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THE NEW MINORITY

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Measuring Marginality

AMERICAN AND BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE
RADICAL RIGHT

The frustration-aggression mechanism is . . . analogous to the law of gravity.
Men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source
in proportion to the intensity of their frustration, just as objects are attracted to
one another in direct opposition to their relative masses and inverse proportion
to their distance.
—Ted Robert Gurr

The preceding chapters depict two white working class communities, composed
of individuals who nearly unanimously attest to a dramatic social, political, and
economic decline over the past several decades. At this juncture, we have a solid
understanding of East London and Youngstown's histories and contexts, and
the variety of political behaviors their transformations have inspired. We have
a strong grasp of the role that identity politics and various political institutions
have played (and have not played) during this time period. We also have a set
of understandings about how individuals' senses of deprivation led to different
types of political behavior.

To recap these understandings, interview data point to a strong relation-
ship between senses of deprivation and observed habits of political behavior.
As depicted in Figure 7.3, those respondents who reported significant re-
gression or "large gap" in the social hierarchy were more likely to participate
in anti-system political behavior that uses undemocratic tactics to express
political preferences. Those respondents who reported a "small gap" or "no
gap" at all were more likely to engage in democratic activities or be compla-
cent. Finally, those respondents who understood their social position to be
peripheral—and to have always been peripheral—were more likely to be po-
litically withdrawn.

These findings tweak my initial hypotheses—grounded in my earlier research on Muslim minority political behavior—in an important way. On the one hand, they reinforce the argument that perceptions of relative deprivation are a key determinant of individual-level political behavior, in particular whether actors will be pro-system or anti-system in orientation. On the other hand, the findings demonstrate that deprivation is not exclusively related to power differences. White working class respondents not only yearn for greater political influence; they yearn to restore a sense of their lost centrality in their countries' and communities' social hierarchy. Their sense of deprivation is therefore as much a matter of power as it is a matter of social stratification. This chapter seeks to apply these concepts, and measure their capacity to explain political behavior among a much broader sample than qualitative research permits.

Using an analysis of survey data that controls for a range of demographic characteristics, I find that social and political forms of deprivation drive people's support for the radical right in Britain and the United States. However, I also find that such deprivation drives people's engagement in peaceful, inclusive, and democratic political behavior. In attempting to distinguish between those who express their deprivation in radical and non-radical ways, I find that supporters of the radical right are disproportionately white, young, lower class, male, without a university education, and ideologically conservative. Those who fit this profile are significantly more likely to back radical parties and candidates. Probing further, I find that those people who are socially or politically deprived and perceive the ascent of historically disadvantaged groups are much more likely to support the radical right than those who are not deprived or do not perceive such an ascent. The data show that senses of social and political deprivation drive white working class people in Britain and America to support the radical right to address what they perceive to be a changing social hierarchy.

Measurement Challenges

Because of the fringe nature of rebellion and radicalism, hypotheses about radical political behavior are rarely measured quantitatively. Indeed, it is a challenge to measure marginality. The withdrawn, the disenchanted, the isolated, and others at society's fringe are—by definition—often challenging to locate, let alone survey. Likewise, those who are politically active but affiliated with illegal or radical groups are often reluctant to report these affiliations. This is a principal reason that ethnographic fieldwork is typically a more effective instrument for developing a complete understanding of the marginalized and developing hypotheses about their behavior and character. However, to establish a broader understanding of these phenomena, polling research is necessary.

The United Kingdom offers an opportunity to conduct such polling about rebellious political behavior and the role of social, economic, and political deprivation. In particular, British politics features a well-known and reasonably established far right flank. The British National Party, the English Defence League, and the English National Alliance are rebellious groups that pursue xenophobic agendas with often-violent tactics. While notorious, their prominence in British public discussion means that, when surveyed, people will be less reluctant to reveal their support for them. The survey for this book was fielded just before the 2015 national election.

Some scholars argue that the United States now features an analogously prominent and more palatable far right, embodied by the antiestablishment Tea Party (Parker and Barreto 2013) and the radical, populist presidential candidacy of Donald Trump (Mudde 2015). However, in order to create a more reliable equivalent in the United States, I also asked American respondents to report their support for a hypothetical third party that was dedicated to "stopping mass immigration, providing American jobs for American workers, preserving America's Christian heritage, and stopping the threat of Islam"—the BNP's platform adapted to the United States. This allows for a more "apples and apples" comparison, though I also collected data about support for the Tea Party and Donald Trump's candidacy, all just before the 2016 primary elections in the United States.[1]

To validly measure people's sense of deprivation, I simply applied interview techniques from the field. Using a scale of 1 to 10, I asked individuals how financially well off they are today, and how financially well off "people like you" were thirty years ago. I asked how much power they have today, and how much power people like them had 30 years ago. And I asked how much politicians care about people like them today, and how much they cared about people like them thirty years ago. The discrepancies in their financial states and political states produced a measure of deprivation (or a lack thereof).

Similarly, to measure people's social deprivation, the surveyed individuals were presented with a concentric circle diagram—identical to that which was presented to people in Youngstown and East London. Using this as a model of social centrality, respondents placed themselves today and placed themselves (or people like them) thirty years ago. I refer to this as a measure of "abstract" centrality. As in the field, I also asked individuals to place a range of other social groups today, including Muslims, women, young people, immigrants, the wealthy, white working class people, nonwhite working class people, and the elderly. As it did in the field, this approach allowed respondents to visualize their social position, their movement over time, and the context of other reference groups' positions (Blumer 1958; Masaoka and Junn 2013). I refer to this as a measure of "contextualized" centrality.

Taken together, these techniques permit a better grasp on a number of questions inspired by this book's fieldwork:

- Does deprivation affect people's support for the radical right?
- Does deprivation affect people's democratic engagement?
- How does deprivation affect people differently?
- How does deprivation relate to perceptions of immigrant centrality?

The remainder of the chapter addresses each question in turn.

Does Deprivation Affect People's Support for the Radical Right?

