices.

Some texts have a simple distribution – a casual conversation belongs only to the immediate context of situation in which it occurs – whereas others have a complex distribution. Texts produced by political leaders, or texts within international arm negotiation, are distributed across a range of different institutional domains, each of which has its own patterns of consumption, and its own routines for reproducing and transforming texts. Television viewers, for instance, receive a transformed version of a speech given by Thatcher or Gorbachev, which is consumed in accordance with particular viewing habits and routines. Producers within sophisticated organizations such as government departments produce texts in ways which anticipate their distribution, transformation, and consumption, and have multiple audiences built into them. They may anticipate not only 'addressees' (those directly addressed), but also 'hearers' (those not addressed directly, but assumed to be part of audience), and 'overhearsers' (those

who do not constitute part of the 'official' audience but are known to be *de facto* consumers (for example, Soviet officials are overhearers in communications between NATO governments). And each of these positions may be multiply occupied.

As I indicated above, there are specifically 'sociocognitive' dimensions of text production and interpretation, which centre upon the interplay between the members' resources which discourse participants have internalized and bring with them to text processing, and the text itself, as a set of 'traces' of the production process, or a set of 'cues' for the interpretation process. These processes generally proceed in a nonconscious and automatic way, which is an important factor in determining their ideological effectiveness (see further below), though certain aspects of them are more easily brought to consciousness than others.

Processes of production and interpretation are socially constrained in a double sense. Firstly, they are constrained by the available members' resources, which are effectively internalized social structures, norms and conventions, including orders of discourse, and conventions for the production, distribution and consumption of texts of the sort just referred to, and which have been constituted through past social practice and struggle. Secondly, they are constrained by the specific nature of the social practice of which they are parts, which determines what elements of members' resources are drawn upon, and how (in normative or creative, acquiescent or oppositional ways) they are drawn upon. A major feature of the three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis is that it attempts to explore these constraints, especially the second – to make explanatory connections between the nature of the discourse processes in particular instances, and the nature of the social practices they are a part of. Given the focus in this book on discursive and social change, it is this aspect of discursive processes – determining what aspects of members' resources are drawn upon and how – that is of most interest. I return to it below in the discussion of intertextuality.

But first I want to say a little in more general terms about the sociocognitive aspects of production and interpretation, and to introduce two more of the seven dimensions of analysis: 'force' and 'coherence'. The production or interpretation of a text (I shall refer just to interpretation in some of the discussion below) is usually represented as a multilevel process, and a 'bottom-up–

top-down' process. Lower levels analyse a sequence of sounds or marks on paper into sentences. Higher levels are concerned with meaning, the ascription of meanings to sentences, to whole texts, and to parts or 'episodes' of a text which consist of sentences which can be interpreted as coherently connected. Meanings for 'higher' units are in part built up from meanings for 'lower' units. This is 'bottom-up' interpretation. However, interpretation is also characterized by predictions about the meanings of higher-level units early in the process of interpreting them on the basis of limited evidence, and these predicted meanings shape the way lower-level units are interpreted. This is 'top-down' processing. Production and interpretation are partly 'top-down' and partly 'bottom up'. In addition, interpretation is taking place in real time: the interpretation which has already been arrived at for word, or sentence, or episode x will exclude certain otherwise possible interpretations for word, sentence, or episode $x + 1$ (see Fairclough 1989a).

These aspects of text processing help to explain how interpreters reduce the potential ambivalence of texts, and show part of the effect of context in reducing ambivalence, in a narrow sense of 'context' as that which precedes (or follows) in a text. However, 'context' also includes what is sometimes called the 'context of situation': interpreters arrive at interpretations of the totality of the social practice of which the discourse is a part, and these interpretations lead to predictions about the meanings of texts which again reduce ambivalence by excluding certain otherwise possible meanings. This is in a sense an elaboration of the 'top-down' properties of interpretation.

A major limitation of the sort of account of sociocognitive processes given above is that it is generally put in universal terms, as if, for example, the effect of context on meaning and the reduction of ambivalence were always the same. But this is not the case. How context affects the interpretation of text varies from one discourse type to another, as Foucault pointed out (see pp. 47–8 above). And differences between discourse types in this respect are socially interesting because they point to implicit assumptions and ground rules which often have an ideological character. Let me illustrate these points through a discussion of 'force' (see Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Leech and Thomas 1989).

