



The Political and Economic Reverberations of the Cuban Revolution in Mexico

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Abstract

Cold War era studies considered the Cuban Revolution's influence on Mexico only mild. Current perspectives now interpret Cuba's impact on Mexico as highly significant. The regime crisis generated by the Cuban Revolution gave rise to an authoritarian Mexican state nationalism that repressed dissent, balanced off Cuban and US pressures, and induced private sector cooperation with an expanded economic and social role for government. Mexican state nationalism's apparent 'solution' to the domestic and international reverberations of the Cuban Revolution during the 1960s created a pattern of authoritarian political monopoly, dependence on foreign borrowing, and unsustainable heavy industrialization. Historians have tended to overlook how much this ingrained 'formula' laid the foundation for the country's disastrous populist policies that emerged after 1970.

Interpreting the impact of the Cuban Revolution on Mexico requires broadening scholarly perspectives beyond those of the Cold War era. During the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles that convulsed many Latin American societies for a generation, scholars focused heavily upon guerrilla movements that bore the signs of Cuban inspiration and support.¹ Analysts generally saw the Cuban Revolution as having 'dictated the broad sweep of Latin American politics' for nearly three decades. Mexico, as a country that lacked both an early Castroite insurgency and a military-dominated national security regime, was said to have been 'only mildly affected by the Cuban Revolution'.² Standard histories of Mexico usually regard the impact of the Cuban Revolution as a momentary phenomenon, one that mostly concerned foreign policy during the administration of Adolfo López Mateos (1958–64).³

Mexico was an exception within Latin America in the ways in which the Cold War – including the Cuban Revolution – influenced its history.⁴ Despite the country's earlier traditions of armed insurrection, no guerrilla *focos* gained footholds in the years immediately after 1959 as they did in several Latin American countries. Neither did Mexico suffer through a ferociously anti-Communist national security state military dictatorship of the sort that emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala,

and Uruguay. Civilian deaths as a result of Mexican government repression numbered in the high hundreds, not in the thousands to tens of thousands that died as a result of official actions under the national security state dictatorships.⁵

Yet Mexico did experience major expressions of political dissidence, not just the highly significant student movement of 1968, but also rural and urban guerrilla movements starting with the Ciudad Madera attack in 1965. The Cuban Revolution, particularly in its early years, powerfully inspired Mexican youth, and helped to recast the Mexican left, incorporating new social actors into political activism. Under the power of the Cuban example, rural mobilizations in Mexico shifted from the older agrarista tradition to more modern attempts at guerrilla insurgency.⁶ Nevertheless, the Cuban Revolution's subversive impact reinforced more than initiated the resistance movements against the governments of López Mateos and his successors, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70) and Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–76). In 1968 US diplomats certainly worried about Communist influence in Mexico, but in the main they recognized that the student movement stemmed from domestic alienation rather than from external infiltration.⁷ The generation of youth that admired the rapid changes of the Cuban Revolution

witnessed in Mexico the exhaustion of the economic development pact that had made the social ascent of the middle classes possible, [and] observed the intensification of the crisis in the countryside, the implacable attack against opposition movements, and the impossibility of carrying out social and economic changes through electoral means.⁸

In the case of Mexico's most significant guerrilla movement, the followers of Lucio Cabañas in Guerrero modeled themselves less on Cuba and 'more on the Mexican tradition of support for the guerrilla struggles of Emiliano Zapata and Rubén Jaramillo of neighboring Morelos'.⁹ Moreover, for reasons of state, Castro provided little or no assistance to Mexican insurgents. As Jorge Castañeda and Sergio Aguayo Quezada have emphasized, Havana needed its international diplomatic relationship with Mexico and largely kept to an understanding between the two governments that Cuba would provide no support for Mexican armed revolutionaries.¹⁰ The Mexican government preserved its relations with Cuba and allowed its citizens a considerable access to books, films, and music concerning the Cuban Revolution, but as the 1960s progressed it drew an increasingly harder line against culture spilling over into political action.

But does this render the political and economic impact of the Cuban Revolution upon Mexico 'mild'? One Mexican scholar has recently contended that the long-term disruptive effects of the Cold War on Mexico were 'distinct, but no less significant than those that took place in other Latin American countries'.¹¹ Changing perspectives on the Cold War today and changing events make the present moment ripe for such revisionist views. The Cold War is over, and Fidel Castro is no longer President of Cuba. Within the island,

'the evils that the revolution came to vanquish – the dollar, tourism, private enterprise, and inequality – are pushing through'.¹² Scholars of the Cold War are now moving beyond 'the period's most rousing events', in the words of Greg Grandin, recognizing that 'the Cold War in Latin America had less to do with geopolitical superpower conflict than it did with bitterly fought battles over citizenship rights, national inclusion, and economic justice'.¹³ While geopolitical rivalries may not merit Grandin's hasty rhetorical dismissal, his insistence on integrating the Cold War – and thus the impact of the Cuban Revolution – into the broader cultural, economic, political, and social history of Latin America bears serious consideration. New research on the Cold War in Latin America has begun to focus on 'the grassroots, where social, political, and cultural conflicts actually brewed'.¹⁴

One can argue that the reverberations of the Cuban Revolution helped to shape a critical juncture in Mexico's contemporary history during the late 1950s and the 1960s. During these years the government attempted – ultimately unsuccessfully – to forge a consensus around a new set of policies to cope with an increasingly youthful, urban, industrial society in the midst of heightened Cold War conflict in the Americas. As Alan Knight has suggested, interpretations should no longer view the period from 1940 to 1968 as a 'golden age of Mexico's political economy'. Research on social movements, political dissidence, and popular culture has made it clear that the long era of wartime and postwar stability was anything but placid. In place of the bipolar view of a period of orderly advance between 1940 and 1968 followed by a time of troubles ever since, historians now find 'constant, contained conflicts and changes' across the nearly seven decades since 1940, punctuated by cycles of 'renovation, stabilization, ossification, protest, and renewed renovation'.¹⁵ The tumultuous year of the student movement and the Tlatelolco massacre stands out as a watershed, but 1968 cannot be detached from earlier struggles and dilemmas.¹⁶

Ironically, the impact of the Cuban Revolution upon Mexico was less as a force for subversion and more as a force for the consolidation of a broader, more authoritarian governmental power. Initially, this hardly seemed likely. Fidelismo had fervent admirers in Mexico. Echoing C. Wright Mills's *Listen, Yankee*, a translation of which circulated openly in Mexico, author Carlos Fuentes told a US audience in 1962 that

it no longer matters what you do or do not do. We already know the path. Open your eyes. Today it is Cuba. Tomorrow. . . . Keep your eyes open. The armies of privilege will be defeated. The old structures will collapse. Land, mines, businesses will be recovered. They will work for the benefit of everyone. . . . Is this a dream? No it is not.¹⁷