Before addressing the question of what causes support for a radical right movement or party, it is first worth determining if people who report a willingness to engage in, or prior engagement in, radical right support are more likely to experience greater levels of deprivation than people who would never support the radical right. In other words, is there even a correlation here? In Britain, I classified people as supportive of the radical right if they have voted or would vote for or participate in the activities of the British National Party, the English Defence League, or the English National Alliance—about 7.5% of the sample. I also asked respondent how strongly, on a scale of 0 to 10, they have considered voting for UKIP. Those who reported 5 or higher—indicating serious consideration or inclination—made up 37% of the sample. In the United States, I classified people as radical right if they strongly or somewhat strongly supported Donald Trump (38% of the sample), the Tea Party (35% of the sample), or the hypothetical third party—a whopping 64.5% of the sample.[2]

Ultimately, across all British and American respondents, I found that those who are willing to or have supported the radical right are more likely to have experienced greater deprivation of each type and measure. Radical right respondents reported greater political deprivation as a measure of *political power*, greater political deprivation as a measure of *politicians' care*, greater economic deprivation as a measure of *financial well-being*, and greater *social deprivation* as well. These results hold whether one classifies radical right support in the American context as support for a third party, Donald Trump, or the Tea Party, and in the British context as support for the BNP, EDL, or UKIP. Across every measure of deprivation, those who support the radical right are more deprived than those who do not.

While this substantiates my findings from the field, this analysis does not provide us with much insight into how deprivation actually works, as the difference in deprivation could be explained by any number of other factors. This finding is also descriptive, rather than causal; we merely have seen that those who

Table 8.1 **Impact of Deprivation on Support for the Radical Right**

Deprivation Measure	UKIP Support	UK BNP/EDL Support	US Trump Support	US Tea Party Support	US Hypothetical Radical Right
Politicians Care	+40	+9		+25	+50
Political Power	+35	+5*			+28
Social Centrality	+22	+7			
Social Context				+15*	
Economic Deprivation	+23		+37		

Each number indicates the change in the predicted probabilities of engaging in or expressing a willingness to support the Radical Right, given a movement from minimum levels of deprivation to maximum levels of deprivation with all other factors held at their means. The first differences with stars are significant at p = 0.10 and unlabeled cells are not statistically significant.

support the radical right are more likely to experience deprivation. The question is whether deprivation drives support for the radical right even after controlling for alternative categorical explanations like class, gender, and ideology.

To account for this range of other factors, I tested the impact of all deprivation on support for the radical right, while controlling for ideology, age, college education, gender, home ownership, marital status, and class.[3] As displayed in Table 8.1, the British analysis shows that the individual who perceives the most political deprivation (as a matter of politicians' care) is about 9 percentage points more likely to support the BNP or EDL than someone who perceives no deprivation whatsoever, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, the individual who perceives the most political deprivation (as a matter of self-reported power) and the most social deprivation (as a matter of personal centrality as placed on the concentric circle diagram) is about 5 and 7 percentage points, respectively, more likely to support the BNP or EDL than someone who perceives no deprivation whatsoever. Correspondingly, it seems reasonable to say that the economic deprivation and the contextualized social deprivation measures are not significant factors here. From this analysis, it is clear that Britons who perceive the greatest political and social deprivation are more likely to support the BNP and EDL than those who perceive no deprivation. Economic deprivation appears to have no noticeable impact. This finding concurs with work by other scholars (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) which finds that economic disadvantage or deprivation fails to drive support for the far right or hostility to immigration. White people appear to respond to a cultural threat—the re-ordering of social hierarchies and associated losses of political power.

In the United States, the individual who perceives the most social deprivation (as contextualized by the centrality of immigrant-origin groups) is 15% more likely to support the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump, and 12% more likely to support a hypothetical radical right party (though the latter narrowly misses standard levels of statistical significance), holding all other variables constant. As in the British case, those white Americans who perceive the greatest political deprivation (in terms of politicians' regard for their views) are also more likely to support the radical right, in the form of the Tea Party and the hypothetical third party. Interestingly, a sense of economic deprivation is only significant in explaining support for Donald Trump.

Does Deprivation Affect People's Democratic Engagement?

Running the same type of analysis,[4] I was also able to test the impact of deprivation on peaceful, inclusive, democratic participation, while controlling for demographic factors. I classified respondents as democratically engaged if they reported partaking in at least one voluntary participatory activity, and reported no interest in the radical right. These participatory activities include signing a petition, attending a neighborhood meeting, voting, joining a community association, joining a union, and participating in a peaceful protest or strike. How might differences in deprivation alone (controlling for all other potential factors) impact the probability that a person will participate in peaceful, democratic ways?

As we see in Table 8.2, my analysis of British respondents shows that the individual who perceives the most political deprivation (as a matter of politicians' care) is about 16% more likely to engage in at least one democratic activity than someone who perceives no deprivation whatsoever, holding all other variables constant. The effect of political deprivation as a measure of self-reported power also drives democratic behavior, but less strongly at 9%. Correspondingly, we can say that the economic deprivation and social deprivation measures are not significant factors here. In fact, abstract social deprivation may even decrease the probability of democratic engagement.

From the British analysis, we see that economic deprivation has no noticeable impact on the probability of engaging in either democratic or radical political behavior, while social deprivation is only associated with support for the radical right. People who feel socially deprived do not perceive democratic means of recourse. This is an important finding. As recorded in interviews, many of my respondents in East London felt helpless about their movement to Britain's social periphery. Sensing their dismissal by mainstream, democratic outlets, they opt for alternative means of achieving their social agendas.

Table 8.2 **Impact of Deprivation on Democratic Activism**

Deprivation Measure	UK Democratic Activism	US Democratic Activism (excluding Third Party support)
Politicians Care	+16	
Power	+9*	
Social Centrality		
Social Context		+25*
Economic		+44

Each number indicates the change in the predicted probabilities of engaging in democratic activities, given a movement from minimum levels of deprivation to maximum levels of deprivation with all other factors held at their means. The first differences with stars are significant at p = 0.10 and the unlabeled cells are not statistically significant. In the US, democratic activism is defined as any reported democratic activity without support for a Radical Right entity (Trump, Tea Party, or the third party). Some may consider support for Trump or the Tea Party as consistent with democratic activism. Accordingly, I also show results for an analysis that only excludes those supportive of the Radical Right third party.

Meanwhile, political deprivation motivates both democratic engagement and—per the earlier results—support for the radical right in Britain. This result suggests the shiftiness of political capital, which leads people to take both democratic and radical action. Indeed, those who feel politically deprived are the most politicized actors surveyed in Britain. They are not only associated with intense expressions of rebellion, but also the most intense democratic activism. Looking just at those who move 7 points or more on the 10-point deprivation scale, those who are severely politically deprived tend to engage in more democratic participation than others who are less deprived or not deprived at all. None of the other forms of deprivation show strong patterns. These results suggest that deprivation effectively cuts both ways—the same intensity that produces model democratic activists also produces, or turns them into, radicals. In the United States, various expressions of deprivation cut both ways, depending on the form of political participation.