The force of part of a text (often, but not always, a sentence-sized part) is its actional component, a part of its interpersonal meaning, what it is being used to do socially, what 'speech act(s)' it is being used to 'perform' (give an order, ask a question, threaten, promise, etc.). Force is in contrast with 'proposition': the propositional component, which is part of ideational meaning, is the process or relationship that is predicated of the entities. So in the case of 'I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of £5', the force is that of a promise, whereas the proposition might be schematically represented as 'x pay y to z'. Parts of texts are typically ambivalent in terms of force, and they may have extensive 'force potential'. For instance, 'Can you carry the suitcase?' could be a question, a request or order, a suggestion, a complaint, and so on. Some analyses of speech acts distinguish between direct and indirect force; we might say in this case that we have something with the direct force of a question which might also have any of the other forces listed as its indirect force. Moreover, it is by no means uncommon for interpretations to remain ambivalent: on occasion, it may not be clear whether we have a simple question, or also a veiled (and so, if challenged, deniable) request.

'Context' in both senses above is an important factor in reducing the ambivalence of force. Sequential position in the text is a powerful predictor of force. In a cross-examination, anything that counsel says to a witness immediately following an answer from the witness is likely to be interpreted as a question (which does not preclude it being simultaneously interpreted as other things, such as an accusation). This helps to explain how it is that forms of words can have forces which seem highly unlikely: if one considers them out of context. And, of course, the context of situation, the overall nature of the social context, also reduces ambivalence.

However, before an interpreter can draw upon either context of situation, or indeed sequential context, to interpret the force of an utterance, she must have arrived at an interpretation of what the context of situation is. This is analogous to interpreting text: it involves an interplay between cues and members' resources, but the members' resources in this case is in effect a mental map of the social order. Such a mental map is necessarily just one interpretation of social realities which are amenable to many inter-

pretations, politically and ideologically invested in particular ways. Pin-pointing the context of situation in terms of this mental map provides two bodies of information relevant to determining how context affects the interpretation of text in any particular case: a reading of the situation which foregrounds certain elements, backgrounds others, and relates elements to each other in certain ways; and a specification of which discursive types are likely to be relevant.

Thus one effect upon interpretation of the reading of the situation is to foreground or background aspects of the social identity of participants, so that for example the gender, ethnicity, or age of the text producer are much less likely to affect interpretation in the case of a botany textbook than in the case of a casual conversation or a job interview. Thus the effect of context of situation upon text interpretation (and text production) depends upon the reading of the situation. The effect of sequential context, on the other hand, depends upon discourse type. For example, we cannot assume that a question will always predispose to the same degree the interpretation of the utterance which follows it as an answer; it depends on the discourse type. In classroom discourse, questions strongly predict answers; in conversational discourse, within a family, questions may routinely go unanswered without any real sense of infringement or need for repair. A one-sided emphasis on sequential context as determining interpretation without recognition of such variables is an unsatisfactory feature of Conversation analysis, as I argued in chapter 2 above. Moreover, differences between discourse types of this order are socially important: where questions must be answered, the likelihood is that asymmetries of status between sharply demarcated subject roles are taken as given. So investigating the interpretative principles that are used to determine meaning gives insight into the political and ideological investment of a discourse type.

Let us now turn from force to 'coherence' (see de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: chapter 5; Brown and Yule 1983: chapter 7). Coherence is often treated as a property of texts, but it is better regarded as a property of interpretations. A coherent text is a text whose constituent parts (episodes, sentences) are meaningfully related so that the text as a whole 'makes sense', even though there may be relatively few formal markers of those meaningful relationships – that is, relatively little explicit 'cohesion' (see the

last section). The point is, however, that a text only makes sense to someone who makes sense of it, someone who is able to infer those meaningful relations in the absence of explicit markers. But the particular way in which a coherent reading is generated for a text depends again upon the nature of the interpretative principles that are being drawn upon. Particular interpretative principles come to be associated in a naturalized way with particular discourse types, and such linkages are worth investigating for the light they shed on the important ideological functions of coherence in interpellating subjects. That is, texts set up positions for interpreting subjects that are 'capable' of making sense of them, and 'capable' of making the connections and inferences, in accordance with relevant interpretative principles, necessary to generate coherent readings. These connections and inferences may rest upon assumptions of an ideological sort. For instance, what establishes the coherent link between the two sentences 'She's giving up her job next Wednesday. She's pregnant' is the assumption that women cease to work when they have children. In so far as interpreters take up these positions and automatically make these connections, they are being subjected by and to the text, and this is an important part of the ideological 'work' of texts and discourse in 'interpellating' subjects (see the next section). There is, however, the possibility not only of struggle over different readings of texts, but also of resistance to the positions set up in texts.

