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
PLATO'S EUTHYPHRO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES AND CRITO

EDITED WITH NOTES


BY

JOHN BURNET



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CRITO

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

CRITO was of the deme Alopece like Socrates and was of the same age (*Ap.* 33 d 9). Xenophon includes him in his list of true Socratics (*Mem.* i. 2, 48), and he was one of those who offered to become surety for the fine of 30 minae proposed by Socrates as an alternative to the death penalty (*Ap.* 38 b 6). Moreover (and this is important for a right understanding of the present dialogue) he appears to have offered to go bail that Socrates would not attempt to escape during the time which must elapse before the sacred boat returned from Delos (*Phaed.* 115 d 7 *πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς . . . ἡγγυᾶτο . . . ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν*).

This matter was put in the right light by Cook Wilson (C.R. xvi. 202). The reference is not to the period before the trial, since the offer was made *πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς*, and in any case an Athenian citizen was not, in ordinary cases, imprisoned or expected to find bail before his trial came on (cf. *Dict. Ant.* s.v. *Engye*). Nor can the reference be to the offer to become security for a fine, since the language of the *Phaedo* excludes this. As the offer was made before the court adjourned (*πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς*), it only remains to suppose that it was intended to spare Socrates the indignity of imprisonment during the time between the sentence and the return of the sacred boat from Delos. It was in fact unusual for Athenian citizens to be kept in prison unless the imprisonment was part of the sentence (cf. *Ap.* 37 c 2 *δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσω*). This offer of Crito was not accepted, as we know, and that seems to be implied by the imperfect *ἡγγυᾶτο*.

Crito was a wealthy man. Xenophon (*Mem.* ii. 9) tells a story, which he says he heard from Crito himself, of how he was blackmailed by *συκοφάνται* until, on the advice of Socrates, he attached to himself a poor but able man, Archedemus, who turned the tables

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on the blackmailers so successfully that they had to pay money to Crito instead of extorting it from him.

For the wealth of Crito see also *Euthyd.* 304 c 3. In his work entitled *Socrates*, Demetrius Phalereus stated that Crito looked after the investment of Socrates' patrimony. Cf. Plut. *Aristides* I καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ (Σωκράτει) φησὶν οὐ μόνον τὴν οἰκίαν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μνᾶς ἑβδομήκοντα τοκιζομένας ὑπὸ Κρίτωνος. We have seen already (*Ap.* 23 c 1 n.) that Socrates was not always poor, so there is no reason to doubt this very precise statement.

Xenophon refers in his *Apology* to the efforts made by the friends of Socrates to get him out of prison (§ 23 ἔπειτα τῶν ἐταίρων ἐκκλέψαι βουλομένων αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐφείπετο κτλ.). Xenophon was absent from Athens at the time, but the fact was, of course, notorious. Diogenes twice (ii. 60 and iii. 35) repeats a story that it was really Aeschines of Sphettos (see *Ap.* 33 e 1 n.) who advised Socrates to run away, but that Plato ascribed the conversation to Crito because he disliked Aeschines. The authority for this is Idomeneus of Lampsacus, and it is plainly, in this form, a piece of spiteful Epicurean tittle-tattle. Certainly the impecunious Aeschines cannot have used the arguments here attributed to Crito. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aeschines was also among the ἐταῖροι of Socrates who urged flight upon him, and it is even likely that he wrote a dialogue on the subject (cf. 44 b 2 n.).

The statement is commonly quoted from Herodicus (ap. Athen. 506 d) that Plato's *Crito* Σοφοκλέους περιέχει καταδρομήν. That, however, seems due to the confusion of the text. The reference is really to *Rep.* 329 c. See Kaibel's note *in loc.*

There is no inconsistency, such as Forman finds (*Selections*, p. 321), between the attitude of Socrates in the *Crito* and his disobedience to the arbitrary orders of the Thirty some years earlier (*Ap.* 32 c 4 sqq.). The Thirty were a temporary body appointed by the psephism of Dracontides to revise the laws, and they had no legal authority to do anything except what was necessary to carry out this duty. Certainly they were not entitled to put citizens to death without trial (ἀκρίτους), and their arbitrary acts are evidently included among the παράνομα referred to in *Ap.* 31 e 4. In *Ἀθ. Πολ.* 41, 2 Aristotle definitely calls the rule of the Thirty a τυραννίς, though they are not spoken of as 'the thirty tyrants' till a later date. Xenophon, who had certainly no democratic preju-

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dices, is quite clear that the arrest of Leon of Salamis was *παρὰ τοὺς νόμους* (*Mem.* iv. 4, 3 quoted in *Ap.* 32 c 6 n.).

Xen. Hell. ii. 3, 11 αἰρεθέντες . . . ἐφ' ᾧτε ξυγγράψαι νόμους καθ' οὓστινας πολιτεύσονται, τούτους μὲν αἰεὶ ἔμελλον ξυγγράφειν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, βουλήν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς κατέστησαν ὡς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς, *Ar. 'Ath. Pol.* 35, 1 γενόμενοι δὲ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τὰ δόξαντα . . . παρεώρων, πεντακοσίους δὲ βουλευτὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστήσαντες . . . κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν δι' ἑαυτῶν.—*Xen. Hell.* ii. 3, 1 Πυθοδώρου δ' ἐν Ἀθήναις ἄρχοντος (404/3), ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἤρεθθη, οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναρχίαν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καλοῦσιν.

Introductory Dialogue (43 a 1-44 b 5).

The scene is the prison, about a month after the condemnation of Socrates. It is not yet daybreak (a 4), and Crito has been sitting for some time at the bedside of Socrates, who is still asleep. We know from the *Phaedo* (59 d 1 sqq.) that, all through the month that intervened between the trial and death of Socrates, his friends used to meet early each morning in the *δικαστήριον*, which was near the prison, and to pass the time in conversation till the gates were opened. That was not early in the morning (d 5 ἀνεώγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῶ). On this occasion, however, Crito has come by himself hours before the usual time; for he has heard that the sacred ship has reached Sunium on its return voyage from Delos. It will probably make the Piraeus by next day, and then Socrates must die. Crito cannot sleep for sorrow, and he has got the warder to let him in, but he will not waken Socrates, who is sleeping calmly. At last Socrates awakes and sees his old friend.

43 a 1 τηνικάδε, 'at this hour'. Like its correlative Πηνικά (a 3), the adverb is here used strictly of the time of day (*ῥας δηλωτικόν Phryn. Ecl.* 33). So *Prot.* 310 b 7 τοῦ ἔνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου; addressed to the young Hippocrates who has knocked Socrates up ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου (see next note), *Phaed.* 76 b 11 αὔριον τηνικάδε, 'this time to-morrow'.

a 4 Ὀρθρος βαθύς, 'cock-crow', the last part of the night as opposed to the first part of the day, which is ἔως. Cf. *Phryn. App. Soph.* (Bekk. *Anecd.* p. 54) ὄρθρος . . . ἐστὶν ἡ ὥρα τῆς νυκτὸς καθ' ἣν οἱ ἀλεκτρυόνες ἄδουσιν. It is the time just before the first glimmer of daylight, not the time between that and sunrise.

Phrynichus, *Ecl.* 242, defines it as τὸ πρὸ ἀρχουμένης ἡμέρας (*day-light*), ἐν ᾧ ἔτι λύχνῳ δύναται τις χρῆσθαι. He condemns the later use of ὄρθρος for 'dawn', ἕως, *diluculum*, and in *Prot.* 310a 8 it is definitely counted as part of the *night* (τῆς . . . παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου). Cf. also *Ar. Wasps* 216 (ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ὄρθρος βαθύς), where it is said to be ὄψέ (sc. τῆς νυκτὸς) compared with μέσαι νύκτες. Another phrase is quoted from Ion of Chios in the recently recovered portion of Photius (*Anf.* 89, 24) Ἀμβλὺς ὄρθρος. Ἴων. "νῦν δ' ἐγγὺς ἡοῦς ἤνικ' οὐδέπω φάος | οὐδ' ἀμβλὺς ὄρθρος".

a 5 ὁ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου φύλαξ, 'the warder'. This is too dignified a title for the θυρωρός or 'porter', who appears at the beginning of the *Phaedo* (see next note), but who would hardly be on duty at night when the gate was supposed to be shut. It more probably means the ὑπηρέτης τῶν ἐνδεκα, whose kindness to Socrates in the prison is immortalized by Plato in *Phaed.* 116 d 5 sqq.

a 6 ὑπακοῦσαι, 'to answer your knock'. Cf. *Phaed.* 59 e 4 ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν. The use of the word is well illustrated by *Xen. Symph.* I, 11 Φίλιππος . . . κρούσας τὴν θύραν εἶπε τῷ ὑπικοίσαντι εἰσαγγεῖλαι ὅστις . . . εἶη.

a 8 καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, 'and besides I have done him a good turn'. This touch characterizes the kindly Crito at once. The man is under an obligation to him, which should not be vulgarized into a 'tip' with some editors.

The formula καί τι καὶ does not occur anywhere else in Plato, but is found several times in Thucydides. Cf. also *Dem.* 19 § 197 κατακλίνεσθαι καί τι καὶ ἄδειν ἐκέλευον.

a 10 Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι, 'a fairly long time ago'. Cf. *Theaet.* 142 a 1 Ἄρτι . . . ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;—Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι, *Phaed.* 80 c 5 ἐπιεικῶς συχνόν . . . χρόνον.

b 1 Εἶτα *mirantis*. 'Then how comes it that . . .?' Cf. *Ap.* 28 b 3. Socrates wonders why Crito did not wake him up *as soon as he came* in, instead of sitting in silence till he wakened of himself.

b 3 Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία (sc. ἐπήγειρά σε), 'No indeed!', 'I should think not!' Crito does not at once answer the question, but rejects the very idea of waking Socrates. He would not be awake himself, if he had his way, but grief has made him sleepless.

b 5 ἐπίτηδες, *consulto*, 'on purpose', 'deliberately'.

b 6 οὐκ ἤγειρον, 'I kept from waking you' (negatived imperfect), dist. οὐκ ἤγειρα, 'I did not wake you' The 'vivid' sequence ἵνα . . . διάγης is not common in Plato.

43 b 6 σε . . . ηὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, 'I have thought you fortunate in your disposition'. Cf. *Ap.* 41 c 3 n. and *Phaed.* 58 e 3 εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο . . . καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων. This is immediately followed by ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, just as here by ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις, 'so lightly and patiently do you take it' (the ground stated in the form of an exclamation, like the Homeric οἶ ἀγορεύεις).

b 10 πλημμελής: cf. *Ap.* 22 d 8 n.

c 1 ἐν τοιαύταις συμφοραῖς. For this use of ἐν cf. *Phaed.* 108 c 1 ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία, *Rep.* 395 e 1 ἐν συμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην.

c 2 οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται . . . τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ . . ., 'their age gives them no relief from . . .'. This use of ἐπιλύεσθαι does not seem to be found elsewhere, but Aesch. *Sept.* 134 has ἐπίλυσιν πόνων, ἐπίλυσιν δίδου, where ἐπίλυσις clearly means 'relief' or 'release'. The construction is that of a verb of hindering.

c 7 ἐν τοῖς βαρύτερα, 'most grievously of all'. Cf. 52 a 5 οὐχ ἥκιστα . . . ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.

This use of ἐν τοῖς to strengthen a superlative is found once in Herodotus (vii. 137 τοῦτό μοι ἐν τοῖς θειότατον φαίνεται γενέσθαι), several times in Thucydides, and thirteen times in Plato. It is not found in the Orators or in Xenophon.

c 9 τὸ πλοῖον: cf. *Phaed.* 58 a 7 sqq.

d 1 τεθνάναι: cf. *Ap.* 30 c 1 n.

d 2 δοκεῖν μὲν μοι ἤξει, 'to my thinking it will come'. The usual phrase in Plato is ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν.

TW have the more obvious δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν, and so B² corrects, but the δοκεῖν μὲν μοι of B seems too idiomatic for a mere mistake, even though B has ἤξειν like the other MSS. As Buttman also pointed out, the μὲν *solitarium* suggests a wrong emphasis if we read δοκεῖ.

d 3 ἐξ ὧν, 'to judge by what . . .', the regular meaning of the expression.

d 4 καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. On the eastern side of the low isthmus which connects the headland of Sunium with the mainland there is a narrow creek where sailing vessels, unable to weather the cape, take shelter (Frazer, *Pausanias*, vol. ii, p. 1). We know from *Phaed.* 58 b 8 that the winds were unfavourable at the time.

ἐκ τούτων (neuter), i. e. ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγελλουσὶν τινες, 'from this'.

The addition of τῶν ἀγγέλων (BT) can hardly be right; for ἐκ τούτων should correspond to ἐξ ὧν above. W adds τῶν ἀγγελιῶν (with ἀγγέλων in the margin), which is better in point of sense, but cumbrous. It seems likely that we have to do with two ancient explanatory notes, of which the second is the more accurate.