Among British democratic activists, however, we see that political deprivation produces a specific kind of activist, one that uses extra-institutional means of pursuing an agenda. Looking at each measure of political participation in Table 8.3, we see that both measures of political deprivation are significant predictors of actors' membership in a union and signing of a petition. Political deprivation (as a matter of power) significantly predicts participation in peaceful protests. All of these activities are important forms of democratic engagement, but forms that seek to influence the state from outside its institutions—they are forms of protest.

Table 8.3 **Effects of Deprivation on UK Political Participation**

	Political Deprivation (politicians)	Political Deprivation (power)	Social Deprivation (abstract)	Social Deprivation (contextual)	Economic Deprivation
Institutional					
Neighborhood Meeting			−	−	
Vote for Different Party				−	
Community Association	+				
Petition	+	+			+
Protest					
Union	+	+		+	+
Peaceful Protest		+			−
Anti-System					
British National Party			+		
English Defence League or English National Alliance	+	+	+		
UKIP	+	+	+		+

Plus signs and minus signs indicate statistically significant and direction of relationship (at or above 90% level) for the deprivation measure in each model with full controls. Plus signs indicate that deprivation is positively associated with the behavior. Minus signs indicate a negative association.

Table 8.4 Effects of Deprivation on US Political Participation

	Political Deprivation (Politicians)	Political Deprivation (Power)	Social Deprivation (Abstract)	Social Deprivation (Contextual)	Economic Deprivation	
Neighborhood Meeting						Institutional
Vote for Different Party						
Community Association	−		−		−	
Petition	+				+	
Union						
Peaceful Protest	−	−			−	Protest
Hypothetical Third Party	+	+				
Trump Candidacy					+	Anti-System
Tea Party Support	+			+		

Plus signs and minus signs indicate statistically significant and direction of relationship (at or above 90% level) for the deprivation measure in each model with full controls. Plus signs indicate that deprivation is positively associated with the behavior. Minus signs indicate a negative association.

More established means include voting, membership in organized associations, and community meetings. Of these three institutional means of participation, only community meetings are an outlet for British people who sense exclusively political deprivation. Instead, the data show that a *lack* of social deprivation (in both measures) is what leads people to join associations or express their frustration by voting.

In the United States (Table 8.4), political deprivation (as a matter of politicians' care and political power) has a stronger association with far-right behavior than institutional means of participation. While it does increase the likelihood that one will sign a petition, it is also associated with support for the hypothetical far-right party and the Tea Party. A lack of political deprivation is associated with a higher likelihood of both institutional and protest democratic behaviors, increasing the likelihood that an individual will join a community association and/or attend a peaceful protest.

Social deprivation (contextualized with other groups) is associated with Tea Party support in the United States. Similarly, economic deprivation is associated with support for Donald Trump. Economic deprivation is associated with a higher probability of signing a petition. A lack of all kinds of deprivation is associated with a higher likelihood of community association involvement.

When I separated those people who reported severe social deprivation (a decline of 3 points or more) from those respondents who reported minor deprivation (a decline of less than 3 points), the results were even more dramatic. Those who reported support for the radical right are twice (200%) as likely to be severely socially deprived (as measured abstractly), 100% more likely to be severely politically deprived (politicians' care), and 70% more likely to be severely politically deprived (power) than those who reported no radical inclinations. What remains confounding is that the same sense of political deprivation mobilizes some to engage democratically and others to rebel. What separates these two groups of individuals: those who engage and those who rebel?

How Does Deprivation Affect People Differently?

The above tests of deprivation on support for the radical right are, in some ways, very conservative. Given the stability of partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960), it is less likely that perceived deprivation will drive left-wing partisans to support the radical right. In this section, I first look at the heterogeneous effects of deprivation on just those who self-identify as Republicans (in the United States) or Conservatives (in the United Kingdom). I then consider demographic attributes to calculate the predicted probability that a "profiled" radical will support the Radical Right.

Table 8.5 **First Differences Min–Max Deprivation for Interaction Models (Republicans/Conservatives Only)**

	US Tea Party	US Trump	US Third Party	UK BNP/EDL	UKIP
Social (Abstract)	46.5		37.6	10.6	45.2
Social (Contextual)	46.7		30.1		28.1
Political (Politicians)	44.1	37.8	50.6	14.4	72.3
Political (Power)	50.1	41.1	65.9	10.2	67.9
Economic	48.6	66.9	41.7		47.9

Predicted first differences and 95% confidence intervals moving each deprivation from its minimum value to its maximum value for each DV for Republicans (Conservatives in UK) only in interaction models.

In Table 8.5, I display the change in probability of supporting the radical right given a change from minimum levels of deprivation to maximum levels of deprivation among Republicans and Conservatives with all other covariates held at their means.[5] I find, not surprisingly, that deprivation has a much stronger effect on this target subgroup than either of the full samples. Some notable patterns emerge. Political deprivation remains a strong and consistent predictor of support for the radical right in all models. Indeed, its effect is downright enormous when it comes to American support for the Tea Party, the hypothetical third party, and British support for UKIP. Moving from minimum to maximum levels of political deprivation is associated with a 68 and 72 percentage point increase in support for UKIP. Social deprivation emerges as a similarly stronger predictor of support for the Tea Party, the hypothetical third party, and UKIP. Finally, economic deprivation becomes a significant predictor of support for the Tea Party and the hypothetical third party. These results are remarkably consistent across the two samples.

To distinguish democrats from radicals, I also considered their demographic attributes. Those respondents who expressed a willingness to support, or a record of support for, the radical right were disproportionately white, young, lower class, male, without a university education, and ideologically conservative. While this describes the "profiled" radical, it does not reveal how much these demographic attributes drive the differential impact of social and political deprivation on individuals' behavioral choices.

To do this, I asked the probability that a so "profiled" deprived, conservative, working class, 24- to 39-year-old, white male without a university degree would support the radical right. According to the demographic breakdown, such an

individual should be highly likely to support the radical right. I then compared him to an "average" white British male—that is, a white British male whose demographic characteristics are all set to their means (a moderate ideology score, of average class, age, and educational attainment, and average levels of political deprivation). The difference is substantial.