Let me now turn to the last of the seven dimensions of analysis, and the one which is most salient in the concerns of this book: 'intertextuality' (see Bakhtin 1981, 1986; Kristeva 1986a). I shall devote the whole of chapter 4 to intertextuality, so discussion here can be quite brief. Intertextuality is basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth. In terms of production, an intertextual perspective stresses the historicity of texts: how they always constitute additions to existing 'chains of speech communication' (Bakhtin 1986: 94) consisting of prior texts to which they respond. In terms of distribution, an intertextual perspective is helpful in exploring relatively stable networks which texts move along, undergoing predictable transformations as they shift from one text type to another (for instance, political

speeches are often transformed into news reports). And in terms of consumption, an intertextual perspective is helpful in stressing that it is not just 'the text', not indeed just the texts that intertextually constitute it, that shape interpretation, but also those other texts which interpreters variably bring to the interpretation process.

I shall draw a distinction between 'manifest intertextuality', where specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text, and 'interdiscursivity' or 'constitutive intertextuality'. Interdiscursivity extends intertextuality in the direction of the principle of the primacy of the order of discourse which I discussed above, p. 68. On the one hand, we have the heterogeneous constitution of texts out of specific other texts (manifest intertextuality); on the other hand, the heterogeneous constitution of texts out of elements (types of convention) of orders of discourse (interdiscursivity).

The concept of intertextuality sees texts historically as transforming the past – existing conventions and prior texts – into the present. This may happen in relatively conventional and normative ways: discourse types tend to turn particular ways of drawing upon conventions and texts into routines, and to naturalize them. However, this may happen creatively, with new configurations of elements of orders of discourse, and new modes of manifest intertextuality. It is the inherent historicity of an intertextual view of texts, and the way it so readily accommodates creative practice, that make it so suitable for my present concerns with discursive change, though as I shall argue below (pp. 93–4) it needs to be linked to a theory of social and political change for the investigation of discursive change within wider processes of cultural and social change.

Analysis of discursive practice should, I believe, involve a combination of what one might call 'micro-analysis' and 'macro-analysis'. The former is the sort of analysis which conversation analysis excel at: the explication of precisely how participants produce and interpret texts on the basis of their members' resources. But this must be complemented with macro-analysis in order to know the nature of the members' resources (including orders of discourse) that is being drawn upon in order to produce and interpret texts, and whether it is being drawn upon in normative or creative ways. Indeed, one cannot carry out micro-analysis

without knowing this. And, of course, micro-analysis is the best place to uncover that information: as such, it provides evidence for macro-analysis. Micro- and macro-analysis are therefore mutual requisites. It is because of their interrelationship that the dimension of discursive practice in my three-dimensional framework can mediate the relationship between the dimensions of social practice and text; it is the nature of the social practice that determines the macro-processes of discursive practice, and it is the micro-processes that shape the text.

One implication of the position I have adopted in this section is that how people interpret texts in various social circumstances is a question requiring separate investigation. While the framework I have presented points to the importance of considering interpretation in its own right, it should be noted that empirical studies are not included in this book. (For discussion of research on the interpretation of mass media texts, see Morley 1980 and Thompson 1990: chapter 6.)

Discourse as Social Practice: Ideology and Hegemony

My objective in this section is to spell out more clearly aspects of the third dimension in my three-dimensional framework, discourse as social practice. More specifically, I shall discuss discourse in relation to ideology and to power, and place discourse within a view of power as hegemony, and a view of the evolution of power relations as hegemonic struggle. In doing so, I draw upon the classic contributions to twentieth-century Marxism of Althusser and Gramsci, which (despite the increasing contemporary unfashionability of Marxism) provide a rich framework for investigating discourse as a form of social practice, though with important reservations, especially in the case of Althusser.

Ideology

The theorization of ideology which has been most influential in recent debate about discourse and ideology is surely that of Althusser (Althusser 1971; Larrain 1979), which I briefly referred

to in discussing Pêcheux in chapter 1. In fact, Althusser can be regarded as having provided the theoretical bases for the debate, although Volosinov (1973) was a much earlier substantive contribution.

The theoretical bases I have in mind are three important claims about ideology. First, the claim that it has a material existence in the practices of institutions, which opens up the way to investigating discursive practices as material forms of ideology. Second, the claim that ideology 'interpellates subjects', which leads to the view that one of the more significant 'ideological effects' which linguists ignore in discourse (according to Althusser 1971: 161 n. 16) is the constitution of subjects. Third, the claim that 'ideological state apparatuses' (institutions such as education or the media) are both sites of and stakes in class struggle, which points to struggle in and over discourse as a focus for an ideologically-oriented discourse analysis.

