

Chapter 2

Weber as Protagonist of Bourgeois Values

'After long experience,' Weber wrote to a friend in 1918, '... I am convinced that the individual can only come to know what his own will really is through testing his supposed "ultimate" convictions by his attitude to *thoroughly specific problems*, in which the issues are sharply accentuated.'¹ The present chapter will follow this approach, by looking at examples of Weber's writing on specific problems, as the best means to defining his general political standpoint and values. Three works will be discussed, each typical of a different period of his life. From the early period of the 1890s comes the Inaugural Address at Freiburg, 'Economic Policy and the Nation State,' which combines a summary of Weber's researches on the conditions of East Prussian agriculture with an expression of his nationalist conviction typical of this time. Second will be considered the two extended articles he wrote on the Russian revolution of 1905-6. These belong to the new phase of his writing after his illness, and are representative of the more universalist character of his outlook in this period, expressed in his concern with the problem of freedom in an increasingly rationalised world. Third is the most substantial example of his wartime polemics, 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany,' which is again typical of its period in his return to a preoccupation with the problems of German politics, and in the greater emphasis given to the analysis of political institutions. After a brief summary of each of these works, their wider significance will be discussed. In this way it is hoped to provide a representative view of Weber's political values, as well as some idea of the development in his thinking.

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The Freiburg Inaugural Address is the most important statement of

Weber's political ideas in his early period.² It begins with a brief summary of his main findings on agricultural conditions in East Prussia. Weber wrote numerous different accounts of these findings, all with slightly different emphases, but the situation he found was broadly as follows.³ The recent intensification of international market competition had threatened the economy of the large estates in East Prussia, particularly those on poor soil, and accelerated the introduction of mechanisation and of crops such as sugar beet which could be cultivated intensively. Instead of a feudal patriarch the landowner became a capitalist entrepreneur.⁴ The agricultural worker changed correspondingly from a tied cottager, who shared in the produce of the harvest and thus had a common interest with the landowner, to a 'potato-eating proletarian' whose interests were in direct conflict with those of his employer.⁵ The introduction of capitalism brought not only class conflict, but also competition among the workers themselves. It was generally cheaper for the landowner to import Polish casual labourers for the summer season than to employ German workers who had to be paid all the year round. The result was a large-scale emigration of German workers to the towns or abroad, particularly of the more enterprising, who saw no chance of achieving economic independence under existing conditions. In some of his accounts, particularly to the Protestant Social Congress, Weber emphasised the more positive aspects of this process: the 'deep-felt' desire of the German worker for freedom from his traditional subservience.⁶ In the Inaugural Address, however, it was the displacement of Germans by Polish immigrants that he concentrated on.⁷ The competition among the workers, introduced by capitalism, favoured those whose standard of living and expectations were lower. The same was also true in the independent smallholdings, as well as on the large estates. The German smallholders, who produced for the market, were unable to make the best use of the land in the circumstances of increased competition, and were replaced by Polish peasants who operated a subsistence economy. In each case, that of labourers and of independent farmers, the process of economic development favoured the Poles precisely because their economic needs were lower than their German counterparts, because they represented a 'less developed cultural type'.⁸

From this situation Weber drew a number of general conclusions in his Inaugural Address. First was to question the assumption that economic development could serve as a self-evident goal for economic policy.⁹ Economic development could produce

the triumph of an inferior type of man. The Poles were able to survive, and drive out the Germans, because their standard of living, their economic and cultural demands, were lower than those of their German counterparts. What happened was the survival of the *unfittest*. This threatened the basis of German culture in the east, and the national security of the eastern frontier. Such a threat could only be overcome and the 'Slavic flood stemmed' by a policy of state support for the re-colonisation of German farmers, and by closing the eastern frontier.¹⁰ However, it was not so much the specific remedy as the general lesson that Weber was concerned to develop in his Address. This was that the maximisation of production could never serve as the unquestioned goal for economic policy, but must be subordinate to national and cultural values. Weber poured scorn on the 'Endaimonisten', who believed that economic development would effortlessly produce a general increase in happiness. What such people overlooked was the universality of conflict and struggle, between groups and between nations, which economic development only intensified, as the situation on the eastern frontier showed. In such a context of struggle, the promotion of German national and cultural values was all-important. So, he concludes this section of the Address, the goal of German economic policy as well as the standards of German economic theory could only be national, German ones. 'The science of economic policy is a *political* science; it is the servant of politics . . . of the long-term great power interests of the nation.'¹¹

If one consequence of the economic situation in the east was the threat to German culture and national interests, a second was the crisis of political leadership brought about by the economic decline of the Junkers, and the movement of the centre of economic power from the rural estates to the towns.¹² The Junkers were an economically declining class, and such a class could not provide strong national leadership since they were primarily concerned to use their political power to bolster up their declining economic position. 'They have performed their task,' said Weber, 'and now lie in an economic struggle to the death, from which no economic policy on the part of the state can restore them to their traditional social character.'¹³ However, although economic power had passed to the towns, the bourgeoisie were politically immature and uneducated. One of the chief reasons for this was the dominance exercised by Bismarck. Bismarck had stifled all political talent, and the bourgeoisie had become accustomed to having a great man take the initiative. As a result they had had no

chance to develop politically.¹⁴ Germany was thus in the position where a declining class wielded political power in its own narrowly conceived interest, whereas the economically developing class was unfitted for wielding political power at all. Weber summarised the position succinctly:

It is dangerous . . . when an economically declining class holds political power. But it is even more dangerous when classes, to whom economic power and with it the expectation of political supremacy are passing, are politically too immature to take on the leadership of the state. Both these threaten Germany at the moment, and this is the key to our present dangers.¹⁵

The crucial question was how the bourgeoisie could become fit to rule. At least part of the answer lay, according to Weber, in political education; and what more worth-while task could there be for a national economist than that?

For the immediate future one thing stands out: there is a huge task of *political* education to be accomplished. No more serious duty faces us than . . . to play our part in the work of educating the nation *politically*, which must remain the final goal of our science.¹⁶

Weber's Inaugural Address has been dismissed by some critics as a youthful excess. It is true that some views were expressed here with a crudity not found later, and others came to be substantially modified, most notably Weber's assertion of the subordination of economic science to political goals.¹⁷ Yet even on the question of value freedom there were seeds of his mature doctrine here in his repeated insistence that the mere fact of economic development could not provide any self-evident value or standard, whether for practical policy or for science; values could not be deduced from facts.¹⁸ And in general the Address expresses attitudes which are repeated in Weber's mature works, and can be regarded as characteristic of his political thought. The most important of these will be considered briefly.