Figure 8.1 summarizes the extent to which the "profiled" individual—subject to different forms of deprivation—is more likely to support the radical right in the United Kingdom and the United States. While all effects are quite strong, some stand out. In Britain, I found that the "profiled" individual who is socially deprived (as a matter of abstract centrality) is about 51% more likely to support the BNP or EDL. The same profiled individual is 67% more likely to support UKIP. In the United States, similar effects exist across almost every type of deprivation. In particular, the profiled individual who is socially deprived (as a

Figure 8.1 Profiled Individual United States and United Kingdom.   Bars indicate the change in the predicted probabilities of engaging in or expressing a willingness to engage in anti-system activities given a movement for an average white male with minimum levels of deprivation to a "profiled" white male with maximum levels of deprivation in both the United States and United Kingdom. All estimates were statistically significant.

matter of contextualized centrality) is about 26 percentage points more likely to support Trump, 34 percentage points more likely to support the Tea Party, and 20% more likely to support the third party. The demographic characteristics that are significant indicators of democratic activism are age, education, ideology, gender, and class. Older, more liberal, female, college-educated, and middle- or upper-class individuals are more likely to engage democratically.

The British and American data therefore both suggest that while political and social deprivation mobilizes most people to become democratically engaged in the political system, this deprivation drives white working class Britons and Americans toward the fringe of the public sphere. The qualitative data suggest two important reasons for this. First, radical right groups offer a source of heritage-based political identity for white working class Britons who have lost sources of occupational identity, and now try to distance themselves from association with immigrant origin minorities. And second, radical right groups serve as a refuge or an antiestablishment alternative to mainstream political parties that white working class individuals believe have adopted the cause of immigrant-origin minorities at the expense of native constituents. In this logic, wealthier, more educated, and more liberal people who also feel a sense of political deprivation are better able to find a democratic outlet for their views. These two proposed reasons presume that individuals who support the radical right perceive the ascendance of immigrant-origin minorities in their society—a presumption worth examining.

How Does Deprivation Relate to Perceptions of Immigrant Centrality?

If an individual perceives deprivation and believes that other historically marginalized groups are becoming more central to society, does this increase the probability that he or she supports the radical right? Put another way, are people who perceive the relative ascendance of historically marginalized groups—namely Muslims, immigrants, and nonwhite working class people—more likely to support the radical right than those who believe these historically disadvantaged groups are still disadvantaged?[6]

In Britain, the results show that people who sense that they are socially deprived (as a matter of contextualized centrality) or politically deprived (as a matter of power) and perceive the ascent of historically disadvantaged groups are much more likely to support the radical right than those who are not deprived or do not perceive such an ascent. Interactions with other measures of deprivation do not demonstrate significant effects.

In the United States, we see far more robust results. Those who are economically, socially, or politically deprived *and* perceive historically disadvantaged groups as central to society are more likely to support the Tea Party or Donald Trump than those who are deprived but also see historically disadvantaged groups as deprived.

An alternative way to analyze this phenomenon is by comparing an individual's self-placement on the provided concentric circles with where they place other groups. If an individual were to place herself closer to the center than historically disadvantaged groups, would she be less likely to express support for the radical right?[7] In Britain, I find no difference. This confirms that it is the perceived centrality of historically disadvantaged reference groups that matters, rather than the relative position of the white working class. In the United States, we find another strong pattern. Those who place themselves on the periphery of social centrality, but place historically marginalized groups in the center, are 32% more likely to support the Tea Party.

Competing Extremisms

These results offer unique measurements of white working class marginality and the way marginality motivates the contentious and occasionally extreme political behavior surrounding immigration, multiculturalism, and Islam. Indeed, the radical right parties discussed in the British survey would not exist if it were not for the demographic change and subsequent Muslim politics of contemporary Britain. And in many cases, white working class people's extremism competes with the extremism exhibited by certain members of the historically disadvantaged minorities they resent. Violence has erupted when radical right groups have interrupted British Muslim demonstrations in favor of shariah, or when Muslim extremists have sought to publicly attack British soldiers returning from tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. More conventionally though, far-right radicals and Muslim radicals compete quite separately, in the seclusion of their own living rooms, against the constructed imaginaries of their alter ego reference group—each other. Both sets of radicals receive disproportionate publicity relative to the peaceful, adaptive, and tolerant majority of their democratic co-ethnics.[8]

In earlier research of Muslim political behavior (Gest 2010), I noted the similar sense of deprivation detected by British Muslims. While white working class people express their marginalization in terms of lost social and political status, the British Bangladeshis I interviewed in London's East End described the way they feel disqualified from the rights, freedom, and membership that other Britons enjoy in the United Kingdom. In this light, both groups refer to

unfulfilled senses of entitlement, closely tied to the politics of heritage stimulated by immigration, diversity, and the challenges of coexistence. Many white working class individuals are frustrated by their eviction from positions of advantage, their lost sense of centrality in the societies they once defined. As shown in this chapter, I found this feeling of social and political deprivation to clearly predict a higher probability of support for radical right groups.

Meanwhile, many British Muslims are frustrated by the prejudice that underpins their entrenched disadvantage, and the perceived impossibility of ever achieving centrality in the only society they know. The British survey suggests that such frustrations motivate both democratic and extreme political behavior. The survey does not test for radicalism among historically disadvantaged groups. The sample has a disproportionately small number of nonwhite respondents, and I do not solicit respondents' engagement with extremist organizations, or causes that appeal specifically to Muslims or other minorities.

For the white British and American people, I find that political and social frustrations, respectively, create a form of transferable political capital—one that is directed at extra-institutional means of democratic engagement, but also support for the radical right. In scope, these are both forms of protest politics. The data suggest that while the wealthier, the educated, and the older opt for peaceful means of protest, younger white working class men are more likely to pursue anti-system activity. Driving this radicalism is not merely a measurable sense of political deprivation, but evidently a profound sense of social displacement—a shift to the periphery of British society.

Given the large sample of respondents, these data corroborate a number of key dynamics that this book discusses, particularly the effect of relative deprivation on political behavior. They also demonstrate the parallels between the ways that white working class people and visible minority groups may understand their marginality, their minoritization. The analysis here permits a more confident discussion of how to mitigate marginality and the radical political behavior it inspires.