If the debate about ideology and discourse has been heavily influenced by these positions, it has also been plagued by the widely acknowledged limitations of Althusser's theory. In particular, Althusser's work contains an unresolved contradiction between a vision of domination as the one-sided imposition and reproduction of a dominant ideology, in which ideology figures like a universal social cement, and his insistence upon apparatuses as the site and stake of a constant class struggle whose outcome is always in the balance. In effect, it is the former vision which is predominant, and there is a marginalization of struggle, contradiction and transformation.

I shall understand ideologies to be significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination. (This is similar to the position of Thompson (1984, 1990) that certain uses of language and other 'symbolic forms' are ideological, namely those which serve, in specific circumstances, to establish or sustain relations of domination.) The ideologies embedded in discursive practices are most effective when they become naturalized, and achieve the status of 'common sense'; but this stable and established property of ideologies should not be overstated, because my reference to 'transformation' points to ideological

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struggle as a dimension of discursive practice, a struggle to reshape discursive practices and the ideologies built into them in the context of the restructuring or transformation of relations of domination. Where contrasting discursive practices are in use in a particular domain or institution, the likelihood is that part of that contrast is ideological.

I maintain that ideology invests language in various ways at various levels, and that we do not have to choose between different possible 'locations' of ideology, all of which seem partly justified and none of which seems entirely satisfactory (see Fairclough 1989b for a more detailed account of the position I adopt here). The key issue is whether ideology is a property of structures or a property of events, and the answer is 'both'. And the key problem is to find, as I have already been suggesting in the discussion of discourse, a satisfactory account of the dialectic of structures and events.

A number of accounts make ideology a property of structures by locating it in some form of convention underlying language practice, be it a 'code', 'structure', or 'formation'. This has the virtue of showing events to be constrained by social conventions, but it has the disadvantage already referred to of tending to defocus the event on the assumption that events are mere instantiations of structures, privileging the perspective of ideological reproduction rather than that of transformation, and tending to represent conventions as more clearly bounded than they really are. Pêcheux in his earlier work is a case in point. Another weakness of the structure option is that it does not recognize the primacy of orders of discourse over particular discourse conventions: we need to take account of ideological investments of (parts of) orders of discourse, not just individual conventions, and of the possibility of diverse and contradictory sorts of investment. An alternative to the structure option is to locate ideology in the discursive event, highlighting ideology as a process, transformation, and fluidity. But this can lead to an illusion of discourse as free processes of formation, unless there is a simultaneous emphasis on orders of discourse.

There is also a textual view of the location of ideology, which one finds in *Critical linguistics*: ideologies reside in texts. While it is true that the forms and content of texts do bear the imprint of (are traces of) ideological processes and structures, it is not pos-

sible to 'read off' ideologies from texts. As I argued in chapter 2, this is because meanings are produced through interpretations of texts, and texts are open to diverse interpretations which may differ in their ideological import, and because ideological processes appertain to discourses as whole social events – they are processes between people – not just to the texts which are moments of such events. Claims to discover ideological processes solely through text analysis run into the problem now familiar in media sociology, that text 'consumers' (readers, viewers) appear sometimes to be quite immune to effects of ideologies which are supposedly 'in' the texts (Morley 1980).

I prefer the view that ideology is located both in the structures (i.e. orders of discourse) which constitute the outcome of past events and the conditions for current events, and in events themselves as they reproduce and transform their conditioning structures. It is an accumulated and naturalized orientation which is built into norms and conventions, as well as an ongoing work to naturalize and denaturalize such orientations in discursive events.

A further substantive question about ideology is what features or levels of text and discourse may be ideologically invested. A common claim is that it is 'meanings', and especially word meanings (sometimes specified as 'content', as opposed to 'form'), that are ideological (e.g. Thompson 1984). Word meanings are important, of course, but so too are other aspects of meaning, such as presuppositions (see pp. 120–1 below), metaphors (see pp. 194–8 below), and coherence. I have already pointed out in the previous section how important coherence is in the ideological constitution of subjects.

A rigid opposition between 'content' or 'meaning' and 'form', is misleading because the meanings of texts are closely intertwined with the forms of texts, and formal features of texts at various levels may be ideologically invested. For example, the representation of slumps and unemployment as akin to natural disasters may involve a preference for intransitive and attributive, rather than transitive, sentence structures ('The currency has lost its value, millions are out of work', as opposed to 'Investors are buying gold, firms have sacked millions'; see pp. 177–85 below for these terms). At a different level, the turn-taking system in a classroom, or the politeness conventions operating between secretary and manager, imply particular ideological assumptions

about the social identities of, and social relationships between, teachers and pupils, and managers and secretaries. Further and more detailed examples will be given in the sample texts of chapters 4-6. Even aspects of the 'style' of a text may be ideologically invested: see my analysis (pp. 131-3 below) of how the style of a Department of Trade and Industry brochure contributes to constituting 'the enterprising self' as a type of social identity.

