

# **International relations and comparative politics**

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## Research problems

Across the preceding chapters in Part II of this volume, we have seen instances in which comparative research has addressed how political processes and events at the domestic level have significant implications for politics at the international level, and we have seen many studies include significant variables drawn from attention to the state behaviour, state interaction, and other factors at the international level that have an impact on domestic political developments. Studies on economic development and democracy often take into account the mediating effects of the structural division of labour in the world economy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Foweraker and Landman 2004; Li and Reuveny 2003) and the impact of constellations of power in the international sphere on socio-political developments at the domestic level (Rueschemeyer *et al.* 1992). Studies of violent political protest and social revolutions pay attention to external factors that may weaken states and contribute to their collapse (Skocpol 1979; Wickham-Crowley 1993), while policy makers worry about the potential for civil strife to move beyond borders and threaten international stability. New research on social movements and non-violent social protest has turned its attention to the transnational nature of mobilization, for example, against the forces of globalization, for the promotion and protection of human rights, and in a response to international events (e.g. Risse *et al.* 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Bob 2005; Tarrow 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).


The studies on democratic transitions initially focused on domestic actors for political transformation but increasingly examined the importance of transnational processes of ‘contagion’ (Huntington 1991; Whitehead 2002) and diffusion (Gleditsch 2002). Increasingly, international donor organizations and OECD countries are taking into account the institutional arrangements and quality of governance of recipient states in their decision to allocate development assistance, which is based on new comparative research linking good governance to economic performance (see World Bank 2002; Knack 2003; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Finally, it is clear that human rights form an important nexus between the international sphere and the domestic sphere since the promotion and protection of human rights relies heavily on the mechanisms (however weak) of inter-state treaties and international law to govern the relationship between states and citizens (Landman 2005a, 2005b).

Traditionally, theories and research in international relations focused on some domestic variables as important determinants of international state behaviour while discounting or completely ignoring other variables. For example, the realist perspective takes into account ‘material’ variables, such as economic power, military capability, size of the population, and geographical location (e.g. distance and contiguity) (see Morgenthau 1961; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 2001), while ignoring regime type, institutions, values, norms, and dimensions of ‘soft’ power (Wendt 1999; Nye 2004) as either largely inconsequential or as having no independent effect on state behaviour in the international sphere (Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 2001). The liberal (and liberal republican) perspective in international relations has argued that domestic institutional arrangements do matter for explaining international behaviour (see e.g. Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1997, 2000), while the neo-liberal institutionalist

perspective argues that international law, institutions, and regimes can have additional ‘constraining’ effects on states at the domestic level (Keohane 1984, 2001, 2002; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). While studies in comparative politics have paid more attention to domestic variables, there has been a much greater tendency within the sub-field to incorporate international variables in the kinds of ways that have been evident across the previous chapters in this part of the book.

The stylized way of representing the main research questions motivated by the overlap between international relations and comparative politics is illustrated in Figure 12.1. It is clear from the figure that many research questions and associated research designs are concerned with examining the relative significance and impact of key domestic variables on state behaviour in the international sphere. But they are also concerned with addressing the different ways in which international variables have an impact on domestic politics. Methodologically, empirical studies in international relations often use similar comparative research designs to analyse substantive research topics, including the comparison of many countries, the comparison of few countries, and single-country studies. Where the methods in international relations differ is the use of comparing ‘dyads’ of politically relevant states across time, but even then, many of the variables that differentiate one state from another in the dyad are domestically based, such as the level of democracy, development, and other features of the kind examined in the previous chapters.

With this brief introductory background in mind, this chapter continues to use the architecture of the preceding chapters to examine studies that compare many countries (including dyads), few countries and single countries across a range of substantive topics to illustrate the ways in which international factors have an impact on domestic politics and how domestic characteristics of states have an impact on their behaviour in the international arena. The first section looks at two main studies: Li and Reuveny’s (2003) many-country comparison on the impact of globalization has on democracy and Russett and O’Neal’s (2001) study on the ‘democratic’ peace and the Kantian ‘tripod’. The latter study compares dyads of states over time to test general propositions drawn from Kant’s (1795) prescient argument in *Perpetual Peace* on the pacific benefits of increased economic interdependence, participation in international organizations and institutions, and so-called ‘civic republican’ systems of governance. The second section considers Bob’s (2005) market-based analysis of the success and failure of domestic insurgent groups in Nigeria and



**Figure 12.1** Linking international relations and comparative politics

Mexico for attracting international financial and moral support, and Moravcsik's (2000) comparison of the impact of nascent democratic institutions on the establishment of the European human rights regime in the aftermath of World War II. The final section uses the case of Chile to demonstrate how actors from the international human rights community created the opportunity for an internal dynamic that liberalized Pinochet's Chile (Hawkins 2004 and Chapter 5 this volume) and how the developments surrounding Pinochet's legal status as a former of Head of State provided firm support for the notion of 'universal jurisdiction', which is a bedrock legal doctrine for the International Criminal Court in the Hague established in 2002 (Kornbluh 2003; Hawkins 2002; Sands 2005).

### **Comparing many countries**

This section starts by considering a study that compares many countries in order to examine the impact of key economic and cultural features of globalization on democracy. Drawing on the research design and findings in the field on economic development and democracy covered in Chapter 6, Li and Reuveny (2003) compare 127 countries between 1970 and 1996 across a range of domestic and international variables. Their analysis tests a variety of claims about the relationship between globalization and democracy, where they summarize seven main arguments for a positive relationship (Li and Reuveny 2003: 32–35), seven arguments for a negative relationship (*ibid.*: 35–38), and three main arguments on an ambiguous relationship (*ibid.*: 38–39). The dependent variable is democracy and the four globalization variables are trade openness, foreign direct investment flows, portfolio investment flows, and the spread of democratic ideas across countries. Democracy is measured using the Polity III combined score for democracy (see Jagers and Gurr 1995; and Chapter 9 this volume). Trade openness is total imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment is the net inflow of investment as a percentage of GDP, portfolio investment is the net inflow of investment as a percentage of GDP, and like Doorenspleet (2005) the spread of democratic values is measured by counting the number of democracies in the region from which a country comes.

These four globalization variables are proxy measures for the degree to which countries are integrated into the world economy and the flow of ideas with a particular normative commitment to democracy. Higher scores on any one of the measures indicate a greater degree of integration, while lower scores indicate a greater degree of isolation from these larger processes of globalization. In addition to the main variables, they also include GDP per capita, economic growth (i.e. the annual percentage change in GDP), the annual rate of inflation, and lagged values of the dependent variable to control for democratic inertia and possible omitted variables. To control for other features of their data (see Chapter 3 in this volume), they use lagged values of the independent variables, separate estimations of the relationship for different decades comprising their sample (1970s, 1980s, and the 1990s), and the White estimator to control for the possible confounding effects of heteroscedasticity (i.e. non-uniform variance in their disturbance terms) (Li and Reuveny 2003: 39–41).

Cognizant of the fact that the mature industrialized democracies of the world have achieved democratic stability and have a higher degree of integration into the

world economy, their comparisons are carried out for all the countries in their sample and for a sample of countries that excludes the developed countries (*ibid.*: 39). This methodological move is consistent with the discussion in Chapter 6, where different analyses of the general relationship between economic development and democracy compared countries at a particular level of development or for a particular region in the world. Across the different country samples and time periods, their analyses find that trade openness and portfolio investment have a negative relationship with democracy, where the negative effect of portfolio investment increases over time. Foreign direct investment has a positive relationship with democracy that weakens over time, while the spread of democratic values has a persistently positive relationship with democracy over time (*ibid.*: 30, 43–52).

Their main conclusion is that ‘the economic aspects of integration into the world economy are beginning to cause a decline in national democratic governance’ (*ibid.*: 53); a finding that creates a tension between two larger policy goals: greater economic efficiency versus better democratic governance. They argue that governments in lesser developed countries lack the capacity to manage their economies in the face of increased capital mobility and the flippancy of international investors who remain largely unaccountable to the people residing in the countries seeking inward investment. Moreover, the general positive trend in democratization illustrated in Chapter 9 may well become eroded as the nascent democratic institutions within transitional societies become undermined by those factors associated with processes of economic globalization. Overall, this study adds value to the comparative literature on economic development and democracy in recognizing the truly international character of processes of economic development, particularly those that have unfolded during the third and fourth waves of democratization.

Our second study in this section focuses on the relationship between particular domestic and international variables that for a long time did not receive attention from international relations scholars as having a bearing on the probability of conflict between states. This field of research has become known as the ‘democratic peace’ since it focuses on how domestic regime types have an effect on inter-state conflict, specified as either full-blown warfare or as ‘militarized disputes’ (Russett and O’Neal 2001: 94–96). As Chapter 1 already pointed out, ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics’ is the fact that democratic countries rarely, if ever, fight each other (Levy 1988). The logic of the proposition is simple and the research design to test the proposition is fairly straightforward. First, there is a normative argument that political elites within democracies adhere to democratic norms, which in turn lead them to prefer non-violent conflict resolution and negotiation to violent conflict. This general normative orientation is then shared by democracies that develop greater trust for one another and leads any two democracies to forgo violent conflict with one another (Rosato 2003: 586). Second, there are several institutional logics at play involving the inherent element of accountability within democracies that constrains leaders from engaging in warfare or conflict, including public constraints on leaders, interest group constraints, the difficulty in mobilizing the public for war, the inability for surprise attacks, and the relative availability of information within the public domain (Rosato 2003: 586–587).

Both the normative and institutional logics inherent within democracies suggests that they would be less likely to go to war with one another and that the

presence of a democracy in any one dyad of states would lower the probability of inter-state conflict. The methods for testing the proposition and extending it to other liberal variables have evolved over time from the original studies by Babst (1964, 1972) with the development of increasingly complex data sets of all the politically relevant dyads between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century (see, for example, Bremer 1992 and 1993; Dixon 1994; Doyle 1983, 1995, 1996, and 1999; Farber and Gowa 1995; Owen 1994; Russett 1993a, 1993b, and 1995; Russett and O'Neal 1999, and 2001; Small and Singer 1976). Of these various studies, Russett and O'Neal's (2001) study tests both the democratic peace proposition and the larger Kantian 'tripod', which adds examination of the pacifying effects of economic interdependence and participation in international organizations.

Methodologically, Russett and O'Neal (2001) compiled a database of politically relevant dyads from 1886 to 1992. Since the politically relevant dyad is the basic unit of analysis, they have a much larger number of observations (dyad-years  $\approx$  40,000) than is typical for many-country studies of the kind considered in this volume thus far. Their main dependent variable is the militarized dispute, which is an international interaction that includes all instances when one state threatened to use force, made an expression of force, or actually used military force against another state. The dispute variable is dichotomous (the dyad was in conflict or not). In order to present a fair test of the Kantian Peace proposition at the global level, they specify a series of liberal and realist independent variables. The liberal variables include democracy, economic interdependence (trade dependency and trade openness), and international institutions (joint IGO membership). The realist variables include contiguity and distance, power ratio, and alliances.


The fairness of the test comes from the fact that they are testing for the statistical significance of the liberal variables alongside the realist variables. The large number of observations allows for this kind of statistical control to be introduced, where all the liberal variables are significant, even in the presence of the realist variables. The quantitative results show that even after controlling for the realist variables and the pacifying effects of interdependence and joint membership of international organizations, 'two democracies are 33 percent less likely than the average dyad to become involved in a militarised dispute', which they argue is a conservative estimate of the 'pacific benefits of democracy' (Russett and O'Neal 2001: 275). Their various analyses show further that not only are democracies less likely to fight one another, but they are even less likely to become involved in disputes than autocracies (*ibid.*: 276). If the effects of all the liberal variables are taken into account, then the probability of dispute falls by 71 per cent, a finding they argue means that peace in the world is becoming more likely since both the number of democracies and the degree of interdependence is increasing (*ibid.*: 282).

Figure 12.2 is a stylized graphical depiction of how the dyads are examined and how the different combination of countries with different regime types (i.e. democracy or autocracy) affect the probability of conflict between any two states. The first dyad comprises two democratic states, which has a lower probability of conflict. The second dyad comprises one democracy and one autocracy, which also has a lower probability of conflict, particularly if the level of democracy in the democratic state increases over time. The third dyad comprises two autocracies, which has a higher probability of conflict. The analysis then compares multiple dyads

over long periods of time to determine the kind of probabilities that are summarized above. Overall, the analysis provides robust statistical evidence of the pacific benefits of democracy and serves as a particularly good example of a many-country comparative research design that examines the relationship between domestic variables and state behaviour at the international level.

Recent studies have queried the robustness of these types of findings for democracy in several ways. From a regional perspective, democratic peace theory (and its Kantian counterpart) can be seen as ethnocentric since it articulates a prescription for peace based on Western liberal democratic values (see, e.g., Chan 1984). In fact, 90 per cent of purely democratic dyads have been confined to two geographical regions: Western Europe and North America (Rosato 2003), which suggests that the discovery of a statistically significant and substantive impact of the Kantian variables at the global level may well be a reflection of the Western experience with democracy, trade, and international institutions. Thus, the basic research design may suffer from a form of selection bias and spuriousness. Second, democratizing countries or states 'in transition' may actually be more war-prone than mature democracies, since they lack fully developed and 'coherent political institutions needed to manage intensified domestic political competition and to prevent it from provoking international conflicts' (Mansfield and Snyder 2005:21; see also Ward and Gleditsch 1998).

While grounded primarily in questions of theory and methodology, these criticisms have substantive importance that go well beyond the academy, since much of the Cold War foreign policy of the United States has been based on democratic peace theory; policy prescriptions that were raised to high relief with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the debates between the supporters and detractors of democratic peace theory have implications for whether some sort of democratic 'sequencing' is required, which places more emphasis on the development of state institutions than on encouraging founding elections (see Mansfield and Snyder 2005



**Figure 12.2** Different dyads and the probability of conflict

and Carothers 2007). Indeed, as Kopstein (2006) argues there have been different understandings of how democracy comes about that have had profound implications for different foreign policies pursued by the United States and countries in Europe.

### Comparing few countries

The previous section showed how different aspects of globalization can have a different impact on democracy and how democracy both in its normative and institutional understanding might well have an influence on the international behaviour of states. A comparative research design comprising many countries over time has been a typical way to address these two research topics. This section considers another set of comparative studies concerned with relationship between domestic and international variables. In *The Marketing of Rebellion*, Bob (2005) compares the fortunes of four instances of insurgent groups in Nigeria and Mexico to show how some movements are more successful than others in attracting international attention, material resources, and advocacy on their behalf from international NGOs and transnational advocacy networks. Moravcsik's (2000) study compares the new democracies of the second wave (i.e. European democracies of the immediate post-World War II period) in an effort to show how concern over the future prospects of democracy led these countries to establish a supranational regime in the area of human rights, which has developed into the most developed of the regional human rights regimes (see Donnelly 1989, 1998). The first study is an example of how the demand for support from groups mobilized at the domestic level interacts with the supply of support at the international level, while the second study shows how domestic institutional arrangements and concern over the survival of democracy led to the creation of a set of international institutions designed to constrain the behaviour of states.

Bob (2005: 2) begins his study with three simple questions:

- 1 How and why do a handful of local challengers become global *causes célèbres* while scores of others remain isolated and obscure?
- 2 What inspires powerful transnational networks to spring up around particular movements?
- 3 Most basically, which of the world's myriad oppressed benefit from contemporary globalization?

He adopts a most similar systems design (MSSD) of 'unlikely' movements that suddenly vaulted to national and international prominence (ibid.: 10). He focuses on one successful and one unsuccessful movement in Nigeria and Mexico to examine their different strategies to attract international support. In Nigeria, he compares the relatively successful efforts of the Ogoni people in the Niger River Delta to attract significant international support for their cause as against the unsuccessful efforts of other minorities in the region to attract the same kind of attention and support. In Mexico, he compares the success of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in the southern state of Chiapas (see Chapter 7 this volume), which 'galvanized advocacy and solidarity activists worldwide' to the failure to do the same

by the Popular Revolutionary Party (ibid.: 11). His study thus compares two movements in two countries ( $n=4$ ) which he argues share similar international and domestic features. Movements in both countries faced a similar international context in terms of the number of NGOs, institutional setting, dominant ideologies and technical development, while at the domestic level, they faced similar state structures and leaders, social groups and attitudes, and processes of economic development and change (ibid.: 12). In short, he compares different outcomes across similar countries.

To explain these differences in outcome, Bob develops a model based on the simple logic of the market. Domestically based challengers *demand* various forms of international support to raise awareness of their plight and bring about social and political transformations in their own governments to provide redress of their grievances. Internationally based inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations *supply* the much-needed support in material and moral terms, but the supply is necessarily limited (the principle of economic scarcity) and thus the market for such support is necessarily highly competitive. In other words, demand for support is much higher than the supply of the support and movements need to compete against one another in this market, which is characterized by the classic features of power, exchange, and marketing. Drawing on social movement literature, Bob (2005:22–46), argues that the two main sets of variables responsible for successful attraction of international support include: (1) movement strategies for raising awareness and framing their struggle in terms that match the goals, culture and ethics of international supporters; and (2) structural factors of the movements (e.g. status, contacts, material resources, and leadership) and their opponents (e.g. identity and reactions to mobilization).

The qualitative analysis of the four groups shows that in both the cases of the Ogoni people and the Zapatistas, movement strategies were more effective in raising awareness and matching the goals of their supporters than in the cases of other minority groups in the Niger Delta and the Popular Revolutionary Party. Despite some differences between the movement in terms of the use of force, direct lobbying, diffuse international consciousness-raising, and support from advocacy and solidarity groups, both the Ogoni and the Zapatistas shared fundamental features, including their marketing approach, factors driving the approach, and the motivations of the supporters which were ultimately in tune with the grievances of these two groups. His findings challenge the popular view that international advocacy and solidarity networks represent an unlimited supply of material resource and good will for the downtrodden, which when tapped, will spring into action and put pressure on states to implement necessary reforms that address the needs of the movement (Risse *et al.* 1999). Rather, there are oppressed groups everywhere who need to mobilize their resources and market their message in ways that match the main aims and objectives of transnational advocacy networks who are ultimately quite selective in who they support.

Our second study in this section examines how particular sets of domestic variables affect the international behaviour of states. Moravcsik (2000) seeks to explain the creation of the European human rights regime through the passage and enactment of the 1951 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The establishment of such a mechanism with the power of enforcement appears

counter-intuitive from many perspectives in international relations, most notably realism. Moravcsik (2000:219) asks:

Why would any government, democratic or dictatorial, favour establishing an effective, independent international authority, the sole purpose of which is to constrain its domestic sovereignty in such an unprecedentedly invasive and overtly non-majoritarian manner?

Drawing on the insights of Putnam's (1988) 'two-level' game (see Briefing box 12.1) and combining them with variants of democratic peace theory (see above), Moravcsik (1997, 2000) develops a theory of 'liberal republicanism', which makes explicit reference to democratic forms of rule and how such domestic systems will have an influence on a country's propensity for making international agreements. He argues that making international agreements can 'lock in' and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability in the long run against possible threats from non-democratic forces. In echoing realist language, he argues that states will make such agreements when the benefits of reducing future uncertainty outweigh the costs of membership in an international regime (Moravcsik 2000:220). He argues further that this argument only really applies to newly established democracies since they face more immediate uncertainty which regime membership tempers. Thus, like Russett and O'Neal (2001), he argues that domestic political processes and institutions associated with democracy are important for explaining international behaviour, but further specifies the argument to address the processes and institutions for newly established democracies.

To test his main proposition, he compares national preferences for the establishment of the human rights regime in 1950 across seventeen European countries during the post-World War II period, including the 'old' democracies, new democracies, and semi-democracies and dictatorships. These preferences are measured according to the relative willingness of states to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the regime and for all individual petitions to be filed against states for breach of the human rights obligations. A vote for both provisions indicates support for a 'reciprocally binding' regime that establishes supranational authority over the domestic affairs of states (Moravcsik 2000:231). His group of old democracies (i.e. democratic from before 1920) includes Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. His group of new democracies (i.e. those that became established between 1920 and 1950) includes Austria, France, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, and West Germany. His group of semi-democracies and dictatorships (i.e. those countries not fully democratic by 1950) includes Greece, Turkey, Spain and Portugal, even though the latter two were not involved in the negotiations to establish the regime.

He adopts a most similar systems design since he compares different outcomes (i.e. support for the enforcement of the European Convention on Human Rights) across seventeen similar European countries. While his comparison controls for those features common to the countries, his main independent variable is regime type, which varies across his groups of old democracies, new democracies, and semi-democracies and dictatorships. Table 12.1 shows the results of his comparison across these different groups of countries. It is clear from the table that there is a distinct

**Briefing Box 12.1 The two-level game**

International relations scholars have focused on the structure of state interaction and how that may account for outcomes such as war, peace, trade, and security, while comparativists have remained focused on the structure of individual interactions in larger processes of economic development, democratization, and conflict, among many other topics. The exception to this observation has been the work on 'two-level' games (Putnam 1993), which brings the convergent views in international relations and comparative research together. Putnam (1993:459) observes that '[t]he most portentous development in the fields of comparative politics and international relations in recent years is the dawning recognition among practitioners in each field of the need to take into account entanglements between the two'. Any engagement of a state in international relations reflects the domestic array of social and political forces, including key actors and institutions (Putnam 1993: 435). The politics of such a two-level game is summarized as follows:

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and the politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments.

