

CHAPTER 3

Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

JAMES M. JASPER

In the late twentieth century, the social sciences underwent a broad cultural turn, building on an earlier linguistic turn (Lafont 1993) but finding human meanings in a variety of activities and artifacts not previously interpreted as cultural. Cognitive psychology played the vanguard role in this shift, but practitioners in all disciplines were soon able to find indigenous traditions and tools that helped them craft their own repertoires for understanding meaning (e.g., Crane 1994; Hunt 1989; Kuper 1999). Beginning in the 1970s, increasing numbers of social scientists began to pay attention to how humans understand the world, and not simply their (supposedly) objective behaviors and outcomes within it.

The cultural turn left its mark on the study of politics and social movements. Interestingly, it was more often those who studied culture who were able to see the politics behind it (Crane 1994); students of politics were slower to see the culture inside it (Jasper 2005). French post-structuralists such as Derrida and Foucault saw politics in all institutions and cultural artifacts (Dosse 1997) long before mainstream political scientists and sociologists recognized the meanings that permeate political institutions and actions.

The gap between more structural and more cultural approaches to mobilization often depended on how scholars who had been politically active in and around 1968 interpreted the barriers they had faced, especially whether they felt their intended revolutionary subjects had had the correct consciousness or not. Culturalists tended to try to explain why the working class had false consciousness, while structuralists concentrated on the defeat of those (such as radical students like themselves) who had had the correct consciousness. Accordingly, cultural and structural theories both flourished after the 1970s, with little interaction between them. One focused on the understandings that encouraged or discouraged collective action; the other on the resources, laws, and state actions that permitted or prevented it.

A central banner of the cultural shift is “social constructionism,” a tradition that showed how aspects of the world that we take for granted as unchangeable or biological have instead been created by those in power as a means to retain their positions (gender being the most studied example). A dizzying number of institutions, expectations, and categories have been deconstructed to reveal the extensive work behind them (Hacking [1999] is a good survey). This tradition has enormous power when scholars remain true to the metaphor and show the

01 concrete political, cultural, and economic work that strategic players put into establishing and
02 maintaining favored meanings. Like all cultural analysis, however, it frequently lapses into
03 interpreting hidden meanings without linking them to strategic players, projects, audiences,
04 and arenas.

05 An appreciation of culture was slow to come to the study of social movements in the
06 United States, in part because structural models had arrived at their full fruition only in the
07 1970s and early 1980s and still attracted the bulk of analytic attention. The cultural gaps in
08 many of these models were filled only in the late 1980s and 1990s, relatively late in the
09 broader cultural revolution. Scholars in other nations tended to be quicker to appreciate cul-
10 tural aspects of politics. Ironically, voluntarist traditions in American politics meant that
11 structural insights remained exciting and fruitful for a long time, while under British tradi-
12 tions of class awareness and under French statism the importance of cultural meaning and
13 identity proved the important theoretical breakthrough (Jasper 2005). Other national tradi-
14 tions tended to fall between these extremes.

15 Culture, as I shall use the term, consists of shared mental worlds and their perceived
16 embodiments. The latter may include words, artifacts, artworks, rituals, events, individuals,
17 and any other action or creation that carries symbolic meanings. Solipsistic understandings
18 are mere hallucinations unless or until they are shared with others. Yet culture is located both
19 within individuals and outside them, and the most robust methodologies usually examine both
20 sources. Cultural meanings need not be embodied: a group can think and feel the same way
21 without articulating it (although there are obvious methodological challenges to establishing
22 this). Finally, culture comprises cognitive understandings of how the world is, moral princi-
23 ples and intuitions about how the world should be, and emotions concerning both of these
24 (and, often, the gap between them). Most cultural artifacts arouse cognition, morality, and
25 emotion at the same time. (For more on this connection, see the third section of this chapter.)

26 In some cases, and in some models, culture comes in discrete units, which can simply be
27 added to existing, noncultural models. Frames are necessary alongside resources, which help
28 disseminate them; at a certain moment collective identities contribute to mobilization in par-
29 allel to interests. In other cases or other models, and increasingly, cultural meanings permeate
30 the basic entities of these other models, so that appreciation of culture requires a fundamental
31 rethinking of these other concepts. In this more thoroughgoing cultural vision, culture is
32 everywhere. But that does not mean it is everything.

33 Analytically, we can distinguish culture from physical resources, the logic of strategic
34 interaction, and individual idiosyncrasies, each of which can have an impact distinct from that
35 of shared meanings. But culture permeates the other factors: we use resources according to
36 how we understand them, we engage in strategic projects with means and ends that are cultur-
37 ally shaped, and our biographies result from our cultural surroundings. Nonetheless, these
38 other dimensions have their own logics not always reducible to culture (Jasper 1997).

39 Cultural insights can be sprinkled atop structural approaches, then, but they can also be
40 used to fundamentally rethink the basic entities of structural approaches. Once rules, arenas,
41 resources, and other traditionally structural variables are seen as partly cultural, we have a
42 cultural approach alongside the structural. Yet at the same time, the two are, with some adjust-
43 ments, made compatible with one another. Few cultural researchers wish to abandon the many
44 insights developed over the years by structuralists—most of whom claim to have adopted
45 cultural insights and to no longer be structuralists (Kurzman 2003; McAdam 2003; McAdam
46 et al. 2001; Tarrow 2003).

47 The first section of this chapter briefly examines the history of the cultural turn, beginning
48 with several early efforts to understand culture in politics that came to be ignored or dismissed

01 in the 1960s and 1970s. Each intellectual fashion inspires a backlash, in what looks like a repet-
 02 itive cycle but is more of a spiral: we never quite return to the same place. I then turn in part II to
 03 a number of the concrete forms that carry culture, arguing that they have not been adequately
 04 linked to strategic players and audiences. I also look at more metaphorical terms that have been
 05 applied to cultural meanings, often derived from physical artifacts. The third section addresses
 06 the emotions of social movements, giving them somewhat more attention only because they
 07 have been especially overlooked, even by proponents of the cultural turn. In the fourth section,
 08 I examine morality as a distinct aspect of culture, crucial to protest mobilization. Next, hoping to
 09 show that their causal impact derives partly from cognitive and emotional dimensions that other
 10 traditions deny, in the fifth section I reinterpret some basic noncultural metaphors and concepts
 11 from a cultural point of view. The sixth section addresses some of the methods used to get at cul-
 12 tural meanings. Finally, I conclude with some salient unanswered questions remaining in the
 13 cultural shift. Throughout, I cite exemplary studies and suggest further readings.

14 Cultural meanings and feelings do not exist in a vacuum. We always need to appreciate
 15 their strategic contexts: who hopes to have rhetorical effects on others, in what arenas, with
 16 what goals in mind, and how are audiences affected by the messages they receive, the beliefs
 17 and morals they hold, the emotions they feel? Culture and strategy are inseparable, as both
 18 offer microlevel mechanisms that help us avoid the gross metaphors—states, structures, net-
 19 works, even movements—that have guided political analysis too often in the past. Even more
 20 than culture, strategy promises conceptual tools to overcome the deterministic models which
 21 have hindered intellectual progress. Combined, culture and strategy offer us a powerful
 22 toolkit for explaining political action.

23 THE VICISSITUDES OF CULTURE

24 The Romance of Community

25 The ancient Greeks and Romans paid considerable attention to the intersection of politics and
 26 culture through the study of rhetoric, the processes by which speakers have effects on their
 27 audiences (and vice versa). Here was the first social-constructionist vision of the world,
 28 launching the oldest tradition of cultural analysis, which is still around today. It is a strategic,
 29 purposive vision that continues to provide lessons.

30 This venerable tradition lost status first with Christian metaphysics and then in the mod-
 31 ern scientific revolution, both of which drew on Plato's belief that we could get at deeper
 32 truths beneath the give and take of rhetoric (from the start, rhetoric had critics who believed in
 33 Truth rather than constructionism). The convoluted debates over truth that tortured medieval
 34 Christian theologians found secular versions in the modern age (Blumenberg 1983).

35 In the Romantic backlash against the Enlightenment, culture returned to the fore as a
 36 way to explain politics, but in a very different form. Culture and community were celebrated
 37 as deep, often organic sources of spiritual values and purpose, more important than the mate-
 38 rial advancement promised by the scientific revolution. Until the middle of the twentieth cen-
 39 tury, concern with culture usually accompanied a conservative politics of community in
 40 opposition to the liberal and Utilitarian embrace of markets and individual rights (for more on
 41 this long development see Jasper [2005] and of course Williams [1958], who tried to recover
 42 its socialist potential).

43 By embracing traditional tropes of nation, culture, and community, yet giving them a
 44 savage reading, the fascists discredited them in the middle of the twentieth century. For
 45
 46
 47
 48

01 20 years after the fall of fascism, such terms remained taboo, allowing a generation to grow
 02 up in the United States and Europe who could rediscover culture and community in the 1960s
 03 without the conservative connotations. Now these tropes were more likely to have a left-
 04 leaning flavor (thanks in part to Williams and E. P. Thompson), a defense of community
 05 against the now-triumphant liberal individualism of the marketplace. The fruitful vocabulary
 06 of nature and the environment, once embedded in conservative or even fascist ideologies,
 07 could be transplanted into leftist fields (Bramwell 1989). Community was now something to
 08 be defended from the thuggish Cold War policies (and later, neoliberal policies) of the United
 09 States. The stage was set for the emergence of identity politics as a thread in the cultural
 10 revolution. But first, we need to examine an earlier (and liberal, in the sense of individualistic)
 11 tradition that had emerged in opposition to the Romantic embrace of community.
 12
 13

14 **Emergence and Enthusiasm in Crowd Traditions**

15
 16 In contrast to the Romantic embrace of the *folk*, other urban intellectuals developed an image
 17 of crowds as folk devils: passionate, irrational, and dangerous. The people were fine as pictur-
 18 esque but inert peasants in the countryside, not as mobs of angry urban workers. The great
 19 revolts of nineteenth-century cities, and the specter of their periodic repetition, persuaded
 20 middle-class intellectuals that individuals in crowds were touched by insanity. In this version
 21 of liberalism, individuals were supposed to vote—if that—to express their political views, not
 22 riot. Along with several contemporaries across Europe, Gustave Le Bon (1960/1895) gave the
 23 crowd trope its classic form (van Ginneken 1992). “A commencement of antipathy or disap-
 24 probation, which in the case of an isolated individual would not gain strength, becomes at
 25 once furious hatred in the case of an individual in a crowd” (p. 50). Crowds generate “exces-
 26 sive” emotions and ideas: “To exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never to
 27 attempt to prove anything by reasoning are methods of argument well known to speakers at
 28 public meetings” (p. 51). In most formulations, as in Le Bon’s, anyone could prove suscepti-
 29 ble to crowd pressures.

30 In other visions, certain kinds of people were particularly open to the strong emotions of
 31 crowds and movements. Eric Hoffer (1951) formulated a popular version of this view, por-
 32 traying a desperate fanatic who needed to believe in something, no matter what it was (on
 33 Hoffer, who was something of a social isolate, see Trillin [1968]). These “true believers” went
 34 from movement to movement, driven by inner compulsions to belong. Their lack of stable
 35 personal identities or the frustrations of “barren and insecure” lives led them to lose them-
 36 selves in some big cause. The self-sacrifice of collective action, according to Hoffer
 37 (1951:25), is patently irrational, attracting “the poor, misfits, outcasts, minorities, adolescent
 38 youth, the ambitious, those in the grip of some vice or obsession, the impotent (in body or
 39 mind), the inordinately selfish, the bored, the sinners.” Fascist mobs and communist sects cast
 40 a long shadow on intellectual formulations of the time, arousing in observers like Hoffer the
 41 same kind of exaggerated images and passions that he attributed to social movements them-
 42 selves. Ideology precluded careful observation.

43 Even the more sophisticated theories of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which focused on
 44 fragmented social structures rather than pathological individuals, built upon crowd imagery.
 45 William Kornhauser (1959) crafted the most precise model of “mass society” in which
 46 anomic individuals are cut loose from the social bonds of formal (“intermediary”) organiza-
 47 tions. This atomization leaves them open to charismatic demagogues like Hitler, who can
 48 manipulate them directly through mass media such as radio and later television. Reflecting

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

63

01 the broader crowd tradition's sharp distinction between normal institutional activities and
02 abnormal noninstitutional ones, Kornhauser admired formal organizations but feared informal
03 social networks, solitary communities such as mining towns, and other collective identities as
04 dangerous. Even emotions such as affective solidarities with a collective were pathological.

05 Neil Smelser (1962) applied Talcott Parsons' systems approach to collective action,
06 which he saw as deviant—something was wrong after all, or people would not protest—but
07 that he attributed to strains in the social system that made it impossible for some to follow their
08 prescribed roles. Like Parsons, Smelser left an important logical place for culture at the heart of
09 his typologies and yet had surprisingly little to say about it. What he did say was often mildly
10 pejorative—although he never used the term irrational. “Generalized beliefs,” such as hysteria,
11 wish fulfillment, and hostility, consisted of a “short-circuited” form of thought, in that they
12 made symbolic leaps from one level of reality to another. But Smelser never admitted that these
13 were emotional symbols, instead dismissing them as mistaken forms of reasoning which
14 lacked sufficient evidence. Before the cultural revolution in social science, scholars who cared
15 about cultural meanings and feelings were drawn to psychoanalysis, the most elaborated
16 framework then available for serious symbolic interpretation (as I argue in Jasper [2004b]).

17 Strip away the unnecessarily pejorative labels, and most of Smelser's description of gen-
18 eralized beliefs deals usefully with how humans use culture. Today, we recognize the ubiquity
19 of metaphors, which transfer meaning from one place to another in a short-circuiting kind of
20 leap. Metonymy is very much a kind of short-circuiting, as a trait of object “stands in for” a
21 person or group. These leaps are often based on emotional connections, which remain invis-
22 ible if we treat beliefs only as truth statements as in science. Our webs of meanings and of feel-
23 ings may be accurate or they may be inaccurate, but cognition and emotion operate the same
24 way in either case. Cultural meanings are not as explicit as science (although even science
25 operates partly through metaphors and other interpretive leaps).

26 Unfortunately, Smelser later elaborated (1968) on the questionable psychoanalytic con-
27 cepts frequently applied to collective behavior, as he himself went through analysis in the
28 years after his book had been published (as did so many serious intellectuals of the time, in an
29 effort to understand meaning). Even as cognitive psychology was elsewhere gaining speed in
30 ways that would help trigger the broader cultural turn (e.g., Bruner 1962), Smelser argued that
31 protestors were working out oedipal impulses. “On the one hand there is the unqualified love,
32 worship, and submission to the leader of the movement, who articulates and symbolizes ‘the
33 cause.’ On the other hand there is the unqualified suspicion, denigration, and desire to destroy
34 the agent felt responsible for the moral decay of social life and standing in the way of reform,
35 whether he be a vested interest or a political authority” (1968:119–120). The cause is the
36 beloved mother, authorities the despised father. Here psychoanalytic tools, oddly deployed
37 outside any ongoing therapeutic context or even depth interviews, made emotions appear
38 pathological and misguided, just as the earlier psychoanalytic application had made
39 metaphorical thought seem a mistake (for an exception, based on actual depth interviews with
40 activists, see Keniston [1968]). Such efforts hid the fact that emotions and cultural interpreta-
41 tion permeate all our actions and institutions.

42 Drawing on a microlevel tradition of American interactionism, Ralph Turner and Lewis
43 Killian (1957) were able to appreciate some of the local dynamics of crowds, especially their
44 ability to create new norms and meanings (although these were thought to “emerge” rather
45 than to be consciously created, as a later generation of researchers might instead see it). Still
46 operating within a “deviance” paradigm, they argued (1957:143) that “Crowd behavior con-
47 sists, in essence, of deviations from the traditional norms of society.” This deviation might be
48 creative and fruitful, but it might also devolve into the crowd dynamics Le Bon had posited.

01 There was still no sense that protestors drew from all sorts of cultural expressions and refer-
02 ences in their society, often very conservative ones. Most crowd traditions, like
03 structural–functional theory of the time, posited “a culture” that dominated society. If protes-
04 tors stepped outside this culture, they had to set up their own alternative culture, different in a
05 full range of emotional and cognitive displays and positions. (Other crowd traditions
06 addressed deviant individuals rather than universal crowd dynamics; psychoanalytic work did
07 both.)

08 During these years, Joseph Gusfield (1963) managed to forge a cultural approach to pro-
09 testors without pejorative psychoanalytic notions. He portrayed a century of U.S. conflict
10 over alcohol consumption and prohibition as an ever-evolving dispute over moral visions: that
11 of the new, urban industrial society on the one hand versus more rural and small-town ethics
12 on the other. “Consensus about fundamentals of governmental form, free enterprise economy,
13 and church power,” he argued, “has left a political vacuum which moral issues have partially
14 filled” (1963:2). In the end, Gusfield did not go far enough in his moral–cultural approach. He
15 contrasted issues of structure and power with those of morality (which only filled a “vac-
16 uum”), as though these were not always entwined. In this view, some movements were
17 expressive whereas most were instrumental. He also saw morality as a self-interested concern
18 with personal status, certainly an important motivation (when combined with anxiety over
19 status loss), but not the only moral motivation.

20 For nearly 100 years, crowd-inspired scholarship discouraged careful attention to the
21 motivations, cognitive meanings, and emotions of protestors. These were present, but located
22 either in individual pathologies or in the very local settings of crowds. Missing was a sense of
23 culture as a social, collective product, as a set of understandings that could be carried from
24 one situation to the next as well as being reshaped by those settings. Missing also was a view
25 of emotions as displays for other people, according to implicit rules, in other words as a
26 means by which people interact rather than as some kind of short-circuiting of interaction.
27 This long tradition recognized that cognition and emotions are important to collective action,
28 but they denied that they are normal—ubiquitous—aspects of all social life. Far from pathol-
29 ogy, however, they are the stuff of political life.

30 31 32 **Civic Culture** 33

34 The flip side of “bad” mob participation was “good” civic participation (Almond and Verba
35 1963). In the American atmosphere of the 1950s, this meant avoiding fascist or communist
36 movements, considered “mass.” Voting for established political parties, joining safe groups
37 such as parent associations, and supporting the ideas of formal democracy—in other words,
38 playing by the rules—were admired as forming a stable civic culture. Scholars in this tradition
39 expected these pluralist institutions and attitudes supporting them to spread gradually around
40 the world, accompanying economic modernization (Gilman 2003; Rostow 1960).

41 A certain personality type, oriented toward achievement and merit, was expected to
42 accompany these transformations (Inkeles and Smith 1974). Some versions of civic culture
43 theory retained a psychoanalytic flavor, especially trying to explain childrearing patterns that
44 led to “authoritarian personalities” (Adorno et al. 1950). This early work assumed a link
45 between individual personality traits and a broader “national culture,” an approach discredited
46 when Stanley Milgram (1974) found—to his surprise—that Americans were as willing as
47 Germans to follow the orders of authorities even when this involved giving nasty electrical
48 shocks to others. The idea of “a culture,” corresponding to a “society” and a “state,” would not

01 last long once the cultural revolution arrived and meaning was no longer thought to cohere at
02 a national level, much less to be associated with national personality traits. As a result studies
03 of “national character” (e.g., Hartz 1955; Potter 1954) would nearly disappear.

04 A more robust strain of this tradition produced research into the “postmaterial” values
05 that were thought to grip the generation of the 1960s, the first cohort in history with a large
06 proportion coming of age relatively free from material deprivation and the insecurity of war
07 that had plagued humans throughout history. Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) docu-
08 mented the shift in values as well as in political behavior. Not only were party affiliations
09 thought to be weakening and traditional left–right ideologies losing their grip (Dalton, Flana-
10 gan, and Beck 1984), but the new values were thought to encourage “new social movements”
11 for peace, ecology, and cultural freedoms (e.g., Cotgrove 1982; Milbrath 1984).

12 Early civic-culture research primarily analyzed survey attitudes and voting behavior, and
13 it is not always clear how its findings extend to more active forms of political participation
14 such as social movements. A newer strain examines people engaged in collective action, fol-
15 lowing Tocqueville in arguing that participation in voluntary associations revitalizes commu-
16 nity and strengthens democracy (Barber 1984; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Wuthnow 1998).
17 These researchers, although more sophisticated than earlier generations, favor the same kinds
18 of “intermediary organizations” that pluralists and mass-society theorists preferred: bowling
19 leagues, clubs, churches, unions, and so on. Many researchers who complain about a lack of
20 community spirit (e.g., Bellah et al. 1985) may again be looking in the wrong places or with
21 the wrong tools (Perrin 2006).