It should not be assumed that people are aware of the ideological dimensions of their own practice. Ideologies built into conventions may be more or less naturalized and automatized, and people may find it difficult to comprehend that their normal practices could have specific ideological investments. Even when one's practice can be interpreted as resistant and contributing to ideological change, one is not necessarily aware in detail of its ideological import. There is a strong case to be made for a mode of language education which emphasizes critical awareness of ideological processes in discourse, so that people can become more aware of their own practice, and be more critical of the ideologically invested discourses to which they are subjected (see Clark et al. 1988; Fairclough forthcoming a).

These comments on awareness can be linked to questions about the interpellation of subjects. The ideal case in the Althusserian account is that of the subject positioned in ideology in a way which disguises the action and effects of the latter, and gives the subject an imaginary autonomy. This suggests discursive conventions of a highly naturalized sort. But people are actually 'subjected' in different and contradictory ways; this consideration begins to cast doubt upon the ideal case. When subjection is contradictory - when a person operating in a single institutional framework and a single set of practices is interpellated from various positions and pulled in different directions, as it were - naturalization may be difficult to sustain. Contradictory interpellation is likely to be manifested experientially in a sense of confusion or uncertainty, and a problematization of conventions (see 'Discursive change' below). These are the conditions under which awareness, as well as a transformative practice is most likely to develop.

The Althusserian account of the subject overstates the ideological constitution of subjects, and correspondingly understates the

capacity of subjects to act individually or collectively as agents, including engagement in critique of, and opposition to, ideological practices (see my reservations about Foucault in this regard, pp. 60-1 above). Here also it is important to adopt the dialectical position I advocated earlier: subjects are ideologically positioned, but they are also capable of acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed, and to restructure positioning practices and structures. The balance between the subject as ideological 'effect', and the subject as active agent, is a variable which depends upon social conditions such as the relative stability of relations of domination.

Is all discourse ideological? I have suggested that discursive practices are ideologically invested in so far as they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations. Relations of power may in principle be affected by discursive practices of any type, even scientific and theoretical. This precludes a categorical opposition between ideology and science or theory, which some writers on language/ideology have suggested (Zima 1981; Pêcheux 1982). But all discourse is not thereby irredeemably ideological. Ideologies arise in societies characterized by relations of domination on the basis of class, gender, cultural group, and so forth, and in so far as human beings are capable of transcending such societies, they are capable of transcending ideology. I do not therefore accept Althusser's view (1971) of 'ideology in general' as a form of social cement which is inseparable from society itself. In addition the fact that all types of discourse are open in principle, and no doubt to some extent in fact, in our society to ideological investment, does not mean that all types of discourse are ideologically invested to the same degree. It should not be too difficult to show that advertising is in broad terms more heavily invested than the physical sciences.

Hegemony

The concept of hegemony, which is the centrepiece of Gramsci's analysis of western capitalism and revolutionary strategy in western Europe (Gramsci 1971; Buci-Glucksmann 1980), harmonizes

with the view of discourse I have been advocating, and provides a way of theorizing change in relation to the evolution of power relations which allows a particular focus upon discursive change, but at the same time a way of seeing it as contributing to and being shaped by wider processes of change.

Hegemony is leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an 'unstable equilibrium'. Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent. Hegemony is a focus of constant struggle around points of greatest instability between classes and blocs, to construct or sustain or fracture alliances and relations of domination/subordination, which takes economic, political and ideological forms. Hegemonic struggle takes place on a broad front, which includes the institutions of civil society (education, trade unions, family), with possible unevenness between different levels and domains.

Ideology is understood within this framework in terms which anticipate all Althusser's advances (Buci-Glucksmann 1980: 66), in, for instance, its focusing of the implicit and unconscious materialization of ideologies in practices (which contain them as implicit theoretical 'premises'), ideology being 'a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual and collective life' (Gramsci 1971: 328). While the interpellation of subjects is an Althusserian elaboration, there is in Gramsci a conception of subjects as structured by diverse ideologies implicit in their practice which gives them a 'strangely composite' character (1971: 324), and a view of (common sense) as both a repository of the diverse effects of past ideological struggles, and a constant target for restructuring in ongoing struggles. In common sense, ideologies become naturalized, or automatized. Moreover, Gramsci conceived of 'the field of ideologies in terms of conflicting, overlapping, or intersecting currents or formations' (Hall 1988: 55-6), what he referred to as 'an ideological complex' (Gramsci 1971: 195). This suggests a focus upon the processes whereby ideological-

al complexes come to be structured and restructured, articulated and rearticulated. (There is important discussion of hegemony and articulation in Laclau and Mouffe (1985) which constitutes a precedent for my application of these concepts to discourse, though without the analysis of actual texts which I would see as essential to discourse analysis.)

Such a conception of hegemonic struggle in terms of the articulation, disarticulation and rearticulation of elements is in harmony with what I said earlier about discourse: the dialectical view of the relationship between discursive structures and events; seeing discursive structures as orders of discourse conceived as more or less unstable configurations of elements; and adopting a view of texts which centres upon their intertextuality and how they articulate prior texts and conventions. An order of discourse can be seen as the discursive facet of the contradictory and unstable equilibrium which constitutes a hegemony, and the articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle. Further, discursive practice, the production, distribution, and consumption (including interpretation) of texts, is a facet of hegemonic struggle which contributes in varying degrees to the reproduction or transformation not only of the existing order of discourse (for example, through the ways prior texts and conventions are articulated in text production), but also through that of existing social and power relations.

Let us take Thatcher's political discourse as an example. This can be interpreted as a rearticulation of the existing order of political discourse, which has brought traditional conservative, neo-liberal and populist discourses into a new mix, and has also constituted an unprecedented discourse of political power for a woman leader. This discursive rearticulation materializes an hegemonic project for the constitution of a new political base and agenda, itself a facet of the wider political project of restructuring the hegemony of the bloc centred upon the bourgeoisie in new economic and political conditions. Thatcher's discourse has been described in these terms by Hall (1988), and Fairclough (1989a) shows how such an analysis can be carried out in terms of a conception of discourse similar to that introduced above, in a way which accounts (as Hall does not) for the specific features of the language of Thatcher's political texts. I should add that the

rearticulated order of discourse is a contradictory one: authoritarian elements coexist with democratic and egalitarian ones (for instance, the inclusive pronoun 'we', which implies a claim to speak for ordinary people, coexists with use of 'you' as an indefinite pronoun in such examples as 'You get sick of the rain, don't you'), and patriarchal elements with feminist ones. The rearticulation of orders of discourse is, moreover, achieved not only in productive discursive practice but also in interpretation: making sense of Thatcher's texts requires interpreters who are capable of making coherent connections between their heterogeneous elements, and part of the hegemonic project is the constitution of interpreting subjects for whom such connections are natural and automatic.

However, most discourse bears upon hegemonic struggle in particular institutions (the family, schools, courts of law, etc.) rather than at the level of national politics, the protagonists (as it were) being not classes or political forces linked in such relatively direct ways to classes or blocs, but teachers and pupils, police and public, or women and men. Hegemony also provides both a model and a matrix in such cases. It provides a model: in education, for example the dominant groups also appear to exercise power through constituting alliances, integrating rather than merely dominating subordinate groups, winning their consent, achieving a precarious equilibrium which may be undermined by other groups, and doing so in part through discourse and through the constitution of local orders of discourse. It provides a matrix: the achievement of hegemony at a societal level requires a degree of integration of local and semi-autonomous institutions and power relations, so that the latter are partially shaped by hegemonic relations, and local struggles can be interpreted as hegemonic struggles. This directs attention to links across institutions, and links and movement between institutional orders of discourse (see chapter 7 below for an analysis of changes which transcend particular orders of discourse).

Although hegemony would seem to be the predominant organizational form of power in contemporary society, it is not the only one. There are also the remains of a previously more salient form in which domination is achieved by an uncompromising imposition of rules, norms and conventions. This seems to corre-

spond to a code model of discourse, which sees discourse in terms of the instantiation of codes with strong framing and classification (Bernstein 1981) and a highly regimented, normative practice. It contrasts with what we might call the 'articulation' model of discourse described above, which corresponds to a hegemonic organizational form. Code models are highly institution-oriented, whereas articulation models are more client/public-oriented: compare traditional and more recent forms of classroom discourse or doctor-patient discourse (I discuss specific examples of the latter in chapter 5 below). On the other hand, writers on post-modernism suggest an emergent organizational form of power which is rather difficult to pin-point, but which represents a further shift from institution-orientation associated with a postulated decentering of power, and seems to go with a 'mosaic' model of discourse which characterizes discursive practice as a constant minimally constrained rearticulation of elements. Discursive practice which seems to fit in with this model has been identified as 'post-modern' (Jameson 1984), and the clearest example is in advertising (see Fairclough 1989a: 197-211). I shall return to these models of discourse in chapter 7 below, in connection with a discussion of certain broad tendencies affecting contemporary orders of discourse.

