ues to be both a fine editor and a terrific human being. May his sense of humor never fail him.

It is hard for us to imagine how people co-authored projects before the existence of the Internet. The ability to send formatted text back and forth (again and again) has meant that for very large parts of this manuscript, it is no longer possible for us to be sure who wrote which sentences, or originated or developed which ideas. The result, we believe, is genuine synergy; neither of us could have done this alone, and despite the occasional rough patch, we had a wonderful time doing it together.

Our families, Doug, Daniel, and Matthew and Larry, Melissa, and Laura, have suffered long and not always silently, but have hung in there nonetheless. We dedicate this book to our husbands, Larry Wright and Douglas Johnson, both longtime activists beyond borders, and thank them for what they have taught us about connection.

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CHAPTER 1

Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction

World politics at the end of the twentieth century involves, alongside states, many nonstate actors that interact with each other, with states, and with international organizations. These interactions are structured in terms of networks, and transnational networks are increasingly visible in international politics. Some involve economic actors and firms. Some are networks of scientists and experts whose professional ties and shared causal ideas underpin their efforts to influence policy.[1] Others are networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation.[2] We will call these *transnational advocacy networks.*

Advocacy networks are significant transnationally and domestically. By building new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, they multiply the channels of access to the international system. In such issue areas as the environment and human rights, they also make international resources available to new actors in domestic political and social struggles. By thus blurring the boundaries between a state's relations with its own nationals and the recourse both citizens

[1] Peter Haas has called these "knowledge-based" or "epistemic communities." See Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,* special issue, *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 1–36.

[2] Ideas that specify criteria for determining whether actions are right and wrong and whether outcomes are just or unjust are shared principled beliefs or values. Beliefs about cause-effect relationships are shared casual beliefs. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 8–10.

and states have to the international system, advocacy networks are helping to transform the practice of national sovereignty.

To explore these issues, we first look at four historical forerunners to modern advocacy networks, including the antislavery movement and the campaign for woman suffrage, and we examine in depth three contemporary cases in which transnational organizations are very prominent: human rights, environment, and women's rights. We also refer to transnational campaigns around indigenous rights, labor rights, and infant formula. Despite their differences, these networks are similar in several important respects: the centrality of values or principled ideas, the belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment by nongovernmental actors of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns.

Scholars have been slow to recognize either the rationality or the significance of activist networks. Motivated by values rather than by material concerns or professional norms, these networks fall outside our accustomed categories. More than other kinds of transnational actors, advocacy networks often reach beyond policy change to advocate and instigate changes in the institutional and principled basis of international interactions. When they succeed, they are an important part of an explanation for changes in world politics. A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.[3] Such networks are most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high value content and informational uncertainty. At the core of the relationship is information exchange. What is novel in these networks is the ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the debate. They are not always successful in their efforts, but they are increasingly relevant players in policy debates.

Transnational advocacy networks are proliferating, and their goal is to change the behavior of states and of international organizations. Simultaneously principled and strategic actors, they "frame" issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encour-

[3] See also J. Clyde Mitchell, "Networks, Norms, and Institutions," in *Network Analysis*, ed. Jeremy Boissevain and J. Clyde Mitchell (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 23. A "common discourse" was suggested by Stewart Lawrence in "The Role of International 'Issue Networks' in Refugee Repatriation: The Case of El Salvador" (Columbia University, mimeo).

age action, and to "fit" with favorable institutional venues.[4] Network actors bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates, and serve as sources of information and testimony. Norms, here, follows the usage given by Peter Katzenstein,

> to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity.[5]

They also promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards. Insofar as is possible, they seek to maximize their influence or leverage over the target of their actions. In doing so they contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behavior.[6]

Networks are communicative structures. To influence discourse, procedures, and policy, activists may engage and become part of larger policy communities that group actors working on an issue from a variety of institutional and value perspectives. Transnational advocacy networks must also be understood as political spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate—formally or informally—the social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise.

[4] David Snow and his colleagues have adapted Erving Goffman's concept of framing. We use it to mean "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action." Definition from Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction," *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 6. See also Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, "Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems," *Journal of Politics* 53:4 (1991): 1044–74.

[5] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5. See also Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); David H. Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Janice E. Thomson, "State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 23–47; and Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms," *International Organization* 47 (August 1993): 565–97.

[6] With the "constructivists" in international relations theory, we take actors and interests to be constituted in interaction. See Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), who argues that "states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world. States are *socialized* to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them live" (p. 2).

We refer to transnational networks (rather than coalitions, movements, or civil society) to evoke the structured and structuring dimension in the actions of these complex agents, who not only participate in new areas of politics but also shape them. By importing the network concept from sociology and applying it transnationally, we bridge the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms. Still, social science theories did not dictate our choice of "network" as the name to be given to the phenomena we are studying. The actors themselves did: over the last two decades, individuals and organizations have consciously formed and named transnational networks, developed and shared networking strategies and techniques, and assessed the advantages and limits of this kind of activity. Scholars have come late to the party.

Given our enterprise, it should be clear that we reject the separation common in our discipline between international relations and comparative politics. Moreover, even liberal theories of international relations that recognize that domestic interests shape states' actions internationally, and that states are embedded in an interdependent world where nonstate actors are consequential, cannot explain the phenomena we describe.[7] Robert Putnam's "two-level game" metaphor has taken liberal theorists some distance toward seeing international relations as a two-way street, in which political entrepreneurs bring international influence to bear on domestic politics at the same time that domestic politics shapes their international positions.[8] But however valuable its insights, even this two-way street is too narrow, implying a limited access to the international system that no longer holds true in many issue areas.

Instead, we draw upon sociological traditions that focus on complex interactions among actors, on the intersubjective construction of frames of meaning, and on the negotiation and malleability of identities and interests. These have been concerns of constructivists in international relations theory and of social movement theorists in comparative politics, and we draw from both traditions. The networks we describe in this book participate in domestic and international politics simultaneously, drawing upon a variety of resources, as if they were part of an international society. However, they use these resources strategically to affect a world of states and international organizations constructed by states. Both these dimensions are essential. Rationalists will recognize the language of incentives and constraints, strategies, institutions, and rules, whereas con-

[7] For an impressive effort to systematize liberal international relations theory, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Working Paper no. 92-6, revised April 1993. Liberal institutionalists since Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), have taken complex interdependence as axiomatic in the development of regime theory.

[8] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988): 427–60.

structivists and social constructionists will be more comfortable with our stress on norms, social relations, and intersubjective understandings. We are convinced that both sets of concerns matter, and that recognizing that goals and interests are not exogenously given, we can think about the strategic activity of actors in an intersubjectively structured political universe. The key to doing so is remembering that the social and political contexts within which networks operate at any particular point contain contested understandings as well as stable and shared ones. Network activists can operate strategically within the more stable universe of shared understandings at the same time that they try to reshape certain contested meanings.

Part of what is so elusive about networks is how they seem to embody elements of agent and structure simultaneously. When we ask who creates networks and how, we are inquiring about them as structures—as patterns of interactions among organizations and individuals. When we talk about them as actors, however, we are attributing to these structures an agency that is not reducible to the agency of their components. Nonetheless, when we sometimes refer to networks as actors in this book, we do not lose sight of the fact that activists act on behalf of networks.

Our approach to these transnational interactions must therefore be both structural and actor-centered. We address four main questions: (1) What is a transnational advocacy network? (2) Why and how do they emerge? (3) How do advocacy networks work? (4) Under what conditions can they be effective—that is, when are they most likely to achieve their goals?[9]

When we started this book, the realm of transnational social movements and networks was still an almost uncharted area of scholarship, both theoretically and empirically, and thus required a style of research aimed at the discovery of new theory and patterns. Because few existing theories attempt to explain the transnational phenomena we are studying, we could not rely on standard social science methods for hypothesis testing. Social scientists recognize that generating theory and formulating hypotheses require different methods from those for testing theory. Our approach thus resembles what sociologists call "grounded theory," which is the most systematic attempt to specify how theoretical insights are generated through qualitative research.[10] While doing the research for

[9] On the problem of measuring effectiveness, see William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1975); and J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., *The Politics of Social Protest* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

[10] See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 38; Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); Barney G. Glaser, *Theoretical Sensitivity* (Mill Valley, Calif.: Sociological Press, 1978); and Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, "Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview," in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994), pp. 273–85.

this book, we first explored these new patterns of interaction inductively, by studying the histories of particular networks involved in transnational campaigns. Because cross-national and cross-cultural activism are intensely context-sensitive, we cast a wide net in our search for intervening variables between values and advocacy and between advocacy and its (apparent) effect. Nevertheless, looking comparatively across regions and issue areas, we found striking commonalities in how and why networks emerged, and in the strategies they adopted. Although we eventually found that theoretical work on domestic social movements has a great deal to say about how transnational advocacy networks function, we did not begin with this assumption. Out of our observed commonalities we generated some initial arguments about why networks emerge and under what conditions they can be effective. In the tradition of grounded theory, we used additional comparative cases to further explore and refine our initial arguments. In each of our cases we refer to issues where networks exist and where networks do not exist, and we explore both successful and unsuccessful networks and campaigns.

International and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a prominent role in these networks, in some cases inspired by an international voluntarism that is largely unaccounted for in international relations theory. Social scientists have barely addressed the political role of activist NGOs as simultaneously domestic and international actors. Much of the existing literature on NGOs comes from development studies, and either ignores interactions with states or is remarkably thin on political analysis.[11] Examining their role in advocacy networks helps both to distinguish NGOs from, and to see their connections with, social movements, state agencies, and international organizations.

We examine transnational advocacy networks and what they do by analyzing campaigns networks have waged. For our purposes, campaigns are sets of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network (what social movement theorists would call a "mobilization potential") develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal (and generally against a common target). In a campaign, core network actors mobilize others and initiate the tasks of structural integration and cultural negotiation among the groups in the network. Just as in domestic campaigns, they connect groups to each other, seek out resources, propose and prepare

[11] Although development journals (especially *World Development*) routinely include articles discussing the role of NGOs, political science journals do not, nor have many political scientists been a part of such discussions in the development community. See David Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda* (Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1990).

activities, and conduct public relations. They must also consciously seek to develop a "common frame of meaning"—a task complicated by cultural diversity within transnational networks.[12] Activist groups have long used the language of campaigning to talk about focused, strategically planned efforts. International campaigns by environmental and conservation organizations, for example, have traditionally had a topical focus (saving furry animals, whales, tropical forests), whereas human rights campaigns have focused on either a country (the Argentina campaign) or an issue (torture).[13]

Analysis of campaigns provides a window on transnational relations as an arena of struggle in ways that a focus on networks themselves or on the institutions they try to affect does not. In most chapters we also consider noncampaigns—issues that activists identified as problematic, but around which networks did not campaign. This focus on campaigns highlights *relationships*—how connections are established and maintained among network actors, and between activists and their allies and opponents. We can identify the kinds of *resources* that make a campaign possible, such as information, leadership, and symbolic or material capital.[14] And we must consider the kinds of *institutional structures*, both domestic and international, that encourage or impede particular kinds of transnational activism. Here we draw from several traditions. Thomas Risse-Kappen's recent work argues that domestic structures mediate transnational interactions. By domestic structures he means state structure (centralized vs. fragmented), societal structure (weak vs. strong), and policy networks (consensual vs. polarized).[15] Similarly, social movement theorists agree that understanding the political context or "opportunity structure" is key both to understanding a movement's emergence and to gauging its success. Assessing opportunity structure can be an exercise in comparative statics—looking at differential access by citizens to political institutions like legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts—or it can be viewed dynamically, as in changes in formal or informal political power relations over time. We agree with Sidney Tarrow on the need to combine the more narrowly institutional version

[12] See Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht, "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany," *American Journal of Sociology* 98:3 (November 1992): 558–59.

[13] For a discussion of World Wildlife Fund campaigns, see Arne Schiotz, "A Campaign is Born," *IUCN Bulletin* 14:10–12 (1983): 120–22.

[14] The classic statement on resource mobilization and social movements is John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82:6 (1977): 1212–41.

[15] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction," in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*, ed. Risse-Kappen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 22.

with a dynamic approach.[16] Finally, a focus on campaigning lets us explore negotiation of meaning while we look at the evolution of tactics; we can recognize that cultural differences, different conceptions of the stakes in a campaign, and resource inequalities among network actors exist, at the same time that we identify critical roles that different actors fill. Campaigns are processes of issue construction constrained by the action context in which they are to be carried out: activists identify a problem, specify a cause, and propose a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern. In networked campaigns this process of "strategic portrayal"[17] must work for the different actors in the network and also for target audiences.

What Is a Transnational Advocacy Network?

Networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange. The organizational theorist Walter Powell calls them a third mode of economic organization, distinctly different from markets and hierarchy (the firm). "Networks are 'lighter on their feet' than hierarchy" and are "particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information," and "for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured."[18] His insights about economic networks are extraordinarily suggestive for an understanding of political networks, which also form around issues where information plays a key role, and around issues where the value of the "commodity" is not easily measured.

In spite of the differences between domestic and international realms, the network concept travels well because it stresses fluid and open relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas. We call them advocacy networks because advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition. Advocacy captures what is unique about these transnational networks: they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often

[16] Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, pp. 41–61. By political opportunity structure he means *"consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements* . . . The most salient kinds of signals are four: the opening up of access to power, shifting alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites" (p. 54, italic in original).