22 Because this approach typically encompasses—or conflates—individual and national
23 levels, it has difficulties recognizing structures of power and advantage (Crenson and Gins-
24 berg 2002; Szreter 2002). Certain groups are likely to organize to pursue basic structural
25 changes, while others merely want to go bowling. Groups vary in their ability to organize to
26 pursue their own interests, as Mancur Olson (1965) famously showed in his devastating criti-
27 que of pluralist theory. Other critics have pointed out the negative side of intermediary
28 groups, especially their tendency to exclude outsiders (Kaufman 2002; Portes 1998). Contem-
29 porary forms of civic associations may discourage cross-class contacts—a problem hidden by
30 the survey method, which does not address structural changes as well as it does individual
31 ones (Skocpol 2003).

32 Despite the tradition’s flaws, efforts to show how individuals gain political and organiza-
33 tional confidence and skills through minor forms of participation contributes to our under-
34 standing of social movements. A sense of mastery may encourage participation in a range of
35 arenas and organizations, as Putnam and others argue. Confidence is crucial to strategic action
36 (Jasper 2006b). But meanings and skills, surveyed through individuals, must be put into their
37 strategic contexts, the institutional arenas in which they become part of a stream of interac-
38 tion. Instead of leaping from the individual to the institutional (a flaw civic culture and crowd
39 theories share), we need to build from one to the other in concrete steps.

42 Ideology and Science in Marxism

44 Karl Marx and most of his long and influential line of followers sharply distinguished the false
45 beliefs of class ideology from the more objective truths of science, the latter of course being
46 what they were engaged in. There were nuances, to be sure, beginning with Marx’s claim
47 that all ideas are influenced by the social setting in which they emerge—presumably includ-
48 ing science (or, in some formulations, all sciences except Marxism). It proved an especially

01 useful distinction for Marxist parties that managed to seize power, allowing them to suppress
02 democracy.

03 This contrast between science and ideology was, perhaps ironically, shared by Smelser
04 and others writing in the United States in the shadow of the triumph over fascism. (World War
05 II had a buoyant effect on American culture, despite doubts about the Bomb, in contrast to the
06 devastation and gloom reflected in European thought.) Smelser, Kornhauser, and Almond and
07 Verba wrote around the same time Daniel Bell published *The End of Ideology* with a some-
08 what similar faith in scientific understandings. “Normal” politics was based on objective
09 knowledge, “mass” politics on ideology that analysts had to pick apart as pathology. Before
10 the cultural revolution, liberals and Marxists both viewed consciousness as either false or
11 true—with different models for understanding each kind.

12 In Britain in the late 1950s, a network of Marxist scholars reacted against the science-
13 ideology contrast, planting what would eventually blossom into a main source of the cultural
14 revolution (Lee [2003] is an interesting history from a world systems perspective). Rooted in
15 working class culture and often teaching in its adult education programs, the scholars who
16 became the New Left reacted against Labor’s support for imperialist intervention in the Suez
17 Canal, and against the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Khrushchev’s speech to the Twentieth
18 Congress in 1956—both of which (in different ways) unmasked Stalinism. They concluded
19 that a “new” left was necessary, more radical than the social democrats and labor but less
20 authoritarian than communism. The dominant figures, Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson,
21 and Stuart Hall, also rejected Stalinism for its anti-intellectualism. All three worked to save
22 culture from crude base-superstructure formulations (Williams 1977).

23 In *Culture and Society* (1958) Williams doggedly uncovered radical, socialist themes in
24 the Romantic and largely conservative tradition in British culture, finding at both ends of the
25 political spectrum a rejection of liberal individualism and an embrace of community. He saw
26 himself as saving this tradition from conservative formulations such as T. S. Eliot’s *Notes*
27 *towards the Definition of Culture* (1948). More broadly, Williams, especially in *Marxism and*
28 *Literature*, found ways to take culture seriously enough that it could not be reduced to a
29 reflection of economic structures and processes. And yet he proved unwilling to give up
30 Marxism’s approach to class and historical change, seeing in “residual,” “dominant,” and
31 “emergent” elements of culture (each connected to a social class) a pattern of social change
32 from feudalism to capitalism to proletarian socialism.

33 Thompson’s work culminated in *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963).
34 It was about the self-making of the working class, a thorough study of the community and
35 religious ideas which allowed a working class culture and collective player to emerge that
36 would eventually be the carrier of social change and eventually socialism. Like Williams,
37 Thompson rejected more economic and structural aspects of Marxism, but not its theory of
38 history as stages accomplished by a succession of triumphant classes. Craig Calhoun (1982)
39 would later cast doubt on Thompson’s assumption that this “working class” was a unitary
40 culture and collective player that persisted over time.

41 Stuart Hall, joining the University of Birmingham’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural
42 Studies in 1964 and becoming its director several years later, imported French cultural analy-
43 ses such as Althusser’s structuralism and Barthes’ semiotics (e.g., CCCS, 1978; 1980; Hall
44 and Jefferson 1976). The Birmingham group examined semiotic codes, but linked them to
45 more sociological issues of the creators and audiences for the codes (replicating Aristotle’s
46 analytic division of rhetoric into orator, audience, and speech: Hall 1980). Structural linguis-
47 tics seemed to offer the hard edge of science, which the Birmingham school could apply to
48 political conflict. Thus, for instance, Dick Hebdige (1979) found resistance in the clothing

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

67

01 styles of punks, and Paul Willis (1977) examined the unintended consequences of working
02 class youths' rebellion against their schools.

03 The British New Left, thoroughly steeped in the culture of working-class resistance,
04 framed cultural struggles largely as hegemony, Antonio Gramsci's famous term for the cul-
05 tural work that elites do (and must do, given the resistance of the oppressed) to maintain their
06 privileged positions. Elites have the resources, material as well as cultural, to win most of the
07 time—but not always. Imprisoned by the fascists from 1926 until his death in 1937, Gramsci
08 could see the central, active role of the state in modern society, rejecting the economism of
09 other Marxists at the time. He was also able to see the political and ideological work neces-
10 sary for elites to maintain their privileges. Published in small bits beginning after 1945, Gram-
11 sci's letters and *Prison Notebooks* would have a greater and greater impact on culturally
12 inclined analysts throughout the world.

13 In Paris, meanwhile, Louis Althusser (1969, 1971; Althusser and Balibar 1970) com-
14 bined Marxism and structuralism in a way that highlighted culture—purveyed through
15 schools, churches, and other “ideological state apparatuses”—but still didn't quite free it from
16 economic determination “in the last instance.” On the one hand, Althusser seemed to open the
17 possibility of ideological struggle within any number of institutions (including academic
18 ones, thus flattering scholars), on the other hand it was not clear how any of these battles
19 could be won. At the least, it would involve smashing all these institutions rather than recal-
20 ibrating them for progressive uses. In a model of ultimate determination, ideological struggle
21 seemed doomed. (A pessimistic conclusion that felt too gloomy at the time but which in ret-
22 rospect may be all too realistic.)

23 In the end, a pair of French scholars, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), nailed
24 shut the coffin of Marxist cultural analysis by using Gramsci against Althusser. Drawing on
25 Derrida (e.g., 1978), they reconceptualized the economy as a discursive realm, among many
26 others, in which are articulated claims about authority, efficiency, technique, money, and so
27 on. Discourses, which allow an infinite play of meaning through differences, entail constant
28 negotiation and construction of meanings. These include the construction of strategic players
29 themselves: these cannot be taken for granted, but are generated through discursive claims
30 and other tactics. There is no way to predict in advance exactly where “social antagonisms”
31 will arise, or where they will lead. Laclau and Mouffe definitively discredited theories that
32 proclaimed to know the direction in which history is moving and the collective players behind
33 that movement. Cultural and political analysis were freed from the weight of historical meta-
34 narratives. The extensive toolkit of cultural concepts that British and French Marxists had
35 developed could be freed from the distorting assumption that only classes had cultures or
36 politics.

37
38

Gender as Culture

39

40
41 During the 1970s and 1980s, gender proved an especially useful laboratory for thinking about
42 the cultural dimensions of politics, so that feminists studying the women's movement were
43 often at the cutting edge of cultural research. If nothing else, gender was not the same as class,
44 which had helped to impose a paradigm of material interest on theory and research for so
45 long. For gender oppression to operate, women must to some extent absorb images and ideas
46 that endorse their inferiority. They are not a community apart, with distinct boundaries, so that
47 their oppression happens every day in subtle ways. There is violence, to be sure, but this is not
48 the main mechanism by which gender inequality is reproduced. Instead, the very concept of

01 gender is a pillar of women's oppression. Here more than anywhere else, it was recognized
02 that knowledge is power. Scholarship meant to trace and undermine the "social construction
03 of gender" exploded, providing the paradigm for deconstructing other oppressive ideolo-
04 gies (Butler 1990; de Beauvoir 1949; Leacock 1981; Martin 1987; Wittig 1992). The
05 women's movement proved good to think about culture with (Elshtain 1981; Friedan 1963;
06 Naples 1998; Young 1997). As T.V. Reed (2005:79) would later phrase it, changing con-
07 sciousness was especially important "in shaping behavioral change in those 'personal' realms
08 that feminist consciousness-raising redefined as 'political,' such as family life; male-female
09 interactions in the kitchen, the bedroom, and the living room; female-female solidarity;
10 female bodily self-image; and the right to reproductive decision-making."

11 In several nations, the internal battles of women's movements in the 1980s raised more
12 troubling questions about what it was to be a woman, and about how to craft an identity
13 around such a general concept. Could you be a feminist if you tolerated or even enjoyed
14 pornography? Did lesbians have the same goals as other women? What about racial and eth-
15 nic minorities? Working-class women? Nowhere was the fragile, fictional nature of collective
16 identities, nonetheless crucial to social movements, articulated so clearly—and painfully
17 (Nicholson 1990). Journals such as *m/f* in Britain did a great deal to question "woman" as a
18 category. Partly as a result of these debates, feminist scholars such as Leila Rupp, Verta
19 Taylor, and Nancy Whittier helped promulgate the concept of collective identity in movement
20 research (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier 1995), especially by drawing on the work of
21 Melucci (1985, 1988).

22 Other researchers examined the internal cultures of movements that assigned women
23 inferior roles. Mary Katzenstein (1998) traced feminist mobilization within conservative
24 organizations such as the military and the Catholic church. Belinda Robnett (1991) showed
25 that women in the U.S. civil rights movement were different kinds of leaders than men, more
26 oriented toward building bridges within the movement and less oriented toward gaining pub-
27 licity with external audiences. Kathleen Blee (1991, 2002) was able to describe a special role
28 that women played in two right-wing movements, bridging gendered expectations of passiv-
29 ity with aggressive activism. Historians found similar tensions between women's idealized
30 passivity and political activism as early as the nineteenth century (Epstein 1981; Ginzberg
31 1990; Ryan 1990).

32 Attention to internal organizational cultures led a number of feminist scholars to exam-
33 ine emotions, especially as emotional expression in most societies is closely linked to gender.
34 For instance, Sherryl Kleinman (1996) found that men and women in an alternative health
35 organization achieved rhetorical effects through different kinds of emotional displays. Men
36 were praised for being sensitive, against traditional expectations, whereas women were not. In
37 the animal rights movement, according to Julian Groves (1997, 2001), activists carefully
38 crafted appeals that relied on science rather than gut feelings, enlisting men to convey "hard"
39 messages even though most activists were women. Both men and women in the movement
40 anticipated that audiences would dismiss emotional arguments presented by women.

41 Emotion norms have often been used to women's disadvantage, as when women are dis-
42 couraged from expressing anger (Hercus 1999; Hochschild 1975) or when their anger is dis-
43 missed as bitterness (Campbell 1994). Just as feminists had to make anger acceptable, so they
44 addressed the norms of motherhood that made postpartum depression simply unthinkable:
45 how could a woman be upset after such a blessed event (Taylor 1996). Scholars of the
46 women's movement have also shown how affective bonds can maintain the networks of
47 movements that have fallen out of the public eye (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). It is
48 perhaps ironic that some feminists criticized the cultural association of women with emotions

01 (and of men with rationality) at the same time that other feminists were cogently tracing so
 02 many emotional dynamics by studying women's actions and understandings (for more leads
 03 on gender and emotions in social movements, see Goodwin and Jasper 2006).

04 As issues of collective identity spread to the gay and lesbian rights movements, they
 05 spurred another wave of theorizing in the early 1990s (Gamson 1995; Seidman 1994; Warner
 06 1993). One reason was an associated academic endeavor, "queer theory," much as there had
 07 been a large body of feminist theory that could point to the dilemmas and paradoxes of iden-
 08 tity without being accountable to the movement itself. Scholars could explicitly identify
 09 tradeoffs that might paralyze collective action, such as the choice of whether to emphasize, in
 10 presenting gay collective identity, similarities to or differences from straight culture (Bern-
 11 stein 1997). Gamson (1997) showed how gay activists policed their external image by
 12 expelling certain "kinds" of gays. In a few cases, identity again led to discussion of emotions:
 13 for instance, Gould (2001) traced the effects of shame on collective action; far from having
 14 the same effect in all circumstances, she argued, it can sometimes encourage quiescence and
 15 at other times militancy.

16 In the field of social movements as in so many others, feminist scholarship's great con-
 17 tribution has been to show the subtle webs that bind people to one another. Humans are not
 18 autonomous or selfish individuals who approach others to satisfy pre-existing goals. Often
 19 using the exemplar of a family rather than a marketplace, feminists have uncovered shared
 20 understandings and identities, affective loyalties, mutual recognitions, communication
 21 processes, and other ways in which people help shape one another. These are the heart of a
 22 cultural approach.

23 24 25 **The Programmed Society**

26
27 If there was one place where culture had a prominent role in research on social movements, it
 28 was CADIS in Paris, founded by Alain Touraine, whose theory of postindustrial trends high-
 29 lighted conflict over cultural understandings. After 1968, having formulated the concept of
 30 the programmed society in which humans control their destinies (or "historicity"—the pace
 31 and direction of change) to an unprecedented degree (1969, 1973), Touraine began investigat-
 32 ing a series of social movements through "sociological interventions." He and his team would
 33 invite a number of participants to a series of meetings aimed at defining the movement's
 34 goals, identity, opponents, and factions. In some cases, opponents of the movement would be
 35 invited to confront the members. In an astounding burst of research, Touraine recreated in a
 36 kind of laboratory setting the dilemmas that a series of movements and their leaders faced or
 37 had recently faced (Touraine 1978; Touraine et al. 1980, 1982, 1984).

38 The climax of each intervention came when Touraine presented the group with his own
 39 hypothesis about their historical significance: that their "real" purpose was a broad-based
 40 effort to oppose the corporate and government technocrats who initiated and directed most
 41 social change. The antinuclear, feminist, student, and other movements were different facets
 42 of one underlying antitechnocratic movement, struggling to emerge, which would assume a
 43 role in postindustrial society that the labor movement had occupied in industrial society. Cul-
 44 tural values and understandings were the main stakes in this conflict, in contrast to the distri-
 45 bution of material products that had (supposedly) been at stake in industrial conflicts. There
 46 was one problem: Touraine was unable to convince his movement representatives of their real
 47 significance. They insisted on their own purposes. Like Marxists before him, Touraine often
 48 seemed to think he knew participants' goals better than they did. In retrospect, this stance

01 seems to have been a hopeful search for a universal player that might replace the “universal
02 class” of Marxism.

03 Partly as a result of these rejections, Touraine mostly abandoned the project of discern-
04 ing *the* social movement that would carry on the fight for social justice in postindustrial soci-
05 ety. His mood today is more pessimistic, as the movements he studied lost their struggles to
06 control social change, especially to giant corporations (Touraine 1997). After the election of
07 Margaret Thatcher and of Ronald Reagan, history took a new direction. “During the last
08 twenty years, the idea of a postindustrial society has disappeared because the most important
09 change turned out to be not a structural transformation but the victory of a new kind of capi-
10 talism” (Touraine 1998b:207). In a process of “demodernization,” society—as a unified
11 system—has unraveled. Sociology, which traditionally looked for that underlying unity and
12 order, must in turn change to study the constructions of identities and strategic projects
13 (Touraine 1998a). His cultural vantage point helped Touraine (like Laclau and Mouffe) to rec-
14 ognize that collective players form new goals; these are never given by social structure or laws
15 of historical change.

16 To express Touraine’s ideas about programmed societies, Alberto Melucci helped to
17 promulgate the term “new social movements” (1985, 1994). He later had some regrets about
18 this, given the misunderstandings and misguided debates the phrase inspired. European and
19 American movements of the 1970s and 1980s were certainly not entirely new, especially in
20 their tactics, nor were they necessarily more oriented toward cultural meanings than the
21 labor movement had been, especially in its early stages. Debates over what was new and
22 what was old, if nothing else, had the salutary effect of inspiring research into the cultural
23 dimensions of earlier movements as well as the new ones (such as Calhoun 1993; see also
24 Pichardo 1997).

25 Melucci’s main intent was to promote a cultural view of social movements, and concepts
26 with which we might get inside them, to appreciate the point of view of participants. Identity
27 was the central rhetorical device of his magisterial *Challenging Codes* (1996a). For instance,
28 it defines an “us” and a “them,” which Melucci (1996a:83) calls “a strong and preliminary
29 condition for collective action, as it continuously reduces ambivalence and fuels action with
30 positive energies.” (This does the same work as Smelser’s unresolved Oedipal conflict, but in
31 a more concrete and realistic way.) Collective identities also define a player’s relationship to
32 the past and the future. Melucci (1996a:86) recognized the core dilemma of identity here
33 (although he instead refers to it as a problem, a tension, and a paradox): “On the one hand, the
34 actor must maintain a permanence which, on the other, must be produced continuously.”
35 Ambitiously, Melucci (1996a:69) thought collective identity can “bridge the gap between
36 behavior and meaning, between ‘objective’ conditions and ‘subjective’ motives and orienta-
37 tions, between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’.”

38 But something is still missing at the psychological level. This is apparent in Melucci’s
39 discussions of the relationship between movement leaders and followers, where he lapsed into
40 the language of exchange, of costs and benefits. He did not say enough to indicate whether he
41 meant this at a vague, tautological level or at the measurable level of material trades—because
42 he did not really fill in the complex psychology of leadership. This would perhaps lead to
43 charisma, a concept currently out of fashion, as well as to a range of emotions, then also out
44 of fashion. Even Melucci, more attuned to psychological and social-psychological dynamics
45 than most (e.g., Melucci 1996b), had thin cultural foundations. To me, this shows that
46 Touraine’s approach, while it had a central logical place for culture and identity (J. L. Cohen
47 1985), still operated at a macrosocial level, with a theory of history that discouraged serious
48 examination of cultural mechanisms—much like structural approaches.

The Cultural Synthesis

Having developed quietly for a decade or two, cultural analysis exploded throughout the social sciences in the late 1970s and 1980s. In addition to cognitive psychology and the British New Left, sources included French structuralism and poststructuralism, the history and philosophy of science, a resurgent Frankfurt School, and social theorists—such as Giddens, Habermas, Bourdieu, and Touraine—concerned with inserting agency (and the actor’s point of view) into models dominated by structures and functions. History and anthropology, with their own longstanding cultural traditions, also provided a number of new tools for analyzing meaning (for more, see Jasper 2005).

For 100 years, French structuralism has concerned itself with meanings, first in Saussure’s linguistics and later in Levi-Strauss’s anthropology, especially his work on myth. The generation that came to dominate Parisian intellectual life in the 1960s dropped the objectivist scientific pretensions of this tradition, grounding it instead in social constructionism. Michel Foucault (1961, 1963, 1966, 1975, 1976), in particular, glamorized cultural approaches by “socializing” linguistic structuralism in a new kind of institutional analysis (on the French tradition see Dosse 1997). Jacques Derrida (1967) had a parallel influence by “deconstructing” our language and concepts to reveal the mechanisms of power and hierarchy beneath them. The work of these two charismatic figures did much to promote cultural analysis.

The new research and theory tends to differ from older cultural work in several ways. A broad social constructionism, which views all knowledge and institutions as shaped by our cognitive frameworks, implies that no crisp distinction between true and false political claims can be sustained. Both can be “deconstructed” by being linked to the social context and position of those making them. Culture can then be seen as an element of strategy and power, a site of contestation as much as a source for social unity (and when it is a source of unity, this is because elites deploy it toward that end). There is also a tendency to reject the idea of “a culture,” corresponding to “a society,” as older visions often had it. Cultural meanings rarely form a unified whole. On the other hand, they are not collapsed into the subjective beliefs of individuals, but had a distinct structure and persistence, an “objective” existence. This is not necessarily a “shared” culture, into which individuals are “socialized,” but more a set of tools that individuals use (Turner 1994, 2002).

Emotions played little part in this great cultural revolution, but there was a simultaneous rediscovery of their role in social life. Just as cognition had long been an object of psychological research, only to spread belatedly to other social sciences, so emotions emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s to form a new sociology of emotions (Hochschild 1983; Kemper 1978). Even today, feelings have not attained equal status to meanings in the study of social life generally or in the study of social movements specifically. But plenty of raw materials are there.