Most obviously typical of the attitudes expressed in the Address is its explicit affirmation of Germany's national interest as the decisive value for political and economic policy. This was affirmed repeatedly by Weber in his later life. In a speech in 1909 he said: 'Many of us take the view that the ultimate definitive value . . . is the power position of a nation in the world.'¹⁹ And again in 1916 he wrote that he had 'always viewed policy from a national standpoint alone.'²⁰ As will be explored in a later chapter, Weber's

nationalism was more complex than has frequently been made out by critics. A central part of it was his commitment to the value of 'Kultur', the cultural uniqueness embodied in national communities in general and the German nation in particular, which could only be protected under modern conditions by means of the power state. At the same time there was an important economic element. The pressure on land and resources brought about by the growth of population and industrial development—the 'harsh gravity of the population problem', as he called it in the Address²¹—made the assertion of national economic self-interest paramount. Germany, in particular, now that national unification had set her firmly in the arena of the great powers, could not opt out of the international struggle. To do so, as he said in the Address, would be to make a mockery of German unification. It was the fate of his generation to live under the shadow of the great generation who had established the Reich, to be 'Epigoni', mere descendants of the great. At least they should see to it that the achievements of their predecessors did not mark the end of German history, but rather the beginning.²² Thus the protection of German culture (particularly against the Slavs), the assertion of economic self-interest, the satisfaction of a new generation's honour and responsibility to the future, all formed part of the nationalism expressed in the Inaugural Address. Chapter 5 will show how far this mellowed, particularly after Weber's Russian studies had awakened him to the problem of national minorities. Nevertheless, nationalism in some form was to remain central among his political values.

A second theme of the Inaugural Address, equally typical, was its criticism of the absence in Germany of any political leadership which could give adequate expression to her national purpose and promote it effectively. Emphasis on the central importance of political leadership was a constant preoccupation of Weber's political writings, as much in his later as his earlier period. Throughout he was convinced that such leadership could only come from a strong economic class—the bourgeoisie. If, however, a strong economic class was a necessary condition for political leadership, it was not a sufficient one; it required also political capacity and political consciousness. 'We forget,' said Weber in the Address, 'that economic power and a calling for political leadership of the nation do not necessarily coincide'.²³ How to instill a political consciousness in the bourgeoisie and wean them from habits of political subservience remained a constant question of German politics for Weber. It was a question he answered differently in different periods. In his early writing the answer lay

in calls for political education and in the development of a vigorous bourgeois democratic party as a means to this;²⁴ in the wartime period his attention concentrated on the reform of political institutions, particularly of the subordinate position of Parliament, to encourage qualities of political will and responsibility.²⁵ In each case the role of class remained indispensable in providing the social basis and support for political leadership.

If a commitment to national values and to the importance of political leadership form the main political themes of the Inaugural Address, the speech is also important for the explicitness with which it gives expression to certain more general assumptions central to Weber's conception of society. The most important of these is the theme that struggle and conflict form a central and permanent feature of social life—struggle between groups, classes, nations, as well as the conflict between differing values. Even where such a conflict is not apparent, it is still going on under the surface. 'There is no peace in the economic struggle for existence', says Weber in the Address, 'only . . . the illusion of peace'.²⁶ A similar statement from one of his last writings demonstrates the continuity of this theme: 'Conflict cannot be excluded from social life . . . "peace" is nothing more than a change in the character of conflict.'²⁷

The Inaugural Address demonstrates clearly the conclusions Weber derived from this fact of struggle and conflict both for empirical analysis and for political values. As to the first, a central feature in the analysis of social structures became the question of what qualities, what types of individual were selected out by the particular character of the conflict taking place within these structures. How did they so shape the character of struggle that they brought certain qualities to supremacy at the expense of others? This concept of 'Auslese' (selection) reappears as a central feature in nearly all Weber's writings on contemporary society. Thus one theme of his studies on East Prussia was how the terms of economic conflict favoured a particular cultural type, the Polish seasonal worker, at the expense of the Germans.²⁸ The theme of the massive study he supervised for the Verein in 1907–9 on conditions in large-scale industry, indeed its explicit title, was what particular psycho-physical qualities and types of worker were 'selected' by the conditions and pressures of modern factory life.²⁹ The theme of two of the major projects he outlined to the first meeting of the German Sociological Society in 1910—systematic studies of voluntary associations and of elites—centred on the process whereby certain qualities came to be selected and rein-

forced by the character of the association or the requirements of the elite role.³⁰ In the political sphere, also, Weber was concerned with the qualities and types of politician selected by different kinds of political system.³¹

This emphasis on the process of selection through conflict and competition, whether open or concealed, not only provided a focus for empirical analysis; Weber also derived conclusions from it for the sphere of values, as the Inaugural Address shows. Recognition of the inevitability of conflict ruled out certain kinds of value position as untenable. If values themselves were in irreducible conflict, then those who believed that all good things could somehow coincide in some future Utopia and refused to admit the necessity for choices between them, were too naïve to be taken seriously. More specifically, the inevitability of conflict between groups and individuals ruled out that range of ideals for mankind in which peace and happiness formed a substantial part; such ideals could only be illusory, because they were based on a false conception of reality. 'For the dreamers of peace and happiness', said Weber, 'there stands written over the door of mankind's unknown future "surrender all hope".'³²

However, in the process of seeking to shatter such illusions, Weber's position showed a subtle shift from regarding conflict as simply a fact of life against which the ideals and values of others should be tested for their realism, to regarding it as something to be positively welcomed, even encouraged. This is implicit in the tone of the Inaugural Address, but is made much more explicit in a speech Weber made to the Protestant Social Congress, also on the problems of East Prussia. Here he expanded on his proposed policy of re-colonisation, which he admitted could only promise German farmers at best a hard struggle to maintain their livelihood. Was this a brutal policy? he asked. They were not involved in 'Sozialpolitik' to increase human happiness:

Our aim is . . . so to create conditions, not that men may feel happier, but that under the necessity of the unavoidable struggle for existence the best in them—those physical and spiritual characteristics which we want to preserve for the nation—will remain protected.³³

Here conditions of struggle were to be welcomed because they fostered qualities of independence that Weber regarded as desirable. Indeed, for Weber the highest values could only be developed through conflict—conflict with other individuals, or with other values, or 'struggle against the difficulties which life presents'.³⁴

It was partly in such terms that he justified the risk-taking activity of the entrepreneur in a context of market competition, in contrast to the bureaucratic 'order' of a planned economy, and a social policy which put the emphasis on extending the effective rights of trade unions to pursue improvements for themselves, in preference to a paternalist system of industrial relations and welfare provision.³⁵

It should be said that the concept of 'Kampf' was one of the least specific of Weber's concepts, ranging from open conflict between people to an unconscious process of selection within social structures. In the section devoted to the term in *Economy and Society*, written at the end of his life, Weber was much more careful than in the Inaugural Address to distinguish between the different types of 'Kampf', and their widely differing significance.³⁶ Although he uses the concept more indiscriminately in his political writings, it is mistaken to call his position a Social Darwinist one, as is often done.³⁷ First, even in the Inaugural Address Weber explicitly rejected as metaphysical any belief in the survival of *superior* types in the process of historical development. It was precisely the higher cultural types who might be least adapted to new environmental circumstances and social arrangements.³⁸ The concept of 'selection' provided Weber with a perspective and a tool for analysis, rather than with a dogma. Secondly, his belief in the value of struggle and competition was nowhere related to a theory of the transmission of favourable characteristics through heredity. The personal qualities developed by such conditions were sufficient justification in themselves.