- d 7 τύχη ἀγαθῇ, 'and may it be for the best', closely with ταύτη ἔστω. The phrase belongs to the customary style of official documents (psephisms, treaties, &c.) like the Latin *quod felix faustumque sit*, e.g. τύχη ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ and Thuc. iv. 118, 11 Λάχης εἶπε, τύχη ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν. It is regularly used with an imperative or its equivalent. So *Symp.* 177 e 5 ἀλλὰ τύχη ἀγαθῇ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος.
- a 2 τῇ . . . ὑστεραία . . . ἢ ἢ . . ., 'the day after that on which'. The comparative force of τῇ ὑστεραία accounts for ἢ after it. Cf. *Symp.* 173 a 6 τῇ ὑστεραία ἢ ἢ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθουεν.
- a 4 γέ τοι δὴ . . ., 'at any rate', stronger than γοῦν. οἱ τούτων κύριοι, 'those who have the matter in hand', i.e. οἱ ἔνδεκα. Cf. *Phaed.* 59 e 6 Λύουσι γὰρ . . . οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ, 85 b 9 ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἑῶσιν ἄνδρες ἔνδεκα.
- a 5 τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας, 'on the coming day'; τῆς ἐτέρας, 'the day after'. As the day was reckoned from sunset to sunset, ἡ ἐπιούσα ἡμέρα generally means 'next day', 'to-morrow', and Crito's τήμερον (43 d 2, d 5) is more accurate. As, however, it is still before day-break (43 a 4 n.), it is not unnatural for Socrates to use the phrase. For τῆς ἐτέρας cf. *Soph. O. T.* 781 τὴν μὲν οὔσαν ἡμέραν | μόλις κατέσχον, θατέρᾳ δ' ἰὼν πέλας κτλ.
- a 6 ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου. For the importance attached by Socrates to dreams cf. *Ap.* 33 c 5 n., *Phaed.* 60 e 2 sqq.
- a 7 ἐν καιρῷ τι, 'not inopportunately'.
- a 10 Ἐδόκει κτλ., the usual terminology in narrating dreams. Cf. *Theaet.* 158 c 5 ὅταν . . . ὄναρ ὀνειράτα δοκῶμεν διηγείσθαι, *Ar. Wasps* 31 ἔδοξέ μοι περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ἐν τῇ πυκνῇ | ἐκκλησιάζειν πρόβατα συγκαθήμενα, *Xen. Cyr.* viii. 7, 2 ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ προσελθὼν κρείττων τις ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν κτλ.
- b 2 ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ κτλ. *Il.* ix. 363 ἡματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην. The words are spoken by Achilles, who means that he can get home in three days, and that is what Socrates understands the

dream to mean. The view that life is an exile from our heavenly home is Orphic. Cf. Empedocles fr. 115, 13 (Diels) τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλίτης. Diogenes Laertius says (ii. 35) ὄναρ δόξας τινὰ αἰτῶ λέγειν ἡματί κεν κτλ., πρὸς Αἰσχίνην ἔφη· Εἰς τρίτην ἀποθανοῦμαι. The dream is, of course, historical, and must often have been talked of by the Socratics at Megara. This, then, may be an indication that Aeschines wrote a dialogue on the same subject as the present. Cf. the Introductory Note.

For the interpretation suggested cf. the dream ascribed to Eudemus of Cyprus in Aristotle's dialogue, and quoted by Cicero *de Div.* i. 25. Eudemus had dreamt that a beautiful youth told him he would return home five years later. In fact he fell in battle at Syracuse five years later, *ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum ut cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur*. I cannot believe that φθίην is meant to suggest the verb φθίνω, as Lambinus supposed.

44 b 4 Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, 'Nay, it is clear enough'. This is the *vox propria* for dreams so distinct that their interpretation is not in doubt. Cf. *Od.* iv. 841 ὡς οἱ ἐναργὲς ὄνειρον ἐπέσσυτο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ, Herod. vii. 47 εἴ τοι ἡ ὄψις τοῦ ἐνυπνίου μὴ ἐναργῆς οὕτω ἐφάνη, Aesch. *Pers.* 179 ἀλλ' οὔτι πω τοιόνδ' ἐναργὲς εἰδόμην | ὡς τῆς πάροιθεν εὐφρόνης.

The Exhortation of Crito (44 b 5-46 a 8).

The arguments of Crito are based (1) on the opinion of the many (ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξα) and (2) the power of the many (ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις)

b 5 ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες. The formula expresses reproach or remonstrance, as often in Homer.

b 6 ἔτι καὶ νῦν, 'even at the eleventh hour', as we say. Cf. Ar. *Frogs* 1235 ἀλλ' ὡγάθ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀπόδος.

b 7 οὐ μία, *non una*, 'more than one'. Crito regards the bad name he will get as a συμφορά additional to the loss of his friend.

χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι κτλ., 'apart from the loss of . . .'. The continuation with ἔτι δὲ καὶ . . . δόξω . . . (as if πρῶτον μὲν ἐστερήσομαι had preceded) is slightly anacoluthic. For the language cf. *Phaed.* 117 c 9 οἴου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην.

All MSS. have σοῦ for τοῦ, which was conjectured by the Abbé Sallier, and must, I think, be right. It does not seem possible to take χωρὶς as an adverb, as Adam suggests.

b 8 οὐδένα μή ποτε εὐρήσω is one of the few examples of οὐ μή with the fut. ind. instead of the aor. subj.

T has εὐρω in the margin here, but there are two other probable instances of the fut. ind. in Plato (*Laus* 735 b 2 and *Eph.* ii. 313 e 4), though the reading is doubtful in both cases. There is, however, a certain case in Ar. *Frogs* 508 οὐ μή σ' ἐγὼ περιόψομ' ἀπελθόντα, where the metre guarantees the reading. See G.M.T. § 295.

c 1 ὡς οἶός τ' ὦν κτλ., 'as being one who could save you if I cared to spend my money', gives the reason for δόξω . . . ἀμελήσαι. They will put it down, he says, to neglect and not to inability, since, in my case, it is a mere question of money. The rather involved constructions in which Crito gets entangled from time to time are, I think, part of the ἠθοποιία.

c 2 ταύτης, 'than this', explained by ἡ δοκεῖν 'than to be thought'. Cf. *Gorg.* 500 c 2 οὐ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις . . . ἢ τοῦτο κτλ. Riddell, *Dig.* § 163.

c 4 οὐκ ἠθέλησας, 'you refused'.

c 7 οἱ . . . ἐπικέστατοι, 'the best men' (urbane for οἱ βέλτιστοι).

c 8 αὐτά, 'the business'. Cf. 46 c 6 πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; ('the thing in question').

οὕτω . . . ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῆ, 'just as it has (shall have) been managed.'

Cobet reads ὥσπερ ἐπράχθη (*Mnem.* 1875, p. 286) with the remark *Recte dicitur ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῆ de re futura et incerti eventus, sed de re absoluta et certa ὥσπερ ἐπράχθη necessarium est.* But this is a *res futura et incerti eventus*, so there is no need to alter the text. Scianz's ὥσπερ δὴ ἐπράχθη is still less convincing.

d 2 αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα . . . ὅτι . . ., 'the present situation shows of itself that. . .'. The construction is anacoluthic; for after the personal use of δῆλος we expect the same subject in the ὅτι clause.

Cornarius conjectured δηλοῖ, and Cobet follows him (*Mnem.* 1875, p. 285).

d 4 εἰάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾗ, 'if a man is misrepresented to them'. Crito means that the condemnation of Socrates proves the danger of διαβολή (cf. *Ap.* 18 d 2 sqq.). For ἐν = *coram* cf. *Euth.* 2 a 4 n.

d 7 ἵνα οἰοί τ' ἦσαν, 'that they might have been able'. If they could do great evil, they would also be able to do great good, on the principle μία δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων, which is fundamental in the

teaching of Socrates. The great chorus of Sophocles, *Antigone* (334 sqq.), is an elaboration of this doctrine (cp. esp. 365 σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν | τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων | τότε μὲν νακὸν ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει.

44 d 8 καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν, 'and it would be well'.

I see no ground for suspecting these words with Cobet (*V.L.*, p. 104). They add nothing of course to εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον κτλ., but it is Plato's way to repeat the beginning of a sentence in a slightly different form at the end of it.

οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον κτλ., 'they can neither make a man wise nor foolish', which, in the long run, is the only good or harm that can be done to him, since he will also be good if he is wise, and bad if he is foolish. The only real injury that can be done to any one is an injury to the soul. Cf. *Ap.* 30 c 8.

d 9 ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι (sc. ποιούντες αὐτόν), 'it is all one what they do to him'. Adam seems to have been the first to point out that the meaning cannot be 'they act at random'. The phrase expresses indifference. Cf. below 45 d 2 τὸ σὸν μέρος ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν, 'so far as you are concerned, they will fare as best they may', *Prot.* 353 a 7 Τί . . . δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; i. e. 'what they say is of no consequence', *Gorg.* 521 c 8, 522 c 2 ἴσως ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ τοῦτο πείσομαι, 'I dare say I shall suffer no matter what', *Symp.* 181 b 6 ὅθεν δὴ συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο πράττειν, ὁμοίως μὲν ἀγαθόν, ὁμοίως δὲ τούναντίον, i. e. 'they don't care which it is'.

e 3 οἱ συκοφάνται. There is happily no English word for these gentry; but their existence was an inevitable consequence of the Athenian system of trusting Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ οἷς ἔξεστιν, even if not personally aggrieved, to initiate all prosecutions instead of a public prosecutor. Most light is thrown on them by the first speech against Aristogeiton ascribed to Demosthenes, which is a most instructive document whether Demosthenes wrote it or not. That it is a real speech actually delivered, I feel sure.

e 4 ἐκκλέψασιν: cf. Lysias 20 § 7 τοὺς μὲν ἀδικοῦντας οἱ κατήγοροι ἐκκλέπτουσιν, ἀργύριον λαμβάνοντες.

e 5 ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν κτλ. There is no question here of forfeiting bail; for, if Crito's offer to go bail for Socrates had been accepted, Socrates would not have been kept in prison (cf.

Introductory Note). I can find no evidence of the procedure adopted against those who assisted a condemned man to escape, but analogy suggests that they were liable to ἔνδειξις (*Ap.* 32 b 7 n.).

Cf. the procedure in the case of exiles who returned without authority (*Dem.* 23 § 51 εἴαν τις κατή ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστιν) and of those who harboured them ([*Dem.*] 50 § 49 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς . . . ἐνέχεσθαι τὸν ὑποδεχόμενον τοὺς φεύγοντας). This suits the language of the present passage very well; for it appears clearly from *Dem.* 21 § 182 and 25 § 92 that, in normal cases, ἔνδειξις led to an ἀγὼν τιμητός, in which the τίμημα might be anything from death downwards (μίλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ θανάτου τιμῆσαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοσοῦτον ἀναθεῖναι τίμημα χρημάτων ὅσον μὴ δυνήσεται φέρειν *Dem.* 25 § 92). So here the words of Crito refer plainly to the legal phrase τιμῶν ὅτι χρή παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι (*Ap.* 36 b 5 n.).

a 1 ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν, 'dismiss it from your mind'. Cf. *Phaed.* 63 e 3 Ἔα . . . χαίρειν αὐτόν, 'never mind him', 65 c 7 (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, 'paying no attention to the body'. Literally, the phrase means 'let it depart', from χαῖρε, 'farewell'. So λέγων, εἰπὼν χαίρειν, 'saying good-bye to . . .', i. e. 'dismissing from one's thoughts'.

δίκαιοι ἐσμεν, 'we are bound'. This personal construction of δίκαιος may often be best represented by saying 'we are bound' or 'we are entitled', according to the context.

a 3 μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, 'do not say me nay', a standing colloquial phrase. Cf. below 46 a 8 καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει, *Phaed.* 117 a 3 ἀλλ' ἴθι . . . πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, *Rep.* 328 a 9 ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε. So *Ar. Birds* 133 (after an invitation to a wedding) καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιήσης, 'I'll take no refusal'.

a 6 Μήτε . . . ταῦτα φοβοῦ κτλ. This μήτε is resumed at b 6 ὅπερ λεγῶ, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος after the long parenthesis a 6 καὶ γὰρ . . . b 5 πολλοὶ πάνυ. It is answered by b 7 μήτε . . . δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω. The involved sentence is part, I think, of the ἠθοποιία.

a 7 ὃ θέλουσι κτλ., 'which certain people are willing to take to save you'.

The form θέλω is hardly used in Plato except after εἰ or μὴ which absorb the following ἐ- (a fact which is conventionally represented by writing εἰ θέλεις, μὴ θέλων and the like), and in the standing phrases, θεοῦ θέλοντος, εἴαν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἰ θεὸς θέλοι. There seems to be nothing to account for it here. Should it be printed οὐθέλουσι?