To summarize, in the three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis introduced above, I identified as a major concern the tracing of explanatory connection-for-particular instances of discourse between the nature of the social practices of which they are a part, and the nature of their discursive practice, including sociocognitive aspects of their production and interpretation. The concept of hegemony helps us to do this, providing for discourse both a matrix - a way of analysing the social practice within which the discourse belongs in terms of power relations, in terms of whether they reproduce, restructure or challenge existing hegemonies - and a model - a way of analysing discursive practice itself as a mode of hegemonic struggle, reproducing, restructuring or challenging existing orders of discourse. This gives substance to the concept of the political investment of discursive practices, and, since hegemonies have ideological dimensions, a way of assessing the ideological investment of discursive practices. Hegemony also has the considerable virtue in the present context of

facilitating a focus upon change, which is my final concern in this chapter.

Discursive Change

The focus of this book is discursive change in relation to social and cultural change; its rationale has been given in the Introduction in terms of the functioning of discourse in contemporary social life. This should be a double focus, in accordance with the dialectic between orders of discourse and discursive practice or the discursive event. On the one hand, one needs to understand processes of change as they occur in discursive events. On the other hand, one needs an orientation to how processes of rearticulation affect orders of discourse. I now discuss these in turn.

The immediate origins and motivations of change in the discursive event lie in the problematization of conventions for producers or interpreters, which can happen in a variety of ways. For example, the problematization of conventions for interaction between women and men is a widespread experience in various institutions and domains. Such problematizations have their bases in contradictions – contradictions in this case between traditional gendered subject positions into which many of us were socialized, and new gender relations. On a rather different plane, Thatcher's political discourse can be seen to arise out of the problematization of traditional right-wing discursive practices in circumstances where contradictions become apparent between the social relations, subject positions and political practices they are based in, and a changing world. When problematizations arise, people are faced with what Billig et al. (1988) call 'dilemmas'. They often try to resolve these dilemmas by being innovative and creative, by adapting existing conventions in new ways, and so contributing to discursive change. The inherent intertextuality and therefore historicity of text production and interpretation (see p. 84 above) builds creativity in as an option. Change involves forms of transgression, crossing boundaries, such as putting together existing conventions in new combinations, or drawing upon conventions in situations which usually preclude them.

Such contradictions, dilemmas, and subjective apprehensions of problems in concrete situations have their social conditions

in structural contradictions and struggle at the institutional and societal levels. To pursue the example of gender relations, the contradictory positioning of individuals in discursive events, and the dilemmas that result from this, originate in structural contradictions in the gender relations within institutions and society as a whole. What crucially determines how these contradictions are reflected in specific events, however, is the relationship of those events to the struggles which are going on around these contradictions. To polarize possibilities which are a great deal more complex, a discursive event may be either a contribution to preserving and reproducing traditional gender relations and hegemonies and may therefore draw upon problematized conventions, or it may be a contribution to transforming those relations through hegemonic struggle and may therefore try to resolve the dilemmas through innovation. Discursive events themselves have cumulative effects upon social contradictions and the struggles around them. To sum up, then, sociocognitive processes will or will not be innovative and contribute to discursive change depending upon the nature of the social practice.

Let us turn to the textual dimension of discourse. Change leaves traces in texts in the form of the co-occurrence of contradictory or inconsistent elements – mixtures of formal and informal styles, technical and non-technical vocabularies, markers of authority and familiarity, more typically written and more typically spoken syntactic forms, and so forth. In so far as a particular tendency of discursive change 'catches on' and becomes solidified into an emergent new convention, what at first are perceived by interpreters as stylistically contradictory texts come to lose their patchwork effect and be 'seamless'. Such a process of naturalization is essential to establishing new hegemonies in the sphere of discourse.

This leads to our second focus, change in orders of discourse. As producers and interpreters combine discursive conventions, codes and elements in new ways in innovative discursive events, they are of course cumulatively producing structural changes in orders of discourse: they are disarticulating existing orders of discourse, and rearticulating new orders of discourse, new discursive hegemonies. Such structural changes may affect only the 'local' order of discourse of an institution, or they may transcend institutions and affect the societal order of discourse. The focus of

attention in investigating discursive change should keep alternating between the discursive event and such structural changes, because it is not possible to appreciate the import of the former for wider processes of social change without attending to the latter, just as it is not possible to appreciate how discourse contributes to social change without attending to the former.

