

BURT C. HOPKINS

**Intentionality**  
**in**  
**Husserl and Heidegger**

The Problem of the Original Method  
and Phenomenon of Phenomenology



CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY

INTENTIONALITY  
IN  
HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

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and Phenomenon of Phenomenology

*by*

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## INTRODUCTION

### § 1. *Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic.*

The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in *Being and Time*, has almost been universally<sup>1</sup> received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of *Being and Time*, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"<sup>2</sup> will, if the conclusions<sup>3</sup> reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological "superiority" over Husserl.

This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisanship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenomenological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy." The effects of this spell are to be found in the near universal appraisal of this controversy in terms of Heidegger's *ontological* formulation of *die Problematik*. This is evident in the near canonical tendency of the literature to address the basic questions of *phenomenology per se* in terms of the following Heideggerian oppositions: Epistemology *or* ontology; ontic *or* ontological; theoretical *or*



pre-theoretical; reflective *or* hermeneutical; subject *or* Dasein; time consciousness *or* original time; presence *or* the interinvolvement of concealment and unconcealment. This list is not exhaustive, since there are seemingly endless variations: e.g., *Evidenz or Auslegung*; objective transcendence *or* ecstatic transcendence; immanence *or* hermeneutical situation; pure *or* factual, etc.

Indeed, given this tendency to either explicitly or implicitly grant priority to the issues set forth by Heidegger's formulation of the *Seinsfrage*, it has become almost axiomatic for philosophers to construe the "controversy" between Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology in terms of variations on the following general assessment. To wit: Husserl's formulation of phenomenology is guided by a phenomenologically *non-radical*, which is to say, "traditionally metaphysical," understanding of the Being of entities. Husserl's understanding is not an accident of his method, but rather, when viewed "phenomenologically," can be seen as the inevitable *necessary* consequence of the reflective character of his phenomenology. As the result, which is to say, as long as phenomenology's self-understanding remains reflective, the Being of entities can be encountered (and therefore "show themselves from themselves") only in terms of their being "objectively present" to consciousness.

This state of affairs, or so this interpretation continues, reveals both the crowning achievement and the phenomenologically ontological downfall of Husserl's phenomenology. It is his crowning achievement to the extent that, contrary to both the empirical and rational traditional ontology, Husserl's phenomenology accomplished the "breakthrough discovery" of a non-constructive intuition or "*zu dem Sache selbst*" encounter with the "Being of entities." But *at the same time*, it marks the downfall of "the actuality of phenomenology as a movement" (i.e., Husserl's formulation of phenomenology), insofar as the "Being of entities" so encountered is *neither* determined on the basis of a radically ontological interrogation into the mode of being of entities, *nor* on the basis of an essentially related radically ontological interrogation of the "meaning of Being as such" (*Sinn des Seins überhaupt*). Rather, the "Being of entities" uncovered by Husserl's phenomenology is determined by a *phenomenologically* uncritical adherence to the modern (Cartesian) epistemological understanding of the "Being of entities" in terms of their immanence "in" consciousness.

The ontological state of affairs exhibited by Husserl's formulation of phenomenology is therefore paradoxical, so the scenario concludes, in the sense that its advance over the traditional modes of access to the "Being of entities" is, as it were, immediately limited by its simultaneous tacit commitment to understanding both entities and the meaning of

Being as such in terms of this very tradition. Hence, we have the basic "ambivalence" in the relationship between Heidegger's and Husserl's formulation of phenomenology.

Now, as Gadamer among others has argued, it may very well be the case that Heidegger is "right"<sup>4</sup> with respect to there being an ontological prejudice operative in Husserl's formulation of phenomenology. And if this charge is correct, then the "spell" cast by fundamental ontology would have its justification, not in any alleged "sorcery" on the part of Heidegger's "word magic" (*Wörterzauberei*),<sup>5</sup> but in the sober assessment of the truth of the *die Sachen selbst* appealed to by both thinkers. Thus, as Bernet has recently suggested, even if one does not follow Heidegger's fundamental ontology all the way and accept "the general idea that a theory of knowledge is only a deficient ontology ignoring its own presuppositions,"<sup>6</sup> one may nevertheless conclude that Husserl's phenomenology, vis-à-vis these very 'matters themselves', "operates with some major ontological presuppositions."<sup>7</sup>

§ 2. *The Ontological Formulation of the Issues in Controversy Between Husserl and Heidegger Necessarily Precludes their Non-partisan "Phenomenological" Exploration.*

As long as the focus of the discussion of the issues in controversy remains "ontological," I think that the possibility of a non-partisan exploration of *all* the issues involved in the controversy over *die Sachen selbst* in Husserl's and Heidegger's differing formulations of phenomenology, must *necessarily* remain precluded. I am suggesting here that in addition to the Husserl's and Heidegger's controversy regarding the relation of phenomenology and ontology, there remains a controversy about phenomenology's most proper *methodological* self-understanding. And even granting, for the moment, the *assessment* that Husserl's phenomenology can be shown to exhibit the ontological deficiencies maintained by the Heideggerian critique, in order for such an assessment to be genuinely *phenomenological*, it must, in my view, be based *not* simply in methodological considerations that are focused on the alleged ontological inadequacies of Husserl's method; but also, it would have to be based on considerations that would substantiate the purported methodological superiority of Heidegger's method over Husserl's.

Such a "phenomenological" substantiation of the methodological superiority of Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology over and against Husserl's must proceed on the basis of an inquiry which would (1) bring into relief exactly what is divergent in their accounts of *die Sachen selbst* at issue in phenomenology's methodological self-understanding,

and (2) "show" precisely how it is, on the basis of what is brought to bear in (1), that Heidegger's method and methodology are more faithful to *die Sachen selbst* than are Husserl's.

In my view, it is precisely such methodological considerations, and the non-partisan exploration of what is in controversy with respect to *die Sachen selbst* of phenomenology's most proper self-understanding of its method and methodology which these methodological considerations would have to entail, that is *conspicuously* lacking in the assessments of the Husserl-Heidegger controversy offered by the literature. Indeed, to the extent that these assessments are so lacking, I would want to maintain that the question of the *phenomenological* issues of the Husserl-Heidegger controversy *has yet to be explored, much less resolved*.

§ 3. "Intentionality" in Husserl's and Heidegger's Formulations of Phenomenology Comprises the Focus of the Present Study. The Philological and Philosophical Reasons for this Focus.

It is toward the end of just such an exploration, that the present study will focus on the issues surrounding Husserl's and Heidegger's controversy regarding the status of the phenomenon of "intentionality" in the formulation and self-understanding of phenomenology's original content and most proper method. My determination of the topic here has its basis in both philological and philosophical considerations.

The philological considerations take their directive from remarks of Heidegger, recorded by Pöggeler, regarding the need for "careful philological work"<sup>8</sup> in order to remove "some gross errors"<sup>9</sup> that occur in (for example) Gadamer's *Truth and Method* with respect to the relation of Heidegger's thinking to Husserl's. Pöggeler reports that the "errors" at issue for Heidegger concern the tendency to credit Husserl's thinking with "a primordial experience of history,"<sup>10</sup> which, in Heidegger's view, is something Husserl never had and therefore is something which "was due to retroactive impulses from his [Heidegger's] own thinking."<sup>11</sup>

In taking its directive from Heidegger's remark regarding the need for careful philological work with respect to the relation of his thought to Husserl's, the present study does not necessarily endorse Heidegger's own evaluation of the specific nature of the "errors" that emerge in the absence of such work. However, as is illustrated by the case of Gadamer<sup>12</sup> singled out by Heidegger, the present study considers the tendency to treat the relation of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology in terms of the working out of problematics figuring prominently

only in Husserl's later work, i.e., the alter-ego, the life-world and history, and which therefore are only marginally, if at all, at issue in the texts of Husserl that were available to Heidegger during the period of his most active *Auseinandersetzung* (coming to terms with) with Husserl's phenomenology, to be *philologically* inappropriate.

Indeed, as the recent publication of the Marburg lectures makes abundantly clear, the textual focus of the relationship between Heidegger's phenomenology and Husserl's is to be found in his "immanent" critique of Husserl's account of the phenomenological status of intentionality. This philological state of affairs is, of course, completely missed by Gadamer and others<sup>13</sup> who regard the problems addressed only in Husserl's later texts as if they were somehow contemporaneous with the content of the earlier Husserlian texts that concerned Heidegger during the period of his explicit concern with phenomenology;<sup>14</sup> which of course means, with his *reworking* of Husserl's conception of phenomenology.

It is for the philological reasons just cited that the present study will be limited only to texts by Heidegger explicitly addressing phenomenology and only to texts by Husserl available to Heidegger during the period of the latter's explicit concern with phenomenology.<sup>15</sup> The later texts of Heidegger only infrequently mention Husserl's phenomenology and, when they do, only repeat the results of his earlier analyses and conclusions. These texts will therefore not be considered in the present study. Likewise, Husserl's later texts, which were *not* a factor in Heidegger's critique of Husserl, will not be considered.

Inasmuch as Husserl's later texts may contain valuable clues regarding his "response" to Heidegger's critique, it may be argued that restricting the scope of Husserlian texts is less warranted than in the case of Heidegger's later texts. However, in the interests of keeping the present study clearly focused on the issues raised during the period of their mutual interest and controversy regarding the phenomenon of intentionality, the chosen textual context is, in my view, sufficient for the purposes of clarifying and reaching conclusions regarding the *phenomenological* status of these issues. Indeed, interest in the phenomenon of intentionality, following Heidegger's own self-interpretation of the definitiveness of his critique of the phenomenological originality of intentionality, is of course no longer mutual with respect to Heidegger's later work. Regarding Husserl's later work and its significance as a response to Heidegger's critique, the present study can be seen as providing a necessary propaedeutic for the assessment of this significance, and indeed, for the assessment of the broader philosophical controversy between Husserl and Heidegger.

The philosophical reasons for the present study's focus have their basis in the fact that the main target of Heidegger's critique of Husserl's

formulation of phenomenology is, as the texts of Heidegger's recently published Marburg lectures make clear, precisely Husserl's account of the phenomenon of intentionality. In short, inasmuch as Husserl's formulation of phenomenology depends upon his account of the phenomenological *originality* of intentionality, and Heidegger's formulation (or reformulation) of phenomenology depends upon his account of the phenomenological *lack* of originality of the phenomenon of intentionality, this phenomenon becomes the central point of contention for both thinkers. For, despite their *fundamental* disagreement over the originality of its phenomenal status, there *is* agreement between Husserl and Heidegger on two key points: (1) intentionality is a phenomenon and (2) the investigation of its status has *decisive* importance for the formulation of phenomenology in terms of establishing the relationship between phenomenology and the philosophical tradition, and in terms of determining the extent to which phenomenology's "breakthrough discoveries" open up problematics that *surpass* this tradition.

As a result of Husserl's and Heidegger's shared commitment to *die Sachen selbst*, that is, to the priority of "self-giveness" or "self-showing" over all philosophical construction, inference and postulation, the present study will endeavor to "show" that their controversy regarding the phenomenon of intentionality stems from their divergent accounts of the interrelated and interdependent problematics of the most proper mode of access to this phenomenon and the precise nature of its phenomenal manifestation. In addition, the claims of each thinker with respect to these issues will be shown to be *foundational*, in the sense that, for Husserl, intentionality will emerge as the basis for phenomenal manifestation *per se*; while for Heidegger, the phenomenon of intentionality will emerge in terms of its basis in a *more original* phenomenon. Indeed, as a result of this foundational conflict, in addition to examining their differences, the present study will also endeavor to *mediate* them in a non-partisan manner.

In my view, such non-partisan mediation is both *possible* and *appropriate*. It is possible insofar as *philosophy itself* proceeds from the premise that, when controversy occurs between two thinkers of importance regarding issues of importance, the non-partisan appeal to the *truth* is capable of mediating the issues in controversy. To claim, *in advance* of a specific attempt at non-partisan mediation regarding a philosophical controversy, that such mediation is *impossible*, would be to assert that philosophy itself, insofar as it assumes the guise of attempting to truthfully assess conflicting accounts of the "same" issues, is itself impossible. I would want to hold then that *amicus Plato magis veritas* is decisive in this regard.

Further, the appropriateness of the present endeavor to mediate, in a non-partisan manner, the controversy between Husserl and Heidegger regarding the status of the phenomenon of intentionality is, in my view, justified by each thinker's foundational appeal to *die Sachen selbst*. This is to say, in the period of their mutual interest and controversy with respect to the phenomenon of intentionality, each thinker regarded the 'findings' of their respective phenomenologies as having philosophical warrant in this phenomenon's *autonomous* manifestation, and not in any traditional philosophical positions, concepts, arguments, etc. In addition, each thinker's well-known self-understanding of the definitiveness of their respective accounts of the matters in controversy provides further warrant for the present study's attempt to mediate the issues in controversy *within its limited philological context and philosophical focus*.

#### § 4. *Design of the Treatise.*

Toward the end of non-partisan mediation of the issues in controversy, this study's first two parts will attempt to *phenomenologically* clarify Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality. Drawing upon detailed exegesis of the relevant texts, my attempt will be to clarify each thinker's formulation of the methodology and content of phenomenology, such that their respective accounts of the problematics involved in the phenomenal exhibition and manifestation of intentionality become at once intelligible and compelling.

On the basis of the results of these analyses, the third part of the study will initially attempt to exhibit the philosophical 'prerogatives' of each thinker's phenomenology, in an effort to thematize the factors involved in their divergent accounts of the phenomenal status of intentionality. The term "prerogative" is understood in its original sense, i.e., in terms of the "asking before" signified by its Latin roots. Thus, the thematic factors involved in the divergencies in Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological investigations of intentionality will be traced to the philosophical concerns that are, as is were, quite literally 'brought before' their phenomenal exhibition and manifestation of this phenomenon.

The concerns highlighted by Part Three's thematic consideration of the philosophical prerogatives operative in each thinker's formulations of phenomenology will revolve around the Husserlian prerogative of a reflectively understood phenomenological method and the *original* phenomenal status of intentionality that emerges within such a methodology; and the Heideggerian prerogative of a hermeneutically

understood phenomenological method and the *derived* phenomenal status of intentionality that emerges within this methodology. Mediative attempts to reconcile these two prerogatives, by taking into account the Husserlian prerogative's 'foreshortened' understanding of 'Being' with respect to the Heideggerian prerogative, and the Heideggerian prerogative's 'foreshortened' understanding of 'reflection' with respect to the Husserlian prerogative, will be seen to reach their limit in the divergent statuses accorded the phenomenon of 'immanence' in the context of each thinker's specific prerogative. Within the Husserlian prerogative, the exhibition of 'immanence' as a phenomenon will be shown to yield an ontologically neutral dimension that *epistemically transcends* any strictly ontological determination of this or indeed, of any other phenomenon. Within the Heideggerian prerogative, it will be shown that it is precisely the exhibition of an epistemic status, manifested by the putative ontological neutrality of this or any other phenomenon, that can be yielded only in terms of an *ontologically derivative* phenomenal status. Which is to say, within the Heideggerian prerogative, the exhibition of any epistemic status presupposes an understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*) and, hence, any epistemic position as such is derivative of an ontological commitment.

As a result of this discrepancy, the conclusion will be drawn that phenomenology's most proper self-understanding *cannot* be at once hermeneutical and reflective. The heteromorphism underlying this is traced to the unresolved controversy regarding the status of intentionality emergent from the confrontation of the Husserlian and Heideggerian prerogatives. Since it is the status of, as it were, the 'same' phenomenon in controversy, Part Three concludes with an attempt to mediate this controversy based on appeals to *die Sache* of this phenomenon 'itself', and *not* on the basis of arguments or endorsements privileging one prerogative over the other. Thus, in the spirit of a 'suitor for agreement', the attempted mediation understands itself to be 'phenomenological', in the sense that *the sole philosophical warrant that it recognizes with respect to adjudication of the issues in controversy, is the felicity of the claims made by each prerogative, as well as those made by the attempt at mediation, to "that which appears" in terms of the autonomous manifestation of the phenomenon of intentionality.*

This attempt at phenomenological mediation results in the conclusion that the *ontological* distinction between the original and unoriginal Being of entities, which is at the root of the Heideggerian prerogative's understanding of the need for methodically hermeneutical mediation vis-à-vis the initially concealed *phenomenal* status of the Being of entities, has its basis in an appeal to a transcendental distinction that

this prerogative's *methodological* self-understanding is incapable of accounting for *in principle*. Without invoking the Husserlian prerogative, the 'advance regard' of the methodical 'sight' responsible for this transcendental distinction, as well as the terms of this distinction itself, will be 'shown' to manifest an intentional structure. And given the phenomenal 'demonstration' of this state of affairs, the systematic part of this study will conclude that the investigation of the ontological status of the methodical regard whose essence manifests the condition of possibility for the uncovering of any phenomena at all, and as well of any phenomena so uncovered, if it wants to be a *phenomenological* investigation, must be an 'intentional' investigation.

This conclusion is of course at considerable variance with the dominant trend in the literature mentioned above. Therefore, in addition to the systematic treatment of the issues in controversy in Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology, the last part of this work will attempt to situate the results of the investigation within the context of the discussions of this controversy representative of the various tendencies in the literature. The works of Gadamer, Ricoeur, Mohanty, Crowell and Landgrebe have been selected for this purpose.

Part Four will therefore argue for the necessity of *reassessing* the *phenomenological* status of the Husserl-Heidegger relationship in light of the methodological issues in controversy. In particular, the near universal tendency to accept the Heideggerian formulation of the methodological (and therefore "phenomenological") status of the essence and accomplishments of "reflection," and/or the related tendency to endorse the so-called "hermeneutic critique" of the phenomenological limits of "reflection," will be challenged on the basis of the present study's attempted non-partisan mediation in regard to *die Sache selbst* of intentionality.

#### § 5. *The Contrast of the Present Study of Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger with Bernet's Treatment of the Problem.*

In this connection Bernet's recent discussion of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger provides the perfect foil to the present study, since (1) it is the only study (other than the present one) which focuses on the status of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger employing the appropriate philological context of the Marburg lectures; and (2) it endorses, almost *en toto*, the ontological prerogative of the Heideggerian formulation of phenomenology.

It is remarkable that such a careful, and often sympathetic, commentator on Husserl should arrive at conclusions regarding the phe-



nomenological status of intentionality *without even mentioning* some of the thornier issues involved in Heidegger's hermeneutical formulation and self-understanding of the phenomenological method.<sup>16</sup> To be sure, that these conclusions could be advanced on the basis of a discussion which, when it considers the issue of phenomenology's method at all, treats it *entirely* within the context of Heidegger's *ontological* posing of the problematic, can only attest in my view to what I referred to above, in all *seriousness*, as the "spell" cast by Heidegger's fundamental ontology. All of this is not to suggest, however, that the appropriate response to this Heideggerian partisanship should be an equally partisan formulation of the issues from the standpoint of the Husserlian prerogative. Instead, the key point here is to call attention to the need for a non-partisan investigation of the methodological issues in dispute *before* arriving at any conclusions regarding who is "right" in this controversy; and indeed, *before* perhaps even jumping to the conclusion that the *phenomenological* status of the controversy is such that *one* of these thinkers treatment of it *has to be* right.

Thus, before concluding with Heidegger that "reflection is an intentional act whose apodictic evidence is due to the fact that it is accomplished within the interiority of the subject,"<sup>17</sup> Husserl's account of phenomenological reflection in methodologically self-conscious contradistinction to the *traditional* formulation of reflection as being determined in *precisely* these terms,<sup>18</sup> viz., on the basis of *ontological* speculations regarding the interiority of its object (i.e., the "mind" of the tradition, or in the Heideggerian account, the "subject") would, minimally, *at least* have to be considered.

Further, before following Heidegger by concluding, with regard to the related issue of the status of "immanence" in Husserl's phenomenology, that "[i]f intentional consciousness is not completely enclosed within the immanence of the subject, it nevertheless finds there its home,"<sup>19</sup> Husserl's account of the phenomenologically reductive unfolding of the "immanence" of consciousness as manifesting a phenomenal status beyond, and indeed, uncritically presupposed by the traditional opposition of "inner" and "outer,"<sup>20</sup> would again, at the very least require some discussion.

Likewise, before endorsing "Heidegger's view, [that the] phenomenological reduction in Husserl is an operation of separation, diametrically opposed to the being of intentionality, which is a being of a relation, a link, a connection,"<sup>21</sup> Husserl's account of the *essential* connection between the empirical and the essential, between the factual and the eidetic, between the phenomenological uncovering of intentional *Sinn* (including the *Sinn des Seins*) and that which is methodologically

yielded as "already there," would seem to warrant treatment in connection with Heidegger's critique.

Again, before lending further credence to the Heideggerian ontological crucible of the status of the *a priori* uncovered by Husserl's eidetic reduction, and maintaining that "this analysis of necessary constituents, be it intentional compartments in general, or be it of a particular intentional compartment, is completely different from the task of a phenomenological analysis of the *a priori* of intentionality,"<sup>22</sup> since the *eidos* of the former is "an *a-temporal* and separate structure,"<sup>23</sup> while the latter "has a sense of being both temporal and inseparable from the actual individual,"<sup>24</sup> the status of the '*apriority*' of Heidegger's *existentialia* would seem to demand some kind of accounting. The phenomenologically ontological status of these latter, as the "structures of existence" (*Existenzstrukturen*), involves the differentiation on Heidegger's part between the following two aspects: (1) existence per se as something temporal and individual, and in this sense 'the prior' of theoretical cognition, and; (2) the "structure(s)" of 'the prior' or *a priori* in this sense.

Insofar as this phenomenological appeal to "structure" is *not* coincident with the temporality and individuality of existence, but as its non-categorical Being character (*Seinscharakter*) must in some sense *exceed* them, it would seem that the assertion that the *a priori* uncovered by Husserl's eidetic reduction is "completely different" from the ontological analysis of the *a priori* of intentionality (or any other phenomenon for that matter) is much too strong. At the very least, this assertion is tantamount to denying that the "*a priori*" in Heidegger's sense has a structure at all. More broadly, maintaining the claim at issue means that we pass over in silence Heidegger's own self-understanding of the task of the phenomenologically conceived "existential analytic" in terms of the *theoretical* aim of "rendering transparent the structure of existence" (*BT*, 275/232), as well as his indefinite postponement of the problem of providing a phenomenological account for the "*ontological genesis* of theoretical compartment" (*BT*, 408/357) that is the phenomenal condition for such an aim.

Finally, before siding with Heidegger and holding that "[t]hose like Husserl who restrict themselves to ontic-intentionality are not only culpable of not pushing the analysis far enough, that is, to its foundation; in so doing they are also operating with a misunderstanding of the ontological difference,"<sup>25</sup> Husserl's account of non-objectivizing intentionality would seem to warrant more than a passing reference<sup>26</sup> in light of the alleged culpability at issue.

All of this is not to suggest that Bernet's analysis of Husserl and Heidegger on intentionality and Being, since it endorses the Heidegger-

ian prerogative with respect to these issues, is *simply wrong*. Rather, it is to suggest that, insofar as it is the intent of his analysis to be "phenomenological," it is incomplete. It is incomplete for the simple reason that his discussion of the methodological dimension of the issues appeals, from the outset, *exclusively* to Heidegger's *ontological* formulation of the problematic. It is in this sense, then, that Bernet's endorsement of the Heideggerian prerogative may be seen as the "perfect foil" to the present study. That is, the present study attempts to expand the discussion of the *controversy* over phenomenology's most proper method and content by introducing into this discussion an appeal to *die Sachen selbst* of the controversy *in accord with the Husserlian prerogative*, toward the end of a non-partisan mediation of this controversy consistent with the "matters themselves" at issue.

**PART ONE**

**HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
ACCOUNT OF INTENTIONALITY**

## INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

### § 6. *Preliminary Considerations.*

Husserl's phenomenological method, and the fundamental phenomenon of intentionality uncovered by this method, are inextricably bound together. Indeed, Husserl even goes so far as to refer to phenomenology's method as the "method of intentionality" (*PP*, 270).<sup>1</sup> In order to unravel, from the "matters themselves" (*Sachen selbst*), the complex relationship between method and the phenomenon of intentionality in Husserl's thought, I will begin my considerations of his account of this phenomenon with a discussion of the general principles which serve to guide his methodical orientation. After these general methodological considerations, which will necessarily have to touch on Husserl's account of intentionality, I will proceed to focus my considerations on the major differentiations which mark his specific account of intentionality. These differentiations concern the logical, material ontological, psychological, and transcendental manifestations of intentionality as the essence of pure consciousness. Having brought into relief the matters themselves of these various aspects of Husserl's account of intentionality, I will conclude my considerations of his account with a discussion of the intentionality of the succession and simultaneity of time.

## CHAPTER ONE

# HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

### § 7. *Introductory Remarks.*

In Chapter One of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, I will be concerned with providing an account of his phenomenological method in view of the matters themselves. My account will, above all, be preoccupied with what I consider to be the all important problem of the phenomenological "beginnings" of this method. My efforts at clarifying these beginnings will attempt to do so by bringing into bold phenomenal relief<sup>1</sup> the peculiar point of departure (*Ansatzpunkt*) of Husserl's phenomenological method. Toward this end I will trace out the initial formulation of this method as it emerges from out of the critique of what he takes to be sensationalist empiricism. My discussion will first try to show that and how this critique leads to Husserl's initial uncovering of the key elements of his method: e.g., lived-experiences, phenomenologically immanent reflection as opposed to, and differentiated from, ontologically mediated "inner" perception or reflection, and the "breakthrough discovery" of the "seeing of essences" (*Wesensschau*). Having shown this, I will then proceed to sketch the general lines of Husserl's abstractive and reductive purification of lived-experiences, in an effort to show how these methodical moves lead to the pure phenomenological uncovering of the essence and eidos of intentionality.

Husserl's phenomenological method is at once "reflective" and "eidetic." It is reflective inasmuch as the starting point for Husserl's phenomenological analyses is always a reflectively uncovered (*ent-hüllen*) field (*Feld*) of lived-experiences (*Erlebnisse*).<sup>2</sup> It is eidetic inasmuch as Husserl's phenomenological concern with the appearance (*Erscheinung*) and manner of appearing (*erscheinen*) of that which is manifested in any field of lived-experiences is always directed towards their invariant characteristics (essences), and thereby, *ipso*

*facto*, unconcerned with the reality (*realität*) of the appearance and its manner of appearing.

The methodological relationship between the reflective uncovering of a field of lived-experiences and the appearance and manner of appearing of that which is manifested therein, along with the methodological relationship between the reality and essence of the appearance and its appearing, is extremely complex. It is commonly assumed that these relationships are exhausted by Husserl's formulations of the various epochés and reductions, presented by him as requisite for access to phenomenologically "purified" consciousness. In my view, however, such an assumption can hold up neither "textually" nor problematically. For reasons I will get into shortly, any attempt to locate the point of departure of Husserl's method with the phenomenological epoché or epochés must necessarily presuppose the initial methodical uncovering of various fields of lived-experiences and an essential insight (*Wesenseinsicht*) into two fundamental kinds of appearances and their corresponding modes of appearing. It is to Husserl's initial uncovering of these various fields of lived-experiences, and the "seeing of essences" which guides his concern with the appearances and their manner of appearing as they are manifested therein, that I will now turn my attention.

#### § 8. Husserl's Initial "Critical" Uncovering of Lived-experiences.

Husserl initially uncovers fields of lived-experiences within the context of his critique of empiricism. The main thrust of this critique is directed against the empirical notion of perception. What Husserl finds objectionable in the empirical accounts of perception is their determination of its nature on the basis of unwarranted ontological speculations concerning the nature of perceptual objects. Husserl's perceptual analyses maintain that the empirical accounts of both "inner" and "outer" perception proceed on the basis of an unquestioned (*selbstverständlich*) perceptual opposition between "inner" and "outer" perceptual objects. This perceptual opposition is said to have its basis in the ontological equation of physical (outer) reality with sense impressions, and of psychical (inner) reality with sensate epiphenomena. Thus, Husserl's perceptual analyses find that it is the conceptual division between physical and psychical reality, implicit in these ontological equations, which determines the empirical accounts of perceptual objects, and therewith the empiricist's corresponding characterizations of inner and outer perception (*LI*, 853/752).

The point of departure for the perceptual analyses underlying Husserl's critique of empiricism is, in his words, the "unnatural dir-

ection of intuition and thought which phenomenological analysis requires" (LI, 254/14).<sup>3</sup> Rather than uncritically accept the empirical formulation of inner and outer perceptual objects and their corresponding notions of inner and outer perceptions, Husserl proposes that the experience (*Erfahrung*) of these empiricistically conceived perceptual objects and perceptions be made into objects of methodical "reflections." These methodical reflections serve to transform the "natural" tendency to uncritically affirm (*zusprechen*) these empiricistic formulations, on the part of empirical thought or cognition, into "lived-experiences" of the same. Husserl's use of the term "lived-experiences" attempts to describe the peculiarity effected by the proposed methodological reflections, whereby both the empirical formulation of perceptual experience, and the cognitive affirming of this formulation, are "lived" as "phenomena," instead of being uncritically accepted as real experience and real cognitions inherent in such experience.

It should be noted at this point that these methodical reflections are not to be equated with Husserl's formulation of the phenomenological epoché of the natural thesis of the world's being and the natural attitude which uncritically accepts this thesis.<sup>4</sup> Rather, Husserl's concern here is "critical," in the sense that these methodical reflections serve to "objectivate" (*vorstellen*) the empirical conceptions of physical and psychic reality underlying the empirical formulation of both experience and cognition. These methodical reflections thus function to exhibit (*aufweisen*) what Husserl describes as experiences and thoughts *already going on*, and perhaps even reflected upon, but with the phenomenologically decisive difference that "instead of becoming absorbed in the performance" (LI, 254/14) of these empiricistically formulated experiences and cognitions, both these experiences and cognitions are transformed into empirically "neutralized"<sup>5</sup> phenomena of the same. Hence, these critically directed methodical reflections have as their object neither the thesis of the natural world nor the natural attitude underlying this but rather, as I hope to be able to show, Husserl's formulations of the phenomenological epochés emerge as a response to, and on the phenomenal basis of, what these initial critical reflections uncover regarding the appearances and manners of appearing of that which is initially manifested in the fields of these lived-experiences.

The critical interest of Husserl's methodical reflections is governed by his juxtaposition of the empirical notions of perceptual evidence with the "matters themselves" uncovered as the phenomena of the empirically neutral lived-experiences. In the instance of empiricistic sensationalism, Husserl's critical reflections find serious shortcomings



concerning the exclusivity with which this variety of empiricism identifies "sense impressions" or "sensations" and evidential originality.

In the case of the sensationalist account of the outer perceptual object and its perception, Husserl can find no phenomenal basis for the empirical identification of the physicality of the outer perceptual object with perceived sensations. On the contrary, what he finds manifested to his methodical reflections, as the lived-experience of the outer perceptual object, is the appearance of the physical object itself (e.g., house, cube, etc.), in its "palpable self-presence" (*leibhaftigen Selbstgegenwart*). It is only with a shift of interest, from the lived-experience of the outer perceptual object to the lived-experience of its perception, that Husserl's methodological reflections are able to uncover sensation contents (*Empfindungsinhalt*) in connection with the physical perceptual object. Husserl writes: "If an outer object (house) is perceived, presenting (*präsentierenden*) sensations are lived in the experience of *this* perception, but they are not perceived" (LI, 864/767). Husserl's perceptual analysis of the sensationalist notion of perceptual evidence therefore finds the aspect of this notion involving the ontological equation of the physical object with sensations to be incapable of perceptual substantiation. Accordingly, the empirical identification of the evidential originality of sense impressions with the physical object is discovered by Husserl to have its basis in *ontological speculations*, and not the "matters themselves" of the outer (physical) perceptual object and its perception.

Husserl's critique likewise finds serious problems with the sensationalist account of the inner perceptual object and its perception. Husserl characterizes the sensationalist account in terms of the empirical attempt to explain the psychic reality of the spirit (*Geist*), and the ideality of its thought contents, on the basis of their origin in physical reality (sense impressions). Accordingly, reflection is understood in terms of "the operations (*Betätigung*) carried out by the spirit on the basis of 'ideas' won through sensation" (LI, 853/752). Inner perception is consequently formulated in terms of this understanding of reflection, and, in view of the origin of its perceptual objects, is less a genuine mode of perception than a nebulous quasi perception of something whose reality is actually physical.

However, Husserl's perceptual analysis of the lived-experience of the ideality of thought contents cannot find any basis in their appearances to turn away from them (as does the empiricism under consideration) in order to "explain" them as real features of physical objects, which have been "abstractively" torn away from their outer perception by the spirit's so-called inner perception or reflection. On the contrary, Husserl's methodical reflections find that the inner perceptual objects of ideal thought contents, as manifested in their

lived-experience, possess a decidedly non-real or "irreal"<sup>6</sup> phenomenal status. Likewise, the lived-experience of the inner perception or reflection which perceives these ideal thought contents is decidedly non-sensuous, and manifests nothing in this non-sensuousness warranting the empirical reduction of this perception to sense impressions. Thus, in addition to Husserl's critical findings regarding the sensationalist misplacing of the locus of sensate evidence in the instance of the perceptual object of physical (outer) reality, he also finds that the evidential exclusivity of sensation, claimed by this kind of empiricism to be the basis for all perception, cannot be maintained in the instance of the perception of ideal thought contents. Again, *ontological speculations* concerning the reality of the perceptual object and its perception are found, by Husserl's critique, to be substituted by empiricism for the "matters themselves" of both the perceptual object and perception.

§ 9. *Phenomenological Reflection is not Determined by the Interiority of its Object; the Reflective "Seeing of Essences."*

On the basis of the discussion thus far of Husserl's critique of the sensationalist accounts of inner and outer perceptual objects and their modes of perception, and in particular, of the identification of reflection with the empirical account of inner perception, the following should be emphasized. Husserl's formulation of the methodical reflections, which comprise the point of departure for his critical concerns, are in no way to be equated with the empirical notion of reflection, i.e., as a quasi perception of inner perceptual objects. Rather, the lived-experiences of both *inner* and *outer* perceptual objects, and their respective perceptions, are the proper objects of Husserl's methodical reflections. In this connection, he writes:

Any kind of lived-experience (including the lived-experience of outer intuition, whose objects on its side are then called *outer* appearances) can be made objects of reflective, inner intuition (LI, 862/765).

Husserl's frequent characterizations of phenomenology's methodological reflections in terms of "inner perception" or "inner intuition," (which I will discuss shortly), can be clarified in terms of the problematic from which they issue, only if clarity has been achieved from the start that phenomenological reflection "does not depend on the peculiarity of inwardly perceived 'phenomena'" (LI, 865/769).<sup>7</sup>

Husserl's critique of the sensationalist empiricism deepens with the consideration of the essence of what appears, along with the essence of its manner of appearing, in the fields of reflectively uncovered lived-experiences. These essential, or "eidetic," considerations are formulated in terms of the "variation" of the manifold (*mannigfaltig*) instances or "exemplars" of what is manifested in the objectivated field occupying Husserl's methodical reflections. According to Husserl, these exemplary variations yield (*ergeben*) before the objectivating regard of the methodically executed reflections an invariant characteristic, or essence (*Wesen*), "running through" (*durchgehend*) whatever is manifesting itself per se within the field of lived-experiences under consideration. Which is to say, there is manifested to the objectivating regard of these methodical reflections both the manifold of critically uncovered lived-experiences, and, with their variation, the essence that is yielded as running through these lived-experiences. Corresponding to the emergence of the essence is its perception by the objectivating regard of the methodical reflection. This resulting perception, or "eidetic intuition," of the essence on the part of the methodologically reflective regard comprises the well known "*Wesensanschauung*" (essence intuition) or "*Wesensschau*" (seeing of essences) of Husserl's phenomenological method.

On the basis of this "seeing of essences," Husserl's deepening critical considerations descriptively characterize the essence of what appears and its manner of appearing, as they are exhibited in the lived-experiences of the empirically formulated conceptions of perceptual experience (*Erfahrung*) and cognition. In the remainder of my discussion of Husserl's general methodological orientation, I will consider his account of these essences insofar as they serve to provide the basis for his uncovering of what he describes as the explicitly phenomenological domain of lived-experiences: the stream of consciousness and the pure ego, whose intentional essence comprises at once the thematic field and reflective method of pure phenomenology.

§ 10. *The Essence of the Lived-experiences of the Appearance, Manner of Appearing, and Perception of Something Transcendent.*

Husserl describes the essence of the perceptual object, appearing as the object of "outer" perception, in terms of its 'palpable self-presence'. That is to say, the appearance of that which appears (e.g., ink stands, houses, match boxes, etc.), always appears as the object it is "in-itself." As such, however, its manner of appearing is always manifested as a definite perspective (i.e., from one side, up close, from a distance, etc.), of the one and the same palpable self-present object in-itself. This

essential "perspectivity" of the palpable self-presence of the outer perceptual object's manner of appearing results, according to Husserl, in its putative transcendent perceptual status. This means that the appearance of the outer perceptual object, as "outer," manifests itself as a function of its always appearing "beyond" the perspective in which it appears. Since what is at issue here is the invariant character running through a manifold of exemplary lived-experiences of the appearance and manner of appearing of an outer percept, as methodically exhibited to the essential seeing of phenomenological reflections, the transcendent status of the outer perceptual object's appearance concerns its meaning (*Sinn*) as a phenomenon, and not its extra-perceptual being or reality. (In view of the importance the problematic of transcendence will assume for Husserl's development of the phenomenological method, the importance of this last distinction cannot be underestimated.)

Inasmuch as the phenomenal meaning of an outer perceptual object as transcendent is essentially determined by its perspectival manner of appearing, this perceptual object is always, according to Husserl, incompletely or "inadequately" given. This is to say, the "evidence" in which the outer perceptual object is manifested is always inadequate, in the sense that any given perspective always, in accordance with an "essential necessity," admits of further determinations. These further determinations, again in accord with an essential necessity, can never add up to a coincidence or "adequation" with the outer perceptual object itself; this is so, since its very status as an "outer perceptual object" is essentially determined by its givenness as one and the same appearance (palpable self-presence) in a continuity of perspectival appearing.

It should be mentioned that Husserl sharply dissociates this phenomenological concept of "appearance" from the traditional concept—in particular from the Kantian conception. Kant's well known contradiction between an appearance that represents an object in-itself which does *not* appear, and therefore an object which cannot be "given," is absent in Husserl's understanding of appearance. For Husserl, the "original concept of appearance" (LI, 862/765) characterizes the object in itself, an object "taken as it appears *hic et nunc*; e.g., this lamp as that which is aimed at in a perception just performed" (LI, 861/765). Hence, for Husserl, the appearance of an object and its givenness are coincident; there is no object behind, or announced by, that which appears. Which is to say, for Husserl the phenomenological concept of appearance, understood as the object which appears to the methodically reflective regard, refers to no phenomenon other than itself as "that which appears."

With the methodical shift of exemplary variations, from the field of lived-experiences of the outer perceptual object's appearance and its

manner of appearing, to the field of the lived-experiences of the outer perceptual object's perception, the essence of these latter lived-experiences is yielded to essential seeing. Husserl describes this essence in terms of apperceptive "adumbrations" (*Abschattung*) that shadow forth the outer perceptual object's perspectivity. They are understood as apperceptive in the sense that, to the component contents of the essence of the lived-experience of the outer perceptual object's perception, there belong not only phenomenal sensations or "hylé," but also a non-sensuous phenomenal "bestowal of meaning" (*Sinngebung*) (*Ideas I*, 205/195) or "intention." This latter essence is described by Husserl in terms of the "consciousness of" that "ensouls" (*beseelen*) the hyletic component such that the perspectival meaning of the transcendent perceptual object is "instituted" (*stiften*).

The essence of the perception of something transcendent (Husserl prefers this locution to that of "outer perceptual object," or "outer object," since these latter phrases are tainted by the sensationalist equation of sensations with the perceptual object at issue) is therefore characterized by Husserl as apperception. As such, correlative to the essential inadequacy of the evidence which comprises the putative transcendent status of the lived-experience of the transcendent perceptual object, is an essential inadequacy of the evidence in which it is apperceived. Which is to say, for Husserl, there is (in accord with an essential necessity) always a transcending "excess" (*Überschuß*) of meaning intended in the apperception of the perspectival appearing of something transcendent. As such, the evidence manifested by this apperception is inadequate, in the sense that the transcending "more" of the intended excess of meaning can never be coincident with its givenness (*Gegebenheit*) as intended.

§ 11. *The Essence of the Lived-experiences of the Appearance, Manner of Appearing, and Perception of Something Immanent.*

In the instance of the "inner" perceptual object and its inner perception or intuition, Husserl finds the essences of their lived-experiences to be lacking the phenomenal mark of inadequacy which characterizes the evidence of both the manner of appearing and perception (apperception) of something transcendent. In the case of the exemplary variation of lived-experiences of the appearance of ideal (*irreal*) thought contents, Husserl's methodological reflections exhibit a "palpable selfhood" (*leibhaftigen Selbstheit*) (*Ideas I*, 10/14-15) whose essence manifests an objectivity in no way derivative of, or reducible to, real (physical) objectivity. On the contrary, the phenomenal status manifested by *irreal* thought contents is such that they

stand or subsist (*bestehen*) originally on their own throughout the empirically formulated flux of real experience and cognition. It should be noted here that what is at issue in this subsistence of *irreal* phenomena concerns, of course, their appearance in a field of lived-experiences and not any kind "real" or "ideal" existence.

Husserl describes the essence of the manner of appearing in which *irreal* phenomena appear in terms of the unity of both their manner of appearing and their appearance. This unity is characterized, negatively, in terms of the lack of perspectival mediation (as in the instance of the manner of appearing of something transcendent) involved in the *irreal* appearance and its manner of appearing. Positively, the unity is characterized in terms of the "immediacy" (*Unmittelbarkeit*) of the *irreal* appearance and its manner of appearing. This is to say, in contradistinction to inadequacy, which is the mark of the appearance of something transcendent, the evidence giving the appearance of something *irreal* is "adequate." Insofar as *irreal* phenomena appear at all, there is not an incompleteness (inadequacy) manifested which would mar the immediacy of the appearance of such phenomena and their manner of appearing. Husserl understands this essential evidential adequacy of the lived-experience of the appearance of *irreal* phenomena and the manner of their appearing in terms of their "immanence." Such phenomena therefore emerge as "inner" perceptual objects (according to Husserl's methodical reflections) as a result of the lived-experience of the immanence manifested by the unity of their appearance and manner of appearing, and not as a result of their quasi ontological "interiority" vis-à-vis the ontological "exteriority" of outer perceptual objects.

With the methodological shift of exemplary variations, from the field of lived-experiences of the immanent perceptual object's appearance and its manner of appearing, to the field of the lived-experiences of the immanent perceptual object's perception, the essence of these latter lived-experiences is yielded to the essential seeing of Husserl's methodical reflections. Husserl describes this essence in terms of the "immediacy" of the immanent perception and its immanent perceptual object. This immediacy manifests itself in terms of an intuitive regard (*Blick*) or intention which "apprehends" (*erfassen*) its immanent perceptual object as belonging (*gehören*) to the same stream of lived-experiences (*Erlebnisstrom*) as the intentionality of the lived-experiences which are intuitively apprehending them. Husserl writes:

By the intentionality of lived-experiences related to something immanent, we understand those to which it is essential that their intentional objects, if they exist [i.e., if they appear in the field of methodically uncovered lived-experiences] at all, belong to the

same stream of lived-experiences to which they themselves belong  
(*Ideas I*, 79/78).

This means that for Husserl the intentional "consciousness of," which comprises the essence of immanent intuition, and the intentional object to which it is related (*bezogen*), "form essentially an unmediated unity" (*Ibid*).

Therefore, according to Husserl, there is correlative to the essential adequacy of the evidence in which the immanent perceptual object's appearance and its appearing are given, the essential adequacy of the evidence in which these "immanent contents" are intuited. Thus, in contradistinction to the perceptual incompleteness which belongs to the manner in which something transcendent appears, and the intentional 'more' which characterizes its apperception, the intuition of something immanent suffers neither a perceptual incompleteness nor a transcending consciousness (intentionality) of a phenomenal meaning exceeding the immediacy of its regard. Rather, insofar as there is manifested to the intentional regard of immanent intuition the appearance of something immanent, the phenomenal manifestation of this appearance and its intuitive exhibition are adequate in the sense that these two intentional moments are in essential accord: the meaning of the given does not exceed the regard which apprehends it.

§ 12. *The Methodological Transition from the Critical Uncovering of the Essences of Lived-experiences to their Phenomenologically Pure Apprehension.*

It is on the basis of the methodological insights won by these critical reflections that Husserl is able to formulate a phenomenological method that proceeds entirely on the basis of an inner or immanent intuition. Such intuition yields, in a manner *analogous* to the evidential adequacy which is the mark of the perception (intuition) of something immanent, an immanently given field of lived-experiences. In addition, the essence of this immanently given field of lived-experiences, according to Husserl, can then be uncovered. This essence manifests the stream of consciousness and the pure ego, whose intentional essence comprises at once the thematic field and reflective method of pure phenomenology.

The uncovering of these essential distinctions has its basis in what Husserl notes as the phenomenal peculiarity which differentiates inadequate and adequate evidence. He finds that his methodical reflections may "purify" the incompleteness characteristic of lived-experiences which apperceive something transcendent, by focusing the

reflective regard exclusively on the immanent content of what is uncovered in any given field of exemplary lived-experiences. Thus, proceeding in accordance with such a methodical shift in the regard of phenomenological reflections, Husserl understands any stream of lived-experiences to be capable of being uncovered in a manner analogous to the adequacy which is the evidential mark of immanent perception. This methodical shift may be abstractive, in which case the apperception of something transcendent is disregarded, in order that the immanence which is the mark of the *irreal* phenomena of thought contents may be uncovered and "logically" investigated. Or, it may be "reductive," in which case the apperception of something transcendent is bracketed and suspended (via the various epochés) and is thereby regarded solely in terms of the immanent contents of its lived-experience.

In either case, the lived-experiences of the intuition of the phenomenological reflections, which regard the immanent contents of these "purified" fields of lived-experiences, are characterized as manifesting an intentionality analogous to the immanent intentionality which intuits an immanent perceptual object. As such, these methodically immanent reflections are guided by the oft quoted "principle of principles":

*... that every originary giving intuition is a source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its "palpable" actuality) offered to us in "intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it yields, but also only within the limits in which it is yielded there (Ideas I, 44/51).*

What is "originary" about this intuition is the methodological delimitation effected by the conscious regard of reflection, such that it only recognizes as 'given' that which it encounters as being manifest within the ambit of its regard. Thus, of the reflection operative in such intuition, Husserl says that it is "the name of the method of consciousness leading to the cognition of any consciousness whatever" (*Ideas I*, 177/165).

On the basis of this discussion of Husserl's general methodological orientation, I think that the conclusion may be safely drawn that the methodical reflections by which his phenomenology proceeds do not have their point of departure in the logically motivated abstractions which uncover *irreal* thought contents, nor in the reductively motivated epochés which uncover pure lived-experiences. Rather, both these abstractive and reductive moves on Husserl's part (which will be discussed in detail in the considerations of the various manifestations of the phenomenon of intentionality to follow) are phenomenally intel-



ligible only as responses to problematics which are initially uncovered in his critique of the empiricist's formulation of perceptual experience. Specifically, it is on the basis of Husserl's methodologically critical and reflective uncovering of the lived-experiences underlying the sensationist formulations of perceptual experience (*Erfahrung*), and the understanding attendant to this which would explain all cognitive thought-contents as 'abstractive' epiphenomena of the former, that Husserl's formulations of a "pure" phenomenological method, as issuing from the matters themselves (*Sachen selbst*), can be appropriated. This conclusion may be textually documented as well. In the appendix to the *Logical Investigations* Husserl differentiates "phenomenology" from "pure phenomenology." He writes:

*Phenomenology* is accordingly the theory (*Lehre*) of lived-experiences as such, inclusive of all matters . . . given in lived-experiences, and evidently manifestable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the essential theory (*Wesenslehre*) of "pure phenomena," phenomena of a "pure consciousness" . . . [I]t does not build on the ground given by transcendent apperception (*LI*, 862/765).

Regarding Husserl's steadfast refusal to equate the methodical reflections of his phenomenology with the empirically sensationist formulation of reflection on the basis of a "false opposition between inner perception and 'outer' perception" (*LI*, 254/13), Husserl's position, on the basis of the preceding discussion, can now be conclusively summarized. The empiricist's formulation of perceptual experience (*Erfahrung*) in terms of the sensuous reality of an outer perceptual object, and the understanding of cognition in terms of "inner" reflections (which perform "abstractions" on the basis of the perception of the sensuousness of reality) is, according to Husserl's critique, "mediated by a division among the objects of perception" (*LI*, 853/752). Husserl's formulation of the "inner" or "immanent" intuition of his methodologically pure reflections, on the other hand, is determined on the basis of an evidential immanence which, vis-à-vis the evidential transcendence manifested in the perception (apperception) of something transcendent, has nothing to do with an inner object whose intelligibility as "inner" is determined in contradistinction to extrapsychic Being or reality.

According to Husserl, these immanent reflections are, within the context of the methodological orientation of a "pure phenomenology," also rendered "pure in a second sense, in the sense of ideation" (*LI*, 863/765). This second purification occurs with the "objectification" (*Vorstellung*) of the essence of any exemplary manifold of lived-

experiences such that this essence is "set out (*gesetzt*) as idea" (*Ideas I*, 8/13). At issue here for Husserl is the variation of any essence that is uncovered (qua its "running through" the lived-experiences of whatever empirically formulated conception of empirical experience or cognition is under methodological consideration) such that "the essences of essences" (*Ideas I*, 16n), or "eidos," is manifested. As such, the eidos yields the a priori of the essence in a freedom from any factual (*faktische*) connection with the originally objectivated manifold of lived-experiences.<sup>8</sup>

It is on the basis of such ideation, or "eidetic variation," that Husserl's methodologically pure reflections uncover the eidos of any immanently given field of lived-experiences: the pure ego, whose intentionality comprises at once the pure consciousness that is the thematic field of pure phenomenology and its reflective method. For, with the prescinding (*absehen*) shift of the reflective regard, from the intentionality of the essence of any field of lived-experiences (as they are originally uncovered vis-à-vis their empirical or factual connection) to the eidos of this essence, Husserl maintains that a pure 'consciousness of', with its source in a pure ego, is uncovered. Husserl describes the pure ego as the invariant 'consciousness of', which, despite the continually changing content that is manifested by consciousness and its objects, serves to unify this conscious flux. As such, the pure ego is characterized as unifying the pure consciousness uncovered as the eidos of the factually connected intentional essence of any lived-experience whatever, as well as unifying the pure consciousness belonging to the phenomenologically purified reflections whose objectifications lead to the uncovering of the eidos of any lived-experience whatever.

### § 13. Summary and Transition.

Thus far, Husserl's initial uncovering of the phenomenon of intentionality has been considered within the context of the methodological significance of his critique of sensationalist empiricism. Viewed within this context, intentionality has been shown to manifest the phenomenally peculiar non-sensuous excess of meaning (*Sinn*), which Husserl exhibits as an essential structure of the lived-experiences of empiricism's formulations of perceptual experience and cognition. As such, intentionality is described by Husserl in terms of the invariant 'consciousness of' and 'object of consciousness' which runs through the exemplarily given manifolds of the lived-experiences of the perception of both transcendent and immanent perceptual objects. This intentional correlation (between 'consciousness' and its 'object') has also been shown

to characterize, according to Husserl, the essence of the intuitive regard of the methodical reflections that exhibit the intentional essence of transcendent and immanent perception.

Indeed, the move Husserl makes to the abstractive and reductive purifications of lived-experiences in general (*Überhaupt*) has been shown to be intelligible only on the basis of the methodical function exhibited by this latter (reflective) intentionality; i.e., its uncovering of the phenomenal peculiarities of transcendent and immanent intentionalities, which enables it to methodologically limit its regard to the immanent contents of its intentional object. And finally, the *eidos* has also been shown, within the context of Husserl's eidetic purification of the transcendentally (not "transcendentally")<sup>9</sup> pure immanent regard of phenomenological reflections (the prescinding shift of which enables the factually uncovered essence to comprise the exemplarily varied manifold), to ideationally yield the a priori of this essence. Within this methodologically general context, the a priori that serves to unify the flux of continually changing contents belonging to any consciousness whatever, the pure ego, has also been discussed.

On the basis of this initial discussion of Husserl's account of intentionality, the interrelation and interdependence of "intentionality" as the "matter itself" phenomenologically uncovered, and "intentionality" as the method which is to secure this uncovering, has been brought into phenomenal relief. As such, the phenomenon of intentionality Husserl uncovers in terms of the non-sensuous essence of lived-experiences does not characterize something previously given and therefore already at hand. Rather, the essential correlation of 'consciousness of' and 'object of consciousness', that intentionality manifests as the "matter itself" of phenomenology, is something to which *access* must first be secured. And, since the securing of access to this phenomenon takes place on the basis of phenomenology's methodical reflections, while the latter likewise manifest an intentional structure, Husserl characterizes the phenomenological method as the 'method of intentionality'.

Inasmuch as the phenomenon of intentionality emerges on the basis of exemplarily given manifolds of lived-experiences, the eidetic character of this phenomenon is essentially related to the specific manifold of lived-experience from which it then emerges as the essence. It has already been shown that, within the context of his critique of sensationalist empiricism, Husserl understands the lived-experience of the same to manifest a reflectively uncovered phenomenon of something which, prior to its phenomenological objectivation, was uncritically accepted as "valid." That which comes before the methodical regard of phenomenological reflection in this instance is understood, by Husserl, to be the "lived" phenomena of empiricistically formulated

conceptions of experience and cognition. *As such, what is at issue here with respect to "lived-experience" is not a general concept, but that which manifests itself to the exhibiting regard of a phenomenologically peculiar reflection.* As it is the exemplary variation of this phenomenally determinate lived-experience which yields intentionality as its essence, the phenomenal character of the latter emerges as *essentially* related to the phenomenal determination of the former.

This state of affairs has as its all important consequence the eidetic differentiation of the essence intentionality in accord with the various phenomenal determinations of the exemplary manifold whose variation yields this essence. Strictly speaking then, that which is exhibited under the general title "intentionality" in Husserl's phenomenological analyses, emerges as manifesting important essential differentiations to the extent that the exemplary manifolds of what he takes to be logical, material ontological, psychological and transcendental lived-experiences themselves manifest phenomenal differentiations. Which is to say, Husserl understands the abstractive and reductive methodological shifts of phenomenological reflections (see § 12 above) to yield phenomenally differentiated manifolds of lived-experiences, the specific variations of which subsequently yield at the essential level correspondingly differentiated intentional essences.

Having discussed the general principles of Husserl's phenomenologically pure methodological orientation, I will now turn my considerations to his specific accounts of the various eidetic structures of the phenomenon of intentionality. In order to bring into phenomenal relief Husserl's specific accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality, and therewith to secure in view of *die Sachen selbst* the phenomenal marks which lead to his differentiation of logical, material ontological, psychological and transcendental manifestations of the essence of intentionality, I will begin with his account of the intentionality of logical significance (*Bedeutung*). My rationale for beginning here has its basis not only in the fact that Husserl's initial characterizations of the essence of intentionality emerge within the context of his logical studies, but also in the consideration that Husserl's account of the logical manifestation of the essence of intentionality needs be brought into bold phenomenal relief if it is to be adequately differentiated from its non-logical manifestations.

## CHAPTER TWO

# THE INTENTIONALITY OF LOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGICAL MEANING

### § 14. *Introductory Remarks.*

In Chapter Two of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, I will be concerned with bringing into relief the phenomenal state of affairs that lead him to differentiate, not only the intentional structure of logical signification (*Bedeutung*) from the intentional structure of material ontological meaning (*Sinn*), but also to maintain an exclusive philosophical importance for the latter. I find this state of affairs to be extremely important on at least two counts.

The first count concerns the problematic of securing the proper methodological access to the phenomenally peculiar lived-experiences which yield the correspondingly differentiated intentional structures of signification and meaning. My discussion of this problematic will endeavor to show how, for Husserl, the exemplary nature of the logically pure categories that manifest logical signification lends itself to abstractive phenomenological purification, while the exemplary nature of material ontological meaning lends itself to (the decidedly non-abstractive) reductive phenomenological purification.

The second count concerns the importance the phenomenologically clarified intentional essence of material ontological meaning assumes within the context of the graded phenomenological reductions. This phenomenologically clarified essence leads Husserl to the discovery of the intentionality of pure consciousness. Since it is the phenomenal content of the intentionality proper to the material ontological which will be reductively transformed with the initial execution of the phenomenologically psychological epoché, my discussion of Husserl's account of the eidetic characteristics of this intentionality will at-

tempt to show both upon what and how this method effects reductive purification.

§ 15. *The Intentionality of Logical Signification: the Analytic Status of the Essence of Logical Categories and their Intuition.*

Husserl's methodological exhibition of the intentionality of logical signification is carried out in terms of what he calls "acts." Logical acts are uncovered within the context of methodical reflections which objectivate, as exemplars, the "given basis (*Grund*) of the lived-experiences of thinking and knowing" (LI, 264/25). These are understood by Husserl to be "given" in the sense discussed above (§ 3), i.e., as the empiricistically formulated conceptions of cognition whose "performance" already "going on" is neutralized as a result of its phenomenal objectification. Once neutralized, these lived-experiences are abstractively purified by methodologically disregarding transcendent apperception. Accordingly, "if we take the trouble to bring out the ideal essence of significations from their psychological and grammatical connections . . . we are already in the domain of pure logic" (LI, 322-323/97). What is thereby uncovered, according to Husserl, are those lived-experiences that manifest logical acts.

The term "act" is understood by Husserl "to abbreviate the locution 'intentionality of lived-experience'" (LI, 617/469). As such, Husserl cautions, regarding the term "act," that "all thought of activity (*Betätigung*) must be rigidly excluded" (LI, 563/393). Rather, logical acts are exhibited by Husserl in terms of the invariant characteristic running through immanently intuited lived-experiences of thinking and knowing which involve logically objective significations (i.e., "categories"). According to Husserl, "examples of logical categories are such concepts as property, relative quality, state of affairs, relationship, identity, equality, aggregate (collection), number, whole and part, genus and species, and the like" (*Ideas I*, 22/27). Husserl's essential investigations of the lived-experiences of categories find that they always manifest, no matter what the nature of the specific objective significance thought, known, and grammatically expressed, an intentional "directedness toward" (*Gerichtetsein auf*). Correlative to this, of course, is an intentional object to which this directedness is directed. As such, both the intentional directedness toward and the intentional object of the logical act are understood, by Husserl, to manifest an objectivity (and the correlative intuitive insight into this objectivity) "prior to all predicative thinking" (*Ideas I*, 10/15).<sup>1</sup>

Husserl understands the logical significations of the objectivity manifested by logical categories to comprise what he calls the "formal

region" (*Ideas I*, 21/26), or formal ontological determination, of any object whatever. As such, logical categories manifest the universal significations that render any object intelligible as such. When considered within the context of the intuition of the intentional essence of these categories, what is at issue for Husserl is the phenomenological clarification of the categories of pure logic.<sup>2</sup> Husserl accomplishes this clarification with the use of the conceptual contraries "analytic" and "synthetic" (*Ideas I*, 21/27). The employment of these terms is related, in a general sense, to the Kantian distinction between a purely formal conceptual manifold (the analytic) and a manifold whose conceptuality involves experiential determinations (the synthetic). However, as the discussion to follow will make evident, Husserl's account of the precise nature of each of these manifolds differs significantly from the Kantian formulation. For Husserl, the conceptuality of both the analytic and synthetic manifolds admit of something that, for Kant, would be impossible: *intuitive givenness*. Nevertheless, Husserl no doubt uses these terms in an effort to draw attention to what he finds to be an all important *phenomenologically* clarified distinction between formal and experiential "manifolds."

The intentional essence of the categories of pure logic is "analytical" for Husserl in the sense that this essence manifests the invariant structure running through the significations of the variable exemplar "any object whatever," i.e., logically pure categories. The lived-experiences of such logically pure categories are further understood by Husserl to be 'freely variable', inasmuch as the formal universality signified by the phenomenal exemplar "logically pure category" does not manifest any specific marks determinative of the intelligibility of what he calls the "material (*materiale*) region" and "individual particularity" of objects.<sup>3</sup> But rather, the significations of logically pure categories are taken by him to be determinative of the intelligibility of objects, *no matter how they may be regionally or individually determined*. Hence, what is freely variable with respect to the phenomenal lived-experiences of such pure categories is the object (i.e., 'any object whatever') which serves as the exemplar for those methodological abstractions that yield the lived-experience and intentional essence of the objective significations pertaining to 'any object whatever'.

For Husserl, then, both the regional and individual determinations of objects "are not mere particularizations of truths included in formal ontology" (*Ideas I*, 31/36). Rather, such particularizations, in accord with their logically pure significative status, serve only to render intelligible objects lacking specific regional or individual determination. This indeterminate universality of the former objects is what Husserl takes to be their "analytical" character, with corresponding

essences manifesting a phenomenally analytic status; while the determinate aspects of objects manifesting these latter qualities are taken to be "synthetic," with their essences likewise manifesting a synthetic status.

Since phenomenological access to the lived-experiences of each of the synthetic determinations of objects (i.e., their regional and individually particular qualities) requires the methodical exhibition of the positive experience and meaning (*Sinn*) of such determinations, Husserl understands the securing of these lived-experiences to fall within the province of the graded reductions initiated by phenomenologically pure reflections.<sup>4</sup> This is the case since not just any object, but only those that are synthetically determined in accord with such positive experience and meaning, can serve as exemplars whose variation will yield the synthetically determined essences of the same. Accordingly, the exemplary exhibition of such objects lacks the free variability of that exemplary object which yields the analytical essence uncovered by the abstractions of phenomenologically pure logical reflections. Thus, what is at issue regarding the analytic status of the intentional object, yielded via the free variations carried out by such reflections, is *not* how an object may be determined as an object belonging to this or that region of being, nor how it may be determined as just this "individual single particular (*individuellen Vereinzelnungen*)" (*Ideas I*, 28/33) object belonging to this or that region of being. But rather, what is at issue here is the intuition of the essence of significations whose universality encompasses any objective region and any regionally determinate individual object. According to Husserl, it is such intuition that is analytic, and the essence it yields is said to manifest the phenomenologically clarified formal region of any object whatever.

§ 16. *The Epistemic Essence of Logical Signifying: Empty and Fulfilled Intentions.*

Husserl characterizes the 'consciousness of' moment of the logical act in terms of what he calls the "epistemic essence" (*LI*, 745/62ff; also *Ideas I*, 350/338) of intentionality. This moment of intentionality is said to "point to" (*bedeuten*) the significations that comprise the categories of the formal region of objectivity. This intentional pointing is manifested in the lived-experiences of the predicative statements of apophantic logic, as well as in the "pre-expressive" lived-experiences of formalizing thinking. According to Husserl, the directional regard of these intentions admit of a continuum of gradations of "intuitive"<sup>5</sup> fulfillment vis-à-vis the categorial significations of its intentional ob-



ject. At the opposing extremes of this continuum are "unfulfilled" and "fulfilled" significative intentions. On the one hand, unfulfilled significative intentions are characterized by Husserl as "empty," since the intentional object toward which the intentional regard is directed does not manifest itself qua its "palpable selfhood." Considered in terms of evidence, such empty intentions manifest the limiting instance of logically inadequate evidence, which is to say, the signification intended is transcendent to the intuitive regard which intends it. On the other hand, fulfilled significative intentions are characterized by Husserl as "full," since the intentional object of the intentional regard manifests itself in terms of its palpable selfhood. Viewed evidentially, full intentions manifest the limiting instance of logically adequate evidence, i.e., the signification intended is immanent to the intuitive regard that intends it.

§ 17. *The Non-logical Intentionality of Synthetic Cognition: its Importance for the Psychological Έποχή and Reduction.*

When the analytical status of the intentional objectivity of the essence of the categories of pure logic is considered in contradistinction to the regional and individual determinations of objects, objective determinations which lie outside the scope of its formal objectivity become a factor with respect to the intelligibility of such objects. This is the case since, in the instance of the objectivity determinate of the regional being of objects, as well as in the instance of the objectivity determinate of the regionally determined 'individual single particular' object (determinations which are called "factual [*tatsächlich*]" by Husserl), the intentional essence of both of these objective determinations cannot be manifested on the basis of the free variation of exemplars that are determinate of any object whatever (i.e., logically pure categories). Rather, insight into their essences requires access to regionally and individually determinate objectivities which, in turn, are phenomenologically objectivated in terms of the neutralized lived-experiences of the same. These latter yield the exemplary manifold from which their correlative 'synthetic' essences are then uncovered. For Husserl, access to the regional determinations of objects is the concern of regional ontologies, while access to the individual determinations of objects is the concern of the positive sciences. In either case, it is the synthetic objectivity and its intuition that, in contrast to analytic objectivity and intuition, "alone is important (and of course fundamentally [*grundwichtigen*]) to philosophy" (*Ideas I*, 22/27).

Within the context of Husserl's characterization of the phenomenon of intentionality, specifically, of his description of the phenomenal marks which differentiate the essential structure of logical acts from the essential structure of the phenomenologically psychological phenomenon of intentionality, the concept of synthetic objectivity is important on two accounts. One account concerns the phenomenological clarification of the synthetic objectification of the perceptual objects of experience (*Erfahrung*), which takes place in the empirically synthetic cognition of the positive sciences, and in the a priori synthetic cognition of the regional ontologies. For Husserl this clarification serves to bring into relief the eidetic structures of thethetic positum "being character simpliciter (*Seinscharakter schlechthin*)" and its protodoxic positing. Further, their clarification brings these into relief as they function in the presentation (*Darstellung*) of objectively transcendent being.<sup>6</sup> Husserl exhibits the positum of this 'being character' and 'protodoxic positing' as the decisive phenomenal marks of the lived-experiences of objective being. The other account is made possible on the basis of this phenomenological clarification. For, once the intentionality of the objective positum and its positing are uncovered, the phenomenological ἐποχή of the efficacy (*Vollziehung*) of both its modality of being (*Seinsmodalität*) and being character simpliciter becomes possible—and with this ἐποχή, the phenomenological reduction to the psychologically pure and ontologically neutral intentionality of consciousness is initiated.

Methodologically, both the phenomenological clarification of synthetic cognition and its ensuing psychological epoché occur within the rubric of what Husserl refers to as the "graded reduction" (*Ideas I*, 66/69) or "reductions" initiated by phenomenological reflection. These reductions commence with the perceptual reduction of the intentionality of transcendent apperception and its transcendent perceptual object, to the immanent contents of its lived-experience (discussed above in § 12). This perceptual reduction functions to phenomenologically clarify the perceptual experience underlying the empiricistic misformulations of the same in terms of sensationalism.

Thus far, I have considered Husserl's phenomenological clarification of perceptual experience in terms of its "critical" preparation for this reduction. In my discussion to follow, it will be seen how, on the basis of the intentionality of pure perceptual consciousness uncovered by Husserl with this reduction, and in particular, on the basis of the differentiation between "actional" (*aktualität*) and "non-actional" (*Inaktualität*) modes of the 'consciousness of' that characterizes intentionality, he is able to phenomenologically clarify the objectifying regard underlying the synthetic cognitions of both positive science and regional ontology.

§ 18. *Actional and Non-actional Modes of Intentionality.*

Husserl's methodological reflections find that the invariant 'consciousness of something' that characterizes the lived-experiences of perception, is not exhausted by the narrow sense of an actionally modified consciousness that manifests the explicit "directedness toward" (*Gerichtetsein auf*), or "turning toward" (*Zuwendung*), which brings before the "mind's eye" (*geistigen Auge*) (*Ideas I*, 72/73) of the regard of consciousness its correlative intentional object. Rather, as actionally modified, consciousness is "surrounded by a 'fringe' (*Hof*) of non-actional lived-experiences" (*Ibid*). The intentionality of these non-actional lived-experiences comprises a background field (*Hintergrundsfeld*) (or horizontal field) of intentional objects and non-actional lived-experiences that are conscious of these objects. As such, they are "there" (*da*), "ready to be perceived (*wahrnehmungsbereit*)" (*Ideas I*, 99/95). When they enter into the actionally modified consciousness, they manifest themselves as already having been intended, and therefore, as already appearing. Husserl writes:

The kind of being (*Seinsart*) [i.e., the phenomenal manner of its manifestation] belonging to lived-experiences is such that a seeing regard of perception can be directed quite immediately to any actual (*wirklich*) lived-experience as an originary living present (*originäre Gegenwart lebendige*). This occurs in the form of "reflection" which has the remarkable property that what is apprehended perceptually in reflection is characterized fundamentally not only as something which is and endures while it is being regarded perceptually but also as something which *already was before* this regard turned toward it (*Ideas I*, 98/95).

According to Husserl, then, the intentional correlation that the essence of perceptual lived-experiences manifests between consciousness and its intentional object, extends beyond the specific directionality of a consciousness that thematically apprehends its intentional object. Thus Husserl writes in this connection "that it should be noted that *intentional* object of a consciousness (taken in the manner in which the intentional object is the full correlate of a consciousness), by no means signifies the same as object *apprehended*" (*Ideas I*, 76/75). In order to terminologically distinguish these two modalities of perceptual intentionality, Husserl uses the Cartesian term "cogito" to refer to the 'being directed toward' that characterizes intentionality's actional modality. He writes:

Precisely these [actionalities], when contrasted with non-actionalities, determine in the widest generality . . . the precise

(pregnant) meaning of the expression "cogito," "I have consciousness of something," "I bring about an act of consciousness." To keep this fixed concept sharply separated [from non-actionalities], we shall reserve for it exclusively the Cartesian terms, cogito and cogitationes (*Ideas* I, 72/73).

In addition, Husserl uses the term "act" to designate the actional mode of intentionality, and notes that, in contrast to his terminological employment of this term in the *Logical Investigations*, he "no longer uses the expressions act and the intentionality of lived-experiences as equivalent without taking precautions" (*Ideas* I, 201/190)<sup>7</sup>

§ 19. *The Phenomenological Clarification of the Intentionality of Synthetic Cognition: the Essential Correlation Between Positing and Positum Manifested in the Objective Presentation of the Experience of Perceptual Objects.*

Husserl's phenomenological clarification of the synthetic objectification of the perceptual objects of *Erfahrung* finds that this objectification manifests an intentionality in the actional mode of the cogito. As such, the intentional essence of the lived-experiences of synthetic cognition is described, by Husserl, in terms of its 'directedness toward' its intentional object, which, qua this cogito, is described as a thematically apprehended object or "cogitatum." The intentionality of these lived-experiences is characterized by Husserl as manifesting an ontological positing and a correlative object posited or "positum."

In the instance of the intentionality manifested by the positive sciences, the objectification of the perceptual objects of *Erfahrung* results in their presentation (*Darstellung*) in terms of objects or facts (*Tatsachen*) that manifest a definite modality of being posited as transcendent. Corresponding to this, perceptual *Erfahrung* is objectified here in terms of a definite presentational mode (*Darstellungsmodus*) of acceptance (*Geltung*), or what Husserl calls the doxic modality of positing a modality of being. The modes of being are characterized by Husserl as the *posita* "certain," "uncertain," "questionable," and "possible" (*Ideas* I, 251/240). Correlative to these *posita* are the doxic modes of positing "certain acceptance," "uncertain acceptance," "questionable acceptance," and "possible acceptance" (*Ideas* I, 250/239).

This intentional correlation between positing and positum is yielded on the basis of the exemplary variation of the manifold lived-experiences of the empirical intuition of any empirical fact whatever, no matter what its empirical type, e.g., physical, psychical, psychophysical, etc. As such, the cognition that is manifested in the

exemplary instances of the lived-experiences of the empirical intuition of empirical facts is understood by Husserl to be synthetic. The individual determinations of facts are in Husserl's view the result of cognitive presentations of experiential perceptual objects. These perceptual objects serve as empirically interchangeable instances of what Husserl understands to be the factual contingency (*Zufälligkeit*) of cognitively objectified individual being. These determinations, therefore, do not "merely express particularizations of the categories of pure logic" (*Ideas I*, 31/37), for such determination would analytically limit their status (see § 15 above). Rather, they manifest cognitive connections which are only determinable on the basis of experience.

However, according to Husserl, the positing of the individual fact in terms of contingency exhibits the following meaning (*Sinn*): "it is thus; in respect to its essence it could be otherwise" (*Ideas I*, 7/12). This meaning points, for Husserl, to eidetic components which delimit the *Erfahrung* that is the basis of empirically synthetic cognition. Specifically,

... an individual object is not merely an individual object as such, a "this here" [τόδε τι], an object never repeatable; as qualified (*beschaffener*) "in itself" thus and so, it has its own specific character, its stock of essential predicables which must belong to it (as "a being [*Seiendem*] such as it is in itself") (*Ideas I*, 7/12-13).

Inasmuch as the directedness of the intentional regard of the cogito, which characterizes empirical cognition (intuition), is directed toward the individual instances or facts objectified by its regard, these eidetic components remain unthematized. This lack of eidetic thematization finds expression in Husserl's well known characterization of the "positivity" of the empirical sciences.

The thematization of these eidetic components is understood by Husserl to be the province of regional ontologies. The intuition of that cognition which thematizes such components is described as the result of the variation of manifold individual instances of similar empirical facts. This variation allows the intuitive regard to shift its thematic focus, away from the exemplary manifold of empirical facts, back to the common qualities that make up (*ausmachen*) their similarity, qualities now (as a result of the empirical variation) yielded to the regard of intuition. With this shift, the regard of intuition is no longer "positively" directed towards individual facts, but "eidetically" directed to the regional categories, or "a priori" meanings (*Sinne*), which determine the empirical typologies of individual facts. Since the regional categorial meanings are exhibited on the basis of experientially determined objectivities, their cognition is characterized as

synthetic. Since it is not individual facts that are cognized, but their experientially determinate a priori meanings, the intuition of such cognition is understood by Husserl to be synthetic a priori.

According to Husserl, the methodological variation of manifold lived-experiences of the synthetic cognition characteristic of any regional ontology whatever manifests an actionally modified intentionality that functions to present (*darstellen*) any regional category or connection (*Zusammenhang*) of categories in terms of an unmodalized primally (*Ur*) posited being, and essentially correlative to this, a primal positing of being (*Seinssetzung*). The unmodalized primally posited being is described in terms of the thesis: "being-characteristic simpliciter" (*Ideas I*, 251/240); i.e., the *Urpositum* "'certain' or 'actually' existing" (*Ibid*) from which all the modalities of posited being are derived. The unmodalized primal positing of being is then described in terms of the proto-doxic 'certain acceptance' of being, from which all doxic modalities of the positing of being are derived.

With this clarification of the intentional essences of the lived-experiences of empirical and a priori synthetic cognition, the full force of Husserl's statement regarding the exclusive philosophical importance of synthetic objectivity begins to come to the fore. On the one hand, such objectivity has been shown to involve experiential determinations of objects which, along with their eidetically determined regional categories, manifest objective meanings which lie beyond the sphere of intelligibility yielded by the significations of logically pure categories. On the other hand, with the phenomenological clarification of the intentional essence of the posited and positing of such "non" or "trans" logical meanings, the way is prepared for their bracketing and epoché. As is well known, it is only on the basis of the methodological execution of the last mentioned moves that Husserl understands the graded reductions which uncover the absolute being of pure consciousness to be initiated. Since Husserl takes the exhibition of this "phenomenological residuum" to be the most significant discovery of the phenomenological program, it is little wonder that he regards the methodological securing and clarification of the *Sinne* yielded by the synthetic objectivity (which figure so importantly in this discovery), to have an *exclusive* philosophical importance vis-à-vis those *Bedeutungen* yielded by analytic objectivity uncovered in the initial, and in this sense, "pre-philosophical," logical investigations.

§ 20. *Summary and Transition.*

Building upon the results of Husserl's critique of sensationalist empiricism, Chapter Two has brought into relief the phenomenal basis for important distinctions emergent from his account of intentionality. Indeed, it has been shown that, for Husserl, intentionality is not a "concept" in the usual philosophical sense. This is to say, for Husserl the term "intentionality" does not designate a general concept that is universally applicable to (or convertible with) either experience or the meaning of experience as such. But rather, the meaning of the term intentionality is "phenomenological" in the decisive sense of its referring to essential structures of various domains of methodologically uncovered lived-experiences. As such, access to what is at issue in Husserl's account of intentionality has as its prerequisite *both* reflections that are critical (in the phenomenological sense) and the various pregiven domains of experience (*Erfahrung*) that are subsequently phenomenally uncovered by these reflections.

For Husserl intentionality is most decidedly *not* an ideal form or substance which has various modes, e.g., logical, ontological and perceptual. Rather than characterize modes of a single "thing" called intentionality, the various distinctions made with respect to intentionality refer to the essential structures of consciousness that are manifested by logical thinking, perceptual awareness and the objective presentation of being *when the Erfahrung of each of these is phenomenologically investigated*. Within the context of such investigations, important distinctions have emerged with respect to the phenomena at issue in the intentional structures of these "pregiven" fields of experience. To wit, the manifestation of the following essential distinctions need to be attended to if Husserl's methodological progression, from the so-called "natural attitude" to the "phenomenological attitude," is to be adequately grasped: (1) the analytic status of the epistemic intentional essence of logical acts; (2) the synthetic status of the intentional essence of the individual and a priori determination of the material regions; (3) the objective presentational essence of the being character and its doxic modality along with their unmodalized primally positing and posited being and finally; (4) the actional (qua the mode of the cogito) and non-actional modes of perceptual intentionality.

Thus it is essential to keep distinct (as do Husserl's investigations) the differing phenomenal statuses of these eidetically unfolded structures of intentionality. With respect to appreciating precisely what is at issue for Husserl with his introduction of the phenomenological ἐποχή as the *sine qua non* for access to the phenomenologically psychological (and ultimately phenomenologically transcendental) attitude, the emergence of the prior eidetic uncovering of the intentional

structure of positional consciousness, as the phenomenal *prerequisite* for the initial ἐποχή prescribed by Husserl, must be attended to. Hence, it is to Husserl's methodological ἐποχή of positional consciousness, and the consequent uncovering of its phenomenologically pure residuum, that I will now turn my discussion.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE INTENTIONALITY OF PSYCHOLOGICALLY PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

#### § 21. *Introductory Remarks.*

In Chapter Three of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, I will be concerned with bringing into relief the phenomenally peculiar non-positing, but nevertheless "objectivating" intentionality of psychologically pure consciousness. Husserl's account of the "absolute being" of this intentionality is in my view important for the following reason. The uncovering of this psychologically pure phenomenological residuum emerges in his analyses as the requisite for uncovering the horizontal intentionality of worldly apperception. I will try to show that it is the mundane efficacy of the non-actional intentionality of the latter which Husserl finds needs to be bracketed and suspended in order to effect the phenomenological reduction of psychologically pure consciousness to transcendently pure consciousness. My discussion of the world phenomenon and its non-actional intentionality is intended then to prepare the way for the discussion, in Chapter Four, of precisely what it is in this state of affairs that leads him to formulate and execute the transcendental reduction.

#### § 22. *The Phenomenological Ἐποχή of Positional Consciousness and the Uncovering of its Psychologically Pure Residuum.*

Having uncovered the intentionality of the lived-experiences of the positing and positum of individual objects and their regional objectivity, Husserl's methodological reflections are able to initiate the explicit reduction to the intentionality of psychologically pure consciousness. Here Husserl's well known methodological principles of "bracketing" and "phenomenological suspension" or "Ἐποχή" begin to

manifest their specific pertinence. Bracketing refers to the "putting out of play" of the efficacy of the specific modalities of being manifested by the positem involved in the intentional presentation of any individual object (fact) as transcendent, as well as of the ontological efficacy of the positem involved in the intentional presentation of what Husserl calls the "quasi-region, 'any object whatever'" (*Ideas I*, 135/126). This bracketing is the accomplishment of the phenomenologically methodical reflections which, having uncovered the positionality of these presentations, are then able to disregard their efficacy by regarding them in terms of their manifested phenomenal meaning (*Sinn*). The ἐποχή refers to the suspension of the doxic positing involved in the intentional presenting of any individual object as transcendent, as well as of the proto-doxic presenting of any object whatever. This ἐποχή is likewise the accomplishment of phenomenologically methodical reflections which, having uncovered these positings, are then able to "put out of action" (*Ideas I*, 61/65) their efficacy by regarding them as "mere" phenomena. Thus Husserl writes:

[W]hen the metaphor of bracketing is closely examined it is seen to be, from the very beginning, more suitable to the object-sphere; just as the locution of "putting out of action" is better suited to the act-or consciousness sphere (*Ideas I*, 60/56).

Having "neutralized" in this manner the intentional positem and positing of transcendent objectivity, Husserl's methodological reflections are able to direct their regard to the "phenomenological residuum" of the phenomenal meaning of the transcendent positem, along with the mere phenomena of its positing, and to consider these in accord with the 'principle of principles'. Which is to say, that the phenomenologically uncovered residuum is further "reduced" such that its manifestation is methodologically regarded exclusively in terms of that which is yielded within the range of the intentional regard of the reflections uncovering the residuum; i.e., it is regarded in terms of its evidentially immanent exhibition (see § 12 above).

It is within the context of this post-epochal reduction of the phenomenological residuum to its immanent givenness (*Gegebenheit*) that Husserl talks of the "absolute being" of pure consciousness. The term 'being' here most emphatically does *not* refer to any posited objects or regionally posited determinations of objects. Rather, it refers to the manner that that which is manifested by the phenomenologically neutralized and reduced intentionality is yielded to the methodical regard of the reflective intentionality that uncovers this neutralized and reduced intentionality. Such phenomenological 'being' is understood by Husserl to be 'absolute' in the sense that it is manifested non-

perspectively. Unlike the adumbrated 'more' characteristic of the intentional manifestation of something transcendent, the phenomenological being of pure consciousness is manifested in terms of the essential immanence obtaining between that which is manifested and the regard to which it is manifested. This immanence is of course for Husserl not a posited (i.e., manifested by a modality of being or being characteristic simpliciter) immanence. On the contrary, it is a phenomenal immanence manifested within a non-positing, yet nevertheless "objectivating" (*vorstellen*), intentionality.

The absolute being of the pure consciousness, as uncovered by the neutralization and reduction considered thus far, is, however, a phenomenologically qualified absolute.<sup>1</sup> This qualification has to do with essential limitations regarding the actional modality (i.e., the act modality of the cogito) of the reduced intentional directedness of positing acts, and their correlative thematically posited intentional objects. These limitations are manifested in terms of the intentional "horizons" of non-actional modes of consciousness briefly discussed above (§ 13), and essentially related to these limitations, the yet to be considered horizontal thesis of the world and the corresponding natural acceptance, or "natural attitude," whose consciousness is the essential correlate of this thesis. Inasmuch as the phenomenal scope of the intentionality initially reduced to pure consciousness is so limited, it "has the world as its hidden foundation" (*PP*, 248). Husserl therefore considers the phenomenal status of the phenomenological residuum (i.e., pure consciousness) of this purely reduced intentionality to be "psychological" in this methodologically specific sense: i.e., the transcendent efficacy of the world-horizon and its correlative acceptance remain intact. Indeed, the intentionality of the world thesis and its corresponding acceptance is only initially uncovered within the context of the phenomenological clarification of the essence and eidos of the psychologically pure intentionality of pure consciousness. Specifically, it is only after this latter intentionality has been clarified, that its limiting horizon of the world thesis and its acceptance can be initially uncovered and eidetically exhibited.

Since it is precisely the transcendent efficacy of the intentionality of the world thesis and its acceptance that requires bracketing and suspension in accord with the universal ἐποχή which initiates the reduction to transcendently pure consciousness, the phenomenological clarification of this intentionality, within the rubric of the phenomenologically psychological reduction, is understood by Husserl to be "a propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology" (*P* 86/295). Which is to say that, in a manner analogous to the prerequisite phenomenological clarification of the positional intentionality of synthetic cognition vis-à-vis its reduction to psychologically pure consciousness,

the reduction to transcendently pure consciousness has as its prerequisite the phenomenological clarification of the intentionality of psychologically pure consciousness.

§ 23. *The Constitutional Essence and Eidos of Psychically Pure Consciousness.*

It should be noted that inasmuch as the initial reductive uncovering of pure consciousness has as its requisite the neutralization of the intentional positing of both individual facts and their regional determinations, the psychological status of this pure consciousness is understood by Husserl to be neither factual (empirical) nor ontological. Rather, this psychic (*seelisch/psychisch*) status has to do with its manifestation of a domain of lived-experiences that has been purified of both specific modalities of being as well as the ontological efficacy of the being characteristic simpliciter. Husserl characterizes this domain of lived-experiences in terms of "the acquisition of a new region of being never before delimited in its ownness (*Eigenheit*)" (*Ideas I*, 63/67). As such, it is characterized by Husserl as "a region of individual being" (*Ideas I*, 64/67) whose essence and eidos comprise the subject matter of phenomenological psychology. Mindful of the phenomenological context within which Husserl is using the term "being" here (see § 18 above), the issue of phenomenological psychology emerges in terms of the phenomenological clarification of the immanent exhibition (*Aufweisung*), of the lived-experiences of the neutralized positing and positum, characteristic of the intentionality of the presentation of any object whatever as transcendent.

Husserl refers to this phenomenological clarification in terms of the problems of "constitution," and he considers this factor to be "the central one for phenomenology" (*Ideas I*, 208/197). The problems of constitution have to do, on the one hand, with the essence and eidos of the neutralized meaning of any transcendent positum as manifested to the methodical regard which exhibits the so neutralized immanently reduced residuum of meaning. On the other hand, they have to do with the essence and eidos of the way in which the neutralized positing of the transcendent positum is manifested to the immanently reduced methodological regard. As such, the basis emerges for Husserl's refusal to equate these constitutional problematics with metaphysical notions of creation in general, and in particular, with idealism's literal reduction of transcendent reality to consciousness. For viewed within the methodological context of their phenomenal uncovering, the matters themselves of these problems of constitution concern the manifestation of phenomenal marks which render intelligible "already given lived-

experiences (*vorgegebenes*)" (*Ideas I*, 178/166) of whatever phenomenal meaning or phenomena of its positing is at issue.<sup>2</sup> As has already been discussed, the issue of phenomenal meaning, or intelligibility, extends beyond the universal particularizations of pure logic (see § 14 above) to include the experiential determinations of synthetic cognition and their regionally determined categories, as well as the, yet to be clarified, determinations of the world thesis and its natural attitude. Since the lived-experiences of the intelligibility of all of these phenomenal domains are always initially uncovered within the context of their manifestation "already there" to phenomenology's methodological reflections, the alienation, from Husserl's understanding of this phenomenal status, of any interpretation that would literally reduce this manner of manifestation "already there," to the "real being" or "actual" (*wirklich*) cognition of phenomenology's reflective regard, should be apparent.

Husserl's methodological reflections characterize the constitutional essence of the psychically pure consciousness on the basis of variations of exemplary manifolds of its lived-experience. These variations yield an intentional essence<sup>3</sup> that Husserl characterizes in terms of the triadic Cartesian formula: ego-cogitatio (cogitationes in the plural)-cogitatum.

The transcendent meaning of the cogitatum, in the instance of any *individual* object, is characterized in terms of an objective identity which, despite its perspectival manifestation, necessarily retains its meaning as "one and the same object." Corresponding to this cogitatum, the transcending consciousness of the cogitationes is characterized in terms of their attentive directedness to one and the same object, despite their adumbrating (*abschatten*) its various perspectives.

In the instance of the quasi-region 'any object whatever', the transcendent meaning of the cogitatum is characterized by Husserl as an objective identity which, despite the interchangeable instances of the contingent individuals that are regionally determined by its meaning, remains one and the same. Likewise, the consciousness of transcendence, of the cogitationes corresponding to this cogitatum, exhibits an attentive directedness to one and the same objective meaning, despite its individually variable manifestation.

And the ego, in the instance of either of these cogitatums and their correlative cogitationes, is characterized in terms of the phenomenally peculiar "transcendence in immanence" (*Ideas I*, 133/124) of a "ray of regard" (*Blickstrahl*) which, despite the varying contents of cogitationes and cogitatums, remains the phenomenal "mine" (*Ibid*) of an individual manifold of lived-experiences.

With the prescinding shift in the methodological regard of phenomenological reflections, such that this intentional essence comes to

comprise the exemplarily varied manifold, the eidos of the intentionality of psychically pure consciousness is uncovered by Husserl. This eidos manifests the a priori of any consciousness whatever, which is to say with Husserl that "we are speaking of lived-experiences purely with respect to their . . . *pure essences* and of that which is 'apriori' included in the essences" (*Ideas I*, 73/74).

Variation of either of these cogitatus yields as their eidos what Husserl characterizes as the noema. In the instance of the cogitatum of any individual object whatever, the noema manifests itself in terms of a noematic "core" (*Ideas I*, 222/210), i.e., the self-same transcendent (qua reduced *Sinn* and not *realiter*) "X," along with its essentially determinative open horizon of noemata which manifest the perspectival aspects of the noematic core, or "correlate" (*Ideas I*, 220/209) as the transcendent meaning of this core is also called by Husserl. The variation of the cogitationes that correspond to either of these cogitatus yields as their eidos what Husserl characterizes as the noesis. In the instance of the variation of the cogitationes essentially correlated to the cogitatum of any individual object whatever, the noesis is manifested in terms of a noetic 'directedness toward' which is eidetically parallel to the noematic core, along with an essentially open continuum of noeses that are eidetically parallel to the open horizon of noemata.

The variation of the cogitatum of the quasi-region of any object whatever yields a noema that manifests a noematic core whose meaning transcends, as their unitary horizon, the manifold noemata of the contingent individual objects which empirically instantiate this meaning. Variation of the cogitationes correlative to this cogitatum yields as their eidos a noesis that manifests a noetic 'directedness toward' which is eidetically parallel to this noematic core, along with an essentially open continuum of noeses that are eidetically parallel to the horizontally continuous manifold of noemata.

And the variation of the transcendence in immanence of the ray of regard of the ego yields as its eidos what Husserl characterizes as the pure ego. This is manifested in terms of the unifying ray of regard per se which encompasses the contentually variable continuum of noeses (variable vis-à-vis the contentual variability of the noema) as well as the noetic directedness as such.

It is important to note that the constitutional eidos of the noema/noesis parallelism, as the reduced and eidetically purified meaning of any transcendent positum and its positing, encompasses the phenomenal a priori of any transcendent objectivity. As such, not only the specific modalities of being and the ontological determinations of the regional categories in which the perceptual objects and apperceptions of physical nature are presented, but the modalities of being

and the ontological determinations of the regional categories which present the perceptual objects and apperceptions of psychophysical "corporeal (*Körperliche*) nature" as well, are understood by Husserl to manifest this constitutional eidós. However, within the context of Husserl's characterization of the constitutional eidós of the intentionality of the pure consciousness of the psychically reduced phenomenological residuum, which alone is of concern here, the *specific* constitutional eidós of the various regions and individual facts of transcendent objectivity are not at issue. Rather, the investigation of the eidetic peculiarity of these noematic "concretions" and their intentional constitution is understood by Husserl to be methodologically subordinate to the investigation of the more universal eidós of psychically pure consciousness. Husserl, therefore, does not undertake the investigation of these various noematic concretions, which are manifested in the specific modalities of being and regional categories of the posita and positings of the positive sciences and regional ontologies, until the second volume of his *Ideas*.<sup>4</sup>

Husserl's methodological reflections describe the intentional relationship between noesis and noema in terms of a continuity of noetic "syntheses of identification" (*Ideas I*, 88/86) which manifest a "unity-consciousness (*Einheitsbewußtsein*)" (*Ideas I*, 360/348) that is eidetically correlated to the open horizon of noemata and the noema's unity (self-sameness). According to Husserl, the transcendent status of the noema's unity vis-à-vis the open horizon of its noemata, along with the transcending syntheses and unity-consciousness eidetically correlated to this transcendence, exhibit the eidetic character of the intentional constitution of objective transcendence accomplished (*leisten*) by psychically pure consciousness. Again, Husserl emphasizes that

... it should be well heeded that *here we are not speaking of a relation between some psychological occurrence—called a lived-experience—and another real existence (realen Dasein)—called an object—nor of a psychological connection taking place in objective actuality (objektiver Wirklichkeit) between the one and the other (Ideas I, 73/74).*

Rather, what is being spoken of is the eidós of an intentionality that renders intelligible the transcendence that is meant in the phenomenally reduced, and immanently exhibited (by the reductive regard of methodological reflections), posited *Sinn* of individually and regionally posited objects.

§ 24. *The Essence and Eidos of the Non-actional Intentionality of the World-horizon and its Correlative Non-conceptual Consciousness.*

Having brought into phenomenal relief the eidetic character of the intentionality of psychically pure consciousness in its 'actional' (*aktualität*) modality, i.e. in the mode of the 'cogito' (along with its actionally modified 'cogitatum'), Husserl's methodologically reductive reflections are able to shift the gaze of their regard from the advertence (directedness toward) of this intentionality to the 'non-actional' (*Inaktualität*) horizon (fringe) of lived-experiences that surround the cogito. Husserl characterizes the 'consciousness of' and 'object of consciousness' of these lived-experiences in terms of, respectively, a non-conceptual (i.e., neither perceptually apprehending [*erfassen*] nor positing a modality of being or being characteristic simpliciter)<sup>5</sup> consciousness and its essentially correlative unthematized (i.e., not perceptually apprehended nor posited in terms of a modality of being or being characteristic simpliciter)<sup>6</sup>, and ultimately 'unthematic', horizon of the world.<sup>7</sup>

Husserl characterizes the field of lived-experiences of the horizon of the world in terms of the 'readiness to be perceived' (*Wahrnehmungsbereitschaft*) of the perceptual objects of *Erfahrung*, as well as in terms of an endlessly spread out manifold of "indeterminate surroundings" (*Ideas I*, 52/57) that are "continually 'on hand' for me" (*Ideas I*, 53/58), and of which "I (*ich*) myself am a member" (*Ibid*). The phenomenal non-equivalence for Husserl of this "I" belonging to the world-horizon, with the essence and eidos of the ego (*Ich*) which encompasses the contentually variable manifold of cogitationes, will be discussed in detail shortly. At present, it should be pointed out that the "I" here characterized manifests itself in terms of a non-thematic *noematic* givenness (and which, therefore, will manifest itself also in terms of its correlation to a non-actional 'consciousness of'), while the essence and eidos of the ego is manifested in terms of the noetic 'being directed toward' of the cogito's actional modality.

The correlative field of lived-experiences that are non-actionally conscious of this world-horizon are characterized by Husserl in terms of

... a "knowing" (*Wissen*) which has nothing of conceptual thinking and which is transformed into a clear intuiting only with the advertence (*Zuwendung*) of attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly (*Ideas I*, 52/57).

The lived-experiences of this 'knowing' "form the universal milieu for ego actionality, lacking by all means the distinctive ego relatedness"



(*Ideas I*, 191/179) of the actionally modified "form of *cogito*" (Ibid). As such, they

... "belong" to the pure ego as "its own" lived-experiences, they are *its* consciousness background, *its* field of freedom (Ibid).

With the variation of these fields of lived-experiences, Husserl's methodical regard exhibits, "prior to any theory" (*Ideas I*, 56/60), the intentional relationship of the "general thesis" (*Ideas I*, 56/61) of the world and its correlative "natural attitude" of non-conceptual acceptance of this thesis. Husserl describes this thesis in terms of the world's essential manifestation as "always there as an actuality" (*Ideas I*, 57/61) that "remains one and the same, though changing with respect to the make up of its contents" (*Ideas I*, 53/58). Husserl describes the non-conceptual acceptance of this thesis in terms of the essential way in which the "I" that belongs to the world-horizon always finds the world "existing (*daseiende*) as given before myself, and therefore accepts it as existing" (*Ideas I*, 57/61).

With the variation of the intentional essence of the general thesis of the world and the natural attitude of its acceptance, there is yielded to the prescinding methodological regard of Husserl's psychologically reductive reflections the eidos of this intentionality. The exemplary variation of the essence of the world thesis manifests the world noema. This is characterized in terms of the noematic core "the world," which despite the changing noemata of perceptual objects, modalities of being and ontologically posited objectivities, remains the one and the same "obscurely intended horizon of indeterminate actuality" (*Ideas I*, 52/57). This horizational "form" (Ibid) of the world eidetically manifests itself as "the dim (*nebelhafte*) and never fully determinable horizon [that] is necessarily there" (*Ideas I*, 53/57). This noematic form comprises the eidos of the intentional object 'world-horizon' that is always already there, as the unthematized (and qua its never fully determinable form, unthematizable) background field for any perceptually or positionally thematized objectivities.

With the variation of the intentional essence of the non-conceptual acceptance by the natural attitude of the general thesis of the world, the eidos of this essence is yielded to the prescinding methodological regard of Husserl's psychologically reductive reflections. Husserl characterizes this eidos in terms of a noesis that manifests the non-directional 'consciousness of' that is eidetically correlative to the noema of the world-horizon. As such, the 'consciousness of' of this noesis manifests the eidetic horizon of the manifold actionally modified noeses that are correlative to changing noemata of perceptual objects, modalities of being and ontologically posited objectivities. The

non-conceptual acceptance of the world noema by the non-directional consciousness of this noesis, comprises then the eidetic structure of its non-actional intentional relation to the unthematic transcendence of the world-horizon.

§ 25. *The Intentionality of Worldly Apperception as the Necessary Phenomenal Background of the Intentionality of the Cogito.*

Husserl's methodological reflections describe the intentional relationship between the noesis of the natural attitude and the noema of the world-horizon in terms of a worldly (*weltlich*) apperception which, as a function of its non-actional modality, is always co-given with the actional (*cogito*) intentionality of perceptual and positional consciousness. Husserl characterizes this worldly apperception in terms of the intentional non-actionality which, in accord with 'eidetic necessity', is always manifested as the horizon of intentionality in its actional modality. Which is to say, that worldly apperception comprises the phenomenal background of the cogito.

The eidetic non-equivalence of these two intentionalities comes, for Husserl, into bold relief when the 'matters themselves' of the worldly "I" are considered in contrast to the psychologically pure ego. The former belongs to the world, according to Husserl, in the sense that the efficacy of its non-conceptual (non-directional) acceptance of the world's natural thesis comprises the necessary horizon for the perceptual apprehending and presentational positing accomplished by the 'being directed toward' of cogitationes. Since the 'ray of regard' of the transcendence in immanence of the psychologically pure ego, which functions to unify these contentually changing cogitationes as 'mine', has as its 'consciousness background' precisely the non-conceptual knowing that characterizes (as its noetic correlate) this worldly "I," the phenomenal status of the "I" and the psychologically pure ego is *ipso facto* not one of equivalence. The phenomenal uncovering of the precise nature of their statuses, however, requires the methodological uncovering of transcendently pure consciousness and the phenomenological clarification of the temporal constitution of succession and simultaneity accomplished by transcendental consciousness. The requisite for this clarification is, of course, "the *transcendental reduction* as built up (*aufgestuft*) on the psychological reduction" (P, 85/293).

§ 26. *Summary and Transition.*

Chapter Three has traced the development of Husserl's account of the phenomenological uncovering of the intentionality of psychologically pure consciousness on the basis of his introduction of the phenomenological ἐποχή of positional consciousness. Hence, for Husserl, the initial formulation and execution of the phenomenological ἐποχή does not simply fall out of the philosophical heavens but has as its specific, and methodologically indispensable, prerequisite, the phenomenological uncovering of the intentional essence of positional consciousness.

Further, the initial ἐποχή, and the phenomenologically pure residuum of pure consciousness that it uncovers, is, for Husserl, *psychological* in the following phenomenally peculiar sense: The phenomenal absoluteness notwithstanding of the immanence of the pure consciousness the initial ἐποχή secures as a problem domain for investigation, the intentionality of such pure consciousness is disclosed as having, as its non-thematic and non-actional *presupposition*, the horizon of the world and the uncritically accepted belief in the world. Indeed, the discovery of the the phenomenon of the world, and its corresponding acceptance in the natural attitude, has for Husserl, as its *sine qua non* precisely this initial ἐποχή and the psychologically pure consciousness that is its result. Thus it is none other than this world-horizon, and its corresponding natural attitude, which must be respectively bracketed and suspended by the phenomenologically transcendental ἐποχή. This has for Husserl the result of the reduction of pure consciousness to transcendently pure consciousness. It is to this that I will now turn my attention.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE INTENTIONALITY OF TRANSCENDENTALLY PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

#### § 27. *Introductory Remarks.*

Chapter Four of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality will be concerned with his exhibition of the transcendental manifestation of this phenomenon. It appears to me that Husserl finds the motivation for the transcendental turn in the "paradoxical ambiguity" which phenomenology's methodological reflections encounter, when they attempt to exhibit the subjective origin of the *Sinn* manifested by the world-horizon. Specifically, so long as the subjectivity of this origin is understood to belong to the non-actional intentionality of the worldly "I," a psychologism results. Hence, in this final discussion of Part One, I will endeavor to clarify Husserl's transcendental resolution of this psychologistic paradox, by bringing into relief his temporal analyses of the "subject pole" of intentionality. In particular, I will try to show the following: (1) That and how these analyses lead Husserl to eidetically differentiate actional and non-actional intentionalities, at both the phenomenologically psychological and transcendental level of pure subjectivity and (2); that such differentiations do not involve a multiplicity of pure egos and their non-actional horizontal consciousnesses, but rather, these differentiations involve evidentially different manifestations of the "same" phenomenon as it appears, respectively, within the mundane and transcendental attitudes.

§ 28. *The Phenomenologically Transcendental Bracketing and Ἐποχή of the Intentionality of the World-horizon: the Initiation of the Transcendental Reduction to Transcendentally Pure Consciousness.*

Inasmuch as it is the transcendent efficacy of experienced perceptual objects and their presentation as modalities of being belonging to regionally determined ontological posita, along with their apperception and positing, that is reduced, via the psychological ἔποχή, to the methodological immanence of pure consciousness, the natural attitude's acceptance of the transcendent status of the world-horizon is understood by Husserl to *remain intact for the methodological reflections that initially uncover its intentionality*. It is this state of affairs that was anticipated by the earlier statements regarding psychologically pure consciousness having 'the world as its hidden foundation' (§ 22 above). However, subsequent to the uncovering of the intentionality of the world, it becomes possible, according to Husserl, for the "theoretical interest" (P, 83/288) of phenomenology's methodical reflections to abandon

... this natural attitude and in a universal turning around of its regard direct itself to the life of consciousness *in which* the "world" is for us precisely the world that is on hand for us (P, 83/288).

This universal turning initiates the explicit reduction to the intentionality of transcendentally pure consciousness. Having uncovered the non-actional intentionality of the lived-experiences of the world-thesis and its acceptance, Husserl understands his methodical reflections to be able to bracket this thesis and suspend (via an epoché) the natural attitude which accepts this thesis. However, the bracketing and epoché of the non-actional intentionality of the world-thesis is not a perfect analogue of the bracketing and epoché of the positional efficacy of the actionally modified intentionality of the cogito. As I have discussed above, this last mentioned bracketing and epoché is psychologically limited, in that the intentionality 'already there' which it neutralizes is characterized by the thematizing 'being directed toward' of its regard and the thematic positing of its intentional object. Whereas the intentionality, 'already there', of the world, as the necessarily indeterminate horizon of the actional mode of intentionality, is in its essence characterized by the non-thematizing manifestation of its 'consciousness of', and the non-thematic manifestation of its intentional object.

Thus it would seem that the thematizing regard of the phenomenological reflections, which are called upon to carry out the bracketing and epoché of the intentionality of the world, are not suited for this

task. Specifically, the unthematic horizontal manifestation of the intentionality of the world seems to be incapable of ever being adequately exhibited within the thematic compass of the regard of phenomenology's methodological reflections. This is the case, since this inadequacy appears to be unlike the inadequacy which characterizes the essence of the manifestation of thematically posited transcendent objects. Husserl understands this last mentioned inadequacy to be "overcome," in a methodological fashion, with the reductive consideration of the immanent exhibition of the object's *Sinn*. However, in the instance of the transcendent horizon of the intentionality of the world, it would appear that, at the very best, this thematizing regard is limited to merely noting that the intentionality which characterizes the mode of givenness of the world, is such that what is given therein, viz., the world, is something which, qua this mode of givenness, necessarily exceeds the regard of the reflection or reflections that would attempt to adequately (immanently) apprehend it. Hence it appears questionable whether the regard of these methodical reflections is able to neutralize the transcendent efficacy of the world-horizon, since this horizon, as the non-actional background of all actionally modified intentionalities, including the actional intentionality of these phenomenological reflections, is the pregiven limit of this regard.

However, when it is recalled that it is *not* the world simpliciter that is phenomenally at issue in Husserl's initial characterization (within the rubric of the psychological reduction) of its intentional manifestation, but rather, the world qua its essential *Sinn* as exhibited to the methodical regard of the *Wesensschau* of phenomenological reflection, then according to Husserl the following becomes possible: The transcendent efficacy manifested by the world's intentional *Sinn* can be bracketed "by the all inclusive resolve" (P, 86/293) of the will of the phenomenologist to inhibit, via "his all-embracing *epoché*" (P, 85/293), the acceptance of the world's transcendence that is the essential characteristic of the natural attitude. Husserl refers to the phenomenal effect of this acceptance as the "mundanization" (*Verweltlichung*) (P, 86/293) of the intentional *Sinn* of the world, in the sense that so long as the natural attitude remains uninhibited, this *Sinn* is understood as belonging to the horizontal indeterminacy of the world, rather than to the non-actional intentionality of the consciousness for which this *Sinn* is the intentional object. With the successful inhibiting of the mundanizing effect of the natural attitude, the essential seeing of the reflective regard finds itself in "a new cognitive situation" (P; 83/288). Husserl characterizes this situation in terms of the "transcendental problem" of the subjective "forming" (*bilden*) or "constitution" of the world's *Sinn* in what is now, with the inhibiting of the

natural attitude's mundanization, characterized as "transcendental consciousness." He writes:

Every *Sinn* which the world has for us (this we now become aware of), both its universal indeterminate *Sinn* and its *Sinn* determining itself in real (*realen*) particularities (*Einzelheiten*), is... a conscious *Sinn*, and a *Sinn* which is formed in subjective genesis. Every acceptance of being is effected within ourselves; and every grounding evidence of experience and theory is living in ourselves (*P*, 83/288).

Since, however, the non-actional efficacy of the natural attitude can never be adequately encompassed by the actional 'being directed toward' of the inhibiting regard of the phenomenologist's methodological reflections, Husserl speaks of the "firm habituality" (*P*, 86/293) of transcendental bracketing and epoché which the phenomenologist must "institute" (*stiften*) in his reflections, such that "the consistent reflection on consciousness yields for him again and again [its] transcendental purity" (*P*, 86/293). Hence, whereas the bracketing and epoché of the actionally modified intentionality of positional consciousness (via the psychological reduction) involves the putting out of play and suspension of the transcendent efficacy of a thematic, or as it were, "static" (*P*, 82/286) phenomenon, the habitual bracketing and epoché of the non-actionally modified intentionality of the world (via the transcendental reduction) involves the putting out of play and suspension of the transcendent efficacy of a non-thematic, or as it were, "dynamic or genetic" (*P*, 82/286) phenomenon.

Thus, while the transcendental epoché, which initiates the reduction of psychically pure consciousness to transcendently pure consciousness, manifests to the reducing regard of the phenomenologically *transcendental* reflections a "parallelism of the transcendental and psychological experience-spheres" (*P*, 86/294), the differing phenomenal nature of the respective static and genetic phenomena involved in the reduction to each, precludes their respective methodologies and experience-spheres from being perfect analogues of each other. Rather, it is the case that with the transcendental reflection on the transition from the world mundanizing intentionality (which comprises the phenomenal horizon of the psychological cogito), to the transcendental consciousness which manifests this apperception as an acceptance phenomenon, "this psychological objectification becomes visible (*sichtlich*) as self-objectification of the transcendental ego" (*P*, 86/294).

Phenomenally, this means that there is manifested to transcendental reflection the horizontally correlative intentionalities of the pure ego and the worldly "I" as they are constituted in the intentionality of

transcendental consciousness. Since the latter is uncovered as a result of the transcendental intentionality of the regard of transcendental reflection, Husserl understands that which this reflection exhibits in terms of the self-objectification of a transcendental ego. Husserl's transcendently phenomenological clarification of the relationship between these intentionalities emerges in terms of the description of the eidetic structure of their temporal genesis. He finds that the temporal phenomenon of the psychological intentionalities, of the pure ego and the worldly "I," manifests a "constituted" phenomenal status when it is transcendently regarded. As such, Husserl's temporal analyses find that the worldly *Sinn*, manifested by this constituted phenomenon, does not have its temporal genesis in intentionalities which belong to the dynamic phenomenon of the world. Rather, it is precisely the transcendental exhibition of the latter, in terms of its phenomenal *Sinn*, that permits, in Husserl's view, its uncovering as an acceptance phenomenon, with its temporal genesis in the absolute intentionalities of transcendental self-constitution. It is to their "original source in what is ultimately and truly absolute" (*Ideas I*, 193/182), viz., the transcendental ego's self-temporalization, that I will now turn my attention.

§ 29. *The Initial Appearance of Transcendent Time to Reflection within the Natural Attitude.*

Husserl's transcendental clarification of the temporal genesis, of the horizontally correlative intentionalities of the pure ego and the worldly "I," begins with an account of the phenomenologically psychological phenomenon of temporality and the correlative phenomenon of the phenomenologically psychological time consciousness. According to Husserl, the intentional syntheses of psychologically pure consciousness that constitute the transcendent *Sinn* of the individual and regional determinations of objects, *are themselves the accomplishment (Leistung) of constituting syntheses*. These latter syntheses "can, with the appropriate reflective attitude" (*Ideas I*, 283/273), be exhibited such that they manifest lived-experiences possessing an intentional essence constitutive of the "event" (*Vorgang*), duration, and "all-embracing unity" of psychologically phenomenological time. As such, these syntheses manifest the transcending "flux" or "stream" "belonging to every single lived-experience," as well as to the "one endless 'stream of lived-experiences'" (*Ideas I*, 194/182).

According to Husserl, the phenomenologically psychological phenomenon of time "by virtue of its essence belongs to lived-experiences as lived-experience" (*Ideas I*, 192/162). As such, it "is not measured nor to



be measured by any position of the sun, by any clock, by any physical means" (Ibid). Rather, it is exhibited with the bracketing and epoché of this "cosmic time." Subsequent to this bracketing and epoché, the methodical regard of phenomenological reflection no longer considers the lived-experiences it exhibits "within the limits of time itself" (*Ideas I*, 284/273). On the contrary, the modes of givenness of the phenomenon of the time in which the phenomenologically psychological lived-experiences manifest themselves, as well as the modes of givenness of the consciousness of this time, are now uncovered by the regard of Husserl's methodical reflections. Husserl characterizes the modes of givenness of the phenomenon of time so considered in terms of the essential form of its "temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*),"<sup>1</sup> and the modes of givenness of the consciousness of this time in terms of the essential form of "time consciousness."

These essential characterizations of the psychological phenomenon of time are uncovered on the basis of exemplary variations of the lived-experience of the appearance of "transcendent time" (*Ideas I*, 193/181) within the natural attitude. Husserl's methodological reflections on this appearance find that time initially appears when lived-experiences come before the regard of natural reflection. As such, it is important to note that for Husserl there are two "levels" of reflection at issue here. There is the natural reflection, whose objectivating regard initially experiences the appearance of transcendent time, and there is the phenomenologically methodical reflection, whose objectivating regard is describing the initial appearance of time within the natural attitude. It should also be borne in mind, in anticipation of the phenomenologically psychological bracketing and suspension of the lived-experience of the transcendent appearance of time, that the methodical reflection which functions to objectivate the natural reflection, itself becomes the object of "a reflection on the reflection which objectivates the latter [i.e., natural reflection]" (*Ideas I*, 176/164). Thus, Husserl writes that the methodological uncovering of the temporal stream of lived-experience is

... effected in many different reflective acts which themselves also belong in the stream of lived-experience and which, in corresponding reflections at a higher level, can and must be made the objects of phenomenological analyses. For such analyses lay the ground for both a universal phenomenology, and the methodological insight so indispensable for this (*Ideas I*, 177/165).

Husserl's methodological reflections on the appearance of transcendent time, i.e., time that 'actually exists' within the natural attitude, find that

. . . when any lived-experience which, at any time (*jeweilig*), is actually being lived comes into the reflective regard it yields itself as actually being lived, as existing "now" (*jetzt*). But not only that: it yields itself as having just now *been* and, in so far as it was unregarded, precisely as having been unreflected (*Ideas I*, 175/162-63).

Thus according to Husserl "each lived-experience of now (*Erlebnisjetzt*), be it even the beginning phase of a newly appearing lived-experience, necessarily has its horizon of before" (*Ideas I*, 195/184). Likewise, "every lived-experience of now also has its necessary horizon of after" (*Ibid*). The lived-experience of the transcendent appearance of time thus manifests itself "in a continuous flow of modes of givenness as a unity belonging to its event and duration" (*Ideas I*, 194/183). Which is to say, that the lived-experience of time *initially* manifests itself to the regard of natural reflection, in terms of the actually existing temporal succession (*Folge*) of a horizontally limited flux "which begins and ends and endures in the meantime" (*Ibid*).

§ 30. *The Essence of the Psychologically Reduced Phenomenon of the Temporality of Succession.*

It is on the phenomenal basis of this description of the initial manifestation of time, that Husserl's methodological reflections are able to place these findings "inside their parentheses [i.e., bracket their transcendent efficacy as "actually existing"]" (*Ideas I*, 175/163). Subsequent to this, these findings "are changed into exemplificatory cases of essential universalities, which we can make our own within the limits of pure intuition and study systematically" (*Ibid*). This occurs with the shift of the methodical regard, from the lived-experience of the transcendent appearance of the succession of time to the natural regard of reflection, to the mode of givenness of the lived-experience of the natural regard of reflection itself. Hence, according to Husserl, "this mode of givenness of the lived-experience [of the transcendent appearance of time] is itself again a lived-experience, although of a new kind and dimension" (*Ideas I*, 194/193). Thus it is possible for the methodically reflective regard to "take notice of" (*achten auf*) the modes of givenness (to the initial regard of reflection) of the temporal phases of the lived-experience of now, before, and after. Husserl describes the modes of givenness of the now and before as follows:

I notice, at any time (*jeweiligen*) the mode of "now" and accordingly that a new and continually new "now" follows upon this now and, of essential necessity, upon every "now" in a necessary continuity; I notice that in unity therewith every actual now is changed into a just now, the just now once more and continuously into an always new just now of the just now; and so forth. This holds for every ensuing now (*Ideas I*, 195/183).

And to the just past nows of the mode of givenness of the before "there corresponds the after" (*Ibid*), i.e., the continuity of nows "coming in the future" (*Ideas I*, 175/163).

With the variation of these modes of givenness, the essences of the now, before, and after are yielded to Husserl's methodological regard. The essence of the actual 'now' is described as something punctual (*Punktuelles*) by Husserl, which means that it manifests itself as "a persisting form for ever new material" (*Ideas I*, 195/183). It is likewise with the essence of the 'just now' and the 'now to come'. In Husserl's words they are "a continuity of forms of always new contents" (*Ibid*).

§ 31. *The Essence of the Psychologically Reduced Phenomenon of the Time Consciousness of Succession.*

Corresponding to these essentially determined modes of givenness of the temporality of the enduring now, before and after, is their givenness "in the manner peculiar to consciousness" (*Ibid*), i.e., their givenness as *Zeitbewußtsein*. The manifestation of this givenness is uncovered with the shift in the methodically reflective regard, from the temporality of the succession manifested by any single lived-experience, to the givenness of the consciousness of this succession. Husserl characterizes the essence of this givenness in terms of "a consciousness-continuum of constant form" (*Ibid*). This form is manifested in terms of the intentional relating (*beziehende*) of an originary impression, which as the conscious "moment of the living now" (*Ideas I*, 180/168), is conscious of both: a continuity of retentions, as "'primary' memory" (*Ideas I*, 175/163), and a continuity of protentions, as "anticipation" (*Vorerinnerung*) (*Ibid*). Husserl characterizes primary memory in terms of the consciousness of the "'just now' having been ('soeben' gewesen)" (*Ibid*). This consciousness of having been serves as the basis for representing (*vergegenwärtigende*) "recollections" (*Widererinnerung*) of past lived-experiences and that which has appeared in them. Likewise, anticipation is characterized as conscious "foresight" (*Vorblick*) into the just now coming in the future. This consciousness of coming in the future serves as the basis for representing "expectations"

(*Erwarten*), which, as "the counterpart of *recollection*" (Ibid), expect future lived-experiences and that which will appear in them.

Husserl describes the content of the intentionality manifested by this form of time consciousness as being always new. Hence, it "yields" (*fügt sich*) a "continuous intentionality" (*Ideas I*, 195/183) of new impressions corresponding continuously to a new duration point, and with this, the continuous changing (*wandeln*) of protentions into impressions, of retentions into retentions of retentions, etc.

Husserl understands it to be "an essential necessity" that the correlative horizons of before and after, retention and protention, "cannot be . . . an empty form without content" (*Ideas I*, 195/184). Rather, these horizons are continuously fulfilled. Thus for Husserl "no lived-experience can cease (*aufhören*) without consciousness of ceasing and of having ceased, and that is a newly filled out now" (*Ideas I* 196/184). As a result, the contentually changing stream of lived-experiences is unified, according to Husserl, by the all encompassing "stream form of a pure ego" (Ibid). Which is to say, beyond the 'consciousness of' characteristic of the manifold lived-experiences that begin and end, there is the regard of the pure ego which, as the 'consciousness of' of the delimited duration of any lived-experience, belongs to the one endless stream of lived-experiences which cannot begin and end.<sup>2</sup>

### § 32. *The Psychological Essence of the Temporality and Time Consciousness of Simultaneity.*

Husserl understands the methodological reflections, that uncover these essential forms of the psychological phenomenon temporality and time consciousness, to be "themselves conscious lived-experiences, which, when taken in full concretion are themselves unreflected (*unreflektiert*) conscious lived-experiences" (*Ideas I*, 180/168). Taking these methodical reflections in full concretion occurs with their objectivation, as the lived-experiences of methodical reflections, by still higher level methodical reflections. The regard of these higher level reflections exhibits, according to Husserl, the unreflected lived-experiences that comprise the horizon of the methodical reflections which uncover the temporality and time consciousness of the succession of lived-experiences unified by the pure ego. As such, these horizontal lived-experiences manifest a temporal "simultaneity (*Gleichzeitigkeit*)" (*Ideas I*, 196/184). This means

. . . that every lived-experience of *now* has a horizon of lived-experiences which also have precisely the originary form of "now,"

and, as "now," make up an *originary horizon of the pure ego* . . . In a unitary way this horizon enters into the modes of the past. As a modified now, every before implies for every lived-experience in view, whose before it is, an infinite horizon embracing everything which belongs to the same modified now; in short, it embraces its horizon of "what was simultaneously" (Ibid).

And likewise, this horizontal simultaneity opens up into the modes of the future, of what will simultaneously be. Thus, according to Husserl "we have the *whole* field of phenomenological time of the pure ego" (*Ideas I*, 196/185).

For Husserl, then, there is "an *essential law* that every lived-experience is an essentially self-enclosed contexture (*sich geschlossenen Erlebniszusammenhang*) not only considered in view of temporal succession but in view of *simultaneity*" (*Ideas I*, 196/184). As such, the essence of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of temporality manifests "three dimensions of before, after and simultaneity" (*Ideas I*, 196/185). Corresponding to this, the essential form of the intentionality of the living now discussed above, whose protentions and retentions comprise the essence of the givenness of the time consciousness of temporal succession manifested by the pure ego, needs "to be supplemented" (Ibid) by the time consciousness of this temporal simultaneity. Hence, Husserl takes as "necessarily correlates" (Ibid) to the intentionality of the living now (with its protentions and retentions) of temporal succession, the horizontal intentionality of the living now (with its protentions and retentions) of temporal simultaneity.<sup>3</sup>

§ 33. *The Eidetic Overcoming of the Essential Horizontal Limitation of Phenomenological Reflection on the Essence of the Psychologically Reduced Phenomenon of Time: The Immanent Manifestation and Intuitive Ideation of Ideas in the Kantian Sense.*

Husserl understands this "*primal form of consciousness*" (*Ideas I*, 197/185) (i.e., the correlated intentionalities of succession and simultaneity) to manifest itself to the higher level methodical reflection that uncovers it, such that when this reflection's "pure reflecting regard reaches any lived-experience . . . the a priori possibility obtains of the regard turning toward other lived-experiences *as far as* this contexture (*Zusammenhang*) reaches" (Ibid). However, it is "an essential necessity" that "this whole contexture is *never* given or to be given by a single pure regard" (Ibid) of the methodological reflection that uncovers it. Rather, this whole contexture is an intentional unity of lived-experiences which "cannot be grasped completely in a

[reflective] perceiving which 'swims along with it' (*Ideas I*, 97/94). Nevertheless, Husserl writes that

... in spite of this, it also can be grasped in a *certain*, although essentially different way: namely [the whole can be grasped] in the fashion of "limitlessness in the progression" of immanent intuitions, going from the fixed lived-experiences to the lived-experiences of its horizon, from their fixation to those of its horizon, etc (*Ideas I*, 197/185).

Husserl refers to the essential structure of the unity of the stream of lived-experiences that is yielded in such intuition as an "idea in the Kantian sense" (*Ideas I*, 197/186). As such, it is exhibited on the basis of the eidetic variations of the temporal essence of the succession and simultaneity of time. This is effected with the prescinding shift of the methodical regard of reflection, from this temporal essence (i.e., the primal form of the consciousness of the three dimensions of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of time), as it structures both the contentually variable exemplary streams and the one endless stream of lived-experiences, to this essence itself. Having effected this, the essence itself is now eidetically varied "in an ideation which sees a Kantian 'idea'" (*Ideas I*, 198/186).

The immanently exhibited Kantian idea manifests the a priori, or eidos, of the essence of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of time. Husserl characterizes this in terms of the eidetic correlation, between the noeses which manifest the eidos of the intentionality of time consciousness, and the noemas which manifest the eidos of temporality. These correlated eide manifest what Husserl describes as

... a manifold of modes of formations (*Bildungsweisen*) belonging to lived-experiences by means of [which] intentional connections (*Verknüpfung*) make their appearance in our horizon (*Ideas I*, 283/273).

As such, these modes of formation are termed "syntheses" by Husserl, and are understood to be unified by "the primal synthesis of original time consciousness" (*Ibid*). The essence of the succession and simultaneity of single lived-experiences (i.e., those that begin and end) has, as its eidos, continually combining syntheses of noeses and noemas which constitute segments (*Abschnitten*) of time. These, in turn, are founded in the succession and simultaneity of the "one noesis" and "one noema (the fulfilled lived-experience of duration)" (*Ideas I*, 283/273), which manifest the eidos of the essence whose primal synthesis is

constitutive of the one endless succession and simultaneity of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of time.

Inasmuch as the higher level methodological reflections, whose pure regard uncovers the essence and eidos of the psychologically reduced primal form of the temporal succession and simultaneity of consciousness, do so "in a mode of 'attention'" (*Ideas I*, 197/185), they too manifest, to corresponding methodological reflections of a higher level, "a horizon of unregarded lived-experiences" (*Ibid*). Thus

... a lived-experience grasped in the mode of "attention" and possibly in increasing clarity, has a horizon of inattention in the background with relative differences of clarity and obscurity as well of prominence (*Abgehobenheit*) and reticence (*Unabgehobenheit*) (*Ideas I*, 197/186).

This essential limitation, in the mode of givenness of lived-experiences to the attentionally modified regard of methodical reflection, nevertheless manifests

... eidetic possibilities of making the unregarded an object of the pure regard, of making the marginally noticed the primally noticed; of making the reticent prominent, the obscure clear and always clearer (*Ibid*).

Which is to say, the attentional regard of methodological reflection can, "in the continuous progression from [horizontal] grasping to [horizontal] grasping, in a certain way" (*Ibid*), viz., as ideas in the Kantian sense, apprehend, with insight, the essential structure of the penumbra of lived-experiences which must necessarily always exceed that which is thematically exhibited by its pure regard. The insight afforded by the manifestation of the Kantian idea, while not forfeiting the essential impossibility of the attentional regard of the methodical reflection being able to adequately encompass its non-thematic horizon, is thus understood by Husserl to be able to yield to this regard (with intuitive immanence) the eidos of its horizon.

#### § 34. *The Methodological Uncovering of the Object and Subject Poles of Intentionality.*

With the situation of Husserl's analyses of the intentionality of the psychological phenomenon of time, within the context of the correlative intentionalities of the cogito and its non-actionally modified world-horizon, the following problematic emerges from the "matters

themselves" uncovered by the methodologically reflective regard: The phenomenon of intentionality manifests, what Husserl calls, "an extraordinarily important two-sidedness to the essence of the sphere of lived-experiences" (*Ideas I*, 191/180), wherein there is distinguished a "subjectively oriented side and an objectively oriented side" (*Ibid*).

This latter side of intentionality, which is also referred to as the "object pole," is comprised of the psychologically reduced *Sinn* of the static phenomena of individual and regionally determined objectivities, along with the dynamic phenomenon of the world-horizon. Included in the object pole of intentionality are the correlative eide of noeses and noemata that synthetically constitute the transcendent noema of thematically apprehended and objectivated objects, as well as the noeses and noemata that are synthetically constitutive of the transcendent noema of the non-thematic world-horizon.

The former side of intentionality, which is also referred to as the "subject pole," is comprised of the psychologically reduced temporal succession of lived-experiences whose stream form is the pure ego, and the temporal simultaneity of lived-experiences which comprises the horizontal field of the pure ego. According to Husserl, the former phenomenon of time has as its intentional correlate the static phenomena of the object pole, in the sense that this phenomenon comprises the essential structure of the time in which the objectivities of this pole are constituted. And the latter phenomenon of time has as its intentional correlate the dynamic phenomenon of the object pole, in the sense that this phenomenon comprises the essential structure of the time in which the world-horizon of this pole is constituted. As such, this is the time in which the worldly "I," whose lived-experiences manifest the non-actional consciousness background of the pure ego, is "constituted." Included in the subject pole of intentionality are the noeses and noemas whose synthetic combining are constitutive of temporal segments of succession and simultaneity, as well as the one noesis and noema, whose primal synthesis is constitutive of the one endless stream of successive and simultaneous time.

§ 35. *The Phenomenologically Transcendental Bracketing and Ἐποχή of the Time in which the Intentionality of the World-horizon Appears.*

So long as the phenomenon of time in which the non-actional consciousness background of the pure ego appears is understood, within the context of the psychologically phenomenological reduction, to belong to the worldly "I," the subjectivity manifested by its constituting syntheses belongs to the mundane apperception of the world. Thus there is manifested to the methodological regard which exhibits this state of



affairs the "paradoxical ambiguity" (*P*, 85/292), wherein a worldly subjectivity is constitutive of itself, as both belonging to the world (qua its status as the temporality in which the "I" belonging to the world horizon appears), and as the source of this worldly *Sinn* (qua its status as the time consciousness in which the background field of non-actional consciousness appears).

This paradox is resolved with the transcendental bracketing of the temporality in which the worldly "I" is manifested, along with the transcendental epoché of the time consciousness in which its correlative field of non-actional consciousness is manifested. With this, the basis of this paradox in a "psychologism" is uncovered. For the transcendental exhibition of the constitution of the time in which the world's *Sinn* appears, that follows this transcendental bracketing and epoché, does so on the basis of the manifestation of this time as an acceptance phenomenon for what is now an "unworldly" subjectivity: i.e., the transcendental subjectivity which is uncovered following the bracketing of the worldly "I" and the epoché of its non-actional consciousness. Husserl writes: "The subjectivity of consciousness which has as its theme its psychic being, cannot be that to which we go back in our transcendental questioning" (*P*, 84/291). This is the case for Husserl since the psychic status of worldly subjectivity has its source in the continued, because unreduced (qua the transcendental reduction), transcendent efficacy of the temporality and time consciousness in which the thesis and natural attitude of the worldly horizon are manifested.

With the transcendental bracketing and epoché of this temporality and time consciousness, their "constituted" phenomenal status emerges, vis-à-vis the "constituting" consciousness of transcendental subjectivity. As such, there emerges the phenomenal basis of the paradoxical ambiguity involved in the psychologistic attempt to understand, as "worldly," the constituting source of the subjectivity wherein this temporality and time consciousness become manifest. This basis is characterized by Husserl in terms of the misguided attempt to found the constituting syntheses of time consciousness in a constituted phenomenon: the worldly "I" and its non-actional background of consciousness. Subsequent to the phenomenologically transcendental bracketing and epoché of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of time, then, there is uncovered, by Husserl's methodologically transcendental reflections, the transcendental lived-experience of the horizontally correlated intentionalities of the temporality and time consciousness of the psychologically pure ego and its horizontal background field of the worldly "I." This is to say, it is the non-actional 'consciousness of' that is the intentional correlate to this worldly "I," which, when subject to the habitual effecting of the transcendental epoché, exhibits the "endless field of transcendental being" (*Ideas I*, 86/294). Along with this, the

phenomenal status of the pure ego, whose intentionality manifests the actionally modified correlate to the now transcendently exhibited 'field of being', is transformed into a transcendently pure ego. This phenomenal transformation occurs with the transcendental manifestation of its background field of consciousness as an acceptance phenomenon for transcendental subjectivity, rather than as a phenomenon whose *Sinn* has as its basis the transcendent efficacy of the world. And likewise, the phenomenal status of the worldly "I" is exhibited, subsequent to its transcendental uncovering, as no longer having its phenomenal basis in the constituted *Sinn* of worldly transcendence. Rather, it is manifested as an acceptance phenomenon in what is now uncovered in terms of its transcendental subjectivity.

Husserl's reference to "being" here is, of course, not to any posited modality of being, nor to any ontological character of worldly being.<sup>4</sup> Rather, it signifies the intentionality that is the transcendental parallel to the mundane intentionality of the object and subject poles of actional and non-actional consciousness. As such, this transcendental intentionality is manifested to the intentionality of the transcendental regard of the methodical reflections, reflections which are effecting the habitual transcendental bracketing and epoché of the psychologically parallel intentionality. This means that the attentional modality of these transcendental reflections manifests, to corresponding transcendental reflections of a higher level, a horizon of unregarded transcendental lived-experiences. Nevertheless, in a methodical manner "parallel to the pure psychological one" (P, 86/294), these transcendental lived-experiences can be grasped in the 'limitlessness in progression' of immanent intuitions, intuitions that uncover the eidetic possibilities of unfolding the eidos of the horizons that are, necessarily, unregarded by the attentionally modified regard of these transcendental reflections. In this way the endless field of transcendental being is reduced to "a new kind of experience, *transcendental 'inner'* [i.e., immanent] *experience*" (P, 86/294).

Since the pure transcendental subjectivity of this transcendently immanent experience manifests a transcendental ego that is intentionally parallel<sup>5</sup> to the psychologically pure ego, and a background non-actional consciousness of the transcendental ego that is intentionally parallel to the psychologically pure ego's non-actional horizontal consciousness, it may seem that there is at issue a multiplicity of egos and their non-actional horizontal consciousnesses. However, there is no "transcendental doubling" (P, 85/292) of egos and horizontal consciousnesses here, since what is at issue is the transition in the *attitude* of the phenomenologically methodological reflections: Within the horizon of the natural acceptance of the world-thesis, the ego and its horizon of non-actional consciousness, are manifested in terms of the eidos of

psychic (*seelisch*) consciousness; with the transcendental reduction of this psychic *eidos*, the *same* ego and non-actional consciousness are manifested in terms of the self-objectification of an "evidently 'different' transcendental ego" (P, 86/294) and its horizontal background of non-actional consciousness. What is 'evidently different' within the context of transcendental attitude, is of course, the phenomenal status of the transcendent *Sinn* of the world-thesis and the temporality and time consciousness of the subjectivity in which this thesis is manifested. Prior to its transcendental uncovering, the phenomenal status of this transcendent *Sinn* has an uninhibited efficacy; subsequent to its transcendental uncovering, this *Sinn* is yielded in terms of its neutralized efficacy as an acceptance phenomenon.

Inasmuch as the subject and object poles of the intentionality of all mundane lived-experiences are manifested as acceptance phenomena of the transcendently exhibited intentionality of transcendental subjectivity, and inasmuch as the *eidos* of the horizons manifested by transcendental subjectivity admit of being reduced to immanent phenomena graspable in evidentially immanent intuitions, Husserl understands transcendental subjectivity to be the non-relative basis (*Boden*) to which the essences of all mundane lived-experiences are related. As such, transcendental subjectivity is characterized as an "absolute" to which all mundane *Sinn* ultimately refers. Which is to say, that all such *Sinne* obtain (*schöpft*) their phenomenally peculiar meaning as phenomena, in terms of their intentional manifestation to an intentionality which has no term other than itself: i.e., the transcendental intentionality manifested as transcendental subjectivity. Thus, Husserl writes that this transcendental subjectivity

... is the concretely self-sufficient (*eigenständige*) absolute basis of being, out of which everything transcendent (and with it every real worldly existent) obtains its being-sense (*Seinsinn*) as the being of something existing (*Seienden*) in a merely relative and incomplete sense: as the intentional unity which in truth emerges from the transcendental bestowal of meaning (*Sinngebung*) (P, 86/294-95).

The intentional directedness of the transcendental reflections which exhibit this absolute of the intentionality of transcendental subjectivity, is itself uncovered by Husserl, with corresponding transcendental reflections of a higher level, in terms of a directedness *per se*. The regard of this directedness serves to unify the continuous iteration of transcendental reflections, with their necessary correlates of continuously changing reflected contents, as reflections belonging to one and the same intentional regard. Since the unifying function of this latter regard *per se*, is itself necessarily uncovered by still higher level

transcendental reflections, Husserl speaks of the "transcendence in immanence" of the transcendently pure ego by which he characterizes this regard. And since the actional modality of the intentional directedness of the transcendently pure ego itself manifests, to still higher level transcendental reflections, a non-actional intentional horizon (i.e., a conscious horizon whose 'consciousness of' is non-directional), the transcendently pure ego, in a manner parallel to that of the psychically pure ego, is itself surrounded by a field of consciousness "lacking by all means the distinctive ego relatedness" (*Ideas I*, 191/179).

When the temporal genesis or constitution of the transcendently pure ego and its horizontal background are phenomenally regarded, the sense in which Husserl speaks of the transcendental absolute as "something that constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely peculiar sense of its own and which has its primal source in what is ultimately and truly absolute" (*Ideas I*, 193/182) becomes manifest. This primal source is, of course, the transcendental intentionality of original time consciousness, the living now of which manifests both the succession of time that is related to the directional regard of the transcendently pure ego, as the time in which this ego manifests itself, as well as the simultaneity of time that comprises the non-actional horizon of the transcendently pure ego, which is the time in which all the phenomena uncovered by the reflective regard of this ego are ultimately situated. As such, the transcendental intentionality of the living now exhibits the necessary correlates of

. . . one summoning (*fordernder*) stream of lived-experiences fulfilled with respect to all three dimensions [before, after, and simultaneity], essentially fulfilling itself in this connecting (*zusammenhängender*) in its continuity of content (*Ideas I*, 196/185).

### § 36. Summary and Conclusion.

Part One has attempted to provide, in view of *die Sachen selbst*, a thorough exegesis of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, in the time period that is at issue within the larger context of my appraisal of both Husserl's and Heidegger's account of this phenomenon. The results of this attempt may be summarized as follows: The phenomenon of intentionality is uncovered as the essence of any lived-experience whatever, as well as the essence of the phenomenologically methodological reflections which accomplish the exhibition (*Aufweisung*) of the intentionality of any lived-experience whatever. As such, intentionality is understood by Husserl to be both

the fundamental phenomenon, which comprises the "main theme of phenomenology" (*Ideas I*, 199/187), and the method by which it proceeds.

Within the methodological context of its unfolding, that which is referred to by the locution "any lived-experience whatever" is not a general concept, but that which is manifested as phenomena to the regard of Husserl's methodological reflections. Phenomena are understood to be exhibited by the objectivating (*Vorstellung*) regard of phenomenological reflection, which instead of uncritically accepting the already given (*vorgegeben*) formulations of experience and cognition that are manifested to its regard, treats these as lived-experiences of the same.

With the exemplary variation of manifold instances of the phenomena manifested by any given field of lived-experiences, Husserl finds there is manifested to the phenomenologically reflective regard the essence (*Wesen*) of the field of lived-experiences under consideration. The correlative reflective insight of the regard which exhibits the essence is characterized by Husserl in terms of an intuition which sees essences (*Wesensschau*).

Husserl further finds that the essence itself may be varied by the phenomenologically reflective regard. This is facilitated with the prescinding shift of this regard, from the essence as it functions to determine the invariant characteristic running through the exemplary field of lived-experiences under consideration (i.e., the essence as it is initially yielded in its *faktische* connection), to the essence in its palpable selfhood (*leibhaftigen Selbstheit*). The exemplary variation of the essence apprehended in this manner yields, according to Husserl, its a priori or *eidos*, i.e., the essence of the essence.

Husserl's phenomenological investigation into the essence of perceptual experience supplants the empiricistic sensationalist formulation of an inner and outer perception, a formulation purportedly mediated by an ontological opposition between inner and outer objects. In place of this opposition, Husserl uncovers lived-experiences whose essences are characterized by a transcendent and immanent manifestation of their perceptual objects. Corresponding to these two kinds of manifestation is their essential exhibition in transcendent and immanent perceptions (or intuitions).

Husserl describes the essence of the moment of 'conscious of' and 'object of consciousness', manifested by the phenomena of these perceptual lived-experiences, in terms of their intentionality. And he likewise characterizes in terms of intentionality the essence of the 'consciousness of' and 'object of consciousness' which is manifested by the methodological regard of the phenomenological reflections, reflections that uncover the essences of lived-experiences.

On the basis of the evidential marks that differentiate the intentionality of transcendent and immanent perceptual objects and their intuition, termed respectively inadequate and adequate evidence, Husserl orients the intentional regard of phenomenological reflection toward the descriptive characterization of that which is evidentially adequate (immanent) to its regard. This methodological move emerges as the phenomenal key to Husserl's progressive purification, of the intentional essence of the conscious moment of lived-experiences, from all phenomenal reference to something transcendent, i.e., from the evidentially inadequate.

Within the methodical context of this evidential orientation, Husserl then uncovers fields (or manifolds) of lived-experiences and the intentional essence and eidos of their moments of consciousness. This is accomplished in a progression from the logical, through the material ontological and phenomenologically psychological, culminating in the transcendental exhibition of lived-experiences and their phenomenologically pure essences and eidos. Included in this progressive phenomenological uncovering is the manifestation of the reflective lived-experiences that accomplish this apprehension of consciousness by consciousness, and the exhibition of the temporal essence and eidos of the intentionality of both reflected and reflecting lived-experiences.

When the matters themselves of the phenomenon of intentionality are considered with respect to the problematic of transcendence, the following conclusions offer themselves: Transcendence as a phenomenon is not equivalent with intentionality, but rather, transcendence is uncovered in terms of its phenomenal *Sinn* on the basis of the methodological regard of Husserl's phenomenological reflections. As such, the phenomenon of transcendence initially manifests itself in terms of the reflective context within which all of Husserl's phenomenological and pure phenomenological considerations emerge. This context is best characterized by Husserl's locution "*vorgegebende*." That which the methodological regard of phenomenological reflection uncovers, be it the initial objectivation of fields of lived-experiences, or the ultimate exhibition of the eidos of the transcendental phenomenon of time, always manifests itself in terms of its manner of givenness as something which endures not only with its reflective objectivation, but as something which endured before (*vor*) it was so objectified, and as something that will perdure subsequent to its being objectified. The "before" and "after" of this pre-giveness are clearly not understood by Husserl in terms of a temporal seriality. Rather, these prepositions are expressive of the phenomenal peculiarity whereby the phenomenally manifest, as exhibited by the methodical regard of reflection, always manifests itself in terms of its transcendent excess to this regard.

Husserl's phenomenological reductions, of the *Sinn* of this transcendent excess, to its immanent exhibition before the regard of phenomenological reflection, characterizes the methodological situation (*Lage*) within which all of his analyses of the specific marks of the phenomena of transcendence emerge. The phenomenon of intentionality enters into this situation, inasmuch as this phenomenon characterizes the essence and *eidos*, of the conscious moment of the field of lived-experiences of the *Sinn* of whatever phenomenon of transcendence is under consideration. Husserl's analyses unfold this *Sinn* in terms of the object and subject poles of intentionality. The object pole is characterized by Husserl in terms of the correlation between the intentional unity of transcendent *Sinn* and the transcending consciousness of this *Sinn*. Husserl characterizes the subject pole in terms of the correlation between the intentional unity of the transcendent phenomenon of the time (in which the object pole is manifested) and the transcendence in immanence of the consciousness of time.

The transcendent *Sinn* of the object pole is differentiated by Husserl in terms of the intentional unity manifested by perceptual, ontic (i.e., determined qua the modalities of being), and ontological objects, as well as in terms of the indeterminate world-horizon within which these objects are manifested. Corresponding to these differentiations in transcendent *Sinn* are the differentiated consciousnesses of these respective unities, i.e., the perceptual, empirical, a priori, and non-conceptual intentional syntheses. Considered together, these intentionally correlated moments of the object pole manifest the constitution of the objective phenomenon of transcendence.

The transcendent status of the *Sinn* of perceptual objects is described by Husserl as being putative, inasmuch as the perceptual object's transcendence manifests itself in terms of the perspectival appearance of one and the same objective unity. The transcendent status of the *Sinn* of ontic objects is described by Husserl as being empirically cognitive, inasmuch as they present (*darstellen*) perceptual objects in terms of modally determined (i.e., certain, uncertain, questionable and possible) *posita*. The transcendent status of the *Sinn* of ontological objects is cognitively a priori, inasmuch as the regional presentation of objects involves the unmodalized *positum* being-characteristic simpliciter. And the transcendent status of the *Sinn* of the indeterminate world-horizon is phenomenal, inasmuch as its non-positional unity involves the phenomenologically reduced non-actional modality of intentionality.

Husserl characterizes the intentional syntheses that correspond to these various transcendent statuses in terms of their unifying consciousness of one and the same objective unity, which, qua its unity perdures the following: The perceptual adumbration of transcendent percepts;

the empirical contingency of ontic facts (*Tatsachen*); the ontological manifold of material regions; and the phenomenal field of objects (including the worldly *ich*) appearing within the indeterminate horizon of the world.

At the psychologically eidetic level of its uncovering, the transcendent *Sinn* of the objective pole is constituted in terms of the synthetic combining of noemata which, in accord with the synthesis of manifold noeses that are parallel to these noemata, intend one and the same noematic unity, or noema, despite the manifold of noemata involved in its manifestation. In the instance of the constitution of the *Sinn* of the transcendent perceptual object, these noemata manifest perspectives of a perceptual noema. In the instance of the constitution of the *Sinn* of transcendent *Tatsachen*, the noemata manifest presentational posita of an ontic noema. In the instance of the constitution of the *Sinn* of the transcendent being thesis simpliciter, the noemata manifest the regionally variable material determinations of an ontological noema. And in the instance of the transcendent *Sinn* of the indeterminate world-horizon, the noemata manifest perceptual objects, ontically presented objects (both in terms of their thematic apprehension and their phenomenally peculiar non-thematic readiness to be perceived) and their regions, of the world-noema.

The transcendent phenomenon of time, as manifested to the psychologically reduced phenomenon of the subject pole, is described by Husserl in terms of the correlation between the flowing phases of temporality and the intentionally correlative transcendence in immanence of the time consciousness of the living now. This phenomenon is differentiated in terms of the succession and simultaneity of both segments of time and the one endless stream of time.

The temporality of the phenomenologically psychological phenomenon of succession is described by Husserl in terms of a reflectively objectivated now, which manifests itself in terms of the flux of its co-given (*mitgegeben*) horizons of before and after. The essence of the flux of these temporal phases is characterized in terms of the transcending continuity of nows coming in the future and nows that have just past, which give rise to (*sich ergeben*) the now as a punctual form, enduring the changing content of its temporal phases. Corresponding to the temporal phases of temporality is the intentional time consciousness of the living now. The consciousness of the living now is described by Husserl in terms of an original impression of a punctual now, that arises as the horizontal limit of the intentional protentions which manifest the anticipation (*Vorerinnerung*) of the just now coming in the future, and the intentional retentions which manifest the primary memory of the having been (*gewesene*) of the now just past.



This unity and duration of the temporal succession of time is differentiated by Husserl in terms of the segments (*Abschnitten*) of time which begin and end, and in terms of the one endless stream of successive phenomenological time which cannot begin and end. The latter is manifested, in terms of the regard of the pure ego that is conscious of the ceasing (*aufhören*) which delimits the manifold segments of successive time, and therefore transcends in its consciousness of succession the immanence of the former flux of time. Hence, the phenomenologically psychological phenomenon of the temporality of the successive flux of time and the correlative intentionality of the living now, manifests itself as a manifold of temporal segments, whose succession begins and ends in the successive unity of the pure ego's consciousness of the one endless stream of phenomenological time.

This correlative temporality and time consciousness of the succession of time, as a function of its exhibition to and by the actionally modified intentionality of reflection, manifests, according to Husserl, a horizontal field of temporal simultaneity. This temporal simultaneity, as exhibited by the regard of higher level phenomenological reflections, manifests itself in terms of the originary horizon of the pure ego. As such, this horizon manifests a living now whose non-actional intentionality emerges with the consciousness (via protentions and retentions) of what simultaneously was and will be. Thus, the psychologically reduced transcendent phenomenon of time manifests not only a flux intentionally correlative to the directional regard of the pure ego, but also a flux correlative to the non-actional intentionality that manifests itself as the horizontal field of the pure ego. Considered together, the living now of temporal succession and simultaneity comprise the primal form of the originary (*originär*) consciousness of the psychologically reduced transcendent phenomenon of time.

At the transcendently eidetic level of its uncovering, the transcendent phenomenon of time, that comprises the subjective pole of intentionality, is constituted in terms of a synthetic combining of temporal noemata which, in accord with the synthesis of manifold noeses that are parallel to these noemata, intend one and the same noematic unity, or noema, despite its manifold noematic manifestations. As such, the temporal noema manifests the eidos of the transcendent excess of the one stream of phenomenological time, fulfilled with respect to its three noematic phases of before, after and simultaneity. The temporal syntheses of the noeses that are parallel to these noematic phases, manifest the eidos of the transcendental consciousness of the unity of this one stream of phenomenological time. Inasmuch as the transcendent excess of the one stream of phenomenological time is uncovered in terms of the temporality and time consciousness of both the actional (*qua* the mode of the cogito) and

non-actional modalities of intentionality, and inasmuch as the transcendental reflections which accomplish the uncovering exhibit both of these intentional modalities, Husserl speaks of the self-constitution of transcendental subjectivity, in terms of the transcendental ego's transcendence in immanence within the non-actional field of its phenomenal freedom "always already there."

**PART TWO**

**HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
ACCOUNT OF INTENTIONALITY**

## INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

### § 37. Preliminary Considerations.

Heidegger's phenomenological account of intentionality emerges within the context of his concern with the "question of the meaning (*Sinn*) of Being"<sup>1</sup> (*BT*, 19/1). His concern is, initially, to "reawaken an understanding (*Verständnis*) for the meaning of this question" (*BT*, 19/1). Toward this end, Heidegger finds it necessary to recast both phenomenology's primary field of research and the method by which it proceeds. In order to unravel, from the "matters themselves," the interrelation of Heidegger's recasting of phenomenology's agenda and his phenomenological account of intentionality, I will begin my considerations of his account of this phenomenon with a general discussion of his concept of phenomenology. After these general considerations, I will proceed to focus my study on Heidegger's formulation and execution of the phenomenological task of inquiring into the Being of intentionality's *intentio* and *intentum*. Heidegger's phenomenological inquiry into the Being of the entity (*Seiendes*)<sup>2</sup> which manifests the structure of intentionality, *Dasein*, will then be discussed in terms of its basic composition (*Grundverfassung*)<sup>3</sup> as being-in-the-world, and the movement (*Bewegtheit*) of transcendence peculiar to this basic composition. Finally, I will conclude my considerations of Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of intentionality with a discussion of the temporal meaning he uncovers as the meaning of transcendence, and the questionableness of the priority and originality of intentionality that he finds to be the result of this meaning.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY

#### § 38. Introductory Remarks.

Heidegger's concept of phenomenology is inextricably bound up with his understanding of ontology. "Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible" (BT, 60/35). His understanding of ontology is guided by the insight that the question concerning its theme, Being (*Sein*), "has today been forgotten" (BT, 21/2). It has been forgotten in the sense that Being is understood, without more ado, as the most universal, undefinable, and self-evident concept.

In order to reawaken the question concerning the meaning of Being, Heidegger finds it necessary to first explicitly restate the question of Being. On the basis of a formal consideration of structure of any question whatever, he gains the insight which enables him to explicitly formulate the question about the meaning of Being. The special way in which this question becomes manifest (*sichtbar*), as formulated in accord with this insight, exhibits (*aufweisen*) a "positive phenomenon" (BT, 25/5) regarding both the mode of being (*Seinsmodus*) of the questioner and "that which is to be found out by the questioning" (*das Erfragte*), viz., the meaning of Being. This positive phenomenon "requires elucidation (*bedarf Aufklärung*)" (BT, 25/5-6), and does so in a manner appropriate to the "the thematic object of the investigation (either the Being of entities or the meaning of Being as such)" (BT, 49/27). The appropriate manner of elucidation is understood by Heidegger to be phenomenological, and contrary to what he takes to be phenomenology's current understanding of itself, such a manner or method of investigation does "not characterize the objects of philosophical research in terms of the what of its subject matter (*sachhaltige*), but the *how* of its research" (BT, 50/27). In order to unfold Heidegger's "method-concept (*Methodenbegriff*)" (Ibid) of phenomenology within the context of its complex interrelationship with his

understanding of ontology, I will begin by turning my attention to his provisional account of the objects<sup>1</sup> of ontology, as they emerge from out of his exposition of the question of the meaning of Being.

§ 39. *Heidegger's Unfolding of the Formal Structure of the Question about the Meaning of Being; the Provisional Account of the Related 'Objects' of Ontology: the Being of Entities and the Meaning of Being as Such.*

As mentioned above, Heidegger unfolds the formal structure of the question of the meaning of Being under the guidance of his insight into the structure of any question whatever. This insight is afforded to him on the basis of clues he gleans from the consideration of what is involved in any *questioning*. He writes:

Every questioning is a seeking (*Suchen*). Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Questioning is a cognizant (*erkennende*) seeking for an entity with regard to the that (*Daß*) and how of its being (*BT, 24/5*).

According to Heidegger, it is possible to expose the character of that which the question is about in any questioning. By so doing, he understands the cognizant seeking of questioning to become an investigating (*Untersuchen*). Heidegger's unfolding (exposing) of the formal structure of any question is thus taken by him to be just such an investigation, i.e., a questioning whose cognizant seeking asks after the character or, as he also is wont to say, structure, of the question involved in any questioning.<sup>2</sup>

Heidegger's investigation finds that the question involved in any questioning about . . . (*Fragen nach . . .*) manifests the following tripartite structure: (a) that which is asked about (*ein Gefragtes*); (b) that which is interrogated (*ein Befragtes*), and (c) that which is to be found out by the asking (*das Erfragte*), i.e., the aim (*Ziel*) of the questioning. He also finds that "questioning itself is the comportment (*Verhalten*) belonging to an entity, the questioner, and as such has its own character of being" (*Ibid*).

Taking this structure and comportment as his clue, Heidegger then formulates the question about the meaning of Being. On the one hand, he finds that the *questioning* about the meaning of Being "must be guided beforehand by what is sought" (*BT, 25/5*), i.e., must be guided in some way by an "understanding of Being (*Seinverständnis*)" (*Ibid*). Indeed, he finds that "out of this understanding of Being arises both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency toward its

conception" (Ibid). On the other hand, he finds that with respect to the formal structure of the *question* of the meaning of Being, this question is to be formulated in accord with the tripartite structure of any question whatever. Thus Heidegger understands (a) above to be Being, "that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood" (BT, 26/6). He understands (b) above to be "the entities themselves . . . [which] are questioned as regards their Being" (Ibid). And (c) above is understood by Heidegger as "the meaning of Being" (Ibid).

The very *Faktum* of their being a question of the meaning of Being points obviously to the situation that "we do not *know* what 'Being' means" (BT, 25/5). Yet, according to Heidegger

. . . already when we ask, "what is Being," we keep within an understanding of the "is", without being able to conceptually fix what the "is" signifies (*bedeutet*) (Ibid).

The investigation of the meaning of Being cannot at the outset, then, expect to elucidate the 'positive phenomenon' of this "average and vague understanding of Being" (Ibid). Nevertheless, by following the necessary clue first provided by the "developed (*ausgebildeten*) concept of Being" (BT, 25/6), the interpretation of both this understanding of Being, and the meaning of Being ultimately illuminated (*Erhellung*) in this understanding, can be initiated.<sup>3</sup>

Toward the end of developing this concept of Being, Heidegger first makes transparent "all the constitutive (*konstitutiven*) characters of the question itself" (BT, 25/5). Thus, in working out (*ausarbeiten*) what is asked about in the question of the meaning of Being, i.e., in working out 'Being', Heidegger finds that "the Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity" (BT, 26/6). Rather, understanding the Being problem requires, as its "first philosophical step" (Ibid), that "Being, as that which is asked about, be demonstrated in its own way, which is essentially different from the way of discovery of entities" (Ibid). Likewise, what is to be found out by the asking of the question of the meaning of Being, the meaning of Being, "also demands its own conceptualization, which in turn stands out essentially from the concepts in which entities attain their determinate signification" (Ibid). And finally, insofar as Being means the Being of the entities to be interrogated, "then these entities, on their side, must have beforehand become accessible (*zugänglich*) as they are in themselves" (Ibid).

§ 40. *Unfolding the Formal Structure of the Being Question Leads to the Priority of Investigating the Being of the Questioner.*

This last structural item of the *question* about the meaning of Being leads Heidegger's investigation to question whether any one entity is especially suited as the exemplary (*exemplarishen*) entity to be interrogated, and if so, which one. Indeed, he writes:

If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to become completely transparent to itself, then . . . it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right exemplary entity, and to work out the genuine way of access to it (*BT*, 26/7).

Noting that the very compartments involved in rendering transparent the structure of the question about the meaning of Being, i.e., having a regard toward something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing and access to it, "are constitutive of our questioning and thus themselves modes of being belonging to the particular (*bestimmten*) entity which we the questioners are" (*BT*, 26-7/7), Heidegger finds that "working out the question of Being means accordingly rendering transparent an entity—the questioner—in its Being" (*BT*, 27/7). Thus, the very asking of this question belongs to an entity's mode of being and is essentially determined by that which is to be found out by its questioning, i.e., Being.

Now the formal objection regarding this way of working out the connection between questioning and the question of Being, viz., that it involves a 'circular proof' in which something is presupposed that only the answer can bring, is understood by Heidegger to "carry no weight and to obstruct headway into the field of investigation" (*BT*, 27/7). This is the case for him since "factually (*faktisch*) there is no circle at all in the questions' [of the meaning of Being] formulation" (*Ibid*). Rather, when considering the concrete ways of investigating questioning and its question, Heidegger finds that "entities can be determined in their Being without necessarily having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being available" (*Ibid*). Such 'presupposing' (*Voraussetzen*) of Being has nothing to do with the positing of an undemonstrated (*unbewiesenen*) basic principle, from which propositions are then deductively derived. On the contrary,

. . . this "presupposing" of Being has the character of taking a glance (*Hinblicknahme*) toward Being beforehand (*forgängigen*) in order that, from out of this glance, the already given



(*vorgegebene*) entities become provisionally articulated in their Being (BT, 27/8).

This guiding (*leitende*) glance toward Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which the questioner always moves (*bewegen*), and "in the end belongs to the essential composition (*Wesensverfassung*)" (BT, 28/8) of the questioner itself. Heidegger refers to the entity which includes questioning as one of the possibilities of its Being as "Dasein." And he thus finds, rather than any circular proof, that in its asking the question of the meaning of Being, "a remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' is borne by what is asked about (Being) to the questioning itself as a mode of being belonging to an entity" (Ibid).

Thus, by beginning to elucidate the structure of the *question* of Being, with the aim of rendering this structure transparent, Heidegger's investigation finds that something like a priority (*Vorrang*) has come forward (*hat sich gemeldet*) with respect to the Being of the entity (Dasein) which asks this question. By continuing to follow the clues which this elucidation yields, Heidegger is able to begin to render transparent the Being of the *questioner*, with the *provisional* (*vorläufig*) consideration of the concept or "idea" (BT, 33/13) of Being, that is disclosed (*erschlossen*) in the *Seinsverständnis* which is characteristic of the mode of being of this entity. It should be noted well here, that Heidegger understands the provisional nature of this consideration to have its basis in its anticipation of "later analyses, in which our results will be authentically exhibited for the first time" (BT, 32/12).

§ 41. *The Provisional Account of the Being of the Questioner (Dasein), Following Clues Provided by the Formal Structure of the Question About the Meaning of Being; Emergence of the Task of Fundamental Ontology.*

Heidegger's provisional consideration of the Being of Dasein suggests that Dasein is an entity which is distinguished from other entities by "the state of affairs (*Daß*) that in its Being this Being itself is at issue for it" (BT, 32/12). This distinguishing mark of Dasein is taken by Heidegger to belong to it as a composition of (its) Being (*Seinsverfassung*), and as such to point to the fact that "it has in its Being a relationship to Being (*Seinsverhältnis*)" (Ibid). This *Seinsverhältnis* also means that Dasein understands itself in some manner and distinctness (*Ausdrücklichkeit*) in its Being. As such, with and through Dasein's understanding of Being, its Being is disclosed to it.

Heidegger's provisional consideration of Dasein's mode of being (*Seinsart*) finds that when this entity is interrogated as regards its status as an entity, that is, when it is considered "ontically," it is "distinctive in that it is ontological" (Ibid). This being ontological of Dasein's ontical status is not understood by Heidegger to mean that Dasein's mode of being necessarily involves theoretical questioning about the Being of entities. Rather, it points to the factual composition of Dasein's mode of being, wherein it is not simply concerned with entities qua entities, but rather is "being (*seiend*) in the way of an understanding of Being" (Ibid). Heidegger refers to the status of this non-theoretical understanding of entities in their Being as "pre-ontological." And, as the Being itself towards which Dasein is always able in one way or another to comport itself, it is termed "existence" (*Existenz*).

The essential determination of the entity that asks about the meaning of Being, i.e., of the questioner, is thus provisionally rendered transparent in terms of "its having to be, at any time (*je*), its own Being" (BT, 32-33/12). As such, its essential determination is not that of a "what" belonging to some subject matter (*sachaltiger Was*). Heidegger further unfolds this pre-ontological essential determination of Dasein, whereby it always understands itself from its existence, in terms of possibilities of itself which it has either chosen, found itself involved in, or already grown into. He calls the understanding of existence which manages itself in this way "existentiell" (*existenziell*). The question of existence is accordingly understood by Heidegger to be an ontical affair for Dasein.

However, the theoretical unfolding (*Auseinanderlegung*) of the ontological structure of that which constitutes existence is not an ontical concern of Dasein's. Rather, the question about such structures, what Heidegger calls the "existentiality" of existence, requires "an understanding which is not existentiell, but existential" (BT, 33/12). Now Heidegger understands the task of an existential analytic of Dasein's existence to be something that is "traced out (*vorgezeichnet*) with regard to its possibility and necessity in the ontical composition of Dasein" (BT, 33/13). Yet such a task, as an ontological analytic, requires according to Heidegger "always already the taking beforehand of a glance toward existentiality" (Ibid). That is, it requires that Dasein comport itself theoretically with the aim of rendering "theoretically transparent the structure of [its] existence" (BT, 33/12), and to do so by orienting itself to the clue provided by the glance it has taken toward the "idea of existence" (BT, 275/232).

Since such a comportment has as its theoretical concern the structures of the Being of an entity that is essentially determined by its pre-ontological understanding of Being, Heidegger maintains that the

ontological analytic of the Being of this entity "cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to an entity, that is, to something ontical" (BP, 19/26). Ontology, then, is understood by Heidegger to have an "ontical foundation" (Ibid). Therefore, according to Heidegger, in order to work out the question about the meaning of Being, the Being of an entity, Dasein, must first be ontologically elucidated. Such an ontology is provisional, since "it is wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of [the meaning] of Being" (BT, 38/17). It is also fundamental, since "it alone first leads to the illumination of the meaning of Being and the horizon of the understanding of Being" (BP, 224/318). Thus, in provisionally carrying out the analytic of Dasein, fundamental ontology is not understood by Heidegger to "give the answer to the leading question about the meaning of Being in general. However, [fundamental ontology] will doubtless provide the ground for attaining this answer" (BT, 38/17). Indeed, since the idea of existence which guides the theoretical comportment of the existential analytic "already includes the idea of Being . . . even the realization (*Durchführung*) [as a fundamental ontology] of the analytic of Dasein depends on the working out beforehand of the question of the meaning of Being as such" (BT, 33/13).

Thus far, Heidegger's investigation of the structure of the question about the meaning of Being has been traced, as it serves to bring into a provisional relief, what he takes to be the interrelated 'objects' of ontology: the Being of Dasein and the meaning of Being as such. By following the clues gleaned by rendering transparent the *question* of the meaning of Being, Heidegger is able to elucidate, within what he at times refers to as a "formal" (BT, 274/231) context, the essential determinations of the Being of the *questioner* insofar as they pertain to the structures of this question. Indeed, the peculiar reciprocal relatedness, of these two terms of the investigation of the question about the meaning of Being, is such that the task of an existential analytic emerges as the ontological requisite for concretely working out the *Seinsfrage*. And this is taken by Heidegger to mean that "the problem of attaining and securing the guiding mode of access (*leitenden Zugangsart*) to Dasein becomes more than ever a vital one" (BT, 37/16). A way of access and unfolding of this entity must be found, such that "this entity can show itself in itself and from itself" (Ibid). This way or method is of course "phenomenology," and it is to Heidegger's working out of its 'methodological concept' that I will now turn my attention.<sup>4</sup>

§ 42. Heidegger's Clarification of Phenomenology Within the Context of the Existential Analytic: the Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology.

Heidegger understands his initial account of the methodological concept of phenomenology to be "only the preliminary concept (*Vorbegriff*)" (BT, 50/28). It is preliminary in the sense that he understands his account to be limited to the working out of "a 'self-evidence' (*eine Selbstverständlichkeit*) which we want to bring closer to us, in so far as it is of consequence for the procedure of this treatise [viz., *Being and Time*]" (Ibid). This self-evidence concerns the exhibition, to be effected via fundamental ontology, of the 'matters themselves' involved in the ontic and ontological manifestation of Dasein. This limiting of the unfolding (*exponieren*) of the methodological concept of phenomenology to the 'matters themselves' involved in the analytic of existence, is maintained by Heidegger to be preparatory to the development of what he calls the "idea of phenomenology" (BT, 408/357). The development of the methodological concept of the latter is understood by Heidegger to require the propaedeutical clarifying (*aufklären*), on the basis of the results of the analytic of existence, of "the meaning of Being and the 'connection' between Being and truth" (Ibid). Hence the limited<sup>5</sup> horizon, within which Heidegger first works out the methodological concept of phenomenology, draws its necessity from the interrelated 'objects' to be phenomenologically investigated, i.e., the Being of Dasein and the meaning of Being as such, and the priority the former manifests (within the formal context of the elucidation of the structures of the Being question) with respect to the elucidation of the latter.

Having formally demonstrated the ontic and ontological priority of Dasein, something like an "'immediate' availability (*'unmittelbaren' Greifbarkeit*)" (BT, 36/15) of this entity and its mode of being (*Seinsart*) seems to emerge. However, Heidegger cautions that even though Dasein is ontically nearest to ourselves, since "we are it at any time" (Ibid), ontologically it is "the farthest away" (Ibid). Dasein is ontologically farthest away, in the sense that the pre-ontological understanding of Being which belongs to its ownmost (*eigensten*) Being, is understood by Heidegger to lay out the Being of its own Being in terms of "the entity (*dem Seienden*)" (Ibid) to which it is most closely related, and which Dasein is not—"the world." Thus, in spite of Dasein's ontic immediacy, the problem of attaining the proper access to Dasein is understood by Heidegger to require methodical mediation.

Heidegger maintains that a

... genuine method is based (*gründet*) on an appropriate advance glance (*Vorblick*) toward the basic composition of the "object" or object sphere to be disclosed. Thus genuine methodical (*methodische*) consideration (*Besinnung*)—which is to be distinguished from empty discussion of technique—yields at the same time information about (*Aufschluß über*) the mode of being belonging to the thematic entity (*BT*, 350/303).

Since methods of historically transmitted ontologies either fail, or do not attempt, to bring into relief the Being of entities and explicate Being itself, Heidegger finds that "the approach of clarifying its [ontology's] method by pursuing the history of that method is automatically precluded" (*BT*, 49/27). Rather, he finds that in the commitment against all free-floating constructions and accidental findings of phenomenology's maxim 'to the matters themselves', there lies the germ of what promises to be a genuine "science 'of' phenomena" (*BT*, 59/35). However, Heidegger is quick to point out that he finds the association of any "standpoint" or "direction" with this science to stand in the way of its methodological self-understanding. Thus, toward the end of working out the methodological concept of phenomenology, Heidegger finds it necessary to recast its possibility *over and against* its present actuality as a philosophical movement.

Heidegger effects this recasting on the basis of a formal characterization of phenomenology's methodological meaning, which he then "deformalizes" (*entformalisiert*) vis-à-vis the ontological problematic of the existential analytic. This characterization takes as its point of departure the clues which he finds in the Greek meanings of the components of the word "phenomenology": φαινόμενον and λόγος. According to Heidegger, the noun "phenomenon" is derived from the Greek verb φαίνεσθαι, which means "to show itself." The verb itself is taken by Heidegger to be

... a middle voiced construction of φαίνω, which means to bring into the light of day, to place into brightness. Φαίνω belongs to the root φα—, like φῶς, light or brightness, i.e., that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself (*BT*, 51/28).

The expression "phenomenon" is thus taken by Heidegger to mean "that which shows itself in itself, the manifest (*das Offenbare*)" (*Ibid*). Accordingly, he takes φαινόμενα to be the totality of what lies, or can be brought to lie, in the light of day.

Heidegger notes that the Greeks sometimes identified φαινόμενα with τὰ ὄντα, entities (*das Seiende*). And he finds that "an entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending on the mode of access (*Zugangsart*) to it" (*Ibid*). Indeed, an entity can even show itself as

something it is *not*, in which case what shows itself looks or seems like something which it is not. This 'seeming' involves the showing of an entity and is thus also expressed in Greek by the expression φαίνόμενον, but with the meaning that what shows itself "looks like, but 'in actuality' is not what it gives itself to be" (BT, 51/29). There is thus recognized, in this second sense of phenomenon, its contrast to the genuine mode of access to the showing (phenomenon) of an entity as it (in actuality) is. Thus "as long as something only pretends to show itself according to its meaning (*Sinne*), that is, to be a [actual] phenomenon" (Ibid), its status in the Greek expression "φαίνόμενον" is that of a "semblance" (*der Schein*). The two Greek significations of the expression are thus structurally interconnected, inasmuch as 'φαίνόμενον' as semblance is founded (*fundierend*) upon 'φαίνόμενον' as the actual self-showing of an entity in-itself. For the purpose of working out the methodological concept of phenomenology, Heidegger terms the privative modification of φαίνόμενον "semblance," and allots to positive and original signification of φαίνόμενον the term "phenomenon."

Heidegger also finds it necessary for this purpose to differentiate both semblance and phenomenon from what is called "appearance" (*Erscheinung*) and "mere appearance." According to him, both of these terms signify something "which shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'" (BT, 54/31). However, Heidegger maintains that 'appearance' always comes forward as the appearance of something which does not show itself. Appearing can therefore mean either that which, by virtue of its coming forward in that which shows itself, does *not* show itself; or, it can mean that which comes forward and, in thereby showing itself, indicates (*anzeigen*) that which does not show itself. And appearing can also mean the genuine sense of phenomenon as showing itself—a signification which Heidegger however does not adopt within the context of his clarification of the methodological concept of phenomenology.

That which does not show itself, in the first two senses of appearance, does not resemble or look like that which shows itself, and thus is not a 'semblance' according to Heidegger. And neither is that which in showing itself indicates something which does not show itself, since again, the indicative reference relationship (*Verweisungsbezug*) does not involve any similarity. Indeed, Heidegger finds that, as in the case of Kant, where the term 'mere appearance' means appearance in both the sense of what shows itself (i.e., objects of empirical intuition), and in the sense of that which conceals itself by coming forward in this appearance (the phenomenon in the genuine, original sense), there can be no possibility of a similarity between the

(Kantian) "phenomenon" and its mere appearance, since the former is something which cannot show itself in principle.

Given the "reference relationship existing (*seienden*) in the entities themselves" (*Ibid*) which comprises the first two significations of 'appearance', Heidegger understands the showing itself of that which comes forward in this relationship to be a 'phenomenon'. However, unlike the showing itself in itself of the positive and original signification of  $\phi\alpha\iota\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ , the 'phenomenon' of 'appearance' does not signify "a distinctive way something can be encountered (*Begegnisart*)" (*BT*, 54/31). Likewise, the "phenomenon" in the Kantian sense is something which cannot be encountered.

§ 43. *The Formal Concept of Phenomenon: its Ordinary and Phenomenological Signification.*

In grasping the concept of phenomenon in the distinctive sense of the showing itself in itself, i.e., as that which can be encountered, Heidegger understands it to be left indeterminate "whether the self-showing is in the particular instance an entity or a character of the Being (*Seinscharakter*) of an entity" (*Ibid*). This indeterminate account of self-showing is characterized by him as the "formal concept" of "phenomenon." Heidegger illustrates a legitimate application of the phenomenon's formal concept with a reference to Kant. Kant's understanding of "phenomenon," in terms of entities that are accessible through empirical intuition, operates within the context of the indeterminate grasping of that which is showing itself; i.e., such an understanding does not bring into relief whether the phenomenon is an entity or a character of the Being of an entity. Such a formal understanding of "phenomenon" has the "signification of the ordinary concept of phenomenon" (*Ibid*) for Heidegger.

In contrast to the formal concept of "phenomenon" as it is ordinarily employed, Heidegger differentiates the phenomenological concept of "phenomenon." Again with a reference to Kant, Heidegger illustrates that what in the Kantian problematic are deduced as the conditions of possibility of the appearance of objects, can *mutatis mutandis* be phenomenologically conceived as "that which already, though unthematically (*unthematisch*) shows itself in appearances prior to and always accompanying the commonly understood phenomenon, [and] can be brought thematically to self-showing" (*BT*, 54-55/31).

The working out of the phenomenological concept of phenomenon thus requires "insight into the meaning of the formal concept of phenomenon and its legitimate application in an ordinary signification" (*BT*, 55/31). And within the context of the fixing of the preliminary concept

of phenomenology, this insight needs to be "deformalized (*entformalisiert*)" (BT, 59/35), in the sense of a delimiting of this concept in a manner that goes beyond these Kantian "illustrations", viz., in terms of the concrete problematic of the existential analytic. But to do this, the peculiar scientificity expressed by the λόγος component of the expression "phenomenon" must first be clarified.

Heidegger finds untenable, the view which maintains that the concept of λόγος in Plato and Aristotle has a multiplicity of competing meanings, with no one basic meaning. Rather, underlying the various meanings of λόγος, which he translates as "*Rede*,"<sup>6</sup> viz., underlying λόγος interpreted as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, or relationship, Heidegger maintains that: "Λόγος as *Rede* means on the contrary the same as δηλοῦν: to make manifest 'what is being talked about' in *Rede*" (BT, 56/32). Indeed, he finds that Aristotle explicates this function of *Rede* more precisely as ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Heidegger writes:

Λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely that about which (*worüber*) the *Rede* is about [. . .] *Rede* "lets something be seen" ἀπό . . . from out of itself: it lets what is under discussion be seen. In *Rede*, to the extent that it is genuine, *what* is said (*was geredet ist*) is drawn (*geschöpft*) from out of that which (*worüber*) is under discussion, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest (*offenbar*) what is under discussion and thus makes it accessible to others (Ibid).

The function of λόγος as ἀπόφανσις, then, "lies in letting something be seen by exhibiting it" (BT, 56/33).

As such, the λόγος has the structural form of σύνθεσις. Taken in its purely apophantical meaning, Heidegger finds that synthesis means letting something be seen in its togetherness with something, that is, "letting it be seen *as something*" (Ibid). Thus apophantical *Rede* encompasses both: 'what is said' in the discussion, i.e., the exhibiting apophantical *Rede*; as well as the making manifest of that which the discourse is about, i.e., the *worüber* wherein something is allowed to be seen as something.

As a result of this synthetic character of *Rede*, the *worüber* which discourse allows to be seen can be seen either as something which it is, i.e., as something true (ἀλήθές), or as something which it is *not*, that is, as something false (ψεύδος). In the former case, the "'being true' of the λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means: in the λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι the entities which the discourse is *about* are taken out of their concealment and allowed to be seen as something unconcealed (ἀλήθές), *discovered*" (Ibid). In the latter case, "being false, ψεύδεσθαι, amounts to de-



ceiving, in the sense of covering up (*verdecken*): placing something before something (by way of letting it be seen) and thereby yielding (*ausgeben*) it as something it is *not*" (*BT*, 57/33).

Since truth has this meaning, Heidegger sharply dissociates the being true of discourse with the modern epistemological problematic of truth, which claims the locus of 'truth' is to be found in the binding (synthesis) of representations (*Vorstellungen*) such that their "inner" psychic occurrence would somehow correspond to something physically "outside." Rather, for him the judgmental agreement involved in the so-called 'truth' of such a correspondence presupposes that the terms of this correspondence, i.e., 'something as something', have *already* been uncovered. That is to say, this epistemological understanding of 'truth' presupposes truth in the sense of ἀλήθεια.

Likewise, the being true of *Rede* is dissociated by Heidegger from the 'being true' in the Greek sense of perception (αἴσθησις). According to him, this latter 'truth' discovers entities merely by *looking* at them. The νοεῖν of such perceptual looking aims at "the simplest determination of the Being of entities as such" (*Ibid*). As such, pure νοεῖν discovers entities in a way that cannot conceal them, never be false—at worst, it can only remain a non-perceiving (*Unvernehmen*), ἀγνοεῖν. Yet, such a noetic perceiving is thus limited to a grasping of entities in terms of their 'what'; the Being of entities in their mode of being seen *as* something thereby remains concealed to the noetic conception of the being of 'truth'.

Since, however, "the λόγος is a determinate mode of letting something be seen, the λόγος is, precisely, *not* to be considered the primary 'locus' (*Ort*) of truth" (*Ibid*). Rather, the being of truth, in so far as there is truth, has its locus in "an essential mode of being belonging to Dasein" (*BT*, 269/226). Thus, Heidegger's consideration of the formal meaning of the component expression λόγος in the word 'phenomenology', leads to the ontological problem of how the Being of an entity (Dasein) is to be worked out such that the appropriate mode of access to the mode of being of this entity is secured—that is to say, the problem of the preliminary concept (i.e., understood in terms of the existential analytic) of the phenomenon of phenomenology is seen by him to be related to the scientificity (truth character) of the λόγος of phenomenology.

§ 44. *The Concrete Envisaging of the Formal and Deformalized Concepts of Phenomenon; the Phenomenological Relevance of the Ordinary Concept of Phenomenon.*

This inner relationship between the meaning of the two terms that comprise the expression phenomenology, is brought into relief when Heidegger formally works out the preliminary concept of phenomenology. He writes: "Phenomenology means ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα—to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (BT, 58/34). Thus, unlike other sciences, phenomenology does not designate an object in accord with its currently understood subject matter. Rather, the word merely indicates

... the *how* of the exhibition (*Aufweisung*) and way of treating *what* in this science is to be treated. A science of "phenomena" means to grasp its objects *in such a way* that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by directly exhibiting and manifesting (*Ausweisung*) it (BT, 59/34-35).

And here Heidegger understands himself to be characterizing nothing else than the *possibility* of a science of phenomena that is found in the descriptive maxim: 'to the things themselves!'

According to Heidegger, the character of the phenomenological description belongs to the specific meaning of phenomenology's λόγος, and "can be fixed only from out of the 'material content' (*Sachheit*) of what is to be described" (BT, 59/35). Thus, in the instance of the "concrete envisaging (*concrete Vergegenwärtigung*)" (BT, 58/34) of the material content of the formal concept of phenomenon, within the context of its ordinary meaning, Heidegger finds that 'what' is to be described is "any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself" (BT, 59/35).

When the formal concept of phenomenon is concretely envisaged so as to be deformalized into the phenomenological one, and distinguished from the ordinary concept, phenomenology lets that be seen which, "according to its very essence (*Wesen*) is necessarily the theme of an *explicit* exhibition" (Ibid). Heidegger characterizes this as

... something that first of all and for the most part does *not* show itself: it is something concealed, in contrast to that which at first and for the most part does show itself. But at the same time, it is something that essentially belongs to what at first and for the most part does show itself; indeed, it belongs in such a way as to make up its meaning (*Sinn*) and ground (*Grund*) (Ibid).

That which remains concealed with the explicit exhibition of something, that is, that which makes up the meaning and ground of the phenomenon in the ordinary sense,

... is not this or that entity, but rather, as the foregoing considerations (*Betrachtungen*) have shown, the *Being* of entities [ . . . ] What accordingly demands to become a phenomenon in a distinctive sense, in terms of its ownmost proper content (*Sachgehalt*), phenomenology has taken into its "grasp" thematically as its object (Ibid).

The concealment of the Being of entities is characterized by Heidegger as something which may be total, either in the sense of its remaining undiscovered or, having once been discovered, now being buried over (*verschüttet*). Or, what is "the rule (*die Regel*), is that what was once discovered may still be visible, though only as a semblance" (*BT*, 60/36). Thus Heidegger can say that "where there is semblance there is 'Being'" (Ibid). The covering up of the Being of entities manifests then two possibilities according to him. It is either accidental (*zufällig*) or necessary, with the latter having its basis in the way what (i.e., the Being of entities) is discovered subsists.

§ 45. *The Need for Phenomenology's Methodological Mediation has its Basis in the Thematic 'Objects' of Ontology; the Reciprocal Relation of Phenomenology and Ontology as Philosophy's Way of Determining and Treating its 'Object'.*

Inasmuch as "what has been taken into its [phenomenology's] 'grasp' thematically as its object" is something which at first and for the most part does not show itself, "phenomenology is needed" (Ibid). This is to say that the methodological mediation of phenomenology is required in order for the "Being of entities, its meaning, modifications and derivatives" (*BT*, 60/35) to be encountered in the mode of phenomenon. Thus, Heidegger finds that the preliminary concept of the deformed phenomenon, phenomenology's 'thematic object', is not the Being of an entity (*Dasein*), but rather, the showing itself from itself of the Being of an entity. Phenomenology is therefore understood by Heidegger to be "the way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and the way of manifesting its determination (*ausweisende Bestimmungsart*)" (Ibid). This is the sense in which he writes:

*Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible* (Ibid)[. . .] Ontology and Phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These two terms characterize philosophy itself according to its object and way of treating (*Behandlungsart*) that object (BT, 62/38).

On the basis of this preliminary delimitation of the concept of phenomenology, Heidegger fixes the meaning of the terms "phenomenal" and "phenomenological." He writes:

What is given and explicable in the way the phenomenon is encountered is called "phenomenal." This is the sense in which phenomenal structures are discussed. Everything that belongs to the manner of exhibition and explication and constitutes the conceptuality which is required by this research, is called "phenomenological" (BT, 61/37).

Because the phenomenon of the preliminary concept of phenomenology involves the showing itself from itself of Being, and since Being is always the Being of an entity, "the ordinary concept of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant" (Ibid). More specifically, the exemplary entity Dasein, whose existential analytic is to serve as the point of departure for fundamental ontology, must show itself on the basis of the kind of access that genuinely belongs to it. In the words of Heidegger:

The preliminary task of a "phenomenological" securing of the exemplary entity, as the point of departure for the analytic proper, is always already prescribed by the aim of this analysis (Ibid).

This means that not only does Heidegger understand the Being of entities to require phenomenology's methodological mediation, if it is to show itself from itself, but also, the entity (Dasein) (or entities) itself is also understood by him to require such methodological mediation, if they it is to show itself from itself. Thus, both the way in which the phenomenological concept of that which is to be encountered in the mode of phenomenon, as well as the way in which the ordinary concept of that which is to be so encountered, "must first of all be *wrested* from the objects of phenomenology" (BT, 61/36).<sup>7</sup>

As a result of this reciprocal philosophical relationship between ontology and phenomenology, Heidegger maintains that the methodological problematic, involved in the bringing of the theme of ontology to its phenomenological self showing, "will yield from the investigation itself that the methodological meaning of phenomenological description is *interpretation* (*Auslegung*) (Ibid). The "investigation itself"

refers in this instance to fundamental ontology, which of course takes as its "theme that entity which is ontologically and ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to bring forward the cardinal problem, the question about the meaning of Being as such" (Ibid). Thus Heidegger says that "the λόγος of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of ἐρμηνεύειν" (Ibid).

Heidegger understands the phenomenology of Dasein to be hermeneutic in what he takes to be the original meaning of the word, wherein the occupation (*Geschäft*) of interpretation is designated. And he unfolds three aspects of the hermeneutic character of the phenomenology of Dasein. There is (1), the philosophically primary (*primären*) meaning of "hermeneutic," which refers to the interpretation of the Being of Dasein that is worked out in the analytic of Dasein's existentiality; (2), there is the "hermeneutic" which *makes known* (*kundgegeben*) the authentic meaning of Being and the structures of Dasein's Being to Dasein's *Seinsverständnis* and; (3), there is the "hermeneutic" which by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein "exhibits the horizon for every further ontological research into entities other than Dasein" (BT, 62/37).

Having provisionally characterized both the 'objects' of ontology and the preliminary phenomenological concepts of how these 'objects' are to become phenomena, Heidegger finds that Being and its structure transcends every entity. As such, "*Being is the transcendens simpliciter* [ . . . ] Every disclosure of Being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental knowledge*" (BT, 62/38). Since however, such disclosure implies the distinctive transcendence of the Being of Dasein, Heidegger understands the first task of clarifying the scientific character of phenomenology to be the "*demonstration (Nachweis) of its ontical foundation and the characterization of this foundation*" (BP, 20/27). Having provisionally done this (see the discussion of fundamental ontology above), he finds that the second task of clarifying phenomenology's scientificity "consists in distinguishing the mode of knowing operative in ontology as science of Being, and this requires the *working out of the methodological structure of ontological-transcendental differentiation*" (BP, 20/27).

§ 46. *Clarification of the Mode of Knowing Operative in the Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology: the A Priori Cognition of Phenomenological Reduction, Construction and Destruction.*

Heidegger characterizes the phenomenological mode of knowing in terms of a priori cognition. Taking his clue from early antiquity, he maintains that Being and its determinations (*Bestimmtheiten*) were

already seen to precede and underlie entities, and as such to be *πρότερον*, an earlier. Such apriority, however, which does not refer to "clock time," has never been clarified with respect to its meaning and possibility. Such a clarification would therefore require that the a priori character of Being and all its structures be cognized in accord "with a specific kind of access (*Zugangsart*) and way of grasping (*Erfassungsweise*)" (Ibid), viz., a priori cognition. The basic components of such cognition "make up what we call *phenomenology*." (Ibid).

Heidegger understands the basic components of the cognition peculiar to the phenomenological method to be comprised of three interrelated and interdependent moments: reduction, construction and destruction (*Destruktion*). The first cognitive moment, reduction, is characterized by him in terms of the way in which the phenomenological glance or regard must direct itself toward an entity in order that "the Being of this entity is brought into relief and the possibility of its thematization arrived at" (BP, 21/28). According to Heidegger the

... grasping of Being, ontological investigation, always turns at first and necessarily towards some entity; but then, in a precise way it is led away from that entity and lead back to its Being (BP, 21/28-29).

For Heidegger, then, it is this leading of the phenomenological regard from the naïve grasping of an entity, "whatever the determination of that grasping" (BP, 21/29), toward the understanding of the Being of that entity, that comprises the meaning of the phenomenological reduction. Since the specific determination of the initial grasping of an entity is not at issue in Heidegger's strictly *methodological* account of this (or any) structure of phenomenological cognition, he is able to differentiate his understanding of phenomenological reduction from what he takes to be Husserl's. According to Heidegger, Husserl understands the phenomenological reduction in terms of the *specifically determined* naïve grasping of things and persons, from which the phenomenological regard is then lead back to the life of transcendental consciousness and its noetic-noematic lived-experiences, in which objects are constituted (*konstituieren*) as correlates of consciousness.

Although a basic component of phenomenological cognition, reduction is not understood by Heidegger to be its central one. "For this guidance of regard back from entities toward Being requires at the same time the positive bringing ourselves forward toward Being itself" (Ibid). Thus the negative adversion of the compartment away from entities, which reductively prepares the way for the thematization of the Being of an entity, "expressly requires a leading toward Being; it requires guidance" (Ibid). Since Being does not become accessible as something simply found in front of us, like an entity, Heidegger characterizes the

guidance the comportment toward Being needs in terms of the "projecting (*Entwerfen*) of the already given entity towards its Being and structures of Being" (BP, 22/29-30). He calls this "free projection (*freien Entwurf*)" (BP, 29/22) phenomenological construction (*Konstrucktion*).

Since the methodological construction of Being occurs on the basis of a methodological recursion (*Rückgang*) or reduction from entities, the determinate factual experience and range of possible experience of entities (or an entity, viz., *Dasein*) is understood by Heidegger to belong to the historical situation of a philosophical investigation. As such, he finds that there is no guarantee that the specific way of access to entities which determines their factual, naïve and common (*vulgären*) experience, is based in a suitable (*angemessen*) understanding of the specific mode of being of the entities or entity in question. Indeed, a glance at the history of philosophy is enough to convince Heidegger that

... there necessarily belongs to the conceptual Interpretation (*Interpretation*) of Being and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of Being, a *destruction*, a critical de-constructing (*Abbau*) in which the traditional concepts, which must at first be necessary employed, are drawn (*geschöpft*) from out of their sources (BP, 23/31).

Heidegger understands these three components of phenomenological cognition to be interrelated, such that reductive "construction in philosophy [phenomenology] is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion of the tradition" (Ibid). When considered within the context of the deformalized preliminary concept of phenomenology, the "mutual pertinence" (Ibid) of these components of phenomenology's a priori cognition can be seen in their relation to the 'content' of this concept. Thus, the existential analytic hermeneutically secures the proper access (in the mode of ordinary phenomenon) to the exemplary entity *Dasein*. This is done in order to prepare the way for the exhibition and manifestation of the Being of this entity (in the mode of phenomenologically proper phenomenon). All of this emerges as taking place in the interrelated components of the reduction, construction and destruction, belonging to phenomenology's a priori cognition. Which is to say, that the hermeneutical securing of the proper phenomenal access to *Dasein*, qua entity, takes place on the basis of the reductive/destructive components of a priori cognition, while the phenomenally related unconcealment of the Being of *Dasein* takes place on the basis of the (mutually related and interdependent) constructive component of such cognition.

§ 47. *Summary and Transition.*

Having discussed in detail Heidegger's general concept of phenomenology in its inextricable relatedness to his understanding of ontology, my discussion is now in a position to consider his concrete recasting of the agenda of phenomenology, maintained by him to be called for on the basis of his phenomenological account of intentionality. Thus far, Heidegger's provisional working out of the interrelated 'objects' of ontology, the Being of Dasein and the meaning of Being as such, has been considered as they emerge from out of his investigation of the formal structure of the question about the meaning of Being. On the basis of his investigation of the formal structure of this question, the priority of a fundamental ontological investigation of the Being of the questioner (having its point of departure in the existential analytic of Dasein) has come forward. This priority has been shown as it gives rise to the pressing problem of *how* the proper access to the entity Dasein is to be secured.

Heidegger's working out of this 'how', in terms of the purely methodological concept of phenomenology has, in turn, been shown as it brings into relief his understanding of the importance of methodological mediation, *if* both the entity Dasein and the Being of this entity are to be encountered in the mode of phenomena, i.e., in their self-showing. Specifically, his account of the formal and deformed concepts of phenomena, as he unfolds them within the context of the existential analytic, has been considered as it brings to the fore the essential tendency of concealment, which he finds manifest in both the exemplary entity Dasein and the Being of this entity. This onto-ontological tendency is then shown as it gives rise to the need for phenomenology. Its phenomenological necessity is subsequently considered, in terms of the hermeneutical character of phenomenological description, whose task emerges as the wresting of phenomena from the 'objects' of phenomenology—i.e., the bringing to self-showing of both the exemplary entity Dasein (qua the phenomenologically relevant ordinary phenomenon) and the Being of this entity (qua the phenomenon proper of phenomenology). In this manner, Heidegger's understanding that "a proper (*eigene*) methodological securing is required of the very *point of departure* (*Ausgang*) for our analysis [*viz.*, the working out of the formal structure of any questioning whatever], as well as for the *access* to the phenomenon and the *way through* the [its] prevailing concealments" (*BT*, 61/36), is brought into bold phenomenal relief on the basis of the 'matters themselves' of his account of these issues. And finally, the a priori character and structure of the comportment of the phenomenological cognition wherein both the ordinary and phenom-



enologically proper phenomena are reductively, constructively, and destructively grasped, has been discussed.

With the turning of the attention of my discussion to the specific features of Heidegger's phenomenologically 'concrete' execution of the existential analytic, his concern with the problem of gaining the proper access to the entity *Dasein*, so as to be able to uncover the Being peculiar to this entity, will be shown as it gives rise to the need of phenomenologically inquiring into the Being of the *intentio* and *intentum* of intentionality. In particular, I will discuss Heidegger's contention that Husserl's phenomenological preoccupation with a 'phenomenology' of theoretical reason limits his access to the genuinely radical significance of the "breakthrough" phenomenon this preoccupation yields, viz., intentionality. The appreciation of this radical significance, in turn, will be traced in its emergence from what Heidegger maintains is the hidden ontological understanding underlying the epistemological position of Husserl's phenomenology.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE BEING OF INTENTIONALITY

#### § 48. *Introductory Remarks.*

Heidegger's concern with securing the proper access to Dasein leads him to assess Husserl's phenomenological understanding of the phenomenon of intentionality within the context of its principle 'to the matters themselves'. Specifically, he is keen to find out whether the phenomenal priority and originality that is ascribed to intentionality by Husserl is based on a justified appeal to the phenomena involved in its manifestation. In order to find this out, Heidegger maintains that he must determine if both the entity that Husserl's phenomenology understands as manifesting the structure of intentionality, as well as this phenomenology's understanding of the Being of this structure, emerge from out of a genuine encounter with each in their respective modes of phenomena, i.e., as phenomena in the ordinary and deformalized phenomenological senses. What is at issue here, for Heidegger, then, is an "immanent critique of phenomenological research" (*HCT*, 102/140), which will make it "clear that the *question of Being* is not an optional and merely possible question, but the most urgent question inherent in the very meaning of phenomenology itself" (*HCT*, 115/158). Which is to say, Heidegger's inquiry into Husserl's understanding of intentionality will be guided by the aim of finding out whether the mode of being of the entity which manifests the phenomenon of intentionality, Dasein, has been exhibited in the way of access most proper to this entity, when it is understood in accord with Husserl's understanding of intentionality.

§ 49. *Heidegger's Characterization of Husserl's Understanding of Intentionality as the Structure of Lived-experiences.*

Heidegger characterizes Husserl's understanding of intentionality to be such as to take it as "the structure of lived-experiences (*Erlebnisse*), this in accord with the basic moments of its composition (*Verfassung*), *intentio* and *intantum*" (*HCT*, 95/130). The *intentio* manifests the specific directing-itself-toward (*Sichrichtens-auf*), which is said to be such as to always be found in correlation with its *intantum*, i.e., the towards which (*Worauf*) of its directedness. This intentional relation is, according to Heidegger, understood in terms of the concept "act." In his words:

What does act mean here? Not activity, process, or some kind of power. No, act simply means *intentional relation*. Acts refer to those lived-experiences which have the character of intentionality (*HCT*, 36/47).

According to Heidegger, Husserl's phenomenological interest in the phenomenon of intentionality is directed toward its a priori. That is, his interest is directed toward determining in advance the structures which make up any lived-experience, no matter how it is concretely individuated. The discerning of the a priori is said to take place in acts of categorial intuition, wherein the a priori is brought into relief on the basis of re-presenting (*Vergegenwärtigung*) individual exemplars of concrete lived-experiences. According to Heidegger, "this discerning of the a priori is called *ideation*" (*HCT*, 95/130).

Since ideation must take place on the basis of the exemplary intuition, Heidegger's 'immanent critique' of Husserl's understanding of the phenomenon of intentionality maintains that it must be able to give an account, on the basis of the 'matters themselves', of the following:

First, of the exemplary ground, the field of concrete individuations of lived-experiences from which its structure of intentionality is to be brought into relief ideatively; second, of the way the a priori structures are brought into relief from this background; third, of the character and mode of being (*Seinsart*) of this region thus brought out and highlighted (*Ibid*).

Heidegger adds that "it is easy to see that the crucial consideration is the first, that of securing and specifying the field which comprises the point of departure (*Ausgangsfelds*)" (*Ibid*). The question, then, is "How do comportments (*Verhaltungen*) in which the structure of intentionality is to be read become accessible? How is something like inten-

tionality, the structure of lived-experience, [and] lived-experience itself, first given" (Ibid)?

According to Heidegger, the field which comprises the point of departure is characterized by Husserl's phenomenology as being first given in terms of the 'natural attitude'. He maintains that this is understood in terms of the givenness of both the "I" (*Ich*) and the world as entities which "occur realiter" (*HCT*, 96/131), in the spatio-temporal spread (*Auseinander*) of natural actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). The "I" is understood to perform acts (*cogitationes*) which belong to the human subject as a member of the same natural reality. These acts are determined in terms of lived-experiences, the totality of which "can be called an *individual stream of lived-experiences*" (*HCT*, 96/132). Remaining in this attitude, Husserl's phenomenology then directs its regard toward the contexture of lived-experiences, which, "as our own takes its course realiter" (Ibid). In Heidegger's words:

This self-directedness toward our own contexture of lived-experiences is a new act which is called *reflection* (*Reflexion*). In such acts we find something objective which itself has the character of acts, of lived-experiences, of modes of the consciousness of something (Ibid).

Persisting (*verharren*) in this understanding of the natural attitude, the intentional differentiation, between immanently and transcendently directed lived-experiences, is then drawn according to Heidegger. In the former instance, acts are grasped (*erfassen*) by reflective acts whose intentional regard follows the natural course of the reflected acts. Heidegger relates that:

The peculiar feature of reflection shows itself here: The object of the reflection, acts, belongs to the same sphere of being (*Seins-sphäre*) as the observation (*Betrachtung*) of the object. Reflection and reflected object both belong to one and the same sphere of being (Ibid).

This *reell*<sup>1</sup> interpenetration (*ineinander*) of the grasped and grasping in the same stream of lived-experience, manifests what Husserl's understanding of intentionality calls "immanence." By virtue of being immanently grasped, the 'palpable' manifestation of acts must necessarily be given 'in' the acts of the reflective regard which so grasps them.

The state of affairs with transcendently directed lived-experiences is totally different. The directedness of lived-experiences toward something transcendent does not really (*reell*) include the object of its

directedness, viz., the 'palpable' thing, 'in' the intentionality of its regard. However, while the intentionality of such lived-experiences does not really include its object, nevertheless, "because of their intentionality, the transcendent world is in a certain sense there in the lived-experiences" (HCT, 98/135). It is just not there in the specific sense of a *reell* grasping. Thus, "it must be seen that for Husserl grasping is not identical with directing-itself-toward" (Ibid).

§ 50. *Heidegger's Characterization of the Way the A Priori of Intentionality is Brought into Relief from its Exemplary Ground in Husserl's Understanding of Intentionality: the Transcendental and Eidetic Reductions.*

According to Heidegger, this last determination of the natural attitude is crucial for providing an account of the way Husserl's understanding of phenomenology brings the a priori of these naturally determined intentionalities into relief. "Since grasping is only a very particular and not necessarily even a predominant mode of intending entities" (HCT, 98-99/135), it is possible for reflection to make a theme of an act's directedness (*intentio*), in which case the towards which (*intentum*) of the act is not grasped as a theme of the reflection. Or, it is possible that the *intentum* may be co-apprehended (*miterfaßt*), such that the apprehending reflection does not "live directly" (Ibid) in the act but rather "lives thematically" (Ibid) in the grasping of it. This "not going along with" (Ibid) the concrete intention, i.e., with the thesis of the material world and every transcendent world, which lives rather "in the attitude of immanent reflective grasping" (HCT, 99/135), is how Heidegger characterizes Husserl's understanding of the phenomenological ἐπιποχή. The resultant thematization of the object of the act, "which does not follow its thematic meaning (*Sinne*),<sup>2</sup> but rather makes the act itself the theme, so that the object of the act is also thematized in terms of the how of its being meant in the corresponding intention" (HCT, 99/136), is the account he gives of "bracketing."<sup>3</sup>

According to Heidegger, the modification of the entity that is the object of the transcendently directed lived-experience, such that "the entity is now considered (*betrachtet*) insofar as it is an object of intentionality" (Ibid), does not take anything away from the entity itself. Rather than maintain that the object is not, and simply have nothing more to do with it, what "in an extreme and unique way is precisely treated (*handelt*) is now the determination of the Being of the entity" (Ibid). Accordingly, Heidegger finds that "the phenomenological suspension of the transcendent thesis has but the sole function of making

the entity present (*präsent*) in regard to its Being" (Ibid). However, when the Being of the entity which manifests the structure of intentionality is considered in accord with Husserl's understanding of phenomenology, then

... it does not treat the Being characters (*Seinscharaktere*) of the intentional but the determination of the Being (*Seinsbestimmungen*) of intentionality; not the determination of the being of the entity which has the structure of intentionality, but the determination of the Being of the structure itself (*HCT*, 106/145).

And further, Heidegger maintains that this determination of the Being of intentionality does not emerge on the basis of an inquiry into "what it is which directs (*dirigiert*) the entire process of making this distinction of Being, in short, the meaning of Being" (*HCT*, 115/158).

§ 51. *The Failure of Husserl's Phenomenology to Investigate the Being Characters of the Intentional.*

Heidegger traces the failure of Husserl's phenomenology to investigate the Being characters of the intentional, to the meaning of the process of the phenomenological reductions. He characterizes the first stage of these in terms of the re-presenting of consciousness, such that in its individual acts "I do not go along with what their object is but perform the *ἐποχή* uniformly throughout the whole sphere of acts. I thus re-present acts and their objects in terms of how they are meant in the acts" (*HCT*, 99-100/136). This results in the reduction of the absorption in the world's transcendent thesis of the natural direction of acts to "the acts themselves present in their full structure" (*HCT*, 100/137). This reductive concern, with the 'structure' of the intentionality of lived-experiences, is crucial for Heidegger's immanent critique of Husserl's understanding of this phenomenon. For, in making no use of the reality (*Realität*) of the intentional, Heidegger maintains that Husserl's phenomenology moves away from the matters themselves involved in the essence (*Wesen*) of the Being of lived-experiences. This is to say, that its concern with the structure of the intentional is taken by Heidegger to be a determination of the phenomenon of the intentional that is limited to a making present of the "what (*Was*)" of its structure, at the expense of a possible thematization of the "way to be (*Weise zu sein*)" (*HCT*, 109/151) of the entity which manifests intentionality as its structure. Thus, Heidegger says that

... in its methodical (*methodischen*) meaning of a disregarding, then, the reduction is in principle inappropriate for determining the Being of consciousness positively. The meaning of the reduction involves precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the Being of the intentional could be raised (*HCT*, 109/150).

This inappropriateness of the reduction with respect to the issue of the phenomenal manifestation of the intentional entity, what, with the taking into account of Heidegger's clarification of the preliminary concept of phenomenology, may be called the 'ordinary phenomenon' involved in the encounter of this entity, comes into bold relief for him with the consideration of the second stage of phenomenological reductions, the eidetic reduction. While the initial, "so-called *transcendental reduction*" (*HCT*, 100/137) reduces the reality of the contexture of concrete lived-experiences to that of the singularity of the structure of "my stream of consciousness" (*Ibid*), with the eidetic reduction "every moment which specifies the individual stream as individual is now suspended"<sup>4</sup> (*Ibid*). Acts and their objects are now considered ideatively, which means for Heidegger their intentional structure is regarded only insofar as it manifests the structure of any lived-experience whatever, with regard for neither their reality nor concrete individuation. Heidegger writes:

At issue is not the particular individuation of a concrete intentional relation but the intentional structure as such, not the concretion of lived-experiences but their essential [what] structure, not the real Being of lived-experience but the ideal essential Being of consciousness itself, the a priori of lived-experiences in the sense of generic universal which in each case determines a class of lived-experience or its structural contexture (*HCT*, 106/146).

By thus merely bringing the what-content (*Wasgehalt*) to the fore, the being of acts with respect to their existence (*Existenz*) is not inquired into. Indeed, "not only is this question not raised in the reduction, the transcendental as well as the eidetic; it gets lost precisely through them" (*HCT*, 110/151-152). According to Heidegger, by limiting its inquiry to the what, the "I" can never experience anything about the meaning and manner of the "that it is (*Daß*)." Merely looking towards (*hinsehen*) the what, in accord with Husserl's understanding of the reductions, means for him "seeing the what as grasped, given, constituted" (*HCT*, 110/152). Such "a conception (*Auffassung*) of ideation as disregard of real individuation lives in the belief that the what of any entity is to be determined by disregarding its existence" (*Ibid*). Thus, for Heidegger, if there were an entity whose what "is

*precisely to be and nothing but to be*" (Ibid), then the ideative regard of such an entity "would be the most fundamental of misunderstandings" (Ibid). Before exploring Heidegger's understanding that Dasein is just such an entity, viz., the entity which manifests intentionality "as the essential structure" (MFL, 133/167)<sup>5</sup> of its existence, Heidegger's characterization of the lack of the phenomenal originality, which guides Husserl's determination of the Being of intentionality as a structure, needs to be considered. Again, mindful of his preliminary concept of phenomenology, what will be considered here is the ability of Husserl's phenomenology to encounter phenomena in terms of their deformed phenomenological manifestation.

§ 52. *The Return of Husserl's Phenomenology to the Idea of a Theory of Reason; its Resultant Inability to Determine the Being of Lived-Experiences in an Original Way.*

Heidegger maintains that Husserl's determination of the Being of intentionality does so in terms of the region in which the structure of consciousness "can become the possible object of an absolute science" (HCT, 107/147). This means that his determinations of the Being of intentionality as immanent, absolutely given, absolutely constituting, and pure, are

*...not attained phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. Thus none of the characters which emerge as determinations of the Being of lived-experience is an original character (Ibid).*

This traditional idea, is of course, the one that preoccupied modern philosophy since Descartes, and its influence is manifested according to Heidegger with respect to Husserl's exclusive treatment of consciousness within the horizon of the theory of reason.

Specifically, Heidegger maintains that each of the above determinations of the Being of the structure of intentionality, emerges only insofar as consciousness is formulated (*gestellt*) in terms of a regard which grasps it as a possible object of reflection. Thus, the determination of consciousness as 'immanent Being'

*... is here asserted of lived-experiences insofar as they are a possible object of a reflective grasping. Immanence is not a determination of the entity itself with regard to its Being, but a relation of two entities within the region of lived-experience or consciousness (HCT, 103/142).*



Likewise, the determination of consciousness as absolute Being in the sense of absolute givenness, as something which, in its contrast to the indirect givenness of the transcendent, is originally given, has its basis "with reference to its being grasped (*Erfaßtsseins*)" (*HCT*, 104/143).

This determination—absolutely given—does not refer to the mutual regional pertinence of the grasped and the grasping but now to the relation of a lived-experience as an object for another lived-experience (*ibid.*).

The determination of consciousness as absolute in the sense of '*nulla re indiget ad existendum*' (needs no other thing to exist), as a self-contained contexture of Being, is related by Heidegger to mean

. . . that consciousness is absolute in the sense that it is the presupposition of Being (*Seinsvoraussetzung*), on the basis of which reality can manifest (*bekunden*) itself. Transcendent Being is always given in presentation (*Darstellung*); indeed, it is presented precisely as the object of intentionality (*HCT*, 105/144).

All Being, as reality, thus 'is' only insofar as it is related to consciousness. Consciousness is therefore "regarded in its possible function as object of constituting consciousness" (*ibid.*). Indeed, as a constituting consciousness it has the determination of Being which is itself not constituted in any other consciousness, i.e., it is self-constituting. Consciousness in this sense means, then, the priority of every subjectivity over every objectivity. Thus absolute Being "once again does not determine the entity itself in its Being but rather sets the region of consciousness within the order of constitution and assigns to it in this order a formal role of being earlier than anything objective" (*HCT*, 105-106/145). In other words, according to Heidegger, consciousness is here considered within the context of a theory of reason, and is taken thus to be first in the sense of Descartes' and Kant's cognitive a priori.

And finally, the determination of consciousness as pure Being "is even less than the other three a characterization of the Being of the intentional, that is, of the entity which is determined by the structure of intentionality" (*HCT*, 106/145). This is the case, according to Heidegger, since the *sine qua non* for ideatively grasping the essential what-content of consciousness as a region of pure Being, requires that "every reality and reification (*Realisierung*) in it is disregarded" (*HCT*, 106/146). Thus, in Heidegger's view the purity of consciousness is determined as ideal and not real Being.

§ 53. *Husserl's Phenomenological Understanding of the 'Natural Attitude' is only a Semblance of Man's Natural Way of Being: its Neglect of the Necessary Posing of the Being Question.*

Now Heidegger realizes that Husserl's phenomenology has a ready response to his immanent critique of its move to the intentional a priori of lived-experiences. To wit, he relates that the reply can be made that the "sense of the reduction is *at first* precisely to disregard reality in order to then be able to consider it precisely as reality which manifests itself in pure consciousness, which I secure through the reduction" (HCT, 109/150). However, for Heidegger, this is insufficient for the question of the Being of the intentional, since the determination of the exemplary ground of the reductions does not originally bring into relief the way to be of the entity which is intentional. Heidegger maintains, then, that the original Being relationship (*Seinsverhältnis*) to this entity is thus *not* secured, in the point of departure for its reduction, by Husserl's phenomenology.

With respect to Husserl's point of departure, Heidegger's immanent critique asks one final question: Could the meaning of the intentional be experienced in the reality of what it takes as its exemplary field, the natural attitude, but thus far not have been brought into relief? In other words,

... if the Being, the "reality" of the intentional, is experienced in the natural attitude itself, then we need only to supplement the considerations of the intentional and of the reduction as we have understood it up to now; we now need to pose the question not only of the what-content, the structure of the acts, but also of the essence of their Being. The way to be would then be grasped in the natural attitude and also determined ideatively in its essence (HCT, 111/153).

However, such a supplementation is not possible in Heidegger's view, so long as man's natural way of experience is characterized in accord with Husserl's phenomenological understanding of the 'natural attitude'. The pertinent question for Heidegger is whether "man's way of experience *vis-à-vis* the other and himself, is for his natural way of consideration (*Betrachtungsart*) to experience himself as ζῶον, as a living being, in this broadest sense as an object of nature which occurs in the world" (HCT, 113/155)? Heidegger maintains that such experience is emphatically *unnatural*. As an 'attitude', it is something which one must "place oneself into (*hineinstellen*) . . . in order to experience in this way" (HCT, 113/156). Indeed, for Heidegger, man's natural way of experience "cannot be called an attitude" (*ibid*). Therefore, both this

attitude, and the specific experience of the Being of acts therein manifest only the "semblance (*Schein*)" (Ibid) of man's natural way of experience.

Thus, despite the fact that Husserl's phenomenology determines the Being of intentionality within the context of its scientific agenda, its failure to establish the relationship of Being so determined, to the original givenness of the entity which it purports to manifest such a determination of Being, points, for Heidegger, to two *immanent* fundamental neglects pertaining to the question of the Being so determined. In other words, Husserl's distinction between the transcendent Being manifesting itself in consciousness, and the immanent Being of consciousness itself, never raises, and so long as it remains in its cognitive attitude, *can never raise*, the *necessary* question concerning the meaning of Being which directs this ontological differentiation. The above considerations (of Heidegger's immanent critique of Husserl's account of the phenomenon of intentionality) thus serve to bring into relief the 'matters themselves' which enable him to conclude the following:

Two fundamental neglects pertaining to the question of Being can be identified [with respect to Husserl's account of intentionality]. On the one hand, the question of the Being of this specific entity, of the acts, is neglected; on the other, we have the neglect of the question about the meaning of Being itself (HCT, 115/159).

§ 54. *The Inquiry into the Being of Intentionality Requires the Phenomenon of Intentionality to be made into a Problem.*

This consideration of Heidegger's immanent critique of Husserl's account of the phenomenon of intentionality has shown the basis for his finding that the question of the Being of acts, i.e., of the *intentio* and *intentum* of the intentional relation, is something which *necessarily* arises from the 'matters themselves' of Husserl's own understanding of this phenomenon. Heidegger's execution of the task of inquiring into the Being of this relation, is, however, still to be discussed. Heidegger's initial discussion of the phenomenological need for inquiring into the Being of the *intentio* and *intentum* has been called the "first phase"<sup>6</sup> of his critique of intentionality. The actual inquiry itself, the "second phase,"<sup>7</sup> is what I will now turn my attention to.

In order to proceed with his inquiry into the Being of the intentional, Heidegger finds it necessary for "intentionality itself to become a problem" (MFL, 134/168). This is to be accomplished by "adhering to the natural meaning (*natürlichen Sinn*) of intentionality" (MFL, 134/168), and steering clear of erroneous "*objectivizing (Objektivierung)*" (BP,

65/91) and "subjectivizing (*Subjektivierung*)" (Ibid) of the intentional phenomenon. These misinterpretations are not accidental, according to Heidegger, but have their basis in the tendency of the entity which manifests the structure of intentionality, *Dasein*,

... to initially (*zunächst*) take into its grasp (*aufzufassen*) every entity, whether it be present-at-hand (*Vorhandenes*) in the sense of nature, or be such as to have the mode of being of the subject, as a present-at-hand entity and to understand it in the sense of presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) (*BP*, 66/92).

By showing how both the objectivizing and subjectivizing misinterpretations of intentionality are rooted in this ontological tendency toward concealment, of the Being of both the *intentio* and *intentum* of the natural sense of intentionality, Heidegger understands his phenomenological account of this phenomenon to prepare the way for the securing of the proper mode of access to the entity *Dasein*, and therewith the proper methodological point of departure for the ontological analysis of the Being of this entity—that is, to prepare the way for fundamental ontology. He writes:

In this way, the limitations of the earlier interpretation and function of the concept of intentionality become visible, as does its fundamental significance. This concept not only brings a modification of the traditional concepts of consciousness and spirit (*Geistesbegriffes*), but the radical formulation of the intentional phenomenon in an ontology of *Dasein* leads to a fundamental, "universal," overcoming (*Überwindung*) of this position (*MFL*, 134/168).

Heidegger's account of the objectivizing and subjectivizing misinterpretations of intentionality, finds "that the most dangerous and stubborn prejudices relative to the understanding of intentionality are not the explicit ones in the form of philosophical theories but the implicit ones that arise from the natural apprehension (*Auffassung*) and interpretation (*Deutung*) of things by the *Dasein*'s everyday good sense" (*BP*, 59/82). By making the attempt to see the phenomenon "straightforwardly (*schlicht*) and without prejudging" (Ibid), Heidegger's account of this phenomenon pursues this structure with the "particular regard (*Berücksichtigung*) to... how it is grounded ontologically in the basic composition of the *Dasein*" (Ibid). This is to say that, in accord with his understanding that a 'genuine method is based on an appropriate advance glance toward the basic composition of the 'object' ... to be disclosed' (see § 42 above), his phenomenological exhibition

and manifestation of the ontological ground of intentionality will be guided by its regard toward existence.

§ 55. *The Erroneous 'Objectivizing' of Intentionality.*

The intentional relation, in the sense of its being-directed-toward, "seems (*scheint*)" (BP, 60/83) to the everyday understanding, to be a present-at-hand relation between a perceiving psychic subject and a perceived physical object. Heidegger finds, implicit in this "pre-conceptual" (BP, 71/100) understanding, the tendency to interpret the basic structure of the intentional entity's comportment in terms of perception, and to take as the basis of this perceptual comportment the "being present-at-hand (*Vorhandenseins*)" (BP, 60/83) of the subject and object. Thus, the intentional relation is understood as something which first falls "to the subject with and through the being-present-at-hand of the object" (BP, 60/84). For Heidegger, that which shows itself in terms of this objective relation completely misses the phenomenal state of affairs of the *intentio*, in which "perceiving is intrinsically a comporting toward, a relationship to the object, whether that object is actually present-at-hand or only presumed (*vermeintlich*) as such" (Ibid). Such 'objectivizing' of intentionality, in its seeming to manifest the self-showing of this phenomenon, conceals according to Heidegger that "the subject is structured intentionally in itself" (Ibid). It thus completely misses "the essence as well as the mode of being of intentionality" (Ibid).

Specifically, in Heidegger's view,

... intentionality is, as the structure of comportments, itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. It is intrinsic to the way of being (*Seinsweise*) of the self-comporting subject as the *comportmental character* of this comportmental relationship (BP, 61/85).

However, this natural manifestation of the phenomenon of intentionality is such as to give rise to "a new misinterpretation to which non-phenomenological philosophy almost universally falls victim" (BP, 61/86). Rather than misinterpret the *intentio*, as does the objectivizing misinterpretation, this interpretation fails to manifest phenomenally "the *intentum*, that toward which the comportment directs itself" (BP, 62/87). While this interpretation manages to elude the misunderstanding of intentionality as an objective, present-at-hand relation between two present-at-hand entities, its understanding of the subject is characterized by a constructive theory, "in which one closes his eyes before

the phenomena and does not give an account of them themselves" (BP, 63/88).

§ 56. *The Erroneous 'Subjectivizing' of Intentionality.*

Since intentionality *appears* to belong to the subject, intentional compartments are understood in terms of an ego's immanent lived-experiences. As such, the intentional directing-one-self-toward *seems* to belong to the subjective sphere. According to Heidegger, "the ego here is something with a sphere in which its intentional lived-experiences are, as it were, encapsulated" (BP, 64/89). The problem becomes then, how can the ego and its intentional lived-experiences get outside its sphere of immanence and "take up a relation to the present-at-hand world . . . and what does this transcendence consist of" (BP, 61-62/86)? In particular, the problem seems to manifest itself in terms of how the immanent lived-experiences of sensations, representations, etc., or in short, the psychic, relates to the physical object?

However, Heidegger finds that when the phenomenological regard is liberated from the theoretical construction, which understands the *intentio* in terms of an object standing over and against the subject, its regard is able, although at first in a necessarily rough fashion, to exhibit the compartmental character of intentionality "according to its directional sense" (BP, 63/88). And with this, the attendant misunderstanding of the self-directedness of the *intentio* which subjectivizes intentionality, is also brought into relief. To wit, Heidegger finds that the towards which of the directedness of the *intentio* is not the psychic, for example, to sensations in perception, but to the perceived entity as something present-at-hand. Thus he can say:

The question as to how subjective intentional lived-experiences can on their part relate to something objectively present-at-hand is put completely the wrong way. I cannot and must not ask how the inner intentional lived-experience arrives at an outside. I cannot and must not put the question in that way because intentional compartment itself as such orients itself toward the present-at-hand. I do not first need to ask how the immanent lived-experience acquires transcendent validity; rather, what has to be seen is that it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which *transcendence* consists (*besteht*) (BP, 63/89).

Heidegger is quick to qualify this *apparent* equation of intentionality and transcendence by saying that "this does not yet provide an adequate elucidation of intentionality and transcendence" (Ibid). And

the basis for this qualification will soon become evident, with his exhibition of the limited understanding of Being which lies concealed in perceptual comportment, viz., with his uncovering of intentionality as an "ontic transcending comportment" (*MFL*, 143/168).<sup>8</sup>

Since the usual separation of an immanent subject and transcendent object is constructive, and carries with it the distinction between an inner and an outer sphere,

... we shall in the future no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the entity to whom intentional comportments belongs as *Dasein*, and indeed in such a way that it is precisely with the aid of *intentional comportment*, properly understood, that we attempt to characterize the Being of *Dasein* in one of its basic compositions (*BP*, 64/90).

Heidegger's qualification here of intentionality as 'one of' *Dasein*'s basic compositions should be noted well and amplified. The intentional phenomenon at issue here for him is neither the contemporary understanding of intentionality, within the context of the theory of reason, nor its erroneous objectivizing or subjectivizing. Rather, what his account of the Being of the *intentio* and *intantum* is beginning to unfold, is the phenomenal relation, of the way of being of the entity which manifests the essential structure of intentionality, to the natural meaning of this structure itself. Guided by the advance glance toward 'existence' as this entity's way of being, Heidegger notes that "a distinguishing feature between the existent [*Dasein*] and the present-at-hand is found precisely in intentionality" (*Ibid*). The significance of the indefinite article "a (*ein*)" is crucial here, since although intentionality is a structure of existent subject (*Dasein*), it is "not the most original structure of the subject [*Dasein*] itself" (*BP*, 65/92). Heidegger's characterization and overcoming of the above misinterpretations of intentionality, thus brings into relief the phenomenal situation wherein the intentional structure of *Dasein*, when exhibited, not in terms of a 'what-content' of an existentially pure region, but in terms of the existential way to be of the exemplary entity to which intentionality as a structure belongs, manifests the essential structure of *Dasein*'s ontic transcendence of entities, i.e., of entities which it understands to be present-at-hand. In Heidegger's words, "*Dasein* exists, means, among other things, that the *Dasein* is in such a way that in being it comports itself towards what is present-at-hand but not toward it as something subjective" (*BP*, 64/90). *Dasein* is thus *already* being-by (*Sein-bei*) entities by virtue of the natural meaning of the intentional structure of its comportments.

§ 57. *The Manifestation of the Natural Meaning of the Phenomenon of Intentionality Overcomes the Problem of the Subject-object Relation, and Points to the Problem of Transcendence.*

Heidegger's phenomenological insight into Dasein's existential way to be, such that "in so far as it is, it is always already dwelling with the present-at-hand" (Ibid), is understood by him to be "the presupposition for expressly making intentionality into a problem" (Ibid). While intentionality is thus brought into view "only approximately" (Ibid), the positive phenomenal result is nevertheless secured wherein the problem of the relation between the subject and object vanishes as a "semblance problem (*Scheinproblem*)" (MFL, 134/168). As a result of this, Heidegger finds that underneath this so-called problem "is the undiscussed problem of *transcendence*" (MFL, 135/169).

By submitting the natural meaning of the being directed-toward of intentionality to further phenomenological scrutiny, Heidegger's inquiry into the Being of its *intentio* and *intantum*, will find that its perceptual comportment toward the present-at-hand, is "founded (*fundiert*)" (BP, 72/102) in Dasein's already understanding the mode of being of what is intended in the *intantum*. And by probing the phenomenal originality of Dasein's perceptual comportment against the phenomenal background of Dasein's understanding of Being, which "gives the ground, the foundation" (BP, 72/102) for such comportment, Heidegger will exhibit, at once, the ontic limitedness of perceptual comportment as a mode of Dasein's transcendence and the ground of its possibility in "original transcendence" (MFL, 135/170). Heidegger refers to this original transcendence as Dasein's "being-in-the-world," and endeavors to show how this "primal transcendence (*Urtranszendenz*) makes possible every intentional relation toward entities" (Ibid). Thus, for Heidegger, the "problem of transcendence as such (*überhaupt*) is not identical with the problem of intentionality" (Ibid). And, within the problematic of securing the proper mode of access to the entity Dasein, with the aim of bringing into relief the Being of this entity, these findings will manifest what he takes to be the phenomenal basis for the inappropriateness of understanding intentionality as *the* most original structure of Dasein's existential way to be.

§ 58. *The Understanding of Being Implicit in the Phenomenon of the Natural Meaning of Intentionality.*

Heidegger characterizes the perceptual grasping manifested by the natural meaning of intentionality in terms of its implicit "aim to dis-



cover (*entdecken*) what is perceived [i.e., the present-at-hand entity], in such a way that it shows itself from itself (*daß es sich an sich selbst zeigt*)" (BP, 69/97). As such, the "perceivedness (*Wahrgenommenheit*)" of its object is nothing objective in the object, but rather "belongs to perceptual intentional comportment" (BP, 69/98). Accordingly, Heidegger writes:

Perceiving discovers the present-at-hand and lets it be encountered in the way of specific *discovering*. Perception takes from the present-at-hand its coveredness (*Verdecktheit*) and releases it so that it can show itself from itself (BP, 70/98).

Dasein thus exists (although unoriginally) as this specific discovering, transcending the present-at-hand such that "the mode of the possible discoveredness of the present-at-hand entity in perception must already be traced out (*vorgezeichnet*) in the perceiving itself" (BP, 70/99). Indeed, the necessity of this antecedent tracing out is something which Heidegger finds can be phenomenally shown as being included in the perceptual *intentio* itself, such that "the *intentio* itself includes an understanding of presence-at-hand, even if it is only pre-conceptual" (BP, 71/100).

Heidegger does not understand this a priori understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*) already lying in the intentionality of perception in terms of measured clock time, i.e., as something sequential which must first occur before the perceived can be discovered and thereby encountered as something present-at-hand, but rather, in terms of Dasein's basic composition. Dasein, as existing, already understands the mode of being of the present-at-hand to which it comports itself, "regardless of how far this present-at-hand entity is discovered and whether or not it is or is not adequately and suitably discovered" (Ibid). Heidegger speaks of this understanding of Being in terms of the "disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) given in the understanding (*Verständnis*) of presence-at-hand" (Ibid). In this disclosive understanding, the meaning of presence-at-hand is uncovered, laid open in such a way that "with respect to its possibility, *perceivedness is grounded in the understanding of presence-at-hand*" (BP, 71/101).

§ 59. *The Intentional Discovery of Entities is Founded in the Disclosedness of the Being of Entities.*

Thus, Heidegger's phenomenological exhibition of the natural meaning of perceptual intentionality finds that it manifests not only "*intentio* and *intentum*, but with similar originality, a mode of discov-

eredness of the *intentum* discovered in the *intentio*" (Ibid). From the "grounds of this state of affairs" (BP, 72/102), he then distinguishes between "the discoveredness of an entity and the disclosedness of its Being" (Ibid). Heidegger's inquiry into the Being of intentionality has shown that the former state of affairs is founded in the latter state of affairs. Which is to say, that the disclosedness of the Being manifested in the understanding of presence-at-hand, provides the ground for the intentional discovery of entities as something present-at-hand. Intentionality, as the structure of Dasein's being directed toward entities, is therefore grounded ontologically in Dasein's existential disclosedness of the Being of these entities. Since, however, this disclosedness of Being has thus far been exhibited within the context of Dasein's perceptual comportment toward, and therefore access to, entities, Heidegger maintains that the understanding of entities in terms of their presence-at-hand needs to be probed further, in order to: (1) determine whether the disclosedness manifested therein is appropriate to all entities in general, and to the entity (Dasein) which exists in particular and; (2), if not, to manifest the peculiar disclosedness of Dasein's existential way to be, such that the phenomenal derivation of the structure of its intentional comportment from this original disclosedness will be brought into phenomenal relief.

Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of intentionality therefore comes again up against the problem of transcendence. That toward which the perceptual *intentio* transcends, discovered entities, has been brought into relief within the phenomenal context of the 'toward which' that the entity that manifests the structure of intentionality transcends, the understanding of the Being of such entities. Since this perceptual toward which is limited to grasping entities, the status of its transcendence is considered to be ontic by Heidegger. The question then emerges, whether the particular ontological transcendence towards presence-at-hand, which perceptual comportment manifests, is the most original transcendence of Dasein's existence. That is to say, Is the toward which of *Seinsverständnis* manifested as presence-at-hand, that toward which Dasein's essential way to be originally "moves"? Heidegger's methodical advance glance toward Dasein's existential being with entities finds that this is far from the case. Rather than exist originally toward entities understood, either individually or as a totality, to be present-at-hand, Heidegger finds that Dasein exists originally toward the world (MFL, 166/212). As such, Dasein is characterized by him in terms of its essential being-in-the-world, wherein world signifies neither the totality of natural entities nor those entities which Dasein has produced as implements (*Zeug*) for use. World for Heidegger "is not a way of characterizing those entities

which Dasein essentially is *not*; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself" (BT, 92/64).

However, in order to characterize positively the phenomenon of Dasein's being-in-the-world, and therewith Dasein's original transcendence, Heidegger finds it necessary to show precisely how it is that Dasein's perceptual intentional comportment, and the epistemological theories grounded therein, manifest a founded mode of being-in-the-world. This necessity stems for Heidegger from the tendency, already noted in a slightly different context, of Dasein to "initially get its ontological understanding of itself from those entities and their Being which it itself is *not* but which it encounters 'within' its world" (BT, 85/58). With the phenomenal uncovering of the basis for this concealing tendency, the way will be prepared for bringing into relief the complex phenomenal relationship between intentionality and original transcendence, and therewith the proper mode of access to Dasein's existential way of being.

#### § 60. Summary and Transition.

Chapter Six has traced Heidegger's account of what he understands to be the necessity of inquiring into the Being of the phenomenon of intentionality. This necessity initially emerges from out of what he takes to be an immanent critique of Husserl's non-phenomenal, epistemological narrowing of this phenomenon. On the one hand, Husserl takes, in his view, as his exemplary point of departure (for phenomenologically investigating intentionality), a phenomenally non-original cognitive attitude (Husserl's "natural attitude"). The entity that manifests intentionality as its structure assumes, rather than manifests *qua* the 'matters themselves', this attitude in accord with the theory of reason. On the other hand, the Being of the intentional structure of the exemplary entity considered thus is investigated *only insofar* as it can be 'grasped', which is to say, *only insofar* as it can be immanently known. Therefore, according to Heidegger, the question of the mode of being of the original terms (*viz.*, the *intentio* and *intentum*) of the entity that manifests intentionality as its structure, *as well as* the Being of the structure of intentionality that they manifest, *remains one that phenomenology, so long as it remains in the cognitive attitude, can never raise.*

For Heidegger, raising the question of the Being of intentionality requires that the phenomenon of intentionality first be made into a problem. Toward this end, Heidegger proceeds to unfold what he understands to be the natural meaning of this phenomenon. He uncovers this by bringing into relief the effects of the tendency of the entity

(viz., Dasein) that manifests intentionality, as a structure of its mode of being, to understand itself in terms of "those entities and their Being which it itself is *not* but which it encounters 'within' its world." Heidegger characterizes these effects in terms the erroneous "objectivizing" and "subjectivizing" of the natural meaning of intentionality. The former misunderstands intentionality in terms of the cognitive relation between a present-at-hand subject and present-at-hand object. Intentionality is misconceived thus as an objective 'being directed towards'. The latter misunderstands intentionality in terms of the relation between an immanent subject and transcendent object. Intentionality is then misconceived as a subjective 'being directed towards'.

Once these two erroneous tendencies are brought into relief, they can be overcome in Heidegger's view, and with this, the natural meaning of intentionality can be disclosed. As such, intentionality manifests an understanding of Being in terms of the perceivedness of objects. Phenomenally, this being character of intentionality belongs to the mode of being of Dasein, *not* objects. Indeed, for Heidegger another term for such comportment is "transcendence." Having disclosed the connection of intentionality's natural meaning and the phenomenon of transcendence, two important results emerge according to Heidegger. The first is that the problem of the relation between the subject and object vanishes: Dasein, as a result of the natural meaning of its intentional mode of being, always already *is* "being-by" entities. The second result concerns the issue of whether the natural meaning of intentionality, as the disclosedness of objects in terms of their perceivedness, is fundamental or not with respect to the understanding of Being manifested by Dasein's basic composition. According to Heidegger this is most emphatically *not* the case. Heidegger's investigation of what he considers to *be* fundamental in this regard, viz., Dasein's original transcendence manifested qua its most basic mode of being, "being-in-the-world," will comprise the next subject of my discussion.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### BEING IN THE WORLD MANIFESTS DASEIN'S ORIGINAL TRANSCENDENCE

#### § 61. *Introductory Remarks.*

According to Heidegger, "being-in-the-world is the *basic composition* (*Grundverfassung*) of Dasein" (MFL, 169/217). As such, it belongs to the essence (*Wesen*) of Dasein that insofar as "Dasein factually (*faktisch*) exists, then its existence has the structure of being-in-the-world" (MFL, 169/217). This means that being-in-the-world is not something which structures Dasein's existence only on certain occasions, but rather that "it must always already have been ontically experienced" (BT, 86/59). The pertinent question that Heidegger asks with respect to this structure is whether knowing (*erkennen*) the world, in the sense of the perception of natural entities, is phenomenally sufficient to establish being-in-the-world as the basic composition of Dasein? More precisely put, the question is one of whether the "already being-alongside-the-world (*Schon-bei-der-Welt*)" (BT, 88/61) constitutive of Dasein's Being is phenomenally manifested as "just a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand" (Ibid)?

Heidegger finds that "initially" being-in-the-world manifests Dasein's concerned absorption (*benommen*) in the world with which it is concerned. He characterizes this in terms of Dasein's everyday involvement (*Bewandtnis*) in producing, handling, and utilizing implements (*Zeug*) within its environing world (*Umwelt*). According to Heidegger, these concerned dealings are guided by a pre-theoretical circumspective viewing of entities "which does not discover them for the first time but finds them as somehow already liberated or laid free"<sup>1</sup> within a "matrix of meaningful relations."<sup>2</sup> These meaningful relations manifest the initial disclosedness of the phenomenon of the world, which as the "'laying open' (*aufschließen*)" and 'the character

of having been laid open' (*Aufgeschlossenheit*)" (BT, 105/75) of entities "is inaccessible to circumspection insofar as circumspection is always aimed toward entities" (Ibid). Thus Heidegger says that "the analysis of useful things (*Gebrauchsdinge*) and their contexture yields precisely the basis (*Anhalt*) and way for first making the phenomenon of the world visible" (MFL, 181/233).

§ 62. *Perceptual Knowing is a Founded Mode of Being-in-the-world; the Foundation of Epistemology in the Ontology of Presence-at-hand.*

When there is a deficiency in Dasein's concerned having to do with the world, in the sense of concern holding itself back from any kind of producing, handling, etc., Heidegger finds that "concern settles into the sole remaining mode of being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside . . . (*Nur-noch-verweilen bei . . .*)" (BT, 88/61). He writes:

This kind of being (*Seinsart*) toward the world lets innerworldly entities be encountered exclusively in their pure appearance (*Aussehen*) (εἶδος); and as the mode of this kind of being, looking toward the appearance of what is encountered is possible (Ibid).

Looking at something in this way is characterized by Heidegger in terms of the determinate taking of a direction toward entities such that they are aimed at (*Anvisieren*) as something present-at-hand. This looking "gathers from the entity so encountered a 'viewpoint' (*Gesichtspunkt*) from the outset (*Vorhinein*) . . . [which] brings about the mode of independent dwelling alongside innerworldly entities" (Ibid), such that they are always already understood in terms of "pure presence-at-hand" (BT, 103/73). According to Heidegger, it is in this kind of being-in, exhibited as a concerned dwelling which holds back from any handling or utilizing, that the perception of the present-at-hand, as the cognitive basis for natural knowledge, is brought about.

Knowing then, as a mode of being in the world which determines entities as present-at-hand on the basis of the advance glance of an understanding of presence-at-hand, does not bring about for the first time the existential situation wherein Dasein is already being-alongside-the-world. It is rather the case that Dasein's pre-cognitive being-in-the-world, in which Dasein transcends entities toward the circumspectively inaccessible phenomenon of the world, provides the phenomenal foundation for the perceptual mode of knowing the natural 'world' (qua innerworldly entities).

Without discussing any further, at this point, Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, the phenomenal basis for his

initially finding the rational epistemological theory of Husserl's phenomenology to be ultimately concealing of the natural meaning of intentionality, and therewith of the proper mode of access to Dasein's original existential way to be, can be brought into relief. Heidegger maintains that the epistemological understanding of the directedness of the *intentio*, an understanding which has as its 'toward which' (*intentum*) the (ontic) discovery of entities present-at-hand, has its phenomenal basis precisely in perceptual knowing as a founded mode of being-in-the-world. Hence, in Husserl's understanding of "θεωρία, *intuitus*, essential seeing (*Wesenschau*), a recourse is had to a consciousness that looks,<sup>3</sup> a recourse so incapable of solving the problem of transcendence, that it is not even capable of seeing the phenomenon of transcendence" (*MFL*, 182/234-235). By merely looking, Husserl's understanding of intentionality can only grasp the entity which manifests this structure in terms of its discovery as an object with the ontological meaning of presence-at-hand. Its comportmental way to be, in terms of its being-in-a-world already disclosed in a way phenomenally prior to all ontic discovery, is thus concealed from its intuitive regard from the start. The proper way of access to Dasein's existential way to be is thus precluded in advance to the seeing of essences, on the basis of the hidden understanding of all entities in terms of their pure presence-at-hand. Original transcendence, in the sense of being-in-the-world, thus cannot be packed "into intuition (*Anschaung*) . . . because it is not even an ontic comportment . . . Transcendence lies before every possible way of comporting in general, before νόησις" (*MFL*, 183/236) and thus before Husserl's phenomenological understanding of intentionality as the object of theoretical cognition.

These considerations lead Heidegger to conclude that "the previous concept of intentionality is shown to be a narrowed conception . . . [in which] intentionality is grasped as an indifferent characteristic of knowing" (*MFL*, 134/168-169). And further, to find that because of this narrowing "the inclination to take self-grasping as an inwardly directed ontic intentionality" (*MFL*, 134/169) is manifested. Heidegger summarizes his findings regarding the traditional concept of intentionality as follows:

- 1) it is only an ontic transcendence; 2) it touches on existing compartments to entities only with a specific restriction; 3) it comes to view only in the narrowing theoretical conception, as νόησις (*MFL*, 135/169).

§ 63. *Summary of the Phenomenal Results of Heidegger's Analyses thus far which Lead him to Recast both Phenomenology's Basic Field of Research and the Method by which it Proceeds.*

At this juncture of the discussion of Heidegger's phenomenological account of intentionality, the 'matters themselves' of this account which move him to recast phenomenology's agenda may be secured by bringing into relief the results of the discussion thus far, within the context of his concern with the question about the meaning of Being. Heidegger's uncovering of what he maintains to be the hidden, and phenomenally restricted, ontological understanding implicit in Husserl's account of the phenomenon of intentionality motivates him to recast both phenomenology's primary field of research, and the method by which this research proceeds.

Since for Heidegger, Husserl's account of intentionality is restricted to its phenomenal manifestation as the structure of perceptual comportment, which his analysis uncovers as a founded, and therefore unoriginal mode of being-in-the-world, the originality and priority ascribed to this phenomenon by Husserl's understanding is called into question. This questionableness demands, on the basis of the very meaning of the phenomenon as it is characterized in Husserl's understanding, an inquiry, according to Heidegger, into both the mode of being of the entity which manifests this phenomenon and the meaning of Being that is disclosed in this entity's understanding of Being. Hence, the recasting of phenomenology's primary field of research which Heidegger finds to be ontologically necessary.

Inasmuch as Husserl's characterizations of the phenomenological method are restricted to the theoretical seeing of essences, understood in terms of the pure presence-at-hand of the 'what' manifested by entities when they are encountered as being present-at-hand, Heidegger finds that this method must be recast if phenomenology's newly uncovered primary field of research is to be secured in the mode of access proper to it. This is the case, for Heidegger, since the analysis of the mode of being of the comportmental 'looking' which guides the theoretical seeing of essences, has uncovered its tendency to conceal any manifestation of the Being of entities other than the way in which they appear as something knowable, a priori, as presence-at-hand. Hence Heidegger's understanding of a 'genuine' method, in terms of its advance glance or regard toward the appropriate basic composition and mode of being of the 'object' to be methodically considered—which means for him that phenomenology and ontology are *not* mutually exclusive, as they *seem* to be for Husserl's self-understanding of phenomenology. But rather, the methodological 'how' designated by phenomenology's methodological conception must somehow anticipate



the ontological character of the 'object' it is to secure in the mode of phenomenon.

Heidegger's provisional account of the 'objects' of ontology and the need for their being hermeneutically wrested from their concealment in order to show themselves in the mode of phenomena, which is discussed above in Chapter Five, will become less provisional in the following discussion of his concrete inquiry into the mode of being of Dasein. For the purposes of the present study, Heidegger's exhibition of the positive phenomenal content of Dasein's basic composition as being-in-the-world, will be considered only insofar as it is relevant for bringing into relief his account of the complex phenomenal relationship between the phenomenon of intentionality and its original ontological foundation. It is to the relevant aspects of this account that I will now turn the discussion.

§ 64. *Heidegger's Analysis of Dasein's Existential Way of Being the 'There': the Equiprimordial Existentialia of the Disclosedness of the Unitary Phenomenon of Being-in-the world.*

Heidegger's phenomenological analytic of Dasein is guided by the aim of bringing to self-showing the existence structure (*Existenzstruktur*) of this entity. Since the Being characters (*Seinscharaktere*) of Dasein are determined by this existentiality, Heidegger calls them "*existentialia*." These are sharply differentiated from the 'categories' of the tradition, which according to him refer to the 'what' or presence-at-hand of entities with a Being character other than existence. Heidegger maintains that "the connection between these two modes of Being characters cannot be dealt with until the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified" (*BT*, 71/45).

Heidegger's provisional account of the structure of existence, which traced this structure on the basis of clues gleaned from his consideration of the structure of the question about the meaning of Being, begins to acquire its 'authentic exhibition' (see § 41 above) on the basis of the manifestation of Dasein's *existentialia*. Indeed, it is in this context that he refers to this provisional account as "what was dogmatically posited earlier" (*BT*, 188/147). Within the framework of the present study of Heidegger's account of the ontological foundation of intentionality, the *existentialia* which manifest the *Daß* and *Seinsverständnis* of Dasein's way to be will be considered. The exhibition of the structures of existence are understood by Heidegger to bring into phenomenal relief the way in which Dasein, qua existing, "is in the way of being its 'there'" (*BT*, 171/133). The 'there' of Dasein is characterized in terms of the "clearing (*Lichtung*)" (*Ibid*) wherein Dasein, as being-in-the-

world, is 'cleared' such that the encounter with entities, both unlike and like the entity Dasein, is possible. It is in this sense that Heidegger says that "*Dasein is its disclosedness*" (Ibid). Which is to say, all ontic transcendence is "only possible on the basis of original transcendence, on the basis of *being-in-the-world*" (MFL, 135/170).

According to Heidegger, the phenomenal character of being-in-the-world "is a structure which is originally and constantly *whole*" (BT, 225/180). And while it is essential that this wholeness not be lost sight of during the analysis of its structure, this "*unified*" (Ibid) phenomenon nevertheless can, in his view, be exhibited in accord with its manifold moments. Such moments, if they show themselves to be constitutive of the Being characters of the phenomenon at issue, are what Heidegger then calls "*equiprimordial (gleichursprünglich)*" (BT, 170/131), in the sense that the explicit methodical exhibition of one such moment phenomenally implies the manifestation of other such moments. The *existentialia* relevant to the ontological foundation of intentionality, that of 'disposition' (*Befindlichkeit*) and 'understanding', are considered by Heidegger to be equiprimordially disclosive of the 'there' manifested by Dasein's being-in-the-world.

§ 65. *Disposition as the Existentialia Disclosive of the 'that-it-is' of Dasein's Way to be.*

Heidegger finds that the 'that-it-is (*Daß*)' of the there of Dasein's being-in-the-world shows itself in the ontic mood (*Stimmung*) which Dasein always has. He writes:

In having a mood, Dasein is always already disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been surrendered (*überantwortet*) in its Being, and which it, in existing, has to be (BT, 173/134).

To be disclosed does not refer here to being known as such, but rather refers to something which Dasein does not know, since "the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the original disclosure belonging to moods" (Ibid). Indeed, it is precisely the veiled (*verhüllten*) 'whence' (*Woher*) and 'whither' (*Wohin*) of the "that it is and has to be" (Ibid) of Dasein's existence that is disclosed to it in its moods, which brings into relief what Heidegger calls the "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*) of Dasein's being surrendered in its Being. This term indicates the pre-cognitive and pre-volitional 'facticity' of Dasein's existence.

By bringing into phenomenal relief (in the sense of the ordinary signification of phenomenon) the ontic "being attuned (*Gestimmtsein*)"

(Ibid) to the 'that it is' manifested by Dasein's moods, Heidegger is also able to consider the ontological meaning of what is manifested therein, in the sense of the exhibition of the phenomenal (in the sense of the deformalized signification of phenomenon) structure of moods. The exhibition of this structure has the status, within the existential analytic, of an *existentiale*, and is termed 'disposition' (*Befindlichkeit*) by Heidegger. Disposition is an original mode of being (*Seinsart*) for Dasein, such that its 'there' is always already disclosed, moodwise, as something that is phenomenally prior to anything which immanent reflection can come across in terms of psychic lived-experiences. Indeed, "disposition is so little reflected (*reflektiert*) that it overtakes (*überfällt*) Dasein precisely in its reflectionless (*reflexionslosen*) submission and expending itself in the world of its concern" (BT, 175-176/136). This negative distinction between disposition and the reflective grasping of something inwardly psychic brings into phenomenal relief "a positive insight" (BT, 176/136) regarding the disclosive character of disposition. Heidegger writes: "The mood has already disclosed in every instance being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes possible first of all a self-directedness toward . . ." (BT, 176/137). Thus, not only does disposition show itself as the existential structure of the disclosedness of the 'that it is' of Dasein's way to be, but with this disclosedness the current world of Dasein's concern is equiprimordially disclosed as well.

These two "essential determinations" (Ibid) of disposition also allow for a third essential determination of this *existentiale* to be exhibited. The aspect of the prior disclosedness of the world, which mood is disclosive of, determines Dasein's concerned encounter with entities in such a way that "what it encounters within-the-world can 'matter' to it" (Ibid). According to Heidegger, this is the case not only in Dasein's circumspective dealings with implements, in which it is always "affected in some way" (Ibid) by these dealings, but also in the case with Dasein's senses (*die Sinne*), whose affections (*Affektion*) matter for it even though they are manifested in a different phenomenal context. In either case, access to 'what matters' is precluded to the comportment which just stares or senses what is discovered within the world, since the phenomenal condition for 'what matters' is to be found in the prior disclosedness whose manifestation is structured by disposition.

§ 66. *Original Understanding as the Existential Disclosive of the Pre-conceptual Understanding of Being Manifested by Dasein's Way to be.*

Equiprimordial with disposition, which Heidegger considers to be "one of the existential structures in which the Being of the 'there' holds itself" (BT, 182/142), is understanding. According to him, disposition always has its understanding, and understanding always has its mood. The understanding at issue here for Heidegger is of course not 'understanding' in the sense of one possible mode of cognition among others, but rather the "primary" (BT, 182/143) understanding which has "already anticipated understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*)... [although] not ontologically conceived it" (BT, 187/147).

Heidegger's analysis finds that Dasein's ontic capacity-for-being (*Seinskönnen*), which manifests itself in terms of its existence being an issue for it, shows itself (qua the ordinary signification of phenomenon) equiprimordially in the disclosedness of its being "toward itself (*zu ihm selbst*)" (BT, 183/143) and in the matrix of meaningful relations (*Bedeutsamskeit*), which its concern with the enviroing world discloses along with this. Heidegger refers to both of these moments of disclosedness as "the original understanding" (Ibid) which Dasein's factual existence manifests. He refers to Dasein's ontic being toward itself as that 'for-the-sake-of which' (*Worumwillen*) Dasein is, and finds that "in the 'for-the-sake-of-which' existing being-in-the-world is disclosed as such" (BT, 182/143). Thus, Heidegger says that

... the disclosedness of understanding, as the equiprimordial disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" and the matrix of meaningful relations, pertains to the entirety of being-in-the-world (Ibid).

The structure of this understanding, as an *existential*, is not versed (*Gekonnte*) in a 'what', but in Being as existing. It shows itself (qua the deformed signification of phenomenon) in the existentiality of Dasein's mode of being, which is to say, in the essential structure of its capacity-for-being. Heidegger characterizes this in terms of the essential being-possible (*Möglichsein*) which being-in-the-world manifests. Heidegger maintains that this being-possible is to be "differentiated from the empty logical possibility and contingency of something present-at-hand, insofar as the present-at-hand is something which can come 'to pass'" (BT, 183/143). Rather, the being-possible of Dasein's capacity-for-being manifests itself in terms of the necessity of the possibility which is the "most original and ultimate positive ontological determination that belongs to Dasein" (BT, 183/143-144). The possibility which shows itself thus does not signify,

for Heidegger, a free-floating (*freischwebende*) possibility for Being in the sense of a "liberty of indifference" (BT, 183/144). On the contrary, in accord with the essential disclosedness of disposition, possibility manifests Dasein's always already having "fallen into (*hineingeraten*) definite possibilities" (Ibid). As such, Heidegger characterizes this possibility as a thrown possibility, in which "Dasein is the possibility of being free for its ownmost capacity-for-being" ().

§ 67. *Projection as an Existential Manifested by Original Understanding.*

Heidegger finds that "understanding is the Being of such capacity-for-being" (BT, 184/144), which as possible, is never something still outstanding in the sense of being not yet present-at-hand, but rather 'is' with the existential Being of Dasein. This understanding 'knows' what its capacity-for-being is capable of, in the sense that it "belongs to the Being of the 'there' which is essentially understanding" (Ibid). As such, Heidegger maintains that "this 'knowing' does not first arise from an immanent self-perception" (Ibid). Rather, it always pertains to the whole basic composition of being-in-the-world, such that "not only is world qua world disclosed in terms of its possible matrix of relations, but the releasing (*Freigabe*) of the innerworldly itself yields this entity as free towards its *own* possibilities" (Ibid). This surge (*dringt*) of the understanding into possibilities points, for Heidegger, to "the existential structure which the understanding has in itself, which we call 'projection' (*Entwurf*)" (BT, 184-185/145).

Heidegger finds that understanding projects Dasein's Being with equal originality upon both its 'for-the-sake-of-which' and the matrix of meaningful relations of its enviroing world. Heidegger writes:

The projective character of understanding constitutes being-in-the-world with respect to the disclosedness of its there as the there belonging to the capacity-to-be. Projection is the existential composition of the being (*Seinsverfassung*) of the leeway (*Speitraum*) belonging to the factual capacity-for-being (BT, 185/145).

As such, the 'projecting' at issue here has nothing to do with 'possibilities' understood in terms of a thought out plan or the thematic grasping of that upon which it projects. Rather, as existing, Dasein has itself always already projected, and insofar as Dasein continues to exist, it is projecting. Thus, according to Heidegger, "as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the projective mode of being" (Ibid). Heidegger considers projection to be an *existeniale*, and maintains that because of this mode

of being "Dasein is constantly 'more' than it factually (*tatsächlich*) is . . . [although it] is never more than it factually (*faktisch*) is" (Ibid).

Since the understanding, in its projective character, "pertains to the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world" (BT, 186/146) (i.e., to the 'for-the-sake-of-which' and the matrix of meaningful relations of the enviroing world), "it corresponds to the clearedness" (BT, 187/147) which characterizes the disclosedness of the 'there'. Heidegger relates that in its correspondence to the disclosedness of the 'there', the projective character of the understanding makes up (*ausmachen*) existentially what is called Dasein's "sight (*Sicht*)" (BT, 186/146). He writes:

With the disclosedness of the "there," this sight is existentially (*existenzial seiende*); and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in accord with the basic ways (*Grundweisen*) of its Being (Ibid).

Thus Dasein is this sight "as the circumspection of concern . . . [and] as sight towards Being as such, for the sake of which Dasein is at any time how it is" (Ibid).

In order to maintain a connection with the traditional orientation of philosophy toward 'seeing' as the way of access to entities and to Being, Heidegger maintains that "one may formalize 'sight' and 'seeing' enough to obtain therewith a universal term for characterizing any access in general to entities and to Being" (BT, 187/147). However, he is quick to point out that all 'sight' is grounded primarily in understanding, which means that the traditional conceptions of cognitive seeing, including those of Husserl's understanding phenomenological cognition, are derivatives of the phenomenon of existential understanding. Thus he can say that

. . . pure intuition, which corresponds noetically to the traditional ontological priority of the present-at-hand, has been deprived of its priority. "Intuition" and "thinking" are both already remote derivatives of understanding. Even the phenomenological "seeing of essences" is grounded in existential understanding. Determining anything about this kind of seeing requires first securing explicit concepts of Being and its structures, such as only phenomena in the phenomenological sense can become (Ibid).

§ 68. *The Understanding's Appropriation of Itself: Interpretation (Auslegung).*

In order to bring more concretely into phenomenal relief the full disclosedness of the 'there', Heidegger's analysis exhibits the development of the understanding as a capacity-for-being. According to him, this development manifests itself in terms of the way in which disclosed possibilities, which Dasein as understanding projects its Being toward, "recoil upon Dasein as a capacity-for-being" (BT, 188/148). The ensuing development of understanding Heidegger terms 'interpretation' (*Auslegung*), of which he says:

In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation the understanding does not become something different, rather, it becomes itself. Interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not emerge from the former (*Ibid.*).

Heidegger understands his analysis of the interpretative development of understanding to provide the phenomenal basis for the circularity belonging to the being of the questioner, which his provisional inquiry into the structure of the question about the meaning of Being initially encountered (see § 39 above). And, as the discussion to follow will show, this circularity, maintained by Heidegger to be manifested by the basic composition of Dasein's interpretative *Seinsverständnis*, will be taken by him as the phenomenal basis for the methodological character of the existential analytic as such; that is, for the explicitly ontological Interpretation (*Interpretation*) of the 'existentiality of existence' as it is guided by the inquiry about the meaning of Being.

Heidegger's analysis of the interpretative development of understanding pursues this phenomenon with respect to only one of the understanding's equally original projections,<sup>4</sup> to wit, with respect to its projective understanding of the world. In accord with the preparatory nature of his analyses of Dasein, the analysis of the understanding's projective understanding of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' is postponed<sup>5</sup> by Heidegger. In Heidegger's own words: "In accordance with the trend of these preparatory analyses of everyday Dasein, we shall pursue the phenomenon of interpretation in understanding the world; that is, in inauthentic understanding" (BT, 189/148).

Heidegger's analysis exhibits the phenomenon of interpretation in terms of what he calls the "existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself" (BT, 195/153). Heidegger finds this structure manifesting itself whenever the circumspective discovering of entities (within the environing world's matrix of meaningful relations) is considered. In understanding

the world in terms of it disclosed matrix of meaningful relations, Dasein's concernful being-by entities "surrenders itself" (BT, 189/148) to whatever functionality that which it encounters can have. When the functionality which Dasein's world understanding has already understood in this way "comes *explicitly (ausdrücklich)* into the sight of the understanding" (Ibid), circumspection discovers entities in terms of "the structure belonging to *something as something*" (BT, 189/149). Heidegger refers to this circumspective discovery of what has already been understood as 'interpretation'. In his words: "Circumspection discovers means that the already understood world becomes interpreted" (BT, 189/148).

According to Heidegger, interpretation explicitly understands the discovered entity in terms of "that which it is for (*des Wozu*)" (BT, 189/149), i.e., its 'end' or 'purpose'. In dealing with environmental entities by interpreting them circumspectively, he finds that "they are 'seen' *as table, door, carriage, bridge*" (Ibid). In taking something as something, interpretation does not function to stick a signification on something 'nakedly' present-at-hand. Nor does the phenomenal explicitness of the discovered entity in the terms of which it is taken require "a determining *assertion (Aussage)*" (Ibid) in order to manifest such explicitness. Rather, what Heidegger refers to as the pre-predicative articulation of this interpretative 'something as something' "lies *before* the thematic assertion about it" (BT, 190/149). Indeed, it is precisely this phenomenal state of affairs which leads Heidegger to differentiate this "original 'as' of an interpretation (*ἐρμηνεία*)" (BT, 201/158), the so-called "existential-hermeneutical 'as'" (Ibid), from the "apophantical 'as'" (BT, 210/158) of assertion. Thus for Heidegger,

... that which is disclosed in understanding, the understood, is always already accessible such that its "as which" can come into explicit relief. The "as" makes up the structure of the explicitness of that which is understood. It constitutes the interpretation (BT, 189/149).

Since the pre-predicative articulation involved in the explicit discovery of entities (manifested by the phenomenon of interpretation) brings into relief something which is already understood, but not so 'articulated' by the original world-understanding, Heidegger finds that "circumspective interpretation is grounded at any given time (*jeweils*) in a *fore-having*" (BT, 191/150). As such, the interpretative appropriation of understanding "moves in understanding Being toward an already understood functional totality (*Bewandtnisganzheit*)" (Ibid), i.e., the disclosed matrix of meaningful relations manifested by



the environing world. The appropriation (*Zueignung*) of an entity which "is understood but still covered over" (*Ibid*) with respect to its 'as', is always guided, according to Heidegger, by a "view toward, which fixes in its regard the upon which what is understood is to be interpreted" (*Ibid*). Thus, for him, "interpretation is grounded at any given time in a *fore-sight*" (*Ibid*). And, an understood entity which is held in fore-having and foresightedly aimed at, "becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation" (*Ibid*). In such an interpretation, the way in which the entity is conceived "can be drawn from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its mode of being" (*BT*, 191/150). In either case, the interpretation "is grounded in a *fore-conception*" (*Ibid*).

§ 69. *The Projective Unity of the Phenomenal Connection Between the Fore-structure of Understanding and the 'as' Structure of Interpretation (Auslegung); the Existentials of Meaning as the Formal Existential Framework of Intelligibility as such.*

This phenomenal character of the 'fore' which the understanding manifests, and the 'as' character manifested by interpretation, "show an existential-ontological connection with the phenomenon of projection" (*BT*, 192/151). Rather than exhibit a fragmented phenomenon, the "original analytic" (*Ibid*) of these two phenomenal moments of the understanding "already presents (*darstellt*) an unitary phenomenon" (*Ibid*). This unitary phenomenon is exhibited by Heidegger with the consideration of the 'upon which' (*Woraufhin*) of the projecting of the understanding, *viz.*, meaning (*Sinn*). "When an innerworldly entity is discovered along with the Being of Dasein, that is, when it has come to the understanding (*Verständnis*), we say it has meaning" (*Ibid*). Taken strictly however, that which is understood in the projecting of understanding "is not the meaning but the entity or, Being" (*BT*, 192-93/151). Meaning emerges then, for Heidegger, with the interpretative appropriation of the understanding which brings into explicit relief that which, in accord with the fore-having of understanding, has already been understood while yet remaining 'covered over'. Thus Heidegger refers to meaning as "that which is articulated in an understanding disclosure" (*BT*, 193/151). Meaning is thereby characterized by him as "that wherein the intelligibility of something is held" (*Ibid*).

As such, meaning is exhibited by Heidegger as "an *existentials* of Dasein" (*Ibid*), whose structure comprises the "formal existential framework (*Gerüst*) of that which necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation articulates" (*Ibid*). Meaning, then, as the 'upon which' of a projection in which something becomes intelligible *as*

something, "is structured through fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception" (Ibid). And, "insofar as understanding and interpretation make up the existential composition of the Being of the there, meaning must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to the understanding" (Ibid).

Having brought into phenomenal relief the existential structure of meaning, Heidegger is able to situate the inquiry about the meaning of Being within the context of what has been exhibited thus far concerning meaning. Since this inquiry asks about the *meaning* of Being, it "asks about Being itself insofar as Being is situated (*hereinstehen*) in the intelligibility of Dasein" (BT, 193/152). Thus for Heidegger, the meaning of Being "can never be contrasted with entities or with Being as the sustaining 'ground' of entities, since 'ground' is only accessible as meaning" (BT, 193-94/152).

§ 70. *The Ontic and Ontological Basis of the Circular Manifestation of the Structure of Dasein's Interpretative Understanding; the Grounding of the Ontological Projecting of the Existential Interpretation Guiding the Existential Analytic of Fundamental Ontology in the Existentiell Being of Dasein.*

The methodological mediation of phenomenology, with its necessary interpretative securing of the proper mode of access to the provisional ontological 'objects' (viz., the entity Dasein and the Being of this entity) involved in the inquiry about the meaning of Being, is situated by Heidegger within the context of what has been exhibited thus far regarding Dasein's existential fore-structure. He maintains that phenomenological description, which in accord with the methodological concept of phenomenology has been clarified in terms of interpretation, has

... as its first, last, and constant task, to never allow fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us through fancies and popular concepts, but rather [the task] of securing of the scientific theme in the working out of these fore-structures from the matter themselves (BT, 195/153).

The seeming *circulus vitiosus* of interpretation, which must always move in the orbit of that which it has already understood, thus does not point for Heidegger to the violation of the most basic principles of logic, but rather to the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in accord with the right way" (Ibid).

Since "ontological investigation is a possible mode of interpretation" (BT, 275/231), Heidegger maintains that when

... an interpretation (*Auslegung*), as Interpretation (*Interpretation*) becomes an explicit task for research, then the totality of these "presuppositions" [i.e., the existential fore-structure of Dasein], which we call the "*hermeneutical situation*," requires a clarification and securing beforehand, both from out of and in terms of a basic experience (*Grunderfahrung*) of the "object" to be disclosed (BT, 275/232).

This means that ontological Interpretation, as the exposing of an entity with respect to the composition of its being, must

... first bring into the fore-having the phenomenal characteristics of the thematic entity, to which all the following steps of the analysis must conform. These steps require, however, at the same time guidance through the possible fore-sight towards the mode of being belonging to the entity. And this fore-having and fore-sight then trace (*zeichnen*) out the conceptuality (*Begrifflichkeit*) (fore-concept) which will bring into relief all the structures of Being (Ibid).

When this 'hermeneutical situation' is considered within the context of the problematic of fundamental ontology, that is, "of securing a clarified idea of Being as such . . . by first working out the understanding of Being which belongs to [the entity] Dasein" (BT, 362/314), a 'thematic' circularity is manifested which is analogous with, in the sense of its being ultimately grounded in, the non-thematic circularity inherent in the interpretative understanding of Dasein's projective being-in-the-world. And, in Heidegger's view, "the clarification of the hermeneutical situation of the problematic of fundamental ontology must come back explicitly to this 'circular argument' (Ibid).

Heidegger clarifies this situation by appealing to the "ontological" (BT, 363/315) projection<sup>6</sup> belonging to the understanding operative in the existential Interpretation of Dasein. In Heidegger's words, "the analysis of this Being [Dasein] took as its clue existence, which it anticipated as determining the essence of Dasein" (BT, 274/231). This "'presupposed' idea of existence as such" (BT, 361/313) has the character of an understanding projection in which

... such understanding allows the developing Interpretation of that which is to be interpreted to come itself into words (*selbst zu Wort kommen*) for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether it, as this entity, yields the composition of being

upon which it has been disclosed in projection in a formal-indicative manner (BT, 362/314-15).

Heidegger maintains that "there is no other way at all by which an entity can itself come into words with regard to its Being" (BT, 363/315).

Heidegger's clarification of this circle, manifested by the hermeneutical situation of the existential Interpretation which guides the existential analytic of fundamental ontology, brings into relief both his understanding of its circularity, and the peculiar scope and limits of the free discretion by which such an Interpretation does violence (*Gewalt-samkeit*) to Dasein's ontico-ontological tendency to conceal itself, thereby allowing Dasein to phenomenologically wrest its own Being from this tendency. With respect to the former aspect of this clarification, he maintains that rather than deny or attempt to overcome this circle, "the endeavor must rather be made to leap into the 'circle' originally and completely, so that even at the point of departure of the analysis of Dasein the full regard toward its circular Being is secured" (BT, 363/315). With respect to the latter aspect of this clarification, he asks if "it may be that this 'violence' is allowed by the methodological demands of the possibilities of existence; but can such violence be taken away from its free discretion" (BT, 360/313)? While Heidegger is clearly of the conviction that this 'violent' tendency of the existential Interpretation is methodologically demanded and cannot be denied, he is also quick to point out that with respect to Dasein's existentiell capacity-for-being, this free discretion is limited. Specifically, while the idea of existence that is projected in the ontological understanding of the existential Interpretation "traces out (*Vorzeichnung*) the formal structure of Dasein's understanding as such, it is not existentiell binding" (Ibid). Rather, the manifestation of the limits of its free discretion emerge within the problematic of fundamental ontology precisely when the idea so projected is 'measured' by the entity and existentiell mode of being of the entity that, within the phenomenal context of this Interpretative projecting, determines *from itself* whether the ontological character of this idea is appropriate or not to that which is existentiell exhibited therein.<sup>7</sup>

#### § 71. *The Problem of Transcendence and Being-in-the-world.*

Having considered in detail the 'matters themselves' involved in Heidegger's account of the structures of the 'there' of Dasein's being-in-the-world, the discussion of Dasein's existential way to be is now in a position to consider his "fixing" (MFL, 136/171) of the problem of transcendence with respect to the 'movement' peculiar to this basic

composition of Dasein's Being. The discussion has already shown how Heidegger's account of intentionality, in bringing this phenomenon into relief as a 'problem', has manifested what he takes to be the non-equivalence of the ontic 'directedness toward' of intentionality and the original phenomenon of transcendence. What needs to be considered now is precisely how Heidegger understands the original phenomenon of transcendence to be manifested within the phenomenal context of the existential structures of being-in-the-world. Specifically, what Heidegger finds to be the "inner kinship between original transcendence and understanding of Being as such" (MFL, 135-36/170), such that "they are in the end one and the same" (MFL, 136/170), will be considered in terms of his exhibition of the origin in freedom of the worldly possibility toward which Dasein's understanding of Being transcends.

Heidegger's explicit account of the problem of transcendence takes as its point of departure clues which he gleans from the Latin meaning of the word. According to him, *transcendere* signifies "to step beyond, to cross over, to cross over to" (MFL, 160/204). As such, this implies

1. an activity in the broadest sense, an action; 2. formally a relation, namely stepping over toward something, indeed from something toward something else; 3. something which is being transcended, a limit, a barrier, a gap, something which lies in between (Ibid).

Within the framework of these clues, he then gives an account of the traditional philosophical employments of the term. He finds that traditionally the term signifies: "1. the transcendent as distinguished from the *immanent*; 2. the transcendent as differentiated from the *contingent*" (Ibid).

With respect to the former signification, transcendence is understood in terms of the cognitive activity of the subject which, as something immanent, must be surpassed in order for it to relate to something outside, viz., the transcendent. Heidegger maintains that "here the subject is represented (*vorgestellt*) as it were as a box with an interior, with the sides of a box and an exterior" (MFL, 160/205). Insofar as transcendence is conceived in terms of "the relationship which somehow or other maintains a passageway between the interior and exterior of the box by leaping over or pressing through the wall of the box" (MFL, 160-61/205), the problem "arises of how to explain the possibility of this passage" (MFL, 161/205). As a result of the cognitive framework within which this possibility traditionally becomes an issue, Heidegger refers to the concept of transcendence which, in taking immanence to be its contrary, gives rise to it as the epistemological conception of transcendence.

With respect to the latter signification, transcendence is likewise understood in terms of a relation. However, unlike the epistemological concept, which conceives transcendence in terms of the relation between an immanent subject and transcendent object, Heidegger refers to the 'theological' conception of transcendence and understands the relation involved in transcendence to have as its terms "conditioned [contingent] entities in general, to which belong subjects and all possible objects, and the unconditioned" (MFL, 162/206). The unconditioned, represented as that towards which transcendence transcends, is understood to be transcendent in the sense of being

... what is beyond all this [i.e., contingent, conditioned entities] as that which conditions it, as the unconditioned, but at the same time as the actually unattainable, *that which exceeds everything conditioned* (*Überschwängliche*) (MFL, 161/206).

As such, the being beyond of the transcendent expresses a difference in the degree of Being between the conditioned and unconditional. The latter is understood thus as the Absolute, in the sense of the divine; hence, Heidegger's characterization of the theological understanding of transcendence in terms of the opposition between the contingent and transcendent.

§ 72. *The Transcendence of Dasein Surpasses Entities, and not the Subject.*

On the basis of these considerations of the traditional conceptions of transcendence, Heidegger finds that it is "clear that the problem of transcendence depends on how one determines the subjectivity of the subject, that is, the basic composition of Dasein" (MFL, 161/205). And, "in view of both its epistemological and theological employments, Heidegger maintains that neither does justice to the phenomenon of transcendence."<sup>8</sup> This is the case, for Heidegger, since the understanding of the subjectivity of the subject underlying both conceptions of transcendence is inappropriate to the existential mode of being-in-the-world which Dasein manifests as its basic composition. Heidegger understands his analyses of this unitary phenomenon to have exhibited the phenomenal state of affairs whereby the determination of the essence of the subject, in terms of its objective cognitive relation as something immanent to what lies outside of it, is phenomenally grounded in Dasein's always already being-in-the-world (see § 64 above). Likewise, these analyses exhibit the phenomenal state of affairs whereby the essence of the subject is inappropriately deter-

mined, if it is understood in terms of "a movement towards an entity which subsists beyond the realm of contingency and is, therefore, incomprehensible to our finite ways of knowing."<sup>9</sup>

When the problem of transcendence is fixed in terms of the movement basic to Dasein's being-in-the-world, Heidegger finds that

... it must in principle be said that transcendence is not a relation between an inner sphere and an outer sphere such that a barrier belonging to the subject would be crossed over, a barrier that would separate the subject from the outer realm. Transcendence is, however, likewise not primarily the cognitive relationship a subject has to an object, one belonging to the subject in addition to its subjectivity. And even less, is transcendence simply the term for what exceeds and is inaccessible to finite knowledge (*MFL*, 165/211).

Rather, for Heidegger, the phenomenon of transcendence "is the original composition of the *subjectivity* of the subject" (*Ibid*). This means that transcendence is not only on occasion manifested by the subject, but that "being a subject means transcendence" (*Ibid*). The determination of the subjectivity of the subject at issue here for Heidegger is, of course, *not* the essential 'what' of the tradition. His analyses have characterized such a traditional determination in terms of the hidden ontology of presence-at-hand, which is inappropriate to the phenomenal manifestation of the existential essence of such 'subjectivity', and to which even Husserl's phenomenology still tacitly appeals. On the contrary, when this 'subjectivity' is phenomenally manifested in terms of Dasein's basic composition, Heidegger finds that

Dasein does not perhaps exist and then occasionally achieve a crossing beyond itself, but existence originally means crossing over. Dasein itself is the passage across. And this implies that transcendence is not one of many possible ways of comportment toward other entities. Rather, transcendence is the basic composition of its Being, on the basis of which Dasein can initially comport itself to entities (*Ibid*).

Thus, for Heidegger that which Dasein surpasses is not the subject, however it may be conceived, but rather "entities, among which Dasein qua its facticity also is" (*MFL*, 166/212). By virtue of the existential essence of Dasein's mode of being, i.e., of being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already with entities. This means for Heidegger that

nothing else but transcendence, which has surpassed entities from the outset (*vorhinein*), initially makes possible for these, before-

hand surpassed *as entities*, to be ontically *opposite* [Dasein], and as opposite to be now graspable in themselves (Ibid).

§ 73. *World as the 'Toward Which' of Transcendence and the Origin of both in Freedom.*

When the phenomenon of transcendence is exhibited in this way, the phenomenal inappropriateness of indentifying the 'toward which' of transcendence with entities or objects that can be encountered becomes manifest for Heidegger. This identification, which is implicit in the contemporary understanding of intentionality in terms of an ontic compartment directed toward entities encounterable as being present-at-hand, fails to realize, according to Heidegger, that "the object or entity which can have the character of being encountered is that which is surpassed, not the toward which. That toward which the subject transcends is what we call *world*" (Ibid). Since transcendence is the basic composition of Dasein, in the sense of its surpassing entities toward world, Heidegger designates "the basic phenomenon of Dasein's transcendence with the expression *being-in-the-world*" (MFL, 166/213).

Having uncovered world as the 'toward which' of the transcendence of Dasein, Heidegger realizes that "the world should be constitutive for the transcendence of Dasein" (MFL, 182/233). The constitutive phenomenon of the world is brought into relief by tracing the transcending movement of Dasein such that world, as the "*free counterhold*" (MFL, 192/248) of Dasein's transcendence, becomes manifest. Heidegger finds that the entities surpassed in transcendence are not limited to those which Dasein is not. Indeed,

... in transcendence Dasein surpasses itself as an entity; more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like itself. In first surpassing itself, the abyss (*Abgrund*) is opened which Dasein is at any time for itself (MFL, 182/234).

According to Heidegger, by transcending itself, in the mode of being toward oneself, Dasein's essential determination as existing 'for-the-sake-of' the possibility of its ownmost capacity-to-be manifests its origin in freedom. In his words:

Here [in freedom] lies . . . the origin of "possibility" as such (*überhaupt*). Only from out of freedom, only a free being (*Wesen*) can, as transcending, understand Being—and it must do so in order to exist as such, i.e., to be among and with entities (MFL, 189/244).



The freedom at issue here for Heidegger is "neither an expression of a radical autonomy, nor a radical refutation of heteronomy."<sup>10</sup> Rather, it involves the "possibility of expressly choosing oneself or of fleeing the choice" (MFL, 189/244). As such, the "willing (*Willen*)" (MFL, 191/246) manifested in such choosing does not refer for Heidegger to "the existentiell-ontic act" (Ibid) wherein Dasein may commit itself to where it is still not yet. But rather, what is at issue here "is the intrinsic possibility of willing: *freedom*" (Ibid). Herein, the 'for-the-sake-of' determinative of Dasein's existential essence manifests the express self-choice of "where and how it always already is, qua Dasein, insofar as it already exists" (MFL, 190/245).

With the removal of freedom from the above mentioned traditional perspectives, Heidegger maintains that "one must seek the basic essence (*Grundwesen*) of transcendence in freedom" (MFL, 192/247). For Heidegger this means that Dasein, as the "*terminus a quo*"<sup>11</sup> of the movement of transcendence, and the the world "as its *terminus ad quem*,"<sup>12</sup> must be phenomenally exhibited such that they become manifest in freedom itself. Toward this end, Heidegger finds that "freedom gives itself to understand; freedom is the primal understanding (*Urverstehen*), i.e., the primal projection (*Urentwurf*) of that which freedom itself makes possible" (Ibid). That which freedom makes possible, as the 'toward which' of transcendence, is "world, as the totality of the essential, intrinsic possibilities of Dasein as transcending, *surpassing* all actual (*wirklich*) entities" (MFL, 192/248).

As free, then, Dasein is world projection. Heidegger maintains that this projecting is projected in such a way that Dasein holds itself in it,

... so that the free hold binds Dasein, that is, so that the hold places (*stellt*) Dasein, in all its dimensions of transcendence, into a possible leeway (*Spielraum*) for choice (Ibid).

According to Heidegger the world is manifested as this binding which, as projected in freedom, holds freedom 'opposite' itself. In his words:

Freedom itself holds this binding opposite to itself. The world is maintained in freedom counter to freedom itself. The world is the free counter-hold of Dasein's for-the-sake-of. Being-in-the-world is accordingly nothing other than freedom (Ibid).

As being-in-the-world, transcending Dasein yields entities the opportunity (*Gelegenheit*) for what he calls "world entry (*Welteingang*)" (MFL, 195/251). Thus, for him, innerworldliness is "not a present-at-hand property belonging to the present-at-hand entities in themselves"

(MFL, 194/251). Rather, innerworldliness "is only the transcendental condition, in the original sense, for the possibility of entities present-at-hand to emerge (*bekunden*) as they are" (Ibid). Therefore, when Dasein exists, "world-entry has simultaneously also already happened together with it" (MFL, 195/252). When entities, as present-at-hand, enter the world, "nothing happens to them basically" (Ibid). Indeed, for Heidegger, the world is 'nothing' in the sense of not being an entity present-at-hand or any of the entities which Dasein itself transcends, including Dasein itself. But it is not 'nothing' in the sense of *nihil negativum*. Heidegger writes: "The world: a nothing, no entity—and yet something; nothing of entities—however Being" (Ibid). In order to answer the question "What kind of 'nihil' is the world, which while a *nihil*, a nothing, is still basically the being-in-the-world itself" (Ibid)?, Heidegger finds that the ultimate origin of the deformed phenomena in the phenomenological sense must be exhibited by bringing into relief the Being of the existential meaning of these phenomena. And with respect to this origin he maintains that "the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is time as original temporality" (Ibid).

#### § 74. Summary and Transition.

Chapter Seven has considered Heidegger's phenomenological account of what he considers to be the "pre-cognitive" "being-in-the-world" constitutive of Dasein's original transcendence. As "pre-cognitive," this mode of being, in Heidegger's view, remains in principle inaccessible to the theoretical vision of both modern reason and Husserl's noetically constrained *Wesensschau*. Indeed, Heidegger traces what he takes to be the "sight" constitutive of *theoria* to a derivative mode of being-in-the-world: looking in the sense of staring. What is "seen" in such a mode of being-in-the-world, according to this analysis, is the "look," in the sense of the εἶδος of entities, and not their meaning in the sense of their pre-theoretical encounter within the pre-thematic matrix of meaning disclosive of the world. The disclosure of the latter, in terms of its manifestation of the ontological dimension of transcendence, emerges then as the task of Heidegger's recast conception of phenomenology. Such a task is necessary since, for him, this dimension of transcendence remains necessarily concealed to what these analyses take to be the ontic framework of Husserl's phenomenological investigation of intentionality.

Heidegger's investigation of Dasein's original transcendence exhibits the existential structures (*existentialia*) of the way in which this entity is always already "there" in the world. Here there can be no

question of the relation between subject and object or contingent being and non-contingent being. Rather, qua its manifestation as original transcendence, Dasein is equiprimordially disclosed in terms of the "that it is" (*Daß*) manifested by the *existential* of disposition and its reflectionless, pre-thematic (but nevertheless ontological) primary understanding. Rendering phenomenally manifest these equiprimordial *existentialia* has, as its requisite, the uncovering of Dasein's mode of being as an ordinary phenomenon. On the one hand, access to this phenomenal dimension of Dasein is secured in terms of Dasein's always having a mood that is attuned at once to itself and 'its' world. On the other hand, such access is secured in terms of Dasein's always anticipating an understanding of itself and 'its' world. Thus, with the *deformation* of these dimensions of Dasein's mode of being as an ordinary phenomenon, the Being of the same emerges, according to Heidegger, in terms of the non-psychological *phenomenon* of "disposition" and the non-categorical, ontological *phenomenon* of primary understanding.

The phenomenon of the primary understanding of Being constitutive of Dasein's mode of being its "there," is not manifest in terms of the thematic grasping of a "what," but in terms of the pre-thematic projection of Dasein's capacity-for-being. Accordingly, for Heidegger, Dasein's understanding does not *originally* become determinate with the reflective thematization, and thereby objectification, of either itself or the world. Rather, this development of the understanding is manifest in terms of interpretation. For Heidegger, then, entities are always already phenomenally determined in terms of the "existential-hermeneutical as," prior to any thematic assertion about them,

The state of affairs manifested by the 'existential-hermeneutical as' is unfolded by Heidegger in terms of (1) the fore-structure of the projective phenomenon of primary understanding and (2) its appropriation by interpretation. (1) is characterized in terms of the *pre-thematic* "fore-having" of an understanding of Being, the *pre-thematic* "fore-sight" that fixes its regard toward this understanding and the "fore-conception" in which an entity is conceived in terms of its *pre-thematic* mode of being. And (2) is characterized in terms of the phenomenon of interpretive projection which, *in unity with* the primary projection of the understanding, holds what is disclosed by the latter in terms of meaning (*Sinn*). Heidegger's analysis of the appropriation of primary understanding by interpretation thus *differentiates* the "strict" taking of that which is understood in the projecting of the understanding, 'not the meaning but the entity or, Being', and the interpretation of the "same" in terms of the projection upon *meaning*. Interpretation thus renders "intelligible" that which is covered over, but understood, by primary understanding in terms of the

"upon which" of its projection, viz., meaning. For Heidegger then, 'interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not emerge from the former'.

These analyses phenomenally clarify both the pre-thematic ontico-ontological circularity of Dasein's *Seinsverständnis* and the "hermeneutical situation" within which the ontologically thematic existential analytic always operates. Thus, for Heidegger, there is not one, but two, phenomenally interrelated hermeneutical circles at issue for the project of fundamental ontology.<sup>13</sup> To wit, there is the *existentiell* circularity of Dasein's original mode of being and the thematically ontological circularity of the existential analytic. The philosophical issue of the first circle concerns the pre-thematic "reflectionless" mode of being of the entity under philosophical investigation. The philosophical issue of the second circle concerns the methodological mediation of the preliminarily worked out concept of phenomenology. This second hermeneutical circle must "wrest" the original mode and meaning of the Being of this entity from its tendency to conceal itself, in order to render "transparent" the phenomenal structures of this original way to be. For Heidegger, this 'original way to be' is transcendence. Exhibiting the meaning of this phenomenon involves bringing into phenomenal relief its intrinsic possibility in 'time as original temporality'. It is to Heidegger's Interpretation of this that I will now turn my attention.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE TEMPORAL MEANING OF TRANSCENDENCE

#### § 75. *Introductory Remarks.*

Having brought into relief the 'matters themselves' of Heidegger's phenomenological account of the origin of Dasein's transcendence toward world in its essential freedom, what now needs to be considered is his account of how "the stepping-beyond entities in transcendence, which is carried out toward all its dimensions, is grounded in the ecstatic composition (*Verfassung*) of temporality" (MFL, 212/275). Within the context of the discussion of Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of intentionality, the consideration of temporality, as the ground of transcendence, will serve to show precisely how he understands intentionality to have its ultimate phenomenal basis in what he calls the "ecstematic unity of the horizon of temporality" (MFL, 208/269). Heidegger's exhibition of the latter, as the "temporal condition for the possibility of world and of world's essential belonging to transcendence" (MFL, 208/269-70), will then be considered in its function to manifest "that (*Daß*) and how the intentionality of consciousness is grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein" (BT, 498n. 23/363n. 10).<sup>1</sup> Proceeding in this way, the discussion will bring into bold relief the ultimate phenomenal basis for Heidegger's calling into question, both the priority and originality, of the phenomenon of intentionality. For the purposes of the present study, Heidegger's analysis of temporality in the *The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic* will form the basis for the discussion of his account of the phenomenon of time, "because here he is concerned with merely showing the implications which temporality has for the issue of intentionality."<sup>2</sup>

§ 76. *The Ordinary Understanding of Time in Terms of a Sequence of Nows; the Manifestation of Time in the Phenomenal Mode of Semblance.*

Heidegger's analysis of time (in this context) unfolds its "total proper essence (*Eigenwesen*)" (MFL, 200/258) by taking as its point of departure the expressive utterances of the ordinary understanding of time. On the basis of his recourse (*Rückgang*) to these utterances, which he finds to be expressive of the "most accessible" (MFL, 204/264) time, Heidegger's analysis observes "the essentials" (MFL, 205/264) of that which is manifested therein, such that the ordinary understanding of time is exhibited, in terms of its origin, in what he refers to as "temporality in its temporalizing" (MFL, 204/264).

According to Heidegger, time is ordinarily conceived in terms of "what is initially accessible to us" (MFL, 200/258). Therefore, as in the case of Dasein's ontico-ontological tendency to understand itself in terms of the Being of entities other than and foreign to itself, time is likewise commonly conceived in terms of concepts of Being foreign to its essence. Heidegger characterizes the main lines of the ordinary conception of time, in terms of its taking time to be something present-at-hand, which is in motion such that "it flows away" (MFL, 197/254). As flowing, time is understood in terms of its passing in the subject, such that "to have time requires an inner consciousness" (Ibid). However, while passing in the subject, time is taken to belong to our sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) such that it "remains distinct from spirit (*Geist*) and reason" (MFL, 197/255). And finally, since Plato, time has been distinguished by contrasting it with a more or less theological conception of eternity.

Now, Heidegger maintains that "everything genuine needs semblance in order to exist" (MFL, 212/274);<sup>3</sup> understood within the context of the ordinary conception of time, this suggests for him that "the essence of time must itself make these kinds of conceptions possible and even plausible" (MFL, 198/255). This means, then, that for Heidegger, time as ordinarily understood must manifest itself as a phenomenon, even if it is only as a phenomenon in the mode of semblance. And indeed, as the discussion to follow will show, this is precisely the case according to him. To wit, time ordinarily manifests itself, to both philosophical (inclusive of the contemporary phenomenology) and pre-philosophical experience, in terms of a mere sequence of 'nows' whose continuum somehow flows together in a single substance or subject, which is understood as something present-at-hand. As such, time is taken to be "additionally present-at-hand" (MFL, 204/264), existing in a manner similar to entities.

§ 77. *The Datable Structure of Expressed Time Emerges on the Basis of Dasein's Relation to Things, and not its Thematic Consciousness of Time Designations.*

However, according to Heidegger, when "examined more precisely" (MFL, 202/259), the phenomenal state of affairs (*Sachlage*) is the contrary. In his words, "we are not directed toward the now and then guided onward toward things and occurrences which are 'in' time" (MFL, 201/259). Rather, when our ordinary comportment to time is considered, he finds that "we are not directed thematically toward the now" (MFL, 200/259). Taking as his guiding clue the way in which time is ordinarily measured, he finds it is measured in a primarily non-numerical way, which he calls "reckoning with it" (MFL, 199/257). Measuring time in this manner does not manifest so much a curiosity regarding what (numerical) time it is, but indicates the concern with "how much time do I still have" (MFL, 202/260). This concern, in the way in which it measures time by taking it "into account" (MFL, 199/257), manifests, according to Heidegger, a "pre-conceptual acquaintance with time" (Ibid). Heidegger finds in Dasein's "entirely unreflective, immediate" (MFL, 200/258) expressive utterances regarding time, that "time itself is designated with 'now', 'afterwards' (*dann*), 'at that time' (*damals*)" (Ibid).

In analyzing the way in which these expressions speak of time, Heidegger maintains that the "structure of time" (Ibid) manifests the character of "datability" (MFL, 205/264). He exhibits this character in terms of the "onward-pointing function (*Fortweisungsfunktion*)" (MFL, 200/259) which the time designations 'now', 'afterwards' and 'at that time' manifest. In each of these designations, Heidegger finds, that "a pointing onward (*Fortweisung*) occurs in the manner of an indicator over to (*Darüberwegweisens*) entities" (MFL, 205/264), such that these can occupy a date. With the utterance of each of these designations, a 'when' is indicated in relation to some entity. In Heidegger's words:

... the now is, in its essence, a "now when this and that . . .", a "now wherein . . ." Likewise, the other expressions for time: the afterwards is always, usually without our expressing it, a "afterwards when . . .", the "at that time" is always a "at that time when . . ." (MFL, 200/259).

This datable relation between the time designation and the "when" occupied by entities does not mean that the two coincide, in the sense of their relation arising by both being at the same time. Rather, the relation belongs to the time designation as such, even though precisely

what takes place in the time designation, i.e., the 'when' of some entity, is "arbitrary, that is, it is not prescribed" (Ibid) by the time designation itself. However, when the phenomenal state of affairs is considered with respect to the initial emergence of these time designations, Heidegger finds that we are not directed toward them and then guided onward toward entities 'in' time. On the contrary, "we are rather occupied with things, related toward them and then we attribute to them these time determinations" (MFL, 201/259). This is the phenomenal basis for Heidegger's view that

... we do not come across the now, afterwards, and at that time as we do present-at-hand things . . . We do not have spread before us a so-called sequence of nows from which we then pick one, grab it, and designate it (Ibid).

And yet, Heidegger finds that "we nevertheless do say 'now' with a peculiar immediacy" (Ibid). Indeed, even though "we are not at all expressly directed towards time . . . we have it immediately 'at hand'" (Ibid). Heidegger traces this peculiar state of affairs to the modes of existence from out of which the time designations emerge. And since these modes of existence are more original than that which emerges from them, he refers to the peculiar unity they manifest as "original time" (MFL, 203/262). Heidegger characterizes the modes of existence, in which the time designations emerge, in terms of the phenomenal manifestation of awaiting (*gewärtig*), retaining (*Behaltens*), and rendering present (*Gegenwärtigen*).

§ 78. *The Origin of Time Designations (Datability) in the Modes of Dasein's Existence; Transcendence as the 'Where' of the Uttered Characters of Time.*

In following his Interpretation (*Interpretation*) of the afterwards, Heidegger finds that

... we utter "afterwards" from out of a *mode of existence* in which we are *awaiting* something to come, of something to be accomplished. Only in such awaiting can I utter a "afterwards." Awaiting, we naturally say "afterwards and then" without expressly being directed towards these . . . Awaiting as such and *out of itself* gives rise to an "afterwards" (MFL, 201-02/260).

The 'afterwards' which emerges from out of awaiting manifests itself such that it is not to be found in "an object which will or should be



'afterwards'" (MFL, 202/260), and neither is it found "in the soul as a psychical occurrence or property thereof" (Ibid). Rather, the 'afterwards' manifests itself in terms of its being "on the way (*Unterwegs*)" (MFL, 202/261), as the stepping-over entities, or in short, as transcendence. Thus Heidegger writes: "This [transcendence] is only a reference to the 'where' which in the end 'is' what we utter as the character of time" (Ibid).

Heidegger finds that what he exhibits with respect to the 'afterwards', "is valid of the 'at that time' and the 'now' in a corresponding way" (Ibid). Hence, "the 'at that time' always bespeaks a *retaining* of something previous (*Vormaligen*)" (Ibid). Retaining is therefore "not identical with our ability to recall former events. On the contrary, retaining enables us to have a past and to recall bygone events."<sup>4</sup> And likewise, "the 'now' bespeaks the being towards that which presences (*Anwesendem*), and we call this being towards presencing entities having in the present (*Gegenwärtighaben*) or *rendering present* (*Gegenwärtigen*)" (MFL, 202/261). Each of these uttered characters of the designations of time, in accord with their manifestation as having "overleapt (*übersprungen*) all possible entities" (MFL, 205/265), such that in their respective retaining and rendering present entities become datable, points again for Heidegger to transcendence as the 'where' of what these characters utter.

§ 79. *The Unity of Original Time; its Manifestation in the Ecstatic Unity of the Temporalization of Temporality.*

According to Heidegger, the 'afterwards', 'at that time' and 'now' do not emerge from their respective modes of existence without any connection. Indeed, he finds that in characterizing each of these in terms of their being 'on the way', or as the 'where' of transcendence, "something quite essential has, for the moment, been overlooked" (Ibid). Heidegger brings what has been overlooked into relief by exhibiting how each of these time designations is always understood in terms of their unity or connection. Thus, he maintains that "the afterwards arises and is utterable in rendering present, and is always understood as: now not yet (but precisely: afterwards)" (Ibid). While "conversely, every at that time is: a now no longer, and as such is, in its structure, accordingly a bridge to a now" (Ibid). And "this now is, in each case, the now of a particular rendering present or retaining in which an 'afterwards' and an 'at that time' is, in each case, uttered" (Ibid). Heidegger notes that the particular connection exhibited here is "still obscure in its essence" (MFL, 202/261), and suggests that the ordinary understanding of time as a flowing stream or continuum of

nows, i.e., now, not yet now, and now no longer, attests (no doubt qua its status as a semblance) to the connection or unity of these time determinations. Indeed, he finds that however time may be determined, "it has become clear that afterwards, at that time, and now emerge, and do so in their *unity*, from awaiting, retaining, and rendering present—which obviously must first be unitary among and in themselves" (MFL, 203/262).

Heidegger refers to this "original time as *temporality*, in order to express the state of affairs that time is not additionally present-at-hand, but that its essence is temporal" (MFL, 204/254). And in working out Dasein's capacity to "stretch" (MFL, 205/265) itself into an 'afterwards', 'at that time' and 'now', which he exhibits in terms of the ἔκστασις manifested by awaiting, retaining, and rendering present, the "self-unifying ecstatic unity in ecstatic temporalization" (Ibid) comes to the phenomenal fore of his analyses, and with this, the original unity of time is understood by him to be accounted for.

Heidegger's clarification of the essential connection, or unity, of original temporality does so by making conspicuous, in original temporality, the indicator over to entities manifested by uttered time. He finds that the time designations of expressed time, in their functioning to indicate entities by way of dating them, are phenomenally possible only on the basis of the modes of existence, from which they issue, being "beforehand carried away (*entrückenden*) beyond all entities" (Ibid). This 'being carried away' manifests the "open direction" (Ibid) 'wherein' Dasein stretches itself, such that its encounter with entities, dated in accord with the time designations, becomes possible. As such, these time determinations, as the "utterance and expression" (Ibid) of Dasein's being carried away qua the original temporality of the awaiting, retaining and rendering present modes of its existence, are "corresponding to this getting-carried-away, indicating the way beyond in . . . [their] . . . own structure" (Ibid).

These modes of existence, in terms of their manifesting Dasein's being carried away, are ecstatic according to Heidegger. This is taken by him to mean that temporality is "the original 'outside of itself' in and for itself" (BT, 377/329). As such, this "stepping out of itself (ἔκστασις) is to a certain extent a rapture (*raptus*)" (MFL, 205/265). Thus, for example, with respect to awaiting, he finds that

Dasein does not gradually await by sequentially traversing the entities that factually approach it as futural entities (*Zukünftiges*), but this traversing rather goes gradually through the open path which the rapture of temporality has itself casted (Ibid).

And he finds this to be "valid, in a corresponding manner, of retaining and rendering present" (Ibid). Heidegger therefore "calls these three basic phenomena the *ecstases* of temporality" (MFL, 205/265-66).

Heidegger maintains the three basic phenomena of original temporality manifest themselves in an ecstatic unity in ecstatic temporalization. Awaiting manifests the possibility of "the basic form of the toward oneself" (MFL, 206/266). It means "to understand oneself from out of one's capacity-for-being" (Ibid), that is, in terms of Dasein's essential "being-with and being-by" (Ibid) entities. In awaiting its own capacity-for-being, Dasein comes toward itself

. . . already and precisely through awaiting. This approaching oneself beforehand from out of the possibility lying in awaiting, is the primary ecstatic concept of the *future*" (Ibid).

For Heidegger, then, "awaiting is not identical with an infinite and indefinite future."<sup>5</sup> Its 'coming to oneself' does not "stretch over a momentary present of my own; it stretches over the whole of my *having been* (*Gewesenseins*)" (MFL, 206/266). Instead of conceiving the future as something infinite, Heidegger "articulates its limitation by pointing out that it arises out of a retaining, which is prior to a recollecting of events that took place (or could have taken place) on former occasions."<sup>6</sup> In other words, and this is Heidegger's thesis, "this having been temporalizes itself only from out of and in the future" (MFL, 206/266). Therefore, Dasein's having been "only 'is', at any time (*je*), according to the mode of the temporalization of the future, and only in this temporalization" (MFL, 206/267). Hence, with this exhibition of the temporalization of the ecstasis of having been, which gives rise to the past, from out of ecstasis of the future, Heidegger's temporal analysis manifests their unity in Dasein's ecstatic temporalization.

Now, for Heidegger, this coming "back toward itself from out of its capacity-to-be . . . does so toward the momentary rendering present which has just thrown the door to having been-ness (*Gewesenheit*) behind itself" (Ibid). And this 'throwing of the door' to its having been, is "already a way of temporalizing the having been, a temporalizing which, in its way, brings into Being the having been" (Ibid). Hence, "it is in the ecstatic unity of future and having been that *rendering present* first temporalizes itself" (Ibid). Heidegger's characterization of this unitary determination of the phenomenon of original time, may be succinctly expressed in terms of an awaiting which renders present by having been.

§ 80. *The Analogical Manifestation of the Ecstatic Horizon of the Temporalization of Temporality; World as the Ecstematic Unity of the Ecstatic Horizons of Temporality.*

With the bringing into phenomenal relief of this unitary temporalization of temporality, Heidegger understands his analysis to "have shown that and how temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the 'there'" (BT, 416/365). Since, however, "in the disclosedness of the 'there' the world is co-disclosed" (BT, 416/365), he maintains that "the ontological constitution of the world must then likewise be grounded in temporality" (Ibid). Indeed, Heidegger finds that the "existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the state of affairs that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon" (Ibid). Heidegger characterizes the horizontal aspect of the ecstases by differentiating its manifestation from the understanding of 'horizon' in terms of the circumference of the field of vision. He writes that, "horizon, from ὀρίζειν, is not at all primarily related to looking and intuiting, but by means of itself simply means that which delimits, encloses, the enclosure" (MFL, 209/269).

Heidegger thus finds that "each ecstasis encloses itself and does so precisely as ἔκστασις" (MFL, 208/269). As such, the ecstatic horizon does not manifest anything determinate in the being-carried-away of the ecstasis. Thus, for example, the horizon of awaiting "cannot decide for itself, and certainly never unambiguously, what, on its basis, can be and how it can be awaited" (Ibid). Nevertheless, according to Heidegger the ecstasis "does produce the horizon of possibility in general, within which a determinate possible can be awaited" (MFL, 209/269). Since, however, the ecstasis surpasses every entity, its horizon likewise "does not present a determinate entity" (Ibid). Indeed, it 'is' not as entities, "but it temporalizes itself" (Ibid). And it does so, according to Heidegger, in a manner such that "the horizon manifests itself in and with the ecstasis" (Ibid). Heidegger refers to this 'where to (Wohin)' of the ecstasis as the "horizontal schema" (BT, 416/365), or as "ecstema" (MFL, 208/269), and he maintains that it is "fashioned analogically, as say σύστημα is to σύστασις or σύνθημα is to σύνθεσις" (MFL, 208/269).

Heidegger further maintains that "corresponding to the unity of ecstases in their temporalization, the unity of horizons is an original unity" (Ibid). This ecstematic unity is for him "nothing other than the temporal condition of the possibility of world and its essential belonging to transcendence" (MFL, 208/269-70). Which is to say "with regard to its temporalizing its Being as temporality, Dasein is, on the basis of its ecstatic-horizontal composition, essentially 'in a world'" (BT, 417/365). Thus

. . . the world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. It "is", with the "outside-of-itself" of the ecstases, "there" (BT, 417/365).

§ 81. *Heidegger's Exhibition of the Unoriginal and Derivative Status of the Intentionality of Consciousness.*

On the basis of this discussion of the 'matters themselves' involved in Heidegger's account of original temporality (as the phenomenal condition which makes Dasein's transcendence toward world possible), the way in which he understands the intentionality of consciousness to be grounded, in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein, can now be considered. Heidegger understands his immanent critique, of Husserl's phenomenological understanding of intentionality, to show that this phenomenon is characterized by Husserl in terms of the 'being directed toward' of consciousness to entities. These latter, as a function of this 'directedness', are discovered and objectivized as something present-at-hand. And, in his following the "natural meaning" of intentionality, in order to bring this phenomenon into relief as a problem, he has exhibited what he takes to be the understanding of Being in terms of presence-at-hand which, as the 'prior' disclosedness of the Being of entities that are discovered in the conscious 'being directed toward' of intentionality, manifests an ontological dimension of this phenomenon. And it is precisely this understanding of Being, which Husserl's understanding of intentionality *fails to investigate*, that yields, in Heidegger's view, the unoriginal phenomenological status of this phenomenon vis-à-vis the phenomenon of the ecstatic-horizonal temporalization of temporality.

Heidegger's understanding, of this complex phenomenal state of affairs involved in intentionality's relation to original temporality, may be 'spelled out' as follows: The epistemological determination of the subjectivity of the subject, which manifests the phenomenon of intentionality, conceals the 'prior'<sup>7</sup> disclosedness of the phenomenon of world. The Being of this phenomenon, in the existential-ontological sense of the "*nihil originarium*" (MFL, 210/272) of original temporality, is thus concealed to the epistemological determination of subjectivity as well. Entities, inclusive of the subject which manifests intentionality, when they are understood in terms of the 'being directed toward' of an intentional consciousness, are thus grasped *exclusively* in terms of their presence-at-hand. Within the phenomenal context of the original temporality that Heidegger exhibits as the basis of Dasein's being-in-the-world, this means, according to him, that such an

"understanding return toward entities is the existential meaning of allowing entities to be encountered by rendering [them] present" (BT, 417/366). Thus, in Heidegger's view, by virtue of its tacit, and concealed, appeal to presence-at-hand or presence (*Anwesenheit*), as the Being of every entity, Husserl's understanding of intentionality fails to exhibit the following phenomenal state of affairs:

That factual Dasein, understanding itself and its world in the ecstatic unity of the "there", returns from these horizons towards the entities encountered within them (ibid).

§ 82. *The Ontic Transcendence of Intentionality Manifests a Semblance of the Phenomenon of Original Transcendence.*

The phenomenon of intentionality then, as a function of its exclusive comportment toward entities, manifests merely an ontic phenomenon, or more precisely, semblance, of the original transcendence manifested by being-in-the-world. And, since the condition of the possibility of this original phenomenon is maintained, by Heidegger, to be the ecstatic-horizonal temporalization of temporality, the ontic transcendence manifested by intentionality is understood by him to be a derivative phenomenon. He illustrates this phenomenal state of affairs by suggesting how, for example, hoping and fearing,

... as intentional comportments toward the futural ... would not be possible, i.e., this self-directing toward such [which will somehow be afterwards], would have no open direction if the Dasein that hopes, fears, etc., did not, as Dasein, stretch itself into something like an afterwards (*Dannhafte*) (MFL, 205/265).

And Heidegger, no doubt, holds the view that this ecstatic openness, exemplified above in terms of its issuing the afterwards which makes possible the intentional comportment toward the futural, would, in a "corresponding" manner, be valid of the ecstatic openness which makes possible the intentional comportments toward the past and present.

It is on the basis of these considerations that Heidegger understands the phenomenon of intentionality, as exhibited in either Husserl's phenomenological understanding or in accord with its natural meaning, to be an unoriginal and hence derived phenomenon. The phenomenal basis, to which Heidegger appeals with this view of intentionality, is summed up in the following quote, in which he suggests that being-in-the-world, as transcending toward world, has its basis in the under-

standing of Being, and that the latter is only possible inasmuch as it lies in the temporalization of temporality. He writes:

Being-in-the-world, transcending toward world, temporalizes itself as temporality and is only possible in this way. It lies therein that world-entry only happens if temporality temporalizes itself. And only if this happens can entities manifest themselves as entities. But insofar as this is possible only on the basis of the understanding of Being, the possibility of the understanding of Being must lie in the temporalization of temporality (*MFL*, 211-12/274).

### § 83. *Summary and Conclusion.*

Part Two has attempted to provide, on the basis of *die Sachen selbst*, a thorough exegesis of Heidegger's phenomenological account of intentionality, in the time period at issue within the larger context of both Husserl's and Heidegger's account of this phenomenon. The results of this attempt may be summarized as follows: Heidegger understands this phenomenon to manifest the essential structure of the ontic being 'directed toward' entities of the entity (Dasein), which manifests this structure, and finds that the original mode of being of Dasein does not manifest itself in terms of this intentionality, but rather in terms of its essential composition as being-in-the-world. The temporal meaning of Dasein's essential composition brings into relief the phenomenal basis of Dasein's transcendence toward world, and manifests, in Heidegger's view, the horizontal openness or disclosedness within which entities are surpassed such that they may be encountered. Thus, the intentional being directed toward entities, which manifests an ontic transcendence toward entities which have already been rendered present, yields a phenomenal semblance of the original transcendence toward world manifested by Dasein's being-in-the-world.

These findings are exhibited by Heidegger within the context of the existential analytic of the mode of being of the entity Dasein, the aim of which lies in the wresting, from concealment, the original showing itself from itself of this entity in its Being, *toward the end of working out the meaning of Being as such*. The necessity of this analytic emerges from out of the concern to reawaken the understanding for the meaning of the question about the meaning of Being. Specifically, in working out the formal structure of this question, he finds that the Being of the entity that raises this question emerges as an issue. On the basis of clues gleaned from the formal structure of the question about the meaning of Being, Heidegger achieves the provisional insight regarding the mode of being of the questioning entity (Dasein), which he

characterizes in terms of this entity being ontically distinctive in that it is ontological. He finds that this peculiar state of affairs is provisionally manifested as Dasein's pre-thematic (and pre-ontological, when "ontology" is understood in terms of the theoretical concern with Being) average and vague understanding of Being, such that in its Being this Being is at issue for it. Heidegger terms this Being, toward which Dasein is always in some manner comporting itself, "existence." He finds that the essential composition of existence is distinctive, in that its pre-thematic *Seinsverständnis* is always oriented beforehand by a glance or regard toward the Being of whatever entity, including itself, is already given for it, such that these entities 'become provisionally articulated in their Being' (§ 39 above).

Hence, on the basis of this provisional characterization of the Being of the entity which raises the question about the meaning of Being, Heidegger maintains that in order to philosophically work out the meaning of what is asked about in this question, i.e., Being, it is necessary, for the ontology which would carry out this task, to first render 'transparent' the questioning entity in its Being. Since the pre-ontological understanding of Being, which Heidegger exhibits with respect to Dasein, manifests what he takes to be the basis upon which the investigation of the meaning of Being must ultimately rest, he refers to the ontological investigation of this entity as "fundamental ontology." And since the first clue regarding the Being of Dasein emerges (from out of Heidegger's consideration of the formal structure of the question about the meaning of Being) in terms of its mode of being always in some manner 'existentially' oriented toward entities in their Being, Heidegger initiates the fundamental ontology of Dasein with the analytic of existence.

Guided thus by the 'idea of existence', Heidegger's investigation of the essential structure, or 'existentiality', of existence, exhibits at once the state of affairs whereby Dasein manifests an essential tendency to conceal itself with respect to both its mode of being as an entity, and with respect to the Being of the entity which it itself is. Indeed, since, for Heidegger, the question of Being always asks about the Being of an entity, this ontico-ontological tendency of concealment gives rise to the necessity of methodologically securing the proper mode of access to Dasein's original mode of being, such that the entity which it is may be freed to show itself as it is in itself, thereby preparing the way for the proper exhibition of this entity in its Being. It is within the context of this ontologically motivated concern with securing the proper mode of access to the entity Dasein, that Heidegger recognizes the necessity for methodological mediation, in order wrest, from Dasein's essential tendency toward concealment, its own proper mode of being as an entity.



In working out the character of the method suitable to the task of the existential analytic, Heidegger finds it necessary to recast Husserl's phenomenological understanding of method. In particular, the provisional state of affairs brought into relief by his working out of the formal structure of the question about the meaning of Being, i.e., that (1) the 'Being' at issue is always the Being of an entity, and conversely, that (2) the entity at issue (Dasein) exists in such a way that its Being is always already at issue, demands, according to Heidegger, that a methodological concept be worked out such that the crucial interrelation and interdependence of this ontico-ontological state of affairs *be secured and highlighted*. Heidegger carries out this delicate task, by characterizing the self-showing (manifestation) of (2) in terms of the phenomenon understood in the ordinary (and formal) sense, and by characterizing the self-showing of (1) in terms of the phenomenon in the deformed, phenomenological sense. By characterizing that which is to be brought to self-showing in this way, i.e., that which is to be encountered in the modes of phenomena, Heidegger clarifies the methodological mediation demanded by the existential analytic. This clarification brings into relief the phenomenological relevance which that which is to be manifested, in the mode of the ordinary phenomenon, has for that which is to be manifested in the mode of the deformed, phenomenological phenomenon.

By working out in this manner (i.e., within the context of the problematic of the existential analytic) the 'purely methodological concept' of phenomenology, Heidegger characterizes Husserl's self-understanding of phenomenology as something to be 'overcome'. What is to be 'overcome', is its historical actuality as a 'movement', committed to the investigation of a determinate subject matter (i.e., consciousness and its intentional structures). The form which this overcoming assumes, is not that of an explicit denial of the philosophical relevance of Husserl's understanding of phenomenology; rather, in working out, in terms of the problematic of fundamental ontology, the *possibility* expressed by the phenomenological maxim *zu dem Sachen selbst*, Heidegger understands himself to be radicalizing this possibility. Indeed, Heidegger unfolds this radicalization in accord with his insight that 'all genuine method is based on an appropriate advance glance toward the basic composition of the 'object' or object sphere to be disclosed' (§ 41 above). By recasting the agenda of phenomenology in this way, Heidegger brings into relief what he takes to be the intimate relationship between phenomenology and ontology. To wit, since, in accord with the deformed concept of phenomenon, the 'thematic object' of phenomenology emerges in terms of the *showing itself from itself of the Being of an entity* (Dasein), and not simply the Being of an entity, Heidegger maintains that

ontology is only possible as phenomenology. And, since that which has been taken into phenomenology's grasp as its thematic object, is precisely that which at first and for the most part *does not show itself*, phenomenology is necessary according to Heidegger. The preliminary concept of phenomenology is therefore understood in terms of the methodological mediation, which wrests, both entities (qua the ordinary meaning of phenomenon) and their Being (qua the deformalized meaning of phenomenon), out of their concealment.

Guided by the advance glance toward the basic composition of its thematic object which, paradoxically, it initially encounters (as a function of its concealment) in the phenomenal mode of semblance, Heidegger finds that the meaning of the investigative description by which phenomenological science proceeds is that of interpretation (*ἑρμηνεύειν*). And it is within the context of the existential Interpretation (*Interpretation*) of Dasein that he finds Husserl's phenomenological understanding of the phenomenon of intentionality, as well as the natural meaning of this phenomenon, to manifest a derived (unoriginal) phenomenon.

With respect to Husserl's characterization of intentionality, Heidegger finds his account of the Being of the entity which manifests this structure to be deficient. This deficiency is traced, by him, to Husserl's phenomenological understanding, of the Being of the entity that manifests the structure of intentionality, exclusively in terms of the cognitive relation between thematically grasping and grasped entities. Heidegger maintains that this ontological understanding is not phenomenologically justified on the basis of an appeal to *die Sachen selbst*, but rather, that it is tacitly taken to be valid on the basis of a return to the traditional theory of Reason. This uninvestigated understanding of Being, limits the ability of Husserl's phenomenological understanding of intentionality to exhibit the existential way to be of the entity which manifests intentionality as an essential structure of its mode of being. Indeed, insofar as Husserl's phenomenological method understands that which it exhibits as phenomena *exclusively* in terms of the thematic grasping of the objectivity of objects, Heidegger maintains that any attempt on its part to uncover the existentiality of the 'subject', which manifests intentionality as its structure, will be necessarily limited to the exhibition of only the *semblance* of this way to be.

With respect to the natural meaning of intentionality, Heidegger finds the phenomenon of intentionality manifests an understanding of Being in terms of presence-at-hand. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is only on the basis of the prior disclosedness manifested by this understanding, that the being directed toward entities encountered present-at-hand is phenomenally possible. However, when considered, again, within the context of the existential Interpretation of Dasein, the prior

disclosedness of Being in terms of presence emerges as an unsuitable determination of the existential way to be, of the entity manifesting intentionality as a structure of its comportment.

Heidegger's exhibition of this basic composition of Dasein's existential way to be, in terms of the essential structure of being-in-the-world that it manifests, also brings into phenomenal relief intentionality's status as a derivative mode of being-in-the-world. Specifically, the ontic transcendence manifested by intentionality, emerges as a semblance of the original phenomenon of transcendence manifested by being-in-the-world. And the temporal meaning of this existential state of affairs, which Heidegger exhibits as manifesting the phenomenal condition for the possibility of entities manifesting themselves as entities in accord with Dasein's understanding of Being, emerges thus as the original phenomenon that makes something like an intentional directedness toward entities possible.

With respect to his original ontological task, of awakening an understanding for the meaning of the question about the meaning of Being, in order to then work out the concept of Being as such, Heidegger finds in 1927 that, in the existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, "something like 'Being' is disclosed in understanding of Being which, as understanding, belongs to existing Dasein" (BT, 488/437). However, this preliminary disclosedness of 'Being' is taken by him to be still "non-conceptual" (Ibid). Precisely what this means is, of course, still a topic of debate. Yet it seems that for Heidegger the exhibition of the non-conceptual disclosedness of Being, as it functions to "make it possible for Dasein as existent being-in-the-world to comport itself toward entities, the innerworldly as well as toward itself as existing" (Ibid), still leaves unresolved the issue of how things stand phenomenally with original time and the meaning of Being.

Heidegger appears to characterize what is at issue here in the following way: He asks if the possibility of Dasein's disclosive understanding of Being can be accounted for "by going back to the *original composition of being* of Dasein, which understands Being" (Ibid). Which is to ask, with respect to the manifestation of this original composition of being in terms of the temporalization of temporality, "How is this mode of the temporalization of temporality to be interpreted (*interpretieren*)" (Ibid)? And it is precisely in this context that Heidegger then asks (in 1927) "Is there a way from original *time* to the meaning of Being" (Ibid)? On the basis of the nature of these questions, it seems safe to conclude that Heidegger would understand them as originating *from within* an awakened understanding of the question about the meaning of Being. However, with respect to the philosophical 'move', from the propaedeutical task which fundamental ontology fulfills in awakening this sensitivity to the Being

question, to the ontological working out or clarifying of the concept of Being as such, Heidegger still seems (on the basis of his investigations in the phenomenologically oriented texts that follow his posing of these questions) undecided as to how they are to be answered. Thus, in 1928 he writes:

Time is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world . . . [however, with respect to] . . . the question of the extent to which one might conceive the Interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way . . . This is a question which I myself am not able to decide, one which is still completely unclear to me (*MFL*, 210/271).

**PART THREE**

**THE CONFRONTATION OF HUSSERL'S AND  
HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNTS OF INTENTIONALITY**

## INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

### § 84. *Preliminary Considerations.*

Having brought into relief both Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality in the exegeses of Parts One and Two, my study is now in a position to begin its mediative venture with respect to these respective accounts. Inasmuch as both of these thinkers understand their accounts of intentionality to be phenomenological, that is, to have their basis or 'philosophical warrant' in an appeal to *die Sachen selbst*, and inasmuch as their respective accounts of precisely what is manifested therein are controversial, it seems to me that some kind of philosophical mediation is called for. It appears to me, however, that such mediation, if it is to remain faithful to the 'spirit' of phenomenology so aptly characterized by Gadamer in terms of the common philosophical commitment to "the priority of self-giveness over against everything merely inferred or postulated,"<sup>1</sup> must, out of a healthy respect for 'the matters themselves', attempt to avoid the phenomenologically alienating pitfalls of certain historical and critical points of view.

Within the context of the present study, I understand by a 'historical' point of view the attempt to mediate the controversial issues by granting any kind of ultimate *philosophical* authority to the so-called historical situation surrounding, or even permeating, the matters at issue. Thus neither Husserl's and Heidegger's assessments of their philosophical relationship, nor any historical narrative which would "reconstruct" the mutually pertinent development of the matters at issue within the context of their philosophies, manifests any degree of *phenomenological* ultimacy. This is the case since, in each instance, the historical point of view introduces a shift in the would be historical arbiter's orientation toward the matters themselves at issue, such that these matters are now encountered within the context of 'historical distance'. This distance is achieved at the expense of the phenomenological commitment to the self-giveness or self-showing of

the matters at issue, since the historical arbiter suffers no compulsion to work through these issues beyond essaying their congruence with their purported historical determination.<sup>2</sup>

Also within the context of the present study, I understand by the 'critical' point of view the tacit or explicit granting of privilege with respect to the philosophical access to the matters at issue, such that the would be critical assessment assumes an argumentative authority over both Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the issues. In my estimation, the philosophical peculiarity of the phenomenological commitment precludes this often subtle shift of ultimate philosophical warrant away from appeals made to the matters themselves, to arguments which refer to, but do not directly take up or encounter, these very matters. Again, in my opinion the assumption of such a critical point of view manifests a disservice to the spirit of phenomenology.

In an effort to avoid what I take to be these pitfalls, my attempted appraisal of Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality will first bring into relief what, on the basis of the exegeses of the first two parts of this study, emerges as both the common and divergent themes of their respective accounts. From what I suggest are the matters proper to these accounts, I will then offer what I find to be the 'Husserlian' and 'Heideggerian' prerogatives on the key issues that manifest the divergences of these accounts. Finally, within the context of this effort to encounter the matters themselves which issue forth these divergences, I will venture what appears or shows itself as having greater "phenomenological" warrant. This does not mean that either the Husserlian or Heideggerian prerogative need emerge as exclusively satisfying this "criterion" but rather, that I will endeavor to leave open the possibility for some kind of phenomenological mediation, though only such mediation deemed appropriate to *die Sachen selbst*. Not unaware of that epiphenomenon of partisanship which has played and continues to play such an, I dare say, "unphenomenological" role in the attempts made by others to encounter the thought of these two great thinkers, my own thoughts on this matter will be offered, following Kant, with all the finality of a "suitor for agreement"—and by this I understand of course, with no finality at all.

## CHAPTER NINE

### THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: REFLECTIVE OR HERMENEUTICAL ?

#### § 85. *Introductory Remarks.*

When the results of the methodological discussions of Parts One and Two of my study are juxtaposed, the common theme of Husserl's and Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology may be summed up with the well-known phrase: *zurück zu den Sachen selbst* (return to the matters themselves). Indeed, it is their common philosophical commitment to what Heidegger refers to as "the meaning of all genuine philosophical 'empiricism' (*Empirie*)" (*BT*, 490 n10/50n), i.e., to the non-constructivistic disclosure of the a priori, that initially makes possible the phenomenological dialogue between these two thinkers. However, as the quotation marks around the word "empiricism" no doubt indicate, Heidegger has reservations about the precise nature of the apriority uncovered in Husserl's understanding of the "method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself" (*BT*, 490 n. 10/50n). These reservations come into bold relief with the consideration of the matters themselves, discussed above, with respect to each thinker's philosophical understanding of the meaning of the "return" expressed in their commonly embraced maxim "to the matters themselves."

#### § 86. *Thematization of Husserl's Account of the 'Necessity' Motivating Phenomenology's Return to the Matters Themselves.*

For Husserl, the necessity of this return emerges from out of his critical preoccupation with empiricistic sensationalism. Husserl's philosophical reflections on what he finds to be the philosophically inconsistent implications of the ontological speculations and episte-



mological constructions upon which, respectively, the empiricistic formulations of perceptual *Erfahrung* (experience) and cognitive ideality have their basis, motivates him to "radicalize" his reflections in accord with what he takes to be the non-speculative and non-constructive matters themselves manifested by the lived-experiences of each. Specifically, by pushing the empirical demand for "evidence" to its limits, Husserl is led to his "breakthrough" discovery of non-sensuous modes of intuition and intuitive objects which are given, yet unaccounted for, by the intelligibility determinate of both the empiricistically formulated notions of perceptual experience and perceptual objects, and their cognitive abstractions and corresponding thought contents.

Indeed, it is Husserl's rejection of the empiricistic determination of the nature of "inner" and "outer" perception on the basis of what he characterizes as the mediation of empiricistic speculations regarding the ultimate evidential or "phenomenal" sensuousness of their perceptual objects, which motivates him to *phenomenologically* thematize what he understands to be the exhibition of the *Erlebnisse* (lived-experiences) of each, *without accepting the ontological validity* of the speculations which heretofore have been accepted as determining the intelligibility of each. Husserl describes the cognitive character of the ensuing phenomenological thematization in terms of "phenomenological reflections." The reflective character of such reflections are understood by Husserl to be determined *not* by the putative interiority of empiricistically determined inner objects vis-à-vis the putative exteriority of equally empiricistically determined outer objects; but rather, the reflective character of phenomenological reflections are understood in terms of their peculiar ability to bring to evidential manifestness both perceptual (empiricistically determined as "outer") and cognitive (empiricistically determined as "inner") experiences 'already going on', yet heretofore empiricistically misdetermined. Thus, for Husserl, the "return" to be accomplished by the scientific research of phenomenology, the 'genuine philosophical empiricism', is initiated within the context of reflections that involve the thematic recovery of an evidential apriority determinative of, yet inaccessible to, the experiential and cognitive intelligibility of empiricistic sensationalism.

§ 87. *Thematization of Heidegger's Account of the 'Necessity' Motivating Phenomenology's Return to the Matters Themselves.*

Heidegger's reservations, concerning the nature of the apriority inherent in Husserl's understanding of the phenomenological return, come into relief when his understanding of the necessity of its return is considered. For Heidegger, the necessity of this return emerges from out of his preoccupation with what he takes to be the basic problem of ontology: the meaning of Being. His assessment of the contemporary philosophical status of this problem finds, paradoxically, that it is *not* a problem. Indeed, he discovers that inasmuch as Being is understood, without more ado, as the most universal, undefinable and self-evident concept, the meaning of Being is no longer even encountered as a problem. His concern for this problem leads to the insight that the question about this meaning has been forgotten to such an extent that it is in need of being reawakened.

In an effort to awaken some kind of insight into the meaning of the question about the meaning of Being, Heidegger first considers what is involved in any questioning. He finds that every questioning is a seeking guided beforehand by what is sought. Heidegger takes this to mean that questioning cognizantly seeks an entity with regard to the that and how of its being. Further, he finds that it is possible for the cognizant seeking of questioning to become an investigation, with the exposing, by this cognizant seeking, of the structure of that which the question is about in any questioning. Heidegger thus investigates the structure of the question involved in any 'questioning about . . .' in order to provisionally render transparent the structure of the question about the meaning of Being.

On the basis of this investigation of any 'questioning about . . .', Heidegger finds that the question manifests a tripartite structure of (1) that which is asked about, (2) that which is to be interrogated, and (3) that which is to be found out by the asking. Taking these structures as his clues, he then unfolds the formal structure of the question about the meaning of Being. Provisionally working out the formal structure of this question in this way, Heidegger arrives at the insight that, in questioning about the meaning of Being, that which is asked about is Being, that which is interrogated are entities with respect to their Being as entities, and that which is to be found out is the meaning of Being.

The special way in which the question about the meaning of Being becomes manifest, when formulated in accord with the structure of any question whatever, yields what Heidegger takes to be a "positive phenomenon" regarding both that which is to be found out by its

questioning, i.e., the meaning of Being, and the mode of being of the questioner. Specifically, despite the *Faktum* that the questioner does not know what the meaning of Being is (because indeed this comprises the very question), nevertheless, guided beforehand by what is sought, the questioner manifests a vague and average understanding of Being. Heidegger's initial investigation of both of these aspects of this positive phenomenon finds, on the one hand, that understanding the problem of Being requires as its first philosophical step, that the ways of exhibiting the entity to be interrogated, the Being of this entity, and the meaning of Being be essentially differentiated. And on the other hand, it finds that the *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) manifested by the questioner's mode of being is essentially determined by its Being being an issue for it. Heidegger designates this mode of being "existence," in an effort to highlight the reciprocal state of affairs whereby the ontic status of the entity to be interrogated with the asking of the question about the meaning of Being, is, in turn, ontologically composed by that which is asked about with the awakening of this question.

Heidegger understands this "preparation of the phenomenal ground" (BT, 490 n10/50n) of the a priori to which phenomenology is to return as provisional. This is the case since the preparation follows phenomenal clues gleaned from the structure of the question about the meaning of Being, which he presents in terms of their anticipation of the 'later analyses, in which the results will be authentically exhibited for the first time'. Nevertheless, these provisional considerations yield the following insight: The 'evidence' which initially and for the most part is exhibited by the traditional understanding of the entity in its Being which 'raises' the Being question only to uninterrogatively answer it, as well as the meaning of Being thereby unquestionably determined, manifests these interrelated and interdependent phenomena in the mode of a phenomenologically unoriginal semblance.

On the basis of his provisional insight into the 'positive phenomenon' of these interrelated ontological structures, Heidegger thus understands himself to be able to characterize (what he takes to be) the unoriginal manifestation of these structures in terms of their *seeming* to be what they are not. As a result of this state of affairs, Heidegger therefore finds that the thematic object to which the scientific research of phenomenology is to "return," the meaning of the Being of entities (which is disclosed in the understanding of Being manifested by the entity whose mode of being is existence), is initially and for the most part concealed to the phenomenological regard which manifests the necessity of this return. Hence, in contradistinction to what he no doubt takes<sup>1</sup> to be Husserl's understanding of what is

involved in the phenomenological return, i.e., the evidential manifestation of a previously concealed a priori which, once thematized by 'phenomenological' reflections, no longer conceals anything to the phenomenological intuition which describes this apriority, Heidegger maintains that phenomenological description must still wrest, from the previously concealed a priori to which it returns, its phenomenon in the original mode of its 'showing itself from itself'. Hence, for Heidegger the original meaning of phenomenological description emerges (on the basis of his provisional advance regard or glance toward the basic composition of the 'object' it is to disclose), as *Auslegung* (interpretation), in the sense of an original ἐρμηνεύειν. Heidegger takes this original sense of hermeneutics to manifest itself in the phenomenological endeavor to appropriate, from the semblance's concealing self-showing, the original phenomenon concealed therein, i.e., the phenomenon which shows itself in itself as the basis for the *Schein* which merely seems to be like what it shows itself to be.

§ 88. *Thematization of the Phenomenal Discrepancy in Husserl's and Heidegger's Account of the Necessity of the Phenomenological Return.*

The locution 'that which shows itself in itself' thus takes the place of Husserl's appeals to "evidence" in Heidegger's concept of phenomenology. This locution signals not only Heidegger's recasting of what he finds to be the fundamental concerns necessitating phenomenology's 'return' to the 'matters themselves', but also his understanding of the phenomenal discrepancy (*vis-à-vis* Husserl) which ensues in these very 'matters', with the transformation of phenomenology's self-understanding following from this recasting. When the matters themselves of Husserl's and Heidegger's respective accounts of the "matters themselves" involved in the phenomenological return to this last mentioned state of affairs are compared, then both the phenomenal similarity and contrast between Husserl's reflective evidential recovery, and Heidegger's hermeneutical recovery, becomes clear. For Husserl, as for Heidegger, phenomenology understands itself in terms of the *Aufweisung* (exhibition) and *Ausweisung* (manifestation) of a philosophically heretofore concealed domain of apriority. However, this similarity in phenomenological self-understanding reveals itself to be merely formal at the moment the specific phenomenal content of their respective accounts of the precise nature of this apriority is considered. Indeed, as the following considerations will make clear, Husserl's and Heidegger's differing accounts of this content stem not so much from the phenomenal peculiarity of their 'individual' visions, but from a pro-

foundly different *philosophical* orientation. The respective orientation is then manifested in both of their self-understandings of the interrelation and interdependence of phenomenology's methodological return, and the matters themselves yielded within the context of such a return.

§ 89. *Thematization of the Philosophical 'Orientation' Guiding Husserl's Understanding of Phenomenology.*

For Husserl, this orientation has its roots in the phenomenological commitment to the empiricist's demand for *Evidenz*. This demand is, of course, phenomenologically radicalized by Husserl to the extent that he is able to understand the "palpable self-presence" of the evidence yielded to the intuition of its reflective regard in terms of not only the non-sensuous ideality constitutive of the perceptual objects of both the empiricistically misdetermined "inner" and "outer" perceptions, but also in terms of the 'non' and finally 'extra' sensuous essences of the phenomenologically peculiar domain of lived-experience. Husserl's uncovering of the latter yields what is ultimately characterized as the absolute being of transcendental subjectivity, and does so on the basis of the phenomenological clarification of the phenomenal *Merkmal* (mark) manifested by the "immanence" of a certain species of lived-experience. Given the importance of Husserl's understanding of 'immanence', not only for his own phenomenological program but for Heidegger's critique as well, the discussion of their differing accounts of the content of the a priori to be uncovered by phenomenology will begin with the highlighting of the distinctive traits of Husserl's account of this phenomenon.

Husserl's understanding of immanence takes, as its point of departure, what he characterizes as the peculiar phenomenal mark manifested by that which appears in the lived-experience of ideal thought contents. The intuitive exhibition of the appearance of such contents is, according to him, such as to manifest an immediacy between that which appears and its mode of appearing. Which is to say, insofar as the *irreal* appears at all for Husserl, that which so manifests itself is understood to yield itself precisely as it subsists in its phenomenal manner of appearing. This phenomenal mark of immanence is likewise understood by Husserl to be manifest with the intuitive exhibition of the regard or intention which intuits this immediacy of the *irreal* perceptual object and its manner of appearing. Hence, in the contrast between the evidential *Überschuß* or excess which marks the perception of something transcendent and the evidential *Ineinander* (one in

the other) or adequacy which marks the perception of something 'inner', Husserl clarifies the idea of immanence. This idea will guide the progressive purification of phenomenology's methodologically "inner" (since immanent), reflective exhibition (intuition) of that which it yields within the rubric of *die Sachen selbst*.

This evidential idea of immanence, which Husserl succinctly formulates in terms of the originary giving intuition of phenomenology's "principle of principles," most emphatically then does *not* have its basis in the *leibhaften Wirklichkeit* (palpable actuality) of a privileged class of empiricistically formulated natural or ideal objects, but in the phenomenologically, since phenomenally, clarified essence of a specific species of *Evidenz*, viz., that which manifests itself 'adequately'. This basis is therefore understood by Husserl to be incorporated into phenomenology's methodological program in an "analogical" fashion, which means that he does not demand for phenomenology's exhibiting intuition any kind of "real" *Ineinandersein* (being in one another) of that which it manifests. This is the case, for Husserl, since the *realität* of such 'being in one another' manifests a phenomenologically naive relationship in which both the modality of being, and ontological characteristic simpliciter of what is manifested, retain their pre-epochal "positive" efficacy. Rather than signify or demand any such *real* relationship, the evidential idea of immanence demands, on the contrary, that any philosophical appeal to that which exceeds what is yielded before the regard of such intuition, is henceforth to be understood as losing its philosophical (phenomenological) warrant. It is within this context, then, that Husserl characterizes the absoluteness of the "phenomenological being" of the transcendently purified manifestation of the essences of perceptual, logical, material ontological, psychological, and transcendental lived-experiences. It is these essences that are to be uncovered by the immanent intuition of phenomenology's methodological reflections.

Husserl understands the phenomenal status of these various essences, "seen" by the *Wesensschau* (seeing of essences) of these methodical reflections, to be yielded with the variation of manifolds of lived-experiences. The peculiar contents of these manifolds manifest themselves as being already determined (as a function of the specificity of their content) when they come before the regard of such reflections. Likewise the "invariant" intelligibility of these eidetically differentiated essences does *not* have its basis, for him, in any privileged class of natural or cognitive objects. Rather, the invariant character of the essence manifests the structure of intelligibility or *Sinn* yielded in terms of its exhibition as that which "runs through" the varied exemplars of phenomenally differentiated lived-experiences. Therefore,

since these phenomenally differentiated lived-experiences are reflectively exhibited qua their phenomenally peculiar "already being there," the status and basis of the essences of such lived-experiences varies according to the specific domain of lived-experience at issue for Husserl.

§ 90. *Thematization of the Philosophical 'Orientation' Guiding Heidegger's Understanding of Phenomenology.*

For Heidegger, the phenomenological appeal to *Evidenz* is legitimate only within the context of what he understands to be the ordinary employment or deformatization of the formal concept of phenomenon. By the latter (i.e., "formal concept of phenomenon") he understands the exhibition of that which shows itself without the concern for differentiating the entity and Being character of that which is evidentially manifested. With the ordinary deformatization of this concept, Heidegger understands that which shows itself from itself to be the entity. Thus, in contrast to Husserl's phenomenological self-understanding of the 'matters themselves' in terms of evidence, Heidegger's self-understanding of the same maintains that their evidential exhibition limits their encounter to phenomena concretized in terms of entities. This means that the phenomenologically deformatized concept of phenomenon, understood in terms of the concealed ground and meaning (*Sinn*) of the phenomenon as it is ordinarily deformatized, is concealed to Husserl's understanding of phenomenon as well.

As a consequence of Heidegger's provisional insight into the basic composition of the thematic object of phenomenology, he maintains further that the evidential exhibition of entities, within the context of Husserl's methodological reflections, limits the access to what is manifested therein to their self-showing in the phenomenal mode of semblance. This is the case for him, since the reflective grasping of lived-experiences, in terms of the immanence of their thematic objectification, conceals an understanding of Being which is *inappropriate* to the original ground and meaning of the entity which manifests lived-experiences as a mode of its being. Specifically, Heidegger finds that this concealed understanding of Being determines the mode of being of the reflecting and reflected lived-experiences, in terms of a grasping entity present-at-hand and a likewise present-at-hand entity that is grasped. It is precisely this understanding of Being, in terms of presence-at-hand, that is contrasted with the idea of existence emergent from the provisional advance regard toward the Being of the entity which asks the question about the meaning of Being. Indeed, it is

*this very contrast* that allows the former understanding of Being to manifest itself as a self-showing in the phenomenal mode of semblance.

For Heidegger, the ontico-ontological tendency toward concealment manifested by the entity that has lived-experiences as a mode of its being is not an accident, but rather an essential trait characterized as this entity's self-alienating understanding of itself in terms of the Being of those entities which it itself is not. Thus he maintains that the exhibition of the interrelated ordinary and phenomenological concepts of the self-showing of this entity in its Being *is not* something which it might be possible for phenomenological reflection to make manifest, were it to "correct" its self-understanding of the thematic object or objects of its evidential regard. On the contrary, what is at issue for Heidegger is the "violent" wresting of the original ground and meaning of the entity in its Being which manifests these lived-experiences as an essential mode of its being (and which, as Dasein, asks the question about the meaning of Being disclosed in its pre-thematic understanding of Being). Therefore, he maintains that only as an interpretative method, guided by an advance regard toward the appropriate idea of the Being of the entity which is to be uncovered, can phenomenology hope to secure the proper mode of access to the concealed self-showing of both the entity and its Being. The entity and its Being, of course, initially and for the most part manifest themselves in the unoriginal phenomenal mode of semblance. Which is to say, for Heidegger the phenomenal unsuitability of reflection does not have its basis *exclusively* in the thematic object of its regard, but rather, its phenomenal unsuitability has its basis in the inappropriate idea of Being (understood as presence-at-hand) determinative of the mode of being of *both* the reflecting and reflected moments of its method.

When the results of this discussion of the common and divergent themes in Husserl's and Heidegger's understanding of the phenomenological method are taken into account, the fundamental issue that emerges concerns the question of whether the reflective or hermeneutical understanding of this method is more felicitous to the matters themselves. Indeed, since it is the very 'content' of the matters themselves that comprise the common theme of these differently formulated phenomenologies, and since the precise nature of this content is, in a sense, "pre-determined" as a consequence of the differing philosophical orientations which motivates as well as distinguishes the return of each to this content, in this next phase of my mediative discussion I will offer what 'the matters themselves' of these differing accounts seem to suggest as the 'prerogatives' of each. By "prerogative" I have in mind the "asking before" (*prae*—before + *rogare*—to ask) signified by the original Latin sense of the word, and not any



distinctively superior advantage supposedly stemming from the philosophical orientations of either thinker.

§ 91. *The "Heideggerian" Prerogative of a Hermeneutically Understood Phenomenological Method.*

The "Heideggerian" prerogative of a hermeneutically understood method comes into bold relief, with the consideration of his "immanent critique" of Husserl's reflective determination of the essence of lived-experience, in terms of the progressively reductive unfolding of this essence as pure consciousness. For Heidegger, the phenomenological radicalization of reflection via its reductive permutations conceals, rather than discloses, the original essence of the *Seinsart* (kind of being) of the entity which manifests pure consciousness as *an* (and not *the*) essence of its way to be. Specifically, the reflectively executed transcendental ἐποχή of the lived-experiences or acts which manifest the thesis of the transcendent world, and the likewise reflective bracketing of the thematic objects of this thesis, precludes rather than yields the disclosure of that which Heidegger, with his provisional securing of the basic composition of phenomenology's thematic object, has characterized as the original way to be of the entity to which these acts belong. This is the case for Heidegger since implicit in such reflection is the *disregard* of the *Seinscharaktere* (Being-character) of acts in order to fulfill the cognitive goal of securing their structure in absolute cognition. This *disregard* comes about as a result of the peculiar feature of reflection which allows it to turn away from the *Realität* of acts and their factically directed or intended themes, in order to immanently grasp the essential structure of the same. Indeed, Husserl's eidetic reduction of every moment which specifies factual individuality in the transcendently reduced contexture of acts, completes what for Heidegger appears to be the methodological exclusion of the existence of acts with the end of bringing to the fore *merely* the act's *Wasgehalt* (what-content).

Husserl's reflective method thus uncovers the "what-content" of acts, i.e., the intentional structure of the transcendently pure consciousness whose regard is directed toward its immanently grasped thematic object. In so doing, such an uncovering presupposes that which is lost precisely through the methodological securing of what it takes to be this phenomenologically absolute realm of Being. Which is to say, the essence of the mode of being, as well as the question about the meaning of Being characteristic of the entity manifesting the reflectively uncovered what-content, remains uninvestigated. The specifically Hei-

deggerian prerogative which permits the characterization of these last mentioned ontological distinctions is, of course, the hermeneutical securing of the provisional basic composition of the existential way to be of the entity that manifests the "ground" and meaning of the intentionality of transcendently pure consciousness. To wit, on the basis of the *Sicht* (sight) which characterizes the "free projection" of the idea of existence emergent from out of the advance regard toward the basic composition of the thematic object of phenomenology, the hermeneutically executed method of phenomenology is able to characterize the essential way to be of the intentional entity in terms of the existentiality of its pre-thematic understanding of Being. This characterization brings to the Interpretative fore of the existential analytic the ontic ground of the interpretative fore-structure of the primary and original pre-conceptual *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) belonging to this entity. And it does so in such a way that the hermeneutical Interpretation of the *Erschlossenheit* (disclosedness) determinative of the essential existential way to be of this entity, viz., *Dasein*, begins to concretely unfold itself in such a manner that its characterization in terms of the epistemological tradition's hierarchical notion of 'ground' is precluded.

It is this distinctive ontico-ontological characteristic of *Dasein*'s basic composition, disclosed by the Interpretation of the existential analytic in terms of the non-thematic hermeneutical circle of its pre-conceptual understanding of Being (which the reflective grasping of transcendently pure consciousness necessarily must disregard), that manifests the basis for the Heideggerian prerogative of the projective sight of the a priori phenomenological cognition of its "thematic" ἐρμηνεύειν over the pure intuition of the what-content of the intentional structure belonging to *Dasein*'s basic composition. Thus for Heidegger, Husserl's reflective return to the 'matters themselves', as a result of its determination of these matters in terms of the uninterrogated understanding of their Being as something present-at-hand in the cognitively immanent relation of grasping and grasped entities, can only yield before its reflective regard the phenomenally unoriginal *Was* of an entity whose original way to be is most emphatically non-cognitive. (That is to say, "non-cognitive" in this existentially specified sense of the *phenomenal priority* of factual individuation over the absolute cognition of the what-content of intentionality, which merely manifests *one* of this factually individuated entity's essential structures.)

§ 92. *The "Husserlian" Prerogative of a Reflectively Understood Phenomenological Method.*

The "Husserlian" prerogative of a reflectively understood method comes into bold relief with the consideration of the account of reflection provided by Heidegger in his 'immanent critique' of the reflective determination of the phenomenological matters themselves. For Husserl, reflection is *essentially* determined by the unitary givenness of its phenomenally distinct *reflected* and *reflecting* moments. When considered phenomenally, the 'reflected' moment of reflection manifests itself to its 'reflecting' moment as something which, prior to coming before the reflecting regard, is unreflected. Thus, in this phenomenally peculiar sense, the 'reflecting' moment of reflection serves as the phenomenal condition for that which it reflects *to come to be given as a phenomenon at all*.

The "inner" or "immanent" characteristic that the relation of these two moments of reflection manifests is sharply distinguished by Husserl from the traditional understanding of reflective interiority as a beholding of inner perceptual objects. These latter, which attain the designation 'immanent' as a function of their ontological opposition to the so-called "outer" perception of transcendent objects, presuppose rather than determine the essence of phenomenological reflection. This is the case since the pre-condition for the phenomenal givenness of both 'inner' and 'outer' objects, and their respective perceptions, is the thematic objectivation of each by the methodologically peculiar reflections of phenomenology. These reflections function to transform the empiricistically determined conceptions of each into lived-experiences of the same, which consequently initially serve to manifest both as reflected phenomena.

Therefore, the "immanence" characteristic of the essence of the reflected and reflecting moments of reflection does not signify a *real* relationship between ontologically mediated objects. Rather, the essential immanence manifested by reflection has its basis, according to Husserl, in the *phenomenal* adequation which the reflected moment manifests to the reflecting moment *when the regard of the latter is focused exclusively on that which is exhibited by the former*.

In Heidegger's critique however, Husserl's methodical reflection is understood in terms of a 'new act' which, initially within the context of the natural attitude, emerges from out of an individual stream of unreflective lived-experiences. As such, reflection is understood by Heidegger to be distinct among lived-experiences inasmuch as the object of its new act, lived-experience itself, belongs to the same *Seinssphäre* (sphere of Being) as the reflection objectifying the reflected object.

Heidegger thus understands *das reelle Ineinander* of the reflecting and reflected moments of reflection in terms of an entity which reflects and the entity which is reflected. Which is to say, for Heidegger, reflection is characterized in terms of an *ontologically* formulated characterization of "immanence."

Understanding reflection in this manner, as a particular instance of lived-experiences that is phenomenally determined by the "inwardness" or "interiority" of the object of its directional regard to this regard itself, allows Heidegger to differentiate reflective lived-experiences from those which the peculiar feature of 'reflective immanence' is lacking. These latter lived-experiences or acts lack, according to Heidegger, the immanent grasping of the entity to which they are directed, and are therefore characterized by him as being *unreflectively* directed toward something transcendent. Indeed, it is within what he takes to be Husserl's differentiation within the natural attitude between acts whose being directed toward grasps (qua immanence) their objects, and those which do not immanently grasp the entity toward which they are directed, that Heidegger characterizes Husserl's radicalization of the former reflective acts in accord with the transcendental ἐποχή of the natural thesis manifested by the unreflectively given stream of lived-experiences. For Heidegger grasping is only a particular, and not necessarily the predominant, mode of being-directed-toward or intending entities. Therefore, his account of transcendental phenomenology's methodical reflections presents some as capable of making a theme of an act's directedness which do not grasp the toward-which of its self directedness. Likewise, on the basis of his understanding of this distinction between grasping and non-grasping acts, he characterizes other methodical reflections which are no longer able to "live in" this co-intended toward-which of their directedness such that its mode of being-reflectively-grasped becomes the object of their immanent regard. In the first instance, the natural thesis of the transcendent world is 'suspended' in accord with the transcendental ἐποχή. In the second instance, the object of this thesis is 'bracketed'. In either case, it is Heidegger's understanding that what is at issue in both of these reflective modifications is Husserl's account of the transcendental reduction of naturally given concrete intentions to their thematic being 'lived' in the immanence of their being reflectively grasped.

By attending to Husserl's—in contrast to Heidegger's—account of the *Ansatzpunkt* (point of departure) of phenomenology's methodological reflections, the prerogative of his reflective understanding of the phenomenological method over its hermeneutical self-understanding begins to emerge. For Husserl, the initial phenomenal uncovering of

*Erlebnisse* (lived-experience), be they immanently or transcendently directed, is an affair of methodological reflection. Indeed, it is only after such reflections have uncovered the evidential essences of each of these already determined (when they are initially reflected by phenomenology's methodological regard) lived-experiences that any kind of epochal purification, in accord with the idea of immanence, becomes possible. Also, for Husserl such radically reflective purifications cannot yield from the start, as Heidegger's account would suggest, access to the phenomenologically transcendental domain of purified lived-experiences. On the contrary, the ἐποχή and reduction to this has as its requisite the perceptual, material ontological, and psychological (subsequent to the phenomenologically psychological ἐποχή) uncovering of the transcendently (not transcendentially) pure essences of the lived-experiences peculiar to each of these. And finally, Heidegger's understanding of reflection in terms of the ontological *Ineinandersein* of the reflected object with the reflecting regard betrays, from the Husserlian prerogative, what appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the phenomenal nature of reflection in general, as well as of Husserl's specifically phenomenological radicalization of the same.

With respect to the general misunderstanding of the phenomenal nature of reflection, it should be noted that for the Husserlian prerogative the essence of reflection does not manifest itself in terms of its differentiation, ontological (i.e., as a function of its *Seinssphäre*) or otherwise, from "concrete" lived-experiences which are directed toward something transcendent. Rather, the essence of reflection *Überhaupt* (as such) is for Husserl exhibited in terms of the phenomenal peculiarity whereby *that which is reflected manifests itself as 'having already been', prior to its reflective thematization.* Which is to say, for Husserl there are not, as Heidegger maintains, two phenomenally distinct streams of lived-experiences or acts, one of which would be "concrete" by virtue of its unreflective directedness to something transcendent (Heidegger's account of the 'natural thesis'), and the other which would be "reflective" by virtue of its being a 'new' or second level act immanently thematizing these first level "unreflective" acts. On the contrary, the *essence* of reflection is such that from the Husserlian prerogative, these so-called "first" level acts have, *as the phenomenal condition for their uncovering,* the reflective act (i.e., the reflecting moment of the unitary phenomenon of reflection) which uncovers them in terms of their manifesting themselves as having already been prior to their *reflective* thematization. Therefore it is only within the phenomenal context of their reflective thematization that they can manifest themselves as having been *unreflektiert* (unreflected) prior to this, their initial phenomenal manifestation. Hence,

in this phenomenologically clarified sense, the necessary condition for any lived-experience to become a phenomenon, whether concretely real or eidetically exemplary, is from the Husserlian prerogative an act or acts of reflection.

For Husserl it is the result of this essence of any reflection whatever that permits its phenomenological radicalization, such that the *Merkmal* (mark) of immanence of certain *reflectively* uncovered lived-experiences can analogically become the guiding idea for a phenomenological science. This specific radicalization of reflection is therefore not accomplished with a 'reductive' *turning inward*, a turning inward that would disregard the *Realität* of that which it turns away from in order to absolutely cognize the thematically grasped "what-content" of the same. This Heideggerian understanding is only possible on the basis of what the Husserlian prerogative would have to characterize as a fundamental misunderstanding of reflection. Such a misunderstanding of reflection takes its essence to be determined in terms of the ontological constitution of "inner" perceptual objects, rather than in terms of the phenomenally peculiar uncovering of its reflected theme as 'something that manifests itself as having already been prior to its coming before the reflecting regard'. Thus, for Husserl, it is reflection which, phenomenologically radicalized or not, initially permits (rather than precludes) the phenomenological characterization of the essence of the *Realität* (i.e., both the *Seinsart* and *Sinn des Seins*) of its reflected theme.

This controversial state of affairs is thus pertinent to the Heideggerian prerogative of a fundamentally hermeneutical self-understanding of the phenomenological method. In accord with this prerogative, the ontico-ontological understanding and meaning of Being manifested by Dasein's disclosedness exhibits an autonomy over all cognitive attempts to apprehend the same. Both the mode and meaning of Dasein's Being are such as to be originally and primordially 'always already there'. Hence the Heideggerian prerogative of this phenomenal priority of Dasein over the cognitive grasping, in accord with the traditional understanding of Being in terms of "immanence," of both this entity's lived-experiences and of their intentional structure. For the Husserlian prerogative however, the issue of both modes of being and the meaning of Being would have to be phenomenally "located" in neither the original, naturally given exemplars of immanently determined lived-experiences, nor in the analogical idea of immanence which ensues with the unfolding of the phenomenological clarification of the essence of this natural immanence. Rather, the *Seinsfrage* (Being-question) can emerge for this prerogative only on the basis of the *reflective* thematization of the lived-experience of questioning *which*

would be then reflectively investigated toward the end of rendering *durchsichtig* (transparent) the structure of this special question. Likewise, the phenomenal condition for the possibility of rendering transparent the peculiar (since it comes forward with a special priority) mode of being of the entity which asks the Being question, would have to be the *reflective* uncovering of the essential structures of this entity, i.e., the thematic *Freilegung* (releasement) of the existentiality of that which manifests itself as having already been, prior to its being reflected, a non-thematic *Existenz*.

However, this seemingly sanguine rapprochement of the Heideggerian hermeneutical and Husserlian reflective methodological prerogatives becomes controversial as soon as the 'matters themselves' of the onto-ontological *Vorrang* (priority) of Dasein's *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being), maintained by the former prerogative, is considered. For it is the pre-thematic, pre-theoretical, ontic priority of the interpretative circularity of the 'matters themselves' of this entity's understanding of Being that, in the final reckoning, comprises the *Grundverfassung* (basic composition) which provides the methodological (i.e., 'phenomenal') warrant for the explicitly ontological (i.e., phenomenologically theoretical) circular *frei Entwurf* (free projection) of the idea of existence that, according to Heidegger, is the only way 'an entity can itself come into words with regard to its Being'. However, from the Husserlian prerogative, it is precisely this attempt to *ground* the methodological legitimacy of Dasein's theoretical comportment in its pre-conceptual, and therefore unreflective comportment, that elicits the most emphatic censure.

This Husserlian prerogative comes into view when the phenomenal condition for the initial exposing, via the Interpretation which guides the existential analytic, of the *Wesensstrukturen* (essential structure) of existence is considered. This prerogative would take Heidegger at his word when he maintains that it is the ontological sight of the free projection that initially allows an entity 'to come itself into words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether it, as this entity, yields the composition of being upon which it has been disclosed in projection'. And yet, when the Heideggerian account of the 'matters themselves' of this formal-indicative projection, as having its ground *not* in the free discretion of this ontological projection, but in the *cognitively autonomous* mode of being which this free projection must initially first disclose, is likewise taken seriously, unavoidable methodological objections would have to emerge from the Husserlian prerogative. What is objectionable to Husserl's methodologically reflective prerogative is not however the circularity of this hermeneutical situation, manifested in terms of the formal-indicative onto-

logical projection first disclosive of the ontic composition of an entity. Rather, what is objectionable to this prerogative is the attempt of the Heideggerian prerogative to ground or found the circularity of the sight of the ontological projection upon the ontic sight of a parallel, *yet more original*, circularity. This latter pre-theoretical circularity cannot help but seem to the reflective prerogative to have as its necessary condition for becoming a phenomenon precisely the circularity of the former's theoretical sight. Indeed, it is this theoretical sight which initially must Interpretatively disclose the essential structures of the 'unreflective' sight of the basic composition of its pre-theoretical understanding of Being, *if the latter is to be encountered at all in the mode of phenomenon*—i.e., is to show itself from itself.

This is to say, the 'matter itself' of the understanding of Being can only become phenomenally manifest from the Husserlian prerogative within the context of the methodical regard of the theoretical comportment determinative of the existential analytic's free projection of the *ontological* (not ontic) idea of existence. Thus, the theoretical comportment of this free projection seems to be phenomenally non-equivalent with the original, non-theoretical comportment of Dasein's existence. And it is precisely this 'non-equivalence' which renders untenable, from the Husserlian prerogative, the Heideggerian attempt to found or ground the former's comportment in the latter. Indeed, it is when these interrelated, yet non-equivalent, comportments are considered, that something like the phenomenon of reflection comes into view. It cannot help but seem to the Husserlian prerogative that the disclosure of an unreflective, pre-theoretical understanding of Being 'always already there', involves the *reflectively* theoretical comportment of a methodical regard whose sight initially allows this pre-theoretical *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) to show itself. Therefore, this prerogative would find that it is reflection which uncovers such an understanding, in the manner peculiar to reflection, as something which manifests itself to its regard as having been unreflected prior to its reflective thematization.

Indeed, the essential unity of these reflected and reflecting moments is such as to prohibit the following: The phenomenological characterization of any kind of ontological independence, or autonomy, of the *Sinn* that is yield qua the mode of being of the reflected, from the reflection which initially must bring to thematic givenness precisely this *Sinn*. To do so, in accord with the grounding of the hermeneutical sight of the ontological projection of the idea of existence, in the ontico-ontological projection of the sight of an entity whose mode of being is maintained to be *fundamentally* unreflective, is thus, for the Husserlian methodological prerogative, to overstep the limits of the "given."



§ 93. *An Attempt to Mediate the Methodological Returns of the Phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger: the Isomorphism which Emerges with respect to these Returns when their "Foreshortened" Understandings of each of other are taken into Account.*

In an effort to venture a mediating appraisal of the methodological discrepancy at issue in Husserl's and Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology's most proper method, I will begin by noting what appears to me to be most obvious: Although Husserl and Heidegger are both using the same words when they discuss "reflection" and "Being," their accounts of the matters themselves of each are in no way the same. When their differing philosophical itineraries are taken into account, it seems to me that this state of affairs has its basis for each thinker in the following.

For Husserl, all talk of entities in their Being is immediately understood in terms of an already constituted domain of phenomena, whose ultimate constitutive source can only be secured on the basis of first phenomenologically clarifying the naturally grasped essences of each, and then tracing the constitution of these essences back to the their transcendently constituted *Sinn* in transcendental subjectivity. Thus, Heidegger's attempt to provisionally secure the thematic object of phenomenology, on the basis of a hermeneutical advance regard toward the basic composition of an entity in its Being, is an anathema for Husserl, since it is precisely what he takes to be the already constituted status of the same which *must be ultimately overcome* in order for phenomenology to fulfill its transcendental mission.

Likewise, all talk of subjects, transcendental or otherwise, is immediately understood by Heidegger in terms of the *cogito*, the subjectivity of which is determined on the basis of an epistemological understanding of an inward reflective grasping of an immanent, and hence absolute, entity in its Being. It is precisely this understanding of Being that his hermeneutical advance glance toward the original subjectivity of the subject, i.e., toward *Dasein*, discloses in terms of its unoriginal showing of *Dasein* (i.e., its manifestation of *Dasein* in the phenomenal mode of semblance). Thus, Heidegger exhibits little patience for Husserl's reflective attempts to secure the thematic content of phenomenology.

Now, it appears to me that when the matters themselves of Heidegger's account of "reflection" are juxtaposed with the matters themselves of Husserl's account of the same, and that when likewise their respective accounts of "entities in their Being" and the "meaning of Being" are so considered, the truth emerges of Fink's observation that "neither Heidegger nor Husserl sees the other without a certain

'foreshortening'."<sup>2</sup> The matters themselves of this "foreshortening" appear to me in such a manner as to suggest that what is at issue for Husserl, with the progressive reflective unfolding of the constitutional essences of the natural attitude and its correlative thesis of the world, is isomorphic with Heidegger's reawakening of the question about the meaning of Being on the basis of the *Seinsverständnis* manifested by Dasein's essential composition as being-in-the-world.

The "similarity in form" of Husserl's transcendental grounding of the origin of the world's *Sinn*, manifested as already having been *erlebt* (lived) prior to its reflected uncovering, with Heidegger's transcendental grounding of the *Sinn* disclosed in the intelligibility of Dasein's *Seinsverständnis*, manifested as always already there, emerges when the following states of affairs are attended to:

(1) First, with the consideration of the difference between transcendental subjectivity in Husserl and the Cartesian cogito. The transcendence in immanence of transcendental subjectivity, which Husserl exhibits as the phenomenally constitutive source of all *Seinssinn* (meaning of Being), is *fundamentally* different from the traditional conception of an immanently grasped cogito which can only "represent" transcendence on the basis of the opposition between the subjectivity of the transcendent directedness of its *Vorstellungen* (representations) and the objectivity which is somehow "contained" *reell* in such representations. This seems to me to be the case since the exhibition of the constitutive *Leistungen* (performances) of transcendence "in" transcendental subjectivity takes place on the basis of transcendental reflections, whose point of departure requires the phenomenal securing of the essential difference (and ontological non-equivalence) between: (a) the lived-experiences that these reflections exhibit as manifesting this transcendent *Seinssinn* in terms of its reflected givenness as 'already having been' and (b); the immanence of the lived-experiences of the regard of these reflections that is the phenomenal condition of the manifestation of these constitutive "performances" at issue. The difference between (a) and (b) is one which cannot be collapsed such that the *Leistungen* at issue could be understood in terms of an 'ontological' origin in either reflection or transcendental subjectivity. This is the case since transcendental reflection merely exhibits transcendence, in accord with its immanent givenness, on the basis of the 'already having been' of a reflected *Seinssinn*. Hence, the "performances" of the transcendental subjectivity at issue refer to precisely this phenomenal non-equivalence of the reflected and reflecting moments that its (i.e., transcendental subjectivity's) *transcendentally* purified (i.e., immanent) lived-experience manifests. Therefore, it appears to me that it is the traditional, rather

than this notion of immanence, that is the target of Heidegger's critique of immanence. And when this 'foreshortening' with respect to Husserl is taken into account, the isomorphism of their respective transcendental groundings can begin to emerge. For this to happen the following must be realized.

(2) The *Sinn* that Heidegger discloses in Dasein's understanding of Being is *fundamentally* different from the thesis that is mundanely apperceived and accepted as valid, namely the thesis of the natural world and its attendant natural attitude. This appears to me to be the case since the former can only be exhibited in terms of its phenomenal originality *on the basis of the hermeneutical wresting* from its initial phenomenal semblance its original self-showing. Therefore, it seems to me that Husserl's suspicion that Heidegger's raising of the *Seinsfrage* (Being-question) signals a "relapse" into the natural attitude and its naively accepted world thesis has its basis in his understanding of the "*Seinssinn*" at issue in the Being-question in terms of what, for Heidegger, is only its initial (although necessary) manifestation in the phenomenal mode of *Schein*. When this 'foreshortening' on the part of Husserl is taken into account, the isomorphism emerges in my view between: (a) Heidegger's concrete working out of the existential analytic, with its methodological basis in the free hermeneutical projection which, counter to Dasein's *initial* self-interpretation of its mode of being and the meaning of Being (and hence initial self-showing of the same), progressively discloses the thematic "transcendental matters themselves" of phenomenology and; (b) Husserl's concrete working out of the phenomenological reductions, with its methodological basis in the epochés which, counter to the lived mundane apperception of experience (and hence naive acceptance of the validity of the same), progressively uncovers the thematic "transcendental matters themselves" of phenomenology.

§ 94. *The Limit of the Methodological Isomorphism between the Hermeneutical and Reflective Returns of Phenomenology: the Problem of Reckoning with the Divergent "Matters Themselves" of Intentionality Uncovered by each Return.*

However, to suggest anything more than this similarity in the *morphe* of the methodological returns of the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, which Heidegger expresses in his *Encyclopaedia Britannica* letter to Husserl when he says that both seem to agree "that the entity (*das Seiende*) in the sense you call 'world' cannot be clarified by a return to an entity with precisely such a mode of being"

(*PP*, 601), would require that my study attempt to mediate their respective accounts of the very "matters themselves" that these returns understand themselves to uncover.

Such an attempt would, it seems to me, have to involve some kind of coming to terms with the different accounts of these matters as they unfold in accord with each thinker's concrete working out of phenomenology's basic itinerary. Were one to try to do this, it appears to me that Husserl's account of the basic phenomenon of phenomenology, which he investigates in terms of the reflectively uncovered multifaceted phenomenon of intentionality, and Heidegger's account of this basic phenomenon in terms of Dasein's pre-reflective (and non-intentional) involvement with Being, would have to be reckoned with. Such a reckoning would have to find a way to deal with the issue of whether phenomenology's most original phenomenon manifests itself: (a) on the basis of the reflective *Leistungen* (performances) of an intentionally structured transcendental subjectivity, or; (b) on the basis of an autonomous *Erschlossenheit* (disclosedness) the *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) of which would render all intentional compartments intelligible as such.

#### § 95. *Transition.*

Reckoning with this issue beyond the consideration of the prerogatives of each thinker worked out above would require a *decision* regarding the ultimate philosophical warrant of each of these prerogatives. Such a decision appears to hinge upon the issue of whether *die Sache selbst* of intentionality manifests itself as an original or derived phenomenon. The phenomenological self-understandings of both Husserl and Heidegger have been considered thus far insofar as they manifest, at the very least, a *formal* agreement concerning phenomenology's commitment to the non-constructivistic exhibition and manifestation of the state or states of affairs to which phenomenology is to return. Hence, despite the differing philosophical orientations which impel the phenomenologies of each to this return, they are in agreement inasmuch as the matters themselves encountered with this return are understood by each to be yielded only insofar as *the autonomy of their peculiar phenomenal manifestness is maintained with their methodological exhibition.*

Thus the pertinent question with respect to the controversy involved in Husserl's and Heidegger's differing accounts of the phenomenal status of intentionality, viz., whether this phenomenon yields an original or derived phenomenon, points to their concern with *die Sache*

*selbst* of the "same" phenomenon. However, a phenomenal paradox obviously emerges with the consideration of their differing accounts of the precise character of what, ostensibly, each holds to be the "same" phenomenon. In order to provide what I find to be the "phenomenologically" necessary mediation with regard to this paradox, the following chapter will first consider the phenomenological prerogatives of each thinker's account of intentionality. Once these prerogatives have been brought into relief, I will then attempt to investigate the felicity of each of these prerogatives with respect to the common phenomenon they purport to exhibit. Finally, I will attempt to implement such an investigation in a manner which will allow for the determination of the above mentioned felicity *on the basis of a decision which is weighted toward the autonomy of intentionality's phenomenal manifestation, and not any kind of preemptive favoring of the prerogative of one thinker over the other.*

## CHAPTER TEN

### INTENTIONALITY: AN ORIGINAL OR DERIVED PHENOMENON?

#### § 96. *Introductory Remarks.*

Drawing again on the exegetical discussions of Parts One and Two of my study, I find that when the results of Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality are considered, the common theme of these respective accounts emerges under the heading of "*Wesensstruktur*" (essential structure). For both of these thinkers, the phenomenon of intentionality emerges in terms of its essential structuring of that which is uncovered or disclosed, within the context of phenomenology's methodological return, as an already given phenomenal field. However, the precise nature of the 'matters themselves' of the already given phenomenal field or realm that, upon being returned to, yields, in accord with its phenomenological treatment, intentionality as *its* (in the instance of Husserl) or *an* (in the instance of Heidegger) essential structure, is controversial for these two thinkers. Which is to say, that not only is the precise character of the 'matter itself' of the essence manifested by the phenomenon of intentionality at issue (and in controversy) for Husserl and Heidegger, but also at issue, is the precise status of the 'matters themselves' of the phenomenologically relevant (since it is encountered as having been already given) exemplary field which comprises the original ground, from out of which the essence of intentionality is unfolded.

§ 97. *Thematization of Husserl's Account of the Exemplary Field which Yields the Intentional Essence of both Actionally and Non-actionally Modified Lived-Experiences.*

For Husserl, the already given exemplary phenomenal field that, subsequent to its methodological variation, initially yields to the intuitive regard of phenomenological reflection the essence intentionality,<sup>1</sup> manifests itself in terms of the conscious moment of lived-experiences that are conscious of either transcendent or immanent perceptual objects. In accord with Husserl's immanently guided phenomenologically methodical reflections, essential distinctions in the phenomenal nature of the intentionalities uncovered as the essences of the lived-experiences of perceptual, logical (analytical), regional (synthetic), psychological, and transcendental phenomena are yielded to the *Wesensschau* (seeing of essences) of the regard of these reflections. And, likewise, there is yielded the all important intentionality that manifests the essential structure of the lived-experiences of the methodical reflections which make-up (*ausmacht*) the phenomenological 'method of intentionality'.

Distinctive among the eidetic peculiarities which emerge with Husserl's reflective unfolding of the essence intentionality, is the state of affairs wherein the intentional correlation between consciousness and its object *exceeds* the more narrowly conceived phenomenon of an explicitly "directional" act, whose conscious *Blickstrahl* (ray of regard) thematically grasps the object of its intention. The phenomenal state of affairs of this latter, "epistemic essence" of "actionally modified" intentionality, is designated by Husserl in terms of either the Cartesian "cogito" or "act," and is sharply differentiated by him from the former phenomenon. What Husserl's methodical reflections uncover, as the phenomenally distinctive feature of the intentional essence of those aspects of consciousness and its object that are distinguished from the peculiar act modality of the cogito, is the state of affairs whereby the regard of consciousness and its correlative "object" manifest, respectively, a *Hof* (fringe) of non-actional lived-experiences and a horizontal field objects which, as the *Blickfeld* (field of regard) of the conscious moment of these non-actional lived-experiences, are intended without being explicitly thematized via a *Blickrichtung* (direction of regard).

The "fringe" of such non-actional lived-experiences and their correlative objective horizontal fields comprises the already given, and contentually differentiated, phenomenal domains of the exemplary perceptual, material ontological, psychological and transcendental "consciousness of," and the full correlate of the non-thematic objects of these consciousnesses. When methodically varied, these yield, before Husserl's reflective regard, intentionality as an essential phenomenon

lacking the distinctive "being directed toward" of the cogito. Thus, for Husserl, the *wahrnehmungsbereitschaft* (readiness to be perceived) of perceptual objects and their corresponding perceptions, along with the world-horizon and its correlative non-conceptual, "consciousness background," or "field of freedom," that belongs essentially to the psychologically and transcendently pure ego, are exhibited by phenomenology's methodological reflections as manifesting an intentional essence whose 'consciousness of', and 'object of consciousness', are lacking the distinctive phenomenal marks of objects thematically grasped by the explicit *Zuwendung* (turning towards) of the directional regard belonging to an act.

Likewise, lived-experiences of the "act" of reflection manifest (to the exhibiting regard of "higher level" reflections) the horizontal field and conscious fringe of non-actional lived-experiences "ready to be perceived," and yield therefore, subsequent to their methodical variation, a non-actional intentional essence. Therefore, within the context of Husserl's transcendently pure phenomenology, the actional and non-actional intentionalities that are manifested on the basis of these already determined fields of lived-experiences, and the likewise actional and non-actional intentionalities that are manifested by the exhibiting regard of methodologically phenomenological reflections, *comprise the original, and primary, phenomenon of phenomenology.*

§ 98. *Thematization of Heidegger's Account of the Unoriginal Phenomenal Status of Intentionality: his Critique of Husserl's "Epistemological" narrowing of this Phenomenon and his Subsequent Unfolding of the Natural Meaning of Intentionality.*

For Heidegger, the structure of intentionality, whether the phenomenon at issue be the "narrowed conception" of Husserl's phenomenology or the epistemologically liberated "natural meaning" of this phenomenon itself, is uncovered on the basis of the Interpretative exposing of the existentiality of an entity whose mode of being manifests intentionality as *an* (not *the*) essential structure of its Being. Having hermeneutically secured the basic composition of this entity in terms of its original comportmental mode of being-in-the-world, Heidegger's phenomenological analysis finds that the peculiar "self-directedness toward" that structures the *intentio* of Dasein's explicit comportment toward and discovery of entities, as well as the peculiar "*Wahr-genommenheit*" or "being discovered" that structures the "toward which" of the *intentum*, is not an original phenomenon. On the contrary, both of these essential moments of intentionality are phenomenally founded upon (rather than founding of) Dasein's original comport-



mental mode of being, which manifests itself in terms of its fundamental way to be as essentially being-in-the-world.

Heidegger finds Husserl's conception of intentionality to be phenomenally unoriginal, in that it takes the epistemological attitude of an explicitly grasping and thereby thematizing mode of Dasein's comportment to be the most original, i.e., "natural," mode of being of this entity in its Being. Hence, guided by the end of absolutely cognizing the essential structure of the 'being directed toward' characteristic of this mode of being, the original existential way to be of Dasein's comportment remains concealed. Indeed, the transcendently pure consciousness and its thematically grasped object, which manifest the absolute Being of the phenomenologically secured (via the reductions) field of intentionality, when exhibited in accord with Husserl's understanding of the exemplary basis of the natural attitude, yield, in Heidegger's view, only the semblance of the natural meaning of this phenomenon. This is the case according to Heidegger's "immanent critique" of Husserl's phenomenology, since the understanding of Being which tacitly guides Husserl's existentially pure phenomenology has its basis in the unoriginal, and uninvestigated, determination (as opposed to its phenomenal characterization) of the meaning of Being in terms of the "what-content" manifested by thematically grasping and grasped entities.

Toward the end of performing what he thus finds to be the *phenomenologically* necessary task of interrogating both the unoriginal (since it conceals the existential way to be of the entity which manifests the structure of intentionality) meaning of Being operative in Husserl's understanding of the absolute Being of intentionality, as well as the meaning of Being as such that will emerge as *the* issue for phenomenology's most proper understanding of itself, Heidegger begins by exhibiting the natural meaning (concealed from Husserl) of the directional sense of intentionality. With the exhibition of this meaning, Heidegger finds that the uncovering, or discovery, of the what-content of the structure of intentionality, *presupposes* the a priori disclosure of an understanding of Being that manifests its meaning in terms of *Vorhandensein* (Being present-at-hand). Indeed, for Heidegger, the cognitive grasping of the what-content of both the 'self-directedness toward' of pure consciousness and the 'toward which' of the thematic object of this consciousness, is only possible if the mode of being of each has been already traced out (disclosed) in terms of a meaning of Being manifested as pure presence-at-hand.

Such a limited understanding of Being yields, for Heidegger, the phenomenal basis for Husserl's unoriginal understanding of the 'subjectivity of the subject', as an immanently grasped entity which, as a function of this grasping, is manifested as something present-at-hand.

It also yields Husserl's unoriginal understanding of the world to which this subject 'directs itself toward', in terms of an entity (or totality of entities) likewise present-at-hand. When the (concealed to Husserl's epistemological determination of intentionality) a priori understanding of Being, in terms of pure presence-at-hand, is interrogated on the basis of the phenomenon exhibited with Heidegger's hermeneutical wresting of the essence of Dasein's original mode of being (which he exhibits as manifesting the existential structure of being-in-the-world), Heidegger finds that Dasein's comportmental 'being directed toward' and discovery of entities, is, again, founded in this more original mode of being. Thus, for Heidegger, the phenomenon of intentionality, whether at issue in accord with its manifestation in Husserl's existentially pure phenomenology, or in accord with its hermeneutically disclosed natural meaning, *manifests an unoriginal and hence derivative phenomenon.*

§ 99. *The Emergent Heteromorphism of Husserl's and Heidegger's Account of the 'Matter Itself' of Intentionality.*

When the results of this discussion of the common and divergent themes of Husserl's and Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of intentionality are taken into account, two basic issues emerge. The first concerns the phenomenological originality of the exemplary field which, in accord with the methodological treatment of each thinker, yields the essential structure of intentionality. And the second concerns the related issue, of the status of the originality of this very structure itself. Again, as in the case of the question of the controversy of the phenomenological self-understanding of the precise nature of the most proper return to the 'matters themselves' that are the common concern of Husserl and Heidegger, what is in controversy here involves the very 'contents' of specific matters themselves, that each phenomenologist finds to be manifest within the context of their concrete working out of phenomenology's methodological return.

My initial consideration of the felicity to the matters themselves of Husserl's reflective and Heidegger's hermeneutical understanding of this return, found that in order to arrive at any kind of "decision" regarding this felicity, it was necessary to consider their accounts of the most original phenomenon that emerges in accord with these respective methodologies. Indeed, despite the apparent isomorphism of the phenomenological returns of each that emerges when their 'foreshortenings', with respect to the methodologies of each other, are taken into account, any further mediation regarding either this isomorphism, or what is now beginning to emerge, with the consideration of their

respective accounts of intentionality, as a serious heteromorphism, requires, in my view, that the prerogatives<sup>2</sup> of each thinker's account of intentionality be considered. For in my opinion, only on the basis of the discussion of these prerogatives can the phenomenological warrant of the interrelated and interdependent methodological returns, and matters themselves that are uncovered (disclosed) within the context of these respective returns, be responsibly considered.

§ 100. *The 'Heideggerian' Prerogative of the Unoriginal Phenomenal Status of Intentionality.*

The Heideggerian prerogative of the unoriginal, and therefore derived, status of intentionality comes into bold relief with the consideration of his immanent critique of Husserl's existentially pure determination of this phenomenon. For Heidegger, the movement of transcendence manifested by the 'self-directedness toward' of the *intentionio* in Husserl's account of this phenomenon, as well as the transcendent 'toward which' of the entity that is discovered in the *intentionio* as its *intentum*, yields a semblance, rather than the original ground and meaning of the phenomenon of transcendence. Hence, this 'self-directedness toward' is *merely* like the original phenomenon of transcendence, and, indeed, presupposes in its self-showing the ground and meaning of a more original phenomenon. This is the case, according to Heidegger, since the movement of transcendence exhibited in terms of Dasein's existential way to be, manifests an original, and primordial, understanding whose non-grasping (i.e., non-cognitive) *Entwurf* (projection) has as its 'toward which' the phenomenon of world *and not entities*. The latter, original projection, in the Heideggerian view, has always already surpassed entities as a function of its existential being-in-the-world. Thus, in his view, Husserl's understanding of intentional acts, in terms of their thematic grasping of present-at-hand entities, as well as his equally present-at-hand understanding of the subjectivity of the *Vorstellungen* (presentations) which comprise the 'toward which' of the act's thematizing regard, manifest merely an *ontic* conception of transcendence.<sup>3</sup> And as such, both the phenomenological characterization of the mode of being of the intentional phenomenon, and the phenomenologically executed interrogation of the meaning of Being as such, which is to follow with the (existential analytic's) characterization of this mode of being, are lacking in Husserl's conception of this phenomenon.

The full force of this Heideggerian prerogative, comes to the fore, with his interpretative (*interpretieren*) consideration of the existential temporal meaning of the transcendence manifested by Dasein's

being-in-the-world. According to this Interpretation, Husserl's exhibition of the original phenomenon of phenomenology, in terms of the cognitive grasping of entities present-at-hand, results in the phenomenological attempt to ground the (original) movement manifested by transcendence in terms of a single modality of time: viz., the present or now. As a result of intentionality's monothetical orientation to entities as something present, Heidegger finds that Husserl can only attempt to account for the ground of the movement manifested by transcendence, in terms of the succession of "nows" which are exhibited to the *Zeitbewußtsein* (time consciousness) of the reflective regard. However, on the basis of having hermeneutically secured the proper mode of access to Dasein (as the entity which existentially manifests the ground and meaning of intentionality), the Heideggerian prerogative is able to disclose, as the temporal meaning of this entity, what must necessarily remain concealed to Husserl's unoriginal mode of access to this entity: *original time exhibited in terms of the temporalization of temporality.*

Heidegger understands this last mentioned phenomenon to manifest itself in terms of the 'self-unifying unity in ecstatic temporalization', that, in "stretching" Dasein beyond entities (including itself), provides the original basis for its basic composition as a Self and world disclosure, which is always already being this "there." Thus, in contrast to what he takes to be the ordinary conception of time operative in Husserl's exhibition of time (i.e., time formulated in accord with the intentional consciousness of time, which reflectively grasps a continuum of present-at-hand 'nows' in terms of 'now, not yet now, and now no longer', in order to move beyond or transcend entities), Heidegger finds that the original temporalization of temporality does not have its phenomenal "locus" in the cognitive (thematic) acts of an entity. On the contrary, time "is" *not* as entities (i.e., as an intentional entity whose directional acts would somehow account for time), but rather temporalizes itself.

This means, according to Heidegger, that time is not initially encountered with the thematic exhibition of a continuum ofnows, but rather, in accord with time's essential structure of datability, it is initially encountered in terms of Dasein's designating entities with the temporal expressions "now when, at the time when, and afterwards when." Such expressive utterances, which Heidegger exhibits in terms of Dasein's 'entirely unreflective, immediate' pre-conceptual acquaintance with time, are what manifest Dasein's being *Unterwegs* (underway), as the stepping beyond or transcendence of entities basic to the meaning of its original mode of being. Hence, for Heidegger, the phenomenal basis for the Husserlian encounter with entities as something present-at-hand, is to be found in the ecstatic unity of the modes of existence which make possible Dasein's (and intentionality's) "movement" beyond entities.

These modes of existence (which are most emphatically not intentional modes of consciousness, thematically directed toward entities 'in' time) are essentially characterized by Heidegger in terms of the ecstatic unity of an awaiting which renders present by having been. It is the phenomena of each of these three ἔκστασις which, by temporalizing themselves in an ecstatic unity from out of the future issued forth from awaiting, yield the phenomenal basis for Dasein's stretching itself beyond the entities which it initially encounters as dated within time.

Inasmuch as Heidegger takes the 'toward which' of Husserl's account of intentional acts to be entities, the final advantage of the Heideggerian prerogative comes to the fore, with respect to the inability of intentionality to account for the temporal condition of world<sup>4</sup> in its essential belonging to transcendence. The phenomenon world, which for Heidegger is *not* accessible as entities are, does not exist according to him as do entities. On the contrary, 'it merely temporalizes itself'. According to the Heideggerian prerogative, it is precisely the world's temporalization, which manifests itself in terms of the analogically fashioned ecstemes which comprise the horizational *Wohin* of the unified ecstases of original temporality, that first makes it possible for Dasein, in accord with its essential (yet unoriginal) mode of intentional comportment, to return, from these horizons, toward entities encountered within them. Hence from the Heideggerian prerogative, the intentional discovery of entities within the world, as a function of its merely ontic transcendence toward these entities, presupposes, rather than grounds, Dasein's original existential mode of always already being-in-the-world. Which is to say, the transcendence exhibited in Husserl's account of intentionality, along with its basis in the time consciousness of the present-at-hand continuum of nows, manifests, within the context of the hermeneutical return to the matters themselves of phenomenology, a semblance (and hence derived phenomenon) of both the disclosedness of the mode of being, and the existential temporal meaning of the Being, of the entity which manifests primordial transcendence.

§ 101. *The 'Husserlian' Prerogative of the Original Phenomenal Status of Intentionality.*

The Husserlian prerogative, of the original phenomenological status of the phenomenon of intentionality, comes into bold relief with the consideration of the account of intentionality which Heidegger takes as the point of departure for his existential grounding of this phenomenon. In Heidegger's critique, intentionality is understood *exclusively* in terms of the *Sichrichtens-auf* (self-directedness toward) of the act of an

*intentio*, which cognitively thematizes its corresponding *intentum* in terms of its objectively grasped status. Which is to say, from the Husserlian prerogative, Heidegger's critique is directed toward the exhibition of the epistemic essence of the actionally modified "act," or "cogito," modality of the intentional phenomenon. The intentional essence of the non-actional fringe and horizontal field, that Husserl exhibits in terms of the *Hintergrundsfeld* (background field) of intentional acts, is therefore *clearly not* addressed in the Heideggerian account and critique of the phenomenon of intentionality. As a consequence of this, the Husserlian prerogative begins to assert itself in terms of the following two crucial points: (1) the phenomenal alienation of Heidegger's account of the ontologically determined *Wasgehalt* (what-content), which he maintains Husserl exhibits as the essential structure of intentionality, from the matters themselves of the phenomena exhibited in Husserl's own account of this essential structure, and; (2) the "ontologization" of the phenomenal *Sinn* that is exhibited, in accord with the phenomenologically psychological and transcendental epochés, of the intentionalities manifested by pure consciousness. This 'ontologization' is the result of granting a hermeneutical priority to the phenomenal characterization of the *essence* of an entity in its Being, in terms of an ontico-ontological *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of being).

With respect to (1), it would appear that the determination of the phenomenal status of the essences uncovered in accord with phenomenology's methodologically reflective seeing of essences, in terms of the cognitive 'what' of an entity in its Being, is possible only on the basis of an understanding of *Wesen* (essence) in terms of the logical categories that are manifested, as intentional objects, in the manifold lived-experiences of logically pure thinking and knowing. However, for Husserl, such *irreal*<sup>5</sup> objects, which indeed manifest the non-sensuous excess of the ideal objects given in the lived-experiences of the non-empiricistically distinctive categorial intuition, do not yield a phenomenally equivalent "essence," in the distinctive methodological sense of phenomenological *Wesensschau* (seeing of an essence). On the contrary, in Husserl's account of the phenomenal state of affairs involved in the exhibition and manifestation of the phenomenally peculiar essence (e.g., of the specifically "logically" predetermined phenomenal field at issue here), it is precisely the 'matters themselves' of these categories and their intuition, which comprises the exemplary manifold *whose variation then yields the phenomenologically distinctive essence*. It is therefore only on the basis of the methodological variation, of the *irreal* objects that comprise the *Wasgehalt* of entities, that there is yielded to the essential seeing of the phenomenologically reflective regard what Husserl takes to be the

phenomenal essence, which renders such *vorgegeben* (already given) phenomena intelligible. Consequently, it is this latter understanding of essence that is operative in Husserl's characterization of the intentional essence of logical acts. Therefore, the prerogative of this account of intentionality would have to take serious issue with Heidegger's apparent conflation, of the *irreal* status of the *Was* (what) exhibited by Husserl as comprising the exemplarily varied (and pregiven) manifold, with the *irreal* status of the essence which is yielded as the result of such variation.

This Heideggerian understanding, of the significance of the phenomenal status of the essence in Husserl, is no doubt what motivates his claims regarding the phenomenal status of both the mode and meaning of the Being of the entity that manifests the essential structure of intentionality. This understanding finds that, on the one hand, Husserl's phenomenological exhibition of the *Wasgehalt* of intentionality 'has but the sole function of making the entity present in regard to its Being'. Yet, on the other hand, this understanding maintains that it is precisely this making of an entity present that Husserl's phenomenology is content to merely determine, *without characterizing, either the mode of being of the intentional entity, or the meaning of Being* which 'directs the entire process of making this distinction of Being'. However, when the Husserlian prerogative is considered, of the phenomenal non-equivalence of the intuition of the *irreal* categories of pure logic (i.e., the so-called "categorical intuition"), with the intuition of the essence (i.e., the so-called *Wesensschau*) of the manifold exemplars of this, or any other, *vorgegeben* exemplary manifold (e.g., the non-logical manifolds of synthetic or phenomenologically psychological cognition, etc.), the Heideggerian account of the phenomena at issue for Husserl becomes problematical. This is not to say that these essential Husserlian distinctions comprise, already in Husserl, some kind of recognition of the fundamentality of the ontological problematic in the Heideggerian sense. Rather, within the context of the present investigation of the 'matter itself' of intentionality, and at this point of the discussion, what seems to be strongly suggested here is that far more is at issue in Husserl's account of the essence intentionality than the mere rendering present of the 'what-content' of this essential structure. (The further discussion of this matter will have to await the consideration of the felicity of each thinkers' account of intentionality to *die Sache selbst*.)

It should be further emphasized that Husserl "eidetically" differentiates the intentional essence that is yielded with the variation of the *analytically* determined manifold of logical acts, from the non-epistemic essences of intentionality which are yielded with the variation of synthetically, as well as phenomenally proper (*qua pure*

phenomenology), determined manifolds of lived-experiences. Indeed, the phenomenally peculiar absence of the freely variable, analytically determined exemplar 'any object whatever' (characteristic of the categories of pure logic), manifests, to the intentional regard of Husserl's methodical reflections, the limiting necessity of phenomenally unfolding the non-epistemological essences of intentionality. The unfolding of these latter occurs on the basis of exemplars that are exhibited in accord with their initially uncovered *faktische Zusammenhang* (factual nexus). Hence, for Husserl, the essential characterization of the factual *Zufälligkeit* (contingency), manifested as the limiting necessity of non-freely variable exemplars, does not have for its phenomenal basis the ontological opposition between the *Daß* (that-it-is) manifested by entities (or, qua *Dasein*, by a 'privileged' entity), and the what-content of its epistemological thematization. Rather, this essential characterization has its basis in the essential seeing of the phenomenologically reflective regard, that initially renders intelligible, in terms of its essential structures, the "that-it-is" manifested by factual contingency, as exhibited by the phenomenological regard.

Therefore, from the Husserlian prerogative, the *Daß* manifested by the *realität* or existence of entities is not something which, with the reductive move toward phenomenological cognition of "pure" phenomena, has to be turned away from. Rather, this Heideggerian account of the significance of Husserl's reflectively executed reduction, misses the latter's characterization of the eidetic components which render the "that-it-is" of any object, or entity, intelligible as such. Indeed, from the Husserlian prerogative, it is only on the basis of the reflectively performed reduction, that the *pure* (since with the reduction what is at issue is only the immanently exhibited *Sinn* of the reality or existence in question) essence of the non-categorical, factual contexture of the *Sinn* manifested by the *Daß* of an entity, can initially be considered as a phenomenon at all.

Hence, with respect to (2), it would seem to the Husserlian prerogative, that the Heideggerian critique of the the transcendental *ἐποχή*, which characterizes this methodological "move" in terms of the reflective turning away from, and hence phenomenal disregarding of, the already given field of factually determined *Realität*, misses what is decisive for Husserl in this move. To wit, that what is suspended by Husserl's methodological reflections with the *ἐποχή* is not the factual *Daß* of entities or an especial entity, but rather, the antecedently uncovered essences of the phenomenal *Sinn* of the factual contexture of exemplary manifolds of lived-experiences. These latter, prior to their *ἐποχή*, are determined by the lived acceptance (*Geltung*) of (the) "natural" *Sinn*. Indeed, for Husserl, the reduction, and consequent tran-



scendental exhibition of the transcendently intentional phenomenon of this natural *Sinn*, has as its prerequisites the following: (a) the phenomenological exhibition of the actionally modified intentional essence of the *Seinscharakter schlechthin* (Being characteristic simpliciter), which is given in the synthetic, a priori cognition of this natural *Sinn*; (b) the phenomenologically psychological ἐποχή of the ontological validity of the synthetic, a priori cognition of this natural *Sinn* (This ἐποχή exhibits the non-actionally modified intentional essence of the mundanely apperceived, and accepted as valid, horizon of the world-thesis, which is then manifested as the phenomenal field of freedom belonging to the primal positing of the thesis 'being-characteristic simpliciter'), and; (c) the phenomenologically transcendental ἐποχή of the non-actional intentionality of this psychologically apperceived horizon of the world-thesis.

Heidegger understands the essence of the original phenomenal field of phenomenology in terms of the ontico-ontological understanding of Being, which, *subsequent* to the hermeneutical securing of the proper mode of access to the 'showing itself from itself' of the *Daß*, is manifested by the factually determined mode of the being of Dasein. Methodologically, the manifestation of the latter occurs in terms of the ordinary deformalization of the concept of phenomenon. The 'showing itself from itself' of Dasein in its *Being* (qua the phenomenological deformalization of the concept of phenomenon), in accord with the existentiality of this existence, is only possible, within the Husserlian prerogative, if the following be maintained of the matters at issue. Namely, that the phenomenally exhibited 'showing itself from itself', which manifests the *Sinne* of both these interrelated and interdependent concepts of phenomenon, *is homogeneous with the entity and its Being at issue*. For Husserl, *this can never be the case*, since the ontologically determined *Sinn* of the latter has, as the phenomenally necessary condition for its manifestation, the exhibiting regard of a reflection which is *not* essentially determined by the *homogeneity*, of this reflected ontological *Sinn* and its reflecting insight, *with the 'thematic object' of an entity in its Being*. Such a 'homogeneity' would render the latter, ontological object, transparent with its phenomenally exhibited and manifested *Sinn*.

The situation (from the Husserlian prerogative) is, rather, that phenomenological reflection is essentially determined by the non-equivalence of the manifested *Sinn*, of the ontologically determined 'thematic object' as something "having already been," prior to its reflected uncovering, and the reflecting exhibition of this *Sinn* as issuing from something *phenomenally* (ontologically) *independent* from its reflective exhibition. This is to say, the phenomenological meaning of the 'already there' *is not* equivalent with the ontological status 'al-

ready there, *transcendent to the phenomenological regard*'. Consequently, this prerogative would want to conclude that Heidegger conflates the phenomenal *Wasgehalt* (what-content) with the essences per se of phenomenology, and conflates as well as the 'showing itself in itself' determinative of phenomena, with an ontologically determined thematic object, i.e., the entity *Dasein* in its Being. Both of these conflation are only possible (when considered from the Husserlian prerogative of the immanent exhibition of phenomena), if the 'phenomena' of phenomenology lose their phenomenal status as the "exhibitive manifestation" of the matter or matters themselves, and are understood, thereby, to be structurally coincident with that which, prior to their phenomenal (reflective) exhibition, manifest themselves as having been "*reflexionlos* (without reflection)." This state of affairs can only be understood, from the Husserlian prerogative, in terms of the "ontologizing" of the transcendental *Sinn* of the essence of intentionality, which misunderstands such *Sinn* to be equivalent with the pre-transcendental, factically determined exemplars that serve as the phenomenal field for the exhibitive manifestation of transcendental *Sinn*.

The full force of this state of affairs maintained by the Husserlian prerogative, comes to the fore with the consideration of Heidegger's account of Husserl's attempt to manifest the ground and meaning of transcendence in the intentionality of time consciousness. Heidegger's exclusive focus is, of course, on the intentional manifestation of the time consciousness of succession. This clearly suggests that the intentionality at issue for him is (again) that which structures (in Husserl's account) merely one modality of lived-experiences, i.e., the actionally modified cogito (act). Thus, Husserl's phenomenal differentiation of the succession and simultaneity of time, as well as the actional and non-actional intentional essences of each, are left undiscussed in Heidegger's account and "immanent critique" of the unoriginal phenomenal status of intentionality. According to Heidegger, in Husserl's phenomenology the essence of the phenomenon of time emerges in terms of the intentional determination of its semblance, as this is manifested to the so-called ordinary understanding of this phenomenon. Hence, to Husserl's intentional account of time, with its reflective focus on the present-at-hand succession of 'nows', there is necessarily concealed, according to Heidegger, the original ecstatic character of temporality. Indeed, it is the temporalization of the latter, in accord with a mode of existence which is fundamentally different from the intentionality of acts and their thematically grasped succession of 'nows', that initially makes possible the transcending "movement" of the 'now' beyond both itself and entities.

However, when the Husserlian prerogative is invoked, the essential distinctions, between "temporality" and "time consciousness,"<sup>6</sup> between the initial natural reflections to which transcendent time is first given and the psychological, and eventually transcendental, reflective exhibitions of the intentional essences of both this temporality and time consciousness, are clearly not at issue in Heidegger's critique. When the intentionality of the simultaneity that is manifested as the horizon the temporality and time consciousness of the succession of phenomenologically reduced time is considered, an intentional simultaneity which, qua its phenomenal status is essentially related to both the contentually changing, and the one "endless" stream of consciousness, then the alienation becomes manifest of the 'matters themselves' of Heidegger's account of these issues from Husserl's account of them.

The question emerges, then, regarding the meaning of this discrepancy within the context of the Husserlian prerogative. At the very least, it seems to indicate that Husserl, like Heidegger, does not characterize the *essence* of time in terms of an endless succession of present-at-hand nows. After all, at issue for both of these thinkers is, indeed, precisely time's phenomenologically exhibited "essence." This is to say, the structure of time, as exhibited within the "thematic" context of the phenomenological return, is what is at issue for both thinkers. Indeed, Heidegger's account of the 'immediate, unreflective' expression of time, is presented precisely in terms of the characterization of the *essence* of time, of which these datable expressions bespeak. Furthermore, Heidegger's account of the ecstatic awaiting that renders present by having been, which as the original "phenomenon" of time (comprised of the unitary phenomena that make possible the immediate encounter of the *Fortweisungsfunktion* [onward-pointing function] of the now not yet of the 'afterwards', the now no longer of the 'at that time', and the now of the 'at this time'), is no more equivalent with an intentionally grasped succession of 'nows' than is Husserl's account of the following. *Viz.*, the intentional moment of the 'impressionally living now', whose protentional and retentional intentional horizons initially make possible (and are therefore essentially non-equivalent with what appears in terms of these horizons) the intentional consciousness of that which is, respectively, rendered present, expected and recollected. Therefore, it is on the basis of the more original intentionality of this living now, and its co-intended horizons, that the intentional "succession" of 'now', 'just now', and 'now coming in the future', is constituted for Husserl. And, when the simultaneity of the temporality and time consciousness of the originary horizon of the psychologically and transcendently pure ego(s) are considered, along with their actionally modified intentionalities of the temporality and time consciousness of succession, the result is the manifestation of the following: The phe-

nominal condition for the exhibition of the transcendence in immanence of the reflective regard, 'within' which, the peculiar transcendence of world *Sinn* is initially uncovered. This, in turn, brings into question precisely Heidegger's contention that the transcendence at issue for Husserl is that of intentionality's being thematically, and therefore "ontically," directed toward present-at-hand entities.

§ 102. *Phenomenology's most Proper Self-understanding cannot be at Once Hermeneutical and Reflective.*

It seems to me that any phenomenologically inspired mediation concerning this controversy of the originality, or lack thereof, of the phenomenon of intentionality, must return to the problem of the methodological prerogatives of phenomenology's most proper self-understanding. And it now appears to me, that this self-understanding cannot, at the same time, be both hermeneutical and reflective. My phenomenal rationale for finding this to be the case has its basis in *die Sache selbst* which each prerogative maintains it exhibits with respect to the phenomenon of intentionality.

On the one hand, the hermeneutical account of the intentional essence consciousness, pure or otherwise, must always return to its *Ansatzpunkt* (point of departure) of the phenomenal securing of the thematic object of its preliminary concept of phenomenology: The *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) that its prerogative finds to be the manifestation of a more original way to be than reflective, or any other kind, of intentional acts. Thus, the Interpretative characterization of the 'showing itself from itself' of the phenomenologically ordinary phenomenon of *Dasein*, must always be guided by the free projection of its advance glance toward the phenomenologically deformed phenomenon of this entity's Being: *Existenz*. And this existence, far from being existentially pure, can only emerge within the context of its ontically determined "hermeneutical as," the projective *Auslegung* of which, in unity with the original projection of the primary, pre-conceptual, understanding of Being, takes "the first cut (*anschneidet*)" (*BT*, 191/150) out of this pre-thematic understanding, by discovering entities in their always already disclosed (on the basis of this primary understanding) Being. Thus, in accord with the hermeneutical prerogative, there can never be any instance of an "ontologically" neutral phenomenal manifestation of entities and their essential structures (e.g., lived-experiences and the intentionality of their conscious moment), since the latter must always be methodologically uncovered within the context of the original, and primordial, ontico-ontological mode of encounter characteristic of existence.

On the other hand, the *Ansatzpunkt* of the reflective account of the existentiality of the *Seinsart* (kind of Being) and *Sinn des Seins* (meaning of Being) of psychologically and ultimately transcendently pure consciousness, must always be guided by the following methodological insight. The *Sinne* of each of these interrelated and interdependent ontological determinations can only be exhibited, in terms of their initial manifestation, within the factically determined contexture of intentional *Sinn*. This, as *vorgegeben* (already given) to the intentionality of phenomenology's methodologically reflective regard, must always have as its *epistemically*<sup>7</sup> phenomenal basis precisely the "ontological neutrality" of the consciousness manifested by this reflective intentionality. Thus, in accord with the reflective prerogative, no phenomenon can lay claim to a *completely* ontological status. This is the case, since the 'showing itself from itself' of any entity and its Being *must*, qua this self-showing, be witnessed by an *epistemic* capacity (which is manifestly *reflective*) to differentiate original and unoriginal modes of showing, along with an equally epistemic (and reflective) interest in investigating the *structures* of the same.

Such ontological 'neutrality' does not preclude the hermeneutical disinterment of either the mode or meaning of the Being of intentionality and its exemplary phenomenal field, *were one's phenomenological prerogative fundamentally determined by such an agenda*. However, the phenomenal regard (*Blick*) of the theoretical thematizing, that *initially* makes possible the phenomenological investigation of the structure (ontological or otherwise) of any phenomenon, manifests itself in terms of a reflective consciousness which is correlative to, but non-equivalent with, the reflected phenomenal *Sinn* which it uncovers. Hence, in accord with the reflective prerogative, no disclosure of *Sinn*, hermeneutical or otherwise, can escape the ambit of the epistemic (and in precisely this sense 'ontologically neutral') condition for such disclosure: the reflecting consciousness of the phenomenological regard.

§ 103. *The Necessity of Attempting to Mediate the Issue of the Phenomenological Originality of Intentionality: the Non-partisan "Opening-up" of the Phenomenon of Intentionality within the Hermeneutical and Reflective Methodological Prerogatives.*

The mutually exclusive hermeneutical and reflective methodological prerogatives of phenomenology, which has emerged as a result of this consideration of the originality, of the *content* of the phenomenon of intentionality exhibited by each methodology, points, it seems to me, to a dilemma that any would be "philosophical (and ultimately phe-

nomenological) mediator" of this controversial state of affairs must confront. Namely, how to 'gauge' the felicity of each prerogative to the 'matter itself' of intentionality, without endorsing by philosophical fiat either prerogative. The phenomenological necessity for some kind of mediation cannot be denied, if one takes the view that it is the *same* phenomenon that is at issue for both prerogatives. Inasmuch as Heidegger's account of this phenomenon begins with *explicit* references to the account of Husserl, I do not see how the attempt (at least) at mediation can be forsaken. However, given the intertwining of methodological prerogative and the determination of the phenomenal status of intentionality, the *only* way out of this dilemma that I have been able to come up with, begins with the investigation of the question of whether each thinker's account of intentionality is the *only* one possible *within* the context of the methodological prerogative of each. If other possibilities for the manifestation of intentionality can be shown to be consistent with one, or both thinkers', methodological prerogative, then it would seem to me that an "opening" may be uncovered in *die Sache selbst* which would lend itself to non-partisan mediation.

§ 104. *The Hermeneutical Prerogative and the Non-actional Dimension of Intentionality.*

With respect to the Heideggerian methodological prerogative of the *fundamentally* ontological character of all phenomena, the issue in need of investigation with regard to the phenomenon of intentionality would be, then, as follows: Surveying the autonomous manifestation of the 'being directed towards' of the exemplary field of lived-experiences, as well as the intentional essence of the directionality of the consciousness characteristic of this field, is there anything in these interrelated domains which *precludes* their manifesting, to the hermeneutical regard of phenomenology, what the Husserlian prerogative exhibits in terms of a non-actional horizon and background field? Stated positively, were it to be granted for the nonce that all phenomena are determined in a fundamentally ontico-ontologically manner, is it nevertheless possible for the intentional phenomenon manifested thus to yield a 'consciousness of', which is not exhausted by the directionality of its cogito modality?

In my view, there is nothing in *die Sache selbst*, as exhibited in accord with the hermeneutical prerogative, that is inconsistent with its yielding just such a non-actional dimension. Now, if such a view of the matter accurately characterizes its autonomous manifestation and not some idiosyncratic predilection on my part, the next question in need of investigation seems to me to involve the following: Is such a non-

actional dimension of the phenomenon of intentionality determined, *nevertheless*, by the ontico-ontologically *derivative* understanding of Being, in terms of *Vorhandenheit* (presence)? Which is to ask of the phenomenon, whether the fringe of its 'consciousness of' manifests itself *in terms of an essential tendency to determine, that which is horizontally intended by its consciousness, in terms of a single and limited ontico-ontological character?* Again, granting for the nonce the Heideggerian prerogative of the ontico-ontological determination of all phenomena, it seems to me that the singularity of this putative *Seinsverständnis* (i.e., in terms of Being-present-at-hand), *need not* manifest the definitive determination of the understanding of Being that such a horizontal intentionality is capable of. For instance, once the non-actional modality of the horizontal dimension of intentionality is exhibited within the context of the hermeneutical prerogative, the existential *Sicht* (sight) that makes up the original projective understanding of *Existenz* (and which is correlative to the *Erschlossenheit* of the "there") appears, in my view, to manifest just such a "non-actional" intentional—and therefore 'conscious'—phenomenon.

However, it is precisely at this juncture, in the attempt to 'open up' (within the context of the Heideggerian prerogative), the intentional phenomenon, that *die Sache selbst* which can admitted therein *seems* to "close itself up." This appears to be the case since, while it may be consistent with this prerogative for the phenomenon of intentionality to manifest a non-actional modality, it nevertheless would be totally *inconsistent* with its hermeneutic *Ansatzpunkt*, for the Being of consciousness, even if it be acknowledged that the latter manifests a non-actional modality, *to be characterized by anything other than "immanence."* Such 'immanence', is for this prerogative, the unavoidable outcome of the reflective, and hence "actionally modified," modality of consciousness which is the necessary requisite for its putative disclosure as something absolute, i.e., purely present-at-hand. Which is to say, that so long as the matter itself of intentionality is understood as having the reflective performances of a subject, transcendental or otherwise, as the access point for its disclosure, the radical interrogation of the phenomenon of the disclosedness of Being, which makes such subjectivity possible, *must be precluded from the outset.*

§ 105. *Two Phenomenally Distinct "Sights" are at Issue within the Hermeneutical Prerogative: the Ontico-ontological and Explicitly Ontological Hermeneutical Circles.*

However, when the following ontologically guided *methodological* distinctions, introduced by the Heideggerian account of the preliminary

concept of phenomenology (i.e., the propaedeutic working out of the concept of 'phenomenon' within the context of the existential analytic—in advance of the working out of the 'idea' of phenomenology) are considered, it again appears, in my view, that the hermeneutic *Ansatzpunkt* is capable of admitting *something like* an intentional moment. Specifically, I have in mind the distinction between questioning that 'is a cognizant seeking for an entity with regard to the that and how of its being', and questioning which becomes an *investigation* by exposing (and indeed 'rendering transparent') the character, or structure, of that which the question is about in any questioning.<sup>8</sup> It is precisely the latter, which when guided by the *Vorblick auf* (advance regard toward) the basic composition of the 'thematic object' of the existential analytic, enables the hermeneutical prerogative to distinguish (however provisionally), *at the inception* of its investigation, between the unoriginal phenomena (i.e., the showing themselves from themselves in the mode of semblance) of both, the entity and its Being, which comprise this thematic object, and the original phenomena of the 'same' (i.e., the entity and its Being that comprise the 'thematic object' of the existential analytic). Consequently, the 'sight' of such an 'advance regard toward' is then, as a function of its investigative concern with the character or structure of that which it is questioning, already differentiated from the 'sight' of a non-investigative questioning, which simply seeks for an entity in the that and how of its being.

Now it is this latter, non-investigative 'sight' that, as a result of its simple concern with entities in the that and how of their being, seems to me to be most suitably accounted for (within the hermeneutical prerogative) in terms of the 'sight' that makes up the original projective understanding of existence—and which (again, within this prerogative) as such grounds the traditional conceptions of cognitive seeing. And, thus, the question emerges concerning the phenomenal status of the 'sight' of the former, free projection toward existence which guides the hermeneutic of the existential analytic. Without invoking the Husserlian prerogative, I think that the Heideggerian prerogative must acknowledge that the two 'sights' at issue here are, no matter how interrelated, in some sense phenomenally distinct. My only question then—leaving aside such quibbles as to whether, and in what sense, the 'sight' of the guiding advance regard toward existence is 'theoretical', 'thematic', and oriented toward something which, qua its (however provisional) *durchsichtigkeit* (transparency), is *vorhanden* (present-at-hand)—is: How is it that the entity, whose mode of being includes being able to comport itself in terms of an existential analytic, can make such a distinction regarding (its) sight? Or, stating the question in terms of that which such differentiated sights 'see':



What allows the distinction that is made between (a) phenomenal *Sinn* and (b) the entity or Being (*BT*, 192-93/151), to be made? This distinction becomes especially problematic, when Heidegger's statement is considered, that the *Sinn des Seins* "can never be contrasted with entities or with Being as the sustaining 'ground' of entities, since ground is only accessible as meaning" (*BT*, 193-94/152—my emphasis).

I do not take these to be rhetorical questions and concerns. Heidegger's disquisitions on the hermeneutical circle touch upon the problematic alluded to here, when they address the issue of the existential grounding, of the circularity of the ontologically free projection of the idea of existence, in the circularity of the ontico-ontological composition of the entity in its Being that is thereby disclosed in, or with, the guiding clue provided by this free projection. And the Heideggerian critique of Husserl's tacit equation of reflective (epistemological) access to phenomena, with the ontological disclosedness of the same, likewise broaches the issue at hand. However, granting again (for the purposes of non-partisan mediation) the ontico-ontological commitment of the hermeneutical prerogative, I think it legitimate to ask whether the above mentioned treatments of the problematic in question suitably account for all the distinctions at issue.

Specifically, how can the hermeneutical 'sight' (and circle), which guides the existential analytic and is maintained to have its basis in the *Grundverfassung* (basic composition) of the very entity that is the issue of the analytic, account for the provisional distinctions that are made between entities (or an entity) in its (or their) Being and the encounter with each in the mode of phenomena? Granting that Heidegger not only recognizes but endorses the state of affairs whereby the difference between entities and their Being is understood in terms of a *transcendental* (when properly understood—i.e., in accord with the transcendence of *Dasein*) distinction, I think there still remains a question about the distinction between the 'thematic object' of phenomenological ontology (or ontological phenomenology), understood as the 'Being of entities', and the 'same', as they are encountered in the 'mode of phenomena'. The hermeneutical 'sights' of the ontological and ontico-ontological projections mentioned above cannot yield, in my view, this distinction, since the very distinction at issue is *what initially renders intelligible* the 'hermeneutical' aspect of the aforesaid 'sights'. And, I want to suggest, that my view here is confining itself to precisely that which, within the context of the ontico-ontological prerogative, makes it possible to think of phenomenology in terms of a hermeneutic. Namely, the *insight* into the distinction between entities in their Being and the 'same' encountered in the modes of both unoriginal and original phenomena. Simply stated, I want to ask how could the 'sight' of such insight be 'hermeneutical', which is to say

illuminated by the necessity of wresting the original self-showing of phenomena from their unoriginal self-showing as semblance, *when it is manifestly the distinction which determines the terms of this necessity that is at issue?*

§ 106. *The Transcendental Distinction Determinative of, yet Unaccounted for, by Hermeneutical Phenomenology.*

At this point in my mediation of the hermeneutical and reflective prerogatives of phenomenology, I find a transcendental distinction operative in the former which, while not unrelated to the transcendental distinction between entities and their Being recognized above, is nevertheless both *different* and *unaccounted for* by this prerogative. This distinction, as discussed above, *manifests itself* in terms of the difference (however characterized) between (a) an entity, or entities, in their Being and (b), their encounter in the mode of phenomena. I take such a distinction to be transcendental inasmuch as it can inhere in neither (a) nor (b), but rather, this distinction is only manifest in an encounter with both that must initially disclose these differences. And my suggestion, that the 'sight' operative in this latter encounter cannot be 'hermeneutical', bases itself in the consideration that the 'business of interpretation' only makes sense in terms of the *Aufweisung* (exhibition) and *Ausweisung* (manifestation) in accord with (b); which is to say, within the context of *phenomenological* ontology. This means that however the status of the 'sight' which grants the provisional 'advance regard' toward the basic composition of entities in their *Seinsart* (kind of being) be characterized, it *cannot be phenomenological*, since the very need for phenomenology is determined by the recognition that the showing themselves from themselves of the interrelated and interdependent entity and its Being, occurs 'initially and for the most part' in the unoriginal modality of semblance. And, the phenomenal relation of the semblance to the original phenomenon, that allows the former to *seem* like the latter, cannot be introduced here in support of the claim that the advance regard at issue is, after all, 'phenomenological', since the very possibility of uncovering the latter in terms of an 'original' showing of 'Being' *requires* the very 'insight' in question. That is, *the insight into Being is requisite for the provisional differentiation of its original showing from unoriginal semblances of the same.*<sup>9</sup>

Without denominating at this point the 'sight' responsible for the insight in question, I would want to maintain that the transcendental distinction at issue, while not explicitly addressed by the hermeneutical prerogative, is nevertheless "at play" in the state of affairs which makes such a prerogative possible. Indeed, inasmuch as the 'sight' at

issue "sets the stage" for the hermeneutical critique of intentionality, a transcendental dimension (*and I would again insist that there is no need to invoke the Husserlian account of such a dimension*) to this critique has been uncovered which invites closer scrutiny. For the purposes of the present discussion however, I want to focus my concern on the question as to whether such sight, and hence the transcendental distinction under consideration, might not be suitably characterized in terms of "intentionality."

§ 107. *The Reflective Prerogative of Phenomenology and the Problem of a Concealed Ontology.*

Both the Heideggerian and Husserlian accounts of intentionality have proven concordant, insofar as each takes this phenomenon to manifest the essence of an already uncovered field of experience. Having suggested that the hermeneutical prerogative seems to unnecessarily restrict the 'consciousness of' characteristic of this essence to the modality of the cogito, I want to now ask now whether the Husserlian prerogative, of the immanent *Sein* of this previously uncovered field of experience, and hence the immanent essence of the same, necessarily precludes the hermeneutical disinterment of both the mode and meaning of the Being of such phenomena. Which is to ask: Must the ontological neutrality of phenomenologically reduced *Erlebnisse* (lived-experiences), and the intentional essence of its 'consciousness of', necessarily conceal or suppress the *Seinsfrage* (Being question)?

Surveying the matters themselves involved in the reflective 'act' or 'acts', that exhibit the *Leistungen* (performances) of transcendental subjectivity within which such neutrality is manifested, this question unfolds in terms of the issue of whether the directionality of the regard manifested by such reflection necessarily *limits* the modality of its 'consciousness of' to the specific modality of the cogito. Were this the case, the ontological neutrality manifested by such an actionally modified intentionality might very well, tacitly, appear to equate epistemological access with ontological determination, *without investigating the latter*. The absolute 'Being' of intentionality yielded by such reflective performances would consequently preclude the phenomenal uncovering of the "disclosedness," which makes, among other things, precisely these performances possible. Leaving aside, for the moment, the issue of whether this hermeneutically inspired critique does justice to the Husserlian account of the essence of reflection,<sup>10</sup> the issue I want to address here is, then, as follows. Granting for the nonce the Husserlian prerogative of the phenomenal non-equivalence of the inner perception of the intentional structure of reflection, with the

traditional notion of "inner perception" (because the latter is determined on the basis of an ontologically mediated opposition between 'inner' and 'outer' perceptions), does not the notion of reflective 'acts', or 'performances', nevertheless imply the essential involvement of some kind of willful *cogitare*, and hence, point to an ontological dimension underlying any appeal to reflection—no matter how the latter may be characterized?

Now it seems to me, that the reflective appeal to the horizontal fringe that is an essential characteristic of the lived-experience of reflection and hence, an essential characteristic of reflection's intentional essence, cannot, by itself, mitigate the force of the claim of reflection harboring a hidden ontology. This is the case, since such a non-actional *Hof* (fringe) is essentially related to the actional mode of the cogito and its *explicitly directional regard*. Consequently, the problem raised regarding the agency of the cogito and its relation to reflective 'acts', remains unaddressed, then, by such an appeal.

However, by appealing to the 'transcendence in immanence', characteristic of even the actionally modified intentional essence of the cogito, it seems to me legitimate to wonder in what sense the notion, of the harboring of a 'hidden' ontology, accurately describes the ontological status of intentionality. Even granting (for the sake of the present discussion) that the conscious moment of lived-experiences and their intentional essence are *fundamentally* ontological, does not the agenda, set on investigating the *structure* of the *Seinsart* and *Sinn des Seins* of consciousness, itself recognize that it has to do so on the basis of the prior disclosure of the aforementioned, insofar as they enter "into the intelligibility of *Dasein*" (BT, 93/152—my emphasis)—which is to say, insofar as they have meaning? This, in my view, clearly being the case, I want to suggest, at this juncture, that the unaccounted for transcendental difference (discussed above) operative with respect to the hermeneutical prerogative—i.e., *the distinction between entities in their Being and the encounter of the 'same' in the mode of phenomena*—involves at least the tacit appeal to something remarkably like "immanence." This appears to me to be the case, inasmuch as the transcendence of the entity which comprises the thematic object of the existential analytic, *Dasein*, is acknowledged as being investigated within the context of the *Sinn* of such transcendence, and not transcendence per se. And how else can such *Sinn* be rendered transparent, save that the analytic which investigates it, encounter it by "remaining in or near" (i.e., "immanent" to) such *Sinn* itself? Indeed, such an investigation involves not simply the unthematic encounter with such *Sinn*, but is conducted in terms of the analytical rendering transparent of the *essential* structures of this *Sinn*.

Now, if the above is, after all, the case, must not the investigation of such structures, in accord with the *Seinsfrage*, be guided by the insight (discussed above) afforded by the advance regard toward Being, which initially enables the hermeneutical differentiation to be made, between original and unoriginal phenomenal manifestations of the meaning in question? I would want to answer this affirmatively, and suggest that with this, the discussion of the ontological neutrality of consciousness has come around to the problem of the status of the advance regard responsible for the (unaccounted for) transcendental difference at issue above. It seems to me that the regard and difference at issue, are at the very root of the possibility of detecting a hidden ontology, in the matter itself of the intentionality manifested by the reflective performance of the transcendental reduction. Thus, before this ontological issue can be decided, it would appear that the problem of giving some account of this advance regard is in order. And it is within precisely this context, as a sort of propaedeutic to the working out the issue of ontology and phenomenology, that I offer the following concluding thoughts on *die Sache selbst* of the phenomenon of intentionality.

§ 108. Working out the Issue of Ontology and Phenomenology Requires a Decision Regarding the Originality of the Phenomenon of Intentionality.

Without exclusively endorsing the methodological prerogative of either Husserlian or Heideggerian phenomenology, I think that intentionality can be suitably characterized in terms of the essential structure of the moment of consciousness that is uncovered in experiences which manifest themselves, as already going on, and therefore, in a certain sense, as autonomous from the phenomenal regard which exhibits the structure of intentionality. This 'already given' consciousness manifests both, an explicitly directional 'consciousness of', which corresponds directly to the appearing "object" of consciousness, and a non-directional fringe 'consciousness of', which corresponds indirectly to the appearing horizontal field of consciousness.

However, beyond these very general and (hopefully, when the above discussion is considered) non-partisan features, the controversy looms regarding the phenomenal originality of this phenomenon. On the basis of my attempt to mediate this controversy, by 'opening up' phenomenal possibilities other than those explicitly admitted by the Heideggerian and Husserlian methodological prerogatives, I want to suggest, in the phenomenological spirit of "a suitor for agreement," the following: That both Heidegger and Husserl are in basic phenomenological agreement, inasmuch as each takes 'phenomenological cog-

dition', to have, as its concern, the "essence" of phenomena. For each thinker it is *not* phenomena *per se*, but the the character or structure of the same, that is investigated in accord with the phenomenological method. Heidegger's differentiation of questioning *Überhaupt* (as such) and investigative questioning, Husserl's differentiation of phenomena and pure (immanent) phenomena, clearly attest to this being the case. Nevertheless, when the problematic concerning access, *not* to the former but to the latter aspect of this basic distinction, is addressed (in the respective phenomenological methodologies), viz., the problematic concerning access to the essence or structure of phenomena, controversy emerges. And this controversy concerns nothing less than the issue of the phenomenal, and hence phenomenological, originality of "intentionality."

For Husserl, the access at issue has its origin in the so-called 'acts' of phenomenological reflection. The single quotes around the word "acts" calls attention, first of all, to the state of affairs whereby the phenomenologically peculiar reflection at issue is *not* to be understood in terms of the "doing" or "movement" of an empirical agent. Rather, the "act" at issue has its provenance in the noetic directedness of the phenomenal regard, which grants access by rendering intelligible that which this regard yields as *vorgegeben* (already given). Thus, the 'act' in question has its locus, less in what is denominated by the past participle of the Latin *agere*, than in the Greek ἀγειν—"to lead." Phenomenological reflection consequently grants access by leading its regard, *from* the so-called "object" that it yields as having already been given, prior to its having come within the ambit of its regard, *to* the "how" of its *Sinn* as it is uncovered within the context of this very same ambit. The regard of this 'act' therefore "bends" or "turns," from its object, to the noematic meaning of the same—hence its designation as "reflection."

Inasmuch as both this so-called reflective 'act' and its so-called 'object' yield—to the *Wesensschau* (seeing of essences) of 'higher level' reflective 'acts'—an intentional essence, the phenomenon of intentionality emerges, within the Husserlian prerogative, as the original phenomenon of phenomenology. This means that both the essence of the phenomena uncovered by this method, as well as the essence of the "condition of possibility" for any phenomenal uncovering, manifest an intentional structure. Which is to say, that the distinctions this prerogative makes between 'object,' objective *Sinn*, and the essence of the same, are all "intentional" distinctions.

For Heidegger, the access at issue has its origin in the regard which encounters the difference between entities in their Being, and the "same," in the mode of phenomena. Specifically, it is the *Vorblick auf Sein* (advance regard towards Being) that permits the distinction to be

made, between the unoriginal, and original, manifestations of the former, in terms of the latter. However, inasmuch as it is precisely this 'advance regard toward Being' that inaugurates the hermeneutical project of securing phenomena with respect to their origin, both the distinction and regard in question here, *cannot be suitably accounted for on the basis of either ontico-ontological or explicitly ontological appeals to the "hermeneutical situation."* Rather, the difference, and insight into the difference, at issue stands somehow 'outside' this situation, since it is only in terms of the very 'matters themselves' with which they deal, that the phenomenal necessity of a hermeneutic *can even become intelligible as such.*

Now the 'matters themselves' of this difference, which I have suggested above (§ 106) are determined in terms of a transcendental difference, do not have any 'phenomenal' status, when they are considered within the context of the hermeneutical prerogative of phenomenology. This is the case, since for this prerogative 'phenomena' refer to the 'self-showing' both of entities and the Being of entities, and thus to *neither entities nor their Being, nor to whatever it is that allows their original, and unoriginal, manifestations to be discerned.* Indeed, it is the latter differentiation which permits the concealed thematic objects of phenomenology to be characterized as such, thereby rendering intelligible the hermeneutical task, of wresting from them their encounter in the "mode" of phenomena.

By way of a conclusion to this discussion, I would suggest that the 'matters themselves' of this difference, which are not only continually operative within the hermeneutical prerogative, but also serve in a fundamental sense to inaugurate it, yield something that my mediating "regard" wants to call "intentionality." It needs to be emphasized though, that this affirmation, of the the originality of the phenomenon of intentionality, still leaves *undecided* the issue of the ontological status of the (intentional) regard whose essence manifests the condition of possibility for the uncovering of any "phenomena" at all. Such an affirmation does seem to suggest, however, that if an investigation into the ontological status of this regard wants to be phenomenological, it would have to be an "intentional" investigation.

## **PART FOUR**

### **DISCUSSION OF THE CONCLUSIONS**



## INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR

### § 109. Preliminary Considerations.

Even a cursory review of the literature dealing with the relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology, reveals a trend in conclusions that are at considerable variance with the findings of the present study. By far, the most prevalent tendency among the commentators, has been to find Heidegger's disquisitions on the *phenomenological* priority of the *Seinsfrage* (Being-question), and the resultant existential analytic, more convincing than Husserl's (or anyone else's) cognitive or theoretical attitude. Heidegger's claims about the derivative, and therefore 'ontic', status of intentionality are consequently either explicitly or implicitly endorsed. The methodological result of this tendency is the concurrence with Heidegger's conclusion regarding the phenomenological priority, of the 'hermeneutical situation', over the reflective reduction to 'pure consciousness'. Discussions on this topic by Gadamer, Biemel, Caputo, Von Herrmann, J. C. Morrison, Stapleton, and Bernet are representative of this tendency.

A second trend among the commentators, again at odds with the conclusions of the present study, is the tendency to *argue* that the phenomenological method and/or content in Husserl and Heidegger are not *necessarily* mutually exclusive. One variation of this tendency is to maintain that hermeneutics and reflectively executed phenomenology "presuppose" one another. Another variation claims that, on the one hand, the *Auslegung* (interpretation) operative in the hermeneutic methodology is inherently *descriptive*. And on the other hand, that the content of such descriptions transcends the limitations of the 'pure consciousness' maintained by the parochial Husserlian position, and thus admits into the content of transcendental phenomenology an interpretive 'opaqueness'. And a final variation of this tendency holds that phenomenology for Husserl and Heidegger is *transcendental*. Therefore, the issue that divides them, whether this transcendentality is more appropriately *interpreted* epistemologically or ontologically,

nonetheless presupposes a context of basic agreement. The first variation of this tendency is found in the discussions of Ricoeur; its second variation is found in Mohanty's discussions, and the third variation is found in Crowell's discussion.

A final trend, again challenged by the results of the present study, is the tendency to accept Heidegger's critique of the ontologically derivative status of Husserl's formulation of the immanence of consciousness. As the result, an insuperable tension between Husserl's program of an eidetically grounded, and therefore absolute, descriptive phenomenological science and the intimations of a non-objectifiable transcendence that, like a specter, haunts this program, is maintained to be at work in Husserl's self-understanding of phenomenology. The result of this tension is held to be, in the final analysis, the impossibility completing the phenomenological reduction. One variation of this tendency argues that Husserl's phenomenological project flounders as a, however magnificent, "shipwreck." While another variation claims that the basic concepts of his phenomenology remain, again in the final analysis, unthematizable and therefore "operative." The work of Landgrebe reflects this first variation, while that of Fink reflects the second.

At this point, I think it is worthwhile to situate the results of my study of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, within the context of the various analyses represented by these trends. Therefore, Part Four of this study will be devoted to precisely this task.

Before turning to this task however, the following general remarks are in order regarding the contrast, in both design and focus, between the present study and those mentioned above. First, with the exception of the work of Bernet treated in the Introduction, none of these studies focuses their treatment of the issues in controversy on the phenomenological status of intentionality.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, none of these studies are guided by the self-conscious goal of attempting to limit all conclusions about the matters in controversy to the *phenomenal status* of these matters, let alone to the matters of a single phenomenon. This factor, combined with the essay medium of all but one<sup>2</sup> of the discussions in question, results in both a broader thematic focus in these studies than the present study, as well as a tendency to either substitute, or eschew, appeals to *die Sachen selbst*, in favor of often quite traditional forms of philosophical argumentation. This last criticism will of course have to be substantiated in the discussion to follow. And indeed, this criticism will only be considered important by those who take seriously, as I do, both Husserl's and Heidegger's 'agreement' during the period of their controversy, that phenomenology's 'breakthrough' discovery opens up a domain of philosophical inquiry which has heretofore been concealed

to the philosophical tradition, and therefore to traditional modes of philosophical argumentation.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### GADAMER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

#### § 110. *Introductory Remarks.*

Toward the end of situating the results of the present study in terms of the most prevalent tendency cited above, I will single out Gadamer's eloquent and challenging treatment of the problem. As Mohanty has pointed out, Gadamer is "appreciative of the goal, the inner potentiality, and even the universality of the transcendental-phenomenological research."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Gadamer clearly, and in my view quite correctly, recognizes something which many who are partial to the Heideggerian prerogative of the phenomenological priority of the *Seinsfrage* do not see, namely, that for Husserl "not all consciousness is consciousness of an object, or better, objectifying consciousness."<sup>2</sup> Gadamer is also careful not to fall into the trap of interpreting Husserl's methodological preoccupations as somehow symptomatic of uncritical adherence to the Cartesian epistemology and its attendant "dogmatism of an immanent consciousness, which must ask: How can we transcend ourselves and make contact with the external world?"<sup>3</sup> Again, in my view he rightly sees that "Husserl overcame this by demonstrating that consciousness is exactly intentionality, which means that we are *in* the matter and not simply enclosed in ourselves."<sup>4</sup> And finally, Gadamer is aware that, for Husserl, phenomenologically methodical reflection is not to be confused with traditionally understood "inner-perception," since it "is not exploring the 'inner perception' of a real 'I'."<sup>5</sup>

§ 111. *The Immanentism Inherent in Husserl's and Heidegger's Foundational Approaches to Phenomenology According to Gadamer.*

Considering the sensitivity evident in these statements to the ability of Husserl's account of the phenomenon of intentionality to take care of the traditional problem of 'immanence', and to its capacity to surpass the restricted sense of the Cartesian cogito by uncovering intentionality's non-objectifying or non-actional dimension, I would suggest that one cannot help but be baffled when reading Gadamer's most recent observations on these matters.<sup>6</sup> He maintains that "[o]ne point is clear, consciousness is representing what is present for it."<sup>7</sup> How does this square with his apparently, now modified, earlier view that phenomenology "saw that consciousness is by no means a self-enclosed sphere with its representations (*Vorstellungen*) locked up in their own inner world"?<sup>8</sup>

A hint that might lead to unraveling this apparent inconsistency may be found by considering the context of Gadamer's later remarks on this matter. In these passages Gadamer is addressing what he is alleging to be an "immanentism" not only in Husserl, but in Heidegger's *Being and Time* as well!<sup>9</sup> He points to the source of this 'immanentism', by asserting "that to be conscious of something is, for essential reasons, to be self-conscious."<sup>10</sup> The issue Gadamer is raising is "whether Heidegger really broke through the immanentism of the Husserlian description of consciousness and self-consciousness . . . or whether he simply concretized consciousness by [replacing it with] care and temporality?"<sup>11</sup> According to Gadamer "the answer [to this] is unclear."<sup>12</sup> Gadamer concludes that in the end, given Heidegger's own self-critique of his transcendental commitment to "the ideal of ultimate foundation (*Letzbegründung*),"<sup>13</sup> the issue of immanentism in *Being in Time* is no longer so pressing. And, so far as I can tell, this is the case for Gadamer, since the ideal of *Letzbegründung* is inextricably bound up with the unwarranted privileging of the self-consciousness implicit in all scientific (rigorous) rationality, in contrast to the self-understanding most appropriate to what he refers to as the "rationality of life."<sup>14</sup>

The issue pointed to, when Gadamer states that consciousness is both representational and essentially self-consciousness, seems to concern the claim (apparently following Heidegger), that the phenomenological commitment to the 'self-givenness' of phenomena, whether Husserl's or Heidegger's, harbors within itself a tacit, and philosophically unwarranted, presupposition regarding 'the given' when the latter involves the 'rationality of life'. Namely, that the latter is indeed something which can be 'given' at all, in the sense of being present for a consciousness, and therefore *a fortiori*, for self-consciousness. Hence, although

Husserl's formulation of phenomenology, on the foundation of the intentional essence of consciousness, and Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology on the foundation of fundamental ontology, both overcome, in their own fashions, the Cartesian epistemological immanence, and are therefore, contra Descartes, 'non-representational'; neither one, and this for the *same* essential reason, can overcome the immanence implicit in the scientific ideal of *Letzbegründung*. And again, the reason for this has its *basis* in Gadamer's claim, that inherent to this ideal, is the presupposition of (transparent) self-consciousness with respect to the "rationality of life."

§ 112. *Gadamer's Account of Husserl's Unwarranted Concept of Immanence.*

Even if these considerations are sufficient to resolve Gadamer's apparent inconsistency regarding the problem of representation and self-consciousness in phenomenology, in my opinion, another serious issue remains unsettled in his treatment of the relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology. Moreover, this issue bears directly upon the problem of the status of 'immanence' in their respective formulations, and, therefore, underlies his discussion of the issue of *Letzbegründung*. Despite Gadamer's acknowledged appreciation for "the rigor of Husserl's transcendental philosophical consistency,"<sup>15</sup> he maintains that "it is the essence of metaphysics (i.e., thinking of truth as disclosedness and of Being as the presence of what is present) that still determines Husserl's transcendental question."<sup>16</sup> Thus, he concludes that Heidegger's recognition of "the concealment that is necessarily connected with the experience (*Erfahrung*) that thinks the Being of the entity, namely, the concealment of that which first makes possible every disclosure of entities as entities—what he called the ontological difference,"<sup>17</sup> and its consequent redirecting of the *content* of phenomenological inquiry, is more consistent with the "ideal of phenomenological manifestation (*Ausweisung*)"<sup>18</sup> than Husserl's "attempt at a 'constitutional phenomenology'."<sup>19</sup>

At the basis of this conclusion is, of course, Gadamer's judgment that Heidegger is "right"<sup>20</sup> in seeing an ontological prejudice operative in Husserl. For, on the one hand, he endorses the Heideggerian ontological prerogative of "the transformation of 'essence' that is given with the question of Dasein's mode of being."<sup>21</sup> While, on the other hand, he grants the Heideggerian methodological prerogative that the "interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment . . . does not lie at all in the direction of transcendental philosophical reflection."<sup>22</sup> And

even though he grants that "Husserl can get around this criticism by saying that every meaning (*Sinn*) of Being must itself be capable of manifestation in constitutional analysis,"<sup>23</sup> he again follows Heidegger, with the assertion that "the appeal to the eidos-character of Dasein is not sufficient."<sup>24</sup> In other words, for Gadamer as for Heidegger, the Husserlian prerogative of transcendental phenomenological reflection, and by implication, its essential intentional structure, is rooted in a phenomenally unoriginal ontology of presence, and therefore, in a phenomenally *unwarranted* concept and understanding of immanence. Hence, in terms of both the content and method of phenomenology, the hermeneutics of facticity wins out over the reflective uncovering of the eidos of pure consciousness.

§ 113. *The Philological and Philosophical Problems Inherent in Gadamer's Account of Husserl's Unwarranted Concept of Immanence.*

In my view, Gadamer's account regarding the matter of Husserl's unwarranted concept of immanence is both philologically and philosophically problematical. The philological problem concerns his handling of the issue of 'immanentism' in both Husserl and Heidegger, while the philosophical problem has to do with his *uncritical* acceptance of Heidegger's hermeneutic of facticity. These factors may not be unrelated, if it can be shown that it is indeed the case, as Gadamer suspects, that Heidegger's project of a fundamental ontology is, as it were, still determined by the immanentism of the self-consciousness implicit in the scientific ideal of *Letzbegründung*. Because in this case, Gadamer's reliance on the *phenomenological* superiority of Heidegger's hermeneutic of facticity, in place of Husserl's reflective methodology, would have to be called into question. And it would have to be called into question, since it is precisely Husserl's supposed 'immanentism' that is the target of Heidegger's hermeneutic of facticity. Further, if both Husserl's and Heidegger's immanentism's could be shown *not* to have, as Gadamer suspects, an ontological basis, but rather a methodological one; and if further, this basis were to be shown to be determined by the guiding ideal recognized by Gadamer to be shared by Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies alike, viz., that of 'phenomenological manifestation', then Gadamer's whole evaluation of the relationship of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology would have to be called into question as well.

The philological problem that I am raising with respect to Gadamer's account concerns his reading back into Heidegger's original formulation of phenomenology (in terms of the project of a fundamental

ontology), his, as it were 'post-phenomenological' concern with, and self-critique of, his earlier commitment to the ideal of *Letzbe gründung*. The relevant philosophical problem that arises at this juncture, concerns Gadamer's attempt to maintain the phenomenological superiority of Heidegger's hermeneutic of facticity over Husserl's reflective immanentism of self-consciousness. Gadamer tries to maintain this *while, at the same time, maintaining* that the very ideal guiding the project of fundamental ontology, which underlies this hermeneutic, *is perhaps itself rooted in an immanentism of self-consciousness*. Of course, Gadamer could attempt to get around this, by pointing out that Heidegger's immanentism is still to be preferred over Husserl's, since the self-consciousness of the former is on the scent of an ontologically more original phenomenon, Dasein, than is the intentional phenomenon of the latter's self-consciousness. But again, in the interests of the attempt at non-partisan mediation in this affair, I would want to ask, is not the resolution of this issue *precisely what still remains outstanding* in Gadamer's discussion?

§ 114. *Gadamer's Uncritical Reliance on Heidegger's Methodological Immanentism.*

By introducing the conclusions of the present study regarding this last mentioned matter, and situating them with respect to the problems I am raising in Gadamer's discussion, I think that the whole issue of *Letzbe gründung* in his treatment of the issues can be shown to be phenomenologically, and perhaps even philosophically, premature. For these results show, in my view, precisely the *methodological* basis of Heidegger's immanentism, and therefore (1) the problematical nature of the hermeneutical critique of consciousness and (2) the *epistemic* dimension, of the *perhaps quite warranted* immanentism, of the 'ideal of phenomenological manifestation'.

Regarding (1), Gadamer nowhere deals with the issue of the warrant, methodological or otherwise, for the 'advance regard' toward the Being of entities that Heidegger's analytic of Dasein *relies on*, for its justification of the *need* for the hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology. That the nature of *die Sachen selbst* demand this issue be dealt with, is, I believe, supported in § 105 and § 106 above. There I suggested that it is precisely the 'insight' into the basic composition of the Being of entities provided by this 'advance regard' that initially permits: (A) the distinction between the Being of entities and their encounter in the mode of phenomena to be made, and; (B) the putatively 'concealed' status of former that the latter manifest, qua their phenom-



enal 'semblance', to be maintained vis-à-vis the (minimally) more original manifestation of the phenomenon in its phenomenologically distinctive sense. Without invoking the Husserlian prerogative, I think that my analysis showed that Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology, in terms of the *necessity* of the hermeneutic of Dasein, presupposes this *transcendental* distinction. I also think my analysis showed this Heideggerian formulation of phenomenology *does not* account for the methodological and/or ontological warrant for its hermeneutic. Indeed, in this context, I would want to maintain my view that taking this distinction into account, and proceeding in a consistently phenomenological fashion, would require that there be found involved in it something remarkably like the phenomenon of 'intentionality'.

Since neither Heidegger, nor Gadamer in following him, account for the philosophical and/or phenomenological warrant of the transcendental distinction at work, in the hermeneutical formulation of the basic method and content of phenomenology, I would want to suggest, at this point, that Gadamer moves too fast with respect to *die Sachen selbst* of the 'interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment', when he says that 'it does not lie at all in the direction of transcendental reflection'. For if it is granted, that the hermeneutical critique of the phenomenally unwarranted 'ontology of presence', determinative of the Husserlian prerogative of the original status of the phenomenon of intentionality, is *itself* rooted in a methodical and therefore *epistemic* moment that manifests an intentional phenomenon, then the alleged ontological superiority of this critique against the Husserlian prerogative, would stand in need of reassessment. And this, for the simple reason, that the very capacity of the so-called hermeneutics of facticity to uncover a 'metaphysics of presence' determinative of Husserlian transcendental reflection, would, *itself*, point in the direction of 'transcendental reflection'. This is to say, this "capacity" would point toward the 'reflection' involved in the transcendental distinction that underlies the recognition of the need for the hermeneutic at issue. Indeed, the very project of a fundamental ontology, insofar as the latter is understood to proceed on the basis of the critique of intentionality advanced by the hermeneutics of facticity, would seem in danger of losing its *phenomenological* priority.

§ 115. *The Unthematized Epistemic Moment of the 'Hermeneutical Situation' in Heidegger and Gadamer in Following Heidegger.*

That this is indeed the case, can be seen in the state of affairs that becomes apparent, once the 'epistemic' moment of the so-called 'hermeneutical situation' and its attendant 'hermeneutics of facticity', is made thematic. For, on the one hand, the Heideggerian prerogative (and Gadamer in following this), maintains that the Husserlian prerogative concerning the original phenomenal status of the constitutive unfolding of the *eidos* of intentionality, is, *in principle*, incapable of raising the *Seinsfrage* (Being-question); and is, therefore, phenomenally blind to the 'ontological difference'. Yet, on the other hand, the very ability to *phenomenally* uncover the 'interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment' that is involved in the 'ontological difference', points to the transcendental distinction between the 'Being of entities' and the "same" (i.e., the 'Being of entities') encountered in the 'mode of phenomena'.<sup>25</sup> And this ability points, as well, to the 'advance regard' that is involved in this distinction. Because *neither this transcendental distinction, nor its 'advance regard', is accounted for by the Heideggerian prerogative*, I would want to maintain this state of affairs is such that, even if my own conclusions about the 'intentional' status of the transcendental distinction, and the reflective direction of its 'advance regard', are not accepted, there is still a problem here for the Heideggerian prerogative, and thus for Gadamer as well. And, I would further hold, that this problem is sufficient to call into serious question the "definitiveness" of the hermeneutical critique of intentionality, and the imputation of an unwarranted ontological 'immanentism' to the Husserlian prerogative's unfolding of this phenomenon.

To the extent that my suggestion regarding the involvement of the phenomenon of intentionality with this problem is granted, there comes into phenomenal view a methodical, and therefore methodological, immanentism in the Heideggerian prerogative's formulation of the issue of the interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment, and the need that follows from this for a hermeneutic of facticity. Thus, contrary to Gadamer's analysis, I think that the answer to the issue of Heidegger's phenomenological immanentism *is clear*. Before addressing the issues involved in my attributing a methodological locus for Heidegger's phenomenological immanentism, and the consequent contrast of this locus to Gadamer's suspicions regarding its ontological character, which is to say, before addressing the problematics involved in the issue of phenomenological self-consciousness and *Letzbe gründung* (ultimate foundation), the following remarks regarding Gadamer's discussion of Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology,

and the Heideggerian prerogative's methodological immanentism, should serve to make clear the implications of this immanentism for the assessment of this relationship.

According to Gadamer, a Husserlian appeal to the eidos-character of Dasein misses the mark of the latter phenomenon. Gadamer makes this claim, because the 'essence' of Dasein is something which is determined by the interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment, that is, Dasein's essence is determined by the so-called 'ontological difference'. According to Gadamer, the ontology of presence, which is so central to the Husserlian program of the eidetic unfolding of essences, is completely insensitive to precisely the phenomenal non-presence inherent in the *Wesen* (essence) of Dasein's *Seinsweise* (mode of being). But, in order to make such a claim, Gadamer must in my view overlook two key points. (1) the subtle methodological distinction made by Heidegger, between questioning that is a "cognizant seeking for an entity with regard to the that and how of its being," (*BT*, 24/5), and questioning that involves "investigating" the character, or structure, of that which is sought in questioning that is a 'cognizant seeking'.<sup>26</sup> (2) Heidegger's methodological self-understanding, consistent with this distinction, i.e., that the goal of the analytic of existence is rendering "transparent" (*durchsichtig*) the phenomenal *character*, or *structure*, of the mode of being that is interrogated by the 'preliminary concept' of phenomenology.

Hence, insofar as the methodological distinctions referred to in (1) and (2) above are appropriated within the context of the issue of Heidegger's preliminary concept of phenomenology, it is *not simply* existence and time, and their phenomenal interinvolvement with disclosure and concealment *per se*, that emerges as the interrogative issue in the phenomenology of their manifestation. But rather, it is the *existentialia* of the existentiality of care, and its origin in the temporalization of temporality, that is the issue. What I am arguing, then, is that *in addition* to the ontological a priori that the Heideggerian prerogative discloses as the phenomenal basis of the intentionality of consciousness, there is also at issue the structural apriority of the *existentialia* of this ontological a priori. And it is precisely the methodical transparency of the latter that manifests, in my view, a methodological immanentism. For, insofar as it is maintained that the *structure or character* of the encounter, *in the mode of phenomena*, with the Being of entities, *necessarily* involves the interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment, then, so far as I can see, the apriority of this necessity has the status of something which 'runs through' the pre-phenomenal field which comprises *die Sache* at issue. Therefore, notwithstanding Gadamer's claim to the contrary, the Heideggerian

prerogative's unfolding of this necessarily yields an 'essence', and therefore an eidos-character, in the Husserlian sense.

The problem I am highlighting here, does not concern the opposing of the ontological 'content' per se of Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology, with its formulation in Husserl. On the contrary, the key point is that the Heideggerian prerogative's theoretical interest in rendering transparent the phenomenal *structure*, of what it takes to be its ontological 'content', is as committed to the putative 'metaphysics of presence' as is the Husserlian theoretical commitment, to the eidos-character of what it takes to be the 'content', ontological or otherwise, of phenomenology. Hence, the methodological locus of the Heideggerian prerogative's immanentism.

§ 116. *The Issue of Whether Husserl's and Heidegger's Phenomenological Commitment to the Phenomenological Ideal of Manifestation is Determined by an Unwarranted Commitment to the 'Metaphysics of Presence'.*

In my view, emphasizing the methodological locus of Heidegger's immanentism does not, *ipso facto*, resolve the ontological dimension of their controversy. It does, however, shift its phenomenological focus, away from Gadamer's formulation of it in the opposition between the eidos-character of 'essence' and its ontologically transformed meaning. The phenomenological issue of this controversy is therefore not simply which content, when *understood ontologically*, is more fundamental, intentionality or Dasein? But rather, the issue becomes one of whether the commitment to the 'phenomenological ideal of manifestation', that is shared alike by the immanentisms of the Husserlian and Heideggerian prerogatives, is rooted in, or otherwise determined by, the commitment to the ideal of *Letzbegründung*, and therefore, to an unwarranted commitment to the so-called 'metaphysics of presence'.

Following Gadamer's formulation, the issue emerges in terms of the question of whether the *telos* of self-consciousness that is, as it were, the driving force behind the ideal of ultimate foundation, is determinative as well of the ideal of phenomenological manifestation. For if this is the case, and further, if such an ideal should prove *philosophically* unwarranted vis-à-vis what Gadamer refers to as the "rationality of life," then the decisive issue would emerge in the direction of what Gadamer appeals to as "another self-interpretation of our doings,"<sup>27</sup> and not in terms of the issue of whether Husserl's, or Heidegger's, formulation of phenomenology more closely approximates the ideal of ultimate foundation. The issue, then, is not whether either

Husserl's or Heidegger's phenomenology is determined by a philosophical immanentism, since this must be answered in the affirmative. On the contrary, the issue is whether the self-referentiality that is determinative of this immanentism must be judged, as Gadamer does, pejoratively.

§ 117. *Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics do not Escape nor Account for the Self-Referentiality of the Transcendentality of Husserl's and Heidegger's Formulations of Phenomenology.*

Regarding this last mentioned issue, I would follow Mohanty's observation, that "[t]he problem that Gadamer succeeds in revealing characterizes all transcendental philosophy . . . Such self-referentiality does not annul transcendental thinking, it rather shows its transcendental nature."<sup>28</sup> Indeed, to this I would want to add that Gadamer's appeal to the inappropriateness of self-consciousness, and therefore to the putative determination of the ideal of *Letzbegründung* by the metaphysics presence, cannot escape precisely such self-referentiality. That this is the case, can be seen with the interrogation of how it is that Gadamer himself is able to set up the opposition or contrast, between the philosophical inappropriateness of self-referentiality, and the task of philosophically interpreting the self-understanding of the 'rationality of life'.

Just as the state of affairs involved in the Heideggerian prerogative, of a distinction between the Being of entities and the "same" encountered in the mode of phenomena, appeals to a transcendental difference, and thus points to an epistemically intentional dimension of the problematic (and therefore points, as well, in the direction of transcendental reflection); so too, *mutatis mutandis*, does this distinction made by Gadamer, between the immanentism of self-consciousness, and the rationality of life's self-understanding, point to a transcendental distinction and *its* reflective uncovering. Hence, insofar as Gadamer's account of the pejorative status of the philosophical immanentisms at issue must (at least) appeal to such a distinction, I would hold that this line of argument commits him also to the self-referentiality involved in the reflective unfolding of an intentional phenomenon, and therefore, to the phenomenological originality of intentionality.

When the results of the present study of the phenomenon of intentionality are situated, within the context Gadamer's discussion of the relation of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology, the key issue is not the problem of their respective immanentisms, and the question of whether their philosophical warrant implies an unjustified commit-

ment to the ideal of ultimate foundation. Nor is the key issue the ontological priority of interpretation (*Auslegung*) over self-consciousness, or the methodological priority of hermeneutics over transcendental reflection. Rather, the key issue concerns phenomenologically accounting for the implicit methodological immanentism, of the Heideggerian ontological prerogative's privileging of the *Seinsfrage*, which Gadamer uncritically follows and invokes against the Husserlian methodological prerogative of phenomenological reflection.

Hence, Gadamer's appeal to Husserl's apparent stubborn refusal to accept the *phenomenological* priority of interpretation over the abstractness of the thematization involved in perceptual evidence, is a secondary issue with respect to *die Sachen selbst* of the controversy at hand. For even if Gadamer's claim is true, it is beside the point. This is the case, because when the phenomenological status of the putative priority of the interpretation appealed to by Gadamer is considered, within the context of the immanentism of the Heideggerian methodological prerogative that uncovers the phenomenon of interpretation, and therefore, when the theoretical thematization that is involved in the epistemic moment of this Heideggerian immanentism is considered, then the phenomenal status of 'interpretation' itself becomes equivocal. For its alleged phenomenal priority, and hence superiority, over the thematic uncovering of evidence, be it perceptual or any other kind, dissolves in the light of the thematic horizon of its own uncovering.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### RICOEUR'S ATTEMPTED RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS

§ 118. *Ricoeur's Thesis of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Presupposing Each Other.*

In the attempt to situate the results of the present study in terms of the first variation of the second trend noted above, Ricoeur's provocative attempt to mediate a dialectic rapprochement between phenomenology and hermeneutics will be considered. Ricoeur's argument is based on the thesis, that beyond "the simple opposition there exists, between phenomenology and hermeneutics, a mutual belonging."<sup>1</sup> The simple opposition that Ricoeur refers to concerns the hermeneutical critique of Husserl's phenomenological idealism. Ricoeur distinguishes the latter critique, from the phenomenological concern per se with the "question of meaning,"<sup>2</sup> and holds that this "*phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics . . . [while again, this] phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a hermeneutical presupposition.*"<sup>3</sup>

§ 119. *Ricoeur's Account of Husserl's Idealism.*

Ricoeur locates Husserl's idealism in "the way in which the immense and unsurpassable discovery of intentionality is couched in a conceptuality which weakens its scope, namely the conceptuality of the subject-object relation."<sup>4</sup> According to Ricoeur, the latter gives rise not only to Husserl's misguided attempts to found the unity of the object in a constituting subjectivity, but also, to "[t]he first declaration of hermeneutics . . . that the problematic of objectivity presupposes a prior

relation of inclusion which encompasses the allegedly autonomous subject and the allegedly adverse object."<sup>5</sup> In order to raise the issue of the alienation, which such a restricted understanding of intentionality manifests, with respect to Husserl's unfolding of this phenomenon's non-actional and therefore *non-objectifying* dimension, I would appeal not only to the results of the present study<sup>6</sup> but to Gadamer's recognition of this dimension, and indeed, to Ricoeur himself! For he observes later on in his analysis of the relation between phenomenology and hermeneutics: "That consciousness is outside of itself, that it is *towards meaning* before meaning is for it and, above all, before consciousness is *for itself*: is this not what the central discovery of phenomenology implies?"<sup>7</sup>

Of course, Ricoeur would want to reply that the 'implication' brought out by his later remark, is precisely what Husserl's idealistic self-interpretations obscure with respect to the phenomenon of intentionality. To wit, he maintains that Husserl's elevation of subjectivity to transcendental subjectivity, on the basis of the indubitability of immanence vis-à-vis the dubitability of all transcendence, effectively "severs the transcendental subjectivity from the empirical self,"<sup>8</sup> and thereby effaces the "opaque *Seinsglaube* [belief in being]<sup>9</sup> of the pre-given *Erfahrungsfeld* (field of experience) initially uncovered by the phenomenological reduction. The unsurpassable result of this, for Ricoeur, is the problematic 'parallelism' between phenomenology and phenomenological psychology, and the idealization of the opacity of the meaning manifested by the initially uncovered *Seinsglaube*, in favor of the conceptual clarity obtained by restricting it to the noematic correlate of the noesis. Indeed, Ricoeur argues that

. . . the phenomenology that arose with the discovery of the universal character of intentionality has not remained faithful to its own discovery, namely that the meaning of consciousness lies outside of itself. The idealist theory of the constitution of meaning in consciousness has thus culminated in the hypostasis of subjectivity.<sup>10</sup>

§ 120. *Ricoeur's Account of Husserl's Alleged Idealism has its Basis in Ontologism and the Conflation of the Psychological and Transcendental Reductions.*

Such an account of Husserl's alleged idealism has its basis in what I would suggest are two crucial departures from *die Sachen selbst* uncovered by his phenomenology. One concerns Ricoeur's tendency to understand the determination of the immanence of consciousness *onto-*



*logically*. This tendency is the result of the determination of the interiority of 'inner-consciousness', on the basis of an ontologically conceived immanent object. Hence, contrary to Husserl's unfolding of the interiority of conscious immanence with respect to phenomenologically exhibited modes of experiential givenness,<sup>11</sup> Ricoeur still appeals to consciousness as something with an 'interior', and therefore, as something with an 'outside'. Related to this ontologizing tendency, is Ricoeur's stressing (in Husserl's analyses) of the Cartesian contrast between the dubitability of the perspectival *Abschattungen* (adumbrations) manifested by the phenomenon of transcendence, and the indubitability of the aperspectival manifestation of the phenomenon of immanence. The stressing of this, is, again, purchased at the expense of attending to Husserl's phenomenological treatment of the exhibited *Sinn* (meaning) of the transcendent and immanent, a treatment carried out in no other terms than their experiential modes of, respectively, perspectival and aperspectival manifestation.<sup>12</sup> This treatment, is, therefore, most decidedly *not* accomplished in terms of speculations regarding the putative ontological statuses of immanent and transcendent objects.

Ricoeur's other crucial departure from *die Sachen selbst* unfolded by Husserl's phenomenology, concerns his formulation of the parallelism between the 'content' of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. Ricoeur characterizes the parallelism, or "correspondence,"<sup>13</sup> at issue, in terms of the empirical status of the former and the 'reduced' status of the latter. Such a formulation is at best misleading, and at worst, totally misses the mark with respect to Husserl's, admittedly difficult, account of this parallelism. It is misleading since the phenomenologically psychological exhibition of phenomena is, for Husserl, an eidetic affair and therefore is *clearly* differentiated, both in method and content, from empirically psychological investigations.<sup>14</sup> It misses the mark, since for Husserl the exhibition of *both* phenomenologically psychological phenomena, and phenomenologically transcendental phenomena, involve phenomenological reductions. Indeed, the phenomenologically psychological reduction functions to unfold the eidetic presuppositions, and therefore the phenomenally psychic basis, of the empirically conceived psychological experience; while the phenomenologically transcendental reduction functions to unfold the transcendental presuppositions, and therefore the transcendently phenomenal basis, of the phenomenologically psychological exhibition of experience. It is only subsequent to the latter reduction, with its manifestation of the intentional *Sinn* of the phenomenon of the world, that the field of transcendental subjectivity is manifested according to Husserl.<sup>15</sup>

§ 121. Ricoeur's Restriction of the Essential Character and Scope of Phenomenological Reflection.

Ricoeur's first departure from *die Sachen selbst* uncovered by Husserl's analyses, results in a restricted appreciation of the essential character and scope of phenomenological reflection. Indeed, Ricoeur treats this phenomenon as if it were essentially the same as the "inner-perception" of the tradition. Hence, he maintains that immanence, for Husserl, allows "only the coincidence of reflection with what 'has just' been experienced."<sup>16</sup> Not only does such a formulation of the phenomenon misunderstand Husserl's analysis of the essence of the temporal horizon of methodically phenomenological reflection, for which such a coincidence is exhibited as *eidetically* impossible; but it also restricts reflection to the "act" (cogito) modality of intentionality, thereby cutting it off from its non-actional (non-cogito) modality, which according to Husserl belongs essentially to the *phenomenon* of reflection.<sup>17</sup> Husserl's entire treatment of the issue of the *essentially* incomplete (inadequate) manifestation, of 'reflected' *Sinn* (meaning), to the exhibiting regard of the 'reflecting' moment of methodically factual reflection, and the problematic of the eidetic reduction of this 'reflected' *Sinn*, such that the phenomenally pure 'idea in the Kantian sense' or *eidos* is uncovered,<sup>18</sup> is therefore not even a factor in Ricoeur's discussion.

Such a limited formulation of the reflective problematic in Husserl's phenomenology, allows Ricoeur to restrict, the a priori uncovered by the eidetic reduction, to the logical ideal of "intentional fulfillment"<sup>19</sup> and its attendant *analytic* problematic of objective conceptuality. "Intuition" and "description" are likewise treated in terms of this logically limited ideal, of the adequate manifestation of evidence, as is clear by Ricoeur's statement that "the ideal of intuitive foundation is the ideal of interpretation which, at a certain point, would pass into full vision."<sup>20</sup> Again, it must be stressed that Husserl clearly distinguished such an ideal, and its phenomenal basis in the "epistemic essence" of intentionality, from the properly philosophical, and therefore phenomenological issues, involved in the constitution of non-objective *Sinne* (meanings), and their phenomenal basis in non-actional modalities of intentionality.<sup>21</sup>

These simplifications, if not falsifications, of Husserl's phenomenological account of immanence and reflection are consequently at the root of Ricoeur's criticism of Husserl's supposed idealism, namely, that "[i]t is indeed 'being-in-the-world which precedes reflection."<sup>22</sup> Since, on this view, Husserlian phenomenology is unable to account meaningfully for the priority of "belonging"<sup>23</sup> manifested by being-in-the-world and

its non-objective, and therefore non-objectifiable, understanding, it is held to be phenomenally blind to "the necessity for all understanding to be mediated by an interpretation."<sup>24</sup> This is to say, that for Ricoeur, because phenomenology is locked into Husserl's idealization of meaning, access to the understanding involved in non-objective "belonging," and its *ipso facto* interpretive dimension, is precluded in terms of both its method and content. Ricoeur's claims in this regard rely on Heidegger's formulation of *Auslegung* (interpretation), as the 'development of understanding', and hold that "[t]he dependence of interpretation on understanding explains why explication [*Auslegung*] as well always precedes reflection and comes before any constitution of the object by a sovereign subject."<sup>25</sup>

§ 122. Ricoeur's Uncritical Reliance on Heidegger's Distinction Between 'Interpretation' and 'Understanding' renders Problematical his Account of the Opposition between Idealistic Phenomenology and its Hermeneutic Critique.

However, when the broader scope of phenomenological reflection, and therefore of phenomenological description and intuition, for the Husserlian prerogative is invoked, the opposition, set up by Ricoeur, between idealistic phenomenology and its hermeneutic critique, collapses. Because following *die Sachen selbst* of this prerogative, I would submit that the apriority of the *structure* of anticipation that is invoked by Ricoeur, with respect to the precedence of interpretation over reflection, *itself* manifests an intentional dimension, and hence, a phenomenal status that points in the direction of the phenomenologically reflective exhibition of this status. Indeed, the very distinction made in Heidegger's analysis and uncritically followed by Ricoeur, between 'understanding' and 'interpretation', cannot in my opinion have a hermeneutical, i.e., interpretive, locus, since it is precisely the *universality*<sup>26</sup> of this distinction that is held to characterize 'interpretation' in the first place. The distinction consequently has a transcendental character, which, again, appears to me to be unaccounted for by the Heideggerian methodological prerogative. And further, insofar as *die Sachen selbst* of this distinction are attended to, there is manifested an intentional phenomenon, and therefore, these *Sachen* point in the direction of the transcendental reflection exhibitive of such a distinction.

Now, Ricoeur might want to respond to the above criticism directed against his discussion of Husserl's idealism, by *accepting in principle* most of it. That is, by pointing out that the understanding of phenom-

enology that he wants to set into a dialectical relationship with hermeneutics, is precisely its intentional impetus toward the disclosure of non-objective meaning which is at issue in my discussion of the shortcomings of his idealistic reading of the Husserlian project. The dispute between the findings of my study and his discussion might then be reduced to a question of textual exegesis. Indeed, the dialectic Ricoeur wants to set up between a phenomenology so understood, and hermeneutics, hinges upon the "the choice [of phenomenology] in favor of meaning" that he holds to be the "most general presupposition of any hermeneutics."<sup>27</sup> Hence, Ricoeur's introduction of what Gadamer has called phenomenology's "hostile brother,"<sup>28</sup> dialectics, occurs in response to his putting his finger on the problem of meaning in Heidegger's hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology. To wit,

[t]he forgotten question is the question of the *meaning* of [B]eing. In that respect the ontological question is a phenomenological question. It is a hermeneutical problem only insofar as the meaning is concealed, not of course in itself, but by everything which forbids access to it. However, in order to become a hermeneutical problem—a problem about concealed meaning—the central question of phenomenology must be recognized as a question about meaning.<sup>29</sup>

§ 123. *Ricoeur's Account of the Opposition between Auslegung and Description, and the Need for their Dialectical Mediation, is based in his Unwarranted Restriction of Phenomenological Intuition and Description.*

Ricoeur thus rightly, in my view, calls attention to the problematic of concealment in Heidegger's formulation of the phenomenological necessity for hermeneutical mediation.<sup>30</sup> He does so by pointing in the direction of the recognition of the privileged status of meaning with respect to that which, as a result of its very determination as concealed, forbids access to such meaning. The concealed status of the latter, therefore, if it is to be rendered meaningful, *stands in need of such mediation*. However, the issue that, in my opinion, remains problematical in Ricoeur's account of this state of affairs, is his characterization of this relation of meaning and hermeneutic in terms of their dialectic. To put it bluntly, what can this *mean*? What is the philosophical warrant for so characterizing this relation? For if the results of the present study are taken into account regarding this distinction, what appears within the context of the Heideggerian hermeneutical prerogative as an unaccounted for presupposition (and a

transcendental one at that), inviting perhaps dialectical resolution, can very well be accounted for within the context of the objectively 'liberated' phenomenon of intentionality, and its methodological unfolding in the direction of phenomenologically transcendental reflection.

The issue, in my view, is therefore not about *whether* Heidegger's hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology 'presupposes' an idealistically "cleansed" Husserlian phenomenology of intentionality, but rather: Inasmuch as hermeneutics *does* so presuppose intentionality, what is the philosophical status of this 'presupposition'? Ricoeur's dialectical characterization of the nature of this presupposition, is rooted in the opposition he sees between phenomenological 'description' and '*Auslegung*'. This opposition occurs in terms of Ricoeur's restriction of phenomenological 'description' to the logical ideal of adequate intuitive fulfillment, with the result that non-objective meaning and understanding *seems* beyond the ambit of such 'description'. Hence, it is hermeneutical *Auslegung* (interpretation) which Ricoeur understands (following Heidegger) as the non-objective, and non-objectifiable, anticipatory structure of pre-reflective existence. And further, again following Heidegger, *Auslegung* is held to be the methodological context most suitable to unfolding such pre-reflective existence.<sup>31</sup> In other words, *Auslegung* must be employed to account for that which is beyond the putatively limited 'descriptive' access to non-objective understanding, since such non-objective understanding is itself most appropriately characterized as *Auslegung*.

Ricoeur further sees, in certain of Husserl's texts which appeal to *Auslegung*, the tacit recognition, which, as it were, strains his descriptive ideal, that "reflection is overwhelmed by the *potential* meanings of one's own lived-experience."<sup>32</sup> The 'infinite work' by which Husserl characterizes the task of unfolding, qua *Auslegung*, the horizons of world meaning, is taken then by Ricoeur to indicate that "[e]xplication [*Auslegung* in Husserl's sense] is thus mid-way between a philosophy of construction and a philosophy of description."<sup>33</sup> However, when Ricoeur's phenomenally unwarranted restriction of 'description' is taken into account, I am inclined to agree completely with Mohanty's observation on this last statement of Ricoeur's, viz., that "I find here [in *Auslegung* in Husserl's sense] nothing but description."<sup>34</sup> This is the case, according to Mohanty, because the very uncovering of interpretations by description "does not alter the fact that what is being done is description."<sup>35</sup> And, as a result of this, I would want to add that the very 'opacity' of the initial, as it were, pre-phenomenal *Seinsglaube* (belief in being), which Ricoeur thinks Husserl's commitment to the logical ideal of intuitive fulfillment is always in danger of

losing, is itself a descriptive phenomenon rooted in the reflective exhibition of the contrast between, that which yields itself in terms of its capacity to achieve conceptual clarity, and that which does not so yield itself. Thus, while Ricoeur maintains that the difference between the natural and transcendental attitude manifested by Husserl "does not consist in descriptive features but in ontological indices,"<sup>36</sup> I would want to hold, in accord with a less impoverished understanding of 'description', that such a difference is entirely "descriptive."

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### MOHANTY'S ACCOUNT OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF DESCRIPTIVE AND INTERPRETIVE PHENOMENOLOGY

#### § 124. *Introductory Remarks.*

Toward the end of situating the results of my study within the context of the second variation of the second tendency, noted above, in the literature addressing the Husserl-Heidegger relation, I will consider Mohanty's careful and insightful attempts to seek a rapprochement between descriptive and hermeneutical phenomenology. He argues that

[b]oth sorts of phenomenology—descriptive as well as interpretive—can be either naive or self-critical. When they are naive, they perceive each other as opposed. When they are self-critical, they recognize each other as complementary, and, in fact, as mutually inseparable.<sup>1</sup>

As a result, "phenomenology and hermeneutics stand in a peculiar dialectical relation to each other."<sup>2</sup> However, unlike Ricoeur's formulation of a dialectic between the two in terms of the reciprocal "presupposition" of the intentional uncovering of meaning and *Auslegung*, in Mohanty's formulation, this dialectic has its basis in the intentional "dialectic of reflection and reflected upon."<sup>3</sup> Such a dialectic has as its terms, on the one hand, the dimension of transcendental subjectivity whose corporeal, historical and linguistic *excess* makes *reflection* and transcendental philosophy possible; and, on the other hand, the impossibility of "a complete coincidence between reflection and the reflected upon,"<sup>4</sup> which discloses the situatedness of consciousness in sedimented (and hence, in some sense, "opaque"<sup>5</sup>) meanings, and its consequent *necessary* involvement in the hermeneutical circle.<sup>6</sup>

§ 125. *Mohanty's Account of the Structural Isomorphism Between the Theory of Consciousness and the Theory of Dasein.*

Mohanty reaches this conclusion by arguing that the hermeneutic critique of transcendental consciousness "holds good against the sort of transcendental philosophy that obtained up until Husserl."<sup>7</sup> However, subsequent to Husserl's "radicalized theory of consciousness as intentionality,"<sup>8</sup> the opposition between consciousness and existence, intentionality and Dasein, description and *Auslegung*, is held by Mohanty to be rooted in naïve self-understandings of each. Such naïveté has its basis, according to Mohanty, in the failure to appreciate the "remarkable structural isomorphism between theory of consciousness and theory of Dasein"<sup>9</sup> that emerges, with the consideration, that for Husserl

[t]he intentionality of consciousness is wider than its objectivating function, all consciousness is not presentational . . . To associate with the idea of consciousness the epistemological concepts of subject and object is a mistake. What objectivates is a certain type of acts of consciousness . . . not all intentionalities are act intentionalities.<sup>10</sup>

Hence, on this point, the findings of the present<sup>11</sup> study are in complete accord with those of Mohanty, as are the initial implications drawn from them by him. Namely, that Husserl's uncovering of the intentional structure of consciousness, and especially its non-actional dimension, is able to meet the challenge of the Heideggerian hermeneutical critique of consciousness, since the latter can "never think of consciousness except as representation, as the inner, as subjective."<sup>12</sup> And although Mohanty does not, to my knowledge, ever thematize what is at issue here in terms of the problematic of 'immanence', as does the present study,<sup>13</sup> nevertheless, the present study is again in accord with his stressing, against the Heideggerian critique, that the intentional state of affairs uncovered by Husserl "expels all contents from consciousness and makes it open towards the world."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, consciousness "does not have an inner core where the things could have their habitation and it hardly makes sense to ask whether the world does or does not exist in consciousness."<sup>15</sup>



§ 126. Mohanty's Account of the Complementarity of Heidegger's Methodological *Auslegung* and Husserl's Intentional Explication is Philologically Questionable.

However, the findings of the present study are no longer in *strict* accord, with the further implications drawn by Mohanty, regarding the "complementarity," and indeed, the "mutually inseparable" *self-critical* relation of hermeneutic and descriptive phenomenology. While what is at issue with respect to this lack of strict accord is really a matter of philological and phenomenological hair splitting, in the interests of completeness, I will attempt to bring into relief what I see as the two main points of divergency. The first concerns the largely philological issue, of the significance of Heidegger's statement that "the methodological meaning of phenomenological description is interpretation (*Auslegung*)" (*BT*, 61/37). The second concerns the phenomenological status of the dialectic that Mohanty sees between 'reflection and reflected upon'.

Regarding this first issue, Mohanty thinks that

... when Heidegger writes that the methodological significance of phenomenological description is *Auslegung* ... he has in mind ... Husserl's intentional explication, which consists in "laying out or setting forth" the implicit components of intentional life, the components that are "horizontally" pre-delineated within explicit intentionality.<sup>16</sup>

In my opinion, however, such a reading is only possible if Heidegger is not taken at his word, regarding the methodological inability of Husserl's account of intentionality to secure the phenomenal state of affairs necessary for raising the *Seinsfrage*. When it is recalled that for Heidegger, this inability is rooted in (1) Husserl's traditional understanding of the mode of being of the entity that manifests intentionality as its essence, and (2) in his likewise traditional formulation of the Being of this intentional essence, the suggestion that Heidegger could have in mind the 'unfolding of intentional horizons', when he says that 'phenomenological description is *Auslegung*', becomes problematical in my view.

On the one hand, for Heidegger *no amount* of unfolding the horizon, of what Husserl understands to be the 'natural attitude', will ever disclose the hermeneuticity of factual *Dasein*. This is the case since, in Heidegger's view, Husserl's reflective grasping of intentional acts, as this functions to make present to consciousness 'acts and their objects in terms of how they are meant in the acts,'<sup>17</sup> necessarily occurs at the expense of the thematization of the non-grasping, *but nevertheless*

*directing-itself-toward*, manifested by the 'way to be' of the intentional entity,<sup>18</sup> viz., *Dasein*. On the other hand, for Heidegger the *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) of the essence of intentionality that guides Husserl's reflective unfolding of the meaning of acts and their objects, is determined by the traditional ontological concept of 'immanence'. And this means, of course, that the horizontal context for the unfolding of any entity is already, *tacitly and irrevocably*, determined in terms of its *Vorhandensein* (presence). Hence, the very raising of the *Seinsfrage* within the context of Husserl's account of intentionality, let alone the recognition by this account, of the necessity of the *hermeneutical* formulation of the phenomenological method that follows with the raising of this question, is precluded, in principle, according to Heidegger, by Husserl's methodological mode of access to the entity that manifests intentionality as its essence. And, it is precluded as well, for Heidegger, by Husserl's formulation of the Being of the essence of intentionality.<sup>19</sup>

I am therefore inclined to understand Heidegger's statement about phenomenological description and interpretation, in terms of the methodological need for mediation. Such mediation occurs, of course, in the guise of the 'violent wresting,'<sup>20</sup> from the phenomenal semblance, of phenomena in the ontologically phenomenological sense, a 'violent wresting' that is demanded by what Heidegger takes to be the initial manifestation of phenomena in terms of the derivative mode of semblance, which at once conceals and points to phenomena in the distinctive sense. It is such mediation, I think, that Heidegger has in mind when, against what he takes to be Husserl's method of the reflective description of the grasped structure of intentionality (within the ontologically derivative horizon of immanence), he maintains that the *Sinn* of such description is *Auslegung*. Which is to say, *Auslegung* in the sense of the hermeneutic wresting of the original meaning of Being, from the concealed mode and meaning of the Being of the intentional phenomenon in Husserl's sense. *Auslegung* is, therefore, not "nothing but the uncovering of sedimented meanings and interpretations,"<sup>21</sup> since so long as such meanings and interpretations manifest intentional phenomena, they can never yield ontologically original phenomena in Heidegger's sense.

§ 127. *Mohanty's Account of the Phenomenological Basis for Self-critical Complementarity of Transcendental Reflection and the Hermeneutical Circle.*

By raising this philological issue regarding Mohanty's account of Heidegger's understanding of "*Auslegung*," I am not at all suggesting that I find convincing the critique of intentionality from out of which this understanding emerges. Quite the contrary. As I have already mentioned, on this point I am in complete agreement with Mohanty, that this critique has as its target intentional acts, and not the non-actional manifestation of this phenomenon that is exhibited by Husserl. However, insofar as Mohanty, in my view, inappropriately takes what Heidegger means by *Auslegung*, to be isomorphic with the descriptive unfolding of intentional horizons, he reaches the problematical conclusion that "[h]ermeneutics and phenomenology coexist in his [Husserl's] thought."<sup>22</sup> In my opinion, such a conclusion is not just philologically problematical, but *phenomenologically* problematical as well. This is the case, because for Mohanty, the isomorphism at issue is taken to extend beyond the ability of descriptive phenomenology to respond to the challenge posed by the hermeneutic critique, to include the *necessary* involvement of phenomenology in Husserl's sense with the hermeneutical circle. In other words, for Mohanty, just as a self-critical hermeneutics is compelled to recognize its isomorphism with the wider phenomenon of intentionality uncovered by Husserl; likewise, a self-critical phenomenology is compelled to recognize its isomorphism with hermeneutic phenomenology. Which is to say, phenomenology is compelled to recognize that as a result of the situatedness of 'the given' in sedimented meanings and interpretations, it is inextricably bound up with the so-called hermeneutical circle.

The issue, then, raised by the hermeneutic critique of consciousness, that Mohanty thinks a self-critical descriptive phenomenology must recognize, is that "neither can consciousness ever be fully transparent to itself nor can it ever totally grasp its object."<sup>23</sup> This issue is brought into relief, for Mohanty, by Gadamer's formulation of the problem that the 'interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment' (which is essential to Heidegger's hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology) poses to Husserl's reflective formulation of phenomenology. The challenge it presents to transcendental philosophy's ideal of full self-knowledge and presuppositionlessness, is such that for Mohanty, the Husserlian project of transcendental phenomenology must recognize that these ideals are "unattainable."<sup>24</sup> This is the case, inasmuch as for Mohanty "[i]t is true that a complete coincidence between reflection and the reflected upon is ruled out by temporality."<sup>25</sup> Hence, that which is

uncovered by reflection as the reflected upon, i.e., the intentionally 'given', "always presuppose[s] the context of meanings that are available."<sup>26</sup>

Even though this "complementarity" and indeed, 'mutual inseparability', of descriptive and hermeneutical phenomenology is brought into relief by the hermeneutic posing of the issue of disclosure and concealment, vis-à-vis the descriptive ideal of reflective transparency and completeness, for Mohanty the self-critical recognition by phenomenology of the latter being unattainable, *does not* necessitate the abandonment of either the descriptive notion of 'the given' nor the transcendental dimension of phenomenological reflection. This is the case because, on the one hand, Mohanty finds that the legitimacy of what he calls the "principle of interinvolvement [of disclosure and concealment]"<sup>27</sup> is questionable. Insofar as its claim, contra the Husserlian notion of 'the given', is that *all* phenomena are interpretive, this universality would amount for Mohanty to "a piece of successful description and this description itself is not an interpretation."<sup>28</sup> And this, of course, because the alleged universality of the pan-*Auslegung* maintained by this principle, would seem to be 'given', and hence, vitiate its very claim. On the other hand, Mohanty argues that the "[t]he possibility of philosophy itself surely requires that one can take a reflective stance in which one watches this circle [i.e., the hermeneutic circle],"<sup>29</sup> rather than be "hopelessly involved"<sup>30</sup> in it.

§ 128. *Mohanty's Account of the Dialectic of 'Reflection and Reflected Upon' is Itself Grounded in Transcendental Reflection. The Consequent Phenomenologically Reflective Basis of the 'Circularity' of the Hermeneutical Circle.*

Thus, for Mohanty, "being given and being interpreted are descriptions of the same situation from two different levels of discourse."<sup>31</sup> Insofar as this assessment of the state of affairs amounts to the suggestion that the hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology has, as its methodological basis, the transcendently reflective 'infinite task' of descriptively unfolding *Sinne* (meanings), the findings of the present study are, in my view, in essential agreement with this assessment.<sup>32</sup> However, Mohanty's further suggestion, that this basis is rooted in the impossibility of 'total reflection' manifested by the dialectic of 'reflection and reflected upon', requires some additional considerations in light of the findings of the present study. In other words, I would hold that *die Sache selbst* of the impossibility of 'total reflection' is *itself a reflected upon phenomenon*. It is therefore at once something

'given', and as well, an eidetic insight into the *essence* of the given. Rather than yield a dialectical movement, whose truth serves as a limiting concept for a self-critical transcendental phenomenology, this state of affairs, in my view, manifests an intentional phenomenon amenable to further *reflective*, and therefore *intentional*, investigative unfolding.<sup>33</sup>

Further, rather than signal a hermeneutic "opacity" with respect to the context of the given, and therefore an intrinsic limit to the transparency of consciousness, the eidetic insight into the impossibility of 'total reflection' is *itself*, in my view, only possible on the basis of reflected upon phenomena manifesting themselves to reflection as something which, *prior to their reflective exhibition*, exceed the ambit of such exhibition. This self-recognized limit with respect to the exhibitiv scope of reflection, and the corresponding range of the reflected upon, does not in my opinion *conceal* anything. Rather, the very *Sinn* of the phenomenon of concealment appears to me to have is basis in the reflectively uncovered transcendental difference, which contrasts some state of affairs, e.g., the genuine meaning of Being, or the historical, corporeal, linguistic situatedness of all reflection, with another state of affairs, that is alleged to be limited vis-à-vis this first state of affairs; e.g., the meaning of Being as it manifests itself 'initially and for the most part', or the opaqueness of consciousness. Needless to say, in accord with the findings of the present study, I would want to suggest that both this difference, and its reflective uncovering, manifest intentional phenomena. And, indeed, that such phenomena, far from being in any way caught up in the hermeneutical circle, function rather as the conditions of possibility for uncovering the putative "circularity" of the latter at all.<sup>34</sup>

All of this is not to suggest that consciousness is *necessarily* always transparent to itself; nor that phenomenological reflection enjoys unlimited access to the reflected upon. However, it is to suggest, that adjudication in matters of the transparency of consciousness, and methodological considerations regarding the limits of reflection, involve either the tacit, as in the case of the Heideggerian prerogative, or explicit, in the case of the Husserlian prerogative, appeal to transcendental distinctions *which, as such, can be made manifest as phenomena only within the scope of the reflective exhibition of intentional Sinn*.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### CROWELL'S ACCOUNT OF HUSSERL'S AND HEIDEGGER'S DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY'S TRANSCENDENTAL CHARACTER

§ 129. *Crowell's Account of Husserl's and Heidegger's Agreement Regarding Phenomenology's Basic Transcendental Character.*

Turning now to the final variation of the trend that seeks a rapprochement between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, Steven Crowell's careful discussion of their relationship will be considered, within the context of the present study. According to Crowell, the issue that divides Husserl and Heidegger does *not* concern the interpretation per se of phenomenology, that is, of "phenomenology: transcendental philosophy or ontology?"<sup>1</sup> Rather, for him the issue is "transcendental phenomenology: epistemology or ontology?"<sup>2</sup> Thus for Crowell, "the real issues concern not so much Heidegger's rejection, as his reinterpretation, of central Husserlian notions."<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Crowell holds that "[t]here is a good sense in which Heidegger can be said to adopt the program of inquiry into 'transcendental constitution'. "<sup>4</sup>

The divergencies between Husserl and Heidegger emerge, for Crowell, on the basis of their *agreement* that transcendental phenomenology consists in a move toward the field of transcendental subjectivity, toward a "field of evidence . . . accessible solely through a reflective inquiry . . . and is concerned *not* with beings *per se*, but with their 'meaning'."<sup>5</sup> Therefore, "the essential differences between the two must be traced further back, in terms of the issues and problems which, brought to this field by each, influence the philosophical significance it is taken to have."<sup>6</sup> Crowell singles out these issues in terms of the controversy between Husserl and Heidegger, over "how this field of transcendental subjectivity (or 'transcendental life' as

Husserl calls it) is to be *interpreted*."<sup>7</sup> In Crowell's view, Heidegger "argues quite plausibly that '[t]hat which constitutes is not nothing, and thus it is something and in being [*seiend*]'—though to be sure not in the sense of the positive. The question about the mode of being of that which constitutes is not to be avoided."<sup>8</sup> Husserl's steadfast refusal to interpret transcendental subjectivity in this way is traced, by Crowell, again following Heidegger, to the epistemological privileges that are accorded, on the one hand, to the phenomenal status of the soul and therefore to his Cartesian perspective on psychology;<sup>9</sup> and on the other hand, to his tendency to conceive of all ontology in terms of the problematics of mundane formal ontology.<sup>10</sup>

While Crowell is aware that "Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl's conception of the relation between phenomenology and ontology involve problems of their own,"<sup>11</sup> he concludes (without discussing such problems) that

[t]he mode of being of the absolute ego must itself become a transcendental problem. Only so can it be phenomenologically clarified how the pure ego both is and is not "the same" as the factic ego (Hus IX 602). The ground upon which entities are encounterable explicitly in their meaning structure must itself be inquired into as to its *Seinssinn*. At the same time, though the point cannot be argued here, such an inquiry preserves a genuine sense and direction for Husserlian "constitutional" investigations *within* the projected (fundamental) ontology of *Being and Time*. A significant *rapprochement* between Husserl and Heidegger, leaving neither totally unrevised, therefore becomes thinkable.<sup>12</sup>

The findings of the present study are in complete accord, with those of Crowell, regarding Husserl's and Heidegger's "agreement" with respect to the transcendental character of phenomenology.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, Crowell's suggestion that the locus of the divergency then between Husserl and Heidegger is to be found in terms of the issues and problems which they each bring to that which is uncovered by transcendental phenomenology, is consistent with the present study's investigation into the philosophical "prerogatives" of each thinker.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, Crowell's findings are in accord with my own, insofar as he holds that what Heidegger "means by 'Being' is no more drawn from the natural attitude as a non-phenomenological presupposition than is Husserl's 'transcendental' concept of being."<sup>15</sup> And finally, given this last mentioned point, they are in basic accord regarding what the present study, following Fink, has characterized as Husserl's "foreshortened"—compared with Heidegger's—formulation of the issue of the ontology and phenomenology, and therefore, they are in accord regarding the

unresolved ontological status of the "agency" or "will" involved in Husserl's formulation of phenomenological reflection in general, and transcendental reflection in particular.<sup>16</sup>

§ 130. *Crowell's Account of the Basic Opposition between Husserl's and Heidegger's Interpretations of Phenomenology's Basic Transcendental Character.*

However, I cannot follow Crowell's conclusion, that this last mentioned ontological state of affairs, is such that "Husserl closes off the possibility of a genuine ontology based on unprejudiced recourse to the 'things themselves'."<sup>17</sup> For here I think that the problems of Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl's conception of the relation of phenomenology and ontology need to be considered, and indeed, in light of their consideration by the present study, I would suggest that this conclusion of Crowell's is extremely problematical. Specifically, I have in mind here the methodological problems involved in Heidegger's formulation of the hermeneutic character of phenomenology. Insofar as these problems involve the appeal to transcendental distinctions that point in the direction of transcendental reflection, and therefore (following Gadamer), manifest an 'immanentism',<sup>18</sup> it seems to me that the issue dividing Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology cannot be formulated in terms of the disjunction: Epistemology or ontology? Rather, the crucial issue appears to revolve around the problem of whether phenomenology's most proper methodological self-understanding is reflective or hermeneutical. That this is the case, can be seen when the Heideggerian prerogative's hermeneutical critique of phenomenological reflection's *necessary* diminution of the ontological, is considered within the context of this prerogative's formulation of the relation between phenomenology and ontology. For if it is indeed the case, as I would want to maintain, that it is *precisely* in its characterization of this "relation" that Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology needs revision,<sup>19</sup> then *die Sachen selbst* at issue in the Husserl-Heidegger controversy would be such as to not lend themselves to the supposed disjunction between epistemology and ontology that is the main issue for Crowell.

In this connection, I would want to maintain that Crowell's translation of "*Besinnung*" (PP, 256) as "reflection" is extremely misleading. Its misleading character emerges when Heidegger's account of the character of the turn, from "entities to consciousness,"<sup>20</sup> that is necessary for the phenomenological "illumination of Being" (Ibid), is considered within the context of his ontological critique of "reflection"



(*Reflexion*). For it is precisely the "reflective" access to the mode and meaning of the Being of entities, essential to Husserl's formulation of phenomenology, that necessarily precludes, in Heidegger's view, the *Seinsfrage* and its consequent phenomenologically formulated fundamental ontology. Hence, insofar as the specific meaning of "reflection" in Husserl's formulation of phenomenology is at issue, Heidegger, in my opinion, most decidedly does *not* hold the view that phenomenology involves "a reflective inquiry"<sup>21</sup> into the meaning of the Being of entities. This is philologically evident as well, in Heidegger's consistent avoidance of the term "*Reflexion*" and its cognates, whenever the formulation of his own understanding of phenomenology is at issue.

§ 131. *Taking into Account Heidegger's Methodological Immanentism Yields Transcendental Reflection as the Arche and Telos of the 'Showing Itself from Itself' of 'that which is'.*

Heidegger's account of the relation between phenomenology and ontology, is therefore rooted in his "immanent"<sup>22</sup> critique of "reflection" in Husserl, and the latter, in turn, is itself rooted in the lack of ontological originality that Heidegger maintains is yielded by the phenomenon of intentionality. In my opinion, then, the problem that the present study has exhibited with respect to the issues surrounding Heidegger's ontological, and Husserl's epistemic, formulation of the 'immanence' manifested by intentionality, have a direct bearing on Crowell's conclusion regarding Husserl's closing "off the possibility of a genuine phenomenological ontology based on unprejudiced recourse to the 'things themselves'." And this, for the simple, reason that Heidegger's own formulation of the phenomenological necessity for a hermeneutical—as opposed to Husserl's reflective—methodology, is *itself* rooted in a reflective 'immanentism'. To wit, the 'immanentism' involved in the intentionality manifested by the transcendental distinction that he appeals to, between the Being of entities and the "same" in the mode of phenomena, along with the likewise intentional status of the transcendental distinction he makes, between the "original" meaning of the former vis-à-vis the concealment, "initially and for the most part," of this original meaning by the latter.