[17] Deborah A. Stone, *Policy Paradox and Political Reason* (New York: HarperCollins, 1988), p. 6.

[18] Walter W. Powell, "Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12 (1990): 295–96, 303–4.

involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their "interests."

Some issue areas reproduce transnationally the webs of personal relationships that are crucial in the formation of domestic networks.[19] Advocacy networks have been particularly important in value-laden debates over human rights, the environment, women, infant health, and indigenous peoples, where large numbers of differently situated individuals have become acquainted over a considerable period and developed similar world views. When the more visionary among them have proposed strategies for political action around apparently intractable problems, this potential has been transformed into an action network.

Major actors in advocacy networks may include the following: (1) international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations; (2) local social movements; (3) foundations; (4) the media; (5) churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; and (7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments. Not all these will be present in each advocacy network. Initial research suggests, however, that international and domestic NGOs play a central role in all advocacy networks, usually initiating actions and pressuring more powerful actors to take positions. NGOs introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes.

Groups in a network share values and frequently exchange information and services. The flow of information among actors in the network reveals a dense web of connections among these groups, both formal and informal. The movement of funds and services is especially notable between foundations and NGOs, and some NGOs provide services such as training for other NGOs in the same and sometimes other advocacy networks. Personnel also circulate within and among networks, as relevant players move from one to another in a version of the "revolving door."

Relationships among networks, both within and between issue areas, are similar to what scholars of social movements have found for domestic activism.[20] Individuals and foundation funding have moved back and forth among them. Environmentalists and women's groups have looked at the history of human rights campaigns for models of effective international institution building. Refugee resettlement and indigenous people's rights are increasingly central components of international environmental

[19] See Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, "The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (July 1993): 56–74.

[20] See McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements"; Myra Marx Ferree and Frederick D. Miller, "Mobilization and Meaning: Toward an Integration of Social Psychological and Resource Perspectives on Social Movements," *Sociological Inquiry* 55 (1985): 49–50; and David S. Meyer and Nancy Whittier, "Social Movement Spillover," *Social Problems* 41:2 (May 1994): 277–98.

activity, and vice versa; mainstream human rights organizations have joined the campaign for women's rights. Some activists consider themselves part of an "NGO community."

Besides sharing information, groups in networks create categories or frames within which to generate and organize information on which to base their campaigns. Their ability to generate information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively, is their most valuable currency; it is also central to their identity. Core campaign organizers must ensure that individuals and organizations with access to necessary information are incorporated into the network; different ways of framing an issue may require quite different kinds of information. Thus frame disputes can be a significant source of change within networks.

Why and How Have Transnational Advocacy Networks Emerged?

Advocacy networks are not new. We can find examples as far back as the nineteenth-century campaign for the abolition of slavery. But their number, size, and professionalism, and the speed, density, and complexity of international linkages among them has grown dramatically in the last three decades. As Hugh Heclo remarks about domestic issue networks, "if the current situation is a mere outgrowth of old tendencies, it is so in the same sense that a 16-lane spaghetti interchange is the mere elaboration of a country crossroads."[21]

We cannot accurately count transnational advocacy networks to measure their growth over time, but one proxy is the increase in the number of international NGOs committed to social change. Because international NGOs are key components of any advocacy network, this increase suggests broader trends in the number, size, and density of advocacy networks generally. Table 1 suggests that the number of international nongovernmental social change groups has increased across all issues, though to varying degrees in different issue areas. There are five times as many organizations working primarily on human rights as there were in 1950, but proportionally human rights groups have remained roughly a quarter of all such groups. Similarly, groups working on women's rights accounted for 9 percent of all groups in 1953 and in 1993. Transnational environmental organizations have grown most dramatically in absolute and relative terms, increasing from two groups in 1953 to ninety in 1993, and from 1.8 percent of total groups in 1953 to 14.3 percent in 1993. The

[21] Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 97.

Table 1. International nongovernmental social change organizations (categorized by the major issue focus of their work)

Issue area (N)	1953 (N=110)	1963 (N=141)	1973 (N=183)	1983 (N=348)	1993 (N=631)
Human rights	33 30.0%	38 27.0%	41 22.4%	79 22.7%	168 26.6%
World order	8 7.3	4 2.8	12 6.6	31 8.9	48 7.6
International law	14 12.7	19 13.4	25 13.7	26 7.4	26 4.1
Peace	11 10.0	20 14.2	14 7.7	22 6.3	59 9.4
Women's rights	10 9.1	14 9.9	16 8.7	25 7.2	61 9.7
Environment	2 1.8	5 3.5	10 5.5	26 7.5	90 14.3
Development	3 2.7	3 2.1	7 3.8	13 3.7	34 5.4
Ethnic unity/Group rts.	10 9.1	12 8.5	18 9.8	37 10.6	29 4.6
Esperanto	11 10.0	18 12.8	28 15.3	41 11.8	54 8.6

SOURCE: Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, 1993). We are indebted to Jackie Smith, University of Notre Dame, for the use of her data from 1983 and 1993, and the use of her coding form and codebook for our data collection for the period 1953–73.

percentage share of groups in such issue areas as international law, peace, ethnic unity, and Esperanto, has declined.[22]

Although the networks discussed in this book represent only a subset of the total number of networks, these include the issue area of human rights,

[22] Data from a collaborative research project with Jackie G. Smith. We thank her for the use of her data from the period 1983–93, whose results are presented in Jackie G. Smith, "Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector," in Jackie G. Smith, et al., eds. *Transnational Social Movements and World Politics: Solidarity beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming 1997), and for permission to use her coding form and codebook for our data collection for the period 1953–73. All data were coded from Union of International Associations, *The Yearbook of International Organizations*, 1948–95 (published annually).

around which the largest number of international nongovernmental social change organizations has organized. Together, groups working on human rights, environment, and women's rights account for over half the total number of international nongovernmental social change organizations.

International networking is costly. Geographic distance, the influence of nationalism, the multiplicity of languages and cultures, and the costs of fax, phone, mail, and air travel make the proliferation of international networks a puzzle that needs explanation. Under what conditions are networks possible and likely, and what triggers their emergence?

Transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge around those issues where (1) channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion the "boomerang" pattern of influence characteristic of these networks (see Figure 1); (2) activists or "political entrepreneurs" believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks; and (3) conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. Where channels of participation are blocked, the international arena may be the only means that domestic activists have to gain attention to their issues. Boomerang strategies are most common in campaigns where the target is a state's domestic policies or behavior; where a campaign seeks broad procedural change involving dispersed actors, strategies are more diffuse.

The Boomerang Pattern

It is no accident that so many advocacy networks address claims about rights in their campaigns. Governments are the primary "guarantors" of rights, but also their primary violators. When a government violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas. They may seek international connections finally to express their concerns and even to protect their lives.

When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside. This is most obviously the case in human rights campaigns. Similarly, indigenous rights campaigns and environmental campaigns that support the demands of local peoples for participation in development projects that would affect them frequently involve this kind of triangulation. Linkages are important for both sides: for the less powerful third world actors, networks provide access, leverage, and information (and



Figure 1 Boomerang pattern. State A blocks redress to organizations within it; they activate network, whose members pressure their own states and (if relevant) a third-party organization, which in turn pressure State A.

often money) they could not expect to have on their own; for northern groups, they make credible the assertion that they are struggling with, and not only for, their southern partners. Not surprisingly, such relationships can produce considerable tensions.

On other issues where governments are inaccessible or deaf to groups whose claims may nonetheless resonate elsewhere, international contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the domestic arena. The cases of rubber tappers trying to stop encroachment by cattle ranchers in Brazil's western Amazon and of tribal populations threatened by the damming of the Narmada River in India are good examples of this.[23]

[23] On the former, see Margaret E. Keck, "Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber Tappers of Acre," *Comparative Politics* 27 (July 1995): 409–24; on the latter, see William F. Fisher, ed., *Toward Sustainable Development? Struggling over India's Narmada River* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

Political Entrepreneurs

Just as oppression and injustice do not themselves produce movements or revolutions, claims around issues amenable to international action do not produce transnational networks. Activists —"people who care enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals"[24]—do. They create them when they believe that transnational networking will further their organizational missions—by sharing information, attaining greater visibility, gaining access to wider publics, multiplying channels of institutional access, and so forth. For example, in the campaign to stop the promotion of infant formula to poor women in developing countries, organizers settled on a boycott of Nestlé, the largest producer, as its main tactic. Because Nestlé was a transnational actor, activists believed a transnational network was necessary to bring pressure on corporations and governments.[25] Over time, in such issue areas, participation in transnational networks has become an essential component of the collective identities of the activists involved, and networking a part of their common repertoire. The political entrepreneurs who become the core networkers for a new campaign have often gained experience in earlier ones.

The Growth of International Contact

Opportunities for network activities have increased over the last two decades. In addition to the efforts of pioneers, a proliferation of international organizations and conferences has provided foci for connections. Cheaper air travel and new electronic communication technologies speed information flows and simplify personal contact among activists.[26]

Underlying these trends is a broader cultural shift. The new networks have depended on the creation of a new kind of global public (or civil society), which grew as a cultural legacy of the 1960s.[27] Both the activism that swept Western Europe, the United States, and many parts of the third world during that decade, and the vastly increased opportunities for international contact, contributed to this shift. With a significant decline in air fares, foreign travel ceased to be the exclusive privilege of the

[24] Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, "Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 252.

[25] See Kathryn Sikkink, "Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986): 815–40.

[26] The constant dollar yield of airline tickets in 1995 was one half of what it was in 1966, while the number of international passengers enplaned increased more than four times during the same period. Air Transport Association home page, June 1997, http://www.air-transport.org/data/traffic.htm. See James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 12, 25.

[27] See Sidney Tarrow, "Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings through Action," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, p. 184.

wealthy. Students participated in exchange programs. The Peace Corps and lay missionary programs sent thousands of young people to live and work in the developing world. Political exiles from Latin America taught in U.S. and European universities. Churches opened their doors to refugees, and to new ideas and commitments.

Obviously, internationalism was not invented in the sixties. Religious and political traditions including missionary outreach, the solidarity traditions of labor and the left, and liberal internationalism have long stirred action by individuals or groups beyond the borders of their own state. While many activists working in advocacy networks come out of these traditions, they tend no longer to define themselves in terms of these traditions or the organizations that carried them. This is most true for activists on the left who suffered disillusionment from their groups' refusal to address seriously the concerns of women, the environment, or human rights violations in eastern bloc countries. Absent a range of options that in earlier decades would have competed for their commitments, advocacy and activism through either NGOs or grassroots movements became the most likely alternative for those seeking to "make a difference."

Although numerous solidarity committees and human rights groups campaigned against torture and disappearances under Latin American military regimes, even on behalf of the same individuals they employed different styles, strategies, and discourses, and understood their goals in the light of different principles. Solidarity organizations based their appeals on common ideological commitments—the notion that those being tortured or killed were defending a cause shared with the activists. Rights organizations, in principle, were committed to defending the rights of individuals regardless of their ideological affinity with the ideas of the victim. One exception to this ideal involved the use of violence. Amnesty International, for example, defended all prisoners against torture, summary execution, or the death penalty, but it would adopt as its more visible and symbolic "prisoners of conscience" only those individuals who had not advocated violence.

Although labor internationalism has survived the decline of the left, it is based mainly on large membership organizations representing (however imperfectly) bounded constituencies. Where advocacy networks have formed around labor issues, they have been transitory, responding to repression of domestic labor movements (as in labor support networks formed around Brazil, South Africa, and Central America in the early 1980s).[28]

[28] Brazil Labor Information and Resource Center, an advocacy group that functioned in the early 1980s, won the support of a large number of unions in the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe in a campaign protesting prosecution of Brazilian labor leaders for leading strikes and addressing rallies; the Labor Committee on South Africa brought together union leaders and intellectuals to disseminate information on labor organizing and repression among South Africa's newly militant industrial unions; the Labor Committee on Central America was composed of labor leaders who built alternative channels of contact and collaboration with Central American (especially Salvadorean and Guatemalan) labor activists in the face of the AFL-CIO's support for Ronald Reagan's policies in the region.

Advocacy networks in the north function in a cultural milieu of internationalism that is generally optimistic about the promise and possibilities of international networking. For network members in developing countries, however, justifying external intervention or pressure in domestic affairs is a much trickier business, except when lives are at stake. Linkages with northern networks require high levels of trust, as arguments justifying intervention on ethical grounds confront the ingrained nationalism common to many political groups in the developing world, as well as memories of colonial and neocolonial relations.

How Do Transnational Advocacy Networks Work?

Transnational advocacy networks seek influence in many of the same ways that other political groups or social movements do. Since they are not powerful in a traditional sense of the word, they must use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies. The bulk of what networks do might be termed persuasion or socialization, but neither process is devoid of conflict. Persuasion and socialization often involve not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing pressure, arm-twisting, encouraging sanctions, and shaming. Audie Klotz's work on norms and apartheid discusses coercion, incentive, and legitimation effects that are often part of a socialization process.[29]

Our typology of tactics that networks use in their efforts at persuasion, socialization, and pressure includes (1) *information politics*, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) *symbolic politics*, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away;[30] (3) *leverage politics*, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (4) *accountability politics*, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles.

A single campaign may contain many of these elements simultaneously. For example, the human rights network disseminated information about human rights abuses in Argentina in the period 1976–83. The

[29] Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*, pp. 152–64.

