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Globalization and backlash: Polayni's revenge?

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates political-economic backlash to economic globalization in industrialized polities. It analyzes data on the content of party platforms to develop measures of party support for, or opposition to, political-economic closure, anti-democratic nationalism, and xenophobia in all party platforms of 23 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries for all national elections between 1960 and 2003. These allow broader judgments of trends in autarky and autarchy than focusing on electoral success of particular extreme-right parties. Based on these measures, the paper quantitatively analyzes how international trade and capital openness and flows, and immigration flows, all influence the embrace or rejection of political-economic backlash among parties. The main explanatory finding is that immigration and capital flows and openness tend to increase marginally such backlash when national welfare compensation is very modest, but to reduce it when national compensation is generous, cushioning citizens from globalization's economic risks. This finding provides evidence that the current wave of globalization only marginally resembles the dark politics ending its nineteenth-century predecessor, and that welfare protection may help make the difference between political-economic backlash and liberalism in contemporary globalization.

KEYWORDS

Globalization; welfare; backlash; parties; protectionism; immigration.

Post-WWII increases in international trade, investment and immigration have been seen by many to alter fundamentally the life chances of groups, the form and size of government policies, and the nature of democratic institutions. Concern and debate over such consequences have always taken place in the shadow of the last wave of globalization at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. That shadow, of course, is a dark one, with the 'Golden age' of globalization culminating in, some would say causing, Depression-era dislocation and the rise of fascism and

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world war. Focusing on this shadow, Karl Polanyi's *Great Transformation* (1944) chronicled how the self-regulating markets manifesting nineteenth-century globalization so damaged social life as to spark spontaneous and large-scale backlash, including the anti-democratic radicalisms of communist revolution and fascism. Many contemporary scholars have peppered their own analyses with warning-cries that current globalization, if not well regulated, may again spawn radicalisms of all forms, including nationalistic autarchy – that is, economic and political closure, nationalism, xenophobia and anti-democratic feeling (Bordo *et al.*, 2002; Kapstein, 1996; Kurzer, 1993; Rodrik, 1997).

In the industrialized world, such dire prophecies remain unfulfilled. But recent research sends contradictory signals about how much we should worry about history repeating itself. Some protectionist backlash has been documented in increased perceived insecurity and protectionist attitudes among those most exposed to international trade, investment and immigration. But dramatic political backlash has been kept at bay – a far cry from inter-war autarky or autarchy. And there is very little evidence that economic globalization has spurred widespread political nationalism or anti-democratic movements. Studies of anti-immigrant and extreme-right parties have yielded evidence that international trade and investment matter, but mixed evidence on the effects of unemployment, inequality and immigration.

Perhaps the backlash is sill to come, such that 'globaphobes' will be proven to have been right afterall. Or perhaps this wave of economic globalization has more modest stakes or takes place in a political climate accustomed to and better able to weather economic winds, such that the 'globaphobes' are just that – phobic towards modest challenges. Either possibility raises the question of whether, and under what conditions, economic globalization spurs or reduces backlash in the form of autarky or nationalist autarchy – the combination of nationalism, xenophobia and anti-democratic politics. At stake here is not just whether Polanyi is relevant for globalization politics, but whether and under what conditions globalization is politically sustainable and safe for liberal democracy.

This paper provides a partial answer to this question by analyzing party platforms in mature democracies. The descriptive focus, developed in the 'Political Backlash: Autarky and Nationalist Autarchy in Party Platforms' section later, is on how much parties support measures of political-economic backlash, using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project on party platforms in 23 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries between 1960 and 2003. I develop both a narrow conception of backlash, *net autarky,* how much party platforms embrace or eschew protectionism and internationalism; and a broad conception, *net nationalist autarchy,* how much platforms embrace or eschew not only protectionism and internationalism but also traditional

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morality, multi-culturalism, nationalist patriotism and democracy and human rights. These measures provide a broader assessment of backlash than existing studies, because the focus here is on agendas of all parties in a party system, not just the existence or electoral success of fringe parties.

The explanatory focus of this paper, developed in the 'Estimating the Role of Globalization and Social Policy' section, is on whether and under what conditions measures of economic globalization increase or decrease such *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy*. This analysis reveals that some, though not all, faces of economic globalization tend to affect both measures of backlash in party platforms, but in ways mediated by existing social welfare policies. Particularly capital openness and flows, and immigration flows, tend to increase net autarky and autarchy when welfare protection is very modest, but tend to have the opposite effects, to actually reduce both measures of backlash, when social policies are generous. These findings partly support the Polanyian idea that globalization may marginally spawn backlash if left unregulated and that social policies might help mitigate the dislocations of and help sustain globalization and liberal-democratic politics – manifesting a kind of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982).