- 45 a 8 τούτους, *istos*. The depreciatory tone is kept up by εὐτελείς, 'cheap', which suggests that they are for sale.
- a 9 ἐπ' αὐτούς, 'to settle them'. If Xenophon's story is true (see Introductory Note), Crito had personal experience of this.
- b 1 σοὶ . . . ὑπάρχει, 'you have at your disposal'.
- b 3 οὗτοι is used δεικτικῶς (cf. *Ap.* 33 e 3). Though they are not present at the moment, we know from the *Phaedo* that Socrates saw them every day during the month, and we are, no doubt, to suppose that they come in after the present dialogue is finished. They had no reason to fear the *συκοφάνται*, as they could be across the Boeotian frontier before the escape of Socrates was discovered.
- b 4 Σιμμίας . . . Κίβητος . . . These were Pythagoreans from Thebes who had been disciples of Philolaus (*Phaed.* 61 d 7) before he returned to Italy (E. Gr. Ph.³ § 138). At this time they were quite young (*Phaed.* 89a 3 τῶν νεανίσκων). Xenophon includes them in his list of true disciples of Socrates (*Mem.* i. 2, 48). In another place (iii. 11, 17) he makes Socrates ask Theodote, the *ἑταίρα*, what had brought Simmias and Cebes to him from Thebes (διὰ τί δὲ καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι, sc. οἶει;). They are the chief interlocutors in the *Phaedo*. It is important for a just appreciation of the historical Socrates to bear in mind that these two young Pythagoreans attached themselves to him after the departure of Philolaus from Thebes, even though Lysis (E. Gr. Ph.³ § 138) was still there to carry on the Pythagorean tradition. From the *Phaedo* we learn that there was a third Theban present, Phaedondas, of whom nothing is otherwise known. The *rapprochement* between Athens and Thebes after Aegospotami will account for the *ἐπιδημία* of these young Pythagoreans. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 124) gives the titles of twenty-three dialogues ascribed to Simmias, which must have been short, as they were contained in a single roll (βιβλίον). Whether they were genuine or not is another question. He also mentions three dialogues by Cebes entitled Πίναξ, Ἑβδόμη, and Φρόνιχος, and a work entitled Κέβητος Πίναξ (*Cebetis Tabula*) is still extant, though it cannot be genuine.

The name Σιμμίας doubtless comes, like the Athenian names Σίμων, Σιμύλος, from σιμός, 'snub-nosed', and Cebet (followed by Schanz) wrote it Σιμίας. Cf. *M.C.*, p. 221 *ut ex pyrros et xanthos formantur nomina propria Πυρρίας, Ξανθίας, sic Σιμίας ex σιμός*

proaucebatur. We have to do, however, with a Boeotian name, since Simmias was a Theban, and the $\mu\mu$ is 'Aeolic'. Moreover, the form $\Sigma\mu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ is actually found on a Theban inscription (Collitz, *Dial.-Inscr.* i. 706, 1). Cf. also Ditt. *Syll.* 140, 155 (from a Delphic inscription), where we have a Thessalian called $\Sigma\mu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ 'Ομολιεύς. I must, therefore, withdraw the remark at the end of my note on *Phaed.* 59 c 1 and be thankful that some 'divine sign' kept me from introducing $\Sigma\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ into my text.

15 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. Socrates had many foreign friends besides the Theban Pythagoreans. From the *Phaedo* 57a sqq. we know that neither Echebrates of Phlius nor any of his associates were able to be at Athens, though they were deeply interested and eager to get a trustworthy account of everything that took place, an account which they get from Phaedo of Elis. Echebrates speaks of Socrates with the greatest enthusiasm and respect (58 d 7, 88 c 8). Now we know that Echebrates and his *ἐταῖροι* at Phlius were Pythagoreans like Simmias and Cebes. Cf. Diogenes Laertius viii. 46 Τελευταῖοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τῶν Πυθαγορείων οὓς καὶ Ἀριστόξενος εἶδε, Ξενοφίλος τε ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ἀπὸ Θράκης καὶ Φάντων ὁ Φλιάσιος καὶ Ἐχεκράτης καὶ Διοκλῆς καὶ Πολύμναστος Φλιάσιοι καὶ αὐτοί. ἦσαν δὲ ἀκροαταὶ Φιλολάου καὶ Εὐρύτου τῶν Ταραντίνων. It is clear from this testimony of Aristoxenus, who knew the men personally, that Phlius, like Thebes, was an important seat of the Pythagorean dispersion, and it follows that the Pythagoreans of Phlius must have sought the acquaintance of Socrates before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (Phlius took the side of Sparta), and that he must have made a deep and lasting impression on them when he was comparatively young. From the *Phaedo* (59 c 2) we learn that Euclides and Terpsion from Megara were present at the death of Socrates. They were Eleatics. Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 106 οὗτος (Εὐκλείδης) καὶ τὰ Παρμενίδεια μετεχειρίζετο. In the *Parmenides* Socrates, who is then σφόδρα νέος, is represented as holding a conversation with Parmenides and Zeno themselves, so there is nothing surprising in the fact that he kept up relations with their followers at Megara. In the *Theaetetus* Euclides is represented as having a dialogue read aloud to Terpsion of which he had taken notes at the time (just before the trial), and which he had corrected by asking questions of Socrates himself when he went to Athens (apparently during the month which

elapsed between the sentence and its execution). That may be fiction, of course, but it presupposes certain facts. Moreover, we know that the *ἐταῖροι* of Socrates retired to Megara after their Master's death. We learn also from the *Phaedo* (*loc. cit.*) that Aristippus of Cyrene was expected, though he did not appear. He was in Aegina at the time. According to Aeschines of Sphettos (*ap. Diog. Laert. ii. 65*) he had come all the way from Cyrene to Athens *κατὰ κλέος Σωκράτους*. It is quite clear then that, before the Peloponnesian War, that is, when he was still in the thirties, Socrates had a reputation all over the Greek world, and especially in Pythagorean and Eleatic circles. During the war Thebes, Megara, and Phlius were cut off from Athens, but the admirers of Socrates did not forget him, and those of them who could do so came to Athens to see him again when peace was concluded. No account of Socrates can claim to be historical which does not take these things into consideration. It may be added that the doubts of the loyalty of Socrates to the *δῆμος* which moved Anytus would only be confirmed by the way in which men who had recently been enemy aliens flocked to Athens to see him as soon as they safely could.

45 b 6 μήτε . . . ἀποκάμης, 'do not shirk the task of saving yourself' (*cf. d 6 τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι*). Socrates has said nothing so far to suggest that his refusal to escape is based on principle, and Crito thinks it is only due to consideration for his friends.

Not perceiving this, Jacobs propounded the reading *ἀποκνήης*, which is not even Greek, and Schanz adopted it in his *editio maior*. Cobet (*Mnem. 1875, p. 286*) pointed out that it was *soloecum*, and Schanz restored *ἀποκάμης* in his school edition (1893) without mentioning that he had ever adopted *ἀποκνήης*. He only says that Jacobs, who had doubted *ἀποκάμης*, afterwards defended it (1828). The construction of *ἀποκάμνω* with the infinitive is very rare. K.-G. only quote one other instance, Eur. *Ion* 134 *πόνους | μοχθεῖν οὐκ ἀποκάμνω*. Generally it is either absolute or takes a participle. The distinction of meaning is doubtless that, while *ἀποκάμνω c. p.c.p.* means 'I am tired of doing so-and-so', *ἀποκάμνω c. inf.* means 'I am (too) tired to do it'. See G.M.T. § 903.

b 7 ὁ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, 'as you said in court'. This may be a reference to *Ap. 37 c 4 sqq.*, or it may just as well be an independent piece of evidence that Socrates did say something of the sort.

b 8 ἐξελθών, 'if you went into exile' is the meaning required here as in *Ap. 37 d 4, e 4*.

c1 ἄλλοσε is certainly strange with πολλαχοῦ, which requires ἄλλοθι. We can only say that the influence of ὅποι makes itself felt. As ἄλλοσέ ποι is so common a phrase, Crito slips into saying ἄλλοσε ὅποι.

If the text is sound, Soph. *O. C.* 1226 βῆναι κείθεν ὄθενπερ ἦκει would be a much more violent expression, as Jebb points out.

ἀγαπήσουσί σε, 'will make much of you'.

c2 εἰς Θετταλίαν. We learn from Aristotle (*Rhet. B.* 23, 1398 a 24) that Socrates had already declined an invitation to the court of Archelaus of Macedon (another instance of his wide reputation). There may, therefore, be some truth in the statement of Diog. Laert. (ii. 25) that he also refused offers from Scopas of Crannon and Eurylochus of Larisa. His friendship with the Thessalian Meno is also in point here.

c5 Ἔτι δέ . . . οὐδὲ δίκαιον, 'in the next place what you propose is not even right', apart from what people may think of it. Cf. *Ap.* 35 b 9

Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης . . . οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι κτλ.

ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα. For the acc. cf. Isocr. I § 3 καλὸν . . . ἔργον ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

c9 τοὺς υἱεῖς : cf. *Ap.* 34 d 6 n.

d1 ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι. Note that γένεσις, τροφή, παιδεία form a regular series in Greek. So below d 5 τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα, 50 e 2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετρέφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης.

d2 τὸ σὸν μέρος, 'for your part', i.e. 'so far as you are concerned' (so below 50 b 2 and 54 c 8).

ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν, 'they will fare as best they may', 'it is all one what becomes of them'. The phrase is meant to characterize the indifference of Socrates. Cf. 44 d 9 n.

d8 ἀρετῆς . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι : the doctrine of ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια once more. Cf. *Ap.* 29 e 1 n.

e3 ἡ εἴσοδος . . . ὡς εἰσῆλθεν. The noun εἴσοδος corresponds to εἰσάγειν, 'to bring into court' (*Ap.* 24 d 5 n.), which has for its virtual passive εἰσιέναι. The suggestion of Cornarius that the words are chosen so as to suggest the idea of a play being brought on the stage, leading up to an ἀγών and ending in a κατάγελως, though approved by most editors, seems to me extremely fanciful and quite out of keeping with the character of Crito. We should have to suppose that he regarded the trial of Socrates as a comedy.

I have kept εἰσῆλθεν, the reading of B, but of course εἰσῆλθες (TW) is possible, though more likely to be due to correction. For εἰσέρχεται ἡ δίκη cf. Dem. 21 § 78 μελλουσῶν εἰσιέναι τῶν δικῶν, 34 § 18 μελλούσης δὲ τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.

45 e 4 ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, 'when it need not have been brought into court'. No doubt Anytus would have been quite satisfied if Socrates had left Athens. If he had done so at any time before the conclusion of the ἀνάκρισις, the case might have been quietly dropped. Such things certainly happened, though strictly speaking they were illegal and involved a penalty.

ὁ ἀγὼν . . . ὡς ἐγένετο. This doubtless refers to the refusal of Socrates to defend himself seriously and to his ἀντιτίμησις, which was a mere defiance of the court. Crito thinks, or affects to think, that all this was only because he would not take the trouble to make a satisfactory defence (observe ὑπὲρ σοῦ . . . αἰσχύνομαι). He is as much puzzled by the μεγαληγορία Σωκράτους as Xenophon was (cf. p. 65).

e 5 καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, 'and now, to crown all'. It is surely more natural to take τὸ τελευταῖον adverbially than to make it the subject of the infinitive which follows, as most editors do. Adam, however, says 'last of all'.

In Demosthenes τὸ τελευταῖον ἰνυί occurs more than once. In 25 § 50 we have τὰ τελευταῖα δὲ ταυτί.

ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, 'the scandal of the whole business', 'a *reductio ad absurdum* as one might say of the whole affair' (Adam).

e 6 διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, 'that it should be thought that the opportunity has escaped us' (*effugisse nos* Ficinus), i. e. that we have allowed it to give us the slip. In this use (and in many others, e. g. διαπέφευγεν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος) the verb διαφεύγειν is a metaphor from hunting, though ἐκφεύγειν is more commonly so used, especially by Demosthenes (cf. Sandys on 3 § 3). There is no difficulty in supplying τὸ πρᾶγμα from e 2 as the subject of the infinitive διαπεφευγέναι, since it is recalled by κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ, which repeats ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ from the earlier clause. Nor is it necessary to assume the harsh construction μὴ δόξη . . . δοκεῖν, since it is simpler to suppose that αἰσχύνομαι μὴ δόξη is resumed by the exclamatory infinitive δοκεῖν (G.M.T. § 187).

Forman says: 'But δόξη is now left so far behind that it is resumed in δοκεῖν though the *syntax* that is resumed is that of πεπράχθαι which is dependent upon δόξη—anacoluthic, but entirely clear.' I think my suggestion is simpler. I cannot believe with Adam that we are to supply σε as the subject of διαπεφευγένοι and to render 'that you should be thought to have given us the slip'.

a 1 οἷτινες κτλ., *quippe qui* . . . , 'in that we did not . . . '.

οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν is necessary because τῇ ἡμετέρα includes Socrates as well as his friends. Cf. 45 d 8 καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. It is quite normal for the relative sentence to become independent in the second clause.

a 2 εἴ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν : cf. *Euth.* 4 e 9 n., *Ap.* 28 b 7 n.

a 3 ἅμα τῷ κακῷ, i. e. ἅμα τῷ κακὰ εἶναι. For this compendious way of speaking cf. *Symp.* 195 c 6 νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός, *Theaet.* 185 e 3 Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ . . . πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με, *Thuc.* ii. 15, 2 Θησεὺς . . . γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνητοῦ καὶ δυνατός.

a 4 βουλεύεσθαι . . . βεβουλεύεσθαι : cf. *Charm.* 176 c 5 Οὔτοι . . . τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν;—Οὐδέν . . . ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύεμεθα.

a 5 τῆς . . . ἐπιούσης νυκτός. Crito still thinks, in spite of the dream, that the ship will arrive to-day; for ἡ ἐπιούσα νύξ is the night which will begin at sunset.

a 6 εἰ δ' ἐτι περιμενοῦμεν, future indicative in 'monitory' protasis.

a 8 καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει : cf. 45 a 3 n.

The Reply of Socrates (46 b 1-54 e 2).

The reply falls into two sections. (1) Socrates deals with Crito's argument from public opinion (ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξα) by appealing to a doctrine on which the friends of Socrates were formerly agreed, namely, that it is not the opinion of the many which must be regarded, but only that of the man who knows (46 c 6-48 a 10). (2) He then answers Crito's argument from the power of the many (ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις), by appealing to another doctrine similarly agreed to, namely, that it is living well and not mere life which is to be prized. As living well (εὖ) means living righteously (δικαίως), it follows that we must never do wrong, even in return for a wrong done to us (48 a 10-50 a 5).

b 1 ὦ φίλε Κρίτων. The unusual position of the vocative expresses remonstrance. Cf. *Euth.* 3 c 6 n.

46 b 1 ἡ προθυμία σου: cf. 44 c 5 ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

b 4 οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεί. Cf. Soph. *Philoct.* 966 οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι, Eur. *Med.* 292 and *Hel.* 957 οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις. Cf. also below 49 e 1 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ. So Lysias 27 § 3 οὐ νῦν πρῶτον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἤδη . . .

For οὐ νῦν πρῶτον all the MSS. and Eusebius have οὐ μόνον νῦν. The reading in the text has been restored from a bust of Socrates, on which this sentence has been inscribed as a motto (C.I.G. iii. 6115), and it would be hard to find a better for the purpose. The alteration of the text is easily explained if we remember that the archetype would write οὐ νῦν \bar{a} for οὐ νῦν πρῶτον. The \bar{a} would easily be lost before ἀλλά, and the insertion of μόνον would be almost inevitable. This way of writing εἰς, πρῶτος, &c., has led to a good many of the early corruptions in the text of Plato.

b 5 τῶν ἐμῶν, neuter, not masculine. Cf. 47 c 5 εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; 47 e 8 ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων. The soul, with its thoughts and feelings, as well as the body and its appurtenances, are all included in a man's 'belongings'.

τῆ λόγῳ, 'the rule'. We see from the words which follow that this does not mean 'reason' (a sense which λόγος never has in Plato). It is, in the first place, the conclusion of a process of reasoning (λογισμός), and, in this case, as it is a result of reasoning on a matter of practice (cf. b 3 εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή) it is really a 'rule' of conduct. The word λόγος easily acquires this shade of meaning, as the verb λέγω often means to 'tell' or 'bid' a person to do something. Accordingly, when the λόγος referred to is specified, it contains the word δεῖ (d 1). This way of looking at questions of practice corresponds exactly to the method of ὑπόθεσις described in *Phaed.* 100 a 3 ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα . . . ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Adam points this out quite correctly, but adds the perverse remark 'Plato uses the phraseology of the Socratic method to describe his own procedure'. It is surely more natural to hold that, if the phraseology is Socratic, the procedure is Socratic too.

b 7 ἐκβαλεῖν, 'to throw overboard', 'jettison', *iacturam facere*. Socrates uses the same metaphor in the *Republic*. Cf. 412 e 6 μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν δόξαν . . . τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν

ἀ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα, 503 a 2 τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτ' ἐν πόνοις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις
... φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας.

b 8 σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, 'they strike me in much the same way as they did'.

Adam suggests that ὅμοιοι (sc. λόγοι) is the subject not the predicate, but the meaning is settled by d 5 εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανείται (sc. ὁ λόγος).

c 1 πρεσβεύω, 'I give the place of honour to'. Cf. *Symp.* 186 b 3 ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην, 188 c 3 εἰ μὴ . . . τιμᾶ τε αὐτὸν καὶ πρεσβεύῃ, *Rep.* 591 c 7 οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων. In this transitive sense (= πρεσβύτερόν τι ἔχω) the verb is mainly tragic.

:3 οὐ μή σοι συγχωρήσω: cf. 44 b 8 n. In this case, however, we have the normal aor. subj.; for Plato regularly uses συγχωρήσομαι as the future of συγχωρῶ.

οὐδ' ἂν πλείω . . . μορμολύττηται, 'not even if the power of the many scares us like children with more bugbears than it does at present'. Μορμῶ (whose full name was Μορμολύκη) was a she-goblin used, like Ἀκκῶ, Ἐμπούσα, and Λάμια, to frighten naughty children. Cf. Theocritus xv. 40 οὐκ ἀξῶ τυ, τέκνον. Μορμῶ, δάκνει ἵππος, Xen. *Hell.* iv. 4, 17 φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς πελταστάς, ὥσπερ μορμόνας παιδάρια, Lucian, *Philops.* 2 παίδων . . . ἔτι τὴν Μορμῶ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων. In *Phaed.* 77 e 6 we have μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. The verb μορμολύττεσθαι occurs also in *Gorg.* 473 d 3. So Ar. *Birds* 1244 πότερα Λυδὸν ἢ Φρύγα | ταυτὶ λέγουσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς;

c 5 δεσμούς, 'imprisonments', dist. δεσμά, 'bonds'. Cf. *Euth.* 4 d 3 n. With θανάτους and χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις it sums up the possibilities of ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι.

ἐπιπέμπουσα, *immittens*, 'setting upon us', 'letting loose upon us'. In this sense too the verb is generally used of the gods (cf. *Ap.* 31 a 6 n.), and is almost technical of divine 'visitations'. Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 810 (the Sphinx) ἂν ὁ κατὰ χθονὸς Ἄιδας | Καδμείοις ἐπιπέμπει, [Lysias] 6 § 20 δέη πολλὰ καὶ κινδύνους ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμπει τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν. So *Phaedr.* 245 b 5 ὡς οὐκ ἐπ' ὠφελία ὁ ἔρως . . . ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται. The effect of the word is, therefore, to suggest that ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις is something mysterious and of supernatural

power. We may say of it, as Hesiod says of φήμη (*O. D.* 764) θεός
 νύ τις ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή.

This is at any rate less fanciful than Verrall's proposal to read ἐπέμπουσα (!) or Adam's idea that the word ἐπιπέμπουσα was chosen 'rather than ἐπιφέρουσα, let us say, because the ending is identical with ἔμπουσα'.

46 c 6 μετριώτατα, 'best' (for μετρίως is an urbane equivalent of εὖ, καλῶς).

εἰ πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἀναλάβοιμεν κτλ., 'if we first of all take up once more the argument you use about what people will think'. He had used it twice, viz. 44 b 9 sqq. and 45 d 8 sqq. Socrates clearly distinguishes the two points urged by Crito, (1) ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξα, (2) ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις. At the end of the section dealing with (1) πρῶτον μὲν is repeated (48 a 7), thus clearly marking it off from the section dealing with (2).

c 8 πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ κτλ. This refers back to 46 b 6 τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον.

I have put a full stop at δοξῶν and taken this as a direct question, not (as in previous editions) as dependent on ἀναλάβοιμεν. That is too ambiguous; for the reader inevitably refers πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο to the λόγος which Crito had used, and that makes nonsense, since Crito had said nothing of the sort.

d 2 ἢ . . . μὲν . . . νῦν δὲ . . . ἄρα . . . An *argumentum ex contrariis* (*Ap.* 34 c 1 n.) but in interrogative form. Cf. also 50 e 7.

d 3 ἄλλως, 'idly'. Cf. *Phaed.* 76 e 4 ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἶη; *I 15 d* 4 ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, *Ar. Wasps* 85 ἄλλως φλυαρεῖτ' οὐ γὰρ ἐξευρίσετε. This use is as old as Homer, e.g. *Od.* xiv. 124 ἄλλως . . . ψεύδοντ(αι).

ἔνεκα λόγου, 'for the sake of speaking', 'just to say something', 'as a *façon de parler*'. Cf. *Lach.* 196 c 1 ὀρώμεν μὴ Νικίας οἶεται τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγει, *Euthyd.* 286 d 11 Λόγου ἔνεκα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὲ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι κτλ.

There is no reason to suspect ἔνεκα λόγου of being a gloss on ἄλλως with Adam, as it may quite well be placed ἐκ παραλλήλου. Cf. *Ar. Wasps* 929 ἵνα μὴ κεκλάγγω διὰ κενῆς ἄλλως ἐγώ, where either διὰ κενῆς or ἄλλως would certainly have been suspected if the metre did not guarantee the text.

d 5 εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανέται. Cf. b 8 σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι.

37 ἔασομεν χαίρειν, 'shall we dismiss it from our minds?' Cf. 45 a 1 n.

38 ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, 'by those (of us) who thought they were speaking to the point'. Socrates always regards the λόγος as a joint production of the ἐρωτῶν and the ἀποκρινόμενος, not as an authoritative *dictum* of his own.

33 ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια, 'humanly speaking'. So *Ep.* vii. 350 e 2 ὅσα γε δὴ τάνθρώπινα. For the use of ὅσα cf. below 54 d 5 ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, *Rep.* 467 c 9 οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται, *Dem.* 39 § 27 ὅσα ἐξ ὄψεως.

ἐκτός, lit. 'out of range' (ἐκτός βελῶν).

31 αὔριον. Crito believes the ship will arrive to-day (43 d 2 sqq.) and that Socrates will have to die to-morrow. It is true that Socrates thought otherwise, but it would not have been worth while to contradict him on the point once more.

To save Plato's consistency Schanz brackets αὔριον, with the result that he makes Socrates say that Crito, a man of seventy, is in no danger of dying!

οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι, 'will not make you lose your wits'. The medical writers use παρακόπτειν, παρακρούειν, and παραπαίειν of what causes mental aberration, and Bekk. *Anecd.* p. 59 has παρακεκροῦσθαι τῶν φρενῶν. This gives a far better sense than to regard παρακρούοι as an exceptional use of the active for the normal παρακρούοιτο, which would mean 'will not cheat you' or 'will not dupe you'. We want something stronger than that.

If this is right it is quite unnecessary to read παρακρούοιθ' with Cobet. The verb παρακρούεσθαι occurs several times in Demosthenes, who couples it more than once with φενακίζειν. That seems to show that it is inappropriate here, though it is quite in place in *Crat.* 393 c 8 φύλαττε γάρ με μή πη παρακρούσωμαί σε.

12 ἱκανῶς . . . λέγεσθαι. Cf. 48 e 5 ὄρα . . . εἰάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, *Symp.* 177 e 4 εἰάν οἱ πρόσθεν ἱκανῶς καὶ καλῶς εἴπωσιν, *Polit.* 284 d 2 καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς δείκνυται.

The conjecture οὐχὶ καλῶς for οὐχ ἱκανῶς is therefore unnecessary, though palaeographically easy.

14 οὐδὲ πάντων . . . τῶν δ' οὐ; This is really the point on which the following argument turns.

As these words are found in TW and were read by Eusebius, their omission in B must be regarded as accidental. Homoeote-

leuton is a sufficient explanation, and the first hand of B is prone to such errors.

47 b 1 καὶ τοῦτο πράττων, *et hoc agens*, 'and who makes this his business'. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8, 22 ἀεὶ πρὸς ᾧ εἶη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν. See Shilleto on Dem. 19 § 323. The phrase implies specialization, and τοῦτο πραττόντων is therefore contrasted with πάρεργον . . . αὐτὸ . . . πράττειν in *Rep.* 498 a 4-6.