Let me illustrate the sorts of issue one might investigate within studies of change in orders of discourse by referring to two related types of change which are currently affecting the societal order of discourse. (There is a more detailed discussion of these in chapter 7 below.) One is an apparent democratization of discourse which involves the reduction of overt markers of power asymmetry between people of unequal institutional power – teachers and pupils, managers and workers, parents and children, doctors and patients – which is evident in a great many different institutional domains. The other is what I have called 'synthetic personalization' (Fairclough 1989a), the simulation of private, face-to-face, discourse in public mass-audience discourse (print, radio, television). Both tendencies can be linked to a spread of conversational discourse from the private domain of the lifeworld into institutional domains. These social and discursive tendencies are established through struggle, and they are furthermore established with only a limited stability, with the prospect that their own heterogeneous elements will be experienced as contradictory and lead to further struggle and change.

One aspect of the openness of orders of discourse to struggle is that the elements of an order of discourse do not have ideological values or modes of ideological investment of a fixed sort. Consider counselling, for example, the apparently non-directive, non-judgemental, empathizing way of talking to people about themselves and their problems in a one-to-one situation. Counselling has its origins in therapy, but it now circulates as a technique across many institutional domains, as an effect of a significant restructuring of the order of discourse. But this development is highly ambivalent ideologically and politically. Most counsellors see themselves as giving space to people as individuals in a world which increasingly treats them as ciphers, which makes counselling look like a counter-hegemonic practice, and its colonization of ever new institutions a liberating change. However,

counselling is now used in preference to practices of an overtly disciplinary nature in various institutions, which makes it look like a hegemonic technique for subtly drawing aspects of people's private lives into the domain of power. Hegemonic struggle appears to occur partly through counselling and its expansion, and partly over it. This accords with Foucault's observation: 'Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy' (1981: 101).

Exploration of tendencies of change within orders of discourse can make a significant contribution to current debates on social change. Processes of marketization, the extension of market models to new spheres, can, for example, be investigated through the recent extensive colonization of orders of discourse by advertising and other discourse types (see Fairclough 1989a, and chapter 7 below). While democratization of discourse and synthetic personalization can be linked to substantive democratization in society, they are also arguably connected with marketization, and specifically with the apparent shift in power away from producers to consumers which has been associated with consumerism and the new hegemonies it entails. There could also usefully be a discursive dimension in debates on modernity and postmodernity. For example, can democratization and synthetic personalization and the spread of conversation to institutional domains be seen as aspects of a 'differentiation' of public and private domains (Jameson 1984), or a fragmentation of hitherto structured professional practices? (See chapter 7 for a fuller discussion.)

Conclusion

The approach to discourse and discourse analysis which I have set out in this chapter attempts to integrate a variety of theoretical perspectives and methods into what is, I hope, a powerful resource for studying discursive dimensions of social and cultural change. I have tried to combine aspects of a Foucaultian view

of discourse and a Bakhtinian emphasis on intertextuality: the former includes the vital emphasis upon the socially constructive properties of discourse, the latter emphasizes the 'texture' (Halliday and Hasan 1976) of texts and their composition from snatches of other texts, and both point to the way in which orders of discourse structure and are restructured by discourse practice. I have also tried to locate the dynamic view of discursive practice and of its relationship with social practice that emerges from this conjuncture within a Gramscian conceptualization of power and power struggle in terms of hegemony. At the same time, I have drawn upon other traditions in linguistics, text-based discourse analysis, and ethnomethodological conversation analysis for the textual analysis. The resulting framework does, I believe, allow one to combine social relevance and textual specificity in doing discourse analysis, and to come to grips with change.

4

Intertextuality

I introduced the concept of intertextuality in chapter 3 (p. 84 above), and pointed to its compatibility with the primacy I have ascribed to change in discourse, and the structuring and restructuring of orders of discourse. The concept of intertextuality was also referred to in chapter 2 as a significant element in Foucault's analyses of discourse. Recall his statement that 'there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactivate others' (1972: 98). My aim in this chapter is firstly to make the concept of intertextuality somewhat more concrete by using it to analyse texts, and secondly to set out rather more systematically the potential of the concept for discourse analysis, as a part of the development of an analytic framework.

The term 'intertextuality' was coined by Kristeva in the late 1960s in the context of her influential accounts for western audiences of the work of Bakhtin (see Kristeva 1986a, actually written in 1966). Although the term is not Bakhtin's, the development of an intertextual (or in his own terms 'translinguistic') approach to analysis of texts was a major theme of his work throughout his academic career, and was closely linked to other important issues including his theory of genre (see Bakhtin 1986, a paper he wrote in the early 1950s).

Bakhtin points to the relative neglect of the communicative functions of language within mainstream linguistics, and more specifically to the neglect of ways in which texts and utterances are shaped by prior texts that they are 'responding' to, and by subsequent texts that they 'anticipate'. For Bakhtin, all utterances,