[30] Alison Brysk uses the categories "information politics" and "symbolic politics" to discuss strategies of transnational actors, especially networks around Indian rights. See "Acting Globally: Indian Rights and International Politics in Latin America," in *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Donna Lee Van Cott (New York: St. Martin's Press/Inter-American Dialogue, 1994), pp. 29–51; and "Hearts and Minds: Bringing Symbolic Politics Back In," *Polity* 27 (Summer 1995): 559–85.

Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo marched in circles in the central square in Buenos Aires wearing white handkerchiefs to draw symbolic attention to the plight of their missing children. The network also tried to use both material and moral leverage against the Argentine regime, by pressuring the United States and other governments to cut off military and economic aid, and by efforts to get the UN and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to condemn Argentina's human rights practices. Monitoring is a variation on information politics, in which activists use information strategically to ensure accountability with public statements, existing legislation and international standards.

The construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of networks' political strategies. David Snow has called this strategic activity "frame alignment": "by rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective."[31] "Frame resonance" concerns the relationship between a movement organization's interpretive work and its ability to influence broader public understandings. The latter involve both the frame's internal coherence and its experiential fit with a broader political culture.[32] In recent work, Snow and his colleagues and Sidney Tarrow, in turn, have given frame resonance a historical dimension by joining it to Tarrow's notion of protest cycles.[33] Struggles over meaning and the creation of new frames of meaning occur early in a protest cycle, but over time "a given collective action frame becomes part of the political culture—which is to say, part of the reservoir of symbols from which future movement entrepreneurs can choose."[34]

Network members actively seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda by framing them in innovative ways and by seeking hospitable venues. Sometimes they create issues by framing old problems in new ways; occasionally they help transform other actors' understandings of their identities and their interests. Land use rights in the Amazon, for example, took on an entirely different character and gained quite different allies viewed in a deforestation frame than they did in either social justice or regional development frames. In the 1970s and 1980s many states decided for the first time that promotion of human rights in other countries was a legitimate foreign policy goal and an authentic expression of national interest.

[31] David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Socilogocial Review* 51 (1986): 464.

[32] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), pp. 197–217.

[33] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, pp. 133–55.

[34] Tarrow, "Mentalities," p. 197.

This decision came in part from interaction with an emerging global human rights network. We argue that this represents not the victory of morality over self-interest, but a transformed understanding of national interest, possible in part because of structured interactions between state components and networks. This changed understanding cannot be derived solely from changing global and economic conditions, although these are relevant.

Transnational networks normally involve a small number of activists from the organizations and institutions involved in a given campaign or advocacy role. The kinds of pressure and agenda politics in which advocacy networks engage rarely involve mass mobilization, except at key moments, although the peoples whose cause they espouse may engage in mass protest (for example, those ousted from their land in the Narmada dam case).[35] Boycott strategies are a partial exception. Instead of mass mobilization, network activists engage in what Baumgartner and Jones, borrowing from law, call "venue shopping," which relies "more on the dual strategy of the presentation of an image and the search for a more receptive political venue."[36] The recent coupling of indigenous rights and environmental issues is a good example of a strategic venue shift by indigenous activists, who found the environmental arena more receptive to their claims than human rights venues had been.

Information Politics

Information binds network members together and is essential for network effectiveness. Many information exchanges are informal—telephone calls, E-mail and fax communications, and the circulation of newsletters, pamphlets and bulletins. They provide information that would not otherwise be available, from sources that might not otherwise be heard, and they must make this information comprehensible and useful to activists and publics who may be geographically and/or socially distant.[37]

[35] Gerhards and Rucht, "Mesomobilization," details the organizational efforts to prepare demonstrations and parallel meetings to coincide with the 1988 meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Berlin. This was by far the largest mass action in conjunction with the multilateral development bank campaign, which began holding meetings and demonstrations parallel to the banks' annual meetings in 1986. Interestingly, the authors seem not to have been aware of the existence of a transnational campaign of which this action was a part. On Narmada, see Medha Patkar, "The Struggle for Participation and Justice: A Historical Narrative," pp. 157–78; Anil Patel, "What Do the Narmada Tribals Want?," pp. 179–200; and Lori Udall, "The International Narmada Campaign: A Case of Sustained Advocacy," pp. 201–30, in *Toward Sustainable Development?* ed. Fisher.

[36] Baumgartner and Jones, "Agenda Dynamics," 1050.

[37] Rosenau, *Turbulence*, p. 199, argues that "as the adequacy of information and the very nature of knowledge have emerged as central issues, what were once regarded as the petty quarrels of scholars over the adequacy of evidence and the metaphysics of proof have become prominent activities in international relations."

Nonstate actors gain influence by serving as alternate sources of information. Information flows in advocacy networks provide not only facts but testimony—stories told by people whose lives have been affected. Moreover, activists interpret facts and testimony, usually framing issues simply, in terms of right and wrong, because their purpose is to persuade people and stimulate them to act. How does this process of persuasion occur? An effective frame must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions. These aims require clear, powerful messages that appeal to shared principles, which often have more impact on state policy than advice of technical experts. An important part of the political struggle over information is precisely whether an issue is defined primarily as technical—and thus subject to consideration by "qualified" experts—or as something that concerns a broader global constituency.

Even as we highlight the importance of testimony, however, we have to recognize the mediations involved. The process by which testimony is discovered and presented normally involves several layers of prior translation. Transnational actors may identify what kinds of testimony would be valuable, then ask an NGO in the area to seek out people who could tell those stories. They may filter the testimony through expatriates, through traveling scholars like ourselves, or through the media. There is frequently a huge gap between the story's original telling and the retellings—in its sociocultural context, its instrumental meaning, and even in its language. Local people, in other words, sometimes lose control over their stories in a transnational campaign. How this process of mediation/translation occurs is a particularly interesting facet of network politics.[38]

Networks strive to uncover and investigate problems, and alert the press and policymakers. One activist described this as the "human rights methodology"—"promoting change by reporting facts."[39] To be credible, the information produced by networks must be reliable and well documented. To gain attention, the information must be timely and dramatic. Sometimes these multiple goals of information politics conflict, but both credibility and drama seem to be essential components of a strategy aimed at persuading publics and policymakers to change their minds.

The notion of "reporting facts" does not fully express the way networks strategically use information to frame issues. Networks call attention to issues, or even create issues by using language that dramatizes

[38] We are grateful to Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing for this point.

[39] Dorothy Q. Thomas, "Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure," in *Ours by Right: Women's Rights as Human Rights*, ed. Joanna Kerr (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 83. This methodology is not new. See, for example, Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision*, pp. 187–88, 211–13.

and draws attention to their concerns. A good example is the recent campaign against the practice of female genital mutilation. Before 1976 the widespread practice of female circumcision in many African and a few Asian and Middle Eastern countries was known outside these regions mainly among medical experts and anthropologists.[40] A controversial campaign, initiated in 1974 by a network of women's and human rights organizations, began to draw wider attention to the issues by renaming the problem. Previously the practice was referred to by technically "neutral" terms such as female circumcision, clitoridectomy, or infibulation. The campaign around female genital "mutilation" raised its salience, literally creating the issue as a matter of public international concern. By renaming the practice the network broke the linkage with male circumcision (seen as a personal medical or cultural decision), implied a linkage with the more feared procedure of castration, and reframed the issue as one of violence against women. It thus resituated the practice as a human rights violation. The campaign generated action in many countries, including France and the United Kingdom, and the UN studied the problem and made a series of recommendations for eradicating certain traditional practices.[41]

Uncertainty is one of the most frequently cited dimensions of environmental issues. Not only is hard information scarce (although this is changing), but any given data may be open to a variety of interpretations. The tropical forest issue is fraught with scientific uncertainty about the role of forests in climate regulation, their regenerative capacity, and the value of undiscovered or untapped biological resources. Environmentalists are unlikely to resolve these questions, and what they have done in some recent campaigns is reframe the issue, calling attention to the impact of deforestation on particular human populations. By doing so, they called for action independent of the scientific data. Human rights activists, baby food campaigners, and women's groups play similar roles, dramatizing the situations of the victims and turning the cold facts into human stories, intended to move people to action. The baby food campaign, for example, relied heavily on public health studies that proved that improper bottle feeding contributed to infant malnutrition and mortality, and that corporate sales promotion was leading to a decline in breast feeding.[42] Network activists repackaged and interpreted this information in dramatic ways designed to promote action: the British development organization War on Want published a pamphlet entitled "The Baby Killers," which the Swiss Third World Action Group translated into German and retitled "Nestlé Kills Babies." Nestlé inadvertently gave activists a prominent public forum when it sued the Third World Action Group for defamation and libel.

Nongovernmental networks have helped legitimize the use of testimonial information along with technical and statistical information. Linkage of the two is crucial, for without the individual cases activists cannot motivate people to seek changed policies. Increasingly, international campaigns by networks take this two-level approach to information. In the 1980s even Greenpeace, which initially had eschewed rigorous research in favor of splashy media events, began to pay more attention to getting the facts right. Both technical information and dramatic testimony help to make the need for action more real for ordinary citizens.

A dense web of north-south exchange, aided by computer and fax communication, means that governments can no longer monopolize information flows as they could a mere half-decade ago. These technologies have had an enormous impact on moving information to and from third world countries, where mail service has often been slow and precarious; they also give special advantages of course, to organizations that have access to them. A good example of the new informational role of networks occurred when U.S. environmentalists pressured President George Bush to raise the issue of gold miners' ongoing invasions of the Yanomami indigenous reserve when Brazilian president Fernando Collor de Mello was in Washington in 1991. Collor believed that he had squelched protest over the Yanomami question by creating major media events out of the dynamiting of airstrips used by gold miners, but network members had current information faxed from Brazil, and they countered his claims with evidence that miners had rebuilt the airstrips and were still invading the Yanomami area.

The central role of information in these issues helps explain the drive to create networks. Information in these issue areas is both essential and dispersed. Nongovernmental actors depend on their access to information to help make them legitimate players. Contact with like-minded groups at home and abroad provides access to information necessary to their work,

[40] Female genital mutilation is most widely practiced in Africa, where it is reported to occur in at least twenty-six countries. Between 85 and 114 million women in the world today are estimated to have experienced genital mutilation. *World Bank Development Report 1993: Investing in Health* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 50.

[41] See Leonard J. Kouba and Judith Muasher, "Female Circumcision in Africa: An Overview," *African Studies Review* 28:1 (March 1985): 95–110; Alison T. Slack, "Female Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal," *Human Rights Quarterly* 10:4 (November 1988): 437–86; and Elise A. Sochart, "Agenda Setting, The Role of Groups and the Legislative Process: The Prohibition of Female Circumcision in Britain," *Parliamentary Affairs* 41:4 (October 1988): 508–26. On France, see Marlise Simons, "Mutilation of Girls' Genitals: Ethnic Gulf in French Court," *New York Times*, 23 November 1993, p. 13. For UN recommendations, see the "Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children," UN Document E/CN.4/1986/42 at 26 (1986).

[42] See D. B. Jellife and E. F. P. Jellife, *Human Milk in the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

broadens their legitimacy, and helps to mobilize information around particular policy targets. Most nongovernmental organizations cannot afford to maintain staff people in a variety of countries. In exceptional cases they send staff members on investigation missions, but this is not practical for keeping informed on routine developments. Forging links with local organizations allows groups to receive and monitor information from many countries at a low cost. Local groups, in turn, depend on international contacts to get their information out and to help protect them in their work.

The media is an essential partner in network information politics. To reach a broader audience, networks strive to attract press attention. Sympathetic journalists may become part of the network, but more often network activists cultivate a reputation for credibility with the press, and package their information in a timely and dramatic way to draw press attention.[43]

Symbolic Politics

Activists frame issues by identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks. Symbolic interpretation is part of the process of persuasion by which networks create awareness and expand their constituencies. Awarding the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize to Maya activist Rigoberta Menchú and the UN's designation of 1993 as the Year of Indigenous Peoples heightened public awareness of the situation of indigenous peoples in the Americas. Indigenous people's use of 1992, the 500th anniversary of the voyage of Columbus to the Americas, to raise a host of issues well illustrates the use of symbolic events to reshape understandings.[44]

The 1973 coup in Chile played this kind of catalytic role for the human rights community. Because Chile was the symbol of democracy in Latin America, the fact that such a brutal coup could happen there suggested that it could happen anywhere. For activists in the United States, the role of their government in undermining the Allende government intensified the need to take action. Often it is not one event but the juxtaposition of disparate events that makes people change their minds and act. For many people in the United States it was the juxtaposition of the coup in Chile, the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and the Civil Rights Movement that gave birth to the human rights movement. Likewise, dramatic footage of the Brazilian rainforest burning during the hot summer of 1988 in the

[43] See on social movements and media, see Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). For a report on recent research, see William A. Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld, "Movements and Media As Interacting Systems," *Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science* 528 (July 1993): 114–25.

[44] Brysk, "Acting Globally."

United States may have convinced many people that global warming and tropical deforestation were serious and linked issues. The assassination of Brazilian rubber tapper leader Chico Mendes at the end of that year crystallized the belief that something was profoundly wrong in the Amazon.