The cultural turn entered (especially American) scholarship on social movements modestly, foremost through the concept of frame alignment, the processes (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation) by which organizers and recruits come (or do not come) to synchronize their ways of viewing a social problem and what should be done about it (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Snow et al. 1986). Structural paradigms could incorporate frames easily, as long as they were seen as a factor added on to the underlying structural story, a kind of “resource” that recruiters had to get right in order to succeed. As late as 1996, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) embraced political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings as the building blocks of a new synthesis that could answer the basic questions about social movements. A more serious rethinking of structures from a

01 cultural perspective would appear only in the late 1990s (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; Jasper
02 1997; Melucci 1996a).

03 The next popular concept, which required more rethinking of structural approaches,
04 was that of collective identities. Arising out of debates within a number of movements
05 over “identity politics” in the 1980s (see the section on Gender as Culture), collective
06 identity came to represent the subjective meanings that movements carried with them.
07 Considerable initial work tried to discern the relationship between structural positions and
08 the identities that might or might not emerge from them (e.g., Pizzorno 1978; Taylor and
09 Whittier 1992). The influence of Touraine and Melucci increased even more thanks to
10 their focus on identities—especially Touraine’s (1978) I – O – T: movements need a sense
11 of their own identity (I), their opponent’s identity (O), and the stakes of the conflict
12 (“totality” in Touraine’s language).

13 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, dissatisfaction with existing models often surfaced in
14 conferences where papers criticized rational choice and structural approaches without yet
15 building systematic cultural alternatives (Morris and Mueller 1992), or ungainly concepts
16 such as “new social movements” were used to discuss cultural mechanisms (Laraña, John-
17 ston, and Gusfield 1994). By the mid-1990s scholars were developing broader approaches
18 that reflected the insights of the cultural revolution without reducing them to one or two sim-
19 ple concepts (Johnston and Klandermans 1995). Melucci (1996a) staked his approach on
20 identity, to be sure, but pushed it into new areas. Jasper (1997) distinguished a number of cul-
21 tural mechanisms at work at both individual and group levels, including emotional as well as
22 cognitive processes. In 1999, Goodwin and Jasper (2003) broadly challenged the structural
23 tradition for its inability to take culture seriously, a point that prominent structuralists quickly
24 conceded (McAdam 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

25 By the turn of the century, the new cultural synthesis had transformed social movement
26 theory, providing ways to talk about meaning and feeling that were not only richer and more
27 systematic but also less pejorative than earlier efforts. The cultural toolkit was now as rich as
28 the structural one. No scholar of movements should ever plead ignorance about these
29 processes or be able to ignore them in good faith. And yet the very extent of the cultural tool
30 kit encourages scholars to focus on one medium or process rather than comparisons among
31 them. Most analysts prefer a loose interpretation, in the style of literary criticism, to the rigors
32 of research into institutional conditions. What actually does the work of carrying cultural
33 meanings, and to what audiences? We still know too little about the strategic contexts in
34 which meanings are deployed—a path of research that might lead cultural analysis to connect
35 with more structural traditions. Cultural dynamics never stand alone. We need to see the car-
36 riers of culture in action.

37 38 39 CARRIERS OF MEANING

40 41 Physical Artifacts

42
43 Almost any object or action can convey messages to audiences. Yet this diversity of media
44 rarely has been taken as an opportunity to make useful comparisons (even when several media
45 are discussed, as in Reed 2005). Frequently one medium is implicitly used as the exemplar for
46 all, with the result that culture’s operations are either distorted or vague and ubiquitous. After
47 I list some of these concrete embodiments, we can move on to more figurative concepts for
48 getting at the shapes that meanings take.

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

73

01 *Jokes, gossip, rumors, and other comments* affect the reputations of players in strategic
02 engagement and thus their ability to act. In face-to-face settings, these can be useful weapons
03 of those with few other capacities (Scott 1985, 1990), depending heavily on shared understand-
04 ings that allow a great deal of meaning to remain implicit. But the same materials can also be
05 broadcast to more anonymous audiences, not only through broadcast media but also via graf-
06 fiti, cartoons, and so on. They are rarely full programs for action, but they have an epideictic
07 impact on the moral sensibilities of audiences. They shape common sense about the world and
08 the players operating in it. Even obscenities can play a role like this (Rothwell 1971).

09 *Speeches*, the great exemplar for rhetoric, also consist of fleeting words, but conveyed in
10 more formal settings to larger numbers of people. This immediacy is an advantage when a
11 speaker hopes to inspire action and decisions here and now. This is the source of some uneasi-
12 ness over rhetoric: groups can be rushed to decisions they might not make if they devoted more
13 time to deliberation. Although they are the most obvious carrier of political messages to assem-
14 bled audiences, speeches are rarely analyzed today in cultural analysis of social movements.

15 Clothing styles and other *lifestyle choices* use materials other than words to convey state-
16 ments about the world, in this case more about the solidarity of a group than about the capacities
17 of players. One of the most fruitful products of the Birmingham School was the notion of resist-
18 ance in everyday life, through choices about how to dress, what to ride, and so on. Just as these
19 help identify the members of a collective to one another, as with punk culture (Hebdige 1979),
20 they can occasion attacks from others. Moral panics frequently target apparently innocuous
21 lifestyle choices, demonizing those who ride motorbikes, listen to rock music, and so on
22 (S. Cohen 1972). Both insiders and outsiders use aspects of lifestyles metonymically to “stand
23 in” for a group—contributing in the process to its collective identity (for an extended discussion
24 of metonymy in social movements, see Polletta 2006:chap. 3). (The *production* of clothing and
25 other items is also an opportunity for political expression: Adams 2000.)

26 Lifestyle choices are a frequent occasion for a common form of protest, a simple refusal
27 to do something. An individual’s choice not to eat meat or drink alcohol, while not necessar-
28 ily accompanied by a collective vow or collective action, is nonetheless a form of protest. It is
29 also not necessarily mute, as it arouses curiosity and provides a rhetorical opportunity for
30 explaining and defending one’s choices. As Mullaney (2006:61) puts it, “When individuals
31 abstain, others want to know why.” Consumer choices, especially through boycotts but also
32 through politically correct buying, have been central to many recent social movements
33 (Kimeldorf et al. 2006). One reason is the global spread of information, making it possible for
34 consumers to learn about the origins of the products they buy. In this case, our statements
35 endow (absent) objects with political meaning.

36 Music, dance, and related *performing arts* also convey messages about politics and
37 change, as well as being crucial components of rituals that build emotions. Music is an espe-
38 cially powerful combination of words—with an explicit ideological message—and concerted
39 action of the kind that creates collective effervescence (Futrell et al. 2006). Although it is
40 inevitably accompanied by music and often by song, dance has its distinct vocabulary as well.
41 Songs are easily transferred and adapted across movements. Morris (1984) emphasized the
42 African American church music that was easily given a civil-rights twist, and Eyerman and
43 Jamison (1998) show that songs are a concrete legacy that defunct movements leave for suc-
44 cessors to discover and adapt. In a study of textile strikes in the U.S. south, Roscigno and
45 Danaher (2004) show how songs, often on the radio, articulated grievances and expressed
46 collective identity and opposition. As Reed (2005:29) puts it in describing the civil rights
47 movements, “Singing (along with prayer) became a perfect way both to keep a mass from
48 becoming a mob, and to convey to opponents that one was witnessing an organized event, not

01 a mob action.” Music affected both internal and external audiences, in both individual listen-
02 ing and collective gatherings.

03 *Theater* is another performing art, but one that (unlike music and dance) almost always
04 requires an audience distinct from the performers (Goldfarb 1980). Otherwise, it becomes
05 more like a ritual. Even the “street theater” (or theatrics) of the Yippies was intended to attract
06 attention, especially from the media. “Every man would be an artist,” according to Abbie
07 Hoffman, but artists need audiences. *Film*, even more, is a costly form in which the produc-
08 tion of the artifact is unusually separated from its consumption. With theater, the production
09 and consumption occur face to face, with immediate feedback possibilities; in film these are
10 separated by both time and space. There is a tradeoff between broader dissemination and
11 immediate interaction between audience and performers.

12 *Rituals* are complex embodied meanings that can combine music, dance, collective loco-
13 motion, theater, and spoken words (Kertzer 1988). They focus a group’s attention, at salient
14 times and places, with the possible effect of arousing emotions and reinforcing our solidarities
15 and beliefs (and sometimes creating new ones). Because several carriers of meaning line up at
16 once, rituals provide especially powerful messages, as Durkheim saw. They can be aimed at
17 external audiences, as proclamations of intent or identity, as well as at participants. Coordi-
18 nated actions are deeply satisfying; even mere shouting feels good in the right circumstances,
19 enhancing solidarity. According to Randall Collins (2001, 2004), rituals generate an emo-
20 tional energy and mutual attention that individuals crave. But this satisfaction, while an end in
21 itself, also provides the confidence and energy for further action and participation, partly
22 independently of the craving for more attention. By examining chains of interactions, Collins
23 sees the microfoundations for broader structures.

24 *People and events* can carry symbolic meanings even though they were not, obviously,
25 created for that purpose. Other entities can also become symbols—parts of the landscape for
26 instance—but groups, individuals, and events are especially easy to craft into symbols. Exam-
27 ples of important events—often called “precipitating events”—include institutional foundings
28 and strategic victories or turning points. Again and again, acts of government repression
29 inspire mass mobilization. Individuals, too, are important symbols: the leader of a group or a
30 government is not only important for the decisions she makes, but also for the ways in which
31 she represents her organization to insiders and to outsiders.

32 Perhaps the most important carriers of cultural messages consist of written words, *texts*:
33 poetry, books, pamphlets, articles, posters, graffiti, and so on. Because messages are conveyed
34 here in relatively permanent media, there is less control over audiences’ interpretations, but at
35 the same time meanings can be conveyed more broadly (an unavoidable tradeoff for all cul-
36 tural artifacts). At one extreme texts are mere slogans which, like epithets, reinforce existing
37 feelings about the world; at the other they are elaborate statements of goals and tactics, of
38 moral positions, of carefully documented grievances.

39 Not all printed materials consist of words; some are *visual symbols* such as caricatures
40 and other cartoons; abstract images such as peace signs or swastikas; photographs of real-life
41 events, people, places; or highly schematized representations such as maps. Much has been
42 written about the rhetorical power of all these, but let me just mention maps as a more unusual
43 form. Elisabeth Wood (2003) asked peasant revolutionaries in El Salvador to draw elaborate
44 maps of their holdings and towns, demonstrating changes in their thoughts and feelings about
45 the land, such as the emotional memories of what had happened in different places during the
46 civil war (especially where people had been killed). In struggles over land, certainly, maps
47 will be key cognitive representations.
48

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

75

01 Also at the more permanent end of the spectrum of cultural artifacts, *buildings*, *memo-*
02 *rials*, and other human constructions are intended to carry meanings to audiences and fre-
03 quently to future generations. Social movements rarely have the permanence or control of
04 public space for these creations, which are usually the tool of the powerful (and no less
05 important for that). Louis XIV wanted the Versailles gardens to express his control over
06 well-defined territory (Mukerji 1997). Corporations construct headquarters that send mes-
07 sages of permanence, power, or good will. States remind domestic and foreign observers of
08 their own dignity, power, and venerable age through their military installations and other
09 functioning buildings. Movements shape collective memories in ways that have similar cul-
10 tural impacts, and they frequently use existing built spaces to make symbolic statements.
11 Even if they do not build monuments, they use them as stages for their own events, trans-
12 forming their meanings in the process.

13 Carriers of meaning vary along several rhetorical dimensions. These include whether
14 creators and audiences are present at the same time, the relative durability of the cultural arti-
15 fact after its creation, the scope with which the artifact can be reproduced or promulgated, and
16 the relative control that one player may have over the production and consumption of the arti-
17 facts. Obviously, face to face settings offer more control over the reception of those meanings
18 than more mediated ones, because of the possibility for constant monitoring and adjustment.
19 And *any* object or idea can be interpreted as conveying symbolic messages, such as a rock for-
20 mation, although some are designed precisely for that purpose (I have concentrated on these
21 in this section).

22 These differences generate a number of different strategic choices for those who would
23 create and deploy cultural messages, of which I'll name just a few (from Jasper 2006b). In
24 the *Audience Segregation Dilemma*, you would like to convey different messages to differ-
25 ent players, but you run the risk of appearing duplicitous if a message goes to the wrong
26 audience. You must choose, for instance, between more local appeals and more global ones,
27 which resonate with different audiences (Gordon and Jasper 1996). Attracting attention
28 through the media publicizes your cause, but in the process your message and identity may
29 be distorted (Gitlin 1980). In the *Articulation Dilemma*, being explicit about your goals
30 may help arouse support for them, but it makes it harder for you to adjust them realistically
31 in the face of new opportunities and constraints. Audiences, institutional settings, and
32 media interact.

33 Exemplary research into audience dilemmas comes from a work that is not explicitly
34 cultural in its orientation, Clifford Bob's *The Marketing of Rebellion* (2005). Bob examines
35 the remarkable success of the Ogoni in Nigeria and the Zapatistas in Chiapas, both of whom
36 managed to capture the imagination of broad audiences and nongovernmental organizations
37 around the world. Using a "marketing" metaphor in which human rights groups must sell
38 themselves to potential funders, Bob demonstrates the crucial importance of a leader (Ken
39 Saro-Wiwa among the Ogoni and subcomandante Marcos for the Zapatistas) who embodies
40 the group's moral aspirations and can speak the (literal and figurative) languages of the audi-
41 ences the group wants to reach. Both were prolific writers, and both were articulate not only
42 in the language of their followers but also in the English so useful in attracting international
43 audiences. They succeeded in reaching out to external audiences, and Bob recounts how they
44 had to make adjustments in order to do this. Insurgents rethink their identities and images,
45 just as nongovernmental organizations think hard about the potential risks and benefits of
46 supporting various groups. Both sets of players face innumerable dilemmas in trying to
47 please more than one audience.
48

01 Metaphors of Meaning.

02
03 In addition to the many physical carriers of meaning and feeling, there are a variety of
04 metaphors through which scholars have tried to understand the cultural dimensions of social
05 movements. Some of these are concrete carriers that have been used to stand in for broader
06 processes of understanding, such as texts or narratives. Others are more clearly figurative con-
07 cepts, such as frames or movement cultures. Most of these latter have variants along a contin-
08 uum from a more structured, formal image to a more action-oriented, open-ended one.

09 One of the most popular terms is *movement culture* (or Fine's [1995] similar idea idio-
10 culture), meant to capture a hodgepodge of sensibilities, ways of operating, tastes in tactics,
11 frames, ideologies, and other packages of meaning. The idea presumably contrasts the mean-
12 ings and processes internal to a movement with those of the broader cultural context, even
13 though the two interpenetrate at a number of points (Williams 2004). Although it recognizes
14 that culture matters, I find that the term covers too much. If the trend is away from talking
15 about "a culture" at the level of society, linking it to another vague entity, a "social move-
16 ment" (as opposed to the organizations that ally to form a movement) helps little. At best, it
17 becomes a catalogue of what participants share (Lofland 1995). We need to speak of the more
18 concrete elements that make up that supposed "culture."

19 *Frames* were the main way analysts inserted cultural meanings into models in the late
20 1980s. In the process, they lost frames' specific context of efforts at recruitment, in which
21 activists crafted messages for audiences of potential recruits. (Snow et al. [1986] had origi-
22 nally used active terms such as frame alignment, bridging, and so on—suggesting players
23 constructing messages.) Instead, frames became something like worldviews, packages of
24 meaning that—uncovered through content analysis of movement literature—were assumed to
25 represent the motivations and visions of participants (as Benford 1997, complains). Specific
26 artifacts metastasized into overly broad metaphors of meaning. At the same time, the active
27 process of framing was transformed into static packages of meanings, and the latter's strategic
28 purposes were lost.

29 *Collective identity* played a similarly spongelike role in the 1990s, after it was recog-
30 nized that frames do not exhaust meanings (Snow 2001). Despite efforts in structural and
31 rational-choice traditions to define strategic players on the basis of objective interests, collec-
32 tive players are as much an accomplishment as a given. Organizers must work hard to prom-
33 ulgate a collective identity that can attract potential participants and retain existing ones (there
34 is often a tradeoff between these two tasks). Considerable research has shown how collective
35 labels are necessary for action, even though they are largely fictional (Gamson 1995; Polletta
36 and Jasper 2001). In some cases, both the means and the ends of collective action seemed to
37 be the construction of collective identities for participants, in another overextension of a per-
38 fectly good concept (Cohen 1985; Melucci 1996a).

39 Shared structural positions—economic activity, legal and political status, strong cultural
40 expectations—make it more likely that a group will develop a shared collective identity.
41 Potential members of the group will have had the same experiences, and through conscio-
42 usness raising of some sort will come to realize this. But structural similarities are neither nec-
43 essary nor sufficient for identity. Rarely made explicit are the shared emotions that arise from
44 those positions and experiences that make the identity possible and motivating. Sociological
45 research shows that characteristic emotions arise from dominant or subordinate positions in
46 hierarchies, and from changes in those positions and the power and status that accompany
47 them (Hochschild 1983; Kemper 1978; Morgan and Heise 1988). For instance, we are con-
48 temptuous of those who claim more status than we think they deserve, and angry at those who

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

77

01 don't grant us the status we think we deserve (Kemper 2001). When political players interact
02 in the context of ongoing hierarchies, characteristic emotions will arise that may advance or
03 hinder collective identities and the accompanying programs and actions.

04 In the same way that collective identities depend on the imagination as much as on actual
05 interactions among people, *symbolic allies* and *symbolic enemies* can be constructed. I call
06 them symbolic to the extent they are not allies in the sense of coordinating, opposing, or inter-
07 acting in any way with us. Protestors like to think that others are engaged in the same fight as
08 they are, share their moral vision, and are part of the same movement. Indeed, a social move-
09 ment is less a coordinated effort by allied groups as a *sense* of a coordinated effort. It is an
10 accomplishment of the imagination. Likewise, we can construct bad guys who we believe
11 threaten us, even if they do not really interact strategically with us in any way, and perhaps do
12 not know who we are. Symbolic allies and enemies are particular easy to construct from play-
13 ers who are in different places, especially different countries, from us—and with whom com-
14 munication is difficult. Roggeband (2004), for instance, describes how European feminists
15 were inspired by feminists in other nations even though they received only a little information
16 from them and about them, without forming any strategic alliance.

17 *Characters* are one aspect of collective identity that receives little attention: collective
18 players try to create these for themselves and others (part of the content of those identities). By
19 this I mean the work of characterizing, often relying on traditional literary character types of
20 hero, villain, victim, and (to fill in the 2 by 2 table formed along the dimensions of strong ver-
21 sus weak and good versus bad) sidekick or clown. To initiate political action, it is often useful
22 to present yourself as a victim who is becoming a hero, to triumph over a villain and his min-
23 ions. This mini-narrative encourages audiences to take sides emotionally, expressing sympathy
24 for the victim, admiration for the hero, and hatred for the villain and his sidekicks. Other poten-
25 tial plots include the conversion of villain into hero (whistleblowers, for instance) and the mar-
26 tyrdom of a hero who sacrifices herself. Characters like these almost demand certain feelings
27 toward them (although it is possible to play against type, for instance there are lovable villains
28 and feared heroes). Even though “flat” (i.e., stereotyped) characters such as these have fallen
29 out of favor in serious fiction, as a form of epideictic rhetoric they live on in political propa-
30 ganda as efforts to shape our understandings of and feelings about the world.

31 *Narrative* is another metaphor of meaning that has recently become as popular as a label
32 to acknowledge that cultural meanings often come packaged as stories with beginnings and
33 ends, recounted in a variety of social contexts (Hall 1995; Polletta 2006; Somers 1995). Some
34 analysis—drawing on literary criticism—treats narratives as structured, predictable combina-
35 tions of characters and events, forming a finite number of familiar plots. Other narrative
36 analysis tends to place stories in the social contexts in which they are told, encouraging more
37 attention to the interactions between the creators of stories and their audiences (Davis 2002).
38 The latter loses the formal constraints featured in traditional narrative analysis but gains a
39 more purposive, rhetorical dimension. Oddly, narrative research has paid little attention to
40 characters (cf. Polletta 2006:chap. 5).

41 Francesca Polletta's *It Was Like a Fever* (2006) demonstrates the strengths of a narrative
42 lens. Each chapter is a case study. One explains why black college students who began sit-ins
43 at segregated stores in 1960 were so insistent that their actions were spontaneous rather than
44 organized and planned. This story emphasized a break with more established civil rights
45 organizations, dramatized the moral urgency of the student's actions, and helped to create a
46 new collective political player. The following chapter revisits the group that formed out of
47 these sit-ins several years later, SNCC, as debates over group structure led to the expulsion of
48 whites. Polletta focuses here on metonymy, especially how particular strategies came to

01 “stand in” for white or for black members of the group. Another chapter examines the rhetor-
02 ical uses of stories in online debate over what kind of memorial to build on the World Trade
03 Center site. Another discusses the dilemma that battered women and their advocates face
04 between presenting themselves as victims or as competent, even heroic actors—one of the
05 rare works on narrative that addresses characters. Victimhood gains sympathy but undermines
06 images of power and rationality. Another chapter details the ways that African American con-
07 gressional speakers refer to Martin Luther King Jr. in a manner that hides his radical activism.
08 All these chapters are rich studies in how meanings are made (going far beyond the narrative
09 metaphor in doing so).