(Ibid.: 436)

While there may be different 'rational' strategies available at either level of the game, Putnam (1993:473) argues that 'there are powerful incentives for consistency between the two games.' What is absent from the formulation of the two-level game is any consideration of the type of government that is in place, although it appears that Putnam implies some form of representative government and most of his empirical examples are of advanced industrial democracies. Indeed, liberal democratic states are simply more open to and reflective of competing claims from domestic groups than authoritarian states. Nevertheless, as the elite-centred work on democratic transitions demonstrates (e.g. see Przeworski 1991; Colomer 2000 and Chapter 10 in this volume), authoritarian regimes are susceptible to competing demands within the authoritarian coalition as well as from groups in civil society, however repressed they may be. It is thus possible to think in broader terms about how the games played at the domestic level (whatever type of government is in place) will be important for state interaction at the international level, thereby giving the notion of the two level game universal applicability (see Czempiel 1992: 257–258).

relationship between the type of regime and support for the enforcement of the ECHR. The second column in the table shows that among the old democracies, only Belgium supported the enforcement provisions, while all others opposed it. This is in stark contrast to the new democracies, where all of them supported the enforcement provisions. The final column shows that like most of their democratic counterparts, the semi-democracies and dictatorships also opposed the enforcement provisions.

**Table 12.1** Support for the European Convention on Human Rights

<i>Support for enforcement of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)</i>	<i>Old democracies (democratic since before 1920)</i>	<i>New democracies (democratic between 1920 and 1950)</i>	<i>Semi-democracies and dictatorships (not yet democratic by 1950)</i>
Yes	Belgium	Austria France Italy Iceland West Germany	
No	Denmark Sweden Netherlands Norway United Kingdom Luxembourg		Greece Turkey (Spain) (Portugal)

Source: Adapted from Moravcsik (2000:233)

These results provide compelling comparative evidence of the propensity for new democracies to desire the establishment of a supranational regime in the area of human rights, and they lend support to Moravcsik’s liberal republican theory. He concludes his analysis by suggesting that his findings may apply to other human rights regimes (e.g. the UN system, the International Criminal Court, the Inter-American System, and the African System) and other issue areas, such as international trade and the environment. Other scholars have suggested that regime membership, particularly for human rights, may well be a function of democracy in general rather than isolated to new democracies (see Zacher 1992:94; and also Vincent 1986), and subsequent analysis of the growth and effectiveness of the international human rights regime shows that fourth wave democracies were more likely to ratify more international human rights instruments with fewer reservations than third wave and old democracies (see Landman 2005b:88–92).

### Single-country studies

The previous two sections have shown how the comparison of many countries and the comparison of few countries can uncover the different ways in which domestic variables and international variables interact. This final section shows how single-country analysis can add to this kind of research agenda by examining the case of Chile under Pinochet. There are many countries that become the centre of the world’s attention for both negative and positive reasons. Indeed, the world has been fixated

on events such as the Soviet crackdowns in Budapest and Prague, the Soweto violence in South Africa, the Chinese crackdown on dissidents in Tiananmen Square, and the plight of detainees in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. But it has been equally fixated on the dramatic turn towards democracy since the Portuguese transition in 1974, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dramatic release of Nelson Mandela and the subsequent transition in South Africa, among many other good news stories of the latter half of the twentieth century.

The case of Chile falls into both categories and its political developments between 1973 and 1998 provide a good illustration of the different ways in which international developments have an impact on domestic developments and how the domestic factors have an impact on international events. The period began in 1973 with a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected president Salvador Allende and ended with the arrest, detention, and return of Augusto Pinochet, the dictator who emerged from within the junta to rule Chile through coercion and repression for nearly eighteen years. Studies on the Chilean case have shown that international factors led to the overthrow of Allende (e.g. Kornbluh 2003), the development of significant opposition to the dictatorship (Hawkins 2002), and the arrest and detention of Pinochet in London (Sands 2005), while domestic factors led to the defeat of Pinochet in a plebiscite (Constable and Valenzuela 1993) and his eventual house arrest for crimes against humanity. Chile thus sits at the nexus of international and domestic concerns over democracy, dictatorship, atrocity, and accountability.

As Chapter 5 outlined, Hawkins' (2002) careful analysis of internal communications, international and domestic mobilization from NGOs, and 'process-tracing' of decision making within the military regime itself shows that fissures developed within the ruling junta that ultimately favoured some form of political liberalization. The democratic transition was prolonged and convoluted throughout the period beginning with the 1980 constitution to the 1988 national plebiscite and 1990 democratic elections. In contrast to some analyses (see Ropp and Sikkink 1999 and Chapter 11), Hawkins (2002) shows that these developments did not take place in linear fashion but involved mobilization against the regime, regime crackdown (particularly during the 1985 state of siege), and eventual capitulation after Pinochet's failure to win a majority in the plebiscite (see also Foweraker and Landman 1997).

The post-authoritarian period in Chile has been equally convoluted with respect to accountability and impunity for the crimes against humanity that were committed during the years of the regime. Pinochet managed to establish certain 'reserve domains' (Foweraker *et al.* 2003) for the military and claimed immunity for his crimes on the basis of being a former head of state. Chile has also had two truth commissions with the mandate to establish a record of the human rights abuses that took place during Pinochet's rule (see Hayner 1994, 2002 and Chapter 11). On a visit to London in 1998, Pinochet found himself arrested by the British authorities acting on an application for extradition by a Spanish judge, and after much debate in the House of Lords, which ultimately decided Pinochet could not claim immunity, was released on the grounds of ill health and returned to Chile in 2000. Emboldened by these international developments, groups seeking justice mobilized the Chilean legal system to seek his prosecution. He was stripped of domestic immunity in 2005 and placed under house arrest in 2006. He subsequently died of heart failure.

## Summary

This chapter is slightly different than the preceding chapters in Part II since it does not focus on one particular research topic. Rather it has sought to demonstrate how the fields of international relations and comparative politics have significant areas that overlap. There are numerous ways in which international variables have been and should be taken into account when seeking to explain domestic political developments, events, and outcomes. Equally, there are numerous domestic variables

**Table 12.2** Summary of studies that examine the nexus between domestic and international variables

<i>Method of comparison</i>	<i>Number of countries</i>	<i>Exemplars</i>	<i>Result</i>
Many countries	127 countries between 1970 and 1996	Li and Reuveny (2003)	Trade openness and portfolio investment have a negative relationship with democracy; negative effect of portfolio investment increases over time. Foreign direct investment has a positive relationship with democracy that weakens over time; spread of democratic values has a persistently positive relationship with democracy over time.
	40,000 dyad-years between 1886 and 1992	Russett and O'Neal (2001)	Joint democracy, economic interdependence, and participation in international institutions lowers the probability of inter-state conflict.
Few countries	Nigeria and Mexico	Bob (2005)	Movement strategies for awareness raising and framing struggle to match international NGOs garner successful support for domestic struggle
	17 post-World War II European countries	Moravcsik (2000)	Uncertainty within new democracies leads them to establish supranational institutions to lock in future generations to democracy.
Single-country studies	One country	Kornbluh 2003; Hawkins 2004; Sands 2005	International pressure provokes fissures within domestic ruling faction and leads to democratization; international arrest and detention of Pinochet fortifies doctrine of universal jurisdiction and emboldens domestic actors to prosecute former head of state.

that need to be taken into account when seeking to explain international state behaviour. This chapter has made it clear that there are numerous examples of both these main points in the studies covered in the previous chapters, while the studies considered here (see Table 12.2 for a summary) are particularly good examples for demonstrating the overlap between the international level and the domestic level. Moreover, this chapter has shown that the studies that incorporate this kind of analysis benefit from the kind of comparative methods examined throughout this book.

## Further reading

Legro, J. and Moravcsik, A. (1999) 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?' *International Security*, 24 (2): 5–55.

Good analysis of the main tenets of realism.

Morgenthau, H.J. (1961) *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd edn, New York: Alfred A Knopf.

Classic realist text.

Schmidt, B.C. (2002) 'On the History and Historiography of International Relations', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. Simmons, (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage, 3–22.

Good summary of the field of international relations.