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL BACKLASH: EMERGING OR IMAGINED?

How far and in what direction economic globalization might actually spark autarkic or autarchic backlash involves debate with respect to: (1) whether such globalization significantly affects life chances of various groups in the developed world; (2) whether this in turn yields significant political demands for economic policy protections; and (3) whether demands might go so far as to include autarky or nationalist autarchy. This debate has yielded plenty of insight into the first two of these issues, but much less into the third.

Political economists have long debated the risks and insecurities that economic globalization poses for particular workers and producers and polities generally. Cutting across such debate, there are plenty of reasons to expect trade, financial and direct investment and immigration to inspire significant insecurities for those tied to sectors facing such globalization and for economies generally. First, trade, investment and immigration – that is, imports plus exports, financial in- and out-flows, FDI in- and out-flows and immigration as a share of production or population – should increase insecurities and objective risks in countries facing such globalization. We can expect such insecurity for two reasons: because of the inter-industry component of such demand that may lower levels of demand for less-skilled labor; and because any kind of international trade and investment (both intra- and inter-industry) will tend to increase the elasticity of labor demand for all skill levels (Rodrik, 1997; Scheve and

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Slaughter, 2004; Traca, 2005). Such insecurity implies insecure and volatile wages, non-wage benefits and employment – regardless of the industrial relations in which benefits are negotiated and even if economy-wide and long-term effects are modest. In addition, adjustment costs associated with job-switching across sectors may significantly increase costs of openness in short-term calculations of job security and income even among those expected to gain in the long run (Davidson and Matusz, 2004).

All these kinds of increases in objective insecurities and costs can be expected to raise subjective dissatisfaction with job or income security (Aldrich *et al.*, 1999; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). Further, trade, investment or immigration signal more general exposure to dislocation risks that fuel *subjective* insecurity – especially given extensive discussion of such risks in the popular media. For instance, highly visible trade liberalization like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may have led to 'information cascades' fuelling subjective grievances and political action (Nelson, 2003). Together, therefore, globalization increases objective and subjective insecurities among a great many workers and producers.

Although often discussed in the context of a common framework, different faces of economic globalization can be expected to have different implications for risk. For instance, some faces of globalization more than others are visible, direct and palpable with respect to job risks – for instance, via threats of outsourcing by companies rather than via trade competition. And more obviously, immigration affects not only the economic conditions above but also feelings of identity, belonging and solidarity that can make its social effects go beyond the purely economic.

What this might mean for politics is subject to a related debate on whether globalization, via its distributional consequences, might influence demands for and supply of various government policies. Such policies include, of course, compensatory policies that might mitigate the costs of globalization, and such is the object of very nuanced controversy (cf. Hicks and Zorn, 2005; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1997; Swank, 2002). More relevant, however, is how globalization risks affect protectionist policies that might roll-back rather than compensate for globalization. Although less studied, plenty of evidence suggests that such economic backlash is real – at least under some conditions. Surveys of individual attitudes on trade, FDI and immigration suggest that in many countries support for protectionism is on the rise – concomitant with rising globalization (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, 2006). And those facing the most risk from globalization – unskilled workers and those tied to import-competing firms – tend to support disproportionately trade protectionism and curbs on immigration (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, 2006). Some studies have also found that the extent to which globalization spurs such economic backlash can be mitigated to the extent that national social policies are in place to compensate vulnerable workers adequately

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for the risks of openness (Hays *et al.*, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2006). Hence, globalization might well spur support for economic nationalism, particularly when not 'embedded' via compensation. Such findings raise concern that erosion of national social policies – whether or not linked to globalization – might create a slippery slope to economic closure.

Whether this merits concern of a slippery slope to autarchy more generally is a more open question. The precedent for such concern is the last wave of globalization – whose tragic culmination looms large in current thinking – perhaps best chronicled in Karl Polanyi's *Great Transformation.* Polanyi's study suggested that societies undergoing the tribulations of market liberalization naturally and 'spontaneously' take action to protect themselves from the damages of markets – in sharp contrast to the unnatural, not-spontaneous creation of such markets. For Polanyi, such reactions included a gamut of policy measures, most in tension with rather than working along-side such markets – from trade protectionism, capital controls and price-setting mechanisms, to minimum wage laws, worker's compensation and anything under the mantle 'social protection'. Polanyi thought these various measures of a piece, all part of society's natural self-preservation: 'Almost simultaneously the self-protection of society set in: factory laws and social legislation; and a political and industrial working class movement sprang into being' (Polanyi, 1944: 132). In countries experiencing the harshest pain of transition to self-regulating markets, further, Polanyi viewed such protective actions as preludes to anti-democratic authoritarian transition – either fascist or communist.