Leverage Politics

Activists in advocacy networks are concerned with political effectiveness. Their definition of effectiveness often includes some policy change by "target actors" such as governments, international financial institutions like the World Bank, or private actors like transnational corporations. In order to bring about policy change, networks need to pressure and persuade more powerful actors. To gain influence the networks seek leverage (the word appears often in the discourse of advocacy organizations) over more powerful actors. By leveraging more powerful institutions, weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly. The identification of material or moral leverage is a crucial strategic step in network campaigns.

Material leverage usually links the issue to money or goods (but potentially also to votes in international organizations, prestigious offices, or other benefits). The human rights issue became negotiable because governments or financial institutions connected human rights practices to military and economic aid, or to bilateral diplomatic relations. In the United States, human rights groups got leverage by providing policymakers with information that convinced them to cut off military and economic aid. To make the issue negotiable, NGOs first had to raise its profile or salience, using information and symbolic politics. Then more powerful members of the network had to link cooperation to something else of value: money, trade, or prestige. Similarly, in the environmentalists' multilateral development bank campaign, linkage of environmental protection with access to loans was very powerful.

Although NGO influence often depends on securing powerful allies, their credibility still depends in part on their ability to mobilize their own members and affect public opinion via the media. In democracies the potential to influence votes gives large membership organizations an advantage over nonmembership organizations in lobbying for policy change; environmental organizations, several of whose memberships number in the millions, are more likely to have this added clout than are human rights organizations.

Moral leverage involves what some commentators have called the "mobilization of shame," where the behavior of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny. Network activists exert moral leverage on the assumption that governments value the good opinion of others;

insofar as networks can demonstrate that a state is violating international obligations or is not living up to its own claims, they hope to jeopardize its credit enough to motivate a change in policy or behavior. The degree to which states are vulnerable to this kind of pressure varies, and will be discussed further below.

Accountability Politics

Networks devote considerable energy to convincing governments and other actors to publicly change their positions on issues. This is often dismissed as inconsequential change, since talk is cheap and governments sometimes change discursive positions hoping to divert network and public attention. Network activists, however, try to make such statements into opportunities for accountability politics. Once a government has publicly committed itself to a principle—for example, in favor of human rights or democracy—networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This is embarrassing to many governments, which may try to save face by closing that distance.

Perhaps the best example of network accountability politics was the ability of the human rights network to use the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords to pressure the Soviet Union and the governments of Eastern Europe for change. The Helsinki Accords helped revive the human rights movement in the Soviet Union, spawned new organizations like the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Helsinki Watch Committee in the United States, and helped protect activists from repression.[45] The human rights network referred to Moscow's obligations under the Helsinki Final Act and juxtaposed these with examples of abuses. In an illustration of the boomerang effect, human rights activist Yuri Orlov said, "We do not have the means to reach our government. My appeal to Brezhnev probably got as far as the regional KGB office. . . . The crucial question is what means are there for a Soviet citizen to approach his own government, other than indirectly through the governments of other countries."[46]

Domestic structures through which states and private actors can be held accountable to their pronouncements, to the law, or to contracts vary considerably from one nation to another, even among democracies. The centrality of the courts in U.S. politics creates a venue for the representation of diffuse interests that is not available in most European democracies.[47] It also explains the large number of U.S. advocacy organizations that specialize in litigation. The existence of legal mechanisms does not necessarily make them feasible instruments, however; Brazil has had a diffuse interests law granting standing to environmental and consumer advocacy organizations since 1985, but the sluggishness of Brazil's judiciary makes it largely ineffective.

[45] Discussion of the Helsinki Accords is based on Daniel Thomas, "Norms and Change in World Politics: Human Rights, the Helsinki Accords, and the Demise of Communism, 1975–1990," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1997.

[46] Walter Parchomenko, *Soviet Images of Dissidents and Nonconformists* (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 156, as cited in Thomas, p. 219.

Under What Conditions Do Advocacy Networks Have Influence?

To assess the influence of advocacy networks we must look at goal achievement at several different levels. We identify the following types or stages of network influence: (1) issue creation and agenda setting; (2) influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations; (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence on policy change in "target actors" which may be states, international organizations like the World Bank, or private actors like the Nestlé Corporation; and (5) influence on state behavior.

Networks generate attention to new issues and help set agendas when they provoke media attention, debates, hearings, and meetings on issues that previously had not been a matter of public debate. Because values are the essence of advocacy networks, this stage of influence may require a modification of the "value context" in which policy debates takes place. The UN's theme years and decades, such as International Women's Decade and the Year of Indigenous Peoples, were international events promoted by networks that heightened awareness of issues.

Networks influence discursive positions when they help persuade states and international organizations to support international declarations or to change stated domestic policy positions. The role environmental networks played in shaping state positions and conference declarations at the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro is an example of this kind of impact. They may also pressure states to make more binding commitments by signing conventions and codes of conduct.

The targets of network campaigns frequently respond to demands for policy change with changes in procedures (which may affect policies in the future). The multilateral bank campaign, discussed in Chapter 4, is largely responsible for a number of changes in internal bank directives mandating greater NGO and local participation in discussions of projects. It also opened access to formerly restricted information, and led to the establishment of an independent inspection panel for World Bank

[47] On access to the courts and citizen oversight of environmental policy in the U.S. and Germany, see Susan Rose Ackerman, *Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

projects. Procedural changes can greatly increase the opportunity for advocacy organizations to develop regular contact with other key players on an issue, and they sometimes offer the opportunity to move from outside to inside pressure strategies.

A network's activities may produce changes in policies, not only of the target states, but also of other states and/or international institutions. Explicit policy shifts seem to denote success, but even here both their causes and meanings may be elusive. We can point with some confidence to network impact where human rights network pressures have achieved cutoffs of military aid to repressive regimes, or a curtailment of repressive practices. Sometimes human rights activity even affects regime stability. But we must take care to distinguish between policy change and change in behavior; official policies regarding timber extraction in Sarawak, Malaysia, for example, may say little about how timber companies behave on the ground in the absence of enforcement.

We speak of stages of impact, and not merely types of impact, because we believe that increased attention, followed by changes in discursive positions, make governments more vulnerable to the claims that networks raise. (Discursive changes can also have a powerfully divisive effect on networks themselves, splitting insiders from outsiders, reformers from radicals.[48]) A government that claims to be protecting indigenous areas or ecological reserves is potentially more vulnerable to charges that such areas are endangered than one that makes no such claim. At that point the effort is not to make governments change their position but to hold them to their word. Meaningful policy change is thus more likely when the first three types or stages of impact have occurred.

Both issue characteristics and actor characteristics are important parts of our explanation of how networks affect political outcomes and the conditions under which networks can be effective. Issue characteristics such as salience and resonance within existing national or institutional agendas can tell us something about where networks are likely to be able to insert new ideas and discourses into policy debates. Success in influencing policy also depends on the strength and density of the network and its ability to achieve leverage. Although many issue and actor characteristics are relevant here, we stress issue resonance, network density, and target vulnerability.

Issue Characteristics

Issues that involve ideas about right and wrong are amenable to advocacy networking because they arouse strong feelings, allow networks to recruit volunteers and activists, and infuse meaning into these volunteer activities. However, not all principled ideas lead to network formation,

[48] We thank Jonathan Fox for reminding us of this point.

and some issues can be framed more easily than others so as to resonate with policymakers and publics. In particular, problems whose causes can be assigned to the deliberate (intentional) actions of identifiable individuals are amenable to advocacy network strategies in ways that problems whose causes are irredeemably structural are not. The real creativity of advocacy networks has been in finding intentionalist frames within which to address some elements of structural problems. Though the frame of violence against women does not exhaust the structural issue of patriarchy, it may transform some of patriarchy's effects into problems amenable to solution. Reframing land use and tenure conflict as environmental issues does not exhaust the problems of poverty and inequality, but it may improve the odds against solving part of them. Network actors argue that in such reframing they are weakening the structural apparatus of patriarchy, poverty, and inequality and empowering new actors to address these problems better in the future. Whether or not they are right, with the decline almost everywhere of mass parties of the left, few alternative agendas remain on the table within which these issues can be addressed.

As we look at the issues around which transnational advocacy networks have organized most effectively, we find two issue characteristics that appear most frequently: (1) issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and (2) issues involving legal equality of opportunity. The first respond to a normative logic, and the second to a juridical and institutional one.

Issues involving physical harm to vulnerable or innocent individuals appear particularly compelling. Of course, what constitutes bodily harm and who is vulnerable or innocent may be highly contested. As the early failed campaign against female circumcision shows, one person's harm is another's rite of passage. Still, campaigns against practices involving bodily harm to populations perceived as vulnerable or innocent are most likely to be effective transnationally. Torture and disappearance have been more tractable than some other human rights issues, and protesting torture of political prisoners more effective than protesting torture of common criminals or capital punishment. Environmental campaigns that have had the greatest transnational effect have stressed the connection between protecting environments and protecting the often vulnerable people who live in them.

We also argue that in order to campaign on an issue it must be converted into a "causal story" that establishes who bears responsibility or guilt.[49] But the causal chain needs to be sufficiently short and clear to make the case convincing. The responsibility of a torturer who places an electric prod to a prisoner's genitals is quite clear. Assigning blame to state leaders for the actions of soldiers or prison guards involves a longer

[49] Deborah A. Stone, "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas," *Political Science Quarterly* 104:2 (1989): 281–300.

causal chain, but accords with common notions of the principle of strict chain of command in military regimes.

Activists have been able to convince people that the World Bank bears responsibility for the human and environmental impact of projects it directly funds, but have had a harder time convincingly making the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responsible for hunger or food riots in the developing world. In the latter case the causal chain is longer, more complex, and much less visible, since neither the IMF nor governments reveal the exact content of negotiations.

An example from the Nestlé Boycott helps to illustrate the point about causal chains. The boycott was successful in ending direct advertising and promotion of infant formula to mothers because activists could establish that the corporation directly influenced decisions about infant feeding, with negative effects on infant health. But the boycott failed to prevent corporations from donating infant formula supplies to hospitals. Although this was the single most successful marketing tool of the corporation, the campaign's longer and more complex story about responsibility failed here because publics believe that doctors and hospitals buffer patients from corporate influence.

The second issue around which transnational campaigns appear to be effective is increased legal equality of opportunity (as distinguished from outcome). Our discussions of slavery and woman suffrage in Chapter 2 address this issue characteristic, as does one of the most successful transnational campaigns we don't discuss—the antiapartheid campaign. What made apartheid such a clear target was the legal denial of the most basic aspects of equality of opportunity. Places where racial stratification is almost as severe as it is in South Africa, but where such stratification is not legally mandated, such as Brazil and some U.S. cities, have not generated the same concern.[50]

Actor Characteristics

However amenable particular issues may be to strong transnational and transcultural messages, there must be actors capable of transmitting those messages and targets who are vulnerable to persuasion or leverage. Networks operate best when they are dense, with many actors, strong connections among groups in the network, and reliable information flows. (Density refers both to regularity and diffusion of information exchange within networks and to coverage of key areas.) Effective networks must involve reciprocal information exchanges, and include activists from target countries as well as those able to get institutional leverage. Measuring network density is problematic; sufficient densities are likely to be campaign-specific, and not only numbers of "nodes" in the network but also their quality—access to and ability to disseminate information, credibility with targets, ability to speak to and for other social networks—are all important aspects of density as well.

[50] See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Target actors must be vulnerable either to material incentives or to sanctions from outside actors, or they must be sensitive to pressure because of gaps between stated commitments and practice. Vulnerability arises both from the availability of leverage and the target's sensitivity to leverage; if either is missing, a campaign may fail. Countries that are most suceptible to network pressures are those that aspire to belong to a normative community of nations. This desire implies a view of state preferences that recognizes states' interactions as a social—and socializing—process.[51] Thus moral leverage may be especially relevant where states are actively trying to raise their status in the international system. Brazilian governments since 1988, for example, have been very concerned about the impact of the Amazon issue on Brazil's international image. President José Sarney's invitation to hold the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil was an attempt to improve that image. Similarly, the concern of recent Mexican administrations with Mexico's international prestige has made it more vulnerable to pressure from the human rights network. In the baby food campaign, network activists used moral leverage to convince states to vote in favor of the WHO/UNICEF codes of conduct. As a result, even the Netherlands and Switzerland, both major exporters of infant formula, voted in favor of the code.

Thinking about Transnational Politics

By focusing on international interactions involving nonstate actors, we follow in the tradition of earlier work in transnational politics that signaled the emergence of multiple channels of contact among societies, and the resultant blurring of domestic and international politics.[52] The network concept offers a further refinement of that work. Both the Keohane and Nye collection and the various analysts of the "new transnationalism" lump together relations among quite distinct kinds of transnational actors: multinational corporations, the Catholic church, international scientific organizations, and activist groups.[53] All

[51] See Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*.

[52] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[53] The only factor that many of these transnational relations share is that all operate across national borders, and all are characterized by purposeful actors (at least one of which is a nonstate agent). See Risse-Kappen, "Introduction," *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*, p. 8.

these relations can be characterized as forms of transnational networks, but we distinguish three different categories based on their motivations: (1) those with essentially *instrumental goals,* especially transnational corporations and banks; (2) those motivated primarily by *shared causal ideas,* such as scientific groups or epistemic communities;[54] and (3) those motivated primarily by *shared principled ideas or values* (transnational advocacy networks).

These different categories of transnational networks correspond to different endowments of political resources and patterns of influence. In transnational relations among actors with instrumental goals, we would expect economic resources to carry the most weight; in epistemic communities, technical expertise and the ability to convince policymakers of its importance counts most. Like epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks rely on information, but for them it is the interpretation and strategic use of information that is most important. Influence is possible because the actors in these networks are simultaneously helping to define the issue area itself, convince target audiences that the problems thus defined are soluble, prescribe solutions, and monitor their implementation. Thus transnational advocacy networks are distinctive in the centrality of principled ideas; their strategies aim to use information and beliefs to motivate political action and to use leverage to gain the support of more powerful institutions.

Without assuming that political interactions in the international system are reducible to domestic politics writ large, we have drawn extensively on insights developed in studies of domestic politics. American political science has been especially attentive to theories of group formation and behavior. However, both pluralist and elitist theories classify issue areas narrowly either by economic sector or by government policy clusters.[55] By extending the use of issue area to principled issues

[54] See Haas, ed., *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination.* Theorists of epistemic communities exclude activist groups from their definition, seeing epistemic communities mainly as groups of scientists, limited to more technical issues in international relations. M. J. Peterson, in "Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 149, 155, distinguishes actors in epistemic communities from activists, who are "not constrained by canons of reasoning" and who frame issues in simple terms, dividing the world into "bad guys" and "good guys."

[55] Andrew S. McFarland, "Interest Groups and Political Time: Cycles in America," *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (July 1991): 261. Attempts to characterize patterns of influence have included explanations highlighting group characteristics, issue characteristics, and, more recently, patterns of interaction—policy committees and issue networks. See, e.g., Heclo, "Issue Networks"; Jack Hayward, "The Policy Community Approach to Industrial Policy," in *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives,* ed. Dankwart Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 381–407; and Howard Aldrich and David A. Whetten, "Organization-sets, Action-sets, and Networks: Making the Most of Simplicity," in *Handbook of Organizational Design,* ed. Paul Nystrom and William Starbuck (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). This organization literature has occasionally been applied to international relations. See Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations," *International Organization* 42 (Spring 1988): 245–73.

as well, we are rejecting an economically reductionist notion of interests, adopting instead a more interactive approach to how interests are shaped within networks. The network literature in sociology has developed formal mechanisms for identifying and mapping networks, and exploring their attributes and relations—such as the network's density or the strength of links within it.[56]

As the notion of a policy community as a patterned interaction within an issue area gained currency, it led to greater interaction with European social scientists, who thought most interest group theory was too closely patterned on U.S. politics. Europeans brought to the debate a concern with group boundaries and relations among members, and with ideas and the intellectuals who frame and spread them. This focus dovetailed with a growing interest, inspired by the work of John Kingdon, in the dynamics of the public agenda.[57] Research on public interest advocacy groups and citizens groups blur the boundaries between social movement and interest group theories. Public interest advocacy groups "thrive on controversy" and are created by political entrepreneurs and supported by private foundations. Like our own, this work highlights the interactive context in which political claims are conceived and negotiated.[58]

Similar concerns have become important in studies of social movements over the last decade. Organizations and individuals within advocacy networks are political entrepreneurs who mobilize resources like information and membership and show a sophisticated awareness of the political opportunity structures within which they are operating.[59] Our stress on the role of values in networks is consistent with some arguments

[56] Methodologies and software for analyzing networks are discussed in David Knoke and James H. Kuklinski, *Network Analysis,* Sage university papers series, Quantitative applications in the social sciences, no. 28 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1982). It is unclear whether the high investment of time and money of using these methodologies to analyze more far-flung international networks can be justified by the theoretical payoffs generated. Although network sampling is possible, "no completely satisfactory strategy currently exists" (p. 27).

[57] Stephen Brooks, "Introduction: Policy Communities and the Social Sciences," in *The Political Influence of Ideas,* ed. Stephen Brooks and Alain-G. Gagnon (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. 5; and John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

[58] Jack L. Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p. 12. On the expansion of citizen action, see especially Michael W. McCann, *Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Jeffrey Berry, "Citizen Groups and the Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics in America," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (July 1993): 30–41.

[59] See, inter alia, David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olsen, "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," *American Sociological Review* 45 (1980): 787–801; Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes"; Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization"; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Mass Politics in the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements,* pp. 1–20.

contained in the literature on "new social movements."[60] Most important, however, over the last decade social movement theory has increasingly focused on the interaction between social structural conditions and action, on the social context of mobilization, and on the transformation of meanings among activists and among mass publics that make people believe they can have an impact on an issue.

As cognitive and relational aspects of these theoretical approaches have come to the fore, their potential utility for studying transnational group activities becomes much greater. By disaggregating national states into component—sometimes competing—parts that interact differently with different kinds of groups, we gain a much more multidimensional view of how groups and individuals enter the political arena. Focusing on interactive contexts lets us explore the roles of values, ideas, and different kinds of information and knowledge. As Heclo argues, "network members reinforce each other's sense of issues as their interests, rather than (as standard political or economic models would have it) interests defining positions on issues."[61] These theoretical approaches travel well from domestic to transnational relations precisely because to do so, they do not have to travel at all. Instead, many transnational actors have simply thrown off the fiction of the unitary state as seen from outside.[62]

Toward a Global Civil Society?

Many other scholars now recognize that "the state does not monopolize the public sphere,"[63] and are seeking, as we are, ways to describe the sphere of international interactions under a variety of names: transnational relations, international civil society, and global civil society.[64] In these views, states no longer look unitary from the outside. Increasingly

[60] See Russell J. Dalton, Manfred Kuechler, and Wilheim Burklin, "The Challenge of New Movements," in *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*, ed. Dalton and Kuechler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 10–16.

[61] Heclo, "Issue Networks," p. 102.

[62] Douglas Chalmers takes this idea the furthest, arguing that many of these international actors should now be viewed simply as "internationalized domestic actors," and their international resources as political resources like any other. See "Internationalized Domestic Politics in Latin America: The Institutional Role of Internationally Based Actors," unpublished paper, Columbia University, 1993.

[63] M. J. Peterson, "Transnational Activity, International Society, and World Politics," *Millennium* 21:3 (1992): 375–76.

[64] See, for example, Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21:3 (1992): 389–420; Paul Wapner, "Politics beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics," *World Politics* 47 (April 1995): 311–40; and the special issue of *Millennium* on social movements and world politics, 23: 3 (Winter 1994).

dense interactions among individuals, groups, actors from states, and international institutions appear to involve much more than re-presenting interests on a world stage.

We contend that the advocacy network concept cannot be subsumed under notions of transnational social movements or global civil society. In particular, theorists who suggest that a global civil society will inevitably emerge from economic globalization or from revolutions in communication and transportation technologies ignore the issues of agency and political opportunity that we find central for understanding the evolution of new international institutions and relationships.

One strong globalization thesis is "world polity theory" associated with the sociologist John Meyer and his colleagues. For Meyer world cultural forces play a key causal role in constituting the state's characteristics and action.[65] World polity researchers have shown conclusively that states with very different histories, cultures, and social and political structures all came to adopt similar conceptions of what it means to be a state and what it means to be a citizen, regardless of patterns of institutional development. Yet in attributing so much to transnational diffusion, they remain silent on the sources of world culture except to argue that it originates from the modern Western tradition. In their view, international NGOs are not actors, but "enactors" of world cultural norms; the role of the International Olympic Committee is functionally the same as that of Greenpeace or Amnesty International.[66]

We lack convincing studies of the sustained and specific processes through which individuals and organizations create (or resist the creation of) something resembling a global civil society. Our research leads us to believe that these interactions involve much more agency than a pure diffusionist perspective suggests. Even though the implications of our findings are much broader than most political scientists would admit, the findings themselves do not yet support the strong claims about an emerging global civil society.[67] We are much more comfortable with a conception of transnational civil society as an arena of struggle, a fragmented and contested area where "the politics of transnational civil society is centrally

[65] For examples see John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., *National Development and the World System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and George Thomas, John Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, John Boli, eds., *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and Individual* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987).

[66] John Boli and George M. Thomas, "Introduction: World Polity Formation since 1875," in *World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations* (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

[67] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1998), Chapter 11. An earlier version appeared as "Fishnets, Internets and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action," Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Madrid: Working Papers 1996/78, March 1996; and Peterson, "Transnational Activity."

about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized (by governments, institutions, and other groups)."[68]

Principles, Norms, and Practices

In his classic work *The Anarchical Society,* Hedley Bull made no bones about the fact that in talking about international society he was talking about a society of states. Such a society of states exists, he believed, "when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions."[69] Bull resisted the notion of an international society made up of individuals, believing that developments in that direction (the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) added confusion to the international scene, in that "there is no agreement as to the relative importance of these different kinds of legal and moral agents, or on any general scheme of rules that would relate them one to another."[70] Bull would have recognized the advocacy networks we discuss in this book as contributors to such uncertainty. However, he also believed in the existence of a set of basic values without which international society was inconceivable—consisting in the protection of life and bodily integrity, observance of agreements, and reasonable consistency of property relations.[71] Understanding the importance of the actors and/or the rules of interaction among them requires attention to the place of values or norms in theorizing about relations.

Interpretivist theories have highlighted the independent role of norms in international relations, and have seen identities, norms, and interests as mutually constitutive.[72] Norms constrain because they are embedded in social structures that partially demarcate valued communities. Nevertheless, systemic explanations need to be grounded in process tracing if they are to show the mechanisms by which norms constrain.[73] That

[68] Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," *Millennium* 24:3 (1995), p. 468.
[69] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 13.
[70] Ibid., p. 37.
[71] Ibid., p. 4.
[72] See, e.g., Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security,* pp. 22–25; Klotz, *Norms in International Relations,* p. 26.
[73] See Klotz's discussion in *Norms in International Relations* of U.S. activists' successful reframing of apartheid as an issue of racial equality, which linked domestic civil rights activity with their campaign around South Africa.

means, to see norms in action we have to examine the actions of individuals and groups in historical contexts. Norms and practices are mutually constitutive—norms have power in, and because of, what people do.

We use the term "practice" here not only as "that which is done," but as "the act of doing something repeatedly." This allows us to consider the intensity of norms as well as normative change. Playing music requires practice—so much practice that in the end hands can move without the conscious mediation of thought telling them where to go. Similarly, we can imagine norms whose practice over time has become so automatic that they gain a taken-for-granted quality, in which practices and standards become so routinized as to be taken almost as laws of nature. Normative change is inherently disruptive or difficult because it requires actors to question this routinized practice and contemplate new practices.[74]

What distinguishes principled activists of the kind we discuss in this volume is the intensely self-conscious and self-reflective nature of their normative awareness. No mere automatic "enactors," these are people who seek to amplify the generative power of norms, broaden the scope of practices those norms engender, and sometimes even renegotiate or transform the norms themselves. They do this in an intersubjective context with a wide range of interlocutors, both individual and corporate. Finally, thinking about norms in relation to practices eliminates the duality between principled and strategic actions. Practices do not simply echo norms—they make them real. Without the disruptive activity of these actors neither normative change nor change in practices is likely to occur. States and other targets of network activity resist making explicit definitions of "right" and "wrong," and overcoming this resistance is central to network strategies.

This general point about the relationship between norms and practices can be illustrated by a discussion of the changing nature of sovereignty. All of our networks challenge traditional notions of sovereignty. Most views of sovereignty in international relations focus almost exclusively on the understandings and practices of states as the sole determinants of sovereignty, seen as a series of claims about the nature and scope of state authority.[75] Claims about sovereignty are forceful, however, because they represent *shared* norms, understandings, and expectations that are

[74] See Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 17–19.
[75] See, e.g., Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 95–96; F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty,* 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Stephen Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy,* ed. Goldstein and Keohane, pp. 235–64.

constantly reinforced through the practices of states,[76] and by the practices of nonstate actors.

Traditionally, as stated by the World Court, the doctrine of state sovereignty has meant that the state "is subject to no other state, and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction"[77] It is a core premise that "how a state behaved toward its own citizens in its own territory was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, i.e., not anyone else's business and therefore not any business for international law."[78] Similarly, how states disposed of the resources within their territories or regulated the development of their economies were at least theoretically sovereign affairs. Much international network activity presumes the contrary: that it is both legitimate and necessary for states or nonstate actors to be concerned about the treatment of the inhabitants of another state. Once granted that cross-border and global environmental problems mean that economic activities within one nation's borders are of legitimate interest to another or others, the frontiers of legitimate interest have been fuzzy—and contested. Transnational advocacy networks seek to redefine these understandings; we ask whether and when they succeed.

Because many of these campaigns challenge traditional notions of state sovereignty, we might expect states to cooperate to block network activities. The ideas that environmental, indigenous, women's and human rights networks bring to the international arena impinge on sovereignty in several ways. First, the underlying logics of the "boomerang" effect and of networks—which imply that a domestic group should reach out to international allies to bring pressure on its government to change its domestic practices—undermine absolute claims to sovereignty. Second, by producing information that contradicts information provided by states, networks imply that states sometimes lie. NGOs often provide more reliable sources of information to international organizations, but by acting on that information, especially when it explicitly contradicts state positions, international institutions implicitly undermine their foundation as organizations of sovereign states.

[76] Alexander Wendt stresses that sovereignty is an institution that exists "only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other." He argues that sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted that "it is easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by and an ongoing artifact of practice." "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 412–13. Still, even critics of standard views of sovereignty are so concerned with exposing how the discourse of sovereignty is constructed and maintained that they often ignore how conceptions of the state are evolving. See also Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium* 17:2 (1988): 227–61.