Thus a heightened awareness of 'selection' at work within social processes, and a readiness to ascribe value to struggle and conflict (albeit within limits not clearly defined) formed central aspects of Weber's social outlook, and the Inaugural Address is typical of these. This brings us to a final point about his political values for which the Address provides evidence, and that is their non-materialist character. For Weber it was non-material values that were important, as opposed to 'bread and butter' questions. Not that he underestimated the practical significance of the latter. But such questions should not form the end of politics. Hence his insistence on German cultural values in face of the assumption that the maximisation of production formed a self-evident goal; and his conviction that the end of 'Sozialpolitik' could never be merely improving the material position of the working class, but the 'development of those characteristics . . . which make for human greatness'.³⁹ 'It is what seems to us valuable in man',

he told the Protestant Social Congress, 'that we seek to protect: personal responsibility, the deep aspiration for the moral and spiritual goods of mankind...'⁴⁰—qualities whose possession Weber argued was in inverse proportion to 'a subjective feeling of happiness'. Politics for Weber was a sphere for the assertion and pursuit of non-material values. While the attainment of power and the satisfaction of material interests were necessary means for the politician, they should not form ends in themselves; the true politician was one who committed himself to a cause.⁴¹ The problem of how such a conception of the politician could be realised in practice will be considered in later chapters. For the present we shall turn to look at a different order of values from those expressed in the Inaugural Address, that of freedom.

FREEDOM AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The tone of all Weber's writings of the 1890s was one of self-confidence, of self-assertiveness. Although he set out to shatter illusions, and in this sense called himself a pessimist,⁴² the illusions were not his own, but those of his fellow members of the Verein für Sozialpolitik and the Protestant Social Congress. In contrast, the character of the writings of the new phase after his illness is very different. Not only is the perspective more universal—it is not Germany that is the theme, but modern society in general; not capitalism as it affected Germany's political structure and standing as a world power, but capitalism as a universal institution—his outlook also is much less self-confident, more genuinely pessimistic. His own ideals had now come up against the limitations of empirical reality. This is particularly apparent in the theme which occurs in one form or another in most of his writings and speeches in the years 1904–10, that of the decline of human freedom in the face of the increasing rationalisation of life, and the bureaucratisation of economic and political structures. It would be wrong to suggest that all Weber's writing in this period was 'really' about this theme. But the fact that it occurs, even by way of digression, in works as diverse as those on the 'Protestant Ethic' and the 'Agricultural Conditions in the Ancient World' is evidence that it was a constant preoccupation.

The theme of freedom was dealt with most explicitly in Weber's writings on the Russian revolution of 1905–6. In her biography Marianne Weber describes the impact the revolution made on her husband. He learnt Russian so that he could read reports of

the happenings in the Russian newspapers, and he 'followed the . . . drama for months on end in breathless excitement'.⁴³ The two articles he wrote for the *Archiv für Sozialpolitik und Sozialwissenschaft*,⁴⁴ intended initially as a review of literature, developed into his most substantial work on politics in this period. They contain a great deal of detailed analysis of the Russian social structure and the course of the political conflict, which will be discussed in a later chapter in the context of Weber's theory of the relationship between society and state. What is of interest here is their underlying theme, the question of what were the chances for freedom in Russia, and in modern society more generally. Only the main outline of Weber's answer will be sketched in here.

The question which forms the main theme of Weber's analysis, particularly in his first article ('The Outlook for Bourgeois Democracy in Russia'), was what social forces existed in Russia which could act as a vehicle and support for the various liberal programmes being put forward.⁴⁵ Weber's assumption was that the ideological movement to establish personal and civil liberties and constitutional government was insufficient to make headway on its own, unless it could harness important social interests in its cause. But what were these social interests? Weber's conclusion was pessimistic. Of the 'historical' institutions of Russia, the Church hierarchy formed one of the main social supports of absolutism, despite the existence of liberal elements among the clergy. Any threat to the Tsar was also a threat to its own hierarchy.⁴⁶ The other 'historical' force, the peasantry, was not interested in any reforms going beyond the redistribution of land. It would support a revolution only to the point where its hunger for land was satisfied, and no further.⁴⁷ Even this much, involving a reform of the land system, could only be achieved with a measure of dictatorial imposition, such was the conflict of interests among the peasants themselves.⁴⁸ If the historical institutions of Russian society thus promised little real support for liberalism, the outlook from its more modern social forces was no brighter. Of these, capitalism, having been 'superimposed in its most advanced form' on top of an 'archaic peasant communism', received direct encouragement from the state, and was able to satisfy its needs through direct liaison with the Tsarist bureaucracy.⁴⁹ The urban proletariat, on the other hand, had been recruited into a social democratic movement of a particularly authoritarian temper; they were drilled by their leaders 'into a spiritual parade march' altogether foreign to liberal ideas or practice.⁵⁰ None of these forces, therefore, offered any permanent support for liberalism

Freeze
Compromise
Capitalism + Estate
Proletarianism
Conscience

as such, whatever temporary alliance they might form in opposition to Tsarist repression.

This pessimistic analysis led Weber to reflect on the unique constellation of factors which had given rise to European liberalism, factors which were not present in Russia and which were no longer repeatable. This passage is worth quoting at some length:

The historical development of modern 'freedom' presupposed a unique and unrepeatable constellation of factors, of which the following are the most important: first, overseas expansion . . . secondly, the characteristic economic and social structure of the 'early capitalist' period in Western Europe; thirdly, the conquest of life through science . . . finally, certain ideal conceptions which grew out of the concrete historical uniqueness of a particular religious viewpoint, and which, working together with numerous unique political circumstances and the material preconditions mentioned above, combined to fashion the 'ethical' and 'cultural' character of modern man. The question, whether any process of material development, in particular that of present-day advanced capitalism, could of itself maintain these unique historical circumstances in being or even create them anew, has only to be asked for the answer to be obvious.⁵¹

A central feature of Weber's analysis here was the observation that modern advanced capitalism was a completely different creature from the early capitalism described, for example, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. It was increasingly subject to that outward rationalisation of life whose development it had helped initially to promote. Modern production was typically standardised, cartellised, bureaucratised production. Such a development left little scope for economic individualism, nor did it share any particular relationship with liberalism in the area of politics:

All the economic weather signs point in the direction of increasing 'unfreedom'. It is ridiculous in the extreme to ascribe to modern high capitalism, as currently being imported into Russia . . . any inner affinity with 'democracy' or even 'freedom' (in any sense of the word). The question is rather 'How are any of these at all possible in the long run under its domination?'⁵²

Weber's conclusion about the chances for the freedom movement in Russia was thus a pessimistic one. A society which had not achieved a tradition of liberalism before the arrival of the modern rationalised form of capitalism, had only a slim chance of de-

veloping it then. In missing the moment in history when a unique series of factors combined to provide the impetus for liberal ideas, it had conceivably missed it for good. 'All the forms of development are excluded which in the West put the strong economic interests of the possessing classes in the service of the movement for bourgeois liberty . . . Never has a struggle for freedom been carried out under such difficult circumstances.'⁵³ Weber could only express his admiration for an attempt which seemed so doomed to failure.

Though the subject of Weber's articles was specifically Russia, with its peculiar social structure and history, yet he clearly regarded his analysis as having a wider significance for modern society in general. Even for societies which had an established tradition of liberalism, the increasing rationalisation of the external conditions of life was progressively eliminating the social structures and areas of independent action which could support that tradition. 'We are individualists *against* the stream of material constellations . . .' wrote Weber in his first article.⁵⁴ This sounds defiant, but it is also touched with pessimism, as many references in other works of this period show. At the end of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* Weber turns aside from his main theme to contrast the free spirit of the early capitalists with the 'iron cage' of modern industrial life, in which material goods have 'achieved an inexorable power over the lives of men'.⁵⁵ In his studies on 'Agriculture in the Ancient World' (somewhat misleadingly titled), the total bureaucratisation of life which was a central feature of ancient Egypt and the late Roman Empire is used as an explicit paradigm for the unfreedom progressively developing in the modern world, 'only on a technically more perfect basis'. Such unfreedom would be at its extreme in a society in which all independent sources of economic activity were removed through the expropriation of private capitalism by the state.⁵⁶ This is also the theme of Weber's speech to the Verein meeting in 1909, in which he depicts a time not far distant when every worker would be simply a small cog in the vast bureaucratic machinery, his only interest being how to become a bigger cog. 'The central question', said Weber, 'is what we can *oppose* to this machinery, so as to keep a portion of humanity free from this parcelling out of the soul'.⁵⁷ This concern with the diminution of freedom in face of the rationalisation of life was thus a constant preoccupation in this period, and the conclusions he drew were largely pessimistic.

We need to be clear, however, about precisely what Weber meant by 'freedom'. At least three different concepts can be distinguished in his writings. First, there is economic individual-

ism: the possession of an independent sphere of activity, guaranteed by private property, over which the individual is master.⁵⁸ Secondly, there are civil and political freedoms: guaranteed rights for the individual and the constitutional rule of law.⁵⁹ Thirdly, there is a more internal concept of personal autonomy or responsibility, the capacity not to 'let life run on as a natural event' but to treat it 'as a series of ultimate decisions in which the soul . . . chooses the meaning of its own existence'.⁶⁰ Of the three, it was particularly the first that Weber saw as being progressively eliminated in modern society, with the expropriation of the small producer. Of course he exaggerated even this; he himself was well aware of the scope which still remained within industry, and even more within agriculture, for individualism of the old kind. It was one of his frequent assertions that the desire for economic independence on the part of the German peasant and small farmer made him unavailable for socialism, and that most socialists failed to perceive the difference in mentality between the urban and the rural worker.⁶¹ Equally there remained a scope for entrepreneurial skills and the exercise of individual responsibility in even the largest economic concerns. Nevertheless the trend against economic individualism was clearly established, and its analysis is a characteristic Weberian theme.

The diminution of one kind of freedom, however, did not necessarily rule out all others as well. Though historically connected with economic individualism, other kinds of freedom might still survive, if with difficulty, under the progressive rationalisation of the outward circumstances of life. In respect to Weber's concept of personal autonomy, Karl Löwith has shown how Weber believed it possible to preserve individual freedom and responsibility, 'amid and in spite of the inescapably compartmentalised humanity' of modern life, by insisting on a tension 'between man and specialized man'—the difference between the routine performance of a role, and the capacity to affirm oneself in it while also recognising its limitations.⁶² How far, though, Weber believed such a consciousness to be available to the average official in a bureaucratic organisation, is open to question. In his 'Rundschreiben' on social policy he argued that their conditions of work threatened their 'personal development' even more than those of the manual worker, and created a stratum of men 'altogether lacking in spiritual independence'.⁶³

As to the political freedoms, which concern us more here, Weber believed that to establish them initially without the support of a strongly individualist society, as the Russian example

showed, was more difficult than to sustain them once firmly established. Political freedoms were still possible in modern society, and Weber was clear about what was necessary to sustain them: strong Parliamentary institutions and the existence of competing sources of power within society, particularly as between bureaucracies of the state and private industry.⁶⁴ While the process of bureaucratisation itself, in politics as in industry, spelt an end to individualism, to maintain a tension between a number of bureaucracies was a necessary condition for civil and political freedom. Although, as we shall see, Weber provides evidence to question whether this condition was in fact a sufficient one, it is mistaken to interpret him as saying that, because individualism was in decline, all forms of freedom must vanish with it. The situation, as he himself analysed it, was more complex than this.

In his writings on the Russian revolution Weber demonstrated a similar capacity to that shown in his writing on East Prussian agriculture, of bringing out the general significance of a particular phenomenon by setting it in a wider context and showing its relationship to a clearly articulated set of values. Weber penetrated beneath the conditions of agricultural labourers in East Prussia to reveal a political crisis facing the nation, and beneath the Russian revolution to demonstrate the dilemma of liberalism in modern society. In this sense he was always a strongly theoretical writer, even when dealing with apparently localised phenomena. What is important to emphasise here, however, is that, while showing a similar theoretical depth, the works from the two different periods embody different values and concerns. In the earlier period it was an exclusively German problem that concerned Weber and it was viewed from a strongly nationalist perspective. In the later period it was the more universal problem of freedom in a rationalised society. This is not to say that the question of freedom did not appear in Weber's earlier writings. It is a matter of emphasis. The writings on Russia are typical of a widened perspective, and of a range of concerns that is easy to underestimate, if one seeks to give an account of Weber's political values from a narrow concentration on his German writings alone. It is to these latter, however, that we shall turn for the last example discussed in this chapter.

BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME GERMANY

Weber's wartime writings mark a return to the mood of the 1890s

and the Inaugural Address. They contain a similar vigorous affirmation of national values, and express a similar sense of urgency at the absence of political leadership and the resulting damage to the nation in the arena of international conflict. However, the problem is now analysed differently, with much greater emphasis on the obstacles to leadership presented by defective political institutions. This emphasis on institutions in fact dates back to 1907, when Weber insisted in correspondence with Friedrich Naumann that it was not persons but institutions that were responsible for the erratic course of German policy.⁶⁵ Yet the theme was only fully developed in his wartime writings. In these he showed his attitude to political institutions to be a purely instrumental one; forms of constitution held no intrinsic value in themselves, but were to be judged solely for their effectiveness in serving ends external to them.⁶⁶ Indeed, Weber expressed some regret at having to spend time discussing 'technical' questions of constitutional reform, instead of the great cultural issues confronting the nation.⁶⁷ But the history of the previous forty years had shown that the main obstacle to the effective promotion of Germany's national and cultural goals had been her defective system of government: The analysis of political institutions therefore took on an urgency and significance it did not normally merit. Once having committed himself to their analysis, Weber did so with his usual thoroughness and with a typically theoretical emphasis. The writings of this period develop what amounts to a theory of political institutions, in particular of their effect on the character of political activity and leadership. The most substantial of these writings is the series of articles Weber wrote for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1917, later reworked and published as a single pamphlet in 1918, under the title 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany'.⁶⁸ Its main themes will be briefly summarised here.

The main theme of this work is that modern government is inevitably government by means of a bureaucracy; administration is in the hands of an expert, salaried, career officialdom. But without the *political* leadership capable of controlling this administration, all political decision making falls into their hands; it becomes government *by*, and not merely *through*, bureaucracy. This had happened to Germany. Although Germany was in theory a monarchical system, in practice the monarch was merely a dilettante in face of the expertise of modern officialdom, and could not be otherwise. A properly political leadership could only exist where there were the appropriate institutions, most important of

which was a strong Parliament. Through lack of such institutions Germany suffered from government by bureaucracy, with pernicious results particularly for her international position and for the vigour and consistency of her foreign policy.

As in the Inaugural Address, the source of the trouble was traced back to Bismarck.⁶⁹ But now it was not merely that the dominating influence of the great man had encouraged habits of subservience. The political structure he left behind perpetuated this lack of political leadership. The crux of the problem was the weak constitutional position of Parliament.⁷⁰ Under the German Constitution the government was neither chosen from the Reichstag nor responsible to it. There was the additional disability that if a party leader was appointed to a ministry, he had to surrender his seat in the Reichstag, and so cut himself off from his political power base in the support of the electorate. When there was added to this a general preference for appointing civil servants to ministerial positions, the result was a government of bureaucratic complexion through and through, lacking in political responsibility and political will. This created its own vicious circle: because Parliament had no real power, it did not attract men of calibre or capacity for leadership; those who wanted a field in which to exercise responsibility went elsewhere, for example into business. 'Our so-called monarchical government', wrote Weber, 'when divested of all its fine phrases, means nothing else than a kind of *negative selection*, which diverts all major talents for leadership into the service of capitalist industry.'⁷¹

Essential to understanding Weber's critique of the German system of government is the distinction he drew between the roles of civil servant and politician, and the different character of their activities and the different qualities required of each.⁷² Where the civil servant was typically responsible to a superior, and operated within an ordered hierarchy of command and obedience, the politician or political leader had to take responsibility on himself, and operated within a system of voluntary recruitment of support in conflict with other groups and other points of view. 'The struggle for personal power and the individual responsibility which flows from this power—this is the life-blood of the politician.'⁷³ The two roles required, and encouraged, quite different qualities. In particular the task of an administrator working to set rules within an ordered hierarchy offered little opportunity for the development of the qualities necessary for political leadership and responsibility, which could only be developed in the political arena of open struggle against opponents. Hence the incapacity

for political leadership repeatedly demonstrated by Germany's bureaucratic leaders, which was responsible for, among other things, the catastrophic course of Germany's prewar foreign policy.⁷⁴ 'We should have had politicians in control', wrote Weber, 'who would have had to take responsibility before Parliament for their foreign policy, not bureaucrats, who repudiated in private what they declared in public',⁷⁵

The solution required more than merely political education, which is what Weber had advocated in the 1890s; it needed a reform of the whole system of government, so as to encourage the development of leaders capable of exercising political responsibility and of restricting the administrators to their proper role. Such a reform meant in the first instance strengthening the position of Parliament, so that the government became recruited from, and directly answerable to, Parliament.⁷⁶ Weber recognised that under conditions of universal suffrage, the position of Prime Minister increasingly resembled that of a President; democracy was evolving in a plebiscitary direction, with the relationship between leader and mass becoming all-important. However, a strong Parliament was necessary as a recruiting ground for such leaders, and to train them in the political skills necessary for office. Only such a reform could render Germany politically capable of pursuing her national aims effectively and conducting an appropriate role in world affairs.

The concluding paragraphs of the work are worth summarising more fully. It was idle to imagine, argued Weber, that changing some clauses of the constitution would suddenly produce political leaders overnight. But it was a prerequisite for this, in removing major obstacles to such leadership. 'A nation which could only produce competent administrators . . . and allowed itself to become subordinate to the uncontrolled rule of officials would be no "Herrenvolk" and would do much better to get on with its everyday affairs than foster pretensions to concerning itself with the fate of the world'.⁷⁷ Without internal reform, the war, which was in part a contest to secure Germany's right to have a say in the future of the world along with others, would be rendered senseless. Without it, all Germany would be good for in future was a purely defensive policy, never for 'tasks of world stature'.⁷⁸

The topics covered in 'Parliament and Government' are too many to do justice to in so short a summary. However, enough should have been said to show the continuity between Weber's wartime writings and the early period of the Inaugural Address, as well as the different emphasis in the later work on the reform of