παντὸς ἀνδρός, 'of any and every man'.

b 3 ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης. In *Gorg.* 452 a 6 sqq. the ἰατρός claims that the ἔργον of his art is ὑγίεια, while the παιδοτρίβης says τὸ . . . ἔργον μου ἐστὶν καλοῦς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. The arts of the doctor and the trainer are very often coupled in this way by Plato.

b 10 τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι. Properly, ἐπιστάτης means one who ἐφίσταται (the psilosis is Ionic), i. e. an 'overseer' or 'director', and Xenophon uses it in connexion with athletics (*Mem.* iii. 5, 18 ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις). As we have seen, however (*Ap.* 20 a 8 n.), Socrates uses it in a way of his own to suggest that the man who κηουσι (ἐπίσταται) should rule. Cf. esp. *Prot.* 312 d 4 Ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν; . . . ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης;—Τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι . . . ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; . . . —Εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;—Δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται;—Εἰκός γε. τί δὴ ἐστὶν τοῦτο περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ;

c 1 ἀπειθήσας, a solemn word. Cf. *Ap.* 29 a 3 n.

c 2 τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν, sc. ἐπαίνους.

The λόγους which BW insert after τῶν πολλῶν is not very appropriate, and is better omitted with T and Eusebius. The full expression would be ἐπαίνους καὶ ψόγους, but Plato avoids pedantic symmetry. Some grammarian no doubt added λόγους because he was puzzled by the way in which τὴν δόξαν is ignored.

c 5 εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; cf. 46 b 5 τῶν ἐμῶν n.

d 3 εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, fut. ind. in 'monitory' protasis.

d 4 ἐκεῖνο . . . ὃ . . . ἐγίγνετο κτλ., 'that which (as we agreed) was made better by right and destroyed by wrong' (i. e. the soul). The imperfect tense refers, like ἐλέγετο 46 c 8, 47 a 13, to previous discussions. As the doctrine is assumed to be familiar even to Crito,

Plato means us to understand that Socrates actually taught that the soul (*ψυχή*) was the seat of goodness and badness, a novel idea in the fifth century B. C. No doubt it is the novelty of the doctrine that makes him avoid the actual word *ψυχή* in this passage (cf. just below e 8 ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων κτλ.). In the fourth century B. C. it was quite familiar. Cf. B.A. 1915-1916, 252 sqq.

19 πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ (sc. ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν). The position of *μὴ* is intended to suggest the opposition, and gives quite a different force to the sentence than if it had run τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ. Stallbaum compares Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9, 6 τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ μὴ ἂ οἶδε (so the MSS.: ἂ μὴ οἶδε Victorius) δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι γινώσκειν ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι.

ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστίν; 'is our life worth living?' Cf. *Ap.* 38 a 5 sq., *Symp.* 216 a 1 ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω, and the passages quoted below e 6 n.

e 1 ἐστὶ δέ που τοῦτο σῶμα. BW have τὸ σῶμα, but Plato uses *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* with or without the article indifferently, and the MSS. often vary on the point. On the whole the article is more likely to be interpolated than wrongly omitted.

e 6 Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου κτλ. Plato ascribes exactly the same argument to Socrates elsewhere. Cf. *Gorg.* 512 a 2 λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθινεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνιάτα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον (βιωτόν;) ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἅντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἅντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου εἴντε ἄλλοθεν ὀποθενοῦν σώσει, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν. So *Rep.* 445 a 5, where Glaucon sums up the argument of Socrates in these words, γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίνεσθαι ἤδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι . . . τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν (i. e. τῆς ψυχῆς) φύσεως παραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται κτλ. As the argument depends on the Socratic doctrine of the soul and its corollary, the need of *ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια*, we may confidently regard it as genuinely Socratic.

e 7 ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται κτλ., 'that which wrong injures and right does good to'. For λωβᾶσθαι c. dat. cf. Phrynichus (Bekk. *Anecd.* p. 50) Λωβᾶσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷδε, αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ. So Ar. *Knights*

1408 ἴν' ἴδωσιν αὐτὸν οἷς ἐλωβᾶθ' οἱ ξένοι. Then, as the relative understood as the object of ὀνίνησιν would be in a different case, it is omitted according to rule.

The alternative reading, δ for ῶ, is ancient (pr. T, superscr. W, Eusebius) and would be more normal; but, just for that reason, it is more likely to be a correction.

47 e 8 ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων: cf. d 4 for the intentional vagueness of the phrase.

48 a 1 περὶ ὃ . . . ἐστίν, 'to which wickedness and righteousness belong'. This is really a case of περὶ c. acc. as a genitive equivalent.

a 6 τί . . . ἀλλ' ὅτι . . . For the variation of ἐρωτηματικά and ἀναφορικά cf. Lobeck, *Phrynicus* 57 n. The usage seems to have shocked later grammarians, which accounts for the change of τί to ὅτι in T and of ὅτι to τί in Eusebius.

a 8 εἰσηγῆ. The verb εἰσηγεῖσθαι is used generally of making formal proposals or recommendations. Cf. *Symp.* 176 e 6 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν εἶαν . . . ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι . . . καὶ δι' οἴων λόγων, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι, *Lach.* 179 e 1 εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μαθήμα, ὅτι καλὸν εἶη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, *Laus* 684 e 1 γῆς . . . ἀναδασμοὺς εἰσηγούμενον καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπᾶς. The sense of καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος in the ἀντωμοσία of Meletus is much the same.

a 10 Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ κτλ. Socrates now turns to Crito's second point, ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις. We have seen that the rule of only attending to the opinions of the wise (b 3 οὗτος . . . ὁ λόγος ἐν διεληλίθαμεν) still holds good. Now, in view of the suggestion that the many can put us to death, we must consider whether another rule of ours also holds good, namely, that we should value, not mere life, but a good life.

a 11 οἰοί τέ γ' εἰσίν (T) perhaps deserves the preference, as ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ nearly always has γε following.

b 1 Δῆλα δὴ . . . ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Editors have divided these words in various ways between Socrates and Crito, and Schanz brackets the words φαίη γὰρ ἄν. They may, perhaps, be an old alternative reading for δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, but to me the threefold answer rather suggests the eagerness of Crito to catch at any straw.

b 3 οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος κτλ., sc. ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ

(47 a 2 sqq.). The τε involves a slight anacoluthon, since the καί (b 4) introduces a changed construction.

b 4 δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον, 'seems to me still as true as it did before'. Cf. 46 b 8 σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι (sc. οἱ λόγοι οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον). For the construction ὅμοιος καὶ . . . cf. e. g. *Ion* 531 d 6 οὐχ ὁμοίως πεποιήκασι καὶ Ὀμηρος. In the same way we find ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ . . ., παραπλήσιος καὶ . . ., ἴσος καὶ . . . (L. and S. s.v. καί A III).

The construction ὅμοιος . . . καὶ πρότερον appears to have puzzled the scribes. The reading of W, τῷ πρότερον, is wrong; for no other λόγος has been discussed. That of B and the corrector of W, τῷ καὶ πρότερον, preserves a trace of the original reading combined with the 'emendation' τῷ. T has καὶ πρότερον. The true reading is preserved by Priscian (vol. iii, p. 333, 1 Keil), who uses this passage to explain the Latin *similis ac, atque*. As Buttman justly pointed out, Priscian got his Greek examples from much older authorities, and we may infer that this passage of the *Crito* was used in the Alexandrian schools to illustrate the construction ὅμοιος καὶ . . . That takes us back to a time long before our best MSS.

5 οὐ τὸ ζῆν . . . ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. The finest expression of this Socratic λόγος is in *Gorg.* 512 d 8 sqq. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον ('a given length of time'), τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλ' ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναῖξιν ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίς ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώσαι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη.

8 καὶ δικαίως, 'and rightly'. This justifies us in going on to ask simply whether it is *right* (δίκαιον) for Socrates to escape or not. If it is not right, it is inconsistent with τὸ εὖ ζῆν. It is not helpful to say that Socrates makes a fallacious use of the ambiguous expressions εὖ ζῆν and εὖ πράττειν. His doctrine is just that there is no ambiguity, since the two senses are identical.

11 ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, 'as a consequence of the admissions you now make', viz. (1) that to live well is to be valued and not merely to live, and (2) that to live well means to live rightly.

2 ἄς . . . σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις κτλ. The relative clause with incorporated antecedent is treated as a noun-equivalent in the nominative case. Cf. *Phaed.* 88 d 2 ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν, *Μενο* 81 e 4 ἦν καλοῦμεν

μάθησιν ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν. So with the article, as here, *Prot.* 342 b 2 ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὗς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, *Rep.* 402 b 9 οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ . . . ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὗς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας.

48 c 4 μὴ . . . ἢ . . ., 'I suspect these are'. Here we have three instances in rapid succession of the 'presumptive use' of μὴ c. subj., for which see *Ap.* 39 a 6 π.

ῥαδίως, 'lightly', 'recklessly'. Cf. *Ap.* 24 c 6 π.

c 5 καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, 'aye, and who would bring them to life again (just as light-heartedly) if they could'. The verb ἀναβιώσκεισθαι means both 'to come to life again' and 'bring to life again'; but, in the former sense, it has the aorist ἀναβιώσθαι, in the latter, ἀναβιώσασθαι (*Phaed.* 89 b 10).

Cf. Photius (*Anf.* 128, 16) ἀνεβιωσάμην· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναβιώσθαι ἐποίησα Κράτης.

c 6 οὐδενὶ ξύν νῶ. So *Ar. Clouds* 580 μηδενὶ ξύν νῶ.

The metre guarantees ξύν for σύν in the passage quoted from Aristophanes (as it does in the phrase ξύν ὄπλοις *Wasps* 359, where see Starkie's note). I have allowed it to stand, as we have clearly to do with a traditional formula. Otherwise, I cannot believe that Plato ever wrote ξύν, which was all but obsolete in his day. The MSS. write ξύν or σύν on no ascertainable principle, but the oldest Plato papyri are quite innocent of ξύν. It seems to be a piece of hyper-Atticism.

τούτων, *istorum*.

ὁ λόγος . . . αἰρεῖ, *ratio evincit*, lit. 'the reckoning proves'. For the use of αἰρεῖν ('catch', 'convict') in the sense of 'prove' cf. *Theaet.* 179 c 4 χαλεπώτερον ελεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς (αἰσθήσεις καὶ δόξαι).

That λόγος in this phrase originally meant 'reckoning', 'calculation' is clear from Aeschines 3 § 59 ὅταν περὶ χρημάτων ἀνηλωμένων διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου καθεζώμεθα ἐπὶ τοὺς λογισμούς . . . ἐπειδὴν ὁ λογισμὸς συγκεφαλαιωθῆ, οὐδεὶς . . . ὅστις οὐκ ἀπέρχεται . . . ἐπινεύσας ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ λογισμὸς αἰρῆ. Dealing with this in his reply, Demosthenes says (18 § 227) ὥσπερ δ' ὅταν οἰόμενοι περιεῖναι χρήματά τῳ ('that he has a balance') λογιζήσθε, ἂν καθαιρῶσιν αἱ ψῆφοι καὶ μηδὲν περιῆ, συγχωρεῖτε (for the compound cf. ἡ καθαιρούσα ψῆφος of a vote for conviction and *Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.* vii. 36 ὅτι δ' ἂν αἱ πλείους ψῆφοι καθαιρῶσι, τοῦτο ποιεῖν). Herodotus has καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος οὕτω αἰρέει (ii. 33) and οὐδὲ λόγος αἰρέει c. inf. (iii. 45, vi. 124). He also uses the phrase with a personal accusative, χράται ὅτι μιν λόγος αἰρέει (i. 132), ὅκως μιν λόγος αἰρέει (vii. 41), ἦν μὴ ἡμέας λόγος αἰρέη (iv. 127), where the meaning is 'as it suits him', 'if it does

not suit him', cf. *il y trouve son compte*, 'it suits his book'. For examples in Plato cf. *Rep.* 440 b 5, 604 c 7, 607 b 3, *Parm.* 141 d 6, *Phil.* 35 d 6, and *Laws* 663 d 6 εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ἦρηχ' ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, which refers to d 5 κατὰ γε τὸν νῦν λόγον and shows that ὁ λόγος does not mean 'reason' in this phrase.

d 1 αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, i. e. σύ τε ἐξάγων καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξαγόμενος, the participles being attached to both parties conjointly, instead of to each severally. Riddell (*Dig.* § 261) compares Isocr. 6 § 47 Ἀπείποιμεν δ' ἂν ἀκούοντές τε καὶ λέγοντες, i. e. ὑμεῖς τε ἀκούοντες καὶ ἐγὼ λέγων.

d 4 παραμένοντας, opp. ἀποδιδράσκοντας, used especially of soldiers, slaves (cf. the name Παρμίων), and prisoners, as here.

d 5 πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, 'in comparison with wrongdoing'. Cf. *Ap.* 28 d 9 μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, and below 54 b 4.

e 4 πείσας σε . . . ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος (sc. σοῦ), 'to act as I am going to act with your approval and not against your will'.