Polanyi was not much interested in drawing distinctions between the range of policies demanded and enacted. But subsequent writing, based on experience with post-war 'embedded liberalism', suggests the claim that national autarchy and Keynesian social capitalism are alternatives. As such, globalization might well spark demands for national autarchy – not only economic protectionism, but also broader xenophobia and anti-democratic nationalist traditionalism – should the more social democratic alternatives be lacking or hollowed-out due to globalization or other (domestic) causes (Greider, 1997; Kapstein, 1996; Ruggie, 1994). Where such social-democratic coverage is strong, such as via welfare protection, one might expect *ex ante* economic globalization to actually strengthen support for internationalism and rejection of autarchy, as groups increasingly gain from such openness while potential losers get bought-off and their worries diffused by social protection (Bordo *et al.*, 2002).

However plausible such links may be between globalization and nationalist autarchy, there are good reasons to doubt whether the dark destiny of the Great Transformation will befall the current wave of globalization. First, it may be that economic globalization poses only muted costs for most producers, in most countries, most of the time – meaning that backlashes will be, at worst, few and far between. Or it may be that those

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economically benefiting from globalization's distributional consequences will trump globalization's victims in politically mobilizing to deepen open polities and economies. It is also possible that development of global economic institutions – from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to G8 summitry – provide elements of control over globlization (particularly trade) so as to soften its risks and the backlash urge. More importantly, experiences with the tragedies of inter-bellum nationalist autarky and autarchy may be so internalized in political memory as to render such reactions off-limits in the minds of all but a very few – limiting such backlash to the margins of democratic politics. Finally, whatever the attractiveness of autarky or autarchy for those most frustrated by the vagaries of globalization, other radical policy responses that reject such autarchy are also possible. Indeed, the alter-globalization movement tends to seek radical reform rather than shutting-down of international institutions and economic openness and tends to champion social democracy much more than 'national socialism' or other anti-democratic reforms. This suggests again that the autarchic answer to globalization's ills will remain a marginal response. In short, globalization might not significantly unleash autarky or nationalist autarchy, even where social safety nets are minimal and getting rolled back.

Unfortunately, the empirical record is mixed and under-developed on whether globalization spurs backlash in thoughts, words or deeds. Some studies have found attitudes supporting, or votes for, extreme-right populist or fascist parties to correlate with economic conditions such as low education (relevant to skill level), blue-collar or manufacturing employment, personal unemployment or levels or changes in regional unemployment (Betz, 1994; Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Kessler and Freeman, 2005) – or more relevant still, subjective job insecurity (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000). The most relevant evidence comes from Swank and Betz's (2003) study focused on globalization and electoral success of 'radical right-wing populist' parties, which 'embrace neo-liberal economic programmes, xenophobia and strident anti-establishment positions' (218). These data suggest that globalization's effects are strongly dependent on welfare institutions, which putatively redress economic risks associated with globalization, deindustrialization and technological change. Also, immigration, investment and trade may increase such electoral success when extant social welfare is *least* generous and selective in benefit allocation – but decrease such success when welfare is more generous and universal.

On the other hand, such findings run against those of studies looking at other countries and time frames or using different estimation procedures. A number of studies of support for, and electoral success of, extreme-right parties variously defined have found little significance for the role of education (hence skill) (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006), inflation (Van der Brug *et al.*, 2005) and inequality and poverty (Jesuit and Mahler, 2005).

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And some studies find unemployment to be either an insignificant or significantly *negative* predictor of such backlash (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Van der Brug *et al.*, 2005). More directly relevant, studies have found immigration or asylum-seeking to be insignificant predictors of right-wing success (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Knigge, 1998; Van der Brug *et al.*, 2005). And some studies have found welfare spending to actually positively affect extreme-right votes and party strength, a pattern thought to reflect how welfare can facilitate political mobilization, stratify by benefit structure and channel marginal citizens to radicalism (Veugelers and Magnan, 2005). These all raise doubts about how economic conditions associated with globalization affect extreme-right-wing party support or electoral success.