Others shared Fuentes's enthusiasm. In a society where nearly half the population was under sixteen years of age and where the official rhetoric of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 had long since grown stale, Cuba's sweeping social transformations and its defiance of the US found a natural

audience. Officials feared that the spillover effects of the Cuban Revolution might threaten Mexico's domestic political economy. As in much of Latin America just after World War II, the Mexican government had taken advantage of the emerging Cold War to stem earlier gains in popular political power and labor organization and to structure government-assisted industrialization along lines favorable to domestic and foreign capitalist interests at the expense of workers.¹⁸ While other large Latin American countries found their postwar politics fraught with populist conflicts and military coups, in Mexico the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) monopolized politics, engaging in a 'discrete but effective anti-Communism' in the enforcement of stability.¹⁹

At first it seemed as if the shock waves from the Cuban Revolution might undermine this stability. The taking of power by a revolutionary government in Cuba coincided with a new, untried administration in Mexico and with concerted labor protests that, in the view of one historian, 'posed a serious threat to the hegemony of the dominant political coalition ruling the country'.²⁰ The leading elements in these labor struggles were the railway workers and teachers unions, joined at different moments by the petroleum workers, telegraphists, metal workers, and telephone workers. Demands emphasized not only salary questions, but more significantly for the ruling system, democratic rank-and-file control over union organization and union leadership. President López Mateos met the strike tactics of the railway workers with force during his initial months in office. Army, police, and secret service details killed some workers and arrested thousands of others, including leaders Demetrio Vallejo and Valentín Campa. In the phrase of Enrique Krauze, 'the prisons were bulging'.²¹ As many as ten thousand rail workers lost their jobs. These tough tactics greatly reinforced the dissatisfaction with the country's direction already present among many intellectuals, particularly those of a younger generation like Fuentes.

Amid the reverberations of these internal tensions, it was not long before the external hostilities between revolutionary Cuba and the US tore at the complex 'política de equilibrios' between Mexico's international and domestic affairs, putting the country's friendly relations with its powerful northern neighbor at risk, further challenging the internal cohesion of the PRI, and straining the dominant agreements among business, organized labor, and government that had sustained the rapid economic expansion of the postwar years.²² As if that were not enough, officials feared that a period of revolutionary tensions would undermine Mexico's future. With the country rapidly urbanizing, a steady expansion of employment and public services seemed crucial. Mexico needed significant new investment to enable its economy to move to more advanced levels of industrialization. None of this could take place in an environment of political radicalization at home and deteriorating relations with the US abroad.²³

Events turned out quite differently. Even as the Cuban Revolution detonated a crisis for López Mateos between 1959 and 1962, it generated a domestic

and international context that enabled his government to transcend that crisis. As Olga Pellicer de Brody has noted in an under-appreciated work, Mexican policy toward revolutionary Cuba became ‘principally an instrument for the consolidation of political power by Mexican governing groups’.²⁴ That power operated through an expanded state nationalism that responded to the Cuban Revolution by (1) repressing dissident elements within the labor movement and containing the left-wing mobilization that Cuba inspired; (2) reestablishing cordial relations with the US while cultivating an image of an independent Mexican foreign policy through opposition to the strongest anti-Castro initiatives of the US; and (3) winning over business-sector support for an expanded governmental role in the economy that renewed economic growth, carried Mexico’s import substitution industrialization to higher levels, and provided an expanded array of government services for the urban working and middle classes.

To employ a concept from political science, the consequences of the Cuban revolution for Mexico created a new ‘international regime’, a set of ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.²⁵ Under a new ‘regime’ that focused upon economic development and permitted subtle means of reconciling Mexican nationalism with US interests, Mexico became the ‘preferred revolution’ for the US, a formerly radical society that had moved from ‘revolution to evolution’, one whose ‘achievement of social progress while maintaining freedom . . . [offered] a meaningful alternative to revolution Communist style’.²⁶ While some contemporary observers worried about a breakup of the Mexican political economy, most considered the new panoply of state nationalist policies a successful response to the challenge of Fidelismo. Yet this ‘regime’ contained the seeds of future catastrophe by creating a rigid authoritarianism against which the country’s youth would soon rebel and by consolidating a ‘tardopriismo’ that postponed the inevitable ending of the PRI’s political monopoly for another generation.²⁷ The ‘regime’ brought a renewal of rapid economic growth, but it also launched a dependence on foreign borrowing that would dangerously mushroom in later years. In short, the Cuban Revolution helped first to generate and then to overcome a serious governing crisis in Mexico between 1959 and 1962. The state nationalist ‘solution’ to the crisis created a ‘formula’ of expanded government, authoritarian politics in the face of popular protest, and debt-reliant industrialization that the later governments of Luis Echeverría and José López Portillo would apply with reckless – and disastrous – abandon. Historial interpretation has customarily identified the immediate roots of Mexico’s present-day political and economic dilemmas with the populist policies of Echeverría and López Portillo in the 1970s and early 1980s. It needs to step back a decade to see how the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution acted as a framing initial chapter for what would come later.

State nationalism – greater government participation in the economy, growing urban social services, an apparently independent foreign policy, and more authoritarian politics under the banner of the Mexican Revolution – first emerged in the government's response to the 1958–1959 labor crisis and to the early waves of enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution in Mexico. In the words of José Agustín, the government's confrontation with the railroad workers proved

decisive for modern Mexico: at first it fortified the regime and set the repressive line that would prevail during the years of the sixties; on the other hand, it was also the start of the popular protests that, little by little, generated the context that gave rise to 1968. It also was an alarm bell.²⁸

In response to that bell, the government recognized that social and political peace could not come through repression alone. Over the next several years, it combined the use of force against independent working-class and campesino movements with the creation of a more elaborate corporatist system of control over a favored labor minority. Officially recognized unions received preferred conditions and special benefits in exchange for their docility. López Mateos created a new welfare institute for state employees (ISSSTE), expanded the social security institute (IMSS), subsidized the distribution of basic foodstuffs (CONASUPO), and initiated profit sharing for workers.²⁹

The government moved to embrace the Cuban Revolution abroad even as at home it expelled two Soviet diplomats and imprisoned leaders of the Partido Comunista Mexicano and the Partido Obrero Campesino Mexicano at the time of the railway strike. Between 1959 and 1961, Mexican diplomats repeatedly invoked the juridical principles of national self-determination and non-intervention during conflicts over Cuba in meetings of the Organization of American States (OAS).³⁰ By the time of Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós's visit to Mexico in June 1960, however, it had become ever more difficult for the government to deal with the Cuban question through the rituals of fellow revolutionary solidarity and the invocation of juridical principles. Mexico increasingly 'found itself in the unique position of maintaining close relations with two countries that were bitter enemies'.³¹ In the context of intense US–Cuban hostilities, the internal consequences of this contradictory international condition became harder to manage. Using diplomacy to reinforce the presumed 'revolutionary' legitimacy of the Mexican political system no longer sufficed to paper over the growing divisions within Mexico over the Cuban Revolution.