The MSS. have πείσαι, but Ficino renders *multi facio, persuaso te hoc agere, non autem invito*, which suggested to Buttman that we should read πείσας. It was easy for a scribe to think he saw πείσαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, but that yields no acceptable sense in the context.

e 5 τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, 'the starting-point of the inquiry'. The terminology of dialectic is represented as already familiar, even to Crito.

a 1 ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη. Socrates is always anxious that the ἀποκρινόμενος should not answer παρὰ δόξαν, since that would destroy the value of his ὁμολογίαι. Cf. below d 1, *Meno* 83 d 2 τὸ γὰρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου, *Rep.* 346 a 3 καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.

a 7 [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο]. No such statement has yet been made, and the words are probably a marginal note on the next clause, which refers back to 46 b 7.

The words were first suspected by Thomas Burgess. Meiser proposed to transpose them by putting them after ἦ instead of before it, but it is more likely that they are an accidental interpolation.

a 9 ἐκκεχυμέναί εἰσίν, 'have they been thrown over?' lit. 'have they been spilt?' The meaning of ἐκχεῖν (*effundere*) is not very different from that of ἐκβάλλειν (*iacturam facere*) at 46 b 7. Cf. *Rep.* 553 b 1

πταίσαντα ὡσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι (a submerged rock) τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐκχέαντα
τά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν, Aesch. *Pers.* 824 μηδέ τις | ὑπερφρονήσας τὸν
παρόντα δαίμονα | ἄλλων ἐρασθεὶς ὄλβον ἐκχέη μέγαν.

49a10 τηλικοῖδε . . . ἄνδρες κτλ. From the *Apology* (17 d 2 and 33 d 9)
we know that they were both seventy.

Thomas Burgess wished to delete γέροντες ἄνδρες, and it certainly
seems difficult to defend γέροντες. On the other hand, ἄνδρες serves
to mark the contrast with παίδων, and is quite grammatical. Cf.
Ap. 37 d 4 τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπων.

b 3 εἴτε φασὶν κτλ. This clause is in apposition to οὕτως ἔχει κτλ.
οἱ πολλοί. Once more Socrates alludes to the two points in
Crito's argument, viz. (1) ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξα, (2) ἡ τῶν πολλῶν
δύναμις.

b 4 εἴτε καὶ πρῶτα does not seem much to the point, but this is an
instance of 'polar' expression. Cf. *Ap.* 28 b 6 εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον
ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι.

Cobet (*Mem.* 1875, p. 286) wished to delete the words, but here,
as in some other places, he failed to appreciate a characteristic
Greek form of expression.

ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν κτλ: cf. *Gorg.* 469 b 12 Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν
ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν; — Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ'
ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν,
508 e 4 τὸ . . . ἀδικεῖν . . . τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχίον εἶναι ἢ
ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.

b 6 φασὲν ἢ οὐ; 'yes or no?' Socrates insists on a ὁμολογία from
the reluctant Crito.

b 10 ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, e.g. Archilochus fr. 61 (48) ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι
μέγα, | τὸν κακῶς (με) δρῶντα δέννοισ' ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς. Xenophon
makes Socrates say in one place (*Mem.* ii. 3, 14) καὶ μὴν πλείστου
γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὅς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς
ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. That, however, is an appeal to the
opinion of οἱ πολλοί (note δοκεῖ), and is only introduced at all to
show that Chaerecrates would do well to take the first step in doing
a service to his brother Chaerepho with whom he had quarrelled.
The emphasis is entirely on ὅς ἂν φθάνῃ . . . τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετῶν.
In another passage (*Mem.* ii. 6, 35) Socrates is explaining how he
can assist Critobulus in winning friends, and he asks permission to
say of him among other things ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν
τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, where the emphasis

is again entirely on doing good to friends. I do not think Plato would have made such a slip as to represent Socrates speaking in this way even in passing, though he makes Meno (*Meno* 71 e 4) give the same account of ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, but it is certainly making too much of a *façon de parler* into which Xenophon drops twice to cite it as evidence that Socrates held such a view himself. I agree with Adam (*Introd.* p. xii) that *Mem.* iii. 9, 8 'proves nothing either way'. And, in any case, Xenophon is no authority on a matter of this kind. Plato distinctly makes Socrates hold the view that wrongdoing is worse than being wronged, and that too in dialogues of which the main purpose is to defend the memory of Socrates rather than to urge novel doctrines of his own. That consideration ought to be decisive.

c 2 κακουργεῖν, i. e. κακῶς ποιεῖν, 'to injure', which is substituted below c 10.

c 10 οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν κτλ. Here ποιεῖν represents ἀντιποιεῖν, the ἀντί of ἀνταδικεῖν being carried on in accordance with Greek idiom. Cf. *Soph. Ant.* 537 καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας, *Dem.* 2 § 9 καὶ συμπονεῖν καὶ φέρειν τὰς συμφορὰς . . . ἐθέλουσιν ἄνθρωποι.

Cobet (*Mnem.* 1875, p. 287) proposed to read οὔτε ἀντὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, observing *dicebant omnes pro ἀντευεργετεῖν ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν et passivè ἀντ' εὖ πάσχειν similiterque ἀντὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν et ἀντὶ κακῶς πάσχειν*. That is true, but it makes it all the easier to carry on the ἀντί of ἀνταδικεῖν. It is on the same principle that a compound verb is repeated by the simple verb.

d 1 παρὰ δόξαν, 'against your (real) belief'. Cf. a 1 n.

d 9 τῆς ἀρχῆς, sc. τῆς σκέψεως (48 e 5). Cf. d 6 ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι.

e 6 δίκαια ὄντα, 'if they are right'. Socrates is always represented as making this reservation. So in the first book of the *Republic* (331 c 5 sqq.) he insists that it is not right to give back a sword to a friend if he has gone mad when he asks it back, or to tell the truth to a friend in such a state.

The Dialogue between Socrates and the Laws of Athens

(50 a 6-54 d 1).

The personification of the Laws (who are of course to be pictured as august *male* figures) allows Socrates to invest the declaration of

his principles with a certain emotion. It thus fulfils the same function as the myths of the more elaborate dialogues.

The προσωποποιία of the Laws was all the easier, as the Athenian idiom said ὁ νόμος διαλέγεται (cf. e. g. Dem. 43 § 59, Aeschines I § 18 (quoted in 51 d 3 n.)).

The style of this passage is very remarkable. Plato aims at representing the Laws as pleading earnestly with Socrates (in fact, of course, Socrates is pleading with himself), and he produces this effect by a free use of anacoluthia and changed constructions.

The argument of the Laws depends on the conception of Law as an agreement or contract (ὁμολογία, συνθήκη) between the State (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως) and the individual. That is the view embodied in the famous definition of law given in the first speech against Aristogeiton (Dem. 25 § 16). Cf. especially the closing words πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, καθ' ἣν πᾶσι προσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει.

This definition was taken over almost *totidem verbis* by the Roman lawyers. Cf. *Dig.* i. 3, 2 and see Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, ii. 18 sq.

50 a 7 εἶθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο. The suggestion is that words like ἀπιέναι, ἐξιέναι are mere euphemisms, though Crito may use them if he likes. The real name of the thing is ἀποδιδράσκειν, the proper word for runaway slaves, prisoners, and deserters.

Cf. Dem. 22 § 56 δημοσία δεθέντ' ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, μήτ' ἀποδόντα ταῦτα μήτε κριθέντ' ἀποδρᾶναι, 25 § 56 τὸ δεσμοτήριον διορύξας ἀπέδρα.

ἐλθόντες . . . ἐπιστάντες ἔροιτο, 'came and appeared to me and asked me' (the first participle subordinate to the second). From Homer downwards ἐπιστήναι is used of dreams and visions. Cf. *Il.* x. 496 κακὸν γὰρ ὄναρ κεφαλῆφιν ἐπέστη, Herod. i. 34, 1 αὐτίκα δὲ οἱ εὗδοντι ἐπέστη ὄνειρος, ii. 139, vii. 14 νυκτὸς δὲ γενομένης αὐτὶς τὸ ὄνειρον τῷ Ξέρξῃ κατυπνωμένῳ ἔλεγε ἐπιστάν. So *Symp.* 192 d 2 εἰ αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπιστὰς ὁ Ἥφαιστος . . . ἔροιτο.

a 8 τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, 'the State', 'the Commonwealth'. The phrase marks at least the beginning of the idea that the State as such was a juristic personality or corporation, a view not as a rule clearly grasped by the Athenians or the Greeks generally. Cf. Vinogradoff, *Hist. Jur.* ii. 105 sqq. In Lysias 16 § 18 τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως is opposed to ἰδιῶται, 'private citizens'.

b 2 τὸ σὸν μέρος, 'so far as in you lies'. Cf. 45 d 2 n.

b 3 ἔτι . . . εἶναι, 'to continue to exist'.

If we take ἔτι closely with εἶναι, there is no difficulty here. Buttmann needlessly proposed τὴν πόλιν <πόλιν> εἶναι.

ἀνατετράφθαι, 'to be subverted'. The *vox propria* for the 'capsizing' of a vessel is ἀνατρέπω, and hence it is applied to the Ship of State. *Rep.* 389 d 4 ἐπιτήδευμα . . . πόλεως ὡσπερ νεὸς ἀνατρεπτικόν. This shows that the metaphor was still felt. Cf. *Euth.* 14 b 6.

b 7 ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ. This refers to the practice of appointing public advocates (σύνδικοι or συνήγοροι) to defend laws which it was proposed to abrogate. Cf. the law quoted in *Dem.* 24 § 23 αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς συναπολογησομένους τὸν δῆμον τοῖς νόμοις οἱ ἂν ἐν (coram) τοῖς νομοθέταις λύωνται. See *Dict. Ant.* s. v. *Syndicus*.

b 8 τὰς δίκας . . . κυρίας εἶναι. The law (passed after the Amnesty, and quoted by *Andocides* I § 87), τὰς δὲ δίκας καὶ τὰς διαίτας κυρίας εἶναι, ὅποσαι ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ τῇ πόλει ἐγένοντο, would apply *a fortiori* to δίκαι decided after the democracy was restored.

c 1 Ἡδίκη . . . ἡμᾶς . . . Here ἡδίκη is a virtual pluperfect (*G.M.T.* § 37) to the virtual perfect ἀδικεῖ (*ib.* § 27).

Heindorf proposed to read ἀδικεῖ and took ἔκρινεν as aorist. In any case, it will not do to say with Adam that 'Socrates speaks as one who had outlived the sense of injury', since he does not in fact adopt the plea.

c 4 ἢ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ., 'was that too in the agreement?' sc. that the justice of the decision should be open to question.

c 5 ἐμμενεῖν. B has ἐμμένειν, but T has no accent at all. MS. authority is of hardly any weight in such matters, and the balance of evidence is strongly in favour of the future infinitive after ὁμολογεῖν all through this passage. See 51 e 6 n.

c 9 τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, i. e. τῷ διαλέγεσθαι, the regular Socratic method. Cf. *Prot.* 336 c 4 διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, *Phaed.* 75 d 2 ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι, *Rep.* 534 d 8 ταύτης . . . τῆς παιδείας (sc. τῆς διαλεκτικῆς) . . . ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἰοῖ τ' ἔσονται.

d 1 πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν κτλ. The series γένεσις, τροφή, παιδεία appears here once more (cf. 45 d 1 n.). So *Alc.* 122 b 5 τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως . . . καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, *Latws* 920 a 8 ὅσοι γενέσει καὶ τροφαῖς εὖ πεπαιδεύονται. The meaning appears from the next clause, and is simply that Socrates was 'lawfully begotten'.

50 d 3 τούτοις ἡμῶν, 'those of us here'.

If τούτοις is used δεικτικῶς, there is no need to bracket τοῖς νόμοις with Stallbaum and others, but it will be well to make the construction clear by adding a comma after ἡμῶν.

d 8 παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ κτλ. We cannot safely infer that there was any direct *compulsion* for parents to educate their sons in μουσική and γυμναστική. We do know, however, from Aeschines 1 § 7 sqq. that the laws of Solon contained minute regulations about school discipline and that they expressly (διαρρήδην) laid down ἀχρὴ τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐλεύθερον ἐπιτηδεύειν, καὶ ὡς δεῖ αὐτὸν τραφῆναι.

e 2 ἐγένου . . . ἐξετράφης . . . ἐπαιδεύθης: cf. d 1 n.

e 5 ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου κτλ., 'do you think you and we are equally justified?' For ἐξ ἴσου (lit. 'on a level') with two datives cf. Lysias 12 § 81 ὁ . . . ἀγὼν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ('on equal terms') τῇ πόλει καὶ Ἐρατοσθένει.

e 6 σοί is governed by δίκαιον. Cf. *Rep.* 334 c 12 δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν;

e 7 πρὸς μὲν ἄρα . . . 51 a 2 πρὸς δὲ . . . ἄρα . . . is a typical *argumentum ex contrariis* (cf. *Ap.* 20 c 6 n.) in interrogative form (cf. 46 d 2) with ἄρα in *both* clauses, as in *Prot.* 325 b 6 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς ὑεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ζημία ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ ἢ τε ζημία θάνατος . . . μὴ μαθοῦσι . . . ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται;

51 a 3 ἐξέσται σοι, sc. ἄπερ πάσχεις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν.