10 Inspired by French poststructuralist thought, scholars have also treated cultural mean-
11 ings as *texts*, using one artifact of meaning as exemplary of meaning more generally (Shapiro
12 1992). In addition to, in most cases, preferring literal texts—such as constitutions, novels, and
13 other documents—as clues to worldviews, poststructuralists read all social life as though it
14 were a text. Sensibilities, wars, cities, landscapes, and so on can all be interpreted in this fash-
15 ion. This approach reminds us of the social construction behind so many events and processes
16 that we might otherwise take for granted, but the approach frequently focuses on the text itself
17 so that the activities of the creator disappear. The textual metaphor seems especially suited to
18 more structured analysis, and less so to more dynamic analysis. If nothing else, it reminds us
19 the world demands to be interpreted.

20 In a closely related development, *discourse* has, also following French poststructural-
21 ists, become a popular term for the deployment of cultural meanings (Snow 2004; Steinberg
22 1998, 1999). If textual approaches emphasize the structured (and usually static) nature of
23 meanings, discourse instead focuses on human participants who interactively sustain or redi-
24 rect meanings (in Saussurian terms discourse is about *parole* not *langue*). An infinite play of
25 meanings allows constant negotiation over meanings. A variety of discursive practices
26 “mediate the relationship between texts on the one hand and (nontextual parts of) society and
27 culture on the other” (Fairclough 1995:10). Although they acknowledge more strategy and
28 creativity than textual models, because discourse approaches see meaning in all actions, they
29 can expand to cover any human actions. Even the physical world, to the extent it is mean-
30 ingful to us, becomes part of a discursive practice (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Torfing 1999).
31 Sometimes this is a creative move, at others merely a confusing one.

32 33 34 **Rhetoric** 35

36 Is there any useful way to reconcile these many terms and ideas? And to recognize both their
37 structured aspects and their more active, strategic ones? I find *rhetoric*, the world’s oldest tra-
38 dition of cultural analysis, especially suited to understanding the cultural dimensions of poli-
39 tics. Aristotle usefully stressed three major components to rhetorical settings: the creators of
40 messages, the messages themselves, and the audiences. The orator’s intended purpose was to
41 have effects of various kinds—beliefs, emotions, and actions—on his audiences. Although
42 rhetoric is less clear about structured or unconscious meanings, it is quite explicit about
43 intended ones, placing meanings in the context of strategic action. We could usefully rethink
44 the artifacts and the metaphors of meaning from a rhetorical perspective, setting them in their
45 proper social contexts.

46 Rhetorical analysis forces clarity about several issues, especially the nature of the audi-
47 ence and the arena. Because speeches were such formal events in ancient Greece and Rome,
48 they were distinguished according to the setting: orations in law courts were designed to

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

79

01 establish what had happened in the past; in political assemblies to decide what course of
02 action to adopt in the future; and in less formal settings such as funerals and festivals to estab-
03 lish more general moral understandings. Although not all political stakes are as clear as that in
04 a law court, rhetoric encourages the cultural analyst to be precise about what purposes and
05 outcomes the players seek.

06 The cultural analyst must also specify who the players are, who exactly is constructing,
07 spreading, and interpreting cultural messages. Culture is still often spoken of in a vague way,
08 as though it were like the air we breathe, surrounding us all beneath our awareness. But most
09 important political messages are carefully, intentionally crafted. One message is purveyed to
10 one audience, a slightly different one to another. And political players frequently take pains to
11 segregate audiences in order to maximize their effects on each (although audience segregation
12 carries risks: Jasper 2006b).

13 Although I am not devoting attention in this essay to the role of the media (for a sum-
14 mary see Gamson 2004), they become central (and integrated with other elements) in a rhetor-
15 ical vision. In addition to players, arenas usually also contain audiences, who may or may not
16 be able to become players themselves. With today's mass media, the size of the audience in
17 most arenas is enormous, although not necessarily capable of being organized into active
18 players. Audiences and media pose a series of dilemmas for players. Should activists rely on
19 the media to purvey their message, knowing that the media have their own goals that are not
20 those of the movement (Gitlin 1980)? Should they strive to create impressions of their power,
21 since potential supporters will be less frightened to support them but may feel that the move-
22 ment does not need the support? And should they strive for extensive coverage, which spreads
23 the message but may arouse a counterattack from opponents (Jasper and Poulsen 1993)? The
24 media have their own goals and means alongside other strategic players.

25 The carriers of meaning we have already examined can be placed in a rhetorical frame-
26 work. Who writes and who sings the songs? Who listens to them, with what understandings
27 and effects? How do the rhetorical settings differ for jokes, songs, logical arguments, films,
28 memorials, and so on? The metaphors of meaning can also be clarified rhetorically. Who
29 tells a story to whom? Who's our audience when we claim an identity? When we frame a
30 social problem and suggest a solution? It should be no surprise that much existing work fits
31 comfortably within rhetoric, as much of it emerged from rhetoric early in its history (the dia-
32 logical approach of Vygotsky, Bakhtin, and Volosinov, for example, is based on the idea of
33 the "utterance," which has Aristotle's three elements of rhetoric, the speaker, the topic, and
34 the listener).

35 The drawback of rhetorical approaches is that they tend to exaggerate the degree to
36 which speakers' intentions determine or explain what happens, or "the extent to which actions
37 are under the conscious control of subjects" (Fairclough 1995:45). In this, they are at the
38 opposite end of the spectrum from textual approaches. Yet rhetoric has a place for preexisting
39 meanings, in that successful orators must be sensitive to audiences' understandings, even of
40 the most unconscious sort. The ability to tap into these is what distinguishes the great orator
41 from the mediocre. The orator's awareness need not even be explicit, although 2400 years of
42 rhetorical treatises have tried to formulate such knowledge.

43 Perhaps the closest to a rhetorical approach is the "cultural pragmatics" developed by
44 social theorist Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander, Giesen, and Mast 2006), which focuses on
45 "social performance" as the embodiment of cultural meanings. Alexander (2006:45–51) sees
46 ancient Greece as the origin of this kind of self-aware performance out of ritual situations in
47 which meanings were more fused with social structure. Not coincidentally, this is the same
48 social setting out of which rhetoric developed, in much the same way. As part of Alexander's

01 group, Ron Eyerman (2006:198) recommends performance theory for “calling attention to the
 02 role of meaning and emotion.” As in theatrical performances, he points out (2006:199),
 03 “Movement actors perform and convey; they also dramatize, adding powerful emotions to
 04 their actions which re-present known narratives through the use of symbols.” Today, I am not
 05 sure we need performance theory to call attention to meaning and emotion, but it does pull
 06 together several of the carriers of meanings we have examined. Like rhetoric, performance
 07 could take its place alongside the other metaphors of meaning, at the same time it helps us
 08 understand their relationships.

09 In my opinion, all the conceptual tools examined in this section have their uses; all help
 10 explain how meanings operate. The danger is to embrace any one of them too enthusiastically,
 11 to the exclusion of the others. Not all meanings come packaged as narratives; not all convey
 12 messages about player identities. The more tools we have at our disposal the finer the cultural
 13 analysis we can craft with them. Rhetoric does not make any of them superfluous, it merely
 14 forces us to specify their contexts more clearly. Rhetoric is a lens for viewing culture that
 15 parallels strategy as a way of viewing political action.

18 EMOTIONS

20 What Are Emotions?

21
 22 Emotions are our stances and reactions to the world that express how it matters for us. To
 23 some extent, they are cognitive evaluations, but typically with physiological components pre-
 24 cisely because something makes a difference to our satisfaction and flourishing. The deep cul-
 25 tural grounding of emotions and their expression in no way denies their physiological
 26 components, any more than a cultural understanding of cognition denies the neurological
 27 pathways in the brain that underpin them. Vituperative debates between those who espouse
 28 cultural approaches to emotions and those of a biological or social–structural bent are fortu-
 29 nately a thing of the past.

30 The traditional image of emotions has generally contrasted them with rationality. “Pas-
 31 sions” are a deviation from normal or rational action, as they “grip” us against our will. Most
 32 of the time, in fact, emotions are an essential part of our projects, shaping both ends and
 33 means. In the few cases when they disrupt our projects, I still prefer to view them either as
 34 extreme privileging of the short run over the longer run, or as mistakes later recognized as
 35 such. Lust may lead us to sleep with someone we know we should not, but the subsequent
 36 costs of doing so may range from nonexistent to enormous. The greater the resulting costs, the
 37 more we are tempted to call it an irrational act, but there is no clear cutoff point. For me, irra-
 38 tionality lies in an inability to learn from our mistakes—perhaps for psychoanalytic reasons
 39 such that we are trapped in reactions that do not change as our environment changes. Emo-
 40 tions are a fundamental part of rational action, not a diversion from it. Emotional mistakes are
 41 no more common—and probably less common—than cognitive mistakes such as incorrect
 42 information.

43 The study of emotions has emerged in the last decade as a hot area of research into social
 44 movements, no doubt because their recognition was repressed for so long under structural
 45 models (Goodwin et al. 2000; Gould 2003). I place them under the rubric of culture for a
 46 number of reasons. Cognition, emotion, and morality are inseparable components of culture,
 47 distinguishable only analytically. Most emotions involve cognitive appraisals of the world:
 48 how things are going for us (Nussbaum 2001). Thus our anger subsides when we learn it was

01 based on mistaken information; transforming shock into outrage (a process central to protest)
 02 involves cognitive reframing. But the slow speed with which our anger may subside demon-
 03 strates that emotions have a reality partly independent of the cognitive component. (See
 04 Chapter 5, this volume, for more on the history of this appraisal approach to emotions, espe-
 05 cially the influence of our identification with groups.)

06 Cognition, emotion, and morality also share a number of research challenges. All three
 07 components of culture have both public displays and interior, personal forms. As a result,
 08 individuals often deviate from “accepted” feelings and beliefs in ways that bedevil our
 09 research techniques, often requiring us to examine both private and public versions and the
 10 relationship between the two. Finally, the components are all capable of enormous complex-
 11 ity and combinations that are hard to pinpoint methodologically but that make them important
 12 and interesting. Viewing emotions as part of culture “normalizes” them, so that they no longer
 13 appear irrational or mistaken.

14 The carriers of culture we have already examined are as important for the feelings they
 15 arouse as for the cognitive meanings they convey. Characters such as heroes stimulate admi-
 16 ration and love, villains disgust and hatred. Collective identity, we saw, is an emotional soli-
 17 darity as much as a cognitive boundary. Frames and rhetoric exert their influence through the
 18 emotions that cause audience members to pay attention because something matters to them.

19 In this part, after distinguishing several types of emotions, I describe some ways that
 20 emotions operate on or as ends of action and on or as means of action, accepting these as basic
 21 components of purposive action (also see Jasper 2006a, 2006c, on which this section draws).
 22 And although I do not address them here, emotions of solidarity help to form and maintain the
 23 collective political players who are capable of having ends and means in the first place.

24 25 26 **Types of Emotions** 27

28 A major obstacle to understanding emotions in politics is that our natural languages class
 29 numerous phenomena under the same term. Depending on what emotions we take as exem-
 30 plars, we arrive at different visions of emotional processes. Crowd traditions favor eruptions
 31 of anger as the model for all emotions. Psychoanalysis adds anxieties and other behavioral
 32 neuroses. Cultural constructionism prefers complex moral emotions such as compassion or
 33 jealousy. As a way out of this seeming morass, I have found it useful to distinguish several
 34 types of emotion, which may operate via different neurological and chemical pathways
 35 (Goodwin et al. 2004; Griffiths 1997; Jasper 2006a, 2006c). They run, roughly, from the more
 36 physiological end of a continuum to the more cultural end. I have been unable to find a theory
 37 of emotions that deals equally well with each type.

38 *Urges* are physical impulses that demand our attention and crowd out other goals until
 39 they are satisfied. Jon Elster (1992b), who calls them “strong feelings,” includes addiction,
 40 lust, fatigue, hunger and thirst, and the need to urinate or defecate. The role of culture in such
 41 urges is modest, although it may affect just what we lust after, and it certainly affects the
 42 means we use to satisfy our urges. Urges such as these help explain how political projects are
 43 sometimes derailed, for instance, under conditions of extreme deprivation (or when key play-
 44 ers get drunk!), but otherwise they have relatively little relevance to politics. Most accounts do
 45 not even classify them as emotions.

46 A second category near the physiological end of the continuum are *reflex emotions*, quick
 47 to appear and to subside. Inspired by Darwin, Paul Ekman (1972) has described these as uni-
 48 versal and hardwired into us, sending quick signals through the hypothalamus and amygdala to

01 set off automatic programs of action—facial expressions, bodily movements, vocal changes,
 02 hormonal charges such as adrenalin. His list includes anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, surprise,
 03 and contempt. Although reflex emotions sometimes lead to actions we later regret, Frank
 04 (1988) has argued that they may send important signals about our character. Being prone to
 05 anger may encourage compliance from others; disgust and contempt may encourage humans to
 06 keep their commitments.

07 *Affects* last longer and are normally more tied to elaborate cognitions than urges or
 08 reflexes are. They are positive and negative clusters of feelings, forms of attraction or repul-
 09 sion. Examples include love and hate as well as respect, trust, resentment, suspicion, and per-
 10 haps dread. They are felt orientations to the world that we go to great lengths to maintain
 11 (Heise 1979). Affects include the solidarities behind collective identities, as well as the nega-
 12 tive emotions toward outsiders that are often equally important (Alford 2006; Polletta and
 13 Jasper 2001).

14 *Moods* typically last longer than reflex emotions but not as long as affects, differing from
 15 both of them in not having a definite source or object (Clore, Schwartz, and Conway 1994).
 16 We frequently carry them from one setting to the next—although in some cases they are rela-
 17 tively permanent aspects of temperament or personality. They have a distinct biochemical
 18 basis, one reason that drugs affect them so directly. In my view, moods operate primarily as
 19 *filters* for perception, decision, and action—especially by giving us more confidence or less.

20 My final category consists of complex *moral emotions* such as compassion, outrage, and
 21 many forms of disgust, fear, and anger. These latter three, although they have their counter-
 22 parts in reflex emotions, appear again here in more cognitively processed forms: the fear we
 23 feel about an automobile suddenly veering toward us is more automatic than the fear we feel
 24 about a hazardous waste dump down the road. Shame, pride, and jealousy are also complex
 25 results of our moral visions of the world (although evidence of something like shame in pri-
 26 mates suggests that it too may have a counterpart in reflex emotions, upon which the more
 27 complex forms build).

28 Not all emotions fit neatly into these categories, not only because we frequently use the
 29 same term to connote very different feelings, but because any feeling that persists well beyond
 30 its initial stimulant can have the effects of a mood, especially pride. Nonetheless, I think a typol-
 31 ogy of this sort offers some analytic advantages, in that we no longer need to lump so many
 32 different processes together simply as “emotions.” No single theory will explain them all.

35 **Emotions and Ends**

36
 37 Occasionally, emotions are ends that we seek for their own sake. More often, they suggest
 38 other ends that would be emotionally satisfying, such as punishing those we hate.

39 *Urges* are immediate-term goals of action, not usually interesting for politics. Except
 40 that their urgency suggests conditions under which humans are distracted from political goals.
 41 We are near the bottom of Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs, and urges prevent us from
 42 moving up to others until the basic urges are satisfied (Inglehart 1977). Those suffering
 43 famine or other deprivation will not devote time and resources to political organizing.
 44 Nonetheless, we make elaborate plans, often over a long period, to satisfy our lusts—certainly
 45 one of the reasons people join social movements (Gitlin 1987).

46 *Reflex* emotions affect our means more than our ends, with one important exception.
 47 Sudden anger is capable of derailing political projects, and for this very reason our opponents
 48 are forever trying to goad us into losing our tempers. But someone who lashes out, either

01 physically or verbally, can be viewed as satisfying an immediate-term goal at the expense of
02 longer term goals. She is also pursuing her own personal satisfaction at the expense of her
03 broader team. From their point of view, she has made a mistake. From hers, she has gained
04 one satisfaction at the expense of others. (I assume here that the anger discredits her, but in
05 many cases angry intimidation is effective in the short and the long term, with no adverse con-
06 sequences and many positive ones.)

07 *Affects* shape some of our most basic goals. Melanie Klein believed that love and hate are
08 the basic categories of human existence, a position compatible with Carl Schmitt's analysis of
09 politics as dividing the world into friends and foes (Alford 1989; Schmitt 1976/1932). To the
10 extent we love other humans (or places, organizations, other species, and so on), their well-
11 being becomes one of our goals alongside our own well-being. And we take satisfaction in
12 harming those we hate. As the well known fable of the prisoner's dilemma shows, it may be
13 impossible to compare or rank-order personal and group goals. Certainly, there are times
14 when the group goals are so important that individuals are willing to sacrifice their lives for
15 them. We cannot understand zealots and martyrs unless we can grasp love and hatred for
16 groups.

17 Hatred for others should never be underestimated as a human motive. *The power of neg-*
18 *ative thinking*, as I have called it (Jasper 1997:362), captures our attention more urgently than
19 positive attractions, most of the time. Blame is at the center of much protest, requiring that
20 protestors identify the humans who have made choices that harmed others. In any political
21 engagement, it is possible for players to concentrate on harming opponents rather than on the
22 original stakes available in the arena. Mutually destructive polarization then occurs, in which
23 each side is willing to bear enormous costs to harm the other. Disgust, normally a reflex gag-
24 ging, reappears as part of the bundle of negative images and affects humans can develop
25 toward others, usually highly stereotyped categories of others.

26 Basic affects can cause individuals to defect from group projects by providing alternative
27 goals, such as rebels who go home to protect their families or couples who fall in love and
28 retreat into their own world. Goodwin (1997) has detailed this issue in the revolutionary Huk
29 movement in the Philippines, whose leaders denounced (and often executed) participants who
30 withdrew to be with their spouses and children. This is a recurrent dilemma for any collective
31 effort: affective ties to the group aid cooperation and persistence, but those loyalties can attach
32 instead to a small part of the broader whole. I call this the *band of brothers dilemma*, which
33 applies not only to couples who fall in love but to soldiers who care more about their immedi-
34 ate comrades than the broader war effort, and to any movement with small cells or affinity
35 groups (Jasper 2004a:13). Affective loyalties can attach themselves to subunits rather than to
36 an organization or movement.

37 Like reflex emotions, *moods* more importantly affect means than ends. But there are
38 some moods we seek out as directly pleasurable. We feel a surge of self-confidence and power
39 when we are on a winning team, for instance. Or a kind of joy when we lose ourselves in
40 crowds and other coordinated, collective activities such as singing, dancing, and marching
41 (Lofland 1982; McNeill 1995). A great deal of political mobilization is aimed at transforming
42 debilitating moods into assertive ones. Nationalism, which combines affects and moods,
43 developed in large part when political elites wished to mobilize populations for war without
44 sharing decision-making with them: a belligerent mood of pride, combined with hatred for
45 others, was their rhetorical solution. But as this example shows, moods that we first seek out
46 as ends then affect other emotions.

47 Finally, the special satisfactions of *moral emotions* make many of them important goals,
48 especially when they are feelings about ourselves rather than about others. Foremost, we feel

01 deontological (or moral) pride in doing the right thing, and in being the kind of person who
 02 does the right thing. In part, this is an elated mood similar to the joys of crowd activity—which
 03 itself is satisfying in part because we are giving voice to deep moral commitments. Thomas
 04 Scheff (1990, 1994, 1997) views pride and shame as the basic drives of human action, espe-
 05 cially in that they (respectively) attach us to or detach us from human relationships.

06 Other moral emotions include pity and compassion, the emotions that victims are sup-
 07 posed to arouse. These are a kind of empathy, in that we feel pain at the plight of others. This
 08 displeasure moves us to try to remove the sources of pain. Photographs have proven an espe-
 09 cially good means for arousing gut-level empathy, especially for suffering children or animals
 10 that are easily characterized as victims. As philosopher Richard Rorty (1993:118) put it, “The
 11 emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge
 12 and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories.” Social-movement organizers fre-
 13 quently aim to expand public compassion, building a case for pain, victimhood, and blame. At
 14 first, it seems that compassion is a means, leading us into actions, but I see it as adding a goal
 15 to our repertory. Like affective bonds, we care directly what happens to others; their suffering
 16 makes us suffer. Empathy for strangers is a recent triumph that it took humans a long time to
 17 accomplish—and which remains all too fragile.

20 Emotions and Means

21
 22 Emotions permeate our political tactics as thoroughly as our political goals. Frequently, what
 23 is an emotional end for a grassroots participant is a means for the organizer who tries to
 24 arouse that emotion in her. It was in this rhetorical context—in which a creator of meanings
 25 aims at effects on audiences—that Aristotle discussed emotions and what causes them more
 26 than 2300 years ago.