More importantly, studies focused on such support or electoral success, whatever their conclusions, provide very rough information on backlash. Support or votes for a particular party labelled 'extreme-right', or self identification as being extreme-right does not mean the same thing as backlash, since many right-wing anti-immigration parties and identification might well include support for libertarian neo-liberalism and investment and trade openness (Fennema, 2004; Swank and Betz, 2003). Conversely, extreme left-wing parties might be or become just as or more focused on autarky or autarchy – something the inter-war years and Polanyi's account of them ought to remind us.

Finally, support for and success of extreme-right parties is both under- and over-inclusive of backlash in the polity as a whole. Perhaps countries experience substantial extreme-right-wing party success while the rest of the party system fully rejects such a party's program. In the Netherlands, for example, the success of extreme-right parties like the 'Lijst Pim Fortuyn' (LPF) or the more recent 'Partij voor de Vrijheid' (PVV) have inspired some parties in the center and left to eschew more vocally autarky, nationalism and autarchy. Alternatively, mainstream parties might well absorb rather than eschew some of the backlash program – as the Dutch example also shows: where the 2002 success of the LPF spurred more anti-immigration stances among parties across the entire left–right spectrum. In any event, understanding how globalization affects radical political backlash requires assessment of autarky and nationalist autarchy in the polity or party system as a whole.

POLITICAL BACKLASH: AUTARKY AND NATIONALIST AUTARCHY IN PARTY PLATFORMS

To do so, I analyze party platforms of all parties in 23 countries[1] from 1960 to 2003, focusing on party positions on trade protectionism, internationalism, nationalism, multiculturalism, traditionalism and democracy. The data come from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset (and

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its 2007 update), which measures party positions on particular issues by the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) about an issue as a percentage of total sentences in the manifesto (Budge *et al.*, 2001; Klingemann *et al.*, 2007; Laver and Garry, 2000). The measures capture salience of an issue to a party. But for some issues, the CMP separately measures positive and negative statements about policy, whereby scores gauge priorities of support or opposition to particular programs (Milner and Judkins, 2004). Such measures, to be sure, may suffer from measurement error, as some research on the CMP data has shown with respect to 'left-right' coding (Mikhaylov *et al.*, 2008), though the scale and implications of this for the measures built here remain unclear. Still, such measures may actually canvass party wishes more than activities once in power, where initiatives reflect constraints of coalition partners. And researchers have found that in various domains manifesto scores *do* predict party behavior in office (Bräuninger, 2005; Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Klingemann *et al.*, 1994).

In any event, these data provide leverage to quantify autarky and nationalist autarchy across countries, parties and time, and to judge whether and under what conditions various measures of globalization affect such backlash. To capture the range of backlash relevant to debates about globalization's political effects, I focus on two measures: (1) *net autarky,* focused narrowly on economic and political closure with respect to international activity; and (2) *net nationalist autarchy,* focused not only on such closure but also on nationalism, xenophobia, traditionalism and anti-democratic feeling.

Net autarky

To assess the degree to which parties embrace autarky in their platforms, I construct a composite of support for and opposition to those measured features of platforms that gauge economic and political isolation:[2] (1) *Protectionism,* support for and opposition to trade protectionism (per406 and per407, respectively); (2) *Internationalism,* support for and opposition to international institutions (per107 and per109, respectively, in the CMP codes); and (3) *European Union,* support for and opposition to authority of the EU as opposed to national sovereignty (per108 and per110, respectively). Unfortunately, the CMP data provide no other measures explicitly focused on support for or opposition to international economic or political influences, such as immigration. Although other measures are relevant to constructing a broader measure of political-economic backlash, the above three dimensions are the best data to capture autarky narrowly.

Based on these platforms, all expressed as sentences and quasi-sentences as a percentage of total platform sentences, I construct the variable *Net autarky: (per406 + per109+per110) − (per407+per107+per108).* Consistent with the convention in other studies using platform data, I treat the components as additive because they are all on the same salience scale of a

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party's platform rather than simply related or inversely-related components on different dimensions or scales (e.g., Budge *et al.*, 2001; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The score for *net autarky* varies, in theory, from –100 to +100: 100% of platform devoted to either rejecting or supporting, respectively, autarkic claims through one or other combination of platform elements above. In any event, this measure captures broadly how much a party in a given election prioritizes statements in line with autarky. Positive values represent net support for autarky and negative values represent net opposition to such autarky.

The *net autarky* scores vary dramatically over time, country and between parties in a given country–year.[3] The full sample (1657 party–country–year observations) has a mean of –3.1 (hence, the average party in the sample tending to eschew autarky in the net), with the mean level actually declining on average over the time period of the sample.[4] But this masks high dispersion within the sample, with a minimum of –28.5 (Danish Liberals in the 1990 election) and a maximum of 40.3 (Belgian 'Walloon Rally' in 1978) and a standard deviation of 5.05 (highly dispersed, given the mean).

To provide a more meaningful snapshot of *net autarky*, Figure 1 shows the sample distribution by country between 2000 and 2003. The distributions are represented as box plots, with the dark areas representing the twenty-fifth through the seventy-fifth percentile sample distribution; the white bar representing the fiftieth percent median point; the 'whiskers' capturing the



Figure 1 *Net autarky* scores in party systems (median scores 2000–3).

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fifth to ninety-fifth percentiles and the points outside the whiskers being the outliers (above the ninety-fifth or below the fifth percentile).

Such features of Figure 1 harbor information on the general patterns, the level of dispersion and the most and least autarkic parties – both within and across countries. The highest score in the 2000–3 sample – the Northern Irish Independence Party, with a score of 36.1 – is enough of an outlier that I exclude it from the figure so as to capture graphically the distribution for the rest of the sample. As all the remaining outliers show, Figure 1's high is for the Greek Communist Party, followed by the ultra-nationalist French National Front – with recent *net autarky* scores reaching 20.7 and 10.3, respectively. The sample low in the period is the Danish Radical Party, with a score of –18.9. More generally, it is interesting that parties with the highest scores are not just Nationalist (the French National Front, Dutch Pim Fortuyn, Danish People's Party, Belgian Flemish Bloc) but also left-wing parties – such as the Communist Party in Greece, Austria and Japan and the Left Party in Sweden. And the parties most actively eschewing autarky tend to be a mix of liberal and left parties.

If one considers the national medians, we can see that Greece's party system has the highest *net autarky*, though at –3.7 still negative in the net towards such *autarky*. The party system with the lowest sample median is Germany's – not surprising, perhaps, given consistent rejection of its own autarkic past. The width of distributions per country – capturing how divided parties within a country are on issues relevant to autarky – shows that Denmark, Greece and France harbor the widest dispersion. And the countries with least dispersion include the US, Portugal and Australia. Interestingly, it appears that countries with the most dispersion also harbor the highest outliers – suggesting that parties might balance one another in their platforms.

Net nationalist autarchy

Given debate about, and historical experience with, political backlash against globalization, it is important to not only assess the degree to which parties embrace autarky in the narrow sense of closure to international conditions but also in the more general, nationalist and anti-democratic sense reminiscent of the 1930s. To do so, I construct a composite of support for and opposition to those measured features of platforms that gauge not only internationalism, but also political nationalism, traditionalism, xenophobia and anti-democratic temperament. This entails supplementing the party embrace or rejection of *autarky,* as defined previously, with the following parameters:[5] (1) *Multiculturalism,* support for and opposition to multiculturalism and ethnic–linguistic–religious cultural diversity in country (per607 and per608, respectively); (2) *National way of life,* support for and criticism of patriotism, nationalism and laws to protect established

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ideas (per601 and per602, respectively); (3) *Traditional morality,* support for and opposition to traditional values and censorship or other laws to protect established national religion and values (per603 and per604, respectively); (4) *Constitutionalism,* support for and criticism of accepting constitutional constraints and 'constitutional way of doing things' (per203 and per204, respectively); and (5) *Democracy and freedom/human rights,* support for principles and legal specifics of minority protection and democratic procedure and of individual and political freedoms (per201 and per202, respectively).

Based on these platforms, I construct the variable *Net nationalist autarchy*: $(per109 + per110 + per406 + per601 + per608 + per603 + per204) - (per107 + per108 + per407 + per602 + per604 + per607 + per201 + per202 + per203)$. This measure captures how much a given party in a given election prioritizes a party program that champions autarky, broadly construed. Positive values represent net support for nationalist autarchy and negative values represent net opposition. As with the previous narrower conception of autarky, the *net nationalist autarchy* measure varies dramatically over time, country and party.[6] The full sample has a mean of –7.9 (the average party thus eschewing *net nationalist autarchy* in the net), with the level increasing appreciably on average between 1960 and 2003 – in contrast to the declining net autarky discussed previously. But again, this masks high dispersion within the sample, with a minