

CHAPTER THREE

The New Military Urbanism

Above all, [the United States' new low-intensity war culture] is self-perpetuating and self-replicating; it normalizes and naturalizes a state of war. Peace is not the end of war culture. At its core, war culture seeks a postponement of peacetime 'for the duration'; it seeks an adjustment to a state of permanent war.¹

At the core of this book's argument is the idea that new military ideologies of permanent and boundless war are radically intensifying the militarization of urban life. The process is far from new: it simply adds contemporary twists to continual transformations – political, cultural and economic – which together serve to normalize war itself as well as the preparations for war.² Indeed, in many cases, the transformations associated with the new military urbanism merely extend and revivify the urban militarization, securitization, Manichean thinking, and fear-mongering that were a central feature of, notably, the Cold War but also of earlier wars.

Military sociologists broadly categorize such processes as 'militarization'. Michael Geyer defines it as 'the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence'.³ Such a process, inevitably, is complex and multidimensional, though its components are as old as war itself. As we saw in the previous chapter, these invariably involve the social construction of a conceptual division between the inside and the outside of a nation or other geographic area, and the orchestrated demonization of enemies and enemy places beyond the boundaries of inside. Militarization also involve the normalization of military paradigms of thought, action and policy; efforts at the aggressive disciplining of bodies, places and identities deemed not to befit masculinized (and interconnected) notions of nation, citizenship or body; and the deployment of a wide range of propaganda which romanticizes or sanitizes violence as a means of righteous revenge or the achievement of some God-given purpose. Above all, militarization and war organizes

1 Deer, 'The Ends of War', 1.

2 Rachel Woodward, 'From Military Geography to Militarism's Geographies: Disciplinary Engagements with the Geographies of Militarism and Military Activities', *Progress in Human Geography* 29: 6, 2005, 718–40.

3 Michael Geyer, 'The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945', in John Gillis, ed., *The Militarization of the Western World*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989, 79.

the 'creative destruction' of inherited geographies, political economies, technologies and cultures.

So, what exactly is new about the 'new military urbanism'? How is it different from the intense militarization experienced by the cities of, say, the Cold War or total war? I shall point to seven related trends which, I argue, introduce palpably new dimensions to the contemporary militarization of urban life.

RURAL SOLDIERS, URBAN WAR

First, new relationships are emerging between nations, soldiers and citizens, which have major implications for the contemporary urbanization of warfare. Deborah Cowen has pointed out that the professionalized, high-tech militaries of the West are now often 'made up overwhelmingly of rural soldiers'.⁴ Drawing on Gramsci, she argues that this 'suggests that a political-geographic rift had emerged between urbanism and cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and ruralism and nationalism on the other.'

Thus, writes Cowen, 'rural areas have become the heartland of militarism and "authentic" patriotism' in many Western nations. Grounded in the long-standing naturalization of nations which appeal to 'a kind of bucolic territorial authenticity' based on whiteness, the conservative politics of rural areas are, as we have seen, frequently based on hatred or suspicion towards the perceived horrors or the racial, cosmopolitan and multicultural impurities and threats posed by cities. In both the US and Canada, Cowen argues, a 'powerful cultural discourse of the rural ideal identifies the rural as the authentic space of patriotic militarism'. The rural is thus widely understood by military recruiters 'to have both the economic motivations for mass enlistment coupled with small-town culture of patriotic nationalism'. Indeed, despite the US being one of the most urbanized nations on Earth, rural soldiers now dominate its military. Between 2003 and 2004, '47.6 per cent of all soldiers killed in action during Operation Enduring Freedom and 44.3 per cent of those killed in action during Operation Iraqi Freedom through February 5, 2004, were from communities with populations under 20,000.'

Yet these largely ruralized Western militaries must now deploy primarily to cities, both domestic and foreign. Given that right-wing media, especially in

4 Deborah Cowen, 'National Soldiers and the War on Cities', *Theory and Event* 10: 2, 2007.

the US, construct cities in general, in Steve Macek's words, as places of 'the savage urban other',⁵ and given the anti-urban character of military cultures, it seems likely that many recruits are easily socialized to see all urbanized places as intrinsically foreign, threatening and dangerous, wherever they may be. In other words, enemy places. Cowen cites many military blogs where 'positive statements about rural patriotism are interspersed with and inextricable from others that construct the city as a place of degeneration and dependency'.⁶

Given that Western militaries deploy from overwhelmingly exurban and rural bases, the widespread discourse that cities must be 'targeted' and 'pacified' through military power – whose exurban and rural heartland is the normalized space of 'authentic' nationalism – is likely to gain added force from the increasingly rural make-up of recruits. Domestic and foreign cities thus become Others, to be addressed and penetrated from afar – from the authentic spaces where military personnel are based and, increasingly, raised.

With urban deployment abroad and at home generally targeting (and often abusing) black or brown bodies, the racialization of urban targeting becomes both clear and contradictory. Even though the US military is now the largest employer of African-Americans, for instance, urban military exercises predominantly target African-American urban neighbourhoods. Following one such exercise in the housing projects of Philadelphia and Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1999, one angry resident complained that 'they wouldn't have done it if this wasn't a Black community'.⁷

TRACKING: CITIZEN–CONSUMER–SOLDIER

Contemporary militarization runs on an economy of *desire* as well as an economy of fear.⁸

The second trend is the unprecedented extent to which the new military urbanism fuses and blurs civilian and military applications of the technologies for control, surveillance, communications, simulation and targeting. This is hardly surprising, given that control technologies originally intended for military use have become fundamental to virtually all acts of urban life and consumption in advanced industrial cities, and that

5 Macek: *Urban Nightmares*, Chapter 3.

6 Cowen, 'National Soldiers'.

7 Ibid.

8 Marieke de Goede, 'Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination', *Security Dialogue* 39: 2/3, 168.

commercial modifications of such technologies are, in turn, being widely reappropriated by militaries.

Their fortifications long forgotten, erased, or turned into tourist sites, contemporary cities are now, in Paul Virilio's words, 'overexposed' to a wide range of ambient, mobile and transnational security threats.⁹ Among these threats are mobile pathogens, malign computer code, financial crashes, 'illegal' migration, transnational terrorism, state infrastructural warfare, and the environmental extremes triggered by climate change.

The permeability of contemporary cities to transnational circulation means that systems of (attempted) electronic control – expanded to match the transnational geographies of such circulation – become the new strategic architectures of city life. These increasingly supplant, without completely replacing, the confined architectures or 'disciplinary spaces' – prisons, schools, clinics, factories, workhouses, barracks – noted by Michel Foucault. At such sites in eighteenth and nineteenth century Western cities, panoptic social control operated through the direct supervisory gaze of humans.

By contrast, argued French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, because networked electronic control and surveillance devices are now distributed throughout society, everyday urban life is now modulated by a sense of ever-present tracking, scrutiny, and electronic calculation. Contemporary societies, he said, are 'societies of control'.¹⁰ The surveillance devices build profiles, analyse patterns of behaviour and mobility, and increasingly – because memory is now digitized – never forget.¹¹ Thus, an individual's movements between different spaces and sites within cities or nations often entails a parallel movement of what sociologists call the 'data subject' or 'statistical person' – the package of electronic tracks and histories amassed as a means of judging the individual's legitimacy, rights, profitability, security or degree of threat. The attempted social control increasingly works through complex technological systems stretched across both temporal and geographical zones. These constitute a working background, a ubiquitous computerised matrix of ever more interlinked devices: ATM cards and financial databases; GPS transponders, bar codes, and chains of global satellites; radio-frequency chips and biometric identifiers; mobile computers, phones and e-commerce sites; and an extending universe of sensors built into streets, homes, cars, infrastructures and even bodies.

Increasingly, then, behind every social moment operates a vast array of computerized calculations dispersed through a global matrix of linked

9 Paul Virilio, *The Lost Dimension*, San Francisco: Semiotext(e), 1991, Chapter 1.

10 Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control', *October* 59, 1992, 3–7.

11 Ibid.

computers and computerized devices. Databases communicate and their content is continuously mined across a diversity sources, scales and sites by advanced computer algorithms that assess a commensurate diversity of bodies, transactions, and movements. Crucially, the volume of data in this 'calculative background' is so vast that only automated algorithms can deem what or who is considered normal and thus deserving of protection, and what or who is considered abnormal and thus a malign threat to be targeted.

Such control technologies increasingly blur into the background of urban environments, urban infrastructures and urban life. Layered over and through everyday urban landscapes, bringing into being radically new styles of movement, interaction, consumption and politics, in a sense they *become* the city. Examples include new means of mobility (congestion charging, smart highways, Easyjet-style air travel), customized consumption (personalized Amazon.com pages) and 'swarming' social movements (social networking, smart and flash mobs).

Discussions about 'homeland security' and the high-tech transformation of war emphasize the need to use some of those very techniques and technologies – high-tech surveillance, data-mining, computerized algorithms – to try to continually track, identify and target threatening Others within the mass of clutter presented by our rapidly urbanizing and increasingly mobile world. The technological architectures of consumption and mobility thus merge into those used to organize and prosecute a full spectrum of political violence, from profiling to killing. And the multiple links between cities and post-Second World War military history suggest that this connection should not surprise us. As Gerfried Stocker notes, 'there is no sphere of civilian life in which the saying "war is the father of all things" has such unchallenged validity as it does in the field of digital information technology'.¹²

Moreover, the new military urbanism has been the foundry of the new control technologies. After the Second World War, a constellation of military strategies known as C3I – command, control, communications, and information – dominated the military's approach to war-fighting and strategic deterrence, and also colonized the minutiae of modernizing urban life, especially in Western nations. 'No part of the world went untouched by C3I', Ryan Bishop writes, 'And it delineates the organizational, economic, technological and spatial systems that derive from, rely on, and perpetuate military strategy'.¹³

¹² Gerfried Stocker, 'InfoWar', in Gerfried Stocker and C. Schopf, eds, *Ars Electronica 98: Infowar*, Springer-Verlag Telos, 1998.

¹³ Ryan Bishop, "'The Vertical Order Has Come to an End": The Insignia of the Military C3I and Urbanism in Global Networks', in Ryan Bishop, John Phillips and Yeo Wei Wei eds, *Beyond Description: Space, History, Singapore*, London: Routledge, 2004, 61.

Since the start of the Cold War, for example, it has been common for the US to devote 80 per cent of all government expenditures on technological research and development to 'defence'.¹⁴ Technologies such as the Internet, virtual reality, jet travel, data-mining, closed-circuit TV, rocketry, remote control, microwaves, radar, global positioning, networked computers, wireless communications, satellite surveillance, containerization and logistics – which now collectively facilitate daily urban life – were all forged in the latter half of the twentieth century as part of the elaboration of systems of military control.

Viewed thus, 'this "insignia of the military" . . . manifests itself in a myriad of ways in global urban sites . . . The global city would not be a global city, as we have come to understand the phenomenon, without being deeply embedded in these processes'.¹⁵ Certainly the relationship between commercial and military control and information technologies has always been a complex two-way affair, but one must keep in mind that the technological architectures of contemporary life and the imperial geographies of empire converge within the new military urbanism.

In today's professional Western militaries, relatively small numbers of recruits are deployed, injured or killed in the new imperial wars. Citizens of the homelands are only rarely exposed to true acts of (terrorist) violence. In addition, only the most strategic urban sites show visible signs of militarization. As a consequence, for the vast majority of people it is the control and media technologies that constitute their main experience of military urbanism.

Take the salient example of GPS. Since the US military first deployed it in support of the 'precision' killing of the First Gulf War, GPS has been partly declassified and made available to an ever-widening universe of commercial, governmental and civilian applications. It has become the basis for civilian mobility and navigation, a ubiquitous consumer technology used in PDAs, watches, cars, and a broad range of geo-location services. It has been used to reorganize agriculture, transportation, municipal government, law enforcement, border security, computer gaming and leisure activities. Few people, however, consider how military and imperial power pervades every GPS application.

With a suite of surveillance and control technologies now organized to preempt and anticipate consumption as well as risk, 'the production of knowledge [is] no longer intended to secrete and clarify what can be known, but rather

¹⁴ Pierre Mesnard y Méndez, 'Capitalism Means/Needs War', *Socialism and Democracy* 22:2, 2002.

¹⁵ Bishop, "'The Vertical Order Has Come to an End"', 61.

to "clarify" what cannot be known.¹⁶ Increasingly the city is 'defined by the military goal of being able to know the enemy even before the enemy is aware of himself as such.'¹⁷ The overarching feature of the new militarized surveillance, whether its targets are located in Manhattan or Baghdad, London or Fallujah, is the building of systems of technological vision in which computer code, along with databases of real or imaged targets, tracks, identifies and distinguishes 'abnormal' targets from the background 'normality' or clutter of a homeland or a war-zone city.

Tracking – what media theorist Jordan Crandall calls 'anticipatory seeing'¹⁸ – is thus central to emerging modes of governance and military power. The key question now, he suggests, is 'how targets are identified and distinguished from non-targets' within 'decision making and killing'. Crandall points out that this widespread integration of computerized tracking with databases of targets represents 'a gradual colonization of the now, a now always slightly ahead of itself'. This shift is a profoundly militarized process because the social identification of people within civilian law enforcement is complemented or even replaced by the mechanistic seeing of 'targets'. 'While civilian images are embedded in processes of identification based on reflection', writes Crandall, 'militarized perspectives collapse identification processes into "Id-ing" – a one-way channel of identification in which a conduit, a database, and a body are aligned and calibrated.'¹⁹

In this way, for example, radio-chip public transport cards or systems for electronically tolling highways or central urban road systems morph into urban 'counterterrorist' screens protecting 'security zones'. The Internet is appropriated as a global system of financial and civil surveillance. Just-in-time logistics chains sustaining both global trade and airline travel are reorganized to allow for permanent profiling, tracking and the targeting of malign bodies and circulations. Everything from mobile phones to passports is fitted with microchip radio frequency tags that have the potential to turn their hosts into tracking devices.

Hence, technologies with military origins – refracted through the vast worlds of civilian research, development and application that help constitute high-tech economies, societies and cultures – are now being reappropriated as the bases

16 Anne Bottomley and Nathan Moore, 'From Walls to Membranes: Fortress Polis and the Governance of Urban Public Space in 21st Century Britain', *Law and Critique* 18: 2, 2007, 171–206.

17 Ibid.

18 Jordan Crandall, 'Anything that Moves: Armed Vision', CTheory.net, June 1999.

19 Ibid.

for new architectures of militarized control, tracking, surveillance, targeting and killing. Mark Mills is thankful that this 'tectonic shift fortunately mirrors the threat environment' of distributed, unknowable enemies and dangerous circulations. 'While much of this capability has focused on producing iPods, cell phones, video games, gigabit data streams, and Internet server farms', he writes, 'the digital economy's underlying intellectual property and machinery is now turning to civilian and military security. All of this augurs well for the prospects of better security, and robust new opportunities for entrepreneurs, large and small.'²⁰

Through such processes, 'more and more sectors of civil society are being integrated into a global infrastructure generated through the military', notes Simon Cooper.²¹ And all of it occurs in the name of security – of a nameless and shapeless us against the infinite threats of a shapeless Other lurking within the 'new normal' of a state of exception, a permanent emergency. Citizens and subjects are thus mobilized for militarized control and conscripted into neoliberal consumption systems which encourage them to consume for the good of the economy – as Bush urged after the 9/11 attacks – while at the same offering up their 'data selves' for continuous, pre-emptive analysis, tracking, profiling, targeting and threat assessment.

Randy Martin has shown how the massive data and surveillance systems that are emerging at this moment of military–civil fusion reinforce the transfer of principles of speculation and pre-emption from neoliberal fiscal policy into the heart of militarized war-making by states, both within and without their territorial boundaries.²² So-called securitization involves both military and financial dimensions, acting in parallel. Such systems, Martin argues, are geared towards protecting the people and urban enclaves that have benefited from the superabundant wealth arising from neoliberal political economies – protecting them, that is, from the risks embodied by the surrounding masses. Attempts to separate good risks from bad, however, end up creating their own financial markets, organized through the same techniques of pre-emption, profiling and targeting used by the military.

In such a context, 'legitimacy is garnered to citizens only to the extent that they are integrated into a high-tech network.'²³ Caren Kaplan argues that the

20 Mark Mills, 'Photons, Electrons and Paradigms', keynote address, USA Defense and Security Symposium, Orlando, Florida, 9–13 April 2007.

21 Simon Cooper, 'Perpetual War within the State of Exception', *Arena Journal*, 1 January 2003, 114.

22 Randy Martin, 'Derivative Wars', *Cultural Studies*, 20: 4–5, 2006, 459–476.

23 Cooper, 'Perpetual War within the State of Exception', 117.

deployment of militarized control technologies at the heart of contemporary 'information societies' necessarily leads to the formation of 'militarized consumer and citizen subjects in relation to technologies that link geography, demography, remote sensing, and contemporary identity politics'.²⁴ Marketing campaigns then target citizens, using the same technologies and targeting algorithms as weapons. 'The digital mingling of position and identity into target subjects', writes Kaplan, 'underscores the martial and territorial aspect of mapping throughout the modern period'.²⁵

However, the new culture of digital surveillance is not simply imposed on coerced, oppressed citizens, as in some Orwellian Big Brother scenario. Very often, as with the use of webcams, mobile phone tracking, and geo-positioning systems, it is embraced and actively deployed as the means for organizing new expressions of mobility, identity, sexuality and everyday life – as well as resistance.

CAMERA-WEAPON: SPECTACLES OF URBAN VIOLENCE

The enduring attraction of war is this: even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living.²⁶

Thirdly, the new military urbanism and its wars are overwhelmingly performed and consumed as visual and discursive spectacles within the spaces of electronic imagery. The vast majority of participants, at least in US or Western European cities, are unlikely to be subjected to either military deployment or violent targeting. Instead they participate via TV, the Net, video games and films. The new wars – geared towards the idea that permanent and pre-emptive mobilization is necessary to sustain public safety – increasingly 'take the form of mediatized mechanisms and are ordered as massive intrusions into visual culture, which are conflated with, and substitute for, the actual materiality and practices of the public sphere'.²⁷

As the 9/11 attacks demonstrate, insurgents and terrorists are themselves careful to organize their violence with extraordinary urban media spectacles in mind – spectacles of apocalyptic urban annihilation, which bear an

24 Caren Kaplan, 'Precision Targets: GPS and the Militarization of US Consumer Identity', *American Quarterly* 58: 3, 2006, 696.

25 *Ibid.*, 698.

26 Chris Hedges, *War Is a Force Which Gives Us Meaning*, New York: Public Affairs, 2002, 3.

27 Allen Feldman, 'Securocratic Wars of Public Safety', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 6: 3, 330–50.

uncanny resemblance to the well-versed tropes of Hollywood disaster movies but are delivered live, in real time and in real places, to real bodies.²⁸ The 9/11 attacks, for example, 'were organized as epic horror cinema with meticulous attention to the *mise-en-scène*', writes Mike Davis, 'The hijacked planes were aimed precisely at the vulnerable border between fantasy and reality.' As a result, 'thousands of people who turned on their televisions on 9/11 were convinced that the cataclysm was just a broadcast, a hoax. They thought they were watching rushes from the latest Bruce Willis film'.²⁹ A common response to those events was that 'it was just like watching a movie!' Indeed, Hollywood dramatic tradition relies heavily on both the spectacular demise of cities and the collapse of towering buildings. The history of New York in particular – the archetypal modern metropolis – can be told through histories of its imagined, imaged demise in films, comics, video games and novels.

These visual and electronic circuits impart to warfare and the military urbanism a certain legitimacy and consent, however precarious. At the same time, the divisions between military simulation, information warfare, news and entertainment are becoming so blurred as to be less and less meaningful. Together, in the US at least, they now fuse into a fuzzy world of self-reinforcing 'militainment'.³⁰

Thus, the US military employs Hollywood's finest to merge their digital simulations for training directly into mass-market video games. Closing the circle, it then uses video-game consoles to model the control stations for the unmanned drones used to patrol the streets of Baghdad or undertake extrajudicial assassinations and targeted killings. In addition, the military 'mobilizes science fiction writers and other futurologists to plan for the wars of tomorrow just as they consciously recruit video-game playing adolescents to fight the same conflict'³¹ on weapons whose controls directly mimic those of PlayStations. The profusion of digital video sensors in turn provides an almost infinite range of material for reality TV shows like *Police, Camera, Action!*, which provide the citizenry with voyeuristic and eroticized experiences of urban violence. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 'was the first war to emerge in the electronic informational space as a fully coordinated "media spectacle",

28 Iain Boal, T. J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts, *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War*, London: Verso, 2006.

29 Mike Davis, *Dead Cities*, New York: New Press, 2002, 5.

30 Jonathan Burston, 'War and the Entertainment Industries: New Research Priorities in an Era of Cyber-Patriotism', In Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman, eds., *War and the Media*, London: Routledge, 2003 163–75.

31 Chris Hables Gray, *Postmodern War*, London: Routledge, 1997, 190.

complete with embedded reporters, interactive websites, and 3D models and maps all at the ready.³²

Shrill and bellicose, the commercial news media meanwhile appropriate their own digital simulations of the cities and spaces targeted by imperial war. They provide a 24/7 world of war and infotainment which eroticizes high-tech weaponry while making death curiously invisible. In the US especially, commercial news content in the run-up to the 2003 invasion was massively skewed towards pro-war arguments. Material was preselected and approved by Pentagon officials serving as resident consultants within each TV studio. Sets, images, maps, simulations and footage orchestrated what James Der Derian calls 'a techno-aesthetic'. 'When the war premiered', he writes, using the term deliberately, 'the television studios introduced new sets that mimicked the command and control centers of the military (Fox News actually referred to its own, without a trace of Strangelovian irony, as the "War Room").'³³

Der Derian also notes that 'computer-generated graphics of the Iraq battlespace were created by the same defense industries (like Evans and Sutherland and Analytical Graphics) and commercial satellite firms (like Space Imaging and Digital Globe) that supply the US military.' Ultimately, technophilic erotics of weaponry filled the screens. 'The networks showcased a veritable *Jane's Defense Review* of weapon-systems', Der Derian writes, 'providing "virtual views" of Iraq and military hardware that are practically indistinguishable from target acquisition displays.'³⁴

More generally, corporate news media both contribute to and benefit from the discourses of fear, demonization and boundless emergency that sustain the new military urbanism. The 'media coverage and terrorism are soul mates, virtually inseparable', admits James Lukaszewski, a US public relations consultant who advises the US military. "They feed off each other. They together create a dance of death – the one for political or ideological motives, the other for commercial success. Terrorist activities are high profile, ratings-building events. The news media need to prolong these stories because they build viewership and readership."³⁵

These blurrings and fusions are symptoms of the broader emergence of what

32 John Jordan, 'Disciplining the Virtual Home Front: Mainstream News and the Web During the War in Iraq', *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 4: 3, 2007, 276–302.

33 James Der Derian, 'Who's Embedding Whom?', *9/11 INFOinterventions*, 26 March 2003, available at www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/911.

34 Ibid.

35 Cited in Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq*, London: Robinson, 2003, 34.

Der Derian³⁶ has called the 'military-industrial-media-entertainment network', a potent agent in the concoction of events and the manipulation of news. 'Battle simulations, news, and interactive games exist within an increasingly unified space', adds Jordan Crandall. 'With military-news-entertainment systems, simulations jostle with realities to become the foundation for war. They help combine media spectatorship and combat, viewing and fighting.'³⁷

In the process, the domestic home – the main site of this continuous performance of electronic screening – becomes a militarized site for the potentially 24/7 enactment of both symbolic and real violence against far-away Others, which can of course exist at a variety of geographic distances from the home screen and its surrounding security architectures. A similar logic operates on the racialized downtown ghetto and the Arab city.

While mediatised urban violence provides a very different experience than does being an actual presence in its cross-hairs, the media experience of massive terrorist or state onslaughts against cities can nonetheless often be 'characterised as sublime: our minds clash with phenomena that supersede our cognitive abilities, triggering a range of powerful emotions, such as pain, fear and awe.'³⁸ Thus, television observers were profoundly unsettled and also awe-struck by both the aestheticized spectacle of the 9/11 attacks and the equally aestheticized 'shock and awe' bombing campaign against Baghdad that putatively constituted the US response to those attacks.

The multiple circuits of 'civilian' media have thus been inscribed into the latest variations on military doctrine as major elements of contemporary battlespace. Indeed, military theorists now commonly describe TV and the Internet as 'virtual weapons' within the crucial domains of 'information warfare'. They also bemoan how 'asymmetric' struggles such as the second Palestinian Intifada gain massive global political credibility because they lead to such images as Palestinian children confronting Israeli tanks with stones.³⁹

Informational and psychological aspects of US military operations are now a central concern of military planners. Think of the 2003 shock-and-awe pyrotechnics, with ordnance devastating targets symbolic of the Hussein regime (as well as Iraqi civilians) a safe but camera-friendly distance away from the serried ranks of journalists lined up in a nearby hotel. Or think of the

36 Der Derian, *Virtuous War*.

37 Jordan Crandall, ed., *Under Fire*, 1, 15.

38 Roland Bleiker and Martin Leet, 'From the Sublime to the Subliminal: Fear, Awe and Wonder in International Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34: 3, 2006, 713.

39 Thomas Hamms, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Zenith Press, 2006.

1991 Gulf War press conferences filled with video footage taken by cameras mounted on missiles showing these weapons 'precisely' hitting their Iraqi targets. Remember, too, that the Pentagon banned the circulation of images of the US war dead being returned home, and explicitly discussed the need to launch completely fabricated news stories.⁴⁰ Finally, consider the violence used against media providers who had the temerity to show images of Baghdad's dead civilians, casualties of US force: Al Jazeera's offices in both Kabul and Baghdad were bombed by the US, killing one journalist.⁴¹

Clearly, US 'information operations' focus on 'visually distribut[ing] death and destruction into domains of the event and the non-event'. As a result, 'shock and awe is a carefully staged media event at the same time that the hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths and maimings through "collateral damage" is a continuous non-event which actually requires, ironically, violent obfuscation', as Allen Feldman puts it.⁴²

At the same time, through increasingly direct intervention from the Pentagon, military action movies and right-wing TV stations such as Fox News have turned into extended ads for the US military or the War on Terror. In effect, 'the military [took] over the television studios.'⁴³ Through their public-affairs offices located within the studios,

retired general and flag officers exercised full spectrum dominance on cable and network TV as well as on commercial and public radio. The new public affairs officers of the military-industrial-media-entertainment network included Clark and Sheppard on CNN, Nash and Hawley on ABC, Kernan and Ralston on CBS, McCaffrey and Meigs on NBC, and Olstrom and Scales on NPR. Fox News alone had enough ex-military to stage their own Veteran's Day parade.⁴⁴

Yet the same digital circuits of imagery that have been organized so successfully to propagandize the war in Iraq have also helped instigate its undoing. The global circulation of the tourist-style digital images of the Abu Ghraib torturers, for example, provided not only a massive boost to the war's opponents but also iconic images of torture to activists and investigators who

⁴⁰ Most notable here was the idea of the 'Office of Strategic Influence, see Der Derian, 'The Rise and Fall of the Office of Strategic Influence', *INFOinterventions*, 4 March 2002, available at www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/911.

⁴¹ Lisa Parks, 'Insecure Airwaves: US Bombings of Al Jazeera', *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 4: 2, 2007, 226-231.

⁴² Allen Feldman, 'Securocratic wars of public safety', 330-350.

⁴³ Der Derian, 'Who's Embedding Whom?'

⁴⁴ Ibid.

had suspected widespread brutality within the US system of incarceration without trial. Efforts by US military information-operations campaigns to buy up relevant satellite imaging during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have not kept Google Earth, for instance, from being widely used by anti-war activists and Iraqi insurgents alike. And while digital video cameras have been used to sustain cheap cable TV channels offering demonized depictions of the dangers lurking in city cores, those very same technologies enabled bystanders to reveal the regular killings of Iraqi civilians by the private military corporation Blackwater.

SECURITY SURGE

A fourth new component of contemporary urbanism is that as the everyday spaces and systems of urban everyday life are colonized by militarized control technologies, and as notions of policing and war, domestic and foreign, peace and war become less distinct, there emerges a massive boom in a convergent industrial complex encompassing security, surveillance, military technology, prisons, corrections, and electronic entertainment. Within the broader apparatus of the military-industrial-media-entertainment network, these fusing industries exploit the cross-fertilization and blurring between the traditional military imperatives of war, external to the state, and those of the policing internal to it.

The proliferation of wars sustaining permanent mobilization and preemptive, ubiquitous surveillance within and beyond territorial borders means that the security imperative now 'imposes itself on the basic principle of state activity'.⁴⁵ Giorgio Agamben argues that 'what used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation'.⁴⁶

The result is an ever-broadening landscape of 'security' blending commercial, military and security practices with increasingly fearful cultures of civilian mobility, citizenship and consumption. As William Connolly suggests:

Airport surveillance, Internet filters, passport tracking devices, legal detention without criminal charges, security internment camps, secret trials, 'free speech zones', DNA profiles, border walls and fences, erosion of the line between internal security and external military action - these security activities resonate together, engendering a national security machine that pushes numerous issues outside the range of legitimate

⁴⁵ Giorgio Agamben, 'Security and Terror', *Theory and Event* 5: 4, 2002, 1-2.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

dissent and mobilizes the populace to support new security and surveillance practices against underspecified enemies.⁴⁷

It is no accident that security-industrial complexes blossom in parallel with the diffusion of market-fundamentalist notions for organizing social, economic and political life. The hyperinequalities, the urban militarization and the securitization sustained by neoliberalization are mutually reinforcing. In a discussion of the US government's response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, Henry Giroux points out that the normalization of market fundamentalism in US culture has made it much more 'difficult to translate private woes into social issues and collective action or to insist on a language of the public good'. He argues that 'the evisceration of all notions of sociality' in this case has led to 'a sense of total abandonment, resulting in fear, anxiety, and insecurity over one's future'.⁴⁸

Added to this, Giroux argues, 'the presence of the racialized poor, their needs, and vulnerabilities – now visible – becomes unbearable'. Rather than address the causes of poverty or insecurity, however, political responses now invariably 'focus on shoring up a diminished sense of safety, carefully nurtured by a renewed faith in all things military'.⁴⁹ One also witnesses the looting of state budgets for post-disaster assistance and reconstruction by cabals of lobbyists with intimate links both to governments and to the burgeoning array of private military and security corporations.⁵⁰

Given that context, it is not surprising that, amidst a global financial crash, market growth in security services and technologies remains extremely strong: 'International expenditure on homeland security now surpasses established enterprises like movie-making and the music industry in annual revenues', announces a December 2007 issue of India's *Economic Times*.⁵¹ Homeland Security Research Corporation (HSRC) notes that 'the worldwide "total defense" outlay (military, intelligence community, and Homeland Security/Homeland Defense) is forecasted to grow by approximately 50 per cent, from \$1,400 billion in 2006 to \$2,054 billion by 2015.' By 2005, US defense expenditures alone had reached \$420 billion a year – comparable to those of the rest of the world combined.

47 William Connolly, *Pluralism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005, 54.

48 Giroux, 'Reading Hurricane Katrina', 171.

49 Ibid., 172.

50 Eric Klinenberg and Thomas Frank, 'Looting Homeland Security', *Rolling Stone*, December 2005.

51 'Spending on Internal Security to Reach \$178 bn by 2015', *Economic Times*, 27 December 2007.

More than a quarter of this was devoted to purchasing services from a rapidly expanding market of private military corporations. By 2010, such mercenary groups are in line to receive a staggering \$202 billion from the US federal government alone.⁵²

Meanwhile, worldwide homeland-security expenditures are forecast to double, from \$231 billion in 2006 to \$518 billion by 2015; 'where the homeland security outlay was 12% of the world's total defence outlay in 2003, it is expected to become 25% of the total defence outlay by 2015', according to HSRC.⁵³ Even more meteoric growth is expected in some key sectors of the new control technologies: global markets in biometric technology, for example, are expected to increase from the small base of \$1.5 billion in 2005 to \$5.7 billion by 2010.⁵⁴

Although there is little good research on the complex structures of what the OECD call the 'new security economy',⁵⁵ it is clear that global consolidation is creating an oligopoly of massive market-dominated transnational security corporations. In 2004 the top six companies took 20 per cent of the global market for security services.⁵⁶ Coalitions between governments and corporate interests are running rampant beyond democratic scrutiny. 'Growth in the industry is assured by massive government contracts and generous subsidies for homeland security research and development', write Ben Hayes and Roche Tasse.⁵⁷ A variety of institutional fusions and alliances between civilian, military and communitarian sectors, marked by complex cross-overs between the application of civilian and military control technologies, are taking place at different geographical scales of operation (Figure 3.1).

52 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, 'Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies', *Occasional Paper no. 6*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, March 2005.


53 Homeland Security Research Corp, 2007, available at www.photonicsleadership.org.uk.

54 Ibid.

55 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The Security Economy*, Paris: OECD, 2004.; see also Sven Bisley, 'Globalization, State Transformation, and Public Security', *International Political Science Review* 25: 3, 2004, 281–96.

56 Frank Seavey, 'Globalizing Labor in Response to a Globalized Security Industry', paper presented at the 'Policing Crowds' Conference, Berlin, June 2006, available at www.policing-crowds.org.

57 Ben Hayes and Roche Tasse, 'Control Freaks: "Homeland Security" and "Interoperability"', *Different Takes* 45, 2007, 2.



3.1 Peter Gill's conception of the convergence of state, corporate and civilian sectors to create global 'security' industries operating at local, national and transnational scales.

Hayes, of the organization Statewatch, argues that the EU's efforts to establish a continent-wide Security Research Programme is best described as "Big Brother" meets market fundamentalism.⁵⁸ The programme's large development and supply contracts are organized by a network of 'EU officials and Europe's biggest arms and IT companies.'⁵⁹ As in the US, moreover, EU security policy and research are heavily influenced by intensive lobbying by the main corporate-security companies (many of which are recently privatized state operations). Rather than the ethics of massive securitization, the prime EU concern has been how European corporation could take a bigger chunk of booming global markets for a 'myriad of local and global surveillance systems; the introduction of biometric identifiers; RFID, electronic tagging and satellite monitoring; "less-lethal weapons"; paramilitary equipment for public order and crisis management; and the militarization of border controls.'⁶⁰ Urban securitization may thus become a shop-window for industrial policy within the burgeoning security marketplace.

⁵⁸ Ben Hayes, *Arming Big Brother: The EU's Security Research Programme*, Washington, DC: Statewatch, 2006.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

COLONIZING TRANSNATIONAL URBANISM

The recalibration of an inside-outside problematique from the point of view of the United States is full of explosive contradictions.⁶¹

Our fifth component is this: in a rapidly urbanizing world marked by intensifying transnational migration, transport, capital and media flows, all attempts at constructing a mutually exclusive binary – a securitized 'inside' enclosing the urban places of the US homeland, and an urbanizing 'outside' where US military power can pre-emptively attack sources of terrorist threats – are inevitably both ambivalent and ridden with contradiction.

'National sovereignty' is now the rationale for constructing transnational systems of attempted social control. Certain people become 'national' subjects only after they become terrorist victims. And 'national' borders simultaneously permeate the spaces within and beyond the territorial limits of nations, as they become inscribed into increasingly ubiquitous systems intended for tracking and control.

Globally, the new military urbanism is being mobilized for the securing of the strung-out commodity chains, logistics networks, and corporate enclaves that constitute the neoliberal geo-economic architectures of our planet. These key nodes, enclaves, circulations and infrastructures that together sustain the architectures of transnational urbanism⁶² tend to lie, cheek by jowl, with populations and urban places deemed likely to be sources of insurgent resistance, social mobilization, or infrastructural terrorism. As we shall see in Chapter 5, there are extremely lucrative attempts underway to re-engineer global finance, communication, airline and port systems to achieve a kind of ubiquitous border, a 'global homeland' which follows the infrastructural architectures of a global network of cities and economic enclaves rather than the territorial limits demarcating nation-states.

The geography of such an imagined, ubiquitous border separates and secures the valorized, strategic 'global cities' of the North as well as the economic enclaves of the South – with their security zones and high-tech surveillance – from the threatening multitudes outside the increasingly fortified urban, national or supra-national gates. Here the discourse of high-tech, 'clean' and 'humane' war surrounding the Revolution in Military Affairs merges with

⁶¹ Roger Keil, 'Empire and the Global City: Perspectives of Urbanism after 9/11', *Studies in Political Economy* 79, 2007, 167–92.

⁶² The term 'transnational urbanism' was coined by Michael Peter Smith in 1996 in his book *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

the glossy ideologies of high-tech globalization at the core of neoliberal economic orthodoxy and market fundamentalism. As Patrick Deer writes, such ideologies claim 'to occupy a clean, smooth space in the command-and-control networks of the first-world global cities, with their frictionless, speedy flows of metropolitan labor and capital.' However, they operate in 'stark contrast to the "dirty" quotidian world of the sweatshops and *maquiladoras* or the *favelas* and refugee camps of the underdeveloped global South.'⁶³

Increasingly, the city-to-city architectures of 'network-centric' or infrastructural warfare converge on the dominant city-to-city architectures of globalized urban life – airline systems, port systems, electronic finance systems, the Internet – that sustain transnational capitalism. The result is the fast-militarizing borders between North and South, the proliferating extraterritorial refugee and torture camps, and colonized urban spaces akin to mass prison camps. This is what geographer Peter Taylor has called the 'world city network'⁶⁴ – the transnational complex of strategic cities, parts of cities, and infrastructures, destined to be bordered, fenced off, and rebuilt into global homelands. And that is how neoliberal globalization, so dominant in Western culture in the 1990s, morphs into permanent war: the architectures of globalization merge seamlessly into the architectures of control and warfare.⁶⁵

In this way, the most basic and banal processes of modern urban life are rendered as (net)war. As Deer writes, "the pervasive metaphorization of war blurs the boundaries between military and civilian, combatant and noncombatant, state and war machine, wartime and peacetime."⁶⁶ Acts of protest, civil disobedience, resistance, social mobilization, labour activism, computer crime, or even attempted survival after disasters are thus deemed acts of urban warfare, requiring a military or paramilitary response as part of low intensity conflict.

Given the critical importance of the system of 'world' cities to the global geographies of imperialism, all this should come as no surprise. Indeed, the burgeoning industrial complex within which the industries of security, technology, biotechnology, corrections, prison, torture, electronics, military, entertainment and surveillance are melding yields large chunks of the lucrative core economies of cities like London and New York.

Yet the centrality of war and imperial power to the economic dynamics of contemporary world cities is continually obscured by the suggestion that

63 Deer, 'The Ends of War', 2.

64 Peter Taylor, *World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis*, London: Routledge, 2004.

65 Deer, 'The Ends of War', 2.

66 Ibid., 1.

such cities, in these post-colonial times, are defined by their cosmopolitan and 'hybrid' mixing – a mixing viewed by such policy gurus as Richard Florida as a key competitive feature of the creative hubs, the 'foundries,' of the 'knowledge-based economy.'⁶⁷ To define cities 'generically and one-sidedly as endogenous "engines of growth" and laboratories of cosmopolitanism,' write Stefan Kipfer and Kanishka Goonewardena, 'is to ignore other formative aspects of urban history: economic and ecological parasitism, forms of socio-political exclusion (against non-city-zens as well as residents) and a dependence of commercial exchange on militarism, imperial expansion, and other forms of primitive accumulation.'⁶⁸

COSMOPOLITANISM AND HOMELAND

Are fear and urbanism at war?⁶⁹

The sixth and penultimate attribute of the new military urbanism is the way it is marked by intense contradictions between discourses stressing powerful disconnection and difference between US cities and those elsewhere, and those emphasizing the proliferation of connection, linkages and interdependences between these two groups of cities. Such contradictions are most evident in the world cities. In the most globalized and cosmopolitan of US cities, New York being the prime example, the notion of an ethno-nationalist homeland is utterly alien – an idea dredged up for the consumption of suburban or exurban Republicans, rather than one describing with any viability the social world of the contemporary city. And yet, as Roger Keil stresses, the United States is now a predominantly suburban nation, whose suburbs, 'although thoroughly urbanized are designed in such a way that any association with the city is avoided.'⁷⁰ For many Americans, Keil points out, 'the insight that the city is at the core of their circumferential world power was not immediately plausible before September 11, 2001.'⁷¹ Moreover, suburban life is so powerfully idealized within US culture as being the authentic 'American way of life' that a sense of connection to the larger world is often noticeable by its absence. 'For

67 Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, New York: Basic Books, 2002.

68 Kipfer and Goonewardena, 'Colonization and the New Imperialism'.

69 Todd Swanstrom, 'Are Fear and Urbanism at War?', *Urban Affairs Review* 38, 2002, 135–40.

70 Keil, 'Empire and the Global City.'

71 Ibid.

many Americans', says Keil, 'the world, which constitutes their existence in a global economy of empire, remains outside of their experience'.⁷²

The 'rebordered' discourse of 'homeland' is an attempt to construct a domesticated, singular, and spatially fixed imagined community of US nationhood.⁷³ Such an imaginary community – tied to some familial 'turf' – valorizes a privileged national population of exurbanites and suburbanites, separated from racialized Others in both US cities and colonial frontiers. Despite the unavoidable, ongoing interconnections between US cities and more or less distant elsewhere, 'the rhetoric of "insides" needing protection from external threats in the form of international organizations is pervasive'.⁷⁴ Which is presumably why the relatively new US Department of Homeland Security sought to re-engineer information, transport, border and logistics systems with new control technologies so as to constantly monitor the multiple circuits linking US cities to those elsewhere.⁷⁵

Amy Kaplan detected a 'decidedly anti-urban and anti-cosmopolitan ring' to this upsurge of nationalism after 9/11.⁷⁶ Even the very word 'homeland' itself, she suggests, invoked some 'inexorable connection to a place deeply rooted in the past'. Such language offered a 'folksy rural quality, which combined a German romantic notion of the folk with the heartland of America to resurrect the rural myth of American identity', while at the same time precluding 'an urban vision of America as multiple turfs with contested points of view and conflicting grounds upon which to stand'.⁷⁷ This kind of discourse was particularly problematic in global cities like New York, constituted as they are by massively complex constellations of diasporic social groups and tied intimately into the international (and interurban) divisions of labour that sustain capitalism today. 'In what sense', asks Kaplan, 'would New Yorkers refer to their city as the homeland? Home, yes, but homeland? Not likely'.⁷⁸

Paul Gilroy goes further, proposing that the widespread invocation of 'homeland' by the Bush administration, following Huntington's extremely

72 Ibid.

73 Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker, *The Rebordering of North America*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

74 Simon Dalby 'A Critical Geopolitics of Global Governance', International Studies Association.

75 See Matt Hidek, 'Networked Security in the City: A Call to Action for Planners', *Planners Network*, 2007; Katja Franko, 'Analysing a World in Motion: Global Flows Meet "Criminology of the Other"', *Theoretical Criminology* 1: 2, 2007, 283–303

76 Amy Kaplan, 'Homeland Insecurities: Reflections on Language and Space', *Radical History Review* 85, 2003, 82–93.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

influential image of a 'clash of civilizations', necessarily 'requires that cosmopolitan consciousness is ridiculed' in the pronouncements of the US state and the mainstream media.⁷⁹ In the 'Post 9/11' world he diagnosed a pervasive 'inability to conceptualize multicultural and postcolonial relations as anything other than ontological risk and ethnic jeopardy'.⁸⁰

The 'hybrid' identities of many neighborhoods and communities in US cities, shaped by generations of transnational migration and diasporic mixing, have thus become problematized. Inevitably, such places and groups stretch across the resurgent 'them and us' and 'home and foreign' binaries. 'When "frontiers" (however reconstructed) and their surveillance become crucial aspects of a constituent passage', Lorenzo Veracini argues, 'diasporas – their composition, their sensibilities, their strategies, their politics, their histories – also become a strategic site for contestation'.⁸¹ Domestic counterinsurgencies and internal colonial strategies invariably target the cosmopolitan urban districts in which diasporic communities and ethnic, post-colonial in-migrants concentrate. Sally Howell and Andrew Shryock call this domestic front of the War on Terror a 'cracking down on diaspora'.⁸² It involves concentrated geographical profiling, increases in raids, extraordinary renditions, clamp-downs targeting undocumented workers, the mobilization of new counterterror powers to search and scrutinize everyday life, and widespread incarceration without trial. In the US, such strategies have particularly targeted Arab American neighbourhoods such as that of the city of Dearborn, Michigan, near Detroit.

City- and neighbourhood-level political concepts, of course, grate against the resurgent nationalism that is part and parcel of the new military urbanism. The events of 9/11 themselves underline conflicting ideas of how geographical territory links with political community in an urbanizing, globalizing world. At least a hundred nationalities were represented on the list of the dead that grim day, and many of those people were 'illegal' immigrants working in New York City. 'If it existed', as Jennifer Hyndman writes, 'any comfortable distinction between domestic and international, here and there, us and them, ceased to have meaning after that day'.⁸³

79 Paul Gilroy, "Where Ignorant Armies Clash by Night": Homogeneous community and the planetary aspect', *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 6: 3, 2003, 266.

80 Ibid., 261.

81 Lorenzo Veracini, 'Colonialism Brought Home: On the Colonialization of the Metropolitan Space', *Borderlands* 4: 1, 2005.

82 Sally Howell and Andrew Shryock, 'Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America's "War on Terror"', *Anthropological Quarterly* 76:3, 2003, 443–62.

83 Jennifer Hyndman, 'Beyond Either/Or: A Feminist Analysis of September 11th', *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*, February 2006.

'Global labor migration patterns . . . brought the world to lower Manhattan to service the corporate office blocks', writes Tim Watson. Those who died along with white-collar office workers that day – 'the dishwashers, messengers, coffee-cart vendors, and office cleaners' – were 'Mexican, Bangladeshi, Jamaican and Palestinian.'⁸⁴ Only in death, however, could such people gain visibility, fleeting though it was. To Watson, 'one of the tragedies of September 11, 2001, was that it took such an extraordinary event to reveal the everyday reality of life at the heart of the global city.'⁸⁵

Posthumously, the dead of 9/11 were aggressively nationalized, re-emerging as heroic Americans whose deaths necessitated a global war orchestrated through Manichaeic renderings of world geography. The transformation is ironic, to put it kindly, given that many would no doubt have been struggling as 'illegal aliens' to attain such nationalization during their lifetime. As Allen Feldman remarks, 'The World Trade Center, despite its transnational frame of reference, was [quickly] eulogized as a violated utopian space of Americanized capital, labor, and the inclusive production of wealth.'⁸⁶

As for the devastating suicide bombings in London by so-called home-grown terrorists on 7 July 2005, the responses of Londoners were markedly different from those that of Prime Minister Tony Blair. The prime minister's immediate response to the atrocities, as Angharad Closs-Stevens suggests, 'was a characteristic affirmation of a British community-in-unity'. That affirmation 'worked very successfully [on the national level] in creating a binary logic between the "British people" [and] those people [who are trying] to cow us, to frighten us out of doing the things we want to do.'⁸⁷ Blair thereby managed to neutralize what could perhaps have been a massive political backlash against the UK's involvement in the Iraq war, an involvement that in Spain, by contrast, had resulted in the swift removal of the Aznar government after the terrorist bombings on Madrid's suburban trains on 11 March 2004.

London's then mayor, Ken Livingston, responded differently, however. Stressing the role of London as a pre-eminent cosmopolitan and diasporic hub, living within as well as beyond any simple notion of British national identity, Livingstone's message revolved around 'the idea of London as an urban,

84 Tim Watson, 'Introduction: Critical Infrastructures After 9/11', *Postcolonial Studies* 6, 109–11.

85 Ibid.

86 Allen Feldman, 'Securocratic Wars of Public Safety', 330–50.

87 Tony Blair, statement to the Press Association, 7 July 2005, quoted in Angharad Closs-Stevens, '7 million Londoners, 1 London': National and Urban Ideas of Community in the Aftermath of the 7th July Bombings', *Alternatives* 32: 2, 2007, 155–76.

multicultural community' and emphasized 'the principle of difference rather than unity.'⁸⁸

Paul Gilroy has a similar criticism of the UK government's response to the London bombings, especially the instigation of a simplistic idea of Britishness and British unity. 'This wholesome alternative', he says, 'would supposedly offer immediate benefits in the form of popular national feeling akin to'⁸⁹ the civic patriotism manifested in the US. Gilroy worries that the proponents of such a tidy vision of Britishness 'turn willfully and . . . deceitfully away from the exhilarating cultural interaction common in cities like [London] which are not – not yet anyway – segregated according to the principles of the racial nomos which, as we saw in the aftermath of the New Orleans flood, is the silent, dominant partner of stubbornly colour-coded US political culture.'⁹⁰

NEW STATE SPACES OF VIOLENCE

The fate of empires is very often sealed by the interaction of war and debt.⁹¹

Finally, the new military urbanism goes far beyond a concern with the technologies, doctrine, and military/security tactics needed for an attempt to control, pacify or profit from demonized populations or spaces. It goes beyond the complex intersections of visual culture and military-control technologies, beyond the tensions between urban and national ideas of community. It uses the powers of the state to violent reconfigure or erase urban space, as a means to allay purported threats, to clear new space for the exigencies of global-city formation, neoliberal production, or the creation of an urban tabula rasa capable of generating maximally profitable bubbles of real-estate speculation. To justify such violent assaults, often against a (demonized and fictionalized) urban, racial or class enemy, it regularly resorts to invocations of exception and emergency. Such states of exception are declared not only to constitute the geographies of permanent violence that sustain the dominant economy but also to create what Achille Mbembe calls 'death worlds' – spaces such as Palestine, where vast populations are forced to exist as the living dead.⁹² In this way, states of emergency support broader geographies of accumulation through

88 Close-Stephens, '7 Million Londoners, 1 London'.

89 Paul Gilroy, 'Multiculture in Times of War: An Inaugural Lecture Given at the London School of Economics', *Critical Quarterly* 48:4, 29.

90 Ibid.

91 John Gray, 'A Shattering Moment in America's Fall from Power', *Observer*, 28 October 2008.

92 Achille Mbembe, 'Necropolitics' *Public Culture* 15: 1, 2003, 11–40.

dispossession, which, while as old as colonialism, prove especially useful for neoliberal globalization.

Here we confront the complex political economies of the new military urbanism and their central integration into what Naomi Klein has diagnosed as the tendency within contemporary neoliberal capitalism to engineer and/or to profit from catastrophic 'natural' or political-economic shocks.⁹³ At issue is the character of what could be called the 'new state spaces' of war and violence, and their relation to political violence and contemporary geographies of dispossession.⁹⁴

Citing the systematic Israeli bulldozing of homes and towns in Palestine, the similar erasure of Fallujah and other loci of Iraqi resistance, and the widespread erasure of informal settlements across the globe as city authorities entrepreneurially reorganize urban spaces, Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer point to 'an ominously normalised reality experienced by the "damned of the earth" after the "end of history"'. This, they argue, has summoned a new keyword in urban studies and allied disciplines: urbicide.⁹⁵

Defined as political violence intentionally designed to erase or 'kill' cities, urbicide can involve the ethno-nationalist targeting of spaces of cosmopolitan mixing (as in the Balkans in the 1990s); the systematic devastation of the means of living a modern urban life (as with the de-electrification of Iraq in 1991, the siege of Gaza in 2006–8, or the attack on Lebanon in 2006)⁹⁶; or the direct erasure of demonized people and places declared to be unmodern, barbarian, unclean, pathological, or sub-human (as with Robert Mugabe's bulldozing of hundreds of thousands of shanty dwellings on the edge of Harare in 2005).⁹⁷

The wiping-out of people and places is an extremely common, though often overlooked, feature in urban areas of the global South, where political and economic elites seek to recast their spaces as 'global cities' – to transform them into 'the next Shanghai' and thus legitimize planning-as-erasure. Super-modern accoutrements – highways, malls, airports, office blocks, sports stadia, luxury condo complexes – are inevitably considered to be more suitable to global status than are the dilapidated, self-made, often 'illegal' shanty districts which house the urban poor. A recent survey by the United Nations found that

93 Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, London: Allen Lane, 2007.

94 The term 'new state spaces' comes from the pioneering book of that title by Neil Brenner, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

95 Goonewardena and Kipfer, 'Postcolonial Urbicide'.

96 See Chapter 9 and also Stephen Graham, 'Switching Cities Off: Urban Infrastructure and US Air Power', *City* 9: 2, 2005.

97 Kipfer and Goonewardena 'Colonization and the New Imperialism'.

between 2000 and 2002, a total of 6.7 million people in sixty countries were forcibly evicted from their informal settlements, compared with 4.2 million in the previous two years.⁹⁸ Frantz Fanon's words are as relevant as ever here: 'the business of obscuring language is a mask behind which stands the much bigger business of plunder'.⁹⁹

To Goonewardena and Kipfer, the contemporary proliferation of urbicide reflects the shift to a world where the politics of the city are utterly central to the production and constitution of social relations. In a majority urban world, they write, 'the struggle for the city [now] coincides more and more with the struggle for a social order'.¹⁰⁰ With urbanization intensifying, this coincidence can only harden further.

As a consequence, architectural and urban theory emerge not only as a key element in efforts – whether imperial, neoliberal, corporate or military – to produce or reorganize urban space, but also in the resistances and countergeographies that arise in response to such interventions.¹⁰¹ Strange appropriations take place here. Eyal Weizman, for instance, has shown how certain Israeli generals have appropriated the radical, post-structuralist writings of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to fashion new military doctrine for taking and controlling the labyrinthine spaces of Palestinian refugee camps.¹⁰² Here, writes Weizman, 'contemporary urban warfare plays itself out within a constructed, real or imaginary architecture, and through the destruction, construction, reorganization, and subversion of space'.¹⁰³ By breaking through the linked walls of entire towns and thus creating paths, the Israeli military seeks to 'create operational "space as if it had no borders", neutralizing the advantages accorded by urban terrain to opponents of occupation'.¹⁰⁴

Many of the new urban-warfare techniques used by state militaries – which Goonewardena and Kipfer label 'colonization without occupation' – are imitations of techniques of urban resistance used *against* state militaries in earlier centuries. 'This non-linear, poly-nucleated and anti-hierarchical strategy of combat in urban areas', they point out, 'in fact plagiarises the tactics of the defenders of the Paris Commune, Stalingrad and the Kasbahs of Algiers, Jenin and Nablus'.¹⁰⁵

Techniques of urban militarism and urbidical violence serve to discipline or

98 UN HABITAT, *State of the World Cities 2006/7*, Nairobi: United Nations, xi.

99 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove, 2004.

100 Goonewardena and Kipfer, 'Postcolonial Urbicide', 28.

101 See Chapter 11.

102 Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land*, London: Verso, 2007.

103 Eyal Weizman, 'Lethal Theory', *LOG Magazine* April 2005, 74.

104 Goonewardena and Kipfer, 'Postcolonial Urbicide', 28.

105 *Ibid.*, 29.

displace dissent and resistance. They erase or delegitimize urban claims and spaces that stand in the way of increasingly predatory forms of urban planning¹⁰⁶ that clear the way for super-modern infrastructure, production centres, or enclaves for urban consumption and tourism.¹⁰⁷ Merging as it does into the authoritarian turn in criminology, penology and social policy, this new military urbanism seeks to control or incarcerate the unruly populations of the post-colonial metropolis, as in what have been termed the 'internal colonies' of the French *banlieues*.¹⁰⁸

Beyond all this, though, the global processes of securitization, militarization, disinvestment and erasure provide sustenance to metropolitan economies. Cities are at the very centre of 'the military-industrial establishments of corporate capitalism, led by the US one, which produce "life-killing commodities" as the most profitable part of global trade'.¹⁰⁹

Consider the assemblage of resurgent and strategic global cities through which capitalist accumulation increasingly operates. They organize and fix financial flows, shape uneven geographic development, and draw off surpluses towards dominant corporate sectors and globalized socio-economic elites which are closely integrated with national and international states. They dominate the production aspects of the military-industrial-security-surveillance complex and are fringed by 'garrison cities' whose economies are dominated by deployed militaries and private industrial corporations. With their stock markets, technopoles, arms fairs, high-tech clusters and state weapons labs, such cities are the brains sustaining the highly militarized globalization of our time.

The imperial military conflict that fuels capital accumulation through the global city system is increasingly based on new forms of 'primitive accumulation', reliant on high rates of return (especially for the petrochemical complex) which are stimulated by resource and oil wars, rather than on the use of military contracts to provide Keynesian stimulation to the economy, as was true in the late twentieth century.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ 'Predatory planning' can be defined as 'the intended process of dispossession through aggressive, global-powered planning processes and use of multiple redevelopment tactics (building blocks), in the wake of existing trauma. The result is a traumatic stress reaction called root shock and the dismantling of our cultural commons'. Kiara Nagel, Design Studio for Social Intervention, available at ds4si.org/predatoryplanning.

¹⁰⁷ A pivotal example here is the attempted reconstruction of New Orleans as a gentrified, tourist city whilst attempting to deny 250,000 African-Americans the rights to return to the city after Katrina.

¹⁰⁸ Mustafa Dikeç, *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Méndez, 'Capitalism Means/Needs War'.

¹¹⁰ Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant Capital and the New Wars', *Journal of World-Systems Research* 10: 2, 2004, 255–327.

Contemporary city-building can thus be seen, argues Neil Smith, as an 'accumulation strategy in a far more intense way than at any previous moment. Militarization, massive reconstructive reinvestment and a supposed humanitarian agenda (bombs dropped alongside care packages on Kabul) all feed into this strategy of city building'.¹¹¹ In this way, military destruction and forcible appropriation can act as agents of rapid creative destruction. This in turn provides major opportunities for privatization, for gentrification, and for the appropriation of assets through global stock markets.

It follows that, in analyzing our 'colonial present', we face the challenge of simultaneously addressing the macro-political economies of what David Harvey calls 'accumulation by dispossession'¹¹² through economies of permanent war, and developing a sophisticated understanding of the everyday tactics and strategies of urban control and urbicide. There is thus a need to comprehensively reconsider the relationship between violence and the national/transnational state system. Although beyond the scope of this book, such a re-theorization must address the ways in which shocks and crises are not only exploited but also manufactured for corporate exploitation. It must address the connections between the global diffusion of the US economic crisis – caused by unregulated financialization, hyper-indebtedness, and unsustainable balance-of-payments deficits – and the longer-term trajectories of the authoritarian and 'post-Fordist' geographies and political economies that nourish the new military urbanism.¹¹³ Lastly, it must help explain the political-economic and cultural importance of hypermilitary ideologies of pre-emptive war, permanent mobilization, and anticipatory risk-management, which render everything a military problem requiring, a priori, a military solution.¹¹⁴

Ultimately, the seven interrelated elements of the new military urbanism – the disjuncture between rural soldiers and urban wars, the blurring of civilian and military control technologies, the treatment of attacks against cities as media events, the security surge, the militarization of movement, the

¹¹¹ Neil Smith, 'The Military Planks of Capital Accumulation: An Interview with Neil Smith', *Subtopia Blog*, 10 July 2007.

¹¹² David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

¹¹³ For an insightful discussion, see George Steinmetz, 'The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism', *Public Culture* 15: 2, 2003, 323–45. Steinmetz argues that the 'emerging condition [following the global financial crisis and recession] does not mark a return to the Fordist–Keynesian welfare state but rather a transition toward an enhanced police state. Security in the disciplinary, not the social, sense in the focus of current government activity'.

¹¹⁴ See Jonathan Michel Feldman, 'From Warfare State to "Shadow State": Militarism, Economic Depletion, and Reconstruction', *Social Text*, 25, 2007, 143–68, and De Goede, 'Beyond Risk'.

contradictions between national and urban cultures of fear and community, and the political economies of the new state spaces of violence – are responsible for forging perhaps its greatest feature. That feature is the radical reorganization of the geography and experience of borders and boundaries. It encompasses a series of Foucauldian ‘boomerang effects’ which continually shift between the colonial metropole and the war-zone frontier – a process so central to the new military urbanism that it warrants a separate chapter, devoted to the emerging ‘ubiquitous border’.

CHAPTER FOUR

Ubiquitous Borders¹

National borders have ceased being continuous lines on the earth's surface and [have] become non-related sets of lines and points situated within each country.²

The act of targeting is an act of violence even before any shot is fired.³

How does one reconcile the proliferation of hard, militarized borders – not just within war-zones such as Baghdad or the West Bank, but between nations and within cities all over the world – with the sense that people and things everywhere on the planet are becoming ever more mobile? What, in other words, is the relation between the proliferation of transnational and urban circulations that surround globalization, and the parallel profusion of what Ronen Shamir calls ‘closure, entrapment and containment’⁴ in the contemporary world?

In this chapter I develop the argument that a major shift is underway regarding our world's borders – a shift that derives from transformations in the nature of nation-states. In our time, nation-states are moving away from their role as guarantors of a community of citizens within a territorial unit, charged with the policing of links between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Instead, these states are becoming internationally organized systems geared towards trying to separate people and circulations deemed risky or malign from those deemed risk-free or worthy of protection. This process increasingly occurs both inside and outside territorial boundaries between nation-states, resulting in a blurring between international borders and urban/local borders. Indeed, the two increasingly seem to meld, to constitute a ‘multiplicity of control points’⁵ that become distributed along key lines of circulation and key geographies of wealth and power, crossing territorial lines between states as well as those within and beyond these boundaries.

¹ This term was first used by Dean Wilson and Leanne Weber in their article ‘Risk and Preemption on the Australian Border’, *Surveillance & Society* 5: 2, 2008, 124–41.

² Paul Andreu et. al, ‘Borders and Borderers’, *Architecture of the Borderlands*, London: Wiley/Architectural Design, 1997, 57–61.

³ Samuel Weber, *Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2005, 105.

⁴ Ronen Shamir, ‘Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime’, *Sociological Theory* 23: 2, 2005, 199.

⁵ Karine Côté-Boucher, ‘The Diffuse Border: Intelligence-Sharing, Control and Confinement along Canada's Smart Border’, *Surveillance & Society* 5: 2, 2008, 153.