All of this is *not* to suggest, in any way, that Husserl's formulations of the relation between ontology and phenomenology are sufficient to address the issue of the *phenomenologically considered* mode and meaning of the Being of "[t]he ground and possibility of the 'will' to transcendental reflection,"<sup>23</sup> an issue that he appeals to in his formulations of the methodology of transcendental phenomenology. Here I

think that Crowell's observations, regarding Husserl's tendency to understand ontology in terms of the *mundane* formulation of the formal ontological problematic, are both insightful and instructive. For the centrality that the epistemologically weighted problematic of "objectification" assumes for ontology, following such a formulation, cannot help but result in Husserl's continual encounter, at the transcendental level, of the aporia of how to "ontologically" characterize the non-objective and non-objectifiable "being" of transcendental subjectivity.<sup>24</sup>

However, inasmuch as Heidegger's formulation of the phenomenological status of ontology must tacitly appeal to the methodologically "epistemic," and therefore, *in this sense*, "ontologically neutral" phenomenon of intentionality<sup>25</sup> in order to account for its hermeneutical situation, I think that it is clear that the *phenomenological* issue *does not* come down to whether Husserl's epistemologically skewed self-understanding, or Heidegger's ontologically skewed self-understanding, is the more correct. Rather, I think the decisive issue is to be found in the answer to the question, of whether *die Sachen selbst* involved in the methodical exhibition and phenomenal manifestation of the *Sinn des Seins* (meaning of Being) of the 'reflective will', or of any other entity, show themselves in terms of intentionality. Which is to say, show themselves in terms of the *reflected* intentionality of that which yields itself *as having already been*, prior to its reflective exhibition, in the *reflecting* intentionality of the regard of phenomenological reflection (which is the *sine qua non* for the manifestation of any phenomenon at all). And indeed, I would hold that *die Sachen selbst* involved in the Husserl-Heidegger controversy, yield the latter "phenomenological reflection" as, at once, the insuperable *arche* and *telos* of the "showing itself from itself" of that which is.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### LANDGREBE'S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTION

#### § 132. *Introductory Remarks.*

Regarding the final trend in the assessment of the issues involved in the Husserl-Heidegger relation evident in the literature, the variation of this trend found in Landgrebe's seminal discussion of the "shipwreck" of Husserl's project, will be discussed within the context of my investigation of the status of the phenomenon of intentionality in Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology. Landgrebe's analysis of Husserl's project focuses on the "fact that for Husserl being [*Sein*] primarily signifies being-an-object [*Gegenstand-sein*] for an act of consciousness which presents it."<sup>1</sup> According to Landgrebe, this understanding of being is "rooted in Husserl's interpretation of the essence and achievement of phenomenological reflection."<sup>2</sup> This interpretation is problematical for Landgrebe, inasmuch as "what Husserl had correctly seen under the title of transcendental subjectivity,"<sup>3</sup> includes a dimension which "can neither be objectified nor brought under concepts of objective being,"<sup>4</sup> and therefore, "can never be overtaken by representing [objectifying] reflection."<sup>5</sup> Husserl's attempt to nevertheless accomplish just this, has the result, for Landgrebe, that Husserl's account of transcendental subjectivity "becomes so obscured that he was not able to arrive at an unequivocal determination of this concept."<sup>6</sup> The influence of Heidegger on these analyses is clear from Landgrebe's characterization, of this non-objectifiable dimension of transcendental subjectivity, in terms of "intentionality in the sense of 'being-already-ahead-of-itself' (transcendence in the sense of Heidegger) . . . [which is] . . . unable to grasp itself in this structure in an objectifying reflection."<sup>7</sup>

§ 133. *Landgrebe's Account of the Important Distinction between Psychological and Phenomenological Reflection.*

Regarding phenomenological reflection, Landgrebe stresses that "the distinction between psychological and phenomenological reflection, which is viewed as something foreign, indeed, even superfluous by many phenomenologists, is of central importance for understanding Husserl's phenomenology."<sup>8</sup> According to Landgrebe, this distinction has its locus in the *contrast* between Husserl's account of the general structure of (psychological) reflection, and the structure, or essence, of phenomenological reflection. In Landgrebe's view, the former is characterized by Husserl in terms of the capacity of the perceiving ego to rise above its initial "self-forgetfulness," or latency,<sup>9</sup> in the paradigmatic instance of its being directed toward what is perceived in external perception, by "at any time turn[ing] back upon its perceiving of which it is still retentionally aware as 'having-just-perceived',"<sup>10</sup> and perceiving itself as an intentional object. What is essential here, according to Landgrebe, is "the fact that the performing ego always remains latent in performing its acts,"<sup>11</sup> and this in the instance not only of the ego qua external perception, but also in the instance of the reflecting ego, which itself "can become evident in a higher-level reflection."<sup>12</sup> This state of affairs does not lead, however, to an infinite regress, since "the performing ego, the 'subject ego', knows itself to be identical with the 'object ego', or the object of reflection . . . [and it therefore] . . . follows that this possible infinite reiteration can remain ignored because it leads to nothing new; it continually leads to the same self-identical ego which is aware of its identity."<sup>13</sup>

For Landgrebe, "what distinguishes the natural, mundane reflection from phenomenological reflection is this: at all times mundane reflection follows from an interest in the being of the object toward which the ego was previously straightforwardly directed."<sup>14</sup> Phenomenological reflection, "by contrast . . . has already set this belief out of play; it lives with an interest solely for the subjective course of the intending and the intended as such, that is, as the correlate of intending, without copperforming the positional act which belongs to this intending."<sup>15</sup> As a result of this, the ego that emerges in phenomenological reflection is "theoretical," in the sense of its detached absence of co-sympathizing interest in the posited being of objects, characteristic of the mundane ego's natural attitude. Thus, again in contrast to the mundane ego's status as a "child of the world," whose latency is such that it is always already given, and as such, at any time available as an object for reflection, the transcendental ego, prior to the setting out of play of the belief in being, is (and here Landgrebe quotes Husserl) "not only there

unnoticed, but it is nonthematic and absolutely anonymous to itself'.<sup>16</sup> Its disclosure, therefore, requires the unique resolve of "the 'beginning philosopher' for absolute justification and responsibility."<sup>17</sup>

§ 134. *Landgrebe's Account of Husserl's Phenomenologically Reflective Uncovering of the Absolute Being of Transcendental Subjectivity.*

Subsequent to the reductive accomplishment, that follows with the 'setting out of play' of the belief in the being of the object by phenomenological reflection, transcendental subjectivity is uncovered, according to Landgrebe, as a "field for description."<sup>18</sup> This is the case, in Landgrebe's view, since the temporal structure of phenomenological reflection is one of a "'subsequent awareness'."<sup>19</sup> The reflecting ego, in its awareness of itself as the same ego that is evident in the reflected upon, "retentionally alive 'having-just-perceived'"<sup>20</sup> ego toward which it is directed, "becomes aware of itself in this identity as a being which constitutes itself as temporal, or as a self-endurance of the ego in its temporalization."<sup>21</sup> Thus, the momentary evidence of the "I am," is unfolded in terms of the "I am as the 'stream of experience' which, in its experience and world-constituting achieving, becomes the field of transcendental experience."<sup>22</sup>

Landgrebe stresses Husserl's distinction, between the being of this reflectively uncovered transcendental subjectivity, understood in terms of the "immanence of a self-enclosed 'holding sway' of the world,"<sup>23</sup> and traditional formulations of "immanence," in terms of the distinction between "inner" and "outer." He writes:

[T]he inseparable unity of world-experience and its intentional correlate, the intended world experienced within it, [is that] upon which the possibility of the traditional distinction between "inner" and "outer," is based. Hence what remains after the reduction is not only the certainty of individual acts performed in the living-present, the present life which alone is immediately given, but also the certainty of the total-horizon as the already cointended world just as it is intended and, in this sense, certainty of the "entirety of an endless nexus of life."<sup>24</sup>

Further, he traces Husserl's account of the "absolute being" of the field of transcendental subjectivity, to the contrast between the self-presentation of the "external" or "straightforward" perceptual object and the ego. For, while the former appears through "presumptive" appearances, which always leave open the possibility of its nonbeing, the latter appears as identical in the temporal succession of its acts,

and is therefore "an absolute self-presentation . . . which excludes all possibility of nonbeing."<sup>25</sup>

§ 135. *The Full Sense of the Intentionality of Transcendental Subjectivity Transcends Husserl's Reflectively Immanent Characterization of its Absolute Being According to Landgrebe.*

It is, however, precisely this ascription by Husserl of "absolute being" to the immanence of transcendental subjectivity, as the self-enclosed holding sway of the world, that Landgrebe finds to be untenable with respect to the full sense of the intentionality of transcendental subjectivity. In Landgrebe's view, transcendental subjectivity in this latter sense, is such as to be "always more than what it knows itself to be in reflection and is never present to itself in reflection, for it is always ahead of itself."<sup>26</sup> Indeed, in his opinion, "[i]t has knowledge of itself prior to all reflection."<sup>27</sup> And as a result of this,

[t]he self-identity of the performing ego is therefore not one that can become objective and cannot be described by concepts referring to objective being; it can be grasped only as the "dialectical" relationship of "being-identical-in-being-other."<sup>28</sup>

Transcendental subjectivity in this sense is "an experience which is free,"<sup>29</sup> and therewith characterized by the "protentional directedness towards 'what is to come' and what is temporally 'forthwith' that grounds the possibility of openness for new experience and for factual responsibility for this experience."<sup>30</sup>

What is untenable for Landgrebe in Husserl's account of transcendental subjectivity, is, however, *not* its reductive disclosure as a field in which the correlation of world appearance and "constitutive world-forming as the 'holding-sway' [*Walten*] of the world itself,"<sup>31</sup> is experienced "in taking up a position for which it bears responsibility."<sup>32</sup> Rather, what emerges in Landgrebe's analysis as untenable, is Husserl's attempt to raise the "play" (*Spiel*) of this correlation "to the level of something absolute."<sup>33</sup> This is the case for Landgrebe since this is precisely what the world in its holding-sway is *not*. On the contrary, "the world in its 'holding-sway' is nothing other than the free play [*Spielraum*] of transcendental subjectivity . . . as an experience which is free and therewith open for an advance."<sup>34</sup> Which is to say, it is nothing other than transcendental subjectivity as "free," "prior to all reflection" and therefore protentionally directed towards the future.

§ 136. Landgrebe's Argument Against Husserl's Representational Theory of Phenomenological Reflection.

According to Landgrebe, Husserl's account of the "anonymity" of the transcendental ego, prior to the phenomenological reduction and its subsequent disclosure as transcendental subjectivity, is indicative of both his awareness of this "deeper ground of intentionality" ["*Untergrund der Intentionalität*"],<sup>35</sup> and paradoxically, of the inability of "[h]is theory of the phenomenological reflection, and the thesis concerning the absolute being of transcendental subjectivity which it serves to found,"<sup>36</sup> to appropriately account for this ground. The problem, as Landgrebe sees it, is located in the claim made by Husserl's theory of phenomenological reflection regarding the transcendental ego being "absolutely anonymous to itself," prior to its phenomenologically reflective disclosure. Insofar as Husserl is consistent about this, and in Landgrebe's view he is, he cannot account for the "motivation" for the setting out of play of the belief in the posited status of objective being, which his theory holds is essential for the reflective thematization and hence, disclosure of the *previously absolutely anonymous* transcendental ego. And this for the simple reason that the awareness, of the transcendental ego's freedom to do precisely this, *appears* to be the prerequisite, rather than the consequence, of the reduction.<sup>37</sup> That is, for Landgrebe the transcendental ego, as that which is responsible for the positionality of objective being, cannot be *absolutely* anonymous to itself, *since insofar as the reduction is motivated, this motivation must, at least tacitly, be derived from the awareness of precisely this freedom, vis-à-vis this taking of a position regarding objective being.*

In Landgrebe's view, then, Husserl's account of the transcendental ego's pre-reductive absolute anonymity has its basis in his theory of phenomenological reflection, which he formulates in terms of the temporal structure of a "subsequent awareness" that makes evident the continuing objective identity, between the performing ego, and the ego that is reflected upon. In Landgrebe's words:

Only in this way does he gain the criterion for distinguishing transcendental subjectivity as a unique and absolute realm of being from mundane subjectivity, or the human ego, which, although for the most part latent, already knows itself to be an ego before the phenomenological reduction takes place.<sup>38</sup>

Again, the problem is that the theory of phenomenological reflection holds that the ego, qua its identity as ego, "would first constitute itself in its absolute identity only through its retentionally established 'having been' [*Gewesen-sein*], which is re-presented reflectively,"<sup>39</sup>

while to the ego in its freedom, there belongs its protentional orientation, and therefore *non-retentive* openness to "what is to come." And, it precisely the latter, which *necessarily* defies all attempts at reflective objectification, and therefore, apprehension as an intentional object for an act of consciousness that presents it.

§ 137. *Landgrebe's Account of the Two Senses of Transcendental Subjectivity: the Reductively Uncovered 'Absolute' in Husserl's Sense and the Anonymous Pre-reflective 'Place' where the Absolute is Experienced.*

For Landgrebe, then, "transcendental subjectivity" has two senses. In one sense, it is the phenomenological experience of the correlation between the world as an already constituted interpretive horizon and the world forming positionality which, in taking up a position with respect to its experience of the world and worldly beings, constitutes an interpretation "of something experienced and about which, 'in-itself', nothing could be possibly said apart from this correlation."<sup>40</sup> Transcendental subjectivity, in this sense, is disclosed as a field of eidetic objectifying description, and the "presentation of this correlation is actually that great task of phenomenological analysis which can be achieved by the reductive method."<sup>41</sup>

In the other sense, "transcendental subjectivity" is the ground for the possibility, of both the experience of the positionality of the world and the reflective expounding—qua eidetic objectifying description—of the experience of the correlation of this world forming positionality and the world's already constituted interpretive horizon. Transcendental subjectivity, in this sense, characterizes for Landgrebe the performing ego whose "[s]ubjectivity in its 'anonymity' as free before all reflection is always absolutely certain of itself beforehand."<sup>42</sup> As such, its "anonymity" is not "absolute" in Husserl's sense, since to its "immediate 'being-with-itself'"<sup>43</sup> belongs the awareness of a "prereflective 'knowledge'"<sup>44</sup> of "the certainty of a transcendence in the sense of something nonworldly which, however, does not stand opposed to it a distinct and separate object, but which announces itself in it as a free subjectivity."<sup>45</sup> And, in a Hegelian turn of phrase, Landgrebe concludes:

Thus transcendental subjectivity in this sense, as a subject aware of its freedom, is not itself the absolute but the place where the absolute is experienced—whereby experience is here clearly spoken of in a radically different sense than as experience of the world and worldly beings, a sense in harmony with Husserl's requirement that every transcendence, if it is not to be an empty



thought, must have a manner of showing itself and announcing itself to consciousness which is appropriate to it.<sup>46</sup>

Husserl's description of two distinct realms of being, the empirical and the transcendental, and "an eidetic which is to be based upon this description,"<sup>47</sup> which brings along with it the problem of the "parallelism" of the psychological and the phenomenological, therefore "disappears" in Landgrebe's view. In the place of an absolutely immanent, and vis-à-vis the empirical, absolutely a priori transcendental subjectivity, there emerges the interrelated (but not interdependent, since transcendental subjectivity in its prereflective sense grounds the possibility of transcendental subjectivity in the sense of a phenomenologically descriptive field) senses of prepositional and positional transcendental subjectivity.

Situating the results of the present investigation of intentionality within the context of Landgrebe's wide ranging discussion of Husserl's phenomenology, two main points of contention, and therefore, in my opinion, problems, emerge with respect to the status of intentionality in his discussion. The first concerns the specific status of the intentionalities of the reflected upon, and the reflecting, in Landgrebe's formulation of the distinction that emerges in the contrast between mundane and transcendental reflection. The second concerns the essentially related issue of the "motivation" for the phenomenological reduction, which Landgrebe maintains both brings about this reflective distinction and calls it into question.

§ 138. *The Lack of Phenomenal Justification for Landgrebe's Characterization of the Status of the 'Reflected Upon' Intentional Object.*

In my view, Landgrebe's characterization of the status of the reflected upon intentional object, in terms of its temporal limitation qua the "having been" of the "retentionally alive," lacks phenomenal justification. For, as far as I can see into this difficult matter, Landgrebe's characterization of the limited temporal horizon of the reflected upon intentional object, has its basis in an appeal to an *argument* about the meaning of the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of the essence and achievement of reflection. This is to say, in lieu of a descriptive appeal to the phenomenal "how" of such awareness, Landgrebe instead makes a case for "how" it *must* be. In addition, it appears to me that the very terms and distinctions he draws upon in order to "advance" his argument, presuppose, and therefore have their basis in, an appeal to phenomena that have their basis in precisely such a descriptive

account of the "how" manifested by the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of reflection.

This is not to say that the phenomenal "how" of the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of reflection, *does not* manifest the temporal dimension of "having been." Rather, however paradoxical it may seem at first glance, it is to suggest that in addition to the temporal dimension of "having been," the intentionality of that which is made evident as a function of the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of reflection, manifests the temporal dimension of "what is to come," and as well, it manifests the temporal dimension of the "present." What I am suggesting here, then, is the phenomenal *non-equivalence* of the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of reflection, and the "having been" of the "retentionally alive." In order to bring what is at issue in this suggestion into bolder relief, I will briefly consider, in contrast to Landgrebe, what I take to be the methodological context of Husserl's descriptive account of the intentional essence of both the reflected upon, and the reflecting performance, manifested by the structure and accomplishment of reflection, and follow this with a brief sketch of the temporal structure of these intentionalities.

§ 139. *Landgrebe's Misleading Formulation of the Centrality of the Distinction between Psychological and Phenomenological Reflection.*

To begin with, I find Landgrebe's formulation of the centrality of the distinction between psychological and phenomenological reflection in Husserl's phenomenology to be misleading. It is misleading, inasmuch as I think that there is sufficient warrant to maintain that Husserl's account of reflection is not limited to the distinction between psychological (mundane) reflection and phenomenological reflection. But rather, on the "side" of phenomenological reflection, Husserl, in my view, differentiates as well psychologically phenomenological reflection from transcendently phenomenological reflection.<sup>48</sup> On this view, mundane reflection would include not only the traditional formulation of reflection in terms of empirically "inner perception," but also phenomenologically psychological reflection, in the sense of the unfolding of the "pre-transcendental" eidetic structures of consciousness. The implications of this additional distinction, with respect to mundane reflection, are of significance not only with regard to accounting for the precise status of the "subsequent awareness" that is characteristic of reflection in general according to Landgrebe; but also, it is of significance for dealing with the problematic issue of the motivation for initiating the phenomenological reduction, and indeed, for deter-

mining the phenomenological status of the absolute "immanence" of the reflectively disclosed transcendental subjectivity

Mundane reflection, in the sense of the traditional concept and experience of "inner perception," has its basis for Husserl in the ontological opposition between putatively "inner" and "outer" objects. As such, its basic character is *not* determined in terms of a "subsequent awareness," but rather, it is determined in terms of a perceptual interiority or inwardness rooted in speculations regarding the contrasting ontological statuses of the objects of perception or awareness. The character of a "subsequent awareness" determining the structure of reflection first becomes an issue, in my opinion, then, for reflection in the sense of phenomenologically psychological reflection. With respect to the latter, it is important to note two things. One, insofar as the horizon of the world and the natural attitude or belief in this horizon, remains *operative* in such reflection, for Husserl it is still a "mundane" reflection. And two, insofar as such reflection is characterized as "unnatural," vis-à-vis empirically mundane perception, the issue of the "motivation" for such reflection emerges in Husserl's phenomenology *prior* to the issue of the "motivation" for the, as it were, reflective turn to the transcendental.

§ 140. *The Pre-transcendental Basis for the 'Motivation' of Phenomenological Reflection in Husserl's Critique of the Empiricistic Formulation of 'Inner-perception'.*

The "motivation," for what Husserl characterizes as the "unnatural direction"<sup>49</sup> of phenomenological reflection, has its basis, in my view, in his critique of the empiricistic formulation of reflection in terms of "inner perception." Inasmuch as this formulation determines the basic character of such "perception" on the basis of appeals to the posited statuses of the objects of perception, and not the experience of perception, it is not rooted in "awareness" according to Husserl's critique.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, inasmuch as the ideality posited of the inwardly perceived conceptual meanings, are empiricistically maintained to be abstractive epiphenomena of the posited external objects of perception, such meanings are *tacitly appealed to, yet in no way accounted for, by the empiricistic epistemology.* In my view, it is precisely the critical realization of the latter that provides the "motivation" for Husserl's initial formulation of phenomenology, in terms of a *reflectively executed* "descriptive psychology." And, in addition, to such reflection there belongs the essence and accomplishment of a "subsequent awareness," in the sense that the *Erlebnisse* (lived-experiences) of the

ideal meanings uncovered by such reflection, manifest themselves as "already there," prior to their phenomenologically descriptive exhibition to the reflecting regard.

It is important to note here, that as a function of their mode of manifesting themselves, qua their phenomenal "how" as "already there," such ideal meanings are yielded "atemporally." This is to say, that so long as the reflecting regard of the phenomenologically descriptive reflection attends solely to what is evident in the reflected upon, the very *Sinn* of the latter, in this instance, is such as to not admit temporal "division," in the sense of a "before," "present," and "after." As a result of this "atemporality" manifested by the ideal *Sinn* of the reflected upon, the "subsequent awareness" of the reflecting regard of the phenomenological reflection that is exhibitively of this, *is itself*, in this phenomenologically peculiar sense, i.e., in terms of its phenomenal "how," likewise "atemporal." This state of affairs, as evident in what Husserl referred to as the "phenomenology of pure logic," consequently provides, in my opinion, an illustration of the phenomenological non-equivalence of the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of phenomenological reflection and the "having been" of the temporal, in the sense of the "retentionally alive."

§ 141. *Landgrebe's Critique of the Intentional Status of the 'Reflected Upon' in Husserl's Theory of Phenomenological Reflection Presupposes the Eidetic Reduction Accomplished by Phenomenology's Methodical Reflections.*

Now, in my view, the intentional status of that which emerges in the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of phenomenologically psychological reflection as the reflected upon, is, when considered phenomenally, *not* something that is factually (*faktische*) there, in a manner analogous with objects of so-called external perception. On the contrary, the intentional structure of the reflected upon, qua its status as the *essence* of the reflected upon (yielded to the exhibiting reflecting regard performed by the reflection at issue), emerges for Husserl only within the context of the methodical comparison, or variation, of that which is initially yielded to the subsequent awareness of reflection as "already there," prior to advertence of the reflecting regard.<sup>51</sup> This is to say, *strictly speaking*, the evident manifestation of the intentionality of the reflected upon requires the achievement of the so-called "eidetic reduction." Therefore, all discussion of the reflected upon, as an "intentional object," has as its *sine qua non*, from the Husserlian point of view, the methodological move to "pure" phenome-

nology.<sup>52</sup> Hence, insofar as Landgrebe's critique of Husserl's theory of reflection is advanced on the basis of appeals to the reflected upon qua its status as an intentional object—and Landgrebe in my view consistently does just this—the critique has as its *presupposition* the eidetic reduction, and hence, an *eidetic interest* in reflection in general and the reflected upon in particular.

This last mentioned issue is thus extremely pertinent, not only to securing the proper phenomenological access to the *die Sachen selbst* yielded by the temporal structure of reflected upon intentional objects<sup>53</sup> in Husserl's analyses, but to Landgrebe's *arguments* regarding the temporal *inaccessibility* of the full intentionality of transcendental subjectivity as well. In addition, it needs at this point in the discussion to be stressed, that from the Husserlian point of view, what is at issue under the rubric of "time" is the phenomenologically uncovered *Sinn* of time, and the eidetic structure of this *Sinn*, and not time per se or its essence.<sup>54</sup> Thus, in the case of the phenomenological account of the "time" of transcendent objects, the positionality of the latter must be initially "reduced," so as to make evident its *Sinn*. And, in order to uncover the *essence* or eidetic structure of this reduced temporal *Sinn*, the latter in turn must undergo the comparison or variation that yields its *eidos*, i.e., must undergo "eidetic reduction."

Again, limiting the discussion to the phenomenology of transcendent time, the result of these considerations, in accord with my view of Husserl's analyses, is that the successive continuum of "before," "now," and "after" of the transcendent object, is initially reduced to its reflected upon *Sinn*. This is made evident to phenomenological reflection as a function of the temporality (*Temporalität*) of its mode of "announcing" itself as temporally transcendent, in the sense that in excess of what is yielded to reflection in terms of its "present now," the transcendent yields itself in terms of its horizontal "just past now," prior to the adventence of reflection, and in terms of its "now to come," subsequent to this reflective adventence. Corresponding to the *Sinn* of this successive continuum, there is made evident in Husserl's analysis, with the shift of the phenomenologically reflective regard from the mode of the *Sinn* of the transcendent "announcing" of time, to the time consciousness of this *Sinn*, the modes of the consciousness of the *Sinn* of transcendent time.<sup>55</sup> Hence, to the *Sinn* of the "present now," there corresponds the consciousness of time in terms of the originary impression of the living now; to the horizontal *Sinn* of the "before" there corresponds the consciousness of time in terms of the "having been" of the retentionally just past now; and to the horizontal *Sinn* of the "after" there corresponds the time consciousness of the "anticipation" of the protentional now to come.

At this point it needs to be noted that inasmuch as this reflective unfolding of the *Sinn* of time, in terms of the correlation between the successive continuum of the transcendent object's temporality and the time consciousness of this continuum, follows as a consequence of the reduction of the positionality of transcendent objects and *not* the positionality of the non-objective world-horizon, the phenomenological status of what is made evident in this manner is "psychological."<sup>56</sup> Also, it needs to be noted that the eidetic reduction, and therefore the intentionality, of this correlation has not yet been considered. And finally, contra Landgrebe's tendency to consider the reflected upon *as if* it initially manifested itself in terms of the "time consciousness" side of the correlation at issue, the *Sinn* of time is initially yielded in Husserl's analyses in terms of its "*Temporalität*" (temporality), and therefore, *not* in terms of time consciousness (*Zeitbewußtsein*). Hence, Landgrebe's tendency to discuss the temporal dimension of the "subsequent awareness" characteristic of reflection exclusively in terms of the latter is, at best, misleading, and at worst, confused.

§ 142. *The Eide of the Succession of the Intentionality of Temporality and Time-consciousness are not Successive in Husserl's Analyses.*

Continuing then the rehearsal of Husserl's analyses, subsequent to the eidetic reduction, the horizontally successive continuum of the "now," "before" and "after" is yielded in terms of its "eidosis." The latter manifests an "intentional object" which functions to structure any successive continuum whatever (*Überhaupt*). As such, the eidetic status of this "intentional object" is *not itself successive*. Rather, it is that which emerges (qua the comparisons or variations performed by the eidetic reduction) as the invariant implicit in, and in this sense, rendering intelligible, the reductively unfolded *Sinn* of the "successive" temporality of transcendent objects. Likewise, the time consciousness of the successive continuum of the *Sinn* of temporality, is yielded in terms the non-actional intentionality of the impressional living now and its retentive and protentive intentional horizons. Again, the eidetic status of this intentionality of the consciousness of time is *not itself successive*. But rather, it manifests the invariant structure implicit in the consciousness of succession.

Now, in addition to the analysis of the phenomenologically reduced time of transcendent objects, Husserl's analyses also treat the reduced time of "immanent objects," in the sense of the lived-experience of methodically reflective regard which uncovers the *Sinn* and eidetic structure of the time of transcendent objects. This is to say, that while

performing the phenomenological analysis of transcendent time, the lived-experience of the methodically reflective regard is, in its full "concretion," something which for Husserl remains "unreflective." Hence, the unfolding of its temporal *Sinn* requires "higher level" methodical reflections, which make evident the temporality and time consciousness peculiar to phenomenological reflection.

According to Husserl, the "time" manifested by the live-experiences of phenomenological reflection (and here is should be stressed again that the reflection at issue is phenomenologically "psychological") is neither transcendent nor successive. It is not "transcendent," inasmuch as it is not announced by the appearance of a transcendent object to lived-experience. Rather, it appears in the manner peculiar to the appearance of lived-experience itself as lived-experience. Indeed, it is precisely the non-presumptive, non-perspectival manner of the appearance of lived-experience qua lived-experience that yields, for Husserl, its status as an "immanent object." It is not "successive," since as the lived-experience of the reflection that phenomenologically uncovers the *Sinn* of the transcendent object's temporality and time consciousness, it is horizontally "already there;" and as such, it is characterized by its manifestation of a temporality and time consciousness which Husserl refers to as "simultaneity" (*Gleichzeitlichkeit*). In Husserl's words, "every lived-experience is an essentially self-enclosed contexture not only considered in view of temporal *succession* but in view of *simultaneity*" (*Ideas I*, 196/184).<sup>57</sup> As such, "immanent time," as the time of lived-experience qua lived-experience, yields itself, to the higher level phenomenological reflections that uncover it, as something which, prior to the advertence to it of the reflecting regard of this "higher level" reflection, was *unreflektiert* (unreflected). With its reflective thematization, however, not only can the *Sinn* of its temporality and the time consciousness of this *Sinn* be phenomenologically made evident, but also, with the eidetic reduction, the intentional structure of these is also yielded and thus made manifest according to Husserl.

§ 143. *Landgrebe's Phenomenologically Inappropriate Characterization of the Intentionality of Temporal Succession as Successive is at the Root of his Misguided Critique of Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Reflection.*

What is at issue here, contra Landgrebe's account of the impossibility of phenomenological reflection to "overtake," and therefore render descriptively manifest, the intentionality of the unreflected dimension of "reflection" that is involved in its (reflection's) performance, is precisely this "accomplishment." I would suggest that this can be seen when it is borne in mind that (1), the intentionality of temporal succession is *itself* not successive and that (2), the temporal *Sinn* of phenomenological reflection is also not "successive," but yields itself in terms of the "simultaneity" of the "manner" or "how" of its appearance, to the "higher level" reflection that unfolds this *Sinn*.

With regard to (1), since neither the intentional essence of temporal succession, nor the temporal *Sinn* of phenomenological reflection, is a succession, the problem of reflection "overtaking" the protentional openness that is essential to the *Sinn* of succession disappears. This is to say, the phenomenologically peculiar making descriptively evident of the intentional structure of time consciousness, in the sense of the impressionable now and its retentive and protentive horizons, is *already a reflected phenomenon*, and as such, descriptively yields precisely what Landgrebe *argues* it is incapable of yielding.

With regard to (2), the "unreflected" status of temporal simultaneity is *not*, as Landgrebe's analyses would suggest, something which is "prereflective" in the sense of its complete inaccessibility to reflection. Therefore it is not something which—vis-à-vis the Husserlian reflective program of a descriptive eidetic of the field of phenomenologically reduced experience—is heteronomous to reflection, in the sense of an "immediate knowledge" and "awareness" of transcendence that, at once, defies reflective access and serves as the basis for the very act of reflection itself. Rather, it seems to me, that any such claims regarding the limits of phenomenological reflection "presuppose" such reflection, once the phenomenal "how" of such claims is descriptively attended to. As such, they would manifest themselves, as a function of their reflected upon *Sinn*, in terms of their being "already there," prior to the advertence of phenomenological reflection, and in terms of their continuing to perdure, subsequent to this advertence. Which is to say, they would manifest themselves in terms of their temporal "simultaneity."



## TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

BP	<i>The Basic Problems of Phenomenology; Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie</i>
BT	<i>Being and Time; Sein und Zeit</i>
HCT	<i>History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena; Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs</i>
Ideas I	<i>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie</i>
LI	<i>Logical Investigations; Logische Untersuchungen</i>
MFL	<i>The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik</i>
P	translation of "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Article"
PP	<i>Phänomenologische Psychologie</i>

(For full bibliographic information, see the Selected Bibliography at the end of this study)

## Notes

### Introduction

1. The one notable exception to this, the essays written over the years by J. N. Mohanty, will be discussed in Part Four of this study.
2. Rudolf Bernet, "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 21, 2 (1990), p. 136.
3. Bernet finds that Heidegger's analyses in these lectures not only contain a "correction of certain analyses by Husserl" (p. 136), but also, that they are "more phenomenological" Bernet, *op. cit.*, (p. 147).
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), p. 169.
5. Dorian Carins, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 107.
6. Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987), p. 286.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," in *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985); pp. 60-61; "The Phenomenological Movement," *op. cit.*, pp. 157-172; *Truth and Method*, trans. and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads Publishing Corporation, 1990), pp. 254-271.
13. See: John Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'Hermeneutic' Phenomenology," *Husserl Studies* 1 (1984), pp. 157-178; Frederick Elliston, "Phenomenology Reinterpreted: From Husserl to Heidegger," *Philosophy Today* 21 (1977), pp. 273-283; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981); Richard Schacht, "Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology," *Philosophical Studies* 23

- (1972), pp. 293-314; Timothy Stapleton, *Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).
14. The unavailability of the Heidegger's Marburg lectures at the time when most of the literature on the Husserl-Heidegger relation was written may explain the lack of attention to the issue of the critical relationship between Heidegger's formulation of fundamental ontology and Husserl's account of intentionality. Notwithstanding this unavailability, the philological inappropriateness of the tendency at issue here remains in my view.
  15. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), German text *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975); *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), German text *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979); *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), German text *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (Frankfurt am Maim: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979); *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), German text *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* (Frankfurt am Maim: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978).

Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), German text *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Vol. 1 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); *Logical Investigations*, trans. J.N. Findlay, 2 Vols. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1982), German text *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2 Vols. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); "Phenomenology," trans. Richard Palmer, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, II, No. 2 (May 1971), pp. 77-90; German text "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Vierte, Letzte Fassung," in *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 277-301.

Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Erster Entwurf," with Heidegger's notes, in *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, op. cit., pp. 237-55; "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Versuch einer zweiten Bearbeitung," with Heidegger's notes, in *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, op. cit., pp. 256-77.

- 16 It may be argued, on behalf of Bernet, that since the focus of his discussion is the lectures surrounding *Being and Time*, he is not obliged to consider their treatment of intentionality and consequent formulation of phenomenology—which is *not* explicitly hermeneutical—in regard to the methodologically hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology in *Being and Time*. However, this is hardly satisfactory in my view, since Bernet's discussion takes the liberty of drawing the conclusion that Heidegger's approach to intentionality is "more *phenomenological*" (my emphasis).

17. Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
18. Gadamer, to some extent, considers this. See "The Phenomenological Movement," *op. cit.*, p. 131 and *Truth and Method*, *op. cit.*, p. 244; For the most complete consideration of this, see J. N. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger," *Man and World* 11 (1978), p. 328; "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," in *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 109, and §§ 9, 12, 92 below.
19. Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
20. See note 18 above. Cf. also Ludwig Landgrebe, "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism," trans. R. O. Elveton, in *The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl*, ed. Donn Welton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 101 and § 39 below.
21. Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
26. Not only does Bernet *not* discuss the implications of Husserl's differentiation of intentionality in terms of "actional" and "non-actional" modalities, but, considering Husserl's treatment of this as early as *Ideas I*, he inexplicably considers it among those issues which, late in Husserl's development, were "imposed on Husserl almost against his own will" (Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 148). See especially § 24 below.

## PART ONE

### Introduction

1. As a result of the close textual reading that will comprise the basis of the following study, which will therefore necessitate a large number of textual citations, I have opted for the increasingly prevalent convention of citing all references to primary texts within the body of my text. All abbreviations are accounted for by the "Table of Abbreviations" appended at the end of this work. All page references are first to the English translation, when available, and then to the German.

### Chapter One

- 1 The term "phenomenal relief" will be used here and elsewhere in this study within the context of the phenomenological project of rendering explicit the pertinent subject matter—what in phenomenology is called "the matter itself" (*Sache selbst*)—of a philosophical discourse in accord

with the very nature of this subject matter itself. Hence, arguments, explanations and theoretical constructions about the nature of a subject matter at issue are eschewed by the phenomenologist in favor of what Husserl calls the "evidence" of something, and what Heidegger refers to as "the showing itself from itself" of something. In the present instance, my attempt at "bringing into bold phenomenal relief" the point of departure of Husserl's phenomenological method will, do so by focusing its considerations on the "matters themselves" of this method as they emerge within the context of *his* writings.

2. Husserl uses the term "lived-experience" (*Erlebnis*) to designate the special kind of "experience" that comprises the subject matter initially revealed by the phenomenological method. It belongs to the specific nature of lived-experience that it is entirely inaccessible to the empirical method and indeed unintelligible to its epistemology. In a certain sense, it can be said that for Husserl the meaning that appears in lived-experience, as well as what he refers to as the manner of appearing of such meaning, is tacitly appealed to *yet in no way accounted for* by empiricism. How Husserl argues that this is indeed the case, how he proposes to *phenomenologically* overcome this empiricistic presupposition, and finally, precisely what he understands by the term "lived-experience," will be clarified in §§ 8-12 of this chapter.
3. In an effort to maintain a terminological consistency and accuracy, I have adopted the convention of altering translations. Due to the rather large number of alterations I have had to make in order to achieve this end, I have not noted these changes.
4. There is a tendency in the literature to understand any discussion on Husserl's part of "reflection" in terms of the phenomenologically peculiar "reflection" involved in the epoché. In my view, such an understanding has its basis in the conflation of "phenomenological reflection" with "reflection per se." As a result of this, Husserl's differentiation of these two modes of reflection, along with his further differentiation of the latter mode in terms of its pre and post epochal characteristics, becomes obscured. Apart from the problems this presents with respect to the adequate appropriation of the nuances involved in Husserl's working out of the problem of reflection, this obscuration, when operative in the discussion of Heidegger's critique of "reflection" in Husserl, stands in the way of an assessment of the merits of Heidegger's critique vis-à-vis a responsible account of the "matters themselves" in Husserl's treatment of the problem. See for instance: Rudolf Bernet, "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being," *op. cit.*, p. 144; John D. Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'Hermeneutic' Phenomenology," *op. cit.*, pp. 163, 176; Friedrich Elliston, "Phenomenology Reinterpreted: from Husserl to Heidegger," *op. cit.*, p. 275; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 46; James C. Morrison, "Husserl and Heidegger: The Parting of the Ways," in: *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*, ed. F. Elliston (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1978), p. 50; Paul Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," in:

*The Conflict of Interpretation*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 18.

5. Husserl's concept of "neutrality" refers to the subtle, yet decisive, transformation of that which phenomenological reflection reflects. Such reflection does not treat the empiricistic understanding of experience and the relation of cognition to such experience, as an in fact binding or otherwise legitimate account of reality, as would the empiricist. According to Husserl, when one's understanding of experience functions in this way, it is brought together with the 'reality' of experience such that the two become indistinguishable. This state of affairs is characterized by Husserl in terms of the function understanding constantly "performs" vis-à-vis the determination of reality. Rather than allow the empiricistic formulations of experience to "perform" this determination of reality, the phenomenologist considers the empiricistic formulations of experience *only insofar* as they appear before the phenomenologically reflective gaze as *thoughts* about reality. Hence, such reflection is understood to consider the "same" empiricistic formulations of experience and cognition as does the empiricist, but with the decisive difference that, unlike the empiricist, the phenomenologist withholds all consent regarding the "claim" that these formulations make regarding reality. This is the sense in which Husserl understands phenomenological reflection to be "neutral" vis-à-vis the "performance" of the empiricistic formulations of experience.
6. This essentially untranslatable term is used by Husserl in this context to express the peculiar status of the lived-experience of what the tradition refers to under the rubric of "ideality": i.e., ideas, categories, concepts, etc. Such objects, according to him, are not *real* in the sense usually accorded to this term. Which is to say, they are not "real" in the sense of being physical, and therefore transcendent to the mind. However, since they can be discovered in a special kind of experience, which in contrast to *this* understanding of the "real" is decidedly *not real*, Husserl refers to their status as so-given as "*irreal*."
7. In addition to the tendency of the literature to conflate phenomenological reflection with reflection per se, there is an even stronger tendency in the literature to understand the "interiority" of Husserl's account of phenomenological reflection on the basis of the putatively "inner object" (i.e., consciousness) which, when perceptively apprehended, is understood to yield "inner perception" or "reflection." This is, of course, to understand reflection in terms of precisely the Lockean and Humean empirical tradition, and the Cartesian rational tradition, that Husserl most emphatically sought to critique. In my view, one of the most significant results of this critique is the working out of a conception of reflection whose "interiority" is *not* determined on the basis of the ontological opposition between "inner" and "outer" objects, but rather, on the basis of the phenomena peculiar to inner or immanent experience itself.

Again, as in the case of the conflation of phenomenological reflection with reflection per se, the understanding of the status of the interiority of phenomenological reflection along the lines of its traditional introspec-

tionist formulation stands in the way not only of adequately appropriating its decisive difference for Husserl from this tradition, but it also prevents the responsible discussion of Heidegger's allegations regarding the ontologically unoriginal, and ultimately phenomenally alienated, status of Husserl's concept of reflection. See for instance: Rudolf Bernet, *op. cit.*, pp. 142, 145, 146, 148; Timothy Stapleton, *Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

8. Husserl's account, or perhaps more accurately, "discovery," of the "ideation" of ideal objects does not have, in my view, any parallels within the philosophical tradition. Insofar as the tradition recognizes the possibility of apprehending "ideas" at all, such apprehension, and that which is apprehended therein, terminates with the grasping of the ideal. As such, the ideal, even when considered as it is "in itself," is always grasped in terms of its *a priori* function with respect to either the Being or the logical unity of the real. The "ideality" of ideal "categories" or "eide" emerges, then, always within the context of its relation to the non-ideal.

With Husserl's discovery of ideation, however, the traditional relation of the ideal to the real serves as the *point of departure* for the methodological variation of the ideal as it is *initially* uncovered vis-à-vis its *a priori* function in relation to the real. With this variation of the ideal, the invariant that functions to determine its status as ideal yields itself to the regard of phenomenological reflection. As such, this invariant is uncovered in terms of its *a priori* function vis-à-vis the ideal *and not the real*. It can be said, then, that "ideality" for Husserl emerges on the basis of "eidetic" distinctions and *not*, as it does for the tradition, on the basis of the contrast between the real and the "ideal."

9. So long as the natural thesis of the world-horizon remains unconsidered, and thus "in effect" with respect to the reductive purifications (vis-à-vis transcendent apperception) of lived-experiences by the regard of phenomenological reflections, the status of such reflections remains, strictly speaking, worldly or "mundane." Regarding the phenomenological uncovering of the natural thesis of the world horizon and its *transcendental* reduction, see § 19ff below.

## Chapter Two

1. This "priority" of the intentionality of logical significance, is of course, not a temporal priority. What is at issue for Husserl in the phenomenological analysis of logical acts is *not* some kind of construction or reconstruction of the *order* of knowing. Rather, the priority at issue here concerns that which renders logical acts "intelligible" as such. It is therefore within the context of the *essential structure* of logical acts, as methodologically unfolded via phenomenologically abstractive reflections, that Husserl speaks of an objectivity 'prior to all predicative thinking'. Put differently, inasmuch as

the objective significations manifested in logical acts comprise the "elements" as it were of predicative thinking, such significations do not have their source in the predication but rather *are presupposed* by it. In Husserl's view it is precisely the task of the phenomenological investigation of pure logic to account for these "presuppositions."

2. The importance of the distinction between "category" and the phenomenologically uncovered "essence" of the category that is presently under consideration cannot be underestimated. While both the category and its essence manifest non-sensuous phenomena, and thus share in the ideality of the *irreal*, they are in no sense the same. Rather, they are *eidetically* distinct, inasmuch as the ideality of categories manifests the ideal significance that renders any empirical object as such intelligible, while the phenomenologically uncovered essence of such categories manifests the ideal a priori that renders categories as such intelligible. Since this distinction is "eidetic," it follows that its philosophical appropriation requires that one be accomplished in the method of "essential seeing." It should be noted that once Husserl makes this distinction, categorial intuition (i.e., the non-sensuous perception of the categories of pure logic) and essential intuition (i.e., the seeing of the essence of any exemplary manifold, eg., the categories now under consideration) should not be identified or otherwise conflated with each other.

Unfortunately, much of the literature does not take note of this distinction and treats 'categories' and 'essences', and therefore 'categorial' and 'essential' intuition, indiscriminately. See for instance: Rudolf Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 141; Ray L. Hart, "Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Phenomenology," *Encounter*, 26 (1965), p. 319; Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorial," in *Continental Philosophy in America*, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, John Sallis, and Thomas Seebom, (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1983), p. 179; James C. Morrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 55; Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

3. By the 'material region' of objects, Husserl understands that which renders intelligible the various domains of "that which is," such as the physical, the psychological, the cultural, etc. By the 'individual particularity' of objects, he understands that which renders intelligible the individual objects belonging to a material region. Just as in the case of the categories of pure logic (which for Husserl are not "invented" by phenomenology but rather uncovered *vis-à-vis* their involvement in experiences already going on "prior" to its methodology), so too the material regions and individual peculiarities within these regions are uncovered on the basis of experiences already going on.
4. This will be discussed in detail below. See §§ 28, 30, 33. Cf. also the brief discussion in § 12 above.
5. It should be noted well that the "intuition" at issue here is precisely specified by Husserl in terms of the phenomenal essence of the lived-experiences of the intentionality of logical acts. As such, it is differentiated by Husserl from other phenomenal manifestations of intuition, e.g., the



intuition that characterizes the methodical regard of the intentionality of the reflections that uncover the intuitive essence of the epistemic essence of logical intentionality, or the essence of the intuition that is involved in the intentional essence of non-logical (non-significative) lived-experiences, etc. Given the phenomenological importance of the matters themselves involved in these essential differences, manifested by intuitive phenomena, their importance with respect to Husserl's account of the various essential differentiations of intentionality is not to be underestimated. Indeed, this is especially the case if clarity is to be achieved in view of the *Sachen selbst* with respect to Heidegger's critique of the ontological deficiency of "essential seeing." See §§ 49, 53, 92, 101 below.

6. What is at issue in Husserl's notion of "being character simpliciter" is the ontological *meaning* (*Sinn*) which he claims his method uncovers as the underlying presupposition of any regional ontology. Likewise, his notion of "protodoxic positing" concerns the basic "belief character" that he claims to uncover as the underlying experience always accompanying the 'being character simpliciter' presupposed by the regional ontologies. It perhaps bears repeating that what is at issue for Husserl in the phenomenological clarification of these essential structures is not any positive claim about either being or the belief in being, but rather the phenomenally uncovered meaning of such a claim and belief.
7. Husserl's phenomenological account of the "actional" and "non-actional" modalities of intentionality, and his terminological fixing of the differentiation emergent in this account by reserving the terms "act" and "cogito" to designate intentionality's actional mode, is perhaps the single most important distinction he makes in regard to this phenomenon. Not only is this distinction of importance in its own right with respect to his understanding of the "basic phenomenon" of phenomenology, but it is also of importance in terms of Heidegger's ontological account of the uncritical rootedness in the Cartesian cogito of Husserl's working out of this phenomenon. In view of the clarity and care with which Husserl attempts to forestall just such an understanding of *all* modes of intentionality in terms of "acts," it is perhaps surprising to nevertheless find a tendency in this direction in the literature. See for instance: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 36, 38, 46; Theodore Kisiel, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-185; James C. Morrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 50, 55; Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," in: *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 105, 109; Paul Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

Caputo, Gadamer and Mohanty are, in varying degrees, exceptions to this tendency. See: John Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'Hermeneutic' Phenomenology," *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 167; Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," *op. cit.*, pp. 131, 144-45, 156, 169 and *Truth and Method*, *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 249; J.N. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl

and Heidegger," op. cit., pp. 328, 331, "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality," in *Analecta Husserliana*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1970), Vol. I, p. 109, and "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," op. cit., p. 111.

### Chapter Three

1. The apparent absurdity of a 'qualified' absolute is mitigated by attending to the non-positional, or non-ontological (in the sense specified by Husserl's phenomenological clarifications), 'matters themselves' involved in Husserl's account of the problematic at issue. What is at issue in the designation 'absolute' is not the posited status of entities or the Being of entities; rather, the issue is the mode of givenness, i.e., the phenomenal manifestation, of that which is uncovered by the intentionality of pure phenomenology's methodological reflections. This claim becomes controversial when it is submitted to Heidegger's phenomenologically ontological critique, since it is his contention that this 'non-positional mode of givenness' is nevertheless phenomenally determined by an understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*) that remains concealed in Husserl's thinking. See §§ 51-54 below for a discussion of Heidegger's critique, and §§ 101-107 for my assessment of its merits.
2. The failure to attend to these phenomenal issues involved in Husserl's account of "constitution," leads to the importation into his formulation of the problematic the foreign issue, of whether the constituting capacity of consciousness "creates" the object and or the object's intelligibility. However, what is clearly at issue for Husserl is not a productive act on the part of consciousness, but rather, *the reflective unfolding of meaning or intelligibility already in some sense there in the prephenomenal experience, and as such (i.e., as "prephenomenal") not thematically accounted for.* The task of accounting for this "pregiven" meaning, such that, the manner in which that which is given in experience is manifested in terms of its intelligibility as such, is what is at issue then for Husserl under the heading of "problems of constitution." For the homologies of Husserl's phenomenologically reflective formulation of this task and Plato's account of Socratic *anamnesis*, see my article "On the Paradoxical Inception and Motivation of Transcendental Philosophy in Plato and Husserl," in *Man and World*, 24, (1991), pp. 27-47.
3. Hereafter in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, all references to "essences" are to the uncovering of "constitutional essences" within the psychologically reduced methodological context discussed above.
4. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marly Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952). English translation by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomeno-*

*logical Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989).

5. In the sense of 'positing' explicated above.
6. In the sense of 'positum' explicated above.
7. Viewed within the context of the history of philosophy, Husserl's phenomenological uncovering of the horizon of the world amounts to a novel discovery. Two considerations must be firmly borne in mind in order to appreciate the novelty of this discovery. The first concerns the fact that what is meant by this term is most emphatically *not* the totality of known or existing objects of nature (beings, *ta onta*, in the broadest conceivable sense), and nor the formal unity and/or structure of interconnection among "worldly" (in this sense) objects. Indeed, it is only when the posited sense of these notions of the world are phenomenologically clarified that the 'world-horizon', in the sense here at issue, can even become a philosophical issue. And it is precisely this state of affairs that leads to the second consideration, viz., that philosophical *access* to the problem domain designated by the term "world-horizon," has as its indispensable prerequisite the phenomenologically psychological reduction and clarification of pure (again in the phenomenologically psychological sense here at issue) consciousness. Inasmuch as the phenomenal status of the world figures prominently in Heidegger's ontological critique of Husserl's account of intentionality (see §§ 62, 82-83 below), this status, and access to this status, deserves careful consideration.

#### Chapter Four

1. Husserl's terminological distinction between "temporality" (*Zeitlichkeit*) and the "consciousness of time" (*Zeitbewußtsein*), and the phenomenal basis upon which he makes this distinction, is crucial for the understanding of his phenomenological account of the essence of time. Indeed, it is fundamental in its own right, with respect to gaining philosophical access to the multidimensionality of the phenomenon of time, which his analyses claim to uncover with respect to the correlation (and non-equivalence) between the *Sinn* of time and the consciousness of this *Sinn*. But it is also of decisive importance with respect to Heidegger's phenomenological critique of the ontological deficiency of Husserl's analyses of time, and the issue of the adequacy of this critique. See especially §§ 81-82, §§ 100-101 below.
2. What is at issue in Husserl's description here of the regard of the pure ego that belongs to an endless stream of lived-experiences which cannot begin and end, is emphatically not any kind of metaphysical postulate or argument. Which is to say, that the issue for Husserl does not involve the substantiality of the ego and its resultant immortality. Rather, requisite for philosophical access to what is at stake here, is attending to the methodological context of the phenomenological reduction and the project of accounting for the essence of lived-experiences within the rubric of the

'principle of principles'. Therefore this claim of Husserl's is eminently *experiential*. As such, the issue is one of whether it is possible to experience consciousness of the cessation of time. It is Husserl's claim that any such experiential candidate purporting to manifest such an experience, would yield, *in accord with the essence of experience*, a temporal horizon as the phenomenal condition of the possibility for such an experience. The relation of this account of the experiential *Sinn* of time, and the ontological problematic of the finitude of time that emerges in Heidegger's phenomenological account of time, will be addressed in § 101 below.

3. Husserl's distinction between the succession and simultaneity of the essence of time, will figure prominently in the consideration of Heidegger's discussion of the lack of ontological radicality of Husserl's phenomenology of time. See § 101 below.
4. See note 6, Chapter Two above.
5. The intentional parallelism, between the psychologically pure ego and the transcendental ego, is not phenomenally inconsistent with the claim that the transcendental for Husserl is *not* the analogue of the psychological (see § 28 above). This is the case, because what is at issue in this parallelism, is not any kind of "proportionality" or similarity between the intentionality of the psychological ego and the transcendental ego. Rather, the issue is one of the non-relational constitution of the *Sinn* 'psychological ego' in the evidence uncovered qua transcendental ego. This is to say, that the 'psychologically pure ego' *refers* to the 'transcendental ego' as the source of its mundane *Sinn*. Hence, what is at issue is most emphatically not the *relation* between two distinct entities.

## PART TWO

### Introduction

1. My rationale for translating *Sein* as "Being" is as follows: It allows the English to consistently reflect, with the use of different terms, Heidegger's German usage of "*Sein*" and "*Seiendes*." Thus *Sein* can be rendered into English as "Being" or "to be," thereby differentiating it (and I believe this differentiation reflects fairly consistently Heidegger's own usage) from *Seiendes* as "entity." I find that the convention of translating *Sein* as "being" and *Seiendes* as "beings" has two disadvantages. On the one hand, it must render both *Sein* and *sein* as "being" on those occasions where "existing" would be inappropriate to Heidegger's usage of *sein*. On the other hand, by translating *Seiendes* with the English plural "beings," Heidegger's use of *Seiendes* and *Seienden* cannot be reflected in the English, while the translation of these two words with "entity" and "entities" is able to reflect the German singular and plural. And I am not so much bothered by the concern that the capital "B" of "Being" will

unwittingly lead to an unwarranted tendency to hypostatize it, since in the texts that I will be dealing with Heidegger clearly articulates his understanding that what is at issue with respect to Being is always its showing itself from itself as *das Sein des Seienden*. See especially §§ 45, 50-51 below.

2. See note 1 above.
3. I have settled on the English "composition," in an effort to translate *Verfassung* in its various usages employed by Heidegger, e.g., *Grundverfassung*, *Seinsverfassung*, *Wesensverfassung*. This rendering has the advantage of being able to reflect in the English Heidegger's German use of *Konstitution* and *Bedingung*, by translating the former with "constitution" and the latter with "condition."

### Chapter Five

1. The *Gegenständen* (objects) at issue here are of course not understood by Heidegger in terms of the traditional *Vorhandensein* (being-present-at-hand) of entities, which he will exhibit in terms of what he takes to be their original perceptual or epistemological grasping (*erfassen*). Thus Heidegger's references to either the 'Being of entities' or 'the meaning of Being as such', as the "thematic object" (*BT*, 49/27) of his investigation, are potentially misleading if his fundamental concern with "reawakening" an understanding for the meaning of the question about the meaning of Being, which guides his characterization of the derivative status of the traditional understanding of 'objects' (in terms of their *Vorhandensein*), is not attended to.
2. Heidegger's account here of the shift in the 'cognizant seeking (*Suchen*)' involved in any questioning, from a 'seeking for an entity with regard to the that and how of its being', to one which 'can become an investigating' that unfolds the character of that which is questioned about, is crucial for philosophically appropriating his understanding of the phenomenological task of fundamental ontology. This is the case, since the latter (as will become apparent below) is understood by Heidegger *not* simply in terms of a seeking for the 'that' and 'how' of entities, but rather, *in terms of the investigation into the character or structure of the 'that' and 'how' of entities*.

To my knowledge, there has not been any reference to this distinction, let alone discussion of its significance, in the literature. See for instance: Rudolf Bernet, "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being," *op. cit.*; John C. Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'Hermeneutic' Phenomenology," *op. cit.* and "The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology," in *Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Martin Heidegger*, ed. John Sallis, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), pp. 84-105; Frederick Elliston, "Phenomenology Reinterpreted: From Husserl to Heidegger," *op. cit.*; Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," *op. cit.*, "The Phenomenological Movement," *op. cit.*,

- Truth and Method*, op. cit.; Ray Hart, "Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Phenomenology," op. cit.; Friedrich-Wilhelm von-Herrmann, op. cit.; Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorical," op. cit.; J.N. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger," op. cit., "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," op. cit.; James C. Morrison, "Husserl and Heidegger: The Parting of the Ways," op. cit.; Paul Ricoeur, "The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in the Philosophy of Heidegger," in *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*, ed. Manfred S. Frings, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 62-75, "Existence and Hermeneutics," op. cit., "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," op. cit., and "The Task of Hermeneutics," op. cit.; Richard Schacht, op. cit.; Francis F. Seeburger, "Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reduction," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 36, (Dec. 1975), pp. 212-221; Timothy J. Stapleton, *Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning*, op. cit.
3. The illumination of the *Faktum* of this initially 'average and vague understanding of Being', by the 'developed concept of Being', is characterized in Heidegger's lecture course given in the Summer of 1927 (referred to below as *BP*), in terms of the "free projection" towards "Being and structures of Being," which guides the thematization of this initial *Faktum*. This is discussed in detail below in § 46.
  4. It is interesting to note here that Heidegger's ontological project involves not only the problem of securing philosophical access to Being and its meaning, but that from out of this very project the problem of securing access to an entity, viz., *Dasein*, also emerges as problematic. Indeed, the propaedeutic function of fundamental ontology, and its analytic of existence, involves precisely the issue of unfolding this entity 'in itself and from itself'—which is to say, of securing philosophical access to it. The failure to attend to the multidimensionality of Heidegger's working out of the project of ontology results in the misguided attempt to understand the analysis of *Dasein* within the context of 'philosophical anthropology'. In other words, proper attention to Heidegger's account of his ontological project should make it clear that he is interested in 'human being' *only insofar as its mode of being (existence) is involved in illuminating Being and its meaning*.
  5. Heidegger's distinction between the 'preliminary concept' and 'idea' of phenomenology, and the phenomenologically methodological and ontological implications of this distinction, has been almost entirely ignored by the literature. Even usually careful readers such as Gadamer and von Herrmann pass over this distinction in silence.
  6. *Rede* should not be identified all too easily with speaking, discourse and the like. Therefore, to the extent that my discussion and its context allow, I leave the word "*Rede*" untranslated in the text.
  7. The relevance of securing genuine access to the manifestation of entities in the mode of the 'ordinary concept of phenomenon', in order to likewise secure genuine access to the manifestation of the Being of entities in the

mode of the 'phenomenological concept of phenomenon', is often missed in the literature. Hence, in such cases, the *phenomenological* problematic of attaining the proper access to Dasein, qua its manifestation as an 'ordinary phenomenon', in order to secure access to the manifestation of Being in the mode of the 'phenomenological concept of phenomenon', is also missed. The results of this omission, apart from the issue of adequately appropriating the phenomenological formulation of Heidegger's thought, present serious problems with respect to the responsible consideration of Heidegger's 'phenomenological' critique of the status of intentionality in Husserl. This is the case, since the basis of this critique is to be found in his claim that Husserl has not secured sufficiently radical access to the intentional entity (i.e., in terms of its manifestation as an ordinary phenomenon) and that, *therefore*, access to the phenomenon of the intentional Being of this entity is precluded. (See §§ 51-52 below)

For instance, according to Bernet, "The entity considered in the 'how of its being intended' is not something other than the 'entity-in-itself'; rather, it is precisely this entity insofar as it is interrogated in its intentional appearing according to its mode of being" (op. cit., p. 139). Here and elsewhere in Bernet's discussion there is *no mention* of *access* to the entity, and hence to its 'mode of being', as something *that is an issue for phenomenology*. Which is to say, Bernet's discussion leaves entirely out of account the 'hermeneutical' context of Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology.

Also, Caputo writes: "The being [entity] becomes a phenomenon for Heidegger only when we grasp it in its Being. The simple and determinate grasp of a particular being [entity] is nothing phenomenological, but a mere naivete of natural common sense" ("The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology," op. cit., p. 89).

And in Morrison: "Being, then, is the proper theme (*Sache*) of phenomenon of phenomenology . . . This contrasts radically with Husserl. For him, the phenomena of phenomenology are *beings* [entities]" (op. cit., p. 52).

## Chapter Six

1. "Reell" is another essentially untranslatable term. It designates an *intrinsic belonging together* of the terms of a phenomenal relation which, while 'actual', is decidedly not "real" in the physical sense
2. This is to say, instead of 'going along with' the thematic meaning of the concrete intention qua its non-grasping of its object, the act of this non-grasping is *itself* thematically grasped (and *ipso facto* treated 'immanently').
3. The implications of Heidegger's account of Husserl's understanding of the phenomenological ἐποχή, especially his characterizations of what is phenomenally at issue with respect to 'reflection' and the bracketing of the

- "material world," both of which *do not* take into account Husserl's distinction between phenomenally psychological and transcendental reflection, and the relation of each to the phenomenon of the world (see §§ 30ff. above), will be discussed in detail below (see §§ 92, 101).
4. Heidegger's account of the meaning of the eidetic reduction for Husserl, in terms of the "suspension" of the individual *such that concrete individual is disregarded*, is crucial for the working out of his ontological critique of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality. Since this critique is explicitly presented by him as an "immanent critique," the adequacy of this understanding of Husserl's move to the eidetic, vis-à-vis Husserl's understanding of this move as *not* disregarding, but bringing into phenomenal relief, the reference to the essential implicit in the very concreteness of the individual (see §19 above), will have to be carefully considered (see §§ 92, 101 below).
  5. Cf. also *BP*, p. 65/92.
  6. Parvis Emad, *Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Values: His Critique of Intentionality*, (Glen Ellyn: Torey Press, 1981), p. 17.
  7. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
  8. The failure to note the phenomenal context of Heidegger's apparent equation here of intentionality and transcendence can lead to the mistaken conclusion, in my view, that in the *BP* he starts from a "contrary claim" ("Transcendence and the Overcoming of Values: Heidegger's Critique of Scheler," Review of Emad's *Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Values* by Robert Bernasconi, in *Research in Phenomenology*, XIV, 1984, pp. 259-267) than in the *MFL*, where "transcendence . . . must never be identified and equated with intentionality" (*MFL*, p. 168/215). That there is no contrariety expressed in these *seemingly* opposing statements, can be seen, when the differing phenomenal statuses of the 'intentionality' at issue for Heidegger in each of these statements is attended to. In the *BP*, the "natural meaning" (*MFL* p. 134/168 and § 58 above) of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has been liberated from the unwarranted tendency to conceive it in terms of theoretical constructions, is at issue in Heidegger's statement. While in the *MFL*, precisely the "narrowed conception" (*MFL*, p. 134/168) of its theoretical construction is the issue of his statement.

### Chapter Seven

1. Emad, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
2. *Ibid.*
3. The issue of whether Heidegger's critique of Husserl's notion of *Wesensschau* is sufficiently attendant to the distinctions made by Husserl, regarding the phenomenal *non-equivalence* of categorical intuition and essential seeing per se (see especially §§ 15-20 above), will be discussed in detail below (see § 101).
4. Cf. *BT*, p. 186/146 and § 66 above.



5. Heidegger apparently postponed this analysis indefinitely. All of his discussions of the hermeneutical character of understanding in the second half of *BT* appeal, for their phenomenal substantiation, to these analyses. For example, the discussion of the 'hermeneutical situation' of ontological investigation in § 45 refers explicitly to § 32. And I am not aware of any phenomenological analysis, of the understanding's projective understanding of the 'for-the-sake-of-which', in any of the published lectures courses which preceded or followed *BT*.
6. See § 41 above; cf. also *MFL*, p. 140/177.
7. In my view, it is within the context of this complex relationship between the ontological need for phenomenology's methodological mediation, and the ontological 'insight' required by such a method if it is to be a genuine method, that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's own capacity-for-being works out the problem of attesting (*Bezeugung*) Dasein's own existentiell capacity-for-being in the second half of *BT*.
8. Emad, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
12. *Ibid.*
13. I am not familiar with any discussion in the literature of the methodical and/or ontological significance of these "two" hermeneutical circles for Heidegger's phenomenological formulation of the project of fundamental ontology. Both of these issues will be considered in detail below (§§ 105-106) in my thematized discussion of the Husserlian and Heideggerian 'prerogatives'.

### Chapter Eight

1. Cf. Emad, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24, where it is persuasively argued that Heidegger's footnote in § 69b refers to § 69c and *not* the unwritten portion of *BT*.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
3. Cf. § 44 above.
4. Emad, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-3.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
6. *Ibid.*
7. "Prior" here refers of course to the phenomenal condition of 'always already being there', and not to any sequential, measured or otherwise, antecedence.

## PART THREE

### Introduction

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., p. 145.
2. This is not to suggest however, that the problem of history is not relevant to phenomenology. It is, of course relevant, although for reasons rooted in the nature of the problematic of my study the phenomenological treatment of history in either Husserl or Heidegger lies outside of its scope. My rationale for mentioning "history" at all here is simply to signal the intention of the present study to steer clear of the disturbing 'historical reductionism' which often creeps into, and ultimately informs, the putative philosophical basis for arbitrating philosophical controversies.

### Chapter Nine

1. Cf., Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann's *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*, op. cit., p. 8, where, in reference to § 7 of *BT*, he comments that "whoever can see what lies between the lines and can hear the effect of Heidegger's doubtless deliberate *ambiguity*, in which he on the one hand speaks in accord with Husserl's meaning, while on the other hand speaks (using the same words) in critical contrast to this meaning, will realize how Heidegger extracts a transformed understanding of the phenomenological method with this penetrating coming to terms with it, despite the connection of his discussion with Husserl's idea of phenomenology" (my translation).
2. Dorian Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, op. cit., p. 25.

### Chapter Ten

1. Despite its grammatical awkwardness, the expression "the essence intentionality" is the only way to accurately render what is phenomenally at issue here. This is the case, since the perhaps grammatically preferred expression "the essence of intentionality," would suggest that what is at issue is intentionality's "essence," whereas phenomenally it is precisely intentionality's status *as an essence* that is at issue.
2. See § 90 above.
3. This view of Heidegger's is consistently echoed in the literature. See for instance: Rudolf Bernet, op. cit., p. 149; John D. Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'Hermeneutic' Phenomenology," op. cit., p. 176-77; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, op. cit., p. 38-9; James C. Morrison, op. cit., pp. 50, 56; Timothy Stapleton, op. cit., pp. 108-9, 116.

4. Again, the grammatically awkward expression "of world" in this sentence, or, in the following sentence the expression "phenomenon world," is phenomenally the more accurate way of expressing what is at issue here, than the grammatically preferred expressions "of *the* world" and "phenomenon *of the* world." This is the case with the expression "*the* world," since this would suggest the world's existential independence from Dasein, which is of course contrary to the phenomenal state of affairs manifest by Dasein qua 'being-in-the-world'. And likewise, the expression "phenomenon *of the* world" would suggest that in addition to the *world as phenomenon* another world, to which the world as phenomenon is related, is somehow involved. And this again is of course precisely *not* what is phenomenally at issue.
5. See Chapter One, note 7, regarding the meaning of the term *irreal*.
6. See § 29 above.
7. The term "epistemic," as it is used here and in what follows, is to be sharply differentiated from the modern concept of "epistemology." This is the case since what is "epistemically" at issue, from the purview of the Husserlian formulation of phenomenology, is most decidedly *not* knowledge of reality or 'that which is'. Rather, in direct contrast with the modern understanding of epistemology, the 'epistemic' refers to the *Sinn* of reality, or 'that which is', in such a manner as to encompass and ground, at once, the terms of the relation between knowledge and reality as conceived by the modern understanding of epistemology.
8. See § 39 above.
9. Bernet admits as much when he discusses how Heidegger's "interest in traditional ontology serves as a guide for the elaboration of a properly phenomenological ontology" (Bernet, *op. cit.*, p. 139). However, since Bernet basically finds Heidegger's ontological considerations in this regard to be convincing, the methodological issue that I am raising here is not addressed by him.
10. See § 92 above.

## PART FOUR

### Introduction

1. Or perhaps, considering the fact that Heidegger's lecture courses treating the problem of intentionality were not yet published, were unable to focus on this issue.
2. Stapleton, *op. cit.*

### Chapter Eleven

1. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," op. cit., p. 111.
2. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., p. 156.
3. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," op. cit., p. 59; cf., "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., pp. 131ff.
4. Ibid; Cf. *Truth and Method*, op. cit., p. 249
5. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, op. cit., p. 244.
6. Cf. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," op. cit., p. 112.
7. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," op. cit., p. 61.
8. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., p. 131/106.
9. Cf., my discussion of the issue of immanence in Heidegger above in § 107.
10. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," op. cit., p. 61.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 62.
15. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., p. 168.
16. Ibid., p. 170.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 171.
20. Ibid., p. 169.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 170.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 169.
25. Ibid., p. 170.
26. Regarding this distinction see §§ 42, 45, 70 above.
27. See § 39 above.
28. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," op. cit., p. 62.
29. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," op. cit., p. 112.

### Chapter Twelve

1. Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," op. cit., p. 101.
2. Ibid., p. 114.
3. Ibid., p. 101.
4. Ibid., p. 105.
5. Ibid.
6. See § 18ff. above.
7. Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," op. cit., p. 115.
8. Ibid., p. 104.
9. Ibid.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
11. See § 9 and § 11 above.
12. See §§ 10-11 above.
13. Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," *op. cit.*, p. 104.
14. See §§ 22-23 above.
15. See § 28 above.
16. Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," *op. cit.*, p. 103.
17. See §§ 33, 92, 97 above.
18. See § 33 above.
19. Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," *op. cit.*, p. 103.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
21. See §§ 7, 87, 101 above.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
28. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," *op. cit.*, p. 168.
29. *Ibid.*
30. See §§ 45, 70, 105-106 above.
31. See §§ 45, 67-70 above.
32. Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," *op. cit.*, p. 126.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account*, (Oxford and Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 21.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

### Chapter Thirteen

1. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
2. Mohanty, "Transcendental Phenomenology and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 115.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 113; cf. *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
6. *Ibid.*, 116.
7. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation between Husserl and Heidegger," *op. cit.*, p. 331; cf. "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 115.
8. Mohanty, "Transcendental Phenomenology and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 109.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
10. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation between Husserl and Heidegger," *op. cit.*, p. 328; cf., "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 109.
11. See §§ 18, 35 above.
12. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 109.
13. See §§ 92, 101, 106 above.
14. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger," *op. cit.*, p. 328.
15. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 109; See also Gadamer's agreement on this, discussed in § 110 above.
16. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
17. See § 51 above.
18. See §§ 50-51 above.
19. See §§ 50, 83, 100 above.
20. See §§ 45, 70 above.
21. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
22. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 117.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Mohanty, "The Destiny of Transcendental Philosophy," in *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 218.
28. Mohanty, "Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account," *op. cit.*, p. 53.
29. Mohanty, "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," *op. cit.*, p. 117.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
32. See §§ 105-106 above.
33. See §§ 89, 92 above.
34. See §§ 105-106 above.

#### Chapter Fourteen

1. Crowell, "Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article," *op. cit.*, p. 503.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 502.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 509.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 507.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 516.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 516-17.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 517.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 518n.
13. See § 93 above.
14. See § 90 above.
15. Crowell, *op. cit.*, p. 505.
16. See § 108 above.
17. Crowell, *op. cit.*, p. 517.
18. See §§ 105-107 and the discussion of Gadamer's account of the Husserl-Heidegger relationship above.
19. And this is suggested in Crowell's analysis, without however, so far as I can tell, any discussion of what it is that is need of revision.
20. Crowell, *op. cit.*, p. 510.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 508.
22. See §§ 48-54.
23. Crowell, *op. cit.*, p. 514.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 516-17.
25. See § 102 above.

### Chapter Fifteen

1. Landgrebe, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
7. Landgrebe, "The Problem Posed by the Transcendental Science of the A Priori of the Life-World," in *A priori and World*, ed. and trans. by William McKenna, Robert M. Harlan and Laurence E. Winters, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 170.
8. Landgrebe, "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism," *op. cit.*, p. 87.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-05.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 101
25. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
46. *Ibid.*; Cf. Heidegger's comments on his difficulties with Husserl's draft of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* Article: "[t]hat which makes up the place of the transcendental . . . raises precisely the problem: what is the mode of being of the entity in which the 'world' is constituted?" (*PP*, p. 601).
47. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
48. See § 35 above.
49. See § 8 above.
50. See §§ 8 and 12 above.
51. See §§ 9 and 13 above.
52. See § 12 above.
53. And mindful of the atemporal status evident in the reflected upon qua ideal meanings, it need not be pointed out that the eidetic reduction and consequent uncovering of the intentionality of the latter, would yield "intentional objects" that *are not* essentially related to temporal objects.
53. See § 29 above.
54. This synopsis of Husserl's phenomenological account of time, is based on §§ 29-32 above
55. See § 35 above.



56. See § 32 above.

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BURT C. HOPKINS

## Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger

### The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology

This book reassesses the phenomenological 'controversy' between Husserl and Heidegger over the proper status of the phenomenon of intentionality. It seeks to determine whether Heidegger's hermeneutical critique of intentionality is sensitive to Husserl's reflective account of its '*Sachen selbst*'. Hopkins argues that Heidegger's critique is directed toward the 'cogito' modality of intentionality, and therefore, passes over its 'non-actional', or 'horizontal', dimension in Husserl's phenomenology. As a result of this, he concludes that Heidegger misinterprets Husserl's account of the intentional 'immanence' exhibited by phenomenological reflection.

On the basis of these findings, Hopkins suggests that the phenomenological methodology, operative in the so-called hermeneutic critique of transcendental consciousness, itself involves transcendental 'presuppositions' that are most appropriately characterized in terms of intentional, and reflective, phenomena.