27 *Urges* are rarely used as means in democratic politics, but they are regularly used in tor-
 28 ture and other coercive acts. (Note that my urges are my tormentors’ means, not my own.)

29 *Reflex* emotions on the other hand are frequently open to manipulation. The classic
 30 example is to goad opponents into anger so that they make mistakes. Protestors and forces of
 31 order frequently taunt each other in this way, hoping the other will discredit themselves
 32 through hasty actions, later regretted. Or we may try to startle or frighten them in order to par-
 33alyze them. Who- or whatever causes the reflex emotion, once in motion it certainly affects
 34 our ability to act. Evolutionary theorists believe that these deeply programmed emotions
 35 developed precisely to launch us into actions that we needed to undertake immediately, with-
 36out thinking, typically because they moved us out of harm’s way. In other words, they are pure
 37 means, packaged in an automatic, pre-programmed sequence unavailable to conscious
 38 thought. For instance, the adrenaline that accompanies reflex emotions may propel us into
 39 action quickly and forcefully. But the accompanying actions may be relatively short-term and
 40 not typical of political action.

41 Anger, like most emotions, can be a carefully cultivated performance as well as a direct
 42 reflex. Mediators “lose” their temper to gain compliance from recalcitrant parties, and protestors
 43 use anger to indicate urgency, frustration, and the threat that they may not be able to control
 44 themselves (or their radical wing) if they do not get what they want. It is not that the people in
 45 these examples do not feel anger, it is that they have considerable control over how to express it,
 46 following cultural scripts that yield advantages (just as Japanese cultural scripts regularly
 47 dampen the expression of anger). In such cases, emotions and their displays actually *are* means.

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

85

01 Most *affects* primarily affect ends, but some also affect means. Love and hate are basic
02 loyalties that are hard to see as mere means (again, organizers arouse these in followers as
03 means, but for the followers they become ends). But trust and respect for others are means
04 that allow collective action to be fulfilled at lower costs (Putnam 2000). Perhaps the clear-
05 est case of affects informing means lies in followers' feelings toward their leaders. Love,
06 trust, and respect for leaders ease a great number of activities carried out for the larger
07 group. Attention to emotional dynamics may allow us to revive the concept of charisma, as
08 a way of understanding the psychological benefits that leaders offer their followers (Mad-
09 sen and Snow 1991). More generally, organizations devote considerable resources to mak-
10 ing others trust them, through a number of symbolic activities and promotion (Meyer and
11 Rowan 1977).

12 *Moods* clearly affect our means for carrying out political ends. Self-confidence aids any
13 player, from the protestor facing the police to the prime minister making a speech. Moods of
14 resignation or cynicism, on the other hand, can cripple anyone's willingness and ability to
15 pursue her goals. The extreme is depression, which robs us of both goals and means for
16 action. Some medium-term types of fear operate as moods, which can be manipulated to
17 inspire or to freeze action—much like anxiety. In many cases, shame must be reworked into
18 pride in order for action to occur or be sustained (Gould 2001).

19 The effects of moods can be complex. Hope, for instance, like other forms of confidence,
20 stimulates action because we think it can be successful. But too much hope may undermine
21 realistic assessments of a situation and discourage information gathering (Lazarus 1999).
22 Similarly, a sense of threat can spur action, but if that threat is seen as overwhelming it can
23 discourage action. Anxiety, too, stimulates action at low levels but cripples it at high levels
24 (this suggests the unspecified emotional underpinnings of concepts like the U-curve describ-
25 ing the effects of repression on political mobilization). There is some evidence that bad
26 moods improve decision-making—by increasing attention to detail and improving analysis
27 (Schwartz and Bless 1991).

28 Whereas *moral* emotions we have about ourselves seem best classified under goals,
29 those about others are probably better described as means (although the distinction blurs
30 somewhat in these cases). Outrage and indignation are the emotions associated with blame:
31 not only do we pity victims, we identify a perpetrator responsible for their suffering. Pity for
32 victims does not by itself lead to action, until we also feel outrage toward the villain. Compas-
33 sion shapes the goal, while outrage provides the spur to action.

34 Affect-control theorists have shown that one basic dimension of emotions is whether
35 they are associated with dominance or with vulnerability, another is whether they are associ-
36 ated with activity or passivity (Morgan and Heise 1988). (The third basic dimension in this
37 model is pleasant versus unpleasant.) Emotional states that are dominant and active, such as
38 outrage, anger, and excitement, are presumably better spurs to political action than those that
39 are vulnerable and passive, such as sadness (Lively and Heise 2004). Both moods and morals
40 fit well in this picture.

41 David Hume carved out a large role for emotions when he portrayed them as the source
42 of human goals, with rationality as mere means for attaining them. But we can see emotions
43 as deeply permeating our means as well. By connecting us to a number of social and physical
44 contexts, and providing immediate evaluations of those contexts, a number of different emo-
45 tions are crucial means in political action. Just as it is difficult to understand political action
46 without addressing its cultural dimensions, so it is almost impossible to understand culture
47 without including its emotional components.
48

MORALITY

Moral Motivations

If cognition, emotion, and morality are three components of culture, morality has been especially slighted in recent theories—despite of or in reaction to Turner and Killian's (1957) and Smelser's (1962) early emphasis on values. Or rather, moral motives have been hidden through a division of labor in which religious movements are either studied separately from secular movements or are stripped of their religious content—as though all that mattered were their networks of recruitment, formal organizations, and so on. It is no accident that Christian Smith, a scholar of religion, should complain so sharply about sociology's inattention to morality. Sociological research, whether structurally or culturally oriented, has mostly avoided the issue of motivation altogether. He recognizes how thoroughly goals are shaped by culture. In his words (Smith 2003:145), any “cultural sociology worth pursuing” must articulate “a model of human personhood, motivation, and action in decidedly cultural terms.” And for him, this means moral terms.

Morality is alive and well in the sociology of religion. Robert Wuthnow (1991) has investigated a number of ways in which religious faith and participation encourage “acts of compassion”—as well as some limitations to those effects. Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2004) showed how missionaries used church networks to focus Americans' attention on their government's policy in Latin America and to inspire protest by reminding Christians of fundamental tenets of their faith. James Aho (1990:15) analyzed the “politics of righteousness” that motivates a number of right-wing Christian groups in the United States, who feel they must do God's will by battling “a satanic cabal that has insidiously infiltrated the dominant institutions of society, especially the mass media, public schools, established churches, and state agencies like the Internal Revenue Service.” What better “God term” than God Almighty himself? There could be no better motivating trope to fuse cognition, emotion, and moral duty.

Yet even scholars of religious movements tend to emphasize cognitive beliefs above emotional and moral motivations. Aho, for instance, highlights a dualistic view of history, a belief in conspiracy, and a sense of urgency because the Second Coming is imminent. These building blocks fit together into a coherent worldview, sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, but the vision's motivating power presumably comes from the moral and emotional components, which are inseparable from the cognitive ones. Enumerating participants' beliefs is only the beginning of a full cultural explanation. The cognitive emphasis is necessary in part because secular scholars have trouble taking the right-wing religious beliefs seriously—one reason that so many scholars of religious movements themselves seem to be believers rather than doubters. But we need to recognize the moral and emotional dimensions.

Religion is not the only source of moral principles and intuitions. Jasper (1997:chap. 6) laid out a number of these, which often come into conflict with each other: political ideologies, professional ethics, community allegiances, and expectations of ontological or economic security. In all these cases, we have expectations about the social world, and when they are disappointed moral shocks may result that leave us indignant. Often we are not aware of our expectations until they are disappointed, and political activity helps us articulate what were previously inchoate moral intuitions. Some moral values attain fundamental importance, becoming what Taylor (1989) calls “hypergoods” that trump other goals.

As important as it is to recognize moral motivations, we cannot simply substitute them for material interests in another monocausal model of what drives human action—as Smith, for example, tends to do. Humans are not “fundamentally” moral any more than they are

01 “fundamentally” materialist. They juggle many motivations and goals, some of which are in
02 conflict and some of which are simply not comparable. The challenge, which I think only a
03 cultural (i.e., rhetorical and strategic) approach could meet, is to understand why different
04 goals become more prominent at different times. Emotions must be central to these models.
05

06 **The Cultural Variety of Morality**

07
08
09 Most moral intuitions and principles vary across groups, even if others seem universal.
10 Changes over time are perhaps easiest to see. Inspired by Nietzsche, Michel Foucault
11 (1998:379) famously commented on this variability: “We believe that feelings are immutable,
12 but every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history.” Foucault’s
13 genealogical approach was intended to demonstrate how moral intuitions and emotions come
14 to feel as though they have emerged from our “gut level,” from our bodies, an insight elabo-
15 rated by Bourdieu (1984).

16 For instance compassion for the weak is a modern specialty. Movements to protect ani-
17 mals, children, or indigenous peoples, to take several examples, build upon a broad shift in
18 moral and emotional sensibilities of the last 200 years, in which broad segments of the middle
19 class have grown sentimental and compassionate about beings considered innocent and there-
20 fore easily portrayed as victims (Haskell 1985). If there were ever a movement that demanded
21 attention to moral motivations, it is animal protection. Here, activists do not even belong to
22 the same species as the beneficiaries of their activities (Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Garner 1993;
23 Groves 1997).

24 Scholars have also examined international variations in morality, based on differences in
25 national cultural traditions and institutions. Robert Bellah, another scholar of religion who
26 broadened his focus to examine morality, worked with colleagues to investigate the languages
27 Americans use to talk about their obligations to others (Bellah et al. 1985). Michéle Lamont
28 (1992) probed the professional middle class in France and the United States for differences in
29 the kinds of moral distinctions they made in daily life. But it is not always clear what kinds of
30 political mobilization are precluded or made possible by the kinds of moral boundaries drawn
31 in conversations with interviewers.

32 In using focus groups, William Gamson (1992) came a step closer to politics, observing
33 the cultural meanings normal people use to elaborate political positions. In the conversations
34 he organized, people drew on cultural understandings derived from the media, from their own
35 experiences, and from popular wisdom as embodied in maxims. From these he was able to see
36 what conditions allowed groups to begin to put together the necessary understandings for col-
37 lective action, including a sense of moral injustice, a sense of agency that suggested it would
38 be possible to alter policies or conditions through collective action, and a sense of collective
39 identity about who would bring about these changes. Packed into this latter is also a sense of
40 the identity of an adversary who must be influenced or stopped. Gamson could trace a num-
41 ber of themes related to the policy issues he raised with the groups.

42 In contrast to Gamson’s work on the understandings that arise in small groups, Luc
43 Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991) have catalogued the kinds of arguments used to jus-
44 tify policies in public debates. In this way, they get at the intersection of cultural meanings,
45 out there and available, and traditional rhetorical appreciation of messages designed to have
46 effects on audiences. They identify the following “grammars of worth”: “market” perform-
47 ance, “industrial” or “technical” efficiency based on technology and planning; “civic” solidar-
48 ity; “domestic” trustworthiness based on personal ties; “inspiration” based on creativity and

01 charisma; “renown” based on fame; and (added later: Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993) a “green”
 02 concern for ecological sustainability. So far, little research has related these grammars of
 03 worth to social movements (cf. Lamont and Thévenot 2000). But different institutional set-
 04 tings encourage different moral references.
 05

06 **Morality and Emotion**

07
 08
 09 We can identify the many, culturally influenced motivations and goals that affect action, but
 10 what are the mechanisms by which they exert their effects? In the skeptical modern world, we
 11 assume that the pursuit of one’s own material interests needs no explanation, but that the pur-
 12 suit of distant ideals may. All goals are culturally shaped, of course, but less attention has
 13 been paid to the moral impulses. When we examine them closely, they may simply not be so
 14 “distant” after all. Acting morally is accompanied by a number of emotions that are directly
 15 satisfying.

16 I have used the concept of *moral shock* to highlight the emotions involved in responses to
 17 perceived injustice (Jasper 1997; Jasper and Poulsen 1995). When we learn or experience
 18 something that suggests the world is not morally as it seems, our indignation has a strong vis-
 19 ceral aspect. We feel betrayed by the world as well as by other people. We rethink our moral
 20 stands and consider action to redress the wrong. Moral shocks can propel people into action,
 21 or at least predispose them to act if there is an opportunity to do so. They help us understand
 22 how morality actually moves us to action. They are a good example of a “precipitating event.”

23 Researchers have found moral shocks in a variety of settings. Repressive regimes often
 24 stimulate more collective protest than they suppress, because of the moral shocks their brutal-
 25 ity causes in “transformative events” (Hess and Martin 2006) and “revolutionary accelerators”
 26 (Reed 2004). Severe human rights abuses can shock foreign audiences, too, gaining their
 27 attention and sympathy (Stewart 2004). Other works trying to describe the emotional dynam-
 28 ics of protest have turned to moral shocks as a mechanism (Reger 2004; Satterfield 2004), for
 29 instance as a way of operationalizing Melucci’s concepts (King 2004).

30 Acting collectively has its own accompanying moral feelings. We do the right thing for a
 31 variety of reasons, and prominent among them must be fear of the consequences of doing the
 32 wrong thing. We may fear public punishment for transgressions, or we may fear internal pun-
 33 ishment such as guilt or shame. In between these extremes, and in a sense combining them,
 34 we may fear for our reputations among various relevant audiences. Fear is an ignoble motive,
 35 but surely it is a major form of glue enforcing the rules of any group.

36 We also enjoy a number of positive feelings that result from doing the right thing. *Deon-*
 37 *tological pride*, if we can call it that, is distinct from other feelings of pleasure. It is a sense
 38 that we have acted in a way we and others admire (and perhaps also signaling that we are the
 39 kind of person who should be admired). This feeling is often mixed with the pleasant anti-
 40 cipation of acclaim, but it need not be. It also contains an element of relief that we did not do the
 41 wrong thing, linking back to the potential fears. There are other forms of pride, of course, but
 42 deontological pride is central to collective action.

43 Deontological pride need not depend on external audiences. We can feel proud of our-
 44 selves for doing the right thing even if no one else knows, and even if we do not survive to
 45 enjoy any acclaim. When we are our own audience in this way, deontological pride comes
 46 close to a feeling of dignity, a key motivation for participation, even or especially in high-risk
 47 activities (Auyero 2003; Wood 2003). Honor is the form deontological pride takes in societies
 48 where there is agreement over the moral rules that determine pride and shame. Historically it

01 has been more important than wealth, and even today reputation ranks as a goal far higher
02 than most political theory recognizes. Reputations are fundamental human values.

03 Although it need not be, I nonetheless suspect that deontological pride is most often
04 based on some collective identity. We have done something that either helps our imagined
05 collectivity or which we think that collectivity would praise. Often, we expect positive reac-
06 tions from individual members of that group, those who symbolize it for us in our face to face
07 interactions. A sense of the collective provides both an imagined audience as well as a set of
08 moral values.

09 There are additional feelings involved in various types of moral action. Most ideologies
10 offer some hope for the future, suggesting that a situation can be improved through collective
11 action. Hope feels good in itself, it is not simply an optimistic assessment about the chances
12 of success (as process theories had it). In some collective action, compassion is an ingredient.
13 Helping those in need is directly satisfying for most people. And let us not forget revenge,
14 formed out of hatred and indignation: suicide bombers find their acts directly satisfying for
15 this reason (and not necessarily because they altruistically strive for some public good, as
16 rational-choice theorists would have it).

17 Blame is a moral and emotional concept crucial to strategic collective action (Jasper
18 1997:103–129; Jasper 2006b:48–53). If we believe that some adverse outcome could have
19 been avoided, by an individual or group, we tend to become angry or indignant. If we cannot
20 find someone to blame, framing what happened as an act of God or nature for instance, we are
21 more likely to be come sad—hardly a mobilizing mood (Nerb and Spada 2001). The bound-
22 aries and forms of blame are preeminently cultural constructions.

23 Even for an individual, few actions are driven by a single motive, aimed at a single goal.
24 The goals of compound (collective) players are far more complicated. But just as we have the
25 tools to get at elaborate cognitive understandings of the world, we have the tools to tease out
26 complex combinations of motivations and of emotions. Morality can take its place alongside
27 other factors, ready to be elaborated through empirical investigation. Goals, like the players
28 themselves, need not be dictated in advance by our theories (on basic goals, see Jasper
29 2006b:chap. 3).

32 RETHINKING NONCULTURAL CONCEPTS

34 Structural and rationalist traditions have proven able to accommodate culture in the form of
35 discrete variables, such as frames or collective identities. But a cultural approach in which
36 human action is thoroughly permeated by meaning, emotion and morality requires more than
37 the addition of culture to other models. It demands that we rethink apparently noncultural
38 concepts from a cultural point of view, demonstrating their meaningful character. Interpreta-
39 tion is required from start to finish. A fully cultural approach recognizes no factors that do not
40 at least interact with our understandings, including biological variables as well as structural
41 ones. And by reinterpreting them from a cultural perspective, I think we strengthen them.

44 Costs and Benefits

46 Rationalist traditions have featured rather stunted versions of humans, most interested in their
47 own individual welfare, typically defined as material wealth. Olson (1965:61) famously rec-
48 ognized moral and emotional factors, only to exclude them from his model on the grounds

01 that “it is not possible to get empirical proof of the motivation behind any person’s action.” Of
02 course it is just as impossible to get proof that one is motivated by self-interest. Olson further
03 muddied the waters by insisting, without evidence, that “most organized pressure groups
04 are explicitly working for gains for themselves, not gains for other groups.” Finally, in the
05 same notorious footnote, he admits that affective groups—his examples are families and
06 friendships—are probably best studied with other models than his. To the extent a protest
07 group has affective ties, his model is inadequate.

08 Under the influence of the cultural revolution, scholars began to recognize the inade-
09 quacy of these early formulations, and to try to insert meanings as a patch (e.g., Ferejohn
10 1991). What seemed a simple supplement helped to transform the field, spawning experimen-
11 tal psychology and economics that could incorporate emotions, morals, and cognition—but
12 which in the process undermined the mathematical precision that Olson had hoped to save.
13 Crucially, the new behavioral economics has demonstrated that decision makers do not antic-
14 ipate moves more than one or two rounds in advance, meaning they are more guided by their
15 own culture and psychology than by the mathematical foresight needed to make optimal
16 choices (Camerer 2003; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rubín 2004).

17 Foremost, costs and benefits are defined and valued through cultural lenses. Jail time and
18 other forms of repression are, from Olson’s perspective, pure costs, but they contain many ele-
19 ments of benefit as well. For many, it is a badge of honor to have been imprisoned, increasing
20 not only their reputations but their own deontological pride. Martyrs are difficult to under-
21 stand through rationalist lenses, since they typically weigh group benefits so heavily. The
22 sources of preferences, long dismissed by rationalists as exogenous to their models, also take
23 us into the realm of culture. Rationalists have tried to incorporate this role of culture and psy-
24 chology in constituting costs and benefits (Chong 1991, 2000), but only by turning rational
25 choice into the platitudinous endeavor that Olson feared.

26 Culture does more than help to define costs and benefits. It tells players how much infor-
27 mation should be collected to make a decision, a choice that cannot be made on purely logical
28 grounds. It allows players to satisfice rather than maximize, partly by providing reference
29 groups for players to decide what is satisfactory. It helps to shape the many decision-making
30 heuristics and biases that cognitive psychologists and economists have described. Culture,
31 and especially emotions, tell us what to do in situations of extreme uncertainty, where no sin-
32 gle rational option could be derived but a decision must be made anyway. Finally, without cul-
33 ture we would have difficulty ranking different preferences, especially when we have
34 noncomparable preferences such as hypergoods (Taylor 1989).

35 As experiments are beginning to show, culture influences how individuals try to balance
36 their own personal interests with those of broader groups (see Camerer 2003 for summaries).
37 Individuals are willing to give up monetary gains in order to punish players they believe are
38 acting unfairly. (When they view the other player’s unfair action as out of her control, they are
39 less likely to punish her for it.) Radical economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
40 (Heirich et al. 2001, 2004) have studied cross-cultural differences in reciprocity, finding that
41 roughly half the variation they observed was due to the relative development of markets and
42 cooperation in the division of labor.

43 The ends, the means, and even the mistakes made in political action are thoroughly
44 shaped by human interpretations of the world. These meanings provide the raw materials for
45 any calculation of costs and benefits, advantages and disadvantages, and risks. Indeed, the
46 real “work” of rationalist analysts is often in their interpretation of situations, not in the math-
47 ematics that follows. In game theory, seeing an interaction as a familiar game is the creative
48

01 moment, often requiring an interpretive leap (especially about a player's goals). Culture is
 02 there from the bottom up, and always has been.

03

04

05

06 **Organizations, Resources, and Leaders**

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

07 One of the leading answers to Olson's challenge about how rational actors would come to
 08 engage in protest came from American "resource mobilization" theorists who focused on for-
 09 mal organizations and those who found and lead them. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald
 10 (1977) expressed this view most influentially, applying the metaphor of firms and industries
 11 and sectors to social movements. Like Olson, and perhaps because they were partly respond-
 12 ing to him, they presented organizations and leaders as though they were little influenced by
 13 culture. But we can reread their position from an interpretive point of view.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

14 Even the most formalized organizations rely on a range of cultural practices and
 15 understandings – as one strand of "new institutionalism" has stressed. They manipulate
 16 symbols and rituals to send signals about what kind of organizations they are (Meyer and
 17 Rowan 1977). They rely on cultural schemas about markets and societies (Dobbin 1994).
 18 Even the forms that protest organizations adopt reflect cultural schemas, often borrowed
 19 from other types of organization (Clemens, 1996). Organizations are never neutral, efficient
 20 means to pursue pre-given ends. They also embody *tastes in tactics* (Jasper 1997).

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

21 In McCarthy and Zald's metaphor of a firm, social movement organizations (SMOs) try
 22 to extract as much time and money from sympathetic populations as they can, competing with
 23 other SMOs (and other outlets for discretionary income) as they do so. But in their eagerness
 24 to reject older "grievance" models, McCarthy and Zald did not address the many rhetorical
 25 processes by which audiences are persuaded to part with contribution—precisely the gap that
 26 "framing" was later meant to fill. Ironically, by a seemingly cultural definition of a social
 27 movement as a "set of opinions and beliefs in a population for changing some elements of the
 28 social structure and/or reward distribution of a society," McCarthy and Zald precluded
 29 research on the sources of those opinions or how organizers might appeal to them. "Mobiliza-
 30 tion" is thoroughly imbued with culture.

31

32

33

34

35

36

31 So are resources. I prefer to define resources as purely physical capacities or the
 32 money to buy them (Jasper 1997), so that we can examine their relationship to the knowl-
 33 edge about how to use them, cultural scripts about when it is appropriate to use them, and
 34 decision-making processes that ultimately deploy them. Resources such as money, tear gas,
 35 and tanks allow certain kinds of actions, but they matter only through decisions and actions.

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

36 If SMOs are firms, their leaders are entrepreneurs, apparently doing what they do for the
 37 money. They see unmet preferences and needs, in the form of money that would be con-
 38 tributed to a new SMO were it founded, and they bear initial organizing costs with the
 39 prospect of recouping them later. Although giving a prominent place to leaders, McCarthy
 40 and Zald do not address the moral intuitions and principles, the emotional sympathies and
 41 antipathies, the cognitive framing and interpretation that make up potential followers' prefer-
 42 ences, even though they highlight "conscience constituencies" who have moral rather than
 43 material interests in the cause being pursued.

44

45

46

47

48

44 Even a cultural observer like Alberto Melucci, as we saw, did not grasp the full cultural
 45 significance of leaders, instead following McCarthy and Zald in seeing leaders and their fol-
 46 lowers as exchanging benefits (1996a). But leaders have considerable cultural importance.
 47 They symbolize an organization or a movement, to insiders and outsiders (although often dif-
 48 ferently to these two audiences). This means that they transmit messages about a movement's

01 intentions, power, trajectory, and tactics, but they also become the object of a variety of emo-
02 tions. The love, admiration, and trust they inspire in members advances mobilization and sac-
03 rifice; the trust they arouse in outsiders eases a movement's strategic efforts. The opposite
04 feelings naturally have the opposite impacts.

05 Janja Lalich (2004) accomplishes this kind of updating in her rethinking of Hoffer's con-
06 cept of a *true believer*. She compares Heaven's Gate, which gained notoriety in 1997 when
07 three dozen of its members—including its aging leader—committed suicide in southern Cali-
08 fornia in the hope of shedding their human traits and bodies and moving to a higher state of
09 evolution via a passing spaceship, with a Marxist–Leninist–Maoist pre-party formation, also
10 founded in the mid-1970s, that lasted a respectable decade. Charismatic leaders (another con-
11 cept she revives) can demand such enormous sacrifices from their followers, she explains, by
12 cutting recruits off from other social ties, people with other perspectives who might offer a
13 critical view of the group's goals and means. They apply constant pressure to make partici-
14 pants see freedom in the ultimate transformation to come, in contrast to the current world of
15 corruption. Charismatic leaders in these two groups lived apart, in ways that allowed follow-
16 ers to see them as embodying their ideals for living and thinking. The leaders and the groups
17 they embodied came to be more important than the actual individuals who also comprised the
18 groups—any of whom could be expelled at any moment. There was also paranoia about the
19 outside world, making any internal criticism an act of betrayal as it could be used by those out
20 to destroy the groups.

21 Much of this is classic Hoffer, but instead of damaged individuals seeking identity,
22 Lalich discusses processes of cognition, culture, and social control that could operate in
23 many different contexts and on anyone (although she is not clear about this). Today, it is easy
24 for social scientists to recognize all the meaning work that goes into any political mobiliza-
25 tion, from the most outlandish to the most mainstream. Groups construct identities for mem-
26 bers, demonize opponents and outsiders, demand allegiance to the group above that to its
27 individual members, find exemplary individuals (leaders or not) who inspire loyalty and
28 action, and develop other ways to get work out of members. We need ways to study such
29 mechanisms in a range of groups, finally overcoming the great intellectual divide, which has
30 bedeviled political analysis for so long, between those who study groups they dislike and
31 those who study groups they admire. Cognitive and emotional shaping occurs in all groups
32 and organizations.

33 34 35 **Structures, Opportunities, and Repression**

36
37 Like resource mobilization, political opportunity models were an important strand of Ameri-
38 can research on movements in the 1970s and 1980s. One concentrated on the economics of
39 protest organizations, the other on their political environments: the states and elites to which
40 they appealed. But just as mobilization theorists ignored the cultural side of their favored
41 processes, so political process theorists tended to view political environments in structural
42 terms that equally ignored their cultural construction. Their belated efforts to add a few cul-
43 tural variables were inadequate, and the paradigm collapsed rather abruptly at the turn of the
44 millennium (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; McAdam et al. 2001).

45 Process theories included culture in the form of “cognitive liberation,” intended to get at
46 the moment when potential protestors believe they have a chance to succeed. For fifteen
47 years, process theorists insisted on distinguishing between the existence of objective opportu-
48 nities and the ability of protestors to perceive them—a distinction neatly demolished when

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

93

01 Kurzman showed that Iranian revolutionaries created opportunities by believing in them
02 (1996). Today it is easier to see that there is some cultural interpretation at every stage or level
03 of an opportunity (including a great deal of cultural work by elites during a crisis). Cognitive
04 liberation involves emotions that might drive people to participate even when they do not
05 think they can succeed.

06 In the dominant models, most structural opportunities involved cleavages among elites
07 that either paralyze them or lead a faction to align with potential insurgents (Jenkins and Per-
08 row 1977). Neither of these is automatic. Potential choices must be framed, symbols pre-
09 sented, emotions aroused. Political players persuade each other rhetorically to undertake
10 certain actions. Alliances are a good example: they do not follow directly from material or
11 “objective” interests. Cultural work goes into persuading players that they share interests, into
12 instilling emotional solidarities, into imagining a certain kind of future together. At every step
13 there are dilemmas to be finessed (Jasper 2006b).

14 Elites are important not only for the legal openings and physical resources they can
15 provide, but also for their decisions about repression. When facing police or troops whose
16 morale does not crack and who are well armed, insurgencies almost inevitably fail. But too
17 often, repression was treated as though it were a structural capacity concerning resources,
18 say the number of rifles or tanks available, rather than a matter of persuasion and choice.
19 Commanders and troops at a number of levels must decide to follow orders, while weighing
20 their moral principles and emotional loyalties and envisioning their futures under different
21 regimes. There are many chances to defect, and many ways to do so. Elites interpret and
22 persuade too.

23 Structures do little by themselves. They constrain because there are other players
24 actively using resources, enforcing laws and other rules, occupying positions in organizations
25 and other hierarchies, and generally working hard to pursue or protect their own advantages.
26 In the heat of strategic engagement, these actions depend on a variety of emotional and cogni-
27 tive processes. Few scholars today embrace the label structuralist, recognizing the open-
28 ended nature of most structures (Kurzman 2003).

29

30

31

Mobilization and Networks

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

One of the most robust findings of movement research has been that participants are frequently recruited through personal networks—part of the structural imagery of the 1970s and 1980s. In the crudest formulations, often encouraged by methods of network analysis, the recruitment is almost mechanical. Attitudes do not seem to matter, only network ties. But David Snow and others (Snow et al., 1980) who helped demonstrate the importance of networks were quick to realize (Snow et al., 1983, 1986) that what mattered was largely the ideas (and I would add, the emotions) that flow through them. Networks consist of affective loyalties, not mechanical interactions. Networks and culture work together (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987).

The concept of biographical availability was used to help explain recruitment: supposedly structural traits such as lack of a regular job, a spouse, or children free individuals for the time commitment of protest (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, McAdam, 1988:chap. 2). But availability is a matter of low costs to protest, and as I argued above all costs must operate through the cultural and psychological filters of decisionmakers. For most the costs will be too high, but not for all. What we need to explain is these different interpretations of circumstances.

01 Bloc recruitment was also initially defined as a structural availability of an entire group
02 or network that could be coopted to a new cause (Freeman, 1973; Oberschall, 1973). But just
03 as individual recruitment through networks relies on activating affective loyalties and persua-
04 sive rhetoric, the same processes operate to draw the leader of a bloc to a new cause, then to
05 keep her followers in the bloc (presumably, many are not persuaded: blocs rarely come in
06 their entirety). Just as interactions with elites and other potential allies entails cognitive and
07 emotional and moral persuasion, so does recruitment to the cause.

08 Theories of frame alignment were originally developed to explain exactly these processes
09 of recruitment. Other cultural concepts, such as suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh, 1981)
10 and moral shocks (Jasper, 1997; Jasper and Poulsen, 1995), were developed largely to get at the
11 cultural spark necessary for networks to do their work—and to explain occasional cases of self-
12 recruitment in the absence of networks. If we do not view protest exclusively or primarily as an
13 effort to redress some recognized material or political lack, but recognize that it can also be an
14 effort to impose cognitive, moral, and emotional order on the world, recruitment is more easily
15 seen as a cultural exhortation than as a simple sharing of information.

16 17 18 **Strategy as a Cultural Concept** 19

20 Thanks to generations of game theorists, social scientists are accustomed to thinking about
21 strategic choices as though they were calculations of advantages and payoffs, with little input
22 from culture. Each player's choices are also narrowed, typically to a mere two possibilities,
23 and communication—hence persuasion—is often barred. The result has been mathematical
24 elegance at the expense of realism. One way to reinterpret strategy from a cultural perspective
25 is to rethink costs and benefits, as we suggested above, but there are others.

26 Of the three main families of strategic action (I define strategy simply as trying to get
27 others to do what you want them to)—coercion, payment, and persuasion (Jasper, 2006b)—
28 the latter is most purely cultural. But the other two also contain elements of tradition, infor-
29 mation, and even some persuasion. Coercion is frequently preceded by threat, for example;
30 payment is typically followed by monitoring for performance. Most strategic engagements
31 involve cooperation and communication, which have deep cultural dimensions. These include
32 appeals to collective identities, emotional solidarities to prevent defections, and the elabora-
33 tion of moral exemplars.

34 Decision making, reduced to a simple mathematical calculation in game theory, is a
35 complex cultural and psychological process (Ganz 2000, 2003). Players rely on traditions and
36 norms, on the cognitive heuristics that memory and media make available, and on their defi-
37 nitions of any given situation. And when it is groups rather than individuals who must arrive
38 at decisions, persuasion becomes internal to a player, adding another layer of cultural process.
39 Shared understandings, which help collective players operate smoothly, must be built up and
40 negotiated.

41 When someone acts strategically, other players are audiences for those actions. They
42 constantly interpret the intentions, feelings, commitments, the fragility of other players.
43 They try to decide which words and actions are bluffs, which sincere. They make judg-
44 ments about potential factions and fissures by assessing various motives. They estimate the
45 utility of various kinds of resources and other advantages. They come up with theories
46 about the “characters” of players, as a way to guess what they will do. They draw on their
47 knowledge to invent new tactics when possible, based on their knowledge of what other
48 players expect.

01 And as we saw above, the very creation of a strategic player is a cognitive and emotional
02 accomplishment, a collective identity that requires continual reinforcement.
03

04 05 **Two Ways to Think about Crowds** 06

07 After this brief jaunt through so many basic concepts, we can return to the root metaphor
08 of so much research on protest, namely crowds, to rethink them as well from a cultural
09 perspective. In the old view, crowds stripped away cultural meanings, broader social ties,
10 and long-term political projects, in order to get down to some “basic” form of interaction.
11 In Durkheim, we see this in the notion that aboriginal gatherings somehow represented the
12 “essence” of religion. As late as Smelser (1962), we see the same idea: that other forms of
13 collective action, even the most complex value-oriented movements, are built up from basic
14 forms of action, namely crowds. Because this long tradition lacked much empirical
15 evidence, and because it relied on psychological mechanisms that were hard to observe, the
16 structural tradition would dismiss it as myth—a cultural construction that served conserva-
17 tive political purposes. Those few who continued to study crowds were most interested in
18 showing the structured microinteractions occurring, in order to demonstrate that crowds are
19 not unified, rarely turn violent, are not composed of people with a predisposition toward
20 violence, and so on (McPhail 1991).

21 Research on crowds is ready for a culturally oriented rebirth. For one thing, psycholo-
22 gists of emotion have demonstrated that the old notion of contagion contains some truth
23 (Hatfield, Cacciopo, and Rapson 1994). Facial expressions of emotion are mimicked by those
24 around one, a process that can spread salient emotions through an interacting crowd. More
25 generally, Collins (2001) has elaborated the ritual component of crowds addressed by
26 Durkheim. Seeking and receiving attention provide both goals and means for further action.
27 The rituals of crowds are simply one example of interactions that generate attention and a
28 number of emotions. The pleasures of crowds and other forms of coordinated movement go
29 beyond social attention, however (McNeill 1995). And as Turner and Killian (1957) recog-
30 nized, they are hotbeds of ideas. As Durkheim claimed, crowd actions interact with existing
31 symbol systems, with each reinforcing the other through the emotions aroused. Crowds are
32 not moments of madness, but moments of articulation.

33 Pamela Oliver (1989) argues that crowds are a corrective to the organizational metaphors
34 and dynamics of most recent research. Events and gatherings have their own momentum and
35 effects, not always under the control of formal organizations. In particular, how the events are
36 understood (as successful or not, as promising, as fun) influences whether they are likely to be
37 repeated. In addition, mutual reactions unfold through a strategic logic that often eludes for-
38 mal organizations. Here too, crowds and culture come together.
39

40 41 **METHODS OF RESEARCH** 42

43 **Case Studies** 44

45 Scholars of social movements typically devote enormous time to mastering the diverse phe-
46 nomena that comprise any movement, usually composed of many diverse groups, different
47 kinds of members, various kinds of tactics and events, interactions with a number of other
48 strategic players, and so on. The result is that most research consists of sustained *case studies*.

01 On the positive side, such close attention can allow an understanding of deep cultural meanings
02 and feelings. On the negative, the same case is often used to develop new theories and concepts
03 as well as to try them out empirically. For instance, each scholar derives a series of frames from
04 her movement, without connecting them to frames in other movements or to broader cultural
05 themes (Benford 1997; cf. Gamson 1992). We need more explicit *comparisons* of movements
06 and settings: how is a frame adapted to a new movement; how does the same group reformulate
07 its appeal for different audiences; how does it present its identity to outsiders and to insiders;
08 when does it play the hero and when the victim. Comparisons over time and across groups or
09 movements will help us isolate causal mechanisms by which meanings are created, dissemi-
10 nated, and affect action.

13 Noncultural Techniques

14
15 Many scholars have avoided the risks of case studies by looking at *events* instead of move-
16 ments. Originally deployed in the study of riots, the use of events as units of analysis was
17 especially helpful in the historical understanding of strikes and other contentious events (for
18 which newspaper reports but not richer information were available. The strength of this tech-
19 nique lies in tracking developments over time and checking correlations of protest with other
20 variables such as unemployment or grain prices, but it remains largely wedded to newspaper
21 accounts and does little to discern the meanings or feelings of protestors. The structural
22 school used it to great effect in criticizing earlier crowd-based models (Shorter and Tilly
23 1974; Snyder and Tilly 1972), but they were forced to use proxies such as economic troubles
24 to get at discontent. Long time series make sense primarily when there is an explicit or
25 implicit theory of history lurking in the background.

26 *Network analysis* is another technique associated with structuralist assumptions about
27 human action. An impressive number of studies have demonstrated the importance of net-
28 works for recruitment and collective action (Diani 2004, is a good summary). But all too
29 often, such studies are content to describe the networks without theorizing exactly how net-
30 works allow or encourage action—often on the implicit assumption that bringing willing par-
31 ticipants together is sufficient (structural models tend to assume that the grievances are
32 already there, and only opportunities are lacking) (Fernandez and McAdam 1988). But more
33 and more work argues that what travels across those networks is not only information about
34 possibilities for action but affective bonds such as trust and collective identities and cognitive
35 frames for understanding issues (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Passy 2003). Mische
36 (2003:259) even suggests that we view networks as “composed of culturally constituted
37 processes of communicative interaction,” in which understandings and decisions are negoti-
38 ated. Unfortunately, the elaborate techniques developed for mapping networks are not the
39 most subtle for getting at those meanings.

40 *Surveys* have the advantages of techniques developed across generations of social scien-
41 tists, and they remain the premier tool for examining the distribution of beliefs in a popula-
42 tion. Surveys can demonstrate a population’s relative support for an issue or action, although
43 cognitive agreement does little to explain who in the end actually participates in a protest
44 action (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). They can identify clusters of ideas that form protes-
45 tors’ worldviews, such as the post-industrial values or the “new environmental paradigm”
46 (Cotgrove 1982; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Milbrath, 1984;). Surveys of protestors have
47 also been used to identify cleavages within a movement, patterns of recruitment, and tactical
48

01 pd. They are especially good for tracing changes across time. They can also be used to gather
 02 basic descriptive information about organizations (such as Dalton 1994). Surveys are less
 03 adept for uncovering ideas unfamiliar to researchers or probing feelings that are difficult (or
 04 sensitive) to articulate (Klandermans and Smith 2002).

07 Interpretive Techniques

08
 09 *Focus groups* redress these drawbacks by allowing deeper probing in a group setting in which
 10 new points of view might emerge that researchers had not initially recognized. We saw that
 11 Gamson (1992) used focus groups to show the raw cultural materials available for organizing,
 12 the common-sense understandings that are as important as media framings of events. Focus
 13 groups can also allow researchers to confront participants to observe their emotional as well
 14 as cognitive reactions, much as in Touraine's sociological interventions. As Kitzinger and
 15 Barbour (1999:5) observe, although with an overly cognitive emphasis, "Focus groups are
 16 ideal for exploring people's experiences, opinions, wishes, and concerns. The method is par-
 17 ticularly useful for allowing participants to generate their own questions, frames and con-
 18 cepts, and to pursue their own priorities on their own terms, in their own vocabulary." They
 19 can also generate their own feelings.

20 Various forms of *content analysis* have looked at publicly expressed meanings, often for-
 21 mulating them as frames (Benford 1997; Johnston 2002). The advantage here is that the
 22 researcher need not probe subtle mental representations, only their public embodiments—
 23 although there remains some assumption of a connection between the two. Discourse analysis
 24 broadens the notion of what can be interpreted: not only written texts but spoken words and
 25 even—in poststructural fashion—all terms and practices (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In this
 26 case, there is nothing outside discourse, in the sense of meaningful action. Even physical
 27 objects are meaningful only as part of a language game. In most cases, discourse analysis is
 28 essentially the study of rhetoric (Billig 1987; Steinberg 1998, 1999). Most often, it is used to
 29 decode the discourses of the powerful rather than those who challenge them, as in the rela-
 30 tively formal Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1995). Here, content analysis is not a
 31 search for static meanings but an effort to show how people *do things* with words.

32 The best way to get at the meanings and especially feelings of participants remains
 33 some form of involvement, through *ethnographic* observation, direct *participation*, depth
 34 *interviews*—or some combination of these. The lengthy time commitment allows adjustment
 35 between hypotheses and evidence, especially in the form of interrogating activists about what
 36 they think they are doing. Lalich's (2004) richly detailed study of Heaven's Gate and the
 37 Democratic Workers Party, for instance, was possible only through her unique (and extensive)
 38 contact with both groups: she belonged to the DWP and was one of its leaders for many years,
 39 and was a therapist and writer who worked with some of Heaven's Gate's former members and
 40 survivors. Of course, such access is costly to obtain. Nor do techniques like this help us under-
 41 stand movements of the past.

42 *Semistructured interviews* represent an effort to combine some of the representativity of
 43 surveys with the depth of open-ended interviews (Blee and Taylor 2002). Researchers can get
 44 at the feelings and understandings of participants, especially by adding some degree of con-
 45 text unavailable to most surveys. By carefully choosing whom to interview, researchers can
 46 get at something beneath the official statements of a group, for instance by probing factional
 47
 48

01 disagreements. But as with surveys, the more structured the interview the less likely it is to
02 reveal something entirely new to the researcher.

03 Several researchers have tried to get at the meanings and decisions of protestors by taking
04 “the actors’ point of view” (Bevington and Dixon 2005; Maddison and Scalmer 2006). Ethno-
05 graphic and similar approaches share the assumption that only through our own participation
06 can we fully understand what protestors are going through, what they are thinking and feeling.
07 But there are two possible ways to adopt the actors’ points of view. One is to sympathize with
08 them, a natural stance for scholars who are also activists, as many are. The risk is that analyses
09 of movements become moral cheerleading aimed at showing their arguments are right rather
10 than at explaining them objectively. The other way to get inside actors’ heads is simply to
11 empathize, to understand their goals and sensibilities as well as possible, but to fit this empathy
12 into rigorous causal models that would work whether the protestors’ arguments are right or
13 wrong. Besides, if sympathy is necessary, how can we understand opponents, state officials,
14 and others who help determine the outcomes of struggle? And how do we study movements, as
15 we’ll see in a moment, for which we have little or no sympathy?
16

17 **Introspection**

18
19
20 Having reviewed methods commonly recognized as useful for the study of the cultural dimen-
21 sion of social movements—and some less useful for it—we turn finally to a method that is
22 often used but rarely discussed, introspection. Still a staple among philosophers, introspection
23 has a terrible reputation among social scientists. In psychology, experimentalism thoroughly
24 vanquished it (Danziger 1990). Among scholars of social movements, it reeks of the “arm-
25 chair theorizing” about crowds that prevented progress in understanding social movements
26 for so long.

27 But armchair theorizing is not the same as introspection, unless those in the armchairs
28 have participated in whatever process they are theorizing about. Today, many of those who
29 write about social movements have participated extensively in them. They use introspection
30 to derive theories on the basis of what they believe is plausible, although they usually seek
31 independent evidence to test them. But since many scholars test their theories on the same
32 movement from which they derived them, they do not always move very far from introspec-
33 tion. By being more explicit about our own introspection, we may be able to improve it by
34 specifying which of our experiences we are drawing upon.

35 In his discussions of practices and habitus, Bourdieu regularly suggested that scholars who
36 observe activities without participating in them tend to draw logical models of them that miss
37 much of their driving force. Speaking of science, for instance, he warned, “One has to avoid
38 reducing practices to the idea one has of them when one’s only experience of them is logical”
39 (2004:39). Meanings must be interpreted, and outsiders require empathy at the very least. Even
40 then, they get things wrong a lot. Participation is useful because it allows introspection.

41 Introspection seems particularly appropriate for two areas of study, emotions, and strate-
42 gic choice. Emotions other than a handful of reflex emotions (see section on Emotions) are
43 often difficult to discern from the outside. Combinations and sequences of emotions are even
44 harder for an observer to interpret correctly, but cautious inspection of our own feelings may
45 allow us to tease them out with a fair degree of complexity. We can actively examine and
46 interrogate ourselves to try to understand our feelings, motives, and so on. Margaret Archer
47 (2003) embraces this technique, rejecting the metaphor of a passive observer implied by
48 “introspection.”

01 Strategic choices often subtly balance a number of competing ends and means, in part
 02 because they involve innumerable tradeoffs. It is impossible to “see” decision making from
 03 the outside; at best one can observe collectives discussing and voting, but not the subtle calcu-
 04 lations that occur inside each player’s head. The creativity, motivations, and choices may not
 05 be entirely transparent even to those who make them, but participants have an enormous
 06 advantage over external observers. When player and analyst are the same person, scrutiny of
 07 one’s mental processes can be disciplined, impulses and emotions can be labeled carefully,
 08 and rationales traced. No method is perfect, but introspection sometimes offers access to men-
 09 tal processes no other method does. We need to be explicit and systematic about it.

10 One drawback of introspection is that it is limited to our own experiences. We might
 11 have difficulty comprehending what it is like to be a suicide bomber, for instance. Another
 12 drawback is that we are not always honest with ourselves—but this is even more of a problem
 13 when we interview others.

16 Unpleasant Cases

18 Methodological challenges for getting at meanings and feelings are especially strong for
 19 those who study movements that are either extremely risky or repellent to the researcher. Rev-
 20 olutionaries are a case of the former, operating at war with authorities and thus putting a
 21 researcher at risk. No wonder revolutions have most often been studied through official
 22 records, or “the prose of counter-insurgency” (Guha 1983). Other “weapons of the weak” are
 23 also kept secret to protect the perpetrators from retaliation, and authorities often have an inter-
 24 est in suppressing publicity for fear that resistance will spread (Scott 1985, 1990). In many
 25 cases, researchers turn to the memoirs of revolutionary leaders who may not have similar
 26 motivations or experiences as their followers, often because they are from a different social
 27 class (Kriger 1992). Plus memoirs always have their own strategic purposes.

28 Other movements are simply offensive to the researcher. Only recently have sociologists
 29 begun to interview the far right, hate groups, and racist movements, after relying for many
 30 decades on content analysis of written materials (just as, until the 1960s, most leftist move-
 31 ments were treated from a distance). Here there is an additional challenge for the researcher:
 32 managing her own emotional displays so as not to disrupt the interview. She cannot show her
 33 own anger or disgust at what she hears without ending or distorting the interview (Blee 1998).
 34 Just as we must interpret an informant’s performance of feelings or presentation of meanings,
 35 trying to see what is calculated strategic intention and what is less guarded, so we must put on
 36 a performance of our own. The more potentially hostile our audience, the more difficult this is.

37 Fortunately, the study of social movements has proven open to a variety of techniques
 38 rather than being wedded to any kind of methodological purity (Klandermans and Staggen-
 39 borg 2002). Because feelings and meanings have both public and private sides, it is usually
 40 best to approach them with multiple methods.

43 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND FUTURE 44 DIRECTIONS

46 Despite the enormous amount of excellent research into social movements during the past
 47 several decades, including its cultural dimensions, there are numerous questions that remain
 48 unanswered. I mention only a few.

01 The *first stirrings* of a social movement remain poorly understood. Given the sensibili-
02 ties, ideas, values, and allegiances mixed together in different population segments, how does
03 necessarily limited attention come to be focused on one set of issues rather than others? This
04 is an eminently cultural process. A newsworthy event or death of a loved one may shock peo-
05 ple into attention. These are often termed precipitating events. The *zeitgeist* may shift slightly,
06 in enormously complex ways, bringing attention and sympathy to new arenas. News coverage
07 also influences our emotional and moral attention. Typically, a small network of would-be
08 leaders manages to set aside their normal lives to craft appeals to these understandings in
09 order to recruit like-minded others (or they may be movement professionals whose work is to
10 stimulate protest). Little is known about these initial processes.

11 We also know relatively little about the cultural dimensions of *how new tactics spread*,
12 presumably as one individual moves from movement to movement or one individual learns
13 from another (Soule 2004). Most work on diffusion has examined network ties and spatial
14 patterns (Hedström 1994; Morris 1981) or the effects of media (Myers 2000). Tactics spread
15 not only because they are effective (at least until opponents themselves innovate in response),
16 but because they fit protestors' tastes in tactics (Jasper 1997), or fit with the way a problem is
17 framed (Roggeband 2004). We know even less about the first creative spark that ignites a new
18 tactic or understanding. I suspect these creative moments arise from the idiosyncracies of
19 individuals finding new ways to deal with strategic dilemmas, typically under some sense of
20 urgency in the heat of an engagement. Learning and choice are both cultural processes, and
21 these are at the heart of tactical diffusion.

22 We still know too little about *cultural change*. How do the creators of meanings tinker
23 with their frames and tropes? What is the interaction between creators and audiences? This
24 seems an area where culture and strategy interact, as activists and their opponents try different
25 ways to have their desired impacts. As I suggested, we still have a lot to learn about these
26 processes from rhetorical traditions.

27 We know little about *strategic dilemmas and choices* made in facing them (Ganz 2000,
28 2003; Jasper 2004a, 2006b). These decisions are a cultural product, not a simple algorithm.
29 Identities such as gender encourage people to answer strategic dilemmas in one way rather
30 than another. Thus in her study of the civil rights movement Robnett (1991) showed
31 women's tendency to reach in rather than reach out when faced with the ubiquitous Janus
32 Dilemma. Groups trying to battle stigmatized identities nonetheless use those identities to
33 mobilize supporters, in a dilemma fraught with risks. Culture and strategy are thoroughly
34 entwined because strategic players are always audiences interpreting each other's words and
35 actions.

36 Students of social movements, especially in sociology, have a lot to learn from *other dis-*
37 *ciplines*. For instance the rediscovery of emotions and morality in behavioral economics,
38 reflecting the lagged influence of cognitive psychology, offers an opportunity for sociological
39 students of collective action. Behavioral economists have criticized the rationalist and materi-
40 alist traditions of their own discipline, showing that people value various forms of fairness.
41 Psychology and social psychology, in addition, have their own insights into political action
42 that are derived from the cognitive revolution (see Chapter 5 in this volume). Indeed, the inter-
43 disciplinary nature of this handbook promises this kind of cross-fertilization.

44 We also need further research in the *substance* of meanings. We need to think about
45 basic sources of meaning such as time, place, and character. Are there tropes that reappear in
46 diverse cultures? Are there certain parts of the social structure, for instance young people,
47 new arrivals, rapidly growing cities, or the poor, that generate anxieties for a population
48 (Jasper 1997:358–363)? Comparative research should help us lay out the variations in all

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

101

01 these that suppress or encourage collective action. What tropes have emotional impacts that
02 encourage confidence and action, which ones discourage them?

03 With the structural turn in movement theory, *leaders* fell from favor as a research topic,
04 despite having once been prominent as the evil, demagogic force behind crowds. Yet there is
05 a great opening today to rethink their role using the new tools of the cultural turn. Leaders
06 are important in the decisions they make, but also in what they symbolize. They represent a
07 group, not only to outsiders but to members as well (even after they are dead: Fine 2001).
08 Part of this symbolic role consists in emotions they arouse both in and out of the group. They
09 also convey important information in very practical ways. (For one effort to revive the
10 concept, although not from an especially cultural perspective, see Barker, Johnson, and
11 Lavalette 2001).

12 Numerous paths of research will return to noncultural mechanisms in order to interrogate
13 and reinterpret them from a cultural perspective. I have barely touched on this kind of project.
14 But if the social world is saturated with meaning, we need to see how culture operates in a
15 number of areas that have hitherto been viewed as noncultural. Meanings and feelings must
16 be seen as parts of strategic engagements in structured arenas, not floating mysteriously on
17 their own. People have both passions and purposes. And when we figure out how these inter-
18 act, we will be much closer to understanding social movements.

SUGGESTED READINGS

- 23 Bob, Clifford. 2005. *The Marketing of Rebellion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24 Fine, Gary Alan. 2001. *Difficult Reputations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
25 Gamson, William A. 1992. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26 Gitlin, Todd. 1980. *The Whole World Is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
27 Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. 2001. *Passionate Politics*. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
28 Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
29 Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.
30 Lalich, Janja. 2004. *Bounded Choice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
31 McDonald, Kevin. 2006. *Global Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell.
32 Melucci, Alberto. 1996. *Challenging Codes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33 Polletta, Francesca. 2006. *It Was Like a Fever*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
34 Touraine, Alain. 1978. *La voix et le regard*. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Translation: *The Voice and the Eye* (1981,
Cambridge University Press).

REFERENCES

- 35
36
37
38
39 Adams, J. 2000. "Movement Socialization in Art Workshops: A Case from Pinochet's Chile." *Sociological Quarterly*
40 41:615–638.
41 Adorno, T. W. et al. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
42 Aho, J. A. 1990. *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
43 Alexander, J. C. 2006. Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy. Pp. 29–90 in *Social Per-*
44 *formance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*, edited by J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, and J. L.
45 Mast. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
46 Alexander, J. C., Giesen, B. and Mast, J. L., eds. 2006. *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics,*
47 *and Ritual*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
48 Alford, C. F. 1989. *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
———. 2006. "Hate and Love and the Other." Pp. 84–102 in *Emotions, Politics, and Society*, edited by S. Clarke,
P. Hoggett, and S. Thompson. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.

- 01 Almond, G. A. and S. Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 02 Althusser, L. 1969. *For Marx*. London: Allen Lane.
- 03 ——. 1971. *Lenin and Philosophy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- 04 Althusser, L. and E. Balibar. 1970. *Reading Capital*. London: New Left Books.
- 05 Archer, M. S. 2003. *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 06 Auyero, J. 2003. *Contentious Lives*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- 07 Barber, B. R. 1984. *Strong Democracy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 08 Barker, C., A. Johnson, and M. Lavalette, eds. 2001. *Leadership and Social Movements*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- 09 Bellah, R., R. Madsen, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swidler, and S. M. Tipton. 1985. *Habits of the Heart*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 10 Benford, R. D. 1997. "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective." *Sociological Inquiry* 67:409–430.
- 11 Bernstein, M. 1997. "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:531–565.
- 12 Bevington, D. and C. Dixon. 2005. "Movement-Relevant Theory: Rethinking Social Movement Scholarship and Activism." *Social Movement Studies* 4:185–208.
- 13 Billig, M. 1987. *Arguing and Thinking*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 14 Blee, K. M. 1991. *Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 15 ——. 1998. "Managing Emotion in the Study of Right-Wing Extremism." *Qualitative Sociology* 21:381–399.
- 16 ——. 2002. *Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 17 Blee, K. M. and V. Taylor. 2002. "Semi-structured Interviewing and Social Movement Research." Pp. 92–117 in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, edited by B. Klandermans and S. Staggenborg. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 18 Blumenberg, H. 1983. *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- 19 Bob, C. 2005. *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 20 Boltanski, L. and L. Thévenot. 1991. *De la Justification*. Paris: Gallimard.
- 21 Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Distinction*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 22 ——. 2004. *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 23 Bramwell, A. 1989. *Ecology in the 20th Century: A History*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 24 Bruner, J. 1962. *On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 25 Butler, J. 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge.
- 26 Calhoun, C. 1982. *The Question of Class Struggle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 27 ——. 1993. "'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century." *Social Science History* 17:385–427.
- 28 Camerer, C. F. 2003. *Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- 29 Camerer, C. F., G. Loewenstein, and M. Rabin, eds. 2004. *Advances in Behavioral Economics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 30 Campbell, S. 1994. "Being Dismissed: The Politics of Emotional Expression." *Hypatia* 9:46–65.
- 31 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). 1978. *On Ideology*. London: Hutchinson.
- 32 ——. 1980. *Culture, Media, Language*. London: Hutchinson.
- 33 Chong, D. 1991. *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 34 ——. 2000. *Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 35 Clemens, E. S. 1996. "Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the American Labor Movement, 1880–1920." Pp. 205–226 in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 36 Clore, G. L., N. Schwarz, and M. Conway. 1994. "Affective Causes and Consequences of Social Information Processing." Pp. 323–417 in *The Handbook of Social Cognition*, 2nd edition, edited by R. S. Wyer and T. Srull. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- 37 Cohen, J. L. 1985. "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements." *Social Research* 52:663–716.
- 38 Cohen, S. 1972. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- 39 Collins, R. 2001. "Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention." Pp. 27–44 in *Passionate Politics*, edited by J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, and F. Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 40 ——. 2004. *Interaction Ritual Chains*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 41 Cotgrove, S. 1982. *Catastrophe or Cornucopia*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- 42 Crane, D., ed. 1994. *The Sociology of Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell.

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

103

- 01 Crenson, M. A. and B. Ginsberg. 2002. *Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelines Its Citizens and Privatized*
 02 *Its Public*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- 03 Dalton, R. J. 1994. *The Green Rainbow*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 04 Dalton, R. J., S. C. Flanagan, and P. A. Beck, eds. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*.
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 05 Danziger, K. 1990. *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research*. Cambridge, UK:
 06 Cambridge University Press.
- 07 Davis, J. E., ed. 2002. *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*. Albany: State University of New York
 08 Press.
- 09 De Beauvoir, S. 1949. *Le Deuxième Sexe*. Paris: Gallimard.
- 10 Derrida, J. 1967. *Ecriture et la Différence*. Paris: Seuil.
- 11 ——. 1978. "Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences." Pp. 278–294 in *Writing and Difference*. Chicago:
 University of Chicago Press.
- 12 Diani, M. 2004. "Networks and Participation." Pp. 339–359 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*,
 edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 13 Dobbin, F. 1994. *Forging Industrial Policy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 14 Dosse, F. 1997. *History of Structuralism*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 15 Ekman, P. 1972. *Emotions in the Human Face*. New York: Pergamon.
- 16 Eliot, T. S. 1948. *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*. London: Faber and Faber.
- 17 Elshstain, J. B. 1981. *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
 University Press.
- 18 Elster, J. 1992. *Strong Feelings*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- 19 Emirbayer, M. and J. Goodwin. 1994. "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency." *American Journal*
 20 *of Sociology* 99:1411–1454.
- 21 Epstein, B. 1981. *The Politics of Domesticity: Women, Evangelism, and Temperance in Nineteenth Century America*.
 Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- 22 Eyerman, R. 2006. "Performing Opposition or, How Social Movements Move." Pp. 193–217 in *Social Performance:*
 23 *Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*, edited by J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, and J. L. Mast.
 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 24 Eyerman, R. and A. Jamison. 1998. *Music and Social Movements*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 25 Fairclough, N. 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis*. Harlow: Longman.
- 26 Ferejohn, J. 1991. "Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England." Pp. 279–305 in
 27 *The Economic Approach to Politics*, edited by K. R. Monroe. New York: HarperCollins.
- 28 Fernandez, R. and D. McAdam. 1988. "Social Networks and Social Movements: Multiorganizational Fields and
 29 Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer." *Sociological Forum* 3:357–382.
- 30 Fine, G. A. 1995. "Public Narration and Group Culture." Pp. 127–143 in *Social Movements and Culture*, edited by
 31 H. Johnston and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 32 ——. 2001. *Difficult Reputations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 33 Foucault, M. 1961. *Folie et Dérason*. Paris: Librairie Plon.
- 34 ——. 1963. *La Naissance de la Clinique*. Paris: PUF.
- 35 ——. 1966. *Les Mots et les Choses*. Paris: Editions Gallimard.
- 36 ——. 1975. *Surveiller et Punir*. Paris: Gallimard.
- 37 ——. 1976. *Histoire de la Sexualité. I: la Volonté de Savoir*. Paris: Gallimard.
- 38 ——. 1998. *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*. Edited by J.D. Faubion. New York: The New Press.
- 39 Frank, R. H. 1988. *Passions within Reason*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- 40 Freeman, J. 1973. "The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 78:792–811.
- 41 Friedan, B. 1963. *The Feminine Mystique*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- 42 Futrell, R., P. Simi, and S. Gottschalk. 2006. "Understanding Music in Movements: The White Power Music Scene."
 43 *Sociological Quarterly* 47:275–304.
- 44 Gamson, J. 1995. "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma." *Social Problems* 42:390–407.
- 45 ——. 1997. "Messages of Exclusion: Gender, Movements, and Symbolic Boundaries." *Gender and Society*
 11:178–199.
- 46 Gamson, W. A. 1992. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 47 ——. 2004. "Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media." Pp. 242–261 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Move-*
 48 *ments*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ganz, M. 2000. "Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture
 (1959–1977)." *American Journal of Sociology* 105:1003–1062.

- 01 —. 2003. "Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social movements. Pp. 177–198 in *Rethinking*
 02 *Social Movements*, edited by J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 03 Garner, R. 1993. *Animals, Politics and Morality*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- 04 Gilman, N. 2003. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
 University Press.
- 05 Ginzberg, L. D. 1990. *Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the 19th-Century United*
 06 *States*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 07 Gitlin, T. 1980. *The Whole World Is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 08 —. 1987. *Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. New York: Bantam Books.
- 09 Goldfarb, J. C. 1980. *The Persistence of Freedom: The Sociological Implications of Polish Student Theater*. Boulder:
 Westview.
- 10 Goodwin, J. 1997. "The Libidinal Constitution of a High-Risk Social Movement: Affectual Ties and Solidarity in the
 11 Huk Rebellion." *American Sociological Review* 62:53–69.
- 12 Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. M., eds. 2003. *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion*. Lanham,
 MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 13 —. 2004. "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. Pp. 3–30 in
 14 *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion*, edited by J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper.
 15 Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 16 —. 2006. "Emotions and Social Movements." Pp. 611–635 in *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, edited by
 17 J. Stets and J. Turner. New York: Springer.
- 18 Goodwin, J., J. M. Jasper, and F. Polletta. 2000. "The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in
 19 Social Movement Theory." *Mobilization* 5:65–84.
- 20 —. 2004. "Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements." Pp. 413–432 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social*
 21 *Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- 22 Gordon, C. and J. M. Jasper. 1996. Overcoming the 'NIMBY' Label: Rhetorical and Organizational Links for Local
 Protestors. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 19:153–175.
- 23 Gould, D. B. 2001. "Rock the Boat, Don't Rock the Boat, Baby: Ambivalence and the Emergence of Militant AIDS
 24 Activism." Pp. 135–157 in *Passionate Politics*, edited by J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, and F. Polletta. Chicago:
 University of Chicago Press.
- 25 —. 2003. "Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back into the Study of Social Movements."
 26 Pp. 155–175 in *Rethinking Social Movements*, edited by J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. Lanham, MD: Rowman
 27 and Littlefield.
- 28 Griffiths, P. 1997. *What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories*. Chicago: University of
 Chicago Press.
- 29 Groves, J. M. 1997. *Hearts and Minds*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- 30 —. 2001. "Animal Rights and the Politics of Emotion: Folk Constructions of Emotion in the Animal Rights Move-
 31 ment." Pp. 212–229 in *Passionate Politics*, edited by J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, and F. Polletta. Chicago: University
 32 of Chicago Press.
- 33 Guha, R. 1983. "The Prose of Counter-insurgency." In *Subaltern Studies II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 34 Gusfield, J. R. 1963. *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*. Urbana, IL:
 University of Illinois Press.
- 35 Hacking, I. 1999. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 36 Hall, J. 1995. "Public Narratives and the Apocalyptic Sect: From Jonestown to Mount Carmel." Pp. 205–235 in
 37 *Armageddon in Mount Carmel*, edited by S. A. Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 38 Hall, S. 1980. "Encoding/Decoding." Pp. 128–138 in *Culture, Media, Language*, edited by S. Hall, D. Hobson,
 A. Lowe, and P. Willis. London: Hutchinson.
- 39 Hall, S. and T. Jefferson. 1976. *Resistance through Rituals*. London: Routledge.
- 40 Hartz, L. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- 41 Haskell, T. L. 1985. "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Parts I and II." *American Historical*
 42 *Review* 90:339–361, 547–566.
- 43 Hatfield, E., J. T. Cacioppo, and R. L. Rapson. 1994. *Emotional Contagion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
 Press.
- 44 Hebdige, D. 1979. *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*. London: Methuen.
- 45 Hedström, P. 1994. "Contagious Collectivities: On the Spatial Diffusion of Swedish Trade Unions, 1890–1940."
 46 *American Journal of Sociology* 99:1157–1179.
- 47 Heirich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis, eds. 2004. *Foundations of Human Sociality*.
 48 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

105

- 01 Heirich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R. McElreath. 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity
02 and Punishment in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies." *American Economic Review* 91:73–78.
- 03 Heise, D. R. 1979. *Understanding Events*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 04 Hercus, C. 1999. "Identity, Emotion, and Feminist Collective Action." *Gender and Society* 13:34–55.
- 05 Hess, D. and B. Martin. 2006. "Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events." *Mobilization*
11:249–267.
- 06 Hochschild, A. R. 1975. "The Sociology of Feeling and Emotion: Selected Possibilities." In *Another Voice: Feminist*
07 *Perspectives on Social Life and the Social Sciences*, edited by M. Millman and R. M. Kanter. Garden City, NY:
Anchor Books.
- 08 ——. 1983. *The Managed Heart*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 09 Hoffer, E. 1951. *The True Believer*. New York: Harper and Row.
- 10 Hunt, L., ed. 1989. *The New Cultural History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 11 Inglehart, R. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton,
12 NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 13 ——. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 14 ——. 1997. *Modernization and Post-Modernization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 15 Inkeles, A. and D. H. Smith. 1974. *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*. Cambridge,
16 MA: Harvard University Press.
- 17 Jasper, J. M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements*. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
- 18 ——. 2004a. "A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social Movement Choices." *Mobilization* 9:1–16.
- 19 ——. 2004b. "Intellectual Cycles of Social Movement Research: From Psychoanalysis to Culture?" Pp. 234–253
20 in *Self-Social Structure, and Beliefs: Explorations in Sociology*, edited by J. C. Alexander, G. T. Marx, and
21 C. L. Williams. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 22 ——. 2005. "Culture, Knowledge, and Politics." Pp. 115–134 in *The Handbook of Political Sociology*, edited by
23 T. Janoski, R. Alford, A. Hicks, and M. A. Schwartz. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 24 ——. 2006a. "Emotions and the Microfoundations of Politics: Rethinking Ends and Means." Pp. 14–30 in *Emotion,*
Politics and Society, edited by S. Clarke, P. Hoggett, and S. Thompson. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- 25 ——. 2006b. *Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in Real Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 26 ——. 2006c. "Motivation and Emotion." Pp. 157–171 in *Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Studies*, edited by
27 R. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 28 Jasper, J. M. and D. Nelkin. 1992. *The Animal Rights Crusade*. New York: Free Press.
- 29 Jasper, J. M. and J. Poulsen. 1993. "Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders, and Countermobilization by the Targets
30 in Three Animal Rights Campaigns." *Sociological Forum* 8:639–657.
- 31 ——. 1995. "Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Antinu-
32 clear Protest." *Social Problems* 42:401–420.
- 33 Jenkins, J. C. and C. Perrow. 1977. "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946–1972)." *American*
Sociological Review 42:249–268.
- 34 Johnston, H. 2002. "Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis." Pp. 62–91 in *Methods of Social*
Movement Analysis, edited by B. Klandermans and S. Staggenborg. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
35 Press.
- 36 Johnston, H. and B. Klandermans, eds. 1995. *Social Movements and Culture*. Minneapolis, MN: University of
37 Minnesota Press.
- 38 Katzenstein, M. F. 1998. *Faithless and Fearless*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 39 Kaufman, J. 2002. *For the Common Good: American Civic Life and the Golden Age of Fraternity*. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
- 40 Kemper, T. 1978. *A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- 41 ——. 2001. "A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions." Pp. 58–73 in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and*
Social Movements, edited by J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, and F. Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 42 Keniston, K. 1968. *Young Radicals*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- 43 Kertzer, D. I. 1988. *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- 44 Kimeldorf, H., R. Meyer, M. Prasad, and I. Robinson. 2006. "Consumers with a Conscience: Will They Pay More?"
45 *Contexts* 5:24–29.
- 46 King, D. 2004. "Operationalizing Melucci: Metamorphosis and Passion in the Negotiation of Activists' Multiple
47 Identities." *Mobilization* 9:73–92.
- 48 Kitzinger, J. and R. S. Barbour. 1999. "Introduction: The Challenge and Promise of Focus Groups." Pp. 1–20 in
Developing Focus Group Research, edited by R. S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger. London: Sage.

- 01 Klandermans, B. and D. Oegema. 1987. "Potentials, Networks, Motivations and Barriers: Steps Toward Participation
02 in Social Movements." *American Sociological Review* 52:519–531.
- 03 Klandermans, B. and J. Smith. 2002. "Survey Research." Pp. 3–31 in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, edited
04 by B. Klandermans and S. Staggenborg. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 05 Klandermans, B. and S. Staggenborg, eds. 2002. *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Minneapolis, MN: University
06 of Minnesota Press.
- 07 Kleinman, S. 1996. *Opposing Ambitions: Gender and Identity in an Alternative Organization*. Chicago: University of
08 Chicago Press.
- 09 Kornhauser, W. 1959. *The Politics of Mass Society*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- 10 Kriger, N. 1992. *Zimbabwe's Guerilla War: Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 11 Kuper, A. 1999. *Culture: The Anthropologists' Account*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 12 Kurzman, C. 1996. "Structural and Perceived Opportunity: The Iranian Revolution of 1979." *American Sociological*
13 *Review* 61:153–170.
- 14 ——. 2003. "The Poststructuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory." Pp. 111–120 in *Rethinking Social*
15 *Movements*, edited by J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 16 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.
- 17 Lafaye, C. and L. Thévenot. 1993. "Une Justification Ecologique? Conflits dans l'Amenagement de la Nature." *Revue Française de Sociologie* 4:495–524.
- 18 Lafont, C. 1993. *La Razón Como Lenguaje*. Madrid: Visor.
- 19 Lalich, J. 2004. *Bounded Choice: True Believers and Charismatic Cults*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 20 Lamont, M. 1992. *Money, Morals, and Manners*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 21 Lamont, M. and L. Thévenot, eds. 2000. *Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
22 University Press.
- 23 Laraña, E., H. Johnston, and J. R. Gusfield, eds. 1994. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia:
24 Temple University Press.
- 25 Lazarus, R. S. 1999. "Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping Resource against Despair." *Social Research*
26 66:653–678.
- 27 Leacock, E. B. 1981. *Myths of Male Dominance: Collected Articles on Women Cross-Culturally*. New York: Monthly
28 Review Press.
- 29 Le Bon, G. 1960/1895. *The Crowd*. New York: Viking.
- 30 Lee, R. E. 2003. *Life and Times of Cultural Studies*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- 31 Lively, K. J. and D. R. Heise. 2004. "Sociological Realms of Emotional Experience. *American Journal of Sociology*
32 109:1109–1136.
- 33 Lofland, J. 1982. "Crowd Joys." *Urban Life* 10:355–381.
- 34 ——. 1995. "Charting Degrees of Movement Culture." Pp. 188–216 in *Social Movements and Culture*, edited by
35 H. Johnston and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 36 Maddison, S. and S. Scalmer. 2006. *Activist Wisdom*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- 37 Madsen, D. and P. G. Snow. 1991. *The Charismatic Bond*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 38 Martin, E. 1987. *The Woman in the Body*. Boston: Beacon.
- 39 McAdam, D. 1988. *Freedom Summer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 40 ——. 2003. "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement: Toward a More Synthetic Understanding of the Origins of
41 Contention." Pp. 201–232 in *Rethinking Social Movements*, edited by J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. Lanham,
42 MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 43 McAdam, D., J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.
44 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 45 McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 46 McCarthy, J. D. and M. N. Zald. 1973. *The Trend of Social Movements in America*. Morristown, NJ: General
47 Learning Press.
- 48 ——. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology*
82:1212–1241.
- McNeill, W. H. 1995. *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
- McPhail, C. 1991. *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Melucci, A. 1985. "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements." *Social Research* 52:789–816.
- . 1988. "Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements. *International Social Movement*
Research 1:329–348.
- . 1994. "A Strange Kind of Newness." Pp. 101–130 in *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, edited
by E. Laraña, H. Johnston, and J. R. Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

107

- 01 ——. 1996a. *Challenging Codes*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 02 ——. 1996b. *The Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
- 03 Press.
- 04 Meyer, J. and B. Rowan. 1977. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." *American*
- 05 *Journal of Sociology* 83:53–77.
- 06 Milbrath, L. W. 1984. *Environmentalists, Vanguard for a New Society*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- 07 Milgram, S. 1974. *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*. New York: Harper and Row.
- 08 Mische, A. 2003. "Cross-talk in Movements: Reconciling the Culture-Network Link." Pp. 258–280 in *Social*
- 09 *Movements and Networks*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 10 Morgan, R. L. and D. Heise. 1988. "Structure of Emotions." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 51:19–31.
- 11 Morris, A. D. 1981. "Black Southern Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization." *American Sociological*
- 12 *Review* 46:744–767.
- 13 ——. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: Free
- 14 Press.
- 15 Morris, A. D. and C. M. Mueller, eds. 1992. *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory*. New Haven: Yale University
- 16 Press.
- 17 Mukerji, C. 1997. *Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 18 Mullaney, J. L. 2006. *Everyone Is NOT Doing It: Abstinence and Personal Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago
- 19 Press.
- 20 Myers, D. J. 2000. "The Diffusion of Collective Violence: Infectiousness, Susceptibility, and Mass Conditions." *American*
- 21 *Journal of Sociology* 106:173–208.
- 22 Naples, N., ed. 1998. *Community Activism and Feminist Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- 23 Nepstad, S. E. 2004. *Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central America Solidarity*
- 24 *Movement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 25 Nerb, J. and H. Spada. 2001. "Evaluation of Environmental Problems: A Coherence Model of Cognition and
- 26 Emotion." *Cognition and Emotion* 15:521–551.
- 27 Nicholson, L. J., ed. 1990. *Feminism/Postmodernism*. New York: Routledge.
- 28 Nussbaum, M. 2001. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
- 29 Press.
- 30 Oberschall, A. 1973. *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 31 Oliver, P. 1989. "Bringing the Crowd Back In: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements." *Research in*
- 32 *Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 11:1–30.
- 33 Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
- 34 University Press.
- 35 Passy, F. 2003. "Social Networks Matter. But How?" Pp. 21–48 in *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by
- 36 M. Diani and D. McAdam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 37 Perrin, A. J. 2006. *Citizen Speak: The Democratic Imagination in American Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago
- 38 Press.
- 39 Pichardo, N. A. 1997. "New Social Movements: A Critical Review." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23:411–430.
- 40 Pizzorno, A. 1978. "Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict." Pp. 277–298 in *The Resur-*
- 41 *gence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968*, vol. 2, edited by C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno. London:
- 42 Macmillan.
- 43 Polletta, F. A. 2006. *It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 44 Polletta, F. A. and J. M. Jasper. 2001. "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology*
- 45 27:283–305.
- 46 Portes, A. 1998. "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology*
- 47 24:1–24.
- 48 Potter, D. 1954. *People of Plenty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Putnam, R. D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
- Press.
- . 1995. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Democracy* 6:65–78.
- . 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Reed, J. P. 2004. "Emotions in Context: Revolutionary Accelerators, Hope, Moral Outrage, and Other Emotions in
- the Making of Nicaragua's Revolution." *Theory and Society* 33:653–703.
- Reed, T. V. 2005. *The Art of Protest*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Reger, J. 2004. "Organizational 'Emotion Work' through Consciousness-raising: An Analysis of a Feminist Organi-
- zation." *Qualitative Sociology* 27:205–222.

- 01 Robnett, B. 1991. *How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights*. New York:
02 Oxford University Press.
- 03 Roggeband, C. 2004. "'Immediately I Thought We Should Do the Same Thing': International Inspiration and
04 Exchange in Feminist Action against Sexual Violence. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 11:159–175.
- 05 Rorty, R. 1993. "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality." Pp. 111–134 in *On Human Rights*, edited by
06 S. Shute and S. Hurley. New York: Basic Books.
- 07 Roscigno, V. J. and W. F. Danaher. 2004. *The Voice of Southern Labor: Radio, Music, and Textile Strikes, 1929–1934*.
08 Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 09 Rostow, W. W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-communist Manifesto*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
10 University Press.
- 11 Rothwell, J. D. 1971. "Verbal Obscenity." *Western Speech* 35:231–242.
- 12 Rupp, L. and V. Taylor. 1987. *Survival in the Doldrums*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 13 Ryan, M. P. 1990. *Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
14 Press.
- 15 Satterfield, T. 2004. "Emotional Agency and Contentious Practice: Activist Dispute in Old-Growth Forests." *Ethos*
16 32:233–256.
- 17 Scheff, T. 1990. *Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion and Social Structure*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 18 ——. 1994. *Bloody Revenge*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- 19 ——. 1997. *Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 20 Schmitt, C. 1976/1932. *The Concept of the Political*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
- 21 Schwartz, N. and H. Bless. 1991. "Happy and Mindless, but Sad and Smart? The Impact of Affective States on Analytic
22 Reasoning." Pp. 55–71 in *Education and Social Judgments*, edited by J. P. Forgas. New York: Pergamon.
- 23 Scott, J. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 24 ——. 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 25 Seidman, S. 1994. "Symposium: Queer Theory/Sociology: A Dialogue." *Sociological Theory* 12:166–177.
- 26 Shapiro, M. J. 1992. *Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice*. Minneapolis, MN: University
27 of Minnesota Press.
- 28 Shorter, E. and C. Tilly. 1974. *Strikes in France, 1830–1968*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 29 Skocpol, T. 2003. *Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life*. Norman, OK:
30 University of Oklahoma Press.
- 31 Smelser, N. J. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
- 32 ——. 1968. "Social and Psychological Dimensions of Collective Behavior." Pp. 92–101 in *Essays in Sociological*
33 *Explanation*, edited by N. J. Smelser. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 34 Smith, C. 2003. *Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 35 Snow, D. A. 2001. "Collective Identity and Expressive Forms." Pp. 2213–2219 in *International Encyclopedia of the*
36 *Social and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. London: Elsevier.
- 37 ——. 2004. "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields." Pp. 380–412 in *The Blackwell Companion to*
38 *Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 39 Snow, D. A. and R. D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International*
40 *Social Movement Research* 1:197–217.
- 41 ——. 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest." Pp. 133–155 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by
42 A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 43 Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford, Jr., S. K. Worden, and R. D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobi-
44 lization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51:464–481.
- 45 Snow, D. A., L. A. Zurcher, Jr., and S. Ekland-Olson. 1980. "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstruc-
46 tural Approach to Differential Recruitment." *American Sociological Review* 45:787–801.
- 47 ——. 1983. "Further Thoughts on Social Networks and Movement Recruitment." *Sociology* 17:112–120.
- 48 Snyder, D. and C. Tilly. 1972. "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960." *American Sociological*
Review 37:520–532.
- Somers, M. R. 1995. "What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere?" *Sociological*
Theory 13:113–144.
- Soule, S. A. 2004. "Diffusion Processes within and across Social Movements." Pp. 294–310 in *The Blackwell*
Companion to Social Movements, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Steinberg, M. 1998. "Tilting the Frame: Considerations of Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn." *Theory and Society* 27:845–872.
- . 1999. *Fighting Words*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Stewart, J. 2004. "When Local Troubles Become Transnational: The Transformation of a Guatemalan Indigenous
Rights Movement." *Mobilization* 9:259–278.

3. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

109

- 01 Szreter, S. 2002. "The State of Social Capital: Bringing Back in Power, Politics, and History." *Theory and Society*
02 31:573–621.
- 03 Tarrow, S. 2003. "Paradigm Warriors: Regress and Progress in the Study of Contentious Politics." Pp. 39–45 in
04 *Rethinking Social Movements*, edited by J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 05 Taylor, C. 1989. *Sources of the Self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 06 Taylor, V. 1989. "Sources of Continuity in Social Movements: The Women's Movement in Abeyance. *American*
07 *Sociological Review* 54:761–775.
- 08 ——. 1996. *Rock-a-bye Baby: Feminism, Self-help, and Postpartum Depression*. New York: Routledge.
- 09 Taylor, V. and N. Whittier. 1992. "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobiliza-
10 tion." Pp. 104–129 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New
11 Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 12 Thompson, E. P. 1963. *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Golancz.
- 13 Torfing, J. 1999. *New Theories of Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 14 Touraine, A. 1969. *La Société Post-industrielle*. Paris: Editions Denoël S.A.R.L.
- 15 ——. 1973. *Production de la Société*. Editions du Seuil.
- 16 ——. 1978. *La Voix et le Regard*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- 17 ——. 1997. *Pourrons-nous vivre Ensemble? Egaux et Différents*. Paris: Arthème Fayard.
- 18 ——. 1998a. "Can We Live Together, Equal and Different? *European Journal of Social Theory* 1:165–178.
- 19 ——. 1998b. "A Reply." *European Journal of Social Theory* 1:203–209.
- 20 Touraine, A., Z. Hegeudus, F. Dubet, and M. Wieviorka. 1980. *La Prophétie Anti-nucléaire*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- 21 Touraine, A., M. Wieviorka, and J. Strzelecki. 1982. *Solidarité*. Paris: Arthème Fayard.
- 22 Touraine, A., M. Wieviorka, and F. Dubet. 1984. *Le Mouvement Ouvrier*. Paris: Arthème Fayard.
- 23 Trillin, C. 1968. *Eric Hoffer; An American Odyssey*. New York: Dutton.
- 24 Turner, R. H. and L. M. Killian. 1957. *Collective Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 25 Turner, S. P. 1994. *The Social Theory of Practices*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 26 ——. 2002. *Brains/Practices/Relativism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 27 van Ginneken, J. 1992. *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics, 1871–1899*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 28 Walsh, E. J. 1981. "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island. *Social*
29 *Problems* 29:1–21.
- 30 Warner, M., ed. 1993. *Fear of a Queer Planet*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 31 Whittier, N. 1995. *Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women's Movement*. Philadelphia: Temple
32 University Press.
- 33 Williams, R. 1958. *Culture and Society: 1780–1950*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 34 ——. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 35 Williams, R. H. 2004. "The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action." Pp. 91–115 in *The Blackwell Companion to*
36 *Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 37 Willis, P. 1977. *Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs*. New York: Columbia University
38 Press.
- 39 Wittig, M. 1992. *The Straight Mind and Other Essays*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- 40 Wood, E. J. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
41 Press.
- 42 Wuthnow, R. 1991. *Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
43 Press.
- 44 ——. 1998. *Loose Connections: Joining Together in America's Fragmented Communities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
45 University Press.
- 46 Young, S. 1997. *Changing the Wor(l)d: Discourse, Politics and the Feminist Movement*. New York: Routledge.
- 47
- 48

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

UNCORRECTED PROOF