Parliamentary institutions. This later concentration on the institutional basis for the political leader has led some to see a major development in Weber's political theory, away from the earlier concentration on class to an emphasis on individual leadership. Although, as will be discussed below,⁷⁹ there are problems about the relationship between class and political leadership in Weber's work, this way of presenting it is an oversimplification. To the end Weber insisted on analysing contemporary politics in class terms. Institutions and individual leaders alike depended upon a social basis of support, which under modern conditions meant class support. Thus a central feature of his analysis of German politics remained the control exercised by the Junkers over the institutions of government, in association with large-scale capitalism.⁸⁰ Whatever the historical origins of the weak Parliamentary system it persisted because it served the interests of major social groups. Any strategy for change could therefore not simply be institutional, but was a question of how to detach the 'broad strata of the bourgeoisie'⁸¹ from their acquiescence in the existing structure. Equally, the viability of a different system depended upon the character of their support for it. How central this was in Weber's thinking can be judged from the following typical passage, written in November 1918 in an article in which Weber reviewed a variety of possible constitutional schemes for the future German state:

Unfortunately, constitutional questions are not unimportant, but naturally they are not the most important thing for politics. Far more decisive for the future of Germany is the question: whether the bourgeoisie as a whole will develop a new readiness for political responsibility and a more self-conscious *political spirit*.⁸²

The difference of emphasis thus lies within an underlying continuity. But what of the theme of freedom, which had been so central to the prewar writings? This had become submerged, though not entirely so. In 'Parliament and Government' Weber also justifies a strong Parliament as a guarantor of individual rights and liberties.⁸³ And the work contains a number of passages reminiscent of prewar themes, for example where he describes bureaucracy as a living machine 'fabricating the cage of bondage which men may one day be forced to inhabit, as powerless as the fellahin of ancient Egypt'.⁸⁴ Although this problem was less immediately pressing than the reform of institutions to encourage political leadership, it still remained at the back of Weber's mind, as is shown explicitly in a series of questions he asks at a central

point in the work.⁸⁵ The onward march of bureaucratisation, he writes, poses a number of questions for political organisation. First of these is, 'How is it . . . possible at all, to preserve *any* element of "individualism" and freedom in face of this powerful onset of bureaucracy?' However, he goes on, this question won't concern us on this occasion, but rather two others: what forces exist capable of exercising some effective control over the bureaucratic machine? and what are the inner limitations of this machine, what is it *not* capable of achieving? Although under the pressures of war the problem of freedom had thus become displaced by more urgent questions, it nevertheless remained firmly on the agenda of inquiry, representing a quite different order of values and concerns.

Thus, though 'Parliament and Government' may appear simply as a return to the concerns of the 1890s, it also contains evidence for a duality of values in Weber's political standpoint, which is one of the themes of this chapter. This duality has led to very different interpretations of Weber, according to which aspect is emphasised. On the one hand there is Weber as presented, for example, by Wolfgang Mommsen's book—the vigorous exponent of German nationalism, eager for the rise of a political leadership capable of extending her power, and ready to subordinate institutional arrangements and even all other values to this end. At its most extreme, this view traces a direct line of descent from Weber to national socialism.⁸⁶ On the other hand there is the view put forward by, among others, Christoph Steding, of Weber as the pessimistic liberal, as an exponent of individualism in an increasingly hostile environment, only too conscious of himself as an 'Epigone', a survivor from a previous era, swimming against the current of his times.⁸⁷ Put at its extreme, as in Steding's later work,⁸⁸ this view sees Weber as a typical representative of the decadent civilisation that national socialism set out to replace.

There is truth in both these views, though Steding ignores the subtlety of Weber's liberalism. More often, in fact, the interpretation of Weber as a liberal is offered as a mark of approval by those who seek to defend him against what they regard as the excesses of Mommsen's approach.⁸⁹ Yet on their own these remain only partial accounts, as the material presented in this chapter should make evident. Any account which is to do justice to the complexity of Weber's political standpoint must recognise alike his commitment to German cultural values, his emphasis on leadership in society and his concern for liberty in an increasingly bureaucratized age. These values stood in some tension to one

another. Such tension, however, was not unique to Weber, nor to the context of German politics, but was a characteristic feature of a bourgeois political standpoint in the circumstances of capitalist development of his time. This brings us to a central theme of this work: that it is not simply as a propagandist and commentator on German politics, with its unique configuration of problems, that Weber should be understood, but also as having a wider significance as a theorist of bourgeois politics. The final section of the chapter will consider what this means.

WEBER AS A THEORIST OF BOURGEOIS POLITICS

To call Weber in the context of his political writings a bourgeois theorist, a theorist of bourgeois politics, is both to characterise a political position, and to define a problem. Weber was, as he himself frequently asserted, a 'self-conscious' or 'class-conscious' bourgeois.⁹⁰ 'I am a member of the bourgeois classes', he said in the Inaugural Address: 'I feel myself as such, and have been brought up in their opinions and ideals'.⁹¹ The values already considered—national, liberal, elitist—were, in the character of their emphasis, bourgeois values, and form an obvious contrast to the collectivist, egalitarian ideals of socialism to which Weber remained opposed throughout his life. At the same time, however, his standpoint did not involve any simple acceptance of capitalism in all its features, much less an identification with the attitudes of the bourgeoisie at any given moment. The problem, therefore, is to clarify what is to be understood by the term 'bourgeois', and what its relationship is to capitalism, particularly to the form of capitalism that was developing in Weber's own time.

The appropriate place to start in considering what is meant by the concept 'bourgeois' is with Weber's own definition. This is to be found most clearly in his writings of the period 1904–6. His works on *The Protestant Ethic* and the Russian revolution respectively defined two different elements in the bourgeois outlook. First of these was the distinctive attitude to work characteristic of the 'spirit of capitalism', and the variety of qualities associated with successful business activity: on the one hand devotion to work as a 'calling', as an end in itself, and an ascetic outlook which imposed its own limitation on material consumption; on the other hand the possession of qualities such as reliability, shrewdness, readiness to take calculated risks, qualities developed in the 'hard school of life' and the struggle of the market.⁹² The second

2 set of features which could be defined as distinctively 'bourgeois' were those associated with the concept of individualism: the ideal of an independent sphere of activity for each individual as a means to distinctive personal development, and its expression in the political sphere in the demand for individual civil and political rights. In Russia this ideal stood in opposition both to traditional patriarchalism and also to the communism of the peasantry whose commitment to the 'ethical equalisation of opportunities', Weber wrote, 'could only hamper the development in that country of an individualistic culture of a Western European kind'.⁹³

Both sets of 'bourgeois' values were strongly affirmed by Weber himself. On the one hand the ascetic attitude to work and the associated qualities described in *The Protestant Ethic* defined his own personal ideal, in contrast to the easy-going approach to life of the 'natural' man.⁹⁴ His affirmation of struggle in the hard school of life and his opposition to materialist values, described earlier in the chapter, typified this outlook. Alongside this went a preoccupation with securing 'freedom of movement' for the individual. Whatever his sympathies with the working class, his wife wrote, he could never become a member of a socialist party, because 'in the substance of his being he remained an individualist'.⁹⁵ In both respects Weber's political standpoint was an embodiment of bourgeois values, as he himself defined them.

Both sets of qualities were historically linked to the ownership of private property and the conditions characteristic of early capitalism. But how far could they be preserved under the circumstances of a more developed stage of capitalism? Weber himself argued that, as a result of the operation of these very qualities, capitalism had come to take a form which put their continuance in question. Capitalism was the 'pacemaker' for the process of bureaucratisation in both industry and state which threatened to stifle all individualism.⁹⁶ It also encouraged the pursuit of material goods as a major end of human life, rather than as a by-product of 'hard work in one's calling'.⁹⁷ Both these developments Weber described, somewhat dramatically, as the 'iron cage' of modern life.⁹⁸ At the same time the growth of class conflict had destroyed for ever the 'belief in the natural harmony of free individuals',⁹⁹ while the internationalisation of economic activity was intensifying national conflicts and making more necessary the assertion of a national cultural identity.¹⁰⁰ None of these developments were consonant with the distinctive 'bourgeois' values, as defined above. Indeed the dilemma, to which Weber's writing gave typical expression, was that the system of

private property was becoming divorced from the values which provided its main justification.

This is not to say that Weber believed these values to belong entirely to a past age. He wished to appeal to them as a still valid justification for capitalism as an economic system against two different forms of threat, both apparent in German society. One of these was the threat to capitalism from within: that the bourgeoisie would go 'soft'; that its members would seek a respite from the hard calling of the entrepreneur in the quiet comfort of a rentier existence, or alternatively in the easy profits to be made from a state-oriented form of capitalism.¹⁰¹ In this context the bourgeois ethic provided a standard from which the German bourgeoisie could be shown to be in danger of deviating.¹⁰² The other threat came from socialism, which sought to replace the dynamic process of market competition by a system of bureaucratic 'order', and the distinctive qualities of the entrepreneur by state officials whose ambition, in many cases, was confined to securing a progressive income appropriate to their status, lasting if possible to the grave.¹⁰³ Such an 'order' would also remove the tension between the bureaucracies of capitalism and the state, on which political freedom, even for the masses, depended. Thus Weber could write, in the first of his Russian articles, that whatever measure of personal freedom was not won for the masses in the course of the next generations, while the 'much abused "anarchy" of production' remained, might well be lost to them for good.¹⁰⁴

The characteristic 'bourgeois' values, therefore, as Weber himself defined them, were not simply a feature of the past, but also served as a justification, and set a standard, for capitalist activity in the present. At the same time, however, the developments generated in society by a more advanced stage of capitalism, mentioned above, called for a political standpoint which went beyond these values. The bureaucratisation of social and political structures led Weber to give a major emphasis to the role of the individual leader who stood at the head of such organisations. The intensification of international competition and conflict led to a strenuous assertion of national cultural values, as well as a commitment to an expansive capitalism as a necessary means to provide for mass needs and the population problem. In these positions elements of the other values can readily be discerned. Thus Weber's nationalism embodied an appeal to his society to accept the challenge and responsibility of world tasks, as a historical "calling", in contrast to the "peace and quiet" of smaller nations.

On the other side, his conception of leadership was defined primarily in individualistic terms. In a sense, these are the familiar bourgeois values writ large. The process of enlargement, however, produced its characteristic tensions; the expression of individual personality on the part of a leader, for example, involved a corresponding suppression of individuality on the part of his following, and the dominance of a great figure threatened the independence of society at large. The values of nation, leadership and freedom thus rested uneasily together. This tension was not unique to Weber alone, but represents a point at which bourgeois political values were themselves undergoing change, in response to the changes capitalism was producing in the character of modern society.

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that to describe Weber's political theory as 'bourgeois' is not to offer a situational critique, in which conclusions drawn from his social position are then imposed *ab extra* on the character of his thought. It is rather to accept his own characterisation of his political values, and to show how these provided the focus for the empirical analysis of his political writings. Among other features of this analysis, Weber gave a major emphasis to the phenomenon of class. Class conflict, he told the Protestant Social Congress amid protests, was 'an integral part of the present social order'; it was time the church recognised this, and in recognising it, thereby *legalised* it.¹⁰⁵ Here also Weber was truly 'class-conscious'. This was so, not only in his recognition of the particular dilemma confronting the German bourgeoisie as a result of Germany's retarded development—caught between the Junker class clinging to political power above them and the working class demanding it from below. It was also in part the prevalence of class and economic interests in modern society that led Weber to insist so strongly on a political dimension which went beyond them. Thus in the Inaugural Address, he insisted on the goal of social unity for the nation, because modern economic development had 'burst it asunder', and on the necessity for the political education of society, because modern economic development threatened to 'destroy men's natural political instincts'.¹⁰⁶ Weber at once both recognised the significance of class and economic interests, and sought to emphasise a political dimension which would transcend them.

This interaction between the economic and the political is an important feature in Weber's perception of his contemporary society, as expressed in his political writings. It is also reflected in the structure of this book. Chapters 3 to 5 will concern them-

selves with the more exclusively political aspects of Weber's account of modern politics: his account and critique of bureaucracy; his account of democracy and mass politics; his conception of the nation and nation state. These are considered largely in abstraction from his theory of society. Chapters 6 and 7 will then discuss the relationship between class and political structure in his accounts of Germany and Russia respectively. This will in turn be completed in Chapter 8 by considering the account of political leadership in his later writings, as seen in the context of his theory of society. The individual chapters are thus not intended to be read in isolation, but as parts of an interrelated whole.

As already mentioned, these different features of Weber's empirical analysis will be treated within the framework of values discussed in this chapter. By characterising these values as 'bourgeois', it is not intended to reduce everything Weber wrote to a crude bourgeois perspective, but rather to identify the most general assumptions within which the analysis contained in his political writings was set. The rest of the book will look systematically at his analysis of the nature and problems of modern politics, as seen from this standpoint.

REFERENCES

- 1 GPS, 1st edn, p 474.
- 2 GPS, pp 1-25.
- 3 The account here is drawn mainly from the Inaugural Address, but is also supplemented from two other writings, especially *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, vol 55, pp 774-804, and GASW, pp 444-507.
- 4 GPS, pp 7-8; SVS, pp 774-5; GASW, pp 474-6.
- 5 SVS, pp 777-81; GASW, pp 449-50, 499-500.
- 6 *Mitteilungen des Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, pp 1-5.
- 7 As also in his verbal report to the Verein meeting, GASW, pp 451-6.
- 8 GPS, pp 8-9; cf GASW, p 452.
- 9 GPS, pp 11-15.
- 10 GPS, p 10; cf GASW, pp 456-67, 505-7.
- 11 GPS, p 14.
- 12 GPS, pp 18-25.
- 13 GPS, p 19.
- 14 GPS, pp 21-2.
- 15 GPS, p 19.
- 16 GPS, p 24.
- 17 This point is discussed in Arnold Bergstraesser, 'Max Weber's Antrittsvorlesung in zeitgeschichtlicher Perspektive', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, vol 5 (1957), pp 209-19, especially p 213.
- 18 GPS, p 16.
- 19 GASS, p 416.
- 20 GPS, p 152.

- 21 GPS, p 12.
 22 GPS, pp 21, 23.
 23 GPS, p 18.
 24 GPS, p 28.
 25 See pages 50–53.
 26 GPS, p 12.
 27 GAW, p 503; MSS, pp 26–7.
 28 'It thus appears to be a *process of selection* that we see taking place; ... that [sc. national group] is victorious, which possesses the greater adaptability to the existing economic and social conditions.' GPS, p 8.
 29 GASS, p 1.
 30 GASS, pp 443–4, 447–8.
 31 See Chapter 4.
 32 GPS, p 12.
 33 *Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses* (1894), pp 80–1. In a speech to the Congress three years later Weber even used the phrase 'the gospel of struggle' ('das Evangelium des Kampfes'). *Verhandlungen* (1897), p 113.
 34 GAW, p 152; MSS, p 55.
 35 See page 168.
 36 WG, pp 10–11.
 37 R Aron in O Stammer, ed, op cit (English edition), pp 92–3.
 38 GPS, p 9. In a note on the same page Weber questions the value of applying the Darwinist theory of selection to the sphere of economics, particularly when used in support of an ideological position: 'the mistake of most of the attempts made from the side of the natural sciences to illuminate the questions of our discipline lies in their misguided ambition to "refute" socialism at all costs'.
 39 GPS, pp 12–13.
 40 *Verhandlungen* (1894), p 80.
 41 GPS, p 532; GM, p 115.
 42 *Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses* (1894), p 80.
 43 *Lebensbild*, p 342.
 44 *Archiv*, vol 22 (1906), Beiheft, pp 234–353; vol 23 (1906), Beiheft, pp 165–401, hereafter cited as *Archiv*, 22B and 23B.
 45 The problem is posed most explicitly at *Archiv*, 22B, pp 280–1, 346–9; 23B, p 398; GPS, pp 39–40, 59–62, 107.
 46 *Archiv*, 22B, pp 273–80; 23B, pp 199–200.
 47 *Archiv*, 22B, pp 317–8, 321–2, 332–6; GPS, pp 45–51.
 48 *Archiv*, 23B, pp 311–4; GPS, pp 90–1.
 49 *Archiv*, 22B, pp 292–3, 347–9; 23B, pp 231–2, 372–3, 398; GPS, pp 40–1, 60–2, 79, 107.
 50 *Archiv*, 22B, pp 284, 291–2, 349; GPS, pp 40, 62.
 51 *Archiv*, 22B, pp 348–9; GPS, 61–2.
 52 *ibid.*
 53 *Archiv*, 23B, p 398; GPS, p 107.
 54 *Archiv*, 22B, *ibid.*
 55 GARS, vol 1, pp 203–4; PE, p 181.
 56 GASW, pp 277–8.
 57 GASS, p 414.
 58 It was individualism in this sense that the Russian peasants would reject, in Weber's view. GPS, pp 45, 51.

- 59 These formed the main political demands of the liberal movement in Russia, GPS, p 40.
 60 GAW, pp 493–4; MSS, p 18.
 61 *Mitteilungen des Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, 6 (1892), p 2; GASS, p 516.
 62 Löwith, op cit, pp 96–9; Wrong, ed, op cit, pp 119–22.
 63 'Rundschrieben', p 3. This could happen, even though they formed a socially and economically *privileged* stratum.
 64 GPS, pp 242, 320, 383; GASS, p 504.
 65 GPS, 1st edn, pp 457–8; Baumgarten, op cit, p 488.
 66 'Forms of constitution are for me technical questions, like any other machinery.' GPS, 1st edn, p 470; cf GPS, pp 296–7.
 67 GPS, p 298.
 68 GPS, pp 294–431.
 69 GPS, pp 299–308.
 70 GPS, pp 327–31, 339–53.
 71 GPS, p 334.
 72 GPS, pp 322–3, 335, 339–42, 365, 411–2.
 73 'As also of the entrepreneur.' GPS, p 323.
 74 GPS, pp 357–70.
 75 GPS, p 365.
 76 GPS, pp 327–31, 339–42, 366–70, 426–31.
 77 GPS, p 430. By 'Herrenvolk' Weber means a people who have the capacity to play a role in world politics, a minimum qualification for which is the capacity for *internal* self-government.
 78 GPS, p 431.
 79 This point is discussed further in Chapter 8.
 80 See Chapter 6.
 81 The phrase is quoted in W J Mommsen, op cit, p 109.
 82 GPS, pp 441–2.
 83 GPS, p 383.
 84 GPS, p 320.
 85 GPS, pp 321–2.
 86 W J Mommsen, op cit, ch. 10, especially p 410.
 87 C Steding, op cit, ch. 1.
 88 C Steding, *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur* (Hamburg, 1938).
 89 e.g. P Honigsheim, 'Max Weber und die deutsche Politik', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 13 (1961), pp 263–74; E Nolte, 'Max Weber vor dem Faschismus,' *Der Staat*, 2 (1963), pp 1–24.
 90 e.g. *Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses* (1894), p 77; *Christliche Welt*, vol 8 (1894), col 477; letter to R Michels (6.11.07), quoted in W J Mommsen, op cit, p 123.
 91 GPS, p 20.
 92 GARS, vol 1, pp 30–62; PE, pp 47–78, *passim*.
 93 GPS, p 51.
 94 This was one ground for Weber's hostility to his father's way of life. See A Mitzman, op cit, pp 47–50.
 95 *Lebensbild*, p 642.
 96 GASW, pp 277–8; WG, pp 129, 562.
 97 GARS, vol 1, pp 203–4; PE, p 181.
 98 *ibid.*; cf GPS, p 242.

62 MAX WEBER AND THE THEORY OF MODERN POLITICS

- 99 GPS, p 40.
100 GPS, pp 13-14.
101 See page 159.
102 This is particularly clearly expressed in an article Weber wrote at the same time as *The Protestant Ethic*: 'Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur Fideikommissfrage in Preussen', GASS, pp 323-93.
103 See page 81.
104 GPS, p 62.
105 *Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses* (1894), p 73.
106 GPS, pp 23-4.