[77] See Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," in *The Strategy of World Order*, vol. II: *International*, ed. Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), p. 164.

[78] Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 228. See also James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 20.

If sovereignty is a shared set of understandings and expectations about state authority that is reinforced by practices, then changes in these practices and understandings should in turn transform sovereignty. The expansion of human rights law and policy in the postwar period is an example of a conscious, collective attempt to modify this set of shared norms and practices.[79] To this end, the human rights network employed two approaches. Activists pressured governments and international organizations to develop formal procedures to investigate the human rights situation in member states. The work of NGOs exposed state repressive practices, causing other states to respond by demanding explanations, and repressive states in turn produced justifications. The combination of changing international norms, compelling information, institutional procedures for action, and targeted lobbying and pressure campaigns created awareness and often caused states to modify their human rights practices. When a state recognizes the legitimacy of international interventions and changes its domestic behavior in response to international pressure, it reconstitutes the relationship between the state, its citizens, and international actors. This pattern, by which network practices instantiate new norms, is a common one among the transnational advocacy networks we will discuss.

Organization of the Book

The case studies that follow, which examine different kinds of advocacy network structures, strategies, and goals, were chosen to highlight the variety of transnational interactions. Chapter 2 asks whether these networks are really a new phenomenon, examining four campaigns that occurred between the 1830s and 1930s. Although not all of them involve transnational networks, all involved transnational actors in the kinds of principled and strategic actions that characterize modern networks. Chapter 3 considers the largest and best-known network, whose practices since the Second World War have promoted changes in norms and institutions around human rights. Comparison of how human rights activists responded to egregious human rights abuses in Argentina during the 1970s and to endemic abuses over the last several decades in Mexico helps to pinpoint the scope, impact, and strategies of the human rights network.

[79] See Paul Sieghart, *The Lawful Rights of Mankind: An Introduction to the International Legal Code of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 67–68.

Chapter 4 looks at the development of advocacy networks around third world environmental issues, focusing particularly on the issue of tropical deforestation. It looks at two concrete instances of deforestation, in Rondônia in the Brazilian Amazon and in Sarawak, Malaysia, each of which was inserted into a different global campaign (the multilateral development bank campaign and tropical timber campaign, respectively). In both cases, how the ideas and practices of transnational actors fit into domestic political contexts is key to the analysis. These cases illustrate the difficulty of frame negotiation, where networks bring together actors with different normative and political agendas. Chapter 5 looks at a comparatively new network, the international network on violence against women, and focuses especially on the negotiations of meaning that were part of the network's emergence. Finally, in the conclusions, we turn to the question of impact: how effective have these networks been in meeting the goals they set for themselves, and what are the effects of their practices in international society?

CHAPTER 2

Historical Precursors to Modern Transnational Advocacy Networks

When we suggest that transnational advocacy networks have become politically significant forces in international relations over the last several decades, we immediately face a series of challenges. First, where we see links among activists from different nationalities and cultures, others may see cultural imperialism—attempts to impose Western values and culture upon societies that neither desire nor benefit from them. Are "moral" campaigns just thinly disguised efforts by one group to gain its interest and impose its will on another? Next, some question the novelty of these phenomena. After all, internationalism in various forms has been around for a long time. Finally, still others ask about significance—have these campaigns ever produced any important social, political, or cultural changes? On what basis do we attribute such changes to network activists' work, rather than to deeper structural causes?

A look at history can give us greater purchase on these questions. In this chapter we examine several campaigns that cast light on the work of modern transnational advocacy networks. They include the 1833–65 Anglo-American campaign to end slavery in the United States, the efforts of the international suffrage movement to secure the vote for women between 1888 and 1928, the campaign from 1874 to 1911 by Western missionaries and Chinese reformers to eradicate footbinding in China, and efforts by Western missionaries and British colonial authorities to end the practice of female circumcision among the Kikuyu of Kenya in 1920–31. For each of these campaigns, we pay attention to comparable "noncampaigns" or related issues around which activists did not organize. In the

The violence against women issue sometimes plays a similar "bridging" role within national women's movements as well. In countries as diverse as Mexico, Turkey, and Namibia, activists have mobilized around violence against women across numerous divisions (politics, race, ethnicity, class, rural vs. urban).[110] Still, it is important to remember that at the same time that a given frame facilitates some kinds of relationships, it may constrain others. Some women's rights activists now admit that they jumped into the rights frame without fully thinking through the consequences for their movement.[111] What the human rights discourse implied was that if women's organizations were going to use international and regional human rights bodies and machinery, they would have to enhance their knowledge of international law. This requires privileging lawyers and legal expertise in a way that the movement had not previously done nor desired to do. The wisdom of this approach is still being debated within the transnational network, and some activists are now trying to reframe violence against women as a health issue. They note that the human rights frame has been important for raising consciousness about the issue, but they fear that it won't be as effective for prevention and treatment. By framing violence against women as a health issue, especially with reference to health care practitioners and international health organizations, they hope to draw additional attention to the issue and help victims receive treatment.

Clearly, asymmetries continue to exist within the network, created by funding flows and the resulting strategic dominance of U.S. and European organizations and individuals. But the emergence of a common advocacy position around violence against women is the result of much more complicated interplay than is suggested by the "human rights is cultural imperialism" model. Like the new understandings of the diversity of relationships between human beings and nature that evolved within environmental networks during the 1980s, the commonalities discovered in advocacy around violence illustrate the important role that networks play as political spaces.

[110] Dianne Hubbard and Colette Solomon, "The Many Faces of Feminism in Namibia," p. 180, and Marta Lamas et al., "Building Bridges: The Growth of Popular Feminism in Mexico," p. 343, in *The Challenge of Local Feminisms*.

[111] Interview with Lori Heise.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions: Advocacy Networks and International Society

Scholars theorizing about transnational relations must grapple with the multiple interactions of domestic and international politics as sources of change in the international system.[1] The blurring of boundaries between international and domestic arenas has long been evident in international and comparative political economy, but its relevance for other forms of politics is less well theorized. Our work on transnational advocacy networks highlights a subset of international issues, characterized by the prominence of principled ideas and a central role for nongovernmental organizations. In this subset of issues, complex global networks carry and re-frame ideas, insert them in policy debates, pressure for regime formation, and enforce existing international norms and rules, at the same time that they try to influence particular domestic political issues. Throughout this book we have tried to achieve greater theoretical clarity in a number of areas. First, we specify how, why, among whom, and to

[1] For example, see Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988): 427–60; David H. Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Haas, ed., *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination* special issue, *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992); James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Douglas Chalmers, "Internationalized Domestic Politics in Latin America," Studies, Princeton University, April 1993; Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21:3 (1992): 389–420; and on transnational social movement organizations see Jackie G. Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, *Transnational Social Movements and World Politics: Solidarity beyond the State* (New York: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming 1997).

what end transnational relations occur. Second, we discuss the characteristic content of such relations—what kinds of ideas and issues seem to require or be amenable to these linkages—and the strategies and tactics networks use. Finally, we consider the implications for world politics of forms of organization that are neither hierarchical nor reducible to market relations.

We suggest that scholars of international relations should pay more attention to network forms of organization—characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal exchanges of information and services. Theorists have highlighted the role of networks in the domestic polity and economy. What is distinctive about the networks we describe here is their transnational nature, and the way they are organized around shared values and discourses. Networks are difficult to organize transnationally, and have emerged around a particular set of issues with high value content and transcultural resonance. But the agility and fluidity of networked forms of organization make them particularly appropriate to historical periods characterized by rapid shifts in problem definition. Thus we expect the role of networks in international politics to grow.

Both technological and cultural change have contributed to the emergence of transnational advocacy networks. Faster, cheaper, and more reliable international information and transportation technologies have speeded their growth and helped to break government monopolies over information. New public receptivity arose partly from the cultural legacy of the 1960s and drew upon the shared normative basis provided by the international human rights instruments created after the Second World War. Transnational value-based advocacy networks are particularly useful where one state is relatively immune to direct local pressure and linked activists elsewhere have better access to their own governments or to international organizations. Linking local activists with media and activists abroad can then create a characteristic "boomerang" effect, which curves around local state indifference and repression to put foreign pressure on local policy elites. Activists may "shop" the entire global scene for the best venues to present their issues, and seek points of leverage at which to apply pressure. Thus international contacts amplify voices to which domestic governments are deaf, while the local work of target country activists legitimizes efforts of activists abroad.

Transnational networks have developed a range of increasingly sophisticated strategies and techniques. We highlight four: *information politics; symbolic politics; leverage politics;* and *accountability politics.* Networks stress gathering and reporting reliable information, but also dramatize facts by using testimonies of specific individuals to evoke commitment and broader understanding. Activists use important symbolic events and conferences to publicize issues and build networks. In addition to trying

to persuade through information and symbolic politics, networks also try to pressure targets to change policies by making an implied or explicit threat of sanctions or leverage if the gap between norms and practices remains too large. Material leverage comes from linking the issue of concern to money, trade, or prestige, as more powerful institutions or governments are pushed to apply pressure. Moral leverage pushes actors to change their practices by holding their behavior up to international scrutiny, or by holding governments or institutions accountable to previous commitments and principles they have endorsed.

Issues involving core values—ideas about right and wrong—arouse strong feelings and stimulate network formation among activists, who see their task as meaningful. Activists capture attention where their issues resonate with existing ideas and ideologies. To motivate action, however, network activists must also innovate, by identifying particular social issues as problematic, attributing blame, proposing a solution, and providing a rationale for action, or by making new connections within accepted value frames.

We have claimed that network actors try to frame issues in ways that make them fit into particular institutional venues and that make them resonate with broader publics, use information and symbols to reinforce their claims, identify appropriate targets, seek leverage over more powerful actors to influence their targets, and try to make institutions accountable in their practices to the norms they claim to uphold. What can we say about what works and what doesn't?

Evaluating Network Success or Failure

Networks influence politics at different levels because the actors in these networks are simultaneously helping to define an issue area, convince policymakers and publics that the problems thus defined are soluble, prescribe solutions, and monitor their implementation. We can think of networks being effective in various stages: (1) by framing debates and getting issues on the agenda; (2) by encouraging discursive commitments from states and other policy actors; (3) by causing procedural change at the international and domestic level; (4) by affecting policy; and (5) by influencing behavior changes in target actors.

The structure of domestic institutions is relevant here, some institutions being more open to leverage than others.[2] The closed political structure in societies where participatory channels are blocked or limited may

[2] On the influence of domestic structures on transnational relations, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994): 185–214.

lead citizens to seek international linkages to press their claims more effectively. The combination of closed domestic structure in one country with open structures in other countries and with international organizations is what activates the boomerang pattern characteristic of networks.

Still, domestic structures are only a starting point for understanding why and how actors form networks, rather than an explanation of the conditions under which networks can be effective. They cannot tell us why some transnational networks operating in the same context succeed and others do not. That similar institutional venues accommodate strikingly different outcomes owes more, we believe, to the nature of the issues and the networks than to domestic or international structures *per se*.

Institutional openness to leverage varies significantly across issue areas within a single institution or state structure. The environmental movement has leveraged the World Bank, getting stronger environmental conditions in loans, but has not always been able to get these conditions enforced. The human rights movement has tried to gain similar leverage in the bank and has failed. The human rights movement has had much greater success in convincing the United States and European countries to consider human rights in their military and economic aid policies. Much of the success of the human rights movement can be attributed to its ability to leverage state aid policies. The U.S. environmental movement has had much more difficulty in establishing a similarly routinized form of linkage; efforts to influence the NAFTA negotiations were only partially successful, and the discussion of trade linkages has exacerbated network divisions within the United States and internationally.

Our case studies suggested that understanding dynamic elements in domestic politics is at least as important to success as understanding domestic structures. Under some circumstances, political oppositions may mediate the influence of transnational actors as much as or more than institutional incumbents. The clearest cases of this in our research were the footbinding and female circumcision cases. The campaign against footbinding resonated within the modernizing discourse of an emergent reformist opposition; the campaign against female circumcision became a symbol for nationalists of colonialism's effort to destroy deeply held cultural values. For almost all transnational campaigns, how the issue of nationalism is engaged is crucial to achieving issue resonance.

Evaluating the influence of networks is similar to evaluating the influence of sanctions, about which there has been considerable study and much disagreement.[3] As in the sanctions literature, we must look at characteristics of the "target" and of the "sender" or "source," and at relations between the two. Because a network as a sender is not a single actor like a state, but a multiple actor, its influence is even more difficult to trace.

[3] See David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Stefanie Ann Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft," *International Organization* 42:2 (Spring 1988): 397–426.

Issue Characteristics

Advocacy networks develop around issues where international relations theorists and theorists of collective action would not predict international cooperation. Except where repressive regimes (as in Haiti) caused serious refugee flows, policymakers could easily ignore human rights, and the doctrine of sovereignty and nonintervention instructed them to do so. The new social knowledge that democracies don't go to war with other democracies may change the stakes in the human rights game; if security (a collective good) is enhanced by the worldwide existence of democracy, then promoting democracy could become a self-interested policy, not just a principled one. Yet the transformation of human rights policies and regimes came well before the emergence of the new social knowledge. As with human rights, states have not traditionally seen women's or indigenous issues as posing collective goods problems. Some environmental issues do pose serious externalities, but these are not necessarily the issues around which advocacy networks form. The environmental networks discussed here, for example, bring pressure on issues that are recognized as posing problems of collective goods, but whose resolution is politically very costly; both sovereignty and property issues are on the table in tropical forest negotiations.

States have few incentives to cooperate on these issues, and because many of the network campaigns challenge traditional notions of state sovereignty, we might expect states to cooperate to block network activities. Active intervention by a committed actor is necessary to get these issues onto political agendas. Human rights violations must be deliberately brought to the foreign policy agenda of a third party or an international organization before influence can be brought to bear. Deforestation and misuse of infant formula became issues rather than mere problems when network activists gave them identifiable causes and proposed remedies.

Actors within government can also raise the salience of an issue, but for states to act, either the values in question must plausibly coincide with the "national interest" or the government acting must believe (correctly or not) that the action is not costly (or at least that it is less costly than not acting). Part of what networks do is to try to transform state understandings of their national interests, and alter their calculations of the costs or benefits of particular policies. Moreover, the activists promoting the issue must seek state actors who are either network members themselves (in terms of their willingness to take costly action to promote is-

sues they care deeply about) or who have other incentives to act. Environmentalists in the multilateral bank campaign got crucial support from Wisconsin senator Robert Kasten, chair of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, more because of his general hostility to the multilateral banks than because of his principled support for their particular aims.

The second characteristic of network issues worth highlighting is that they are all *in their general form* issues around which sustained mass mobilization is unlikely. The problem is transforming diffuse agreement (protect the environment, defend human rights) into willingness to take action.[4] The difficulty of constituent mobilization is one explanation for the predominance of advocacy pressure tactics over mass mobilization campaigns in these issue areas. There are exceptions. Amnesty International's organizational model involves large numbers of people in regular activities; boycott strategies, such as those used in the infant formula campaign and the tropical timber campaign, have similar characteristics.

New ideas are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical setting.[5] Since networks are carriers of new ideas, they must find ways to frame them to resonate or fit with the larger belief systems and real life contexts within which the debates occur.[6] The ability of transnational advocacy networks to frame issues successfully is especially problematic because, unlike domestic social movements, different parts of advocacy networks need to fit with belief systems, life experiences, and stories, myths, and folk tales in many different countries and cultures. We argue that the two types of issues most characteristic of these networks—issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, and legal equality of opportunity—speak to aspects of belief systems or life experiences that transcend a specific cultural or political context.

There are various explanations about why such issues appear most prominently in international campaigns. Although issues of bodily harm

[4] This is similar to the problem of mobilization around consensus issues, discussed in social movement theories. For differing views, see Michael Schwartz and Shuva Paul, "Resource Mobilization versus the Mobilization of People: Why Consensus Movements Cannot Be Instruments of Social Change," pp. 205–23, and John D. McCarthy and Mark Wolfson, "Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the Cooptation of Civic and State Infrastructures," pp. 273–300, in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[5] Peter Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 383–84; Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 26.

[6] David Snow and Robert Benford suggest that four sets of factors account for successful framing: the "robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort"; the internal structure of the larger belief system the framers want to affect; the relevance of the frame to the real world of the participants; and the relationship of the frame to the cycle of protest. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, p. 199.

resonate with the ideological traditions in Western liberal countries like the United States and Western Europe, they also resonate with basic ideas of human dignity common to most cultures. Not all cultures have beliefs about human rights (as individualistic, universal, and indivisible), but most value human dignity.[7] Gross violations of human rights run contrary to these divergent conceptions of human dignity. Issues of bodily harm also lend themselves to dramatic portrayal and personal testimony that are such an important part of network tactics.

Another transcultural belief with wide resonance is the concern with protecting the most vulnerable parts of the population—especially infants and children. The contrast between the Nestlé boycott and other issues that did not lead to international boycotts may capture the importance of the ability to resonate transnationally. Although more deaths are attributed to tobacco use than to the misuse of infant formula, there has been no successful, sustained international consumer boycott of tobacco companies. The perceived harm to vulnerable infants and their mothers who believe they are using a quality product generates more concern than does harm to adults who choose to smoke. A campaign against "Joe Camel" cigarette advertisements is the exception that proves the rule: organizers achieved some success because they claimed that the ads attempted to market cigarettes to children.

The Nestlé boycott also illustrates the importance of framing issues to resonate with existing belief systems. Both the company and the boycott tried to capitalize on the transcultural desire to do the best thing for one's baby. The baby food companies tried to convince mothers that infant formula was a modern healthy way to feed their babies, but the baby food network mobilized information and testimony strategically to convert the bottle from a symbol of modernity and health into a potentially dangerous threat to infant health in the third world.

Campaigns involving legal equality of opportunity also appear to lend themselves to transnational campaigns. Why this issue should have transcultural resonance is not completely clear. Most of the societies where such campaigns are carried out have adopted liberal institutions of democracy and rule of law, yet exclude some signficant part of the population from participation in these institutions. This disjuncture between the neutral discourse of equality implicit in liberalism and the unequal access to liberal institutions opens a space for symbolic political action and the accountability politics of networks. In other words, liberalism carries within it not the seeds of its destruction, but the seeds of its expansion. Liberalism, with all its historical shortcomings, contains a subversive element that plays into the hands of activists. We agree with the work of John Meyer and his col-

[7] See Jack Donnelly, *Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 49–50.

leagues that there is a global cultural process of expansion of liberal values; where we differ is how this leads to political transformation.[8] We argue that liberal discourse can provide opportunities for activists to expose the gap between discourse and practice, and that this has been an effective organizing tool. For example, the organizers of the first conference on women's rights at Seneca Falls in 1848 eloquently and effectively stated their grievances using the words of the U.S. Declaration of Independence but substituting the word "woman" for "man," and "men" for "King George."

Why would we expect concern about the gap between discourse and practice, especially in the authoritarian regimes that are often the target of network pressures? Scholars have long recognized that even repressive regimes depend on a combination of coercion and consent to stay in power. Network campaigns have been most successful in countries that have internalized the discourse of liberalism to such a degree that there exists a disjuncture to plumb and expose. Liberal discourse and institutions also place limits and constraints, which is another reason why issues involving equality of opportunity are easier to organize around than these involving equity of outcome.

Cross-cultural resonance of issues does not necessarily eliminate all of the tensions implicit in the encounter. This is particularly true of issues that address poverty and inequality within an intentionalist frame. Within all networks that involve activists from both developing and developed countries, awareness of vastly unequal access to resources underlies conversation about issue framing, and also about the relationships among network members.

Actor Characteristics: Networks and Targets

Not surprisingly, networks are more effective where they are strong and dense. Network strength and density involves the total number and size of organizations in the network, and the regularity of their exchanges.[9] Strong and dense networks also include many "nodes" within the target state of the campaign. Network campaigns against human rights violations were more successful in Argentina and Chile than in Guatemala in the mid- to late 1970s partly because well-organized domestic human rights organizations existed in those countries. Although rights violations in Guatemala were even more severe than in Argentina and Chile, no effective local human rights NGOs existed in Guatemala until the mid-1980s; the presence of such organizations as part of the net-

[8] George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987).

[9] Analysts of networks within cities or countries are able to measure network density, but the task is far more difficult for a far-flung transnational network.

work increased the success of human rights pressures on Guatemala in the early 1990s. Local network members contribute information and bestow increased legitimacy on the activities of the network as a whole.

The density and strength of networks comes both from their identity as defined by principles, goals, and targets, and from the structural relationships among the networked organizations and individuals. In other words, the network-as-actor derives a great deal of its effectiveness from the network-as-structure, within which ideas are formulated, reformulated, tested, and negotiated. However much an individual or representative of a particular organization may speak and act in the name of a network without necessarily consulting its other members regularly, the synergy of networking nonetheless transforms the timbre of his or her voice. The "voice" of the network is not the sum of the network component voices, but the product of an interaction of voices (and different from any single voice of a network member).

This is not to suggest that advocacy networks are egalitarian structures. We recognize the asymmetrical or lopsided nature of most network interactions. Power is exercised within networks, and power often follows from resources, of which a preponderance exists within northern network nodes. Stronger actors in the network do often drown out the weaker ones, but because of the nature of the network form of organization, many actors (including powerful northern ones) are transformed through their participation in the network. However amorphous or weak the structure, it is still true that the nature of the agency we are talking about derives from that structure—just as the structure is itself a creation of the singular agents embedded within it. Networks cannot be undermined simply by characterizing them (the structures) as "agents" of a particular actor or position. Undermining a dense network rather requires destructuring it—that is, eroding the relations of trust or mutual dependence that exist among networked actors. The Malaysian government attempted to do this in 1993, for example, by circulating a story claiming misuse of funds by NGOs doing fundraising in the Sarawak case, and accusing Randy Hayes of the Rainforest Action Network of fabricating a story about abuse of Penan tribesmen. Network communications were sufficiently strong to weather this set of accusations.

Crucial determinants of the effectiveness of international networks are the characteristics of the targets, especially their vulnerability to both material and moral leverage.[10] The target may be vulnerable to particular

[10] Our notion of vulnerability includes but is not limited to the idea of "vulnerability interdependence" developed by Keohane and Nye. For them, when a country is faced with costs imposed by outside action, vulnerability rests on the "relative availability and costliness of alternatives." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2d ed. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1989), p. 13.

kinds of issue linkage, for example when external aid is dependent on human rights performance. Vulnerability may come from prior normative commitments, as when the World Bank, already committed in many statements to sound environmental performance, was criticized for loans that arguably worsened the environmental situation. Targets may experience greater vulnerability at particular junctures, as was the case with Mexico during the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement; Mexico's need to safeguard its prestige in that context provided openings for both human rights and environmental networks to press claims. Finally, vulnerability may simply represent a desire to maintain good standing in valued international groupings.[11]

Large military and economic aid flows to Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s gave the human rights network leverage against repressive countries in the region. Pressuring a country like China or Burma was more difficult because neither was receiving large economic and military assistance from Western countries. The only available leverage was trade privileges—most favored nation status or the generalized system of preferences—the use of which is more controversial, as it hurts the exporters in Western countries. Ecological groups achieved influence in the bank campaign by providing information that convinced members of Congress and the Treasury Department to instruct U.S. executive directors of multilateral development banks to monitor closely the environmental impact of loans; similar processes took place in European countries.

Even if leverage is available, the target country must be sensitive to the pressures. As the failure of economic sanctions against Haiti in 1993–94 made clear, some governments can resist pressures successfully for long periods. Countries most sensitive to pressure are those that care about their international image. For issue linkage to work, the target country must value the carrot being extended (or good withheld) more than it values the policy being targeted. But as the cases of human rights in Haiti or tropical deforestation in Sarawak illustrate, linkage with money, trade, or prestige is not a sufficient condition for effectiveness. Haiti's military rulers chose to hang onto power in the face of universal moral censure and economic collapse. Only the threat of military invasion led to a last-minute agreement to relinquish power. In Sarawak, local politicians become immensely wealthy by granting logging concessions, and the state government depends on logging for a good part of its revenues. Although the Malaysian federal government was sensitive to attacks on its international status, it was even more vulnerable to threats by Sarawak's politicians to defect from the government coalition.

[11] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

The Nestlé Corporation was vulnerable to the pressures of a consumer boycott because a large range of its consumer food items were identified by the company name (Nestlé Quik, Nestlé Crunch) and because it had invested heavily in a corporate image of quality goods ("Nestlé makes the very best") which could be easily undermined by the accusation that Nestlé goods led to infant deaths in the third world. Attempts to organize a similar boycott against other producers of infant formula in the United States have failed because they have targeted less familiar corporations—American Home Products, Abbott Laboratories—whose products rarely carry the company name.

Implications for International Society

Central to this project is an understanding of the international system not as anarchy but as international society. We share with Hedley Bull and the English school of international relations scholars the idea that we live in an international society when on the basis of common interest and values states "conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions."[12] We disagree, however, with Bull's emphasis always on a society of *states*. Even in 1977 when he wrote his classic work, Bull recognized that international society was evolving, and that the human rights issue offered a particularly potent challenge to the logic of a society of sovereign states.

> Carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states. For, if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage over and against the claims of his state, and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state, then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and entitled to command their obedience, has been subject to challenge, and the structure of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy. The way is left open for the subversion of the society of sovereign states on behalf of the alternative organizing principle of a cosmopolitan community.[13]

Our vision is closer to what Bull called "neo-medievalism," where nonstate actors begin to undermine state sovereignty. The term doesn't adequately portray the dynamism and novelty of the new global actors we

[12] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 13.
[13] Ibid., p. 46.

discuss, but Bull's central insight of a new system with "overlapping authority and multiple loyalty" does capture part of the change we describe.[14] Bull issued two serious challenges, one empirical—the task of documenting the extent and nature of changes—and the other theoretical—to specify what kind of alternative vision of international politics might modify or supplant the centrality of interactions among sovereign states.

Recent empirical work in sociology has gone a long way toward demonstrating the extent of changes "above" and "below" the state. The "world polity" theory associated with John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and their colleagues conceives of an international society in a radically different way. For these scholars, international society is the site of diffusion of world culture—a process that itself constitutes the characteristics of states. The vehicles for diffusion become global intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, but neither the sources of global cultural norms nor the processes through which those norms evolve are adequately specified.[15]

Proponents of world polity theory have documented the rise and diffusion of a wide range of cultural norms and practices and the related emergence of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). These are presented as enactors of basic principles of the world culture: universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, human purposes, and world citizenship; there is thus no meaningful distinction between those transnational actors espousing norms that reinforce existing institutional power relationships and those that challenge them.[16]

We argue that different transnational actors have profoundly divergent purposes and goals. To understand how change occurs in the world polity we have to understand the quite different logic and process among the different categories of transnational actors. The logic of transnational advocacy networks, which are often in conflict with states over basic principles, is quite different from the logic of other transnational actors, such as the International Olympic Committee or, the International Electrotechnical Commission, who provide symbols or services or models for states. In essence, world polity theorists eliminate the struggles over power and meaning that for us are central to normative change. Martha Finnemore makes a similar point when she argues that despite its im-

[14] Ibid., p. 245.

[15] See Martha Finnemore's excellent review essay on the world polity school, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," *International Organization* 50:2 (Spring 1996): 339.

[16] John Boli and George M. Thomas, "Introduction," in *World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations*, ed. Boli and Thomas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming), p. 7 (manuscript).

pressive achievements, world polity theory marginalizes politics, obscures power, and "omits conflicts, violence, and leadership." She challenges political scientists to engage in a dialogue with the world polity theorists because "political process, coercion and violence, value conflict and normative contestation are our business."[17]

Nevertheless, the world polity theorists have an important insight. At some point, they suggest, what was once unthinkable becomes obvious, and from then on change starts to occur much more rapidly. The early battles to gain the vote for women were fought tooth and nail country by country, and success came very slowly. This history does not look at all like the natural process of cultural change suggested by the polity theorists. But after a critical mass of countries adopted woman suffrage, it was naturalized as an essential attribute of the modern state, and many countries granted women the vote even without the pressure of domestic women's movements. Perhaps some understanding of "thresholds" might help integrate our work with that of world polity theorists. These sociologists have focused theoretically on the second part of the process of change, when norms acquire a "taken for granted quality" and states adopt them without any political pressures from domestic politics. Thus they privilege explanations for normative change that highlight the influence of world culture. We explore the earlier stages of norm emergence and adoption, characterized by intense domestic and international struggles over meaning and policy, and thus tend to privilege explanations that highlight human agency and indeterminacy. Rather than seeing these as opposing theoretical explanations for causes of normative change, an understanding of stages suggests that the process of creating and institutionalizing new norms may be quite different from the process of adhering to norms that have already been widely accepted.

World polity theories treat IOs and INGOs as conveyor belts carrying Western liberal norms elsewhere. Once again, our research suggests that much modern network activity does not conform to this pattern. Many networks have been sites of cultural and political negotiation rather than mere enactors of dominant Western norms. Western human rights norms have indeed been the defining framework for many networks, but how these norms are articulated is transformed in the process of network activity. For example, indigenous rights issues and cultural survival issues, at the forefront of modern network activity, run counter to the cultural model put forward by the world polity theorists.

In other words, as modern anthropologists realize, culture is not a totalizing influence, but a field that is constantly in transformation. Certain discourses such as that of human rights provide a language for negotiation.

[17] Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics," pp. 327, 339, 340, 344.

Within this language certain moves are privileged over others; without doubt, human rights is a very disciplining discourse. But it is also a permissive discourse. The success of the campaign in making the point that women's rights are human rights reveals the possibilities within the discourse of human rights. Because international human rights policies came simultaneously from universalist, individualist, and voluntarist ideas *and* from a profound critique of how Western institutions had organized their contacts with the developing world, they allowed broader scope for contradictory understandings than might be expected. These critiques led in a very undetermined fashion to the emergence of human rights policy; theorists in the late twentieth century should not assume that the trajectory was predetermined by homogenizing global cultural forces.

Reconceptualizing international society does not require abandoning a focus on actors and institutions to seek underlying forces that make states and other forms of association epiphenomenal. We do find, however, that enough evidence of change in the relationships among actors, institutions, norms, and ideas exists to make the world political system rather than an international society of states the appropriate level of analysis. We also believe that studying networks is extraordinarily valuable for tracking and ultimately theorizing about these evolving relationships.

In the world political system today, states remain the predominant actors. But even for theoretical purposes it is hard to imagine conceiving of the state as "a closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit, completely separated from all other states."[18] Although the notion of the unitary state remains a convenient convention for certain kinds of international interactions, central to most interstate relations (as well as relationships between states and other individuals or associations) is the recognition of internally differentiated states and societies.[19] But sovereignty is eroded only in clearly delimited circumstances. The doctrine of the exhaustion of domestic remedies that is embedded in human rights law, for example, captures the nature of the relationship between the society of states and the emerging cosmopolitan community: individuals who hope for recourse for the alleged violation of their rights must have exhausted domestic remedies or shown that attempts to do so are futile. Then, and only then, if they still believe that they have been unjustly treated, may they have recourse to the international arena. The cosmopolitan community can bring pressure to bear at stages of the domestic process, but the state is still in charge.

[18] Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 19.

[19] Robert Putnam captures part of this reality with his two-level games metaphor. See "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988): 427–60.

There are few theorists of international relations to whom we can turn for help in giving voice to this vision of the global potential and limitations of a cosmopolitan community of individuals. Anything that hinted of idealism was so thoroughly discredited by the perceived failures of idealism in the interwar period that no self-respecting international relations theorist dared admit a role of individual human agency motivated by principles in transforming the global scene. Yet it was precisely the obvious failure of states to protect human dignity during the interwar period and the Second World War that for political philosophers, such as Hannah Arendt, made such agency necessary. Arendt, argues Jeffrey Isaac, was not a theorist of human rights, but a "theorist of the politics made necessary by a world that despoils human rights," a politics that "might encourage new forms of regional and international identity and moral responsibility."[20]

The international system we present is made up not only of states engaged in self-help or even rule-governed behavior, but of dense webs of interactions and interrelations among citizens of different states which both reflect and help sustain shared values, beliefs, and projects. We distinguish our view from what Sidney Tarrow has called the "strong globalization thesis" which sees structural forces inevitably pulling the world into even more tightly knit global process.[21] The globalization process we observe is not an inevitable steamroller but a specific set of interactions among purposeful individuals. Although in the aggregate these interactions may seem earthshaking, they can also be dissected and mapped in a way that reveals great indeterminacy at most points of the process. There is nothing inevitable about this story: it is the composite of thousands of decisions which could have been decided otherwise.

The problem with much of the theory in international relations is that it does not have a motor of change, or that the motor of change—such as state self-interest, or changing power capabilities—is impoverished, and cannot explain the sources or nature of the international change we study here. Classic realist theory in international relations has not been useful for explaining profound changes, such as the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the satellites states in Eastern Europe, the end of slavery, or the granting of women the right to vote throughout the world.

Liberal international relations theory has a more compelling explanation of change because it is based on the proposition that individuals and groups in domestic and transnational society are the primary actors, that these groups in turn determine the preferences of states, and that the nature

[20] Jeffrey C. Isaac, "A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights," *American Political Science Review* 90:1 (March 1996): 67, 69.

[21] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 11.

and intensity of state preferences determine the outcomes in international politics. Liberalism places significant emphasis, then, on domestic regime type, because whether or not a state is democratic determines which groups and individuals it represents.[22] Regime type is also important because authoritarian governments can "stunt the growth of domestic and transnational civil society."[23] Structural liberalism also argues that there has been a "collapse of the foreign/domestic distinction," and that foreign policy is no longer insulated from domestic politics in the way that it was once perceived to be, an argument that finds substantial support in the cases discussed in this book.[24]

Our approach differs from liberalism in a number of important respects. Liberalism assumes self-interested and risk-averse actors, and therefore its theory of how individuals and groups change their preferences must be based on changes in context leading to changing calculations of interest or risk.[25] We study individuals and groups who are motivated primarily by principled ideas and who, if not always risk-takers, at least are not risk-averse. We share the liberal assumption that governments represent (imperfectly) a subset of domestic society, and that individuals influence governments through political institutions and social practices linking state and society. But liberalism, as currently formulated, lacks the tools to understand how individuals and groups, through their interactions, might constitute new actors and transform understandings of interests and identities. We argue that individuals and groups may influence not only the preferences of their own states via representation, but also the preferences of individuals and groups elsewhere, and even of states elsewhere, through a combination of persuasion, socialization, and pressure.

Network theory can thus provide a model for transnational change that is not just one of "diffusion" of liberal institutions and practices, but one through which the preferences and identities of actors engaged in transnational society are sometimes mutually transformed through their interactions with each other. Because networks are voluntary and horizontal, actors participate in them to the degree that they anticipate mutual learning, respect, and benefits. Modern networks are not conveyor belts of liberal ideals but vehicles for communicative and political exchange, with the potential for mutual transformation of participants.

In this sense, network theory links the constructivist belief that international identities are constructed to empirical research tracing the

[22] This discussion of structural liberalism relies upon Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," *European Journal of International Law* 6 (1995): 503–38.

[23] Slaughter, "International Law," p. 509.

[24] Ibid., p. 514.

[25] Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," p. 3.

paths through which this process occurs, and identifying the material and ideological limits to such construction in particular historical and political settings.

The importance of this process of mutual constitution is particularly relevant for considering the issue of sovereignty, about which significant differences may exist among network members. For the most part, activists in the north tend to see the erosion of sovereignty as a positive thing. For human rights activists it gives individuals suffering abuse recourse against the actions of their own state; for environmental activists it allows ecological values to be placed above narrow definitions of national interest. Given the innumerable glaring violations of sovereignty perpetrated by states and economic actors, why should measures that protect individuals from harm raise such concern? Northerners within networks usually see third world leaders' claims about sovereignty as the self-serving positions of authoritarian or, in any case, elite actors. They consider that a weaker sovereignty might actually improve the political clout of the most marginalized people in developing countries.

In the south, however, many activists take quite a different view. Rather than seeing sovereignty as a stone wall blocking the spread of desired principles and norms, they recognize its fragility and worry about weakening it further. The doctrines of sovereignty and nonintervention remain the main line of defense against foreign efforts to limit domestic and international choices that third world states (and their citizens) can make. Self-determination, because it has so rarely been practiced in a satisfactory manner, remains a desired, if fading, utopia. Sovereignty over resources, a fundamental part of the discussions about a new international economic order, appears particularly to be threatened by international action on the environment. Even where third world activists may oppose the policies of their own governments, they have no reason to believe that international actors would do better, and considerable reason to suspect the contrary. In developing countries it is as much the idea of the state, as it is the state itself, that warrants loyalty.

For many third world activists involved in advocacy networks, the individuated and intentional model of action that networks imply—the focus on "rights talk"—begs the question of structural inequality. At conference after conference, this question has at some point moved to center stage. The issue of sovereignty, for third world activists, is deeply embedded in the issue of structural inequality.

It is over such issues that networks are valuable as a space for the negotiation of meanings. In the emergence of the focus on violence for the international women's networks, in the evolution of the multilateral bank campaign and the tropical timber campaigns, the political learning that took place within the networks involved not only strategies and tactics

but normative shifts in understanding of shared identities and responsibilities. The tropical timber campaign's focus on consumers of tropical hardwoods as much as on producers is the result of such a shift. Because parts of states and international organizations also participate in these networks, this process of negotiation within the emergent cosmopolitan community is not "outside" the state. Instead it involves state actors in active reflection on state interests as well.

Recognizing this dual character of networks provides correction for the continuing inability of structuralist theory to motivate change in the international system.[26] If transnational advocacy networks involve patterned interaction among states and nonstate actors whose agency is expressed in the international system, then by derivation states are bringing more than their relations with other states into their systemic relations. They are bringing more even than the domestic political baggage implied by Putnam's two-level game formulation (which, nonetheless, has the virtue of bridging the domestic international divide in a mutually determining fashion).[27] State actors as network components bring to international relations identities and goals that are not purely derived from their structural position in a world of states—and that may even be constituted by relationships established with citizens of other states. These identities and goals, furthermore, may contain elements in profound contradiction to the usual systemic roles of these states. Resolving these contradictions may require shifts in interstate relations that are not driven either by national interest or by "self-help" as traditionally understood.

The conflicting identities and goals that states qua network components take into the international system are increasingly enmeshed in the structural interaction between state and nonstate actors that is the network. The agency of a network usually cannot be reduced to the agency even of its leading members. This is true even if the network's access to the international arena is dependent upon a state's representative role in relation to other states. However, if the network's agency cannot be reduced to that of its most powerful node, then the appearance of states to each other is described—and circumscribed—by the multiple relationships and identities they carry around always. From the negotiation of this multiplicity of agencies and structures in which states are embedded comes the possibility of change—not so much the negation of self-help as a richer rendering of the constitution of self, and of the substance of the helping.

The concept of a transnational advocacy network is an important element in conceptualizing the changing nature of the international polity

[26] But see also, for a different but similarly motivated argument, David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization* 43:3 (Summer 1989): 441–73.

[27] Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics."

and particularly in understanding the interaction between societies and states in the formulation of international policies. It suggests a view of multiple pathways into the international arena, a view that attributes to domestic actors a degree of agency that a more state-centric approach would not admit. States remain the major players internationally, but advocacy networks provide domestic actors with allies outside their own states. This approach suggests answers to some of the questions about how issues get on the international agenda, how they are framed as they are, and why certain kinds of international campaigns or pressures are effective in some cases but not in others. Our initial research has suggested that networks have considerable importance in bringing transformative and mobilizing ideas into the international system, and it offers promising new directions for further research.