Schanz needlessly reads ἔσται, sc. ἐξ ἴσου. There is no reason why the form of expression should not be varied.

a 4 καὶ σὺ δὲ κτλ. A striking instance of δέ *in apodosi* with anacoluthic effect, the construction reverting to the independent form (ἐπιχειρήσεις). This change of construction appears to express eagerness and earnestness.

BTW all have the reading in the text. Schanz adopts καὶ σὺ γε from Par. 1808 (which is a copy of T). It is easy enough to restore grammatical symmetry by such devices; but they sacrifice the rhetorical effect, which seems plainly intended.

a 6 ὁ . . . ἐπιμελόμενος, a scornful reference to the Socratic doctrine of ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια. Cf. *Ap.* 29 e 1 n.

b 1 ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ is an Ionicism natural in the mouth of the Laws. Cf. Herod. ii. 172, 2 τὰ μὲν δὴ πρῶτα κατῶνοντο τὸν Ἄμασιν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιῇ μοίρῃ μεγάλη ἦγον. So *Laws* 923 b 5 πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο

βλέπων νομοθετήσω, τὸ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου κατατιθεῖς ἐν μοίραις ἐλάττοσι δικαίως.

b 3 ἡ πείθειν is bracketed by Schanz on the ground that it is repeated below c 1. But it is very awkward to make the second ἡ πείθειν depend on δεῖ, and its construction can be otherwise explained (see next note). What is repeated, with some amplification, is really ἡ ποιεῖν ἡ πείθειν, and such a repetition is characteristic of Plato's style (a b a).

c 1 πείθειν, as if δεῖ had preceded instead of verbals in -τέον. Cf. *Gorg.* 492 d 5 τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φησὶ οὐ κολαστέον . . . ἐὼντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν.

c 8 γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες : cf. 50 d 1 π.

d 1 προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι . . . ἐξεῖναι, 'we give public notice by giving permission . . . that it is permitted'. The expression is redundant, but ἐξεῖναι is required to complete the construction of προαγορεύομεν, and τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι is required to explain the nature of the πρόρρησις. (Note the distinction between προαγορεύειν, 'to give public notice', and προλέγειν, 'to foretell').

d 3 ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ, 'as soon as he has reached man's estate' (Church). Cf. *Lysias* 10 § 31 ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἐδοκιμάσθην. This refers to the δοκιμασία εἰς ἄνδρας of young citizens at the age of eighteen when they became ἔφηβοι, and were enrolled in the register of their deme. Cf. *Aeschines* 1 § 18 ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐγγραφῆ τις εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἰδῆ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως . . . οὐκέτι ἐτέρῳ διαλέγεται (ὁ νομοθέτης), ἀλλ' ἤδη αὐτῷ.

d 4 λαβόντα (though τῷ βουλομένῳ precedes) under the influence of the inf. ἐξεῖναι (cf. *Euth.* 5 a 5 π.). This in itself shows that ἐξεῖναι is not an interpolation.

d 5 καὶ οὐδεὶς . . . d 6 βούληται was accidentally omitted by B and supplied by B². This is an instructive case ; for it seems to imply that B missed 3 lines of the archetype (49 letters) owing to the repetition of βούληται.

d 7 εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι. Socrates might very well have gone to Thurii in 444 B. C., when he was about twenty-five years old. This is to be distinguished from μετοικεῖν in the next line, which means to settle in a city which had no connexion with Athens.

e 5 γεννηταῖς, 'begetters'. We must distinguish γεννηταί in this sense from γεννηται, which means members of the same γένος (γέννα), and is co-ordinate with δημότης and φυλέτης. Cf. *Laws*

717 e 1 ὧν οἱ προπάτορες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν γεννητὰς ἐτίθεισαν, 869 b 3 τὴν τοῦ γεννητοῦ ψυχὴν συλήσας, 928 d 6 παίδων (διαφορὰς) πρὸς γεννητὰς. On the other hand, *Laws* 878 d 7 τοὺς γεννήτας καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς.

51 e 6 πείσεσθαι is the reading of W, and is to be preferred to πείθεσθαι (BT). Cf. above e 3 ὁμολογηκένοι . . . ποιήσιν, 52 c 2 ὁμολόγεις . . . πολιτεύσεσθαι, d 4 ὁμολογηκένοι πολιτεύσεσθαι (T: πολιτεύεσθαι B). See also note on ἐμμενεῖν 50 c 5. The present infinitive would properly mean 'having agreed that he is obeying us'. In view of the complete MS. evidence now available, Adam's defence of πείθεσθαι is not required, even if it were permissible to treat ὁμολογεῖν as anything else than a verb of saying. The reading of T ἢ μὴν for ἡμῖν would make it almost necessary to change ὁμολογήσας into ὁμόσας with M. Schmidt (the words are often confused). There is, however, no implication of an oath, but only of a tacit contract.

52 a 1 προτιθέντων ἡμῶν, 'though we set before you (an alternative)'. Cf. *Theaet.* 196 c 9 Ἄπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης. The real object of προτιθέντων is δυοῖν θάτερα, but after the intervening words the participle is resumed by ἐφιέντων, which expresses the same idea in a slightly different way. The words ποιεῖν & ἂν κελεύωμεν depend on ἐπιταπτόντων, not (as Adam says) on προτιθέντων.

a 3 ταύταις . . . ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέχεσθαι, 'that you will be liable to these charges'. For ἐνέχεσθαι, *teneri*, *obnoxius esse*, cf. Dem. 51 § 11 τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ἐπιτιμίοις ἐνέξεται. Compounds of ἔχω very frequently have the same forms in the aorist and future middle and passive. The adjective of ἐνέχομαι is ἔνοχος, cf. *Theaet.* 148 b 4 ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίαις. Both verb and adjective are frequent in the *Laws*.

ὦ Σώκρατες. So T. B omits ὦ, but this would be rather peremptory.

a 4 εἶπερ ποιήσεις, fut. ind. in monitory protasis.

a 5 ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα : cf. 43 c 7 π.

a 6 ἂν . . . καθάπτοιτο, 'they would upbraid me' (not 'retort', Church, Fowler). In Homer we have καθάπτεισθαι . . . ἐπέεσσι c. acc. in a neutral sense; it is simply 'to accost', whether in a friendly spirit or otherwise. In later Greek, however, it always implies censure and takes a genitive.

b 2 τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων . . . διαφερόντως, lit. 'in a surpassing degree compared with all other Athenians'. The verb διαφέρειν and its derivatives can take the construction of the comparative degree (so διαφέρειν ἢ . . .). Cf. *Phaed.* 65 a 2 διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.

b 2 οὐ γὰρ ἂν . . . ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, 'or else you would not have stayed at home in it'. Here ἐπιδημεῖν is the opposite of ἀποδημεῖν, 'to go on a journey abroad'. More often it is used of foreigners visiting Athens. Cf. *Ap.* 20 a 3.

b 4 ἐπὶ θεωρίαν, 'to see the sights', a thing of which the Greeks were passionately fond. In *Rep.* 579 b 6 it is counted as one of the miseries of a tyrant that μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημῆσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαμῶσε οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσιν.

b 5 ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν. The mention of a single exception adds to the force of the statement. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 23) says καὶ Πυθῶδε ἐλθεῖν Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἄλλὰ καὶ εἰς Ἴσθμόν, ὡς Φαβωρίνος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων. If Aristotle really said that Socrates visited Delphi, that was no doubt a slip.

The words ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν are in the text of T and the margin of W from the first hand. Their omission in B and in the text of W is therefore accidental. They contain 18 letters, and may have formed a single line in the archetype. Athenaeus (or rather Herodicus whom he follows) certainly read them where they stand; for he tries to make out that they are inconsistent with the statement of the *Apology* (28 e 2) that Socrates had served at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium. Cf. *Athen.* 216 b ἐν δὲ τῷ Κρίτωνι . . . Πλάτων οὐδὲ ποιήσασθαι πώποτε ἀποδημίαν τὸν Σωκράτη ἔξω τῆς εἰς Ἴσθμόν θεωρίας εἴρηκε. He failed to notice the words εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος.

The source of Aristotle's statement, fr. 2 (if he made it), is obviously *Phaedr.* 229 e 5; but, as Taylor suggests (*Var. Soc.* p. 65) Diogenes (or his source) is only drawing an inference from the fact that Aristotle had spoken of the influence of the Delphic inscription γνῶθι σεαυτόν on Socrates, as we know that he did (ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς) from fr. 1 (*Plut. adv. Col.* 1118 c). Taylor's suggestion is adopted by H. Maier, *Sokrates*, p. 82, n.

b 6 εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, 'except to go on military service'. In *Ap.* 28 e 2 sq. we hear of Socrates serving at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium (see notes *in loc.*). These campaigns are mentioned there as he is speaking of battles, but there is good ground for holding that Socrates also served at the siege of Samos (440 B. C.) in his thirtieth year. Cf. *Diog. Laert.* ii. 23 Ἴων δὲ ὁ Χίος καὶ νέον ὄντα (Σωκράτη) εἰς Σάμον σὺν Ἀρχελάῳ ἀποδημῆσαι. If that is so, Socrates served against a force commanded by Melissus (*E. Gr. Ph.*³ § 164). See also my article *Socrates* in *E.R.E.* xi.

οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω κτλ. Cf. *Phaedr.* 230 c 7, where

Phaedrus says to Socrates ἀτεχνῶς γάρ . . . ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ ('a stranger in the hands of a guide') καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξίέναι. This passage is not really inconsistent with the single journey to the Isthmus. Phaedrus is speaking quite generally, but the Laws are bound to be accurate in detail.

52 b 7 ἐπιθυμία . . . ἄλλης πόλεως . . . εἰδέναί. The object of εἰδέναί is accommodated to the governing word ἐπιθυμία. This is a characteristic Platonic idiom. Cf. *Gorg.* 513 e 5 ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν (for τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας), *Rep.* 443 b 8 ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσιν (for τὴν πόλιν), *Tim.* 33 c 4 οὐδ' αὖ τινος ἐπιδεῖς ἦν ὀργάνου σχεῖν.

c 2 τά τε ἄλλα καί, 'and in particular' (Adam), has become purely phraseological, and it is therefore superfluous to ask what verb it goes with.

c 7 ὡς εἶρησθα: cf. *Apol.* 37 c 4–38 a 6. Here again, I think, we may take this reference in the *Crito* as testimony to the historical truth of the *Apology* (cf. 45 b 7 n.). It would hardly have been fitting for Plato to make the Laws argue with Socrates from a figment of his own. He must have counted on his readers' memory of the trial.

c 8 οὔτ' . . . αἰσχύνῃ, 'you are not ashamed before these words'. As Adam says, the λόγοι are personified here, and the construction is the same as in *Charm.* 169 c 7 ἡσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας.

c 9 οὔτε ἡμῶν . . . ἐντρέπη, 'nor have you any regard for us, the Laws'. Cf. *Phaedr.* 254 a 3 οὔτε μάλιστα ἔτι ἐντρέπεται. The verb originally meant 'turn back' (much like 'respect', 'regard'. Cf. Herod. vii. 211 ὅπως ἐντρέψειαν τὰ νῶτα) and, in this sense, takes the construction of verbs of caring like ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, φροντίζειν. So already in Homer, *Il.* xv. 553 οὐδέ νυ σοί περ | ἐντρέπεται φίλον ἦτορ ἀνεψιοῦ κταμένοιο; (cf. *Od.* i. 59), though μετατρέπομαι is more common in this sense. The word ἐντρέπομαι is mainly Ionic and Tragic. Sophocles has it fairly often, and it is used by Xenophon (*Hell.* ii. 3, 33). In Hellenistic Greek it is common, and acquires the meaning, 'to be ashamed of'. In N.T. ἐντροπή is 'shame'.

d 5 ἔργῳ ἄλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, closely with ὁμολογηκέναι (cf. 51 e 3 ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ).

Some would bracket ἄλλ' οὐ λόγῳ here, but the phrase ἔργῳ ἄλλ' οὐ λόγῳ is a standing formula, and must not be too closely analysed.

- d 8 ἂν φαίεν is a mere parenthesis, and so ἄν is not felt as heading its clause. Cf. *Phaed.* 87 a 7 τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς; Dem. i. §§ 14 and 19 τί οὖν, ἄν τις εἴποι . . . ;
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, 'with us ourselves' (not reflexive). 'Are you not breaking your contract and agreement with us in person?'
- e 1 παραβαίνεις. There was an action for breach of contract (*συνθήκης παραβάσεως δίκη* Pollux vi. 153, viii. 31) in answer to which, as we gather from this passage, it was possible to plead that the contract was void as entered into under duress (ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης) or in consequence of misrepresentation (ἀπατηθείς).
- e 2 ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ . . . ἐν ἑτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα . . . The preposition ἐν is used of the time anything takes. Cf. *Phaed.* 58 b 7 τοῦτο δ' ἐνίστε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, 'this sometimes takes a long time'. The meaning is therefore, as Church gives it, 'you had not to make up your mind in a hurry. You had seventy years &c.'
- e 5 οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα . . . οὔτε Κρήτην κτλ. This would be pointless unless the 'historical' Socrates had actually praised the laws of Sparta and Crete. So far as Sparta is concerned, this is confirmed by Aristophanes, *Birds* 1281 ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, | ἐκόμων, ἐπείνων, ἐρρύπων, ἐσωκράτουν.
- a 1 τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, not τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πόλεων, represents the normal Attic idiom. The ἐθνικόν, not the κτητικόν, is used of cities (as here), and of ships (Φοίνισσα, Κίλισσα ναῦς, Μεγαρίδες νῆες, ἡ στρατηγίς, 'the flagship'). This amounts to personification like our use of 'she' in similar cases. So also of hounds, Λάκαιναι, not Λακωνικάι, σκύλακες.
- Perhaps, then, we should read βαρβάρων with T rather than βαρβαρικῶν with BW. Cf. *Theag.* 126 c 7 καὶ Ἑλληνίσιν προσομιλοῦντας πόλεσιν καὶ βαρβάροις.
- a 2 ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας κτλ. : cf. 52 b 3 διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις. For ἐλάττω (lit. 'in fewer instances') cf. *Gorg.* 512 b 5 οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σῶζειν, *Rep.* 396 d 1 ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἦττον (μιμούμενος). For the home-keeping ways of Socrates cf. *Phaedr.* 230 c 7 (quoted 52 b 6 π.).
- a 4 καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι, 'and presumably we, the Laws'. This draws the inference from the city to the laws, an inference justified in the next clause, τίνα γὰρ ἂν κτλ.

Stephanus already suspected that καὶ ἡμεῖς . . . δῆλον ὅτι was an

interpolation, but the next clause would be meaningless without these words; and so, if we bracket the first clause, we must go on to bracket the second with Heusde and Schanz. Both, however, are necessary to the argument. They are intended to anticipate the objection that Socrates was induced to remain at Athens by some other attraction than its laws, and that there was no tacit contract to obey them at all.

53 a 6 εἰν ἡμῖν γε πείθη κτλ., 'yes, you will, if you take our advice, and you will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving Athens'. The particular ways in which he would make himself ridiculous are specified in the next paragraph.

a 8 καὶ ἔξαμαρτάνων κτλ., 'and offending in any of these respects'. The present participle is used because a continuing state is meant, as with ἀδικῶ.

b 1 καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν, 'to be exiles as well as you'.

b 3 πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. answered by d 1 ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν κτλ.

b 5 εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι. Socrates had friends both at Thebes and Megara. We have seen that some of the Theban Pythagoreans were devoted to him (45 b 4 n.), and there is direct evidence that the good government of Thebes at this time was ascribed to the Pythagoreans who were the teachers of Epaminondas. Cf. E. Gr. Ph.³ p. 278, n. 1.

b 7 ὑποβλέψονται σε, 'will look askance at you'. Cf. *Symp.* 220 b 7 οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν.

βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, 'you will confirm the judges in their opinion'. The words might equally well mean 'you will do the judges the service of confirming other people's opinion about them', and Schanz thinks that the following sentence (ὅστις γὰρ κτλ.) makes this more appropriate. I cannot see why, and prefer the more obvious interpretation. The judges will feel assured that they were right in finding Socrates guilty of corrupting the young, since one who corrupts the laws will *a fortiori* be in all probability a corrupter of youth.

c 8 καὶ οὐκ οἶει κτλ., 'don't you think it would seem indecent on the part of Socrates?' Cf. *Hipp. ma.* 286 e 8 φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν.

[ἂν] φανείσθαι. The ἂν is in BW, but not in T or Eusebius, so the tradition is not decisive on the question of ἂν c. fut. Cf. *Ap.* 29 c 4 n.

l 1 οἶεσθαί γε χρή, 'I should think so!' This formula is used when the speaker answers himself. Cf. 54 b 1, *Phaed.* 68 b 2, *Prot.* 325 c 4.

l 2 ἀπαρεῖς; 'will you take your departure?' Cf. *Ep.* vii. 328 c 4 ἀπῆρα οἴκοθεν. The opposite is καταίρειν. It is better to explain αἶρω and its compounds in their intransitive senses as objectless than to suppose any definite ellipse. We can use 'lift' intransitively in English.

The future of αἶρω with its compounds (which has a long α, being contracted from ἀερῶ) is a constant source of trouble to scribes. In the present passage BTW have preserved ἀπαρεῖς safely.

d 3 πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία: cf. what Xenophon says of the effect produced on Critias by his stay in Thessaly (*Mem.* i. 2, 24) Κριτίας . . . φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομία μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρωμένοις.

d 5 σκευήν, 'costume', 'disguise'. Cf. *Rep.* 577 b 1 γυμνός . . . τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς, *Laus* 947 c 5 τὴν πολεμικὴν σκευὴν ἐνδεδυκότας, *Xen. Anab.* iv. 7, 27 σκευὴν Περσικὴν.

d 6 ἐνσκευάζεσθαι: cf. *Ar. Ach.* 384 ἐνσκευάσασθαι μ' οἶον ἀθλιώτατον, *Frogs* 523 σε παίζων Ἡρακλῆα ἔνσκευάσα.

e 1 οὕτω γλίσχρως, 'so greedily'. The literal meaning of γλίσχρος is 'glutinous', from which the metaphorical sense of 'importunate', 'greedy' is easily derived (cf. the verb γλίχομαι in *Phaed.* 117 a 2 γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν). It also came to mean 'penurious', 'paltry', 'shabby'.

The reading is guaranteed by the agreement of T and Eusebius. BW have οὕτως αἰσχρῶς, the latter with οὕτω γλίσχρως in the margin by the first hand. In B a late hand (not B²) has written γλι in the margin. The mistake is due to the common confusion of uncial A and Λ. It is found also in *Isocr.* 5 § 142, where the Urbinas has οὐ γλίσχρως and other MSS. οὐκ αἰσχρῶς (cf. Cobet, *Coll. Crit.* 510).

e 3 εἰ δὲ μή, 'otherwise', i. e. 'if you do annoy any one'. The phrase has become stereotyped, and is used even after negative conditions, regardless of its literal meaning.

e 4 ὑπερχόμενος, 'fawning upon', 'cringing to'. It is only in this compound, and only when it has this metaphorical sense, that Attic writers carry the stem ἔρχο- through the imperfect, the moods of the present, and the present participle.

The facts about the conjugation of ἔρχομαι and its compounds were first stated by Elmsley (on Eur. *Heraclid.* 210). Cobet (*V.L.* p. 34) supplemented them by the observation *notandum est verbum ὑπέρχομαι, ubi significat θωπεύειν, πρὸς χάριν ὀμιλεῖν, ea lege non teneri. Exempla sunt apud Platonem, Demosthenem, alios.* Rutherford (*New Phryn.*, p. 110) quotes, in addition to the present passage, Dem. 23 § 8 ὑμᾶς . . . ὑπέρχεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν, Andoc. 4 § 21 ὑπέρχεσθαι Ἀλκιβιάδην, [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* 2, 14 οἱ γεωργοῦντες καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι . . . ὑπέρχονται τοὺς πολεμίους μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ δῆμος . . . ἀδεῶς ζῆ καὶ οὐχ ὑπερχόμενος αὐτούς.

53 e 5 εὐωχούμενος. So Aristophanes says (*Frogs* 85) of Agathon who had gone to the court of Archelaus of Macedon, that he had departed ἐς μακάρων εὐωχίαν. The semi-barbarous hospitality of the Thessalian chiefs was notorious. Euripides makes a point of it in his *Alcestis*. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi. 1, 3 (of Polydamas of Pharsalus) ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.

54 a 4 ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν, 'that they may get this advantage too'. For the ironical use of ἀπολαύω cf. *Laws* 910 b 5 (ἵνα μὴ) πᾶσα . . . ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύη τῶν ἀσεβῶν, Isocr. 8 § 81.

W has τοῦτό σου for τοῦτο BT, which makes good sense.

a 5 ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, 'or, if you won't do that', i.e. take them to Thessaly to bring them up, but leave them behind to be brought up here at Athens (αὐτοῦ). In that case, the Laws ask, will they be any the better brought up because you are alive (σοῦ ζῶντος), seeing that you are away in Thessaly and not associating with them (μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς)?

a 6 θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται, passive. Cf. 52 a 4 ἐνέξεσθαι.

οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι κτλ., 'yes, for your friends will look after them'. The Laws suggest a possible answer to the preceding question.

a 7 πότερον εἰ μὲν κτλ., i.e. Does it depend on your being in Thessaly rather than in the other world, whether your friends will look after them or not?

a 9 εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος κτλ., 'if they are good for anything'. Cf. 46 a 2 n., *Euth.* 4 e 9 n.

b 1 οἴεσθαι γε χρή, 'to be sure they will'. The phrase (for which cf. 53 d 1 n.) has become stereotyped, and is used (like εἰ δὲ μὴ, 53 e 3 n.) even after a negative statement.

b 4 πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, i.q. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον, but stronger. Cf. *Phaed.* 99 a 2

εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδι-
δράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἢντιν' ἂν τάττη.

b 5 τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν. The Orphic doctrine of judgement after death is assumed here, as it may well be. With Crito there is no need for the reserve which was appropriate before the judges. Cf. *Ap.* 40 c 6 sqq. and notes. For ἐκεῖ, 'in the other world', opp. ἐνθάδε, 'in this world', cf. *Phaed.* 61 e 1 n.

b 8 νῦν μὲν, 'as it is', answered by εἰάν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς κτλ.

d 2 Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε κτλ. Cobet, *Mnem.* 1875, p. 287, defends his excisions thus: *Quae aurister repetitum ἀκούειν tolerare possit? Reliqua deleverunt iam alii, sed retinent omnes αὕτη ἢ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων, sed vel unum αὕτη additum facit ut fraudem manifestam teneamus.*

d 3 οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες, 'those affected by Corybantic enthusiasm' (the form of the verb κορυβαντιᾶν indicates a morbid condition, cf. Rutherford, *New Phryn.*, p. 153), *Tim. Lex.* Κορυβαντιᾶν· παρεμ-
μαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῶς κινεῖσθαι. So *Ar. Wasps* 8 ἀλλ' ἢ παρα-
φρονεῖς ἔτεόν ἢ κορυβαντιᾶς; The reference is specially to the homoeopathic treatment of nervous and hysterical patients by wild pipe and drum music. The patients were thus excited to the pitch of exhaustion, which was followed by a sleep from which they awoke purged and cured. What we are told of Tarantism in the Middle Ages throws great light on this (cf. *Enc. Brit.*¹¹ s.v. *Tarantula*). Plato refers to this form of psychotherapy more than once. Cf. *Euthyd.* 277 d 6 sqq., *Symp.* 215 e 1 ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολὺ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾶ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, *Laus* 790 e 1 (of nurses putting children to sleep by motion) καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἶον καταλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ ἢ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις (sc. καταλοῦσα). So *Ar. Pol.* 1342 a 7 (of ἐνθουσιασμός) καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώιχμοί τινές εἰσιν· ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως ('purgation'). I cannot doubt the connexion of this with the Pythagorean use of music as a soul-purge (*Phaed.* 67 c 5 n.), or that it is the ultimate source of the κάθαρσις doctrine in Aristotle's *Poetics*. In its context the passage quoted from the *Politics* seems to settle that.

τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, 'think they hear the pipes', even

when they have stopped playing. This is the origin of the metaphorical use of the adjective ἔναυλος of what 'rings in the ears'. Cf. *Menex.* 235 c 1 οὕτως ἔναυλος ὁ λόγος τε καὶ ὁ φθόγγος παρὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ἐνδύεται εἰς τὰ ὦτα, Aeschines 3 § 191 ἔναυλον γὰρ ἦν ἔτι τότε πᾶσιν ὅτι . . . ὁ δῆμος κατελύθη.

54 e 1 Ἔα τοίνυν, 'Let it be!' Cf. *Charm.* 163 e 6 Ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, *Euthyd.* 302 c 2 Ἔα . . . ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.

e 2 ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται, 'God leads the way'. Here there can be no question of any particular god. The words are definitely monotheistic.