9

The Untouchables

WHO CAN APPEAL TO THE WHITE WORKING CLASS?

They don't care about what you know, until they know that you care.
—Quotation hanging on the locker room office wall of then-Youngstown
State University Head Football Coach Jim Tressel (attributed to his father,
Lee Tressel, but also to US President Theodore Roosevelt)

There was a time when the white working class defined American and British politics. Today, few politicians know what to do with them. While white working class voters make up a major portion of the electorate, especially in Rust Belt regions, many elected officials are baffled about how to reach them—or at least how to do so in a postindustrial economy without alienating other crucial components of their respective electoral coalitions. In Britain, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has emerged as a third party by making a direct play for white working class votes, and Jeremy Corbyn has returned Labour to its socialist roots. But there is no exact equivalent in the United States, which is constrained by a two-party landscape. Rather, in the more candidate-driven American system, individual campaigns have made populist appeals to white working class voters, and have attempted to pull their parties to the far reaches of the political spectrum.

After offering a prospectus of the partisan landscape in the United Kingdom and the United States, this chapter traces how history has shaped the white working class's tense relationships with political parties—with special emphasis on the emergence of UKIP and the 2016 presidential candidacy of Donald Trump, the Republican nominee. In the end, I offer insights for any political organization or candidate who attempts to bring the white working class back into the political fold.

A UKIP Future in Britain?

In the United Kingdom today, UKIP has already capitalized on the attitudes discussed in this book. After not contesting the 2010 general election, UKIP claimed 12.6% of the national vote in 2015 (BBC News 2015). Because of Britain's first-past-the-post system, this only translated into one Parliamentary seat. However, the popularity of its anti-immigration platform and skepticism of the European Union made UKIP a potent factor during the campaign and the subsequent referendum on British membership in the European Union. In the 2015 Parliamentary election, the Conservatives felt pressured to cover their right flank, and ultimately, UKIP challenged Labour for the votes of disaffected Liberal Democrats on the left. In Barking, UKIP garnered 22.2% of the vote, which was largely comprised of BNP supporters who backed Nick Griffin in 2010. In Dagenham, UKIP received 29.8% of the vote, taking a good number of voters from both the Tories and Liberal Democrats (*Telegraph* 2015).

A formal political party, UKIP renders antiestablishment and working class voters a peaceful, democratic means of expressing their frustration with the direction of British society. Emboldened by its results, UKIP is now poised to poach further support from both Labour and the Conservatives, having already absorbed a substantial number of Liberal Democrat voters since 2010. UKIP appeals to the isolationist (and often former unionist) far left and also the nativist far right, which had been reluctant to support the more profane and overtly racist BNP. UKIP promises a reduction in foreign aid provisions, an increase in National Health Service spending, and no tax on low-wage workers. Until UKIP's emergence, Labour struggled to unite urban cosmopolitans and ethnic minority blocs with its historically unionist base. Meanwhile, the Tories worried that nativist rhetoric might alienate moderates, and were largely distrusted by unionists after decades of antagonism anyway. With the establishment of UKIP, the British political landscape may shift, leaving fewer voters for whom Tories and Labourites may compete.

With the Tories' enduring Euroskepticism placating many on the far right, Labour responded to their 2015 defeat by appointing socialist Jeremy Corbyn as their leader and, in so doing, sought to reclaim the far left and its historically working class base. However, the move represents precisely the gamble that Democrats and Republicans in the United States have been unwilling to take. It opened an opportunity for Prime Minister David Cameron to monopolize the British center with his progressive approaches to environmentalism, gay rights, and the minimum wage. However, Cameron was soon undone by the EU referendum he long promised to nationalist Tory backbenchers. With his Brexit loss and subsequent resignation, both parties are now being tugged to their fringes, leaving the center

wide open and increasingly precarious. In many ways, the British case will serve as a useful experiment for American politicians of both parties. How will the Tories respond to their internal division? Will Labour be able to hold any space in the center of the political spectrum? Will Labour actually be able to appeal anew to white working class people wooed by UKIP and thus far estranged from Labour for its support of minority rights? In any case, UKIP will endure as the kind of party which would emerge were the United States not constrained by its traditional two-party structure. Instead, American parties have been reluctant to adopt the positions and strategies that might mobilize greater white working class engagement.

Personality Contests in America

Three weeks before the 2012 general election, Republican vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan made a campaign stop at the St. Vincent De Paul Society's soup kitchen in Youngstown, Ohio. The dining hall was largely empty. Its mostly homeless patrons had eaten, the servery had been cleaned, and many volunteers had left. En route to the airport, Ryan and his staffers rushed into the kitchen for a fifteen-minute photo-op, touting those who give back. The candidate was presented to the volunteers who remained, and he was handed clean dishes to re-wash for the photographers, according to charity workers (Montopoli 2012).

There was a time when every American presidential candidate stopped by Youngstown to appeal for support. In its Steeltown days, Youngstown was one of the United States' key manufacturing hubs. Ever since, Youngstown has seen plenty of politicians promise to spruce things up. Yet in the minds of those who live here, little gets cleaned.

Though they are dispersed countrywide, there is a significant concentration of white working class people in postindustrial regions like Youngstown throughout the Upper Midwest and Great Lakes—encompassing a number of swing states in national elections. These include Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. According to a variety of studies that understand the white working class in different ways, the group makes up about 53% of the electorate in Michigan, 55% in Pennsylvania, 58% in Wisconsin, 62% in Ohio, 66% in Indiana, and nearly 70% in West Virginia (Judis 2007; Democratic Strategist 2011; Olsen 2010). As a result, this subset of the American electorate is a key determinant of electoral outcomes, but alas, one that has been misunderstood and under-mobilized. In recent elections, white working class people have had low turnouts relative to their share of the US population (CNN 2008; 2010). This is true despite the fact that white Americans are disproportionately of voting age vis-à-vis non-white Americans, who on average are younger.

While Republicans continue to expand upon their support among white working class people in the American South, Democrats have salvaged a nearly

split vote among this group in the North and Upper Midwest—bolstering their recent electoral victories in those states and nationwide (Edsall 2012). But the reflexive Democratic affiliation which was founded in deep ties to unions is eroding, and now, both political parties are perplexed about how to attract white working class support in the Rust Belt region, and how to balance that support with that of their traditional bases.

Researchers, campaigners, and locals alike wonder whether Youngstown's voters are permanently withdrawn, having lost all faith in government. However, the evidence suggests that the citizens of Youngstown—and many other post-traumatic cities in the American Rust Belt—have merely been waiting for parties and organizations to mobilize them. Youngstown does not have a shortage of civic-minded individuals; those individuals simply do not feel comfortable entering a political sphere that has long been characterized by corruption and dysfunction. Today's working class, Rust Belt voters are disenchanted by what they perceive to be a political and economic culture of exploitative greed and gridlock, and are waiting for someone to adopt their cause.

Jimbo Democrats

It is precisely this sense of abandonment, coupled with a general distrust of government, that softened the ground for Youngstown's most popular politician, the late Congressman Jim Traficant—the nine-term member of the House of Representatives who evaded FBI prosecution for two decades before being convicted on ten counts of racketeering and corruption in 2002. Even though he was expelled from Congress and imprisoned for his misdealings, he remains revered by many Youngstown residents, as described in Chapter 4. Despite his unscrupulous behavior, Traficant gave white working class voters a sense of representation, a sense of identification with someone who finally spoke truth to power. As many respondents emphasized, "he cared." Indulging working people's grievances but also their conspiracy theories, Traficant laid out a basic blueprint for attracting white working class votes: earn working class credentials; employ working class language; and engage in working class actions with voters—not just for them. Voters in Youngstown were so desperate for such a candidate, and such candidates were so rare, that they overlooked Traficant's criminality, mania, and legislative inaction, because he was perceived to be one of the last white working class people in national public office.

Traficant also channeled a political outlook that has otherwise confused national political parties. Like Traficant, Youngstown's citizens have been reliably affiliated with the Democratic Party for decades, but their political preferences

frequently run counter to party prerogatives. So Democrats have won due to the absence of a viable alternative. Republicans have historically been viewed as elitist and anti-union—an image that the Obama campaign reinvigorated in 2012 despite its weakening relevance thirty years after Youngstown's mills closed.

Although they cast themselves as the working man's party, the ranks of elected Democrats are just as elite. As I noted earlier, members of Congress are supremely wealthier than their average constituents (Whoriskey 2011) and those who have previously belonged to the working class compose only 2% of Congress overall (Carnes 2012). The influx of money in politics and changing campaign finance rules may be partially to blame, encouraging both parties to rely more heavily on candidates who can self-fund expensive races; the same study found that the average winning House candidate now spends four times as much (in inflation-adjusted dollars) as he or she did in 1976. Even the legendary Jim Traficant had a graduate degree.

Yet despite the social conservatism of Youngstown's white voters, their desperation for economic development, and Democratic elected officials' equal inability to truly reflect the working class electorate, Republicans have made little attempt to capture these voters. And this Republican divestiture from Youngstown has exacerbated the party's problems in this region: because Youngstown's voters have had little exposure to local Republicans who could counter the historical stereotype, the Republican Party remains the representative of the companies, not the workers, to the mostly white voters in Mahoning County and in the Rust Belt more broadly.

In the antiestablishment wave that swept the United States leading into the 2016 general election, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders competed directly for such voters against the early Democratic favorite, former First Lady, New York Senator, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Sanders spoke directly to many white working class voters seeking a left-wing populism that constrained economic inequality, pursued more protectionist trade policy, and regulated campaign finance. Sanders's endurance in the Democratic primary campaign was a harbinger of the revolutionary sentiment that characterized the complexion of the entire national campaign.

The Trump Experiment

Enter Donald Trump. A self-aggrandizing plutocrat, Trump gained the ear of white working class people with the anti-immigrant, protectionist appeal of his initial June 2015 announcement to run for president in 2016. Trump's entry into the campaign fundamentally altered its style and character. Before his declaration, the early Republican primary polling was led by candidates deeply

ensconced in American politics: former Florida Governor and President George W. Bush's brother Jeb Bush, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, and first-term Florida Senator Marco Rubio, whom many branded as the face of the Republican Party's future. After the declaration, Bush's campaign entered a tailspin, Walker dropped out, and Rubio would ultimately depart after losing his home state and every other primary except Minnesota. Instead, Trump led the polls over Ohio Governor John Kasich, and the rebellious Texas Senator Ted Cruz—who echoed Trump's scathing perceptions of Washington and the establishment of American politics.

Through the Republican primaries, Trump's meteoric ascendance and ultimate nomination was driven by strong support among white people without university degrees. Though Trump struggled to attract a majority of polled Republican voters before the primaries, these white working class people were numerous enough to give Trump a significant early polling lead in a field that at one point contained sixteen Republican candidates. With many such supporters among so-called "unlikely" voters, he awakened a dormant part of the American electorate, who was otherwise unenthusiastic about either party's candidates or simply withdrawn from participation. The attraction between these strange bedfellows can be understood through the lens provided in this book.

First, in light of party establishments' cagey approach to white working class voters and their subsequent sense of postindustrial abandonment, many are fed up with Washington. "The thing I like about Trump is that both sides hate him," says Bob Campanella, a Youngstown Northsider. This sentiment encompasses much of today's Republican base. A mere 16% of Republicans feel like they are represented in Washington—even though the party currently controls both houses of Congress; those who do not feel represented supported Trump by a sizeable margin (CNN/ORC 2015). Trump's bombastic declarations that his rivals have been corrupted by corporations and donors (like himself) validates the belief among white working class voters that the political system is rigged by the very special interests that abruptly closed American factories, laid off American workers, and invested money overseas to circumvent American wages and taxes.

Second, Trump addresses people who have felt silenced. While Trump does not counterbalance the wealth of American politicians, he validates the views of many ordinary voters as he channels conspiracy theories and whispers from the streets to the stump. Trump's off-color remarks about women and minorities, his frustration with "disgusting" people, and his baseless assertions about Mexico's deliberate exportation of criminals across the US border fit this mold. Much like Jim Traficant in Youngstown, Trump's amplification of these ideas rendered credibility to a subset of voters who feel sidelined. Trump regularly referred to his supporters as the "silent majority."

Third, Trump bluntly acknowledged white working class people's acute sense of loss—the factor that I find best explains radical political behavior. Trump, who talked about economic losses to China, Mexico, and Japan in the manner of an Olympic basketball team on a tour of the United States, communicated his awareness of this lost status in simple, blunt terms. Shamelessly showboating his own successes, Trump promised to spread his winnings around and to punish companies that take their manufacturing overseas—a direct appeal to the Rust Belt. The "Again" in his campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again," plugs into this sense of nostalgia and suggests a return to better times. "I guess I want things back to the way they were," Campanella says in Youngstown. "And in his odd, crude way, he makes sense. I know he's not a woman-hater and he's not going to reverse what liberalism has done for us the last 40 years. He just wants to get our country stabilized and back on track. [. . .] I know it's never going to be like the way it was. But we need to concentrate on this country. We're lowering our standards more than we're raising standards in third world countries. We can't worry about other people's problems."

During his ascent, Trump's support came from a particular, but relatively large, plurality of voters. This group—composed to an important extent of white working class voters—is numerous enough to affect election outcomes, but not large enough to determine them without their integration into a broader coalition. And because many white working class positions are fringe, they are difficult to streamline in combination with more centrist positions. Many registered Republicans said that they would not vote for Trump even after he won the party's nomination; his unfavorability ratings were exceptionally high for a presidential nominee.

Trump's positions very much mirror those of the BNP in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the US-adapted BNP platform that I offered to surveyed American respondents was surprisingly well received. Over 60% of a nationally representative sample of white people said that they were either likely or very likely to support a party that advocated for "stopping mass immigration, providing American jobs for American workers, preserving America's Christian heritage, and stopping the threat of Islam." Consequently, while Trump's rise may have been initially driven by white working class voters who unabashedly backed these once-fringe positions, he appears to have tapped into a latent populism (and distrust of Washington establishment) that has emerged since the global economic crisis and its segmented recovery.

Still, the bombastic Trump remains a product of the candidate-driven nature of American electoral politics. For all his unexpected success, he is unique. Few other candidates can replicate perhaps his most appealing quality—his independence, which he claims renders him the freedom to speak his mind and pursue policies in the interest of those who cannot sway politicians with lobbyists and

campaign donations. Combine his wealth with his remarkable impermeability to criticism, and Trump is hardly a blueprint for future candidates of either party hoping to appeal to white working class communities. Nevertheless, the anger of white working class people—which Trump has harnessed—has reinvigorated their role in national politics. Where it was once determinant, it is now disruptive; but white working class people feel like they matter again. Unable to reproduce Trump's personality and wealth, future candidates who seek white working class support will need to become familiar with this otherwise perplexing constituency.

Outlook of White Working Class Americans and Britons

Those who hope to reach the white working class across Britain and America's Rust Belts must first understand the crosscurrents of this group's political outlook.

Economics: Most white working class respondents are antagonistic toward big business. A legacy of their relationship with the manufacturing industry, white working class people distrust the wealthy and are cognizant of elite advantage. They have long memories of labor exploitation and harsh tactics against strikers and in union negotiations.

However, in the United States, they anxiously await the next big industry to rescue their economy. Most Youngstown respondents support the growth of hydraulic fracturing or "fracking," despite its dangerous excavation work, a record of recruiting labor from outside the region, and potential environmental hazards. With fracking, Youngstown has been confronted with a referendum on its past as a factory town, and most citizens would do it all again. They simply can't conceive of another model. While the Britons I interviewed would be pleased to return to the good old days when factories were running, many now look to government to resolve their economic difficulties and facilitate a way forward.

Unions: After the deterioration of unions, many white working class people still rely on such organizations to politically mobilize them. This creates a dependency that has led to low participation rates in many elections. When unions were weakened, so were the principal enablers of working class political expression.

However, few respondents in the United States or the United Kingdom were impressed by contemporary unions anyway. After decades of membership, many working class white respondents believe

unions to now be feeble and just as corrupt as the political and business officials they resent.

Immigration: As the descendants of immigrants, nearly all Youngstown respondents are sympathetic to the struggles of American minority groups. On the one hand, working class white Americans are very cognizant and proud of their own immigrant heritages from countries like Italy, Ireland, Slovakia, and Greece. They also admire and acknowledge today's immigrants as hardworking members of society, chasing the American Dream. On the other hand, they are frustrated by the government's leniency about undocumented immigrants, who they believe are likely to work below established wages, driving them down for others.

My British respondents acknowledge no such immigration lineage, even though many have roots abroad. Rather, immigration represents the single greatest issue of political salience in Britain and Europe today. While the flames of this obsession were fanned by the difficult years after the 2008 global recession, the 2015 European refugee crisis ignited them more intensely. Monolithically, they view immigrants as opportunists who will compete for the jobs and benefits to which Britons are entitled, but also a group that profits from sympathy and unfounded favoritism.

However, even many American respondents are convinced of their own emerging minority status. Respondents in both countries feel increasingly outnumbered, in light of both local and national demographic changes. They feel discarded to the periphery of their national psyche, despite a history as the industrial backbone of the country. And they feel subject to discrimination in the form of affirmative action and diversification policies. To express this sense of injustice, respondents have appropriated the language of the civil rights movement (equality).

Culture Wars: Despite their social conservatism, the Americans I interviewed are largely unexcited by culture wars. In Youngstown, many respondents were Catholic parishioners, while others maintain connections with Catholic schools and charities. As a result, they hold relatively conservative views on social issues. However, very few actually vote according to candidates' views on these disputes. Many note that their families have traditionally overlooked culture-war disagreements as long as a candidate aligns with their economic needs. This helps explain how Donald Trump's candidacy maintained momentum despite his wishy-washy statements on abortion, homosexuality, and Christianity. His primary base of supporters is more excited by his nativism and protectionism.

Still, white working class Americans remain wary of welfare recipients whose integrity they judge. A disproportionate number of white working class Americans consume Social Security, food stamps, disability, and unemployment benefits vis-à-vis racial minorities (Jones and Cox 2012), but many white voters in Youngstown understand "welfare" to exclusively mean cash assistance. Consequently, even those who are benefiting from safety-net programs themselves view "welfare" recipients as lazy and disingenuous people, and resent them for receiving a similar amount of money to those who are employed full-time. They frame this matter as a moral, not a racial, issue and emphasize the value of hard work and independence.

The Untouchables

When politicians wish to address white working class people, they must go directly to them on a regular basis. In the United States in particular, few do.

Given the perplexing worldviews of the white working class, Republican and Democratic Party establishments are unclear about how to mobilize white working class voters. So for the most part, they have been left alone. Youngstown has remained a Democratic fiefdom, even though the party's candidates have brought little improvement in citizens' quality of life and economic prospects. If anything, officials have been consumed by corruption and inaction, despite party-unified county and city chambers. As a result, until Trump's emergence, these voters had few options. Neither party has focused recent platforms on working people's needs. And neither party fields very many candidates from working class backgrounds.

The Republican Party is anemic in Mahoning County, and leaders are likely intimidated by the ostensible Democratic monopoly. Even if they recognize that Democrats are winning by default, they are unsure how to appeal to a white working class population without compromising the party's ties to the business lobby.

National Democratic leaders seem to view the region as an enigmatic, troublesome family member—one that they see in November every two years for obligatory reasons but otherwise from which they would prefer to maintain a safe distance. They are confused about how to mobilize greater turnout among people distrustful of big government and harboring more culturally conservative views than much of the Democratic coalition.

This is not a bitter struggle for appeal. Rather, both parties have determined that wooing the white working class risks complicating their established

coalitions. While Democrats would benefit the most from the unification of the (white and nonwhite) American working class in the short term, they are reluctant to risk their relationship with more socially liberal and diverse voting blocs who have invigorated their return to power since 2006. More implicitly, they may also be wary of turning off elite moderates who fear the inflammation of class divisions. For now, both party establishments are reluctant to invest in white working class people as a constituency. They are viewed as untouchable.

The candidacy of Donald Trump poses a direct challenge to this logic. Whereas party elites avoided a direct appeal to white working class Americans out of their concern with assembling an electoral majority, Trump has tapped into this neglected set of voters. And while his numbers would not win primary elections in previous years when the Republican Party was unified behind an establishment candidate, Trump benefited from the manner in which the Tea Party has polarized and atomized the right's historic coalition. Early in the anti-establishment 2016 election cycle, populism was the only approach that unified a quorum of Republicans sufficient to lead the presidential campaign.

Appealing to the White Working Class

The result of the difficulties encountered by mainstream American and British political parties is a vast sector of the electorate that has been uninspired, but also largely unsolicited, by political campaigns. White working class people in the American Rust Belt are conventionally thought of as a swing vote, because of their unpredictability and a lack of loyalty to either party at the national level. In both countries, great rewards await the party that finds a way to sustainably reintegrate them as part of a grander coalition. Republicans and Tories seek a new, expanded base of voters to compete with Democrats' and Labour's growing demographic edges. Democrats, in particular, could seal their national dominance by attracting a broader spectrum of working class voters. If any party chooses to make this appeal, there are a number of gaps that a future generation of leaders may fill:

- *Recruit candidates from the ranks of the non-elites.* It is not sufficient to hammer the excesses of big business and cast the other side as the keepers of an elitist plutocracy. Working class voters want to see candidates with working class backgrounds. Democrats should not simply assume that their opposition will always be led by a private equity tycoon—a circumstance which made them look working class by comparison in 2012. In fact, the median net worth of Democratic Members of the House of Representatives has

risen substantially, up nearly $200,000 in inflation-adjusted dollars just be-
tween 2004 and 2009 (Center for Responsive Politics 2013). Meanwhile, the
median net worth of Republican House Members was down by nearly the
same amount over that time period, closing the gap between the parties to
less than $100,000 (ibid.). In Britain, election laws allow officials to represent
constituencies in which they do not reside. Barking's Margaret Hodge lives in
a posh neighborhood of Islington, while Dagenham's John Cruddas resides
in Notting Hill. The white working class understands that politicians likely
won't have calloused hands, but they also yearn to see their own reflection
in a representative who understands manual labor. It's not enough to pro-
duce candidates who attempt to connect with the middle class based on their
ancestry—for example by indicating that at some point in their family lin-
eage, someone was middle or working class. The African-American, Latino,
and lesbian and gay communities can all see visible representation in party
leadership; the white working class wants no less.

- *Employ working class narratives.* When candidates are not working class
  themselves, they can still show signs of empathy by channeling the language
  and lifestyle of constituents. That means making reference to their realities of
  unstable jobs, declining wages and benefits, and a greater strain on family life
  because of these burdens. It also means emphasizing the common goal that
  everyone should be able to work one job, forty hours a week, and take care
  of their families. Working class voters see the parties doing visible outreach
  to other constituent communities and they want the same consideration and
  thought put toward wooing them. They will listen for language that explicitly
  includes them and lifts them up, favoring politicians who try to earn their vote
  over those who simply assume they have it.

- *Do not conflate the working class with the helpless.* Most working class
  people are not earning the minimum wage, nor do they think of themselves
  as reliant on government welfare programs (even when they are benefiting
  from many of them). They want to be seen as independent, self-sufficient,
  and hard-working, and as such, they won't be satisfied by a candidate or party
  who simply promises to protect or expand poverty assistance programs or
  raise the minimum wage. They want to know that their political leaders both
  understand their struggles, and distinguish them from those of people who
  are another rung down on the income ladder.

- *Do not assume unions are synonymous with the working class.* Times have
  changed, and most white working class people are not unionized anymore.
  Both parties and candidates must eschew shortcuts, address their con-
  stituents directly, and stop simply depending on unions as interlocutors—
  especially given that unions' status with many of these voters is questionable
  at best, as this book shows.

- *Challenge nostalgia with hope.* This book has demonstrated the mobilizing power of nostalgia, but also its destructive consequences. No party will ever deliver on promises to turn back the clock, so leaders must seize the challenge to envision a future that incorporates white working class people into the global economy and into coexistence with ethnic minorities. There is an opportunity waiting for leftist leaders who can appeal to white working class voters in these ways, especially if they go hand in hand with pursuing labor standards and strengthening social protections. There is also an opportunity for rightists who believe in an egalitarian meritocracy that rewards hard work and enterprise, especially if they demonstrate a new commitment to ensuring that everyone who works hard can succeed, despite their status at birth.

Ultimately, contrary to conventional portrayals, white working class voters are rational. They seek representatives who care about their grievances. They seek platforms that act on these grievances. And they respond to parties and organizations that invest in them with time, resources, and candidates. This is not different from any other sector of the electorate. The difference is that, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, social and economic forces have isolated the white working class as a political constituency, to the extent that many in this demographic feel like a peripheral afterthought in a country they once defined. A group with a powerful vote has thus been neglected, and populists are beginning to take notice.