At first, the López Mateos regime found it difficult either to repress or to coopt pro-Cuban enthusiasts. They simply did not operate through older established channels. The Partido Comunista Mexicano remained outmoded as 'a large part of the Mexican left broke with many of the traditions of socialist thinking and practice, and new historical subjects and forms of struggle emerged' over the next several years.³² Members of the Juventud Comunista gravitated to the Cuban Revolution and ignored the party's

sectarian high command. Leadership of pro-Cuban radicalism in Mexico rested on the powerful shoulders of former president Lázaro Cárdenas, who still enjoyed a mass popular following at home two decades after having left office. He visited Cuba in July 1959.

As the US and Cuba traded blows, public demonstrations in support of Cuba multiplied in Mexico, culminating in Cárdenas heading a protest march to the Zócalo during the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961.³³ The salient position of Cárdenas in the revival of the left threatened to split the PRI's ruling coalition. In March, 1961, the former president presided over the *Conferencia Latinoamericana para la Soberanía Nacional, la Emancipación Económica y la Paz* in Mexico City, a forum that attracted many Latin American intellectuals who supported Cuba's example of liberation and resistance to imperialism. In August, a group of Mexican leftists formed the *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN)*, not only to defend Cuba, but also to create a political vehicle around which Mexican radicals could unite. While the US embassy in Mexico regarded the MLN as a 'Communist-dominated' front organization with Cárdenas as a mere figurehead, in reality its membership represented an eclectic assemblage of intellectual, political, and cultural figures. Its program was more nationalist, reformist, and Cardenista than anything else. The MLN favored industrialization, Mexican control of natural resources, sovereignty in the face of US power, and collaboration with a nationalist bourgeoisie and state.³⁴

In the end, Cárdenas shrank back from breaking ranks with the government and promoting a revolution within Mexico. Without his leadership, pro-Cuba organizations succumbed to government repression and to their own internal divisions. Lacking his broad base of personal support, the MLN shared the fate of many of the institutions of the Mexican left – fragmentation and isolation. By 1964, the MLN was a force that had withered away in all but name. Even with the official 'taming' of Cárdenas on the matter of Cuba, polarization continued to thwart the use of symbolic actions as a means to satisfy diverse clienteles at home and abroad. Business circles remained wary of López Mateos's policies between 1959 and 1961, withholding investment and keeping money abroad. Private investment levels in 1960 were less than those of four years earlier.³⁵ The big business confederations – the *Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio (CONCANACO)*, the *Confederación de Cámaras de la Industria (COMCAMIN)*, and the *Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana (COPARMEX)* – cooperated with the Catholic church and anti-Communist civic groups in political activities against the MLN including the creation of a counter organization, the *Frente Cívico Mexicano de Afirmación Revolucionaria*, headed by ex-president Miguel Alemán. Conservative circles tended to see the specter of the Cuban Revolution hovering over every public issue from government school textbook policies to the latest official utterances.³⁶

President López Mateos's comments on 2 July 1960 that his government stood 'on the extreme left within the Constitution' constituted nothing

more than a well-established tactic intended to coopt the left and project an image of a still vital Mexican Revolution.³⁷ Nevertheless, his remarks provoked a flurry of controversy in Mexico and the US. Those fearful of Communism interpreted the President's words in the context of Cuba's recent takeover of the Shell and Esso oil refineries on the island and Nikita Khrushchev's 2 July statement in Vienna that Communism could triumph without the use of armed force. A spokesperson for the opposition *Acción Nacional* party articulated the fears of many in the Mexican business world when he termed López Mateos's statement simply 'a euphemism for the government's Communizing tendency already revealed by growing state intervention in matters of the private sphere'.³⁸

Nevertheless, although threatened by the Cuban Revolution, historic bonds of mutual self-interest did exist between the state and the private sector. In the spring of 1959, the CONCANACO, COMCAMIN, and COPARMEX all joined with the *Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación* (CANACINTRA), the organization of small and medium-sized businesses, to support the government's firm hand with the railroad workers.³⁹ A pacified urban working class remained a prerequisite for both government and the private sector. While not an institutional part of 'revolutionary' Mexico's dominant political machine, businessmen exercised considerable influence upon the country's economy and politics. Over the years the complex relations between Mexican economic and political elites had rested on three shared assumptions that still retained validity:

- (1) the popular masses, especially labor, should be kept under control; (2) the public and private sectors must often act in explicit cooperation; and, given these conditions, (3) entrepreneurs and politicians [could] still compete for relative superiority.⁴⁰

Reconstructing state-private sector cooperation proved to be a key factor in the transformation of the Cuban Revolution from a force that subverted into a force that augmented the power of Mexican political and economic elites during the early 1960s. Historical scholarship has not paid sufficient attention to this change, in part because studies have focused less on the political influence of organized business in Mexico than on other elements in Mexico's ruling system.⁴¹ On the one hand, the government needed the active cooperation of the private sector. Political leaders considered industrial growth both the key to Mexico's future development and the arena in which government would have to take new initiatives. Since 1956 the prices of coffee, cotton, and minerals had continued to fall, and income from exports remained virtually stagnant. With external demand weak, manufacturing would have to become an even stronger force within the domestic economy. Over the previous generation, Mexico's import substitution policy had successfully created a consumer goods sector that supplied most of the country's wants, but import substitution had virtually stagnated since 1950. Already 40 per cent of private investment consisted of imported machinery

and equipment.⁴² Further economic development required that import substitution move into the production of intermediate and capital goods. This could not happen unless fear of the Cuban Revolution became a motive for increased private investment rather than a motive against it.⁴³

For its part, the private sector certainly feared the advent of what it sometimes called the ‘Satanismo–Leninismo’ (Satanism–Leninism) of Cuba, but concern over a growing ‘estatismo’ (statism or ‘socialismo del estado’, state socialism) formed the most consistent thread in the public pronouncements of the Mexican big business organizations during the early years of López Mateos’ presidency. In the face of private capital’s reluctance to invest, the state acted to fill the void. Public investment rose 27 per cent between 1959 and 1960 alone, with the heaviest shares going to parastate organizations and to the ‘urban leviathan’ of the Federal District.⁴⁴ In the midst of this new state nationalism, the enemies that the business association trade journals worried about were not guerrillas in the mountains, but ‘Sovietófilos’ (Russofiles) poised to take over Mexican private property under their supposed ‘malinchista envy’ of Cuban nationalizations.⁴⁵ Private sector leaders were well aware that they existed within a monopolistic, authoritarian political system. Their statements usually embodied language meant to instruct, to solicit, and to praise the politically powerful, not to defy them openly. ‘¿Por cuál camino, Señor Presidente?’ (Along Which Road, Mr. President?) – a full-page newspaper advertisement in November 1960 – inveighed against the evils of state economic power, warning that Mexico could end up impoverished like Argentina under Juan Perón if it continued down the road of ‘intervencionismo Estatal’ (state interventionism). It concluded by reaffirming loyalty to the private sector’s past patterns of cooperation with governments of the Mexican Revolution.⁴⁶

