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Introduction

The New Development—Security Terrain

The optimism of the early post-Cold War years that the world was entering a new era of peace and stability has long since evaporated. It has been swept aside by a troubled decade of internal and regionalised forms of conflict, large-scale humanitarian interventions and social reconstruction programmes that have raised new challenges and questioned old assumptions. During the mid-1990s the need to address the issue of conflict became a central concern within mainstream development policy. Once a specialised discipline within international and security studies, war and its effects are now an important part of development discourse. At the same time, development concerns have become increasingly important in relation to how security is understood. It is now generally accepted that international organisations should be aware of conflict and its effects and, where possible, gear their work towards conflict resolution and helping to rebuild war-torn societies in a way that will avert future violence. Such engagement is regarded as essential if development and stability are to prevail. These views are well represented in the policy statements of leading intergovernmental organisations;[1] international financial institutions;[2] donor governments;[3] United Nations agencies;[4] influential think-tanks;[5] international NGOs;[6] and even large private companies.[7] At the same time, the literature on humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction has burgeoned,[8] new university departments and courses have sprung up, and practitioner training programmes have been established. Conflict-related NGOs have emerged, while existing NGOs have expanded their mandates. In addition, donor governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and the UN have all created specialist units and committees. Linking these developments, dedicated multidisciplinary and multisectoral fora and networks have multiplied.

This book is a critical reflection on the incorporation of war into development discourse. The shift in aid policy towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction is analysed not merely as a technical system of support and assistance, but as part of an emerging system of global governance. In order to frame this approach, the introduction has two main parts. First, the changing nature of North–South relations is described in broad terms. In particular, it is argued that the capitalist world system is no longer a necessarily expansive or inclusive complex. Since the 1970s, formal trade, productive, financial and technological networks have been concentrating within and between the North American, Western European and East Asian regional systems at the expense of outlying areas. On the basis of raw materials and cheap labour alone, the inclusion of the South within the conventional global economy can no longer be taken for granted. The second part of the introduction builds on this reconfiguration and focuses particularly on its association with the reinterpretation of the nature of security. Today, security concerns are no longer encompassed solely by the danger of conventional interstate war. The threat of an excluded South fomenting international instability through conflict, criminal activity and terrorism is now part of a new security framework. Within this framework, underdevelopment has become dangerous. This reinterpretation is closely associated with a radicalisation of development. Indeed, the incorporation of conflict resolution and societal reconstruction within aid policy – amounting to a commitment to transform societies as a whole – embodies this radicalisation. Such a project, however, is beyond the capabilities or legitimacy of individual Northern governments. In this respect, the changing nature of North–South relations is synonymous with a shift from hierarchical and territorial relations of government to polyarchical, non-territorial and networked relations of governance. The radical agenda of social transformation is embodied within Northern strategic networks and complexes that are bringing together governments, NGOs, military establishments and private companies in new ways. Such complexes are themselves part of an emerging system of global liberal governance.

From a capitalist to a liberal world system

The nation state was a political project based upon a logic of expansion, inclusion and subordination. It was also closely associated with the growth of a capitalist world system. Until the 1970s, this system was widely perceived as a geographically expanding and spatially deepening universe (Wallerstein 1974). A broad consensus held that capitalism

had grown over several hundred years from its European origins to span the globe by the end of the nineteenth century. Indeed, contrary to some of the current views on globalisation, a few writers have even argued that the world economy reached a peak of interdependence and openness in the early years of the twentieth century that has not been equalled since (Hirst and Thompson 1996). While such detail is contested, in capitalism's seemingly inexorable forward march other social systems fell before it and, for better or worse, found themselves subordinated to its logic. Even the peripheral areas of the world system were valued for their raw materials and cheap labour and were typically incorporated through colonial or semi-colonial relations of tutelage (Rodney 1972). In the capitalist core areas, bureaucratic, juridical and territorially based state systems developed. Through the emergence of widening forms of legal, political and economic protection, state actors forged inclusive national identities from the disparate social groups that lay within state borders.[9] On the basis of the growing competence of the nation state, citizens were expected to be loyal and defer to its normative structures and expectations (Derlugian 1996).

The 1970s are widely regarded as signalling a profound and historic change in the nature of the capitalist world system and with it the nation state. From this period, while market relations have continued to deepen in core areas, the future of capitalism as a globally expansive and inclusive system has been increasingly questioned (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). Contrary to popular views of globalisation which often portray capitalist relations as redoubling their penetration and interconnection of all parts of the globe (for examples see Waters 1995), the core regions of what could now be termed the liberal world system appear to be consolidating and strengthening the ties between them at the expense of outlying areas. In a review of the existing quantitative information, Hoogvelt (1997: 69–89) has argued that in broad terms the loci of economic power and influence in the world have remained remarkably stable for the past several hundred years. The one major exception is the relatively recent emergence of a number of East Asian countries to join Japan in confirming that region, together with the North American and Western European systems, as one of the core areas of an emerging global informational economy (Castells 1996).

If globalisation has a meaning in this context, it is the consolidation of several distinct but interrelated regionalised economic systems as the core of the formal international economy. Moreover, rather than continuing to expand in a spatial or geographical sense, the competitive financial, investment, trade and productive networks that link these regionalised systems have been thickening and deepening since the

1970s. Although there are, of course, many differences that separate them, these core regionalised systems of the global informational economy are here figuratively described as the 'North'. Correspondingly, the areas formally outside or only partially or conditionally integrated into these regional networks are loosely referred to as the 'South'. The inclusion of the South within the conventional economic flows and networks of the global economy – even when raw materials and cheap labour are available, even as unequal and exploited subjects – can no longer, as in the past, be taken for granted.

> The architecture of the global economy features an asymmetrically interdependent world, organised around three major economic regions and increasingly polarized along an axis of opposition between productive, information-rich, affluent areas, and impoverished areas, economically devalued and socially excluded. (Castells 1996: 145)

In the case of Africa, for example – with the exception of South Africa and, beyond it, a certain number of prized raw materials, niche tropical products and adventure tourism – commercial investment has collapsed since the 1970s. In much of the former Soviet Union a similar lack of interest exists, as evidenced by relatively low levels of Western investment in all fields except energy and a number of valuable raw materials. Manuel Castells (1996, 1998) has argued that global capitalism no longer operates on the basis of expansion and incorporation but on a new logic of consolidation and exclusion (see also Hirst and Thompson 1996: 68–9).

There are numerous instances of the logic of exclusion informing North–South relations, including the increasing restriction of immigration from the South since the 1970s and the hardening of the international refugee regime (UNHCR 1995). Indeed, the present refugee regime can best be described as one of return rather than asylum. Although some views of globalisation stress interconnection and integration, the movement of poor people from the South to the North, and even across international boundaries in the South itself, is becoming more difficult and contested. Writing in a similar vein, Robert Cox has argued that the irrelevance of much of the world's population in relation to the formal global economy is manifest in the shift from attempts to promote economic development in the South 'in favour of what can be called global poor relief and riot control' (Cox 1995: 41). Restriction, in many cases, has been matched by a system concordance geared to attempting to develop methods of population containment. During the first half of the 1990s, for example, a key response to the new wars of the post-Cold War era was the emergence of system-wide UN humanitarian opera-

tions. Largely through negotiating access with warring parties, in Africa and the Balkans, for example, aid agencies developed the means of providing humanitarian assistance directly to populations within their countries and areas of origin (Duffield 1997). Such operations, together with related 'safe area' policies, had the effect of encouraging war-affected populations, with varying degrees of success, to remain within conflict zones and to avoid crossing international borders.

The idea of exclusion, however, should not be understood too literally. As well as a closing of doors or severing of relationships, exclusion is also a subordinating social relationship embodied in new relations of connection, interaction and interdependence. In other words, the concept of exclusion encompasses both new types of restriction and emergent and subordinating forms of North–South integration.

The ambivalence of Southern exclusion

Political economy has largely understood Southern exclusion in terms of the ambivalence of its present economic position within the global economy. On the one hand, evidence suggests that the South has been increasingly isolated and excluded by the dominant networks of the conventional global informational economy. Many traditional primary products are no longer required or are too low-priced for commercial exploitation, investment is risky, the available workforce lacks appropriate skills and education, markets are extremely narrow, telecommunications inadequate, politics unpredictable, governments ineffective, and so on. Regarding much of Africa, Castells has argued that liberal economic reform has revealed its 'structural irrelevance' for the new informational economy (Castells 1996: 135). At the same time, however, formal economic exclusion is not synonymous with a void, far from it. The South has effectively reintegrated itself into the liberal world system through the spread and deepening of all types of parallel and shadow transborder activity (Bayart *et al*. 1999). This represents the site of new and expansive forms of local–global networking and innovative patterns of extra-legal and non-formal North–South integration.

Not only does exclusion imply both isolation and subordinating forms of interaction, the terms North and South also require some qualification. They are no longer regarded as relating to just spatial or geographical realities. They are now as much social as they are territorial.[10] Under the impact of market deregulation and the increased ease with which finance, investment and production can cross borders, although North–South distinctions are still geographically concentrated, they also reflect important non-territorial social modalities. While the gap in

per capita income between Northern and Southern countries has been widening for generations (Hoogvelt 1997; UNDP 1996), similar gaps between the richest and poorest sections of the population in the North have also grown. Castells (1996: 145) describes as 'an enduring architecture and variable geometry' this qualified consolidation of historic North–South geographic divisions, accompanied at the same time by a growing non-territorial fluidity of the social modalities involved. Thus, within the networks and flows of the global economy, the North now has a 'variable geometry' of pockets of impoverishment, redundant skills and social exclusion, just as within 'the enduring architecture' of the South even the poorest countries usually have small sections of the workforce connected to high-value global networks. Indeed, such connections are important in understanding the new wars. They reflect the points at which the control of markets and populations, together with their selective integration into the networks of global governance, are often contested.

In studying the new wars, one is largely reliant on the contribution of political economy and anthropology. However, the literature has yet to make up its mind. Indeed, much of the work on global political economy avoids any serious analysis of the South.[11] Moreover, in relation to political economy, where the South is discussed, there is a major division between viewing the new wars as social regression or, in contrast, as systems of social transformation. That is, there is a distinction between seeing conflict in terms of having causes that lead mechanically to forms of breakdown, as opposed to sites of innovation and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority. This contrast, moreover, relates not only to political economy. It is a generic division that characterises the literature on the new wars in general. Most donor governments and aid agencies, for example, tend to see conflict as a form of social regression. For political economy, while its analysis of the exclusionary logic within global liberal governance contains a number of useful insights, much of this work has not translated into a credible theory of the new wars. Manuel Castells, a key figure in the analysis and documentation of the changing global political economy, well illustrates this failure. There is a risk in arguing that the new system logic results in the exclusion of the South from the dominant networks of the global economy, which it appears to do. The danger is to overstate the case and follow through with an implied void of scarcity that, it is assumed, leads to growing resource competition, breakdown, criminalisation and chaos. For Castells, the declining investment in Africa has led to a heightened competition for control of the remaining resources, including the state:

> [B]ecause tribal and ethnic networks were the safest bet for people's support, the fight to control the state … was organised around ethnic cleavages, reviving centuries-old hatred and prejudice: genocidal tendencies and widespread banditry are rooted in the political economy of Africa's disconnection from the new global economy. (Castells 1996: 135)

Castells has subsequently developed this argument in relation to the 'black holes of informational capitalism' (Castells 1998: 161–5). Due to self-defeating spirals of decline, poverty and breakdown, populations entering these black holes usually end up reinforcing their own social exclusion. The result has been that

> a new world, the Fourth World, has emerged, made up of multiple black holes of social exclusion throughout the planet. The Fourth World comprises large areas of the globe, such as much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and impoverished rural areas of Latin America and Asia. But it is also present in literally every country, and every city, in this new geography of social exclusion. (*Ibid*.: 164)

Consistent with the logic of this view – that exclusion leads to the breakdown of normative order – Castells has argued that the only export from the global black holes that rivals the informational economy in terms of its innovation and networked character is the 'perverse' connection of a global criminal economy (*ibid*.: 166–205). In this respect, the Castells viewpoint well reflects current concerns that have led to the reinterpretation of the nature of security. The focus of new security concerns is not the threat of traditional interstate wars but the fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalised activity and international instability. This reinterpretation, moreover, means that even if the system logic is one of exclusion, the idea of underdevelopment as dangerous and destabilising provides a justification for continued surveillance and engagement.

The internationalisation of public policy

The logic of exclusion informs and shapes public policy in many ways. In this respect, one should not forget that exclusion also implies the existence of criteria of *inclusion*. Unlike the more general logic of inclusion and subordination that existed when the capitalist world system was geographically expansive, however, inclusion under global liberal governance is more discerning and selective. Southern governments, project partners and populations now have to show themselves fit for consideration. That is, they have to meet defined standards of behaviour and normative expectations. In the case of governments, this could

mean following neoliberal economic prescriptions, adhering to international standards of good governance or subscribing to donor-approved poverty reduction measures. Through relations of fitness and normative benchmarking the logic of exclusion manifests itself in direct and indirect ways. In particular, it has allowed a stratified system of engagement to emerge. This ranges from forms of exclusion, such as the sanction regimes presently encompassing so-called rogue states, to conditional types of partnership and inclusion for authorities with whom the North feels able to do business. Indeed, the more extensive and significant application of an exclusionary logic is contained in the nuanced and complex interface of partnership, cooperation and participation through which the North now engages and selectively incorporates the South.

The politics of liberal governance are associated with the transformation of nation states in both the North and the South 'from being buffers between external economic forces and the domestic economy into agencies for adapting domestic economies for the exigencies of the global economy' (Cox 1995: 39). This transformation has been achieved through the emergence of new cross-cutting governance networks involving state and non-state actors from the supranational to the local level. The growth of such networks is associated with the attenuation of the ability of state incumbents to govern independently within their own borders. Governments now have to take account of new supranational, international and even local constituencies. However, this does not mean that states have necessarily become weaker (although many have, especially in the South); it primarily suggests that the nature of power and authority has changed. Indeed, contained within the shift in aid policy towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction, Northern governments have found new methods and systems of governance through which to reassert their authority.

Governance networks create horizontal North–North flows and exchanges as well as enmeshing institutions and systems along a vertical North–South axis. However, there is a difference in the nature and character of these flows and networks. Those creating North–North linkages are primarily of an economic, technological, political and military character (Held *et al*. 1999). They reflect new forms of regionalisation and embody the North's dominant position. Such networks have been thickening noticeably since the 1970s. The governance networks linking North and South, however, largely reflect the internationalisation of public policy and reflect the South's subordination (Duffield 1992; de Waal 1997; Deacon *et al*. 1997). As the formal North–South economic linkages have narrowed and shrunk, the compensating

networks of international public policy have thickened and developed new organisational forms. To a certain extent, using Cox's imagery, the conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction concerns of liberal governance could be seen as the 'riot control' end of a spectrum encompassing a broad range of 'global poor relief' activities including, for example, NGO developmental attempts to encourage self-sufficiency in relation to food security and basic services. Such public welfare initiatives now complement the economic prescriptions of structural adjustment. The internationalisation of public policy has filled the vacuum, as it were, resulting from the marked process of debureaucratisation and attenuation of nation-state competence that has been deepened in the South by liberal economic reform (Reno 1998).

In terms of the international North–South flows and networks, there is a noticeable duality. While patterns are uneven and great differences exist, the shrinkage of formal economic ties has given rise to two opposing movements. Coming from the South, there has been an expansion of transborder and shadow economic activity that has forged new local–global linkages with the liberal world system and, in so doing, new patterns of actual development and political authority – that is, alternative and non-liberal forms of protection, legitimacy and social regulation. Emerging from the North, the networks of international public policy have thickened and multiplied their points of engagement and control. Many erstwhile functions of the nation state have been abandoned to these international networks as power and authority have been reconfigured. The encounter of the two systems has formed a new and complex development–security terrain. Concerns with stability and the new wars represent an extreme and particular form of engagement within this much broader framework. The networks and actors involved define the points of greatest tension and open confrontation within the encounter. At the same time, however, this violent engagement crystallises and reflects the logic of the system as a whole.

Liberal peace

The new development–security terrain remains underresearched and its study has yet to establish its own conceptual language.[12] One can, however, make a few preliminary remarks. In terms of methodology, a useful distinction is that between mechanical and complex forms of analysis. This difference sets apart Newtonian physics from the emerging complexity sciences such as quantum theory, non-linear mathematics, biotechnology and cybernetics (Dillon 2000). It can be summarised as the difference between seeing the world as a machine and seeing it as a

living system or organism. The Newtonian view of the cosmos is that of a vast and perfect clockwork machine governed by exact mathematical laws. Within this giant cosmic machine everything can be determined and reduced to a scientific cause and effect. The material particles that make it up, and the laws of motion and forces that hold or repel them, are fixed and immutable. Set in motion at the birth of the cosmos, this huge mechanism has been running ever since. While having earlier origins, by the mid-twentieth century the Newtonian world view had been superseded. From quantum theory, for example, a new physics has emerged (Capra 1982). Rather than mechanical precepts, this is based on organic, holistic and ecological principles. What is suggested is not a mechanism made up of different basic parts but a unified and determining whole created from the relations between its separate units. The new physics represents a shift from the study of objects to that of interconnections.

A concern with interconnections defines a systems approach. Systems are integrated wholes that cannot be reduced to their separate parts. Instead of concentrating on basic elements, systems analysis places emphasis on the principles of organisation (*ibid*.: 286). From this perspective, a number of distinctions can be made between machines and systems. Machines are controlled and determined by their structure and characterised by linear chains of cause and effect. They are constructed from well-defined parts that have specific functions and tasks. Systems, on the other hand, are analogous to organisms. They grow and are process-oriented. Their structures are shaped by this orientation and they can exhibit a high degree of internal flexibility. Systems are characterised by cyclical patterns of information flow, non-linear interconnections and self-organisation within defined limits of autonomy. Moreover, using the analogy of an organism, a system is concerned with self-renewal. This is important, since while a machine carries out specific and predictable tasks, a system is primarily engaged in a process of renewal and, if necessary, self-transformation. It is a central contention in this book that aid policy, both generally and in relation to the new wars, continues to exhibit a Newtonian or mechanical view of the world. In developing a critique of aid policy as embodying emergent forms of liberal governance, and in analysing the new wars themselves, a systems orientation has been adopted: one that emphasises complex holistic systems in which interconnection, mutation and self-transformation are key characteristics.

Examining aid policy as an expression of global governance – as a political project in its own right – demands attention to its particular forms of mobilisation, justification and reward. The idea of *liberal peace*,

for example, combines and conflates 'liberal' (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with 'peace' (the present policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). It reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising and, especially, transformational measures. While this can include the provision of immediate relief and rehabilitation assistance, liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy. In many respects, while contested and far from assured, liberal peace reflects a radical developmental agenda of social transformation. In this case however, this is an international responsibility and not that of an independent or single juridical state.

During the first half of the 1990s the main concern of the international community regarding conflict was that of humanitarian intervention: developing new institutional arrangements that allowed aid agencies to work in situations of ongoing conflict and to support civilians in war zones (Duffield 1997). Partly due to the limited success of these interventions and the difficulties encountered, since the mid-1990s the policy focus has shifted towards conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction. This change of emphasis does not mean that conflicts have necessarily reduced in number or lessened in terms of their seriousness. Rather, it is policy that has changed. Instead of revolving around humanitarian assistance *per se*, the new humanitarianism has invested developmental tools and initiatives with ameliorative, harmonising and transformational powers that, it is hoped, will reduce violent conflict and prevent its recurrence. While the initiatives that make up liberal peace are usually understood as being a response to specific needs and requirements, liberal peace is a political project in its own right.[13] The aim of liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities.

While states remain important, since the 1970s, under the influence of what is commonly known as globalisation, they have been drawn into multi-level and increasingly non-territorial decision-making networks that bring together governments, international agencies, non-governmental organisations, and so on, in new and complex ways. Consequently, there has been a noticeable move from the hierarchical, territorial and bureaucratic relations of government to more polyarchical, non-territorial and networked relations of governance (Held *et*

al. 1999). While clearly they have deeper historical roots, relations of governance have come to shape and dominate political life over the past several decades. In this respect, liberal peace is not manifest within a single institution of global government; such a body does not exist and probably never will. It is part of the complex, mutating and stratified networks that make up global liberal governance. More specifically, liberal peace is embodied in a number of flows and nodes of authority within liberal governance that bring together different *strategic complexes* of state–non-state, military–civilian and public–private actors in pursuit of its aims. Such complexes now variously enmesh international NGOs, governments, military establishments, IFIs, private security companies, IGOs, the business sector, and so on. They are strategic in the sense of pursuing a radical agenda of social transformation in the interests of global stability. In the past, one might have referred to these complexes as representing the development or aid industry; now, however, they have expanded to constitute a network of strategic governance relations that are increasingly privatised and militarised.

The networks of liberal peace achieve their greatest definition on the borders of global governance, where its strategic actors confront systems and normative structures that are violently different from its own (Dillon and Reid 2000). In mainstream policy terms, these shifting border areas are usually described as constituting a complex emergency or, since the mid-1990s, a complex political emergency (Edkins 1996). Among UN agencies, a complex emergency is understood as denoting a conflict-related humanitarian disaster involving a high degree of breakdown and social dislocation and, reflecting this condition, requiring a system-wide aid response from the international community (Weiss 1999a: 20). The widespread upheaval and social displacement associated with Somalia and Bosnia during the early part of the 1990s, for example, typifies this condition. In requiring a system-wide response, these emergencies have made it necessary for UN agencies, donor governments, NGOs and military establishments to develop new roles, mechanisms of coordination and ways of working together. While the transformational aim of liberal peace now describes the political content of such system-wide operations, attempts to establish a liberal peace have been subject to controversy, marked unevenness and increasing patterns of regional differentiation and hierarchies of concern. Where complex emergencies are encountered, however, some form of strategic complex involving thicker or thinner networks of state–non-state actors is usually involved. This can range from what amounts to global governance's best efforts at social reconstruction, as presently found in the Balkans, to what Boutros-Ghali once referred to as Africa's orphan wars.

The new wars

In relation to the new post-Cold War conflicts, the conventional approach is to look for causes and motives and, rather like Victorian butterfly collectors, to construct lists and typologies of the different species identified. Ideas based on poverty, communication breakdown, resource competition, social exclusion, criminality and so on are widely accepted among strategic actors as providing an explanation. At the same time, various forms of collapse, chaos and regression are seen as the outcome. While such causes and outcomes may well exist, in terms of advancing our understanding of the new wars the search for causes is of limited use. The approach adopted here is to regard war as a given: an ever-present axis around which opposing societies and complexes continually measure themselves and reorder social, economic, scientific and political life. Apart from being a site of innovation, this process of restructuring is also one of imitation and replication (van Creveld 1991). If opposing societies or complexes are not to suffer compromise or defeat, they must match or counter the innovations that each is liable to make. Not only is war an axis of social reordering, historically it has been a powerful mechanism for the globalisation of economic, political and scientific relations (Held *et al*. 1999). In this respect, the development of the modern and centralised nation state has been closely associated with the restructuring and globalising effects of war.

When the competence of nation states begins to change and they become qualified and enmeshed within non-territorial and networked relations of governance, one can assume that the nature of war has also changed. This relates not only to the way the new wars are fought, in this case beyond the regulatory regimes formally associated with nation states, but also to the manner in which societies are mobilised, structured and rewarded in order to address them. A major contention in this book is that the strategic complexes of liberal peace, that is, the emerging relations between governments, NGOs, militaries and the business sector, are not just a mechanical response to conflict. In fact, they have a good deal in common, in structural and organisational terms, with the new wars. For example, strategic complexes and the new wars are both based on increasingly privatised networks of state–non-state actors working beyond the conventional competence of territorially defined governments. Through such flows and networks each is learning how to project power in new non-territorial ways. With contrasting results, liberal peace and the new wars have blurred and dissolved conventional distinctions between peoples, armies and governments. At the same time, new systems of reward and mobilisation,

especially associated with privatisation, have emerged in the wake of the outmoding of such divisions. Liberal peace and the new wars are also both forms of adaptation to the effects of market deregulation and the qualification and attenuation of nation-state competence. In many respects, the networks and complexes that compose liberal peace also reflect an emerging liberal way of war.

In the case of the new wars, market deregulation has deepened all forms of parallel and transborder trade and allowed warring parties to forge local–global networks and shadow economies as a means of asset realisation and self-provisioning. The use of illicit alluvial diamonds to fund conflicts in West and Southern Africa is a well-known example of a system that has a far wider application. Rather than expressions of breakdown or chaos, the new wars can be understood as a form of non-territorial *network war* that works through and around states. Instead of conventional armies, the new wars typically oppose and ally the transborder resource networks of state incumbents, social groups, diasporas, strongmen, and so on. These are refracted through legitimate and illegitimate forms of state–non-state, national–international and local–global flows and commodity chains. Far from being a peripheral aberration, network war reflects the contested integration of stratified markets and populations into the global economy. Not only can the forms of innovation and state–non-state networking involved be compared to those of liberal peace; more generally, they stand comparison with the manner in which Northern political and economic actors have similarly adapted to the pressures and opportunities of globalisation. In this respect, as far as it is successful, network war is synonymous with the emergence of new forms of protection, legitimacy and rights to wealth. Rather than regression, the new wars are organically associated with a process of social transformation: the emergence of new forms of authority and zones of alternative regulation.

Instead of complex political emergencies, global governance is encountering *emerging political complexes*[14] on its borders. Such complexes are essentially non-liberal. That is, they follow forms of economic logic that are usually antagonistic towards free-market prescriptions and formal regional integration. At the same time, politically, the new forms of protection and legitimacy involved tend to be socially exclusive rather than inclusive. However, for those that are included, such political complexes nonetheless represent new frameworks of social representation and regulation. In other words, political complexes themselves are part of a process of social transformation and system innovation, a characteristic that embodies the ambiguity of such formations. While their economic and political logic can find violent and

disruptive expression, in many cases such complexes are the only forms of existing or actual authority that have the powers to police stability. This ambiguity, however, pervades the general encounter of the new wars with the strategic complexes of liberal peace. The aid agencies, donors and NGOs involved also reflect and embody ideals of protection, legitimacy and rights. They also have transformational aims – in this case, however, liberal ones.

Global governance and the emerging political complexes are in competition in relation to the forms of authority and regulation they wish to establish. This competition establishes a fluctuating border area that is as much social as territorial across which a range of transactions, confrontations and interventions are possible. At its most general, it is the site of numerous discursive exchanges and narratives. The symbolic role of privatisation is a good example. Among many of the strategic actors of liberal governance, privatisation denotes a move towards a sound economy and the prospects of development. Among state actors and local strongmen, however, it can represent an innovative way to further the non-liberal political logic of the complex concerned. At the same time, at various points along this border, competition turns into antagonism and the site of more direct forms of intervention. If the Cold War represented a Third World War, then the contested, uneven and differential confrontation between the strategic complexes of liberal peace and the political complexes of the new wars is the site of the Fourth.

The merging of development and security

That liberal peace contains within it the emerging structures of liberal war is suggested in the blurring and convergence during the 1990s of development and security. The transformational aims of liberal peace and the new humanitarianism embody this convergence. The commitment to conflict resolution and the reconstruction of societies in such a way as to avoid future wars represents a marked radicalisation of the politics of development. Societies must be changed so that past problems do not arise, as happened with development in the past; moreover, this process of transformation cannot be left to chance but requires direct and concerted action (Stiglitz 1998). Development resources must now be used to shift the balance of power between groups and even to change attitudes and beliefs. The radicalisation of development in this way is closely associated with the reproblematisation of security. Conventional views on the causes of the new wars usually hinge upon their arising from a developmental malaise of

poverty, resource competition and weak or predatory institutions. The links between these wars and international crime and terrorism are also increasingly drawn. Not only have the politics of development been radicalised to address this situation but, importantly, it reflects a new security framework within which the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous. This framework is different from that of the Cold War when the threat of massive interstate conflict prevailed. The question of security has almost gone full circle: from being concerned with the biggest economies and war machines in the world to an interest in some of its smallest.

In most of the policy statements mentioned above (see footnotes 1 to 7) there is a noticeable convergence between the notions of development and security. Through a circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential for securing the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development. This convergence is not simply a policy matter. It has profound political and structural implications. In relation to the strategic complexes of liberal governance it embodies the increasing interaction between military and security actors on the one hand, and civilian and non-governmental organisations on the other. It reflects the thickening networks that now link UN agencies, military establishments, NGOs and private security companies. Regarding NGOs, the convergence of development and security has meant that it has become difficult to separate their own development and humanitarian activities from the pervasive logic of the North's new security regime. The increasingly overt and accepted politicisation of aid is but one outcome.

The encounter of the strategic complexes of liberal peace with the political complexes of the new wars has established a new development–security terrain. It is developmental in that liberal values and institutions have been vested with ameliorative and harmonising powers. At the same time, it represents a new security framework since these powers are being deployed in a context in which the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous and destabilising. This contested terrain, which looks set to deepen and shape our perceptions over the coming decades, remains underresearched and is not captured in conventional and increasingly prescriptive and policy-oriented development and international studies. It is comprised of complex relations of structural similarity, complicity and, at the same time, new asymmetries of power and authority.

In terms of similarity, both liberal peace and the new wars have blurred traditional distinctions between people, army and government

and, at the same time, forged new ways of projecting power through non-territorial public–private networks and systems. Along the social border between these two complexes, relations of accommodation and complicity are common and find many forms of expression. Rather than eliminating famine, for example, aid agencies have been charged with obstructing this aim (de Waal 1997). The international hierarchy of concern that exists also denotes a susceptibility within global liberal governance to normalise violence and accept high levels of instability as an enduring if unfortunate characteristic of certain regions. This new development–security terrain also contains marked asymmetries of power. Indeed, it tends to reverse and upset traditional notions of what power is and where it lies. It is a terrain where, in confronting new challenges, the authority of the major states is in a process of reconfiguration. While the growth of increasingly privatised and non-territorial strategic complexes reflect new ways of projecting liberal power, the effectiveness of these forms of authority is still an open question – especially when they confront political actors who have a strong sense of right and history, despite being part of economically weaker systems. Whether donor governments, militaries, aid agencies and the private sector can secure a liberal peace remains an open question. One thing, however, is perhaps more clear. It is difficult to imagine that the increasingly privatised and regionally stratified strategic complexes of liberal governance will be able to deliver the geographically and socially more extensive patterns of *relative* security that characterised the Cold War years. Understanding this new terrain should therefore be a priority for us all.

The organisation of this book

Chapter 2 analyses the convergence of development and security. It does so by first describing the different view of instability that existed when capitalism was still an expansive and inclusionary world system. Third Worldism and dependency theory, for example, saw the problems of the South in terms of an unequal and exploitative international trade system. With the growing regionalisation of the global economy and the triumph of neoliberal prescriptions, such views have all but disappeared. They have been supplanted by a representation of conflict as stemming, essentially, from internal developmental causes. During the course of the 1990s, this representation underpinned the radicalisation of the politics of development: the commitment, in policy terms at least, to transform societies as a whole, including the attitudes and beliefs of their members. The politicisation of development is also

related to the changing perception of security. Rather than interstate conflict being the main threat to world stability, the factors of underdevelopment now occupy this position.

Chapter 3 examines the emerging strategic complexes of liberal governance. The convergence of development and security is embodied in the expansion of international relations of governance involving state and non-state actors. The chapter describes the changing nature of loyalty and sacrifice that underpins such networks, particularly the emergence of more direct and pecuniary forms of reward associated with increasing public–private networking. It also looks at some of the adaptations and connections emerging within and between NGOs, military establishments, the commercial sector, IGOs and donor governments in relation to securing the aims of liberal peace.

Chapter 4 continues the analysis begun in Chapter 2 concerning the radicalisation of the politics of development, in this case by examining the new or principled humanitarianism that has emerged. This is discussed in relation to the policy of linking relief to development that underpins it. In terms of governance relations, the linking debate has provided Northern governments with new contractual tools, planning mechanisms and monitoring regimes necessary to extend their authority through non-state actors. The new humanitarianism represents a government-led shift from humanitarian assistance as a right to a new system framed by a consequentialist ethics. That is, humanitarian action is now only legitimate as long as it is felt to do no harm and generally support the conflict resolution and transformational aims of liberal peace. From helping people, policy has shifted towards supporting processes.

Chapter 5 analyses how strategic actors understand the causes of conflict. Reflecting the logic of exclusion and isolationism, global governance is confronted with the problem that the popular understanding of the new wars emphasises the reappearance of ancient tribal hatreds and other forms of biocultural determinism. Faced with this isolationist challenge, strategic actors have used conflict to reinvent development. Conflict is portrayed as deepening poverty and weakening social and cultural cohesion. In this way, violence is seen as creating a level playing field on which the possibilities of development have been renewed and reinvigorated. At the same time, through forms of analysis that delegitimise and criminalise the leadership of the new wars, the way is cleared for a radicalised development to attempt to change societies as a whole.

Chapter 6 begins an extended analysis of the new wars. It examines how market deregulation and structural adjustment have encouraged

the expansion and deepening of all forms of parallel and shadow transborder trade. Although excluded from the conventional economy, the South is now widely integrated into the global marketplace through shadow networks. While the parallel economy is extensive and a lifeline for millions of people, it is not reflected in official statistics or orthodox economic models. The chapter concludes by examining the non-liberal nature of transborder trade, that is, its tendency towards protectionism, extra-legal mechanisms and exclusive forms of social control.

Chapter 7 analyses the new wars in terms of their representing emerging forms of political complex in the South. The reintegration of the South through stratified shadow economic networks has facilitated this process. In particular, it has allowed the appearance of overlapping centres of political authority associated with market reform. The multiplication of nodes of non-liberal authority in various relations of competition, complementarity and complicity with state actors has blurred the boundaries of legality and legitimacy. Rather than looking for causes, the chapter proceeds to analyse the new wars in terms of the organisational effects of a growing demand for private protection. Subaltern and non-state forms of protection and regulatory authority are examined, together with how they articulate with state forms. The demand for protection among state incumbents is discussed in relation to the Russian mafia and the growing involvement of private military companies in Africa. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the new wars as forms of network war. It examines the characteristics of such wars, the merging of war and peace, the selective incorporation of Southern economies within the global marketplace and, importantly, the high levels of commercial complicity necessary for such wars to develop.

Using the example of war-displaced Southerners in Sudan, chapters 8 and 9 provide a case study of the new development–security terrain. This study argues that donor governments and aid agencies have reinforced the relations of violence they oppose. Chapter 8 examines this complicity in relation to the construction of an internally displaced person (IDP) identity. Reflecting how strategic actors understand conflict, the IDP identity is a de-ethnicised construct based on an economic self-sufficiency model of development. Represented as having lost all assets through war and displacement, it is assumed that with a minimum input of economic resources (and avoiding dependency-creating food aid), IDPs will once more become self-provisioning. Even the development of a rights-based approach by NGOs has not altered this basic model; de-ethnicised liberal self-management has been

redefined as a 'right'. The IDP identity represents the displaced as autonomous and self-contained households and ignores the wider relations of exploitation and oppression within which displaced Southerners are enmeshed in Northern Sudan.

Chapter 9 takes this analysis further by showing the effects of strategic complicity for displaced Southerners. At the same time, it serves to indicate the ambiguity of the political complexes that are emerging. The networks that have formed in western Sudan between merchants, commercial farmers and the military represent local forms of authority and legitimacy. At the same time, they are oppressive and exploitative in relation to Southerners. Attempts by aid agencies to promote development in this context have reinforced their subjugation. Cuts in food aid, in order to encourage Southerners into the wage economy, have resulted in their becoming further enmeshed in non-remunerative forms of bonded labour. At the same time, the development resources given to the displaced to promote their self-sufficiency have invariably ended up in the hands of the surrounding groups and networks. A decade of such assistance has resulted in the wretched condition of Southerners in Northern Sudan improving little if at all.

In drawing the book together, the Conclusion reinterprets the development–security terrain linking liberal peace and the new wars as a complex and shared system of moral responsibility. In this respect, it details the lacuna in our knowledge and the forms of research that are required if we are to understand the nature of this new terrain and the opportunities and dangers that it presents. In particular, if liberal peace is not to transform into liberal war, rather than searching for technical solutions and more informed analysis, the most pressing issue is that of understanding the organisational dynamics involved, including our own.

NOTES

1 OSCE 1995; EU 1996; DAC 1997; OECD 1998.
2 World Bank 1997b; World Bank 1997a.
3 Pronk and Kooijmans 1993; ODA 1996; DFID 1997; MFA 1997; IDC 1999.
4 Boutros-Ghali 1995 (original 1992); UNDP 1994; UNHCR 1995.
5 Carnegie Commission 1997; World Bank and Carter Center 1997.
6 ActionAid 1994; Cottey 1994; IFRCS 1996.
7 PWBLF 1999.
8 See the following bibliographies: Fagen 1995; Masefield and Harvey 1997; Gundel 1999.
9 For a discussion of the development of constitutional liberalism prior to universal suffrage in the West, see Zakaria 1997.
10 Cox 1995: 40; Castells 1996: 147; Hoogvelt 1997: 66.

11 A good example is the recent and substantial work by Held, McGraw, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) on *Global Transformations*. While their work has been praised as exhaustive and comprehensive by commentators, the authors nonetheless consciously exclude the effects of globalisation on the South from their study.
12 In developing the critical concepts used in this book, I am greatly indebted to Mick Dillon, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster. Coming, respectively, from development and security backgrounds, the telling surprise was to find that we were talking about similar things.
13 For an example of this approach to development, but one that mainly deals with the situation during the Cold War, see Escobar 1995.
14 This organisational rectification was first coined by Mick Dillon at a conference on 'The Politics of Emergency' in the Department of Politics, University of Manchester, May 1997.