Big business remained suspicious about where state nationalist policies might lead. López Mateos’s ‘Mexicanization’ of the electric utility industry took place between the spring and fall of 1960 against the backdrop of Cuban expropriations of domestic and North American-owned properties. Official fanfare invoked Mexico’s revolutionary past with slogans such as ‘La tierra 1915. El petróleo 1938. La electricidad 1960. ¡Adelante! México es nuestro’ or ‘La luz es nuestra’. In fact, this state purchase of two foreign-owned electric utilities was a cautious, conservative business transaction that radiated respect for private enterprise, evoking the ‘maturity’ that the Mexican Revolution was said to have attained.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, CONCAMIN editorialized that government control over electric power represented ‘one more step – a gigantic one – in a program of transforming Mexico into a socialist state’.⁴⁸

The private sector wanted a clear definition of the limits of state participation in the economy and no progressive march toward what it saw as Cuban-style policies. Eventually, Mexico’s policies toward Cuba and the US became a crucial vehicle for an accommodation between the state and the private sector. In 1960–1961, this would have seemed wildly

improbable. Soviet support in 1960 prevented North American economic power from destroying the Cuban revolutionary regime, while the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 demonstrated Washington's inability to overthrow Castro through the use of Cuban opposition.⁴⁹ This made diplomatic action through the OAS a more crucial instrument of US foreign policy against the Castro government, placing Mexico in a highly awkward position. On the one hand, its historic defense of international juridical principles undergirding the peaceful resolution of disputes, self-determination, and national autonomy constituted a core element of its foreign policy. Any abandonment of them would have destabilizing internal political consequences and diminish political legitimacy. On the other, Mexico's failure to go along with diplomatic initiatives against Cuba brought repeated domestic criticism from business interests and a reluctance to invest. Nor could Mexico afford to abandon its historic unwritten agreement not to oppose fundamental US international interests, as López Mateos's firm support for the US in the missile crisis would later confirm in October 1962.⁵⁰

Over the course of 1961 and 1962, the US and Mexico discovered how to live with their differences concerning Cuba, thus paving the way for reconciliation between the Mexican government and the private sector. US officials came to appreciate that Mexico's progressive foreign policies aided the stability of its internal authoritarian system.⁵¹ This lesson did not come immediately. At times, powerful figures like US Ambassador Thomas Mann lost patience with what they considered Mexican 'vacillation' and lack of support for curtailing the influence of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America. In July 1961, for example, an exasperated Mann argued that 'the whole problem of making a two-way street is much more urgent for Mexico than for us'. He therefore urged that the US use the occasion of Mexico's request for a \$400 million development loan to squeeze López Mateos hard over matters concerning foreign private investment and presumed Communist influence in Mexico. Mann wanted 'a clear answer to the question of whether Mexico wants any new US private investments in the next decade' and 'a clear and consistent repudiation of Communist infiltration into the political life of Mexico followed by concrete acts quietly to remove from public office known members of the Communist Party'.⁵² Later that year, he thought Mexico's objection to collective OAS action against Cuba reason enough to postpone President John F. Kennedy's trip to Mexico and to delay loans from the US and from international financial institutions.⁵³

But views like these did not prevail as the US and Mexico created a new 'regime' to cope with the consequences of the Cuban Revolution. Mexico maintained the appearance of a sovereign, principled foreign policy while at the same time cooperating with the US. After abstaining during the vote that expelled Cuba from the Organization of American States in January, 1962, Foreign Minister Manuel Tello Barraud gave a

speech denouncing socialism as incompatible with the free enterprise system that the Mexican government endorsed. At home, the government used Tello's speech as an occasion to consolidate a broad range of national support for Mexican foreign and domestic policies. 'Beneplácito de banqueros, obreros y el Embajador de EU por el discurso de Tello' (Bankers, Workers, and the US Ambassador Approve Tello's Speech) proclaimed *Excélsior*.⁵⁴ Mexico subsequently strongly backed the US during the October missile crisis. Later, alone among the members of the OAS, Mexico refused to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the island in 1964. Behind the scenes, US officials did not object since Mexico supplied the US with intelligence it gathered in Cuba.⁵⁵

Both the US and Mexico considered industrial modernization an essential inoculation against Communism. Thus their 'agreement to disagree' over Cuba opened the way for new forms of economic cooperation that ultimately proffered opportunities for both foreign capital and the Mexican private sector. The glamorous and widely celebrated official visit to Mexico by President Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy in late June, 1962 marked a turning point. Labeled an event of 'trascendencia histórica' (historic significance) in which the Kennedys became 'plenamente identificados con México' (completely identified with Mexico), this official visit constituted both a symbolic and practical US endorsement of Mexico's state nationalist policies. In welcoming the Kennedys, López Mateos publically praised the Alliance for Progress.⁵⁶ The Mexican private sector remained closely attuned to US attitudes. The new 'developmentalist' foreign policy doctrines of the Kennedy administration allowed for a greater social and economic participation by Latin American governments in the name of development and anti-Communism. Following the Kennedy visit, the private sector adjusted its thinking. Business publications dampened some of their overt concerns over 'estatismo' and began to publish articles on development and economic planning.⁵⁷

The Mexican private sector found that it could benefit from state nationalist initiatives intended to upgrade national industrial capacity. The new official economic plan announced in mid-1962 designated around five hundred new industries that the private sector would be responsible for developing with significant state support in the form of fiscal exemptions, credits, and other forms of assistance.⁵⁸ The government negotiated with foreign companies to transform the country from its role as an automobile assembler into an automobile manufacturer. By 1962, auto producers in Mexico had to use 60 per cent local content while the state provided investment credits, tax subsidies, and other supports for this new initiative. Even if the government fell far short of its goals of obtaining partial Mexican ownership of foreign-owned plants like those of Ford, General Motors, and Nissan, the private sector could object neither to the state's 'Mexicanizing' intent nor to the realities of multiplying private sector contracts for local content auto parts.⁵⁹

The private sector's initial fears subsided during 1962 as it understood three things: that the government would keep a tight reign on Cuban influences within Mexico; that strong ties to the US would continue; and that state efforts to move the economy to a higher level of import substitution meant vast new opportunities for domestic business. It became evident that the government would not enforce the profit-sharing law with much vigor, and the fiscal reforms in 1961 and 1964 continued the pattern of light taxation on interest, dividends, and profits that Mexico's private sector had enjoyed for years.⁶⁰ In early 1964, the US Department of State informed President Lyndon Johnson that Mexican businessmen were 'reassured' by the selection of Minister of Government Díaz Ordaz to succeed López Mateos, and that the new official candidate would be unlikely to effect 'any significant change' in policies.⁶¹ Amid the blossoming atmosphere of confidence, domestic and foreign private investment renewed. With the regime crisis provoked by the advent of the Cuban Revolution seemingly over, the economy expanded at an annual real growth rate of over 7 per cent between 1962 and 1970 amid price stability and low inflation.

So great were the subsequent 'overexpansive policies' of Luis Echeverría Alvarez (1970–76) and José López Portillo (1976–82) that scholars have tended to overlook the influence of the critical juncture of the early 1960s on Mexico's later economic disasters.⁶² In a highly interesting essay on state-society relationships in modern Mexico, Alan Knight draws a sharp distinction between the decades of 'extensive regulation but limited state expenditure' before 1970 and the years of 'rapid increase of state expenditure, payroll and interventionism' thereafter. Using measures such as the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, Knight rightly observes that 'in formal terms, Mexico had never been so statist' as it was after 1970. Reliance upon statistical indicators, however, makes 1970 too absolute a dividing line.⁶³ It obscures the continuity in political strategy that began with López Mateos of using an authoritarian and expansionist state nationalism to regenerate political legitimacy and achieve higher levels of industrialization. 'By the 1960s and 1970s', Lorenzo Meyer notes, 'the growth of the public sector in the economy was the regime's proud indicator that it had fulfilled its historic commitment to its bases. The public sector sustained legitimacy'.⁶⁴

Echeverría and López Portillo vastly escalated that strategy, plunging Mexico into the debt crisis of 1982, but many of 'los grandes problemas nacionales' that flew out of control during their presidencies – including a rising foreign debt and uncompetitive politically protected industries – were well identified before either took office. Periods of economic policymaking have a way of overlapping each other.⁶⁵ Economist Enrique Cárdenas has argued that the decade of the 1960s has a special significance in understanding Mexico's later economic difficulties because it was the time 'when decisions to guarantee the sustained long-run development of the national economy should have been taken'.⁶⁶ But politics and perspectives of the time prevented many of the appropriate policies from emerging.

Scholars as well as former public officials like Carlos Tello Macías have begun to articulate the continuities between the period of ‘desarrollo estabilizador’ (stabilizing development, 1958–70) associated with Secretario de Hacienda Antonio Ortiz Mena and the economic problems of the governments that followed. Tello, a top economic policy maker at different moments under Echeverría and López Portillo, has recently published a study that defends the administrations he served and severely criticizes the private sector for many of the deficiencies of Mexico’s industrial development.⁶⁷

From a more detached position, the economic historian Carlos Marichal has emphasized the ‘exceedingly heavy legacy’ left by ‘the unresolved problems of stabilizing development’. Building upon the earlier work of Clark Reynolds, Rosario Green, and others, Marichal has documented how the López Mateos years began Mexico’s reliance on foreign financing for its move into more complex levels of import substitution. Between 1960 and 1964, the country’s foreign debt doubled; by the end of the decade it was nearly eight times that of ten years earlier. Loans from private banks in the US constituted over 40 per cent of this external debt.⁶⁸ Historians have insufficiently appreciated the increase in Mexico’s foreign indebtedness following the Cuban Revolution since the amounts owed appeared small compared to the scale of later borrowings under Echeverría and López Portillo. Already by 1970, however, servicing external creditors absorbed roughly a quarter of Mexico’s export earnings, and the structural dependency upon outside loans guaranteed that foreign debt would continue to grow rapidly.⁶⁹ The primary consideration of economic policy was the preservation of the government’s political monopoly. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, this required increased public expenditure, expanding the corporatist controls of the PRI, and consolidating private sector cooperation for greater import-substitution industrialization. Ironically, the politics of state nationalism produced a strong political class along with privileged minorities in the business world, yielding at the same time a fiscally weak state incapable of either financing itself or formulating a viable industrial policy. In the 1960s, just as later in the 1970s, Mexican officials borrowed ever more extensively while failing to provide government with an adequate domestic tax base. Mexico’s tax rates remained low by international standards, in part due to the pressures of the organized private sector, particularly the Asociación de Banqueros de México and the Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios, the latter formed in 1962 to defend Mexico against the Cuban Revolution and to keep the policies of state nationalism favorable to big business.⁷⁰ Corruption meant that the powerful could often escape the full payment of whatever taxes they owed.

Fearful of the upsurge in domestic radicalism and the weaker economic growth that coincided with the Cuban Revolution, Mexican officials undertook policies that provided a short run security at an unforeseen long-term cost. The strategy of stabilizing development, which demanded what Manuel Gollás calls ‘la mítica tasa de cambio de 12.50 pesos por dólar’

(the mythical exchange rate of 12.5 pesos per dollar), yielded price stability and low inflation, but it also produced an overvalued peso whose consequences were uncompetitive Mexican exports, unsuccessful import substitution, and an ultimately unsustainable growth in external debt.⁷¹ Some economic historians see the López Mateos years as a lost moment in which Mexico should have shed its protectionist policies and developed a capacity for competitive industrial exports. 'It was precisely at the beginning of the 1960s', notes Enrique Cárdenas, 'that trade policy [should have been] changed to begin gradually liberalizing the protected industries to force them to compete'. Such a shift would have avoided the high-cost strategy of promoting advanced import substitution based upon a domestic market too small to finance such an endeavor. 'But the mood was not ready for that change', he adds. 'After the G.D.P. growth diminished at the beginning of the 1960s, presumably due in part to Mexico's policies toward Cuba, the greatest worry was how to resume growth'. So instead of liberalization,

Mexico reinforced its protectionist policy, a decision shared by both the government and the private sector, including the labour unions. Neither of these particular groups would benefit in the short run if the economy was liberalized.⁷²

Once locked in, this policy could only increase Mexico's foreign debt as exports remained too weak to pay for imports of capital goods, and as Mexico's economy made only the most meager progress in producing capital goods of its own.⁷³

From a post-Cold War perspective, the evidence shows that the political and economic impact of the Cuban Revolution on Mexico has been significant. While at first it seemed as if the Cuban Revolution would damage relationships between the US and Mexican governments and the Mexican government and the private sector, the opposite proved to be the case. It is doubtful that the Mexican private sector or the US would have agreed to the policies of state nationalism during the 1960s without the fear of social unrest and political instability that the Cuban Revolution instilled in them. In the interest of retaining the PRI's political monopoly amid the reverberations from Cuba, the governments of López Mateos and Díaz Ordaz rejected both political and economic liberalization, opting instead for ultimately unsustainable renewals of authoritarianism and protectionism. The 'revolutionary' impact of the Cuban Revolution came later as a sort of delayed fuse in a young generation's resistance to the authoritarianism of Mexican state nationalism. In the face of this youthful political challenge, the regimes of Echeverría and López Portillo engaged in a remarkable expansion of the 'formula' of the state nationalism that had consolidated itself in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. The size of the public sector and the external debt, having both grown rapidly during the 1960s, now spun wildly out of control, eventually provoking economic disaster. Starting in 1959, in response to the ramifications of the Cuban Revolution,

actors in Mexico and the US created a new 'international regime' that claimed to offer a harmonious route to peace and prosperity. Instead, it laid the foundations for the political and economic frustrations that Mexico has experienced ever since. Historical analysis, having mistakenly categorized the Cuban Revolution's impact in Mexico as 'mild', now needs to dig deeper into its significant and enduring legacies.

Short Biography

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Notes

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¹ For example, see Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, revised and updated introduction and case studies by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (Wilmington: SR Books, 1997); Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (London: Nelson, 1970); Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

² Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, rev. ed. (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2001), xiii, 43.

³ For example, Peter H. Smith, 'Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Mexico since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 354–6; Alicia Hernández Chávez, *Mexico, a Brief History*, trans. Andy Klatt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 281, 291.

⁴ Friedrich Katz, 'La guerra fría en América Latina', in Daniela Spenser (coord.), *Espesos de la guerra fría: México, América Central y el Caribe* (México: Ciesas/Porrúa, 2004), 16. For a revised English-language version of this volume that contains a few of the same essays along with several different ones, see Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (eds), *In from the Cold. Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

⁵ For a testimonial account by a guerrilla supporter jailed, tortured, and amnestied by the Mexican government, see Alberto Ulloa Bornemann, *Surviving Mexico's Dirty War. A Political Prisoner's Memoir*, ed. and trans. Aurora Camacho de Schmidt and Arthur Schmidt (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2007). See also the report contained in Kate Doyle, 'Draft Report Documents 18 Years of 'Dirty War' in Mexico', National Security Archive, Washington, DC, February 26, 2006, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB180/index.htm>, accessed on August 9, 2007.

- ⁶ Tanalís Padilla, 'From Agraristas to Guerrilleros: The Jaramillista Movement in Morelos', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 87/2 (2007): 258.
- ⁷ See the documents appended to Kate Doyle, 'The Tlatelolco Massacre. U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968', National Security Archive, Washington, DC, October 10, 2003, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/>, accessed on August 9, 2007.
- ⁸ Laura Castellanos, *México armado, 1943–1981* (México: Ediciones Era, 2007), 169. Castellanos sees a continuity in rebellion from the Jaramillista movement that began in the 1940s through the generation inspired by the Cuban Revolution to the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) and other resistance movements today.
- ⁹ O'Neil Blacker-Hanson, 'La Lucha Sigue! ("The Struggle Continues!") Teacher Activism in Guerrero and the Continuum of Democratic Struggle in Mexico', Ph.D. diss. (University of Washington, Seattle, 2005), 360.
- ¹⁰ Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed. The Latin American Left After the Cold War* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 88; Sergio Aguayo Quezada, *La charola. Una historia de los servicios de inteligencia en México* (México: Editorial Grijalbo, 2001), 123. See also Ana Covarrubias, 'Cuba and Mexico: A Case for Mutual Non-Intervention', *Cuban Studies*, 26 (1996): 121–41. Christopher M. White, *Creating a Third World. Mexico, Cuba, and the United States during the Castro Era* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 13–14, questions the existence of any 'unwritten understanding' between Mexico and Cuba, suggesting that Cuba supported guerrillas in Mexico more than is usually thought. However, he does not explore this question, focusing his study instead on how Mexico and Cuba 'valued their relationship' as a factor that enabled them to 'become true actors on the international relations world stage' during the Cold War.
- ¹¹ Soledad Loeza, 'Gustavo Díaz Ordaz: el colapso del milagro mexicano', in Ilán Bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer (eds), *Una historia contemporánea de México, Vol. 2, Actores* (México: Editorial Océano de México, 2005), 154.
- ¹² Juliana Barbassa, 'The New Cuban Capitalist', in Lydia Chávez (ed.), *Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters the Twenty-First Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 17.
- ¹³ Greg Grandin, 'Off the Beach: The United States, Latin America, and the Cold War', in Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (eds), *A Companion to Post-1945 America* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 426.
- ¹⁴ Daniela Spenser, 'Standing Conventional Cold War History on Its Head', in Joseph and Spenser (eds), *In from the Cold*, 381. See also Gilbert M. Joseph, 'What We Now Know and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into Cold War Studies', op. cit., 3–46.
- ¹⁵ Alan Knight, 'Historical Continuities in Social Movements', in Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig (eds), *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990), 93, 97. See also Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov, 'Assembling the Fragments: Writing a Cultural History of Mexico Since 1940', in Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov (eds), *Fragments of a Golden Age. The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 3–22; Arthur Schmidt, 'Making It Real Compared to What? Reconceptualizing Mexican History Since 1940', op. cit., 23–68.
- ¹⁶ Barry Carr, 'The Many Meanings of 1968 in Mexico. The Student-Popular Movement Thirty Years After', *Enfoque* (Fall/Winter 1998): 1–2, 6.
- ¹⁷ Carlos Fuentes, 'The Argument of Latin America: Words for North Americans', in *Whither Latin America?* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 21; C. Wright Mills, *Listen, Yankee. The Revolution in Cuba* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1960) was available in Mexico as *Escucha, yanqui* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961).
- ¹⁸ See Grandin, 'Off the Beach' and his *The Last Colonial Massacre. Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), Conclusion, as well as his *Empire's Workshop. Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2006), Chapter 1. See also Smith, 'Mexico since 1946', 321–96; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds), *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Bethell and Roxborough, 'The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America', in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds), *Origins of the Cold War. An International History*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY and London: Routledge, 2005), 299–316; Susan Gauss, 'The Politics of Economic Nationalism in Postrevolutionary Mexico', *History Compass*, 4/3 (2006): 567–77.

¹⁹ Lorenzo Meyer, *El espejismo democrático. De la euforia del cambio a la continuidad* (México: Editorial Océano de México, 2007), 162.

²⁰ Barry Carr, *Marxism and Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 203.

²¹ Enrique Krauze, *Mexico. Biography of Power. A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*, trans. Hank Heifetz (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1997), 637. Elena Poniatowska, *El tren pasa primero* (México: Alfaguara, 2005), a novel of the railway strike and its repression, won the fifteenth Rómulo Gallegos prize in 2007.

²² See Lorenzo Meyer, 'La guerra fría en el mundo periférico: el caso del régimen autoritario mexicano. La utilidad del anticomunismo discreto', *Espesos de la guerra fría*, 95–117. The phrase 'política de equilibrios' refers to the Mexican government's practice of employing foreign policy to promote balance among competing internal groups, particularly the use of Mexico's positions on international issues to cement ties with a political left unhappy about the course of domestic governance after 1940.

²³ Olga Pellicer de Brody and José Luis Reyna, *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 1952–1960. El afianzamiento de la estabilidad política*. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 22 (México: El Colegio de México, 1978), 215–17.

²⁴ Olga Pellicer de Brody, *México y la Revolución Cubana* (México: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1972), 130. In addition to her use of published materials, Pellicer de Brody benefited from the conclusions that Arthur K. Smith, Jr. drew from his unattributed interviews with Mexican officials: 'Mexico and the Cuban Revolution: Foreign-Policy Making in Mexico Under President Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964)', Ph.D. diss. (Cornell University, 1970).

²⁵ Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.

²⁶ Stanley Robert Ross, 'Mexico: The Preferred Revolution', in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead (eds), *Politics of Change in Latin America* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1964), 151. The phrase 'revolution to evolution' served as the title of another book of the time: Howard F. Cline, *Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940–1960* (New York, NY and London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

²⁷ The term 'tardopriismo' (late PRIismo) evokes the notion of the official party decaying in the late phases of its overly lengthy political monopoly. It comes from Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, 'México, fin de siglo', in *Pensar en México* (México: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006), 31. Raymond Vernon worried about a breakup of the Mexican political economy in *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development. The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).

²⁸ José Agustín, *Tragicomedia mexicana, Vol. 1, La vida en México de 1940 a 1970* (México: Editorial Planeta Mexicana, 1990), 179.

²⁹ Ilán Bizberg, 'Auge y decadencia del corporativismo', in Bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer (eds), *Una historia contemporánea de México, Vol. 1, Transformaciones y permanencias* (México: Editorial Océano de México, 2003), 114, 320–1.

³⁰ On Mexican foreign policy, see Mario Ojeda, *Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México* (México: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1976), and on Mexico's ambassadors to Cuba and to the OAS, see Enrique Camacho Navarro, 'Un nacionalista mexicano y su postura antiimperialista: Gilberto Bosques en Cuba (1953–1964)', in Agustín Sánchez Andrés et al. (coords.), *Artífices y operadores de la diplomacia mexicana, siglos XIX y XX* (México: Porrúa, 2004), 431–474; Leticia Bobadilla González, 'México y la revolución cubana: Vicente Sánchez Gavito en la OEA, 1959–1964', op. cit., 475–503.

³¹ White, *Creating a Third World*, 49.

³² Carr, *Marxism and Communism*, 225. Carr refers to 'new historical subjects' that included agrarian workers and landless peasants, students and young people in general, state sector workers, and radicalized Christians, all of whom expanded the Mexican left to include 'a huge number of tendencias, movements, and organizations united around the central aim of democratizing Mexican society'. *Ibid.*, 225–32.

³³ Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba and the United States. Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 241–3; Pellicer de Brody, *México y la Revolución Cubana*, 94–5.

³⁴ United States Department of State, Embassy in Mexico, Secret Airgram, 'Economic Nationalism and Current Lopez [sic] Mateos Maneuvers to the Left', September 24, 1962, 7, annexed to Kate Doyle, 'After the Revolution. Lázaro Cárdenas and the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional', National Security Archive, Washington, DC, May 31, 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124/doc25.pdf>, accessed on August 9, 2007.

³⁵ Olga Pellicer de Brody and Esteban L. Mancilla, *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 1952–1960. El entendimiento con los Estados Unidos y la gestación del desarrollo estabilizador*. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 23 (México: El Colegio de México, 1978), 26.

³⁶ White, *Creating a Third World*, 70. While aware of the international significance of domestic pressure groups, White's examination of the triangular relationship among Cuba, Mexico, and the United States concentrates mostly upon government-to-government relations and devotes much less attention to the impact of the Cuban Revolution on Mexico's internal politics, society, and economy.

³⁷ In fact, the statement of López Mateos about 'the extreme left within the Constitution' was part of a longer reply to a question about the political orientation of his government in which the President simply defined the meaning of the word 'left' in Mexico as relating to the popular origins and aspirations of the Mexican Revolution. "'Dentro de la Constitución mi gobierno es de extrema izquierda", definió así su régimen, anoche, el presidente', *Excélsior*, July 2, 1960, 1, 19.

³⁸ 'Se desata una tormenta política por las declaraciones de ALM', 'Triunfará el comunismo sin las armas', and 'Confirma 'atinada izquierda' del PRI', *Excélsior*, July 3, 1960, 1, 15.

³⁹ Marco Antonio Alcázar, *Las agrupaciones patronales en México* (México: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1970), 73–75, 78.

⁴⁰ Peter H. Smith, 'Does Mexico Have a Power Elite?', in José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (eds), *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia, PA: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), 146.

⁴¹ For studies of Mexican business, see Roderic Ai Camp, *Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ben Ross Schneider, *Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America* (Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Dale Story, *Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986); Robert Jones Shafer, *Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1973).

⁴² See Enrique Cárdenas, 'The Process of Accelerated Industrialization in Mexico, 1929–82', in Enrique Cárdenas, José Antonio Ocampo, and Rosemary Thorp (eds), *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Latin America, Vol. 3, Industrialization and the State in Latin America: The Postwar Years* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000), 176–204; René Villarreal, 'The Policy of Import-Substituting Industrialization, 1929–1975', in Reyna and Weinert (eds), *Authoritarianism in Mexico*, 67–107. A more extensive version of Villarreal's analysis is *Industrialización, deuda y desequilibrio externo en México: un enfoque neoestructuralista (1929–1997)*, 3rd ed. (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997).

⁴³ The Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress aimed at promoting private and public investment along with social and political reforms as a means of deterring the spread of Communism in Latin America. See Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World. John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), Chapter 7. The Alliance's promise of greater access to foreign development funds appealed to Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, López Mateos's Secretary of Government and his successor as president, 1964–1970. See Loeza, 'Gustavo Díaz Ordaz', 130–1.

⁴⁴ Pellicer de Brody, *México y la Revolución Cubana*, 59–60. Diane Davis uses the phrase 'urban leviathan' to identify the importance of Mexico City in the political economy of modern Mexico: *Urban Leviathan. Mexico City in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994).

⁴⁵ The monthly publication of CONCAMIN, *Industria. Al Servicio del México Industrial* offers an illustrative case during the early 1960s. See, for example, the editorial 'El desarrollo económico de México debe ir en avión, no en motocicleta', *Industria*, 12 (December 1960): 30. 'Malanchista envy' refers to Malinche, the translator and mistress of Hernán Cortés, whose name subsequently became a term for traitorous behavior in Mexico.

⁴⁶ CONCAMIN, CONCANACO, and COPARMEX, '¿Por cuál camino, Señor Presidente?' *Novedades*, November 24, 1960, 9.

⁴⁷ Miguel S. Wionczek, *El nacionalismo mexicano y la inversión extranjera* (México: Siglo XXI, 1967), 145–8. The slogans read: ‘Land 1915; petroleum 1938; electricity 1960. Onward! Mexico is ours’ and ‘The light is ours’.

⁴⁸ ‘La nacionalización de la industria eléctrica entraña una grave responsabilidad’, *Industria*, 12 (September 1960): 133.

⁴⁹ Richard Saull, *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War. The State, Military Power, and Social Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 178–85.

⁵⁰ Meyer, ‘La guerra fría en el mundo periférico’, 100, 103, 107–8.

⁵¹ Sergio Aguayo Quezada, *Myths and [Mis]perceptions. Changing U.S. Elite Visions of Mexico*, trans. Julián Brody (México: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, El Colegio de México; La Jolla, CA: Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1998), 109.

⁵² United States Department of State, Embassy in Mexico, Secret Telegram, untitled, July 17, 1961, annexed to Doyle, ‘After the Revolution’, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, May 31, 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124/doc04.pdf>, accessed on August 9, 2007.

⁵³ United States Department of State, Embassy in Mexico, Secret Telegram, untitled, December 6, 1961, annexed to Doyle, ‘After the Revolution’, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124/doc06.pdf>, accessed on August 9, 2007.

⁵⁴ *Excelsior*, January 26, 1962, 1. See both the editorial and paid advertising support for the ‘impeccable tesis de Tello’ in *Excelsior* and *Novedades*, January 25–31, 1962.

⁵⁵ Kate Doyle, ‘After the Revolution’, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124>, accessed on August 9, 2007. For a more extensive treatment of Mexico cooperating with the United States in intelligence information concerning Cuba, see White, *Creating a Third World*, chapters 4–6.

⁵⁶ For these quotations, see *Novedades*, July 2, 1962, 1. See also Aguayo, *Myths and [Mis]perceptions*, 110–12.

⁵⁷ For example, see Ives Gálvez, ‘La intervención del estado a la economía’, *Industria*, 13 (July 1962): 15–17, 26; ‘El sector privado debe participar en la formulación de los planes de desarrollo económico’, *Industria*, 14 (October 1962): 156.

⁵⁸ Pellicer de Brody, *México y la Revolución Cubana*, 80. On the developmental efforts of the Mexican state, see Ben Ross Schneider, ‘The *Desarrollista* State in Brazil and Mexico’, in Meredith Woo-Cummings (ed.), *The Developmental State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 276–305; Juan Felipe Leal, *Del estado liberal al estado interventor en México* (México: Ediciones El Caballito, 1991).

⁵⁹ Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, *Transnational Corporations versus the State. The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 105, 109.

⁶⁰ Luis Aboites Aguilar, *Excepciones y privilegios. Modernización tributaria y centralización en México, 1922–1972* (México: El Colegio de México, 2003), 49–50.

⁶¹ United States, White House, ‘Meeting of Presidents Johnson and López Mateos in California, February 20–22, 1964’, Secret Papers, appended to Doyle, ‘After the Revolution’, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124/doc37.pdf>, accessed on August 9, 2007.

⁶² For example, see Nora Lustig, *Mexico, the Remaking of an Economy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 1; Clark Reynolds, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Mexico’s Development Challenges’, in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Eduardo Zepeda (eds), *Confronting Development. Assessing Mexico’s Economic and Social Policy Challenges* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 601.

⁶³ Alan Knight, ‘The Weight of the State in Modern Mexico’, in James Dunkerley (ed.), *Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2002), 248, 252. The figures used by Knight show that the biggest increases in central government spending as a share of GDP commenced in 1975 rather than immediately after 1970, running through Echeverría’s last two years as president and through the sexenio of López Portillo. During Echeverría’s first four years, the rise in the annual average of central government spending as a percentage of GDP compared to the annual average of the Díaz Ordaz administration was about the same as that of the López Mateos administration over the ratio of his predecessor Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. See *ibid.*, 217, and James W. Wilkie and Adam Perkal (eds),

Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. 24 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1985), 875.

⁶⁴ Lorenzo Meyer, 'The Second Coming of Mexican Liberalism: A Comparative Perspective', in Elisa Servín, Leticia Reina, and John Tutino (eds), *Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of Change. Crisis, Reform, and Revolution in Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 288.

⁶⁵ Manuel Gollás, 'Breve relato de cincuenta años de política económica', in Bizberg and Meyer (eds), *Una historia contemporánea*, Vol. 1, 223–7. Gollás's use of the phrase 'big national problems' alludes to the title of the famous book of Andrés Molina Enriquez on the eve of the Mexican Revolution, *Los grandes problemas nacionales*. For two accounts of the time that identified key economic issues, see David Ibarra, 'Mercados, desarrollo y política económica: perspectivas de la economía de México', in *El perfil de México en 1980* (México: Siglo XXI, 1970), 1:89–189; Víctor Urquidi, 'Fundamental Problems of the Mexican Economy', in Tom E. Davis (ed.), *Mexico's Recent Economic Growth. The Mexican View*, trans. Marjory Urquidi (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1967), 173–202.

⁶⁶ Enrique Cárdenas, *La política económica en México, 1950–1994* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996), 57.

⁶⁷ Carlos Tello, *Estado y desarrollo económico: México 1920–2006* (México: Universidad Autónoma de México, 2007), 369–70, 412–17, 459–66, 506–15, 599–623.

⁶⁸ Carlos Marichal, 'La deuda externa', in Bizberg and Meyer (eds), *Una historia contemporánea*, Vol. 1, especially 460–4. The quotation comes from 462. See also Clark W. Reynolds, 'Why Mexico's "Stabilizing Development" was Actually Destabilizing (With Some Implications for the Future)', *World Development*, 6 (1978): 1005–18; Rosario Green, *El endudamiento público externo de México, 1940–1973* (México: El Colegio de México, 1976), 127–65. Mexico's public external debt rose about fifteen-fold in current dollars between the early 1970s and the debt crisis of 1982.

⁶⁹ Cárdenas, 'Process of Accelerated Industrialization in Mexico', 195.

⁷⁰ Aboites Aguilar, *Excepciones y privilegios*, 47–8, 51; Escalante Gonzalbo, 'México, fin de siglo', 22; Carlos Alba Vega, 'Las relaciones entre los empresarios y el Estado', in Bizberg and Meyer (eds), *Una historia contemporánea*, Vol. 2, 165.

⁷¹ Gollás, 'Breve relato de cincuenta años de política económica', 237; José Romero, 'Crecimiento y comercio', in Bizberg and Meyer (eds), *Una historia contemporánea*, Vol. 1, 178, 183.

⁷² Cárdenas, 'Process of Accelerated Industrialization in Mexico', 194. U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Mann would have agreed with these historical views. He criticized protectionism in a September 1962 speech to the COPARMEX, declaring that 'national industries which cannot compete abroad cannot earn foreign exchange . . . [and] have little incentive for keeping up with modern technological advances'. Thomas C. Mann, 'The Experience of the United States in Economic Development: Its Relevance for Latin America', *Department of State Bulletin*, 47 (19 November 1962): 775.

⁷³ Gollás, 'Breve relato de cincuenta años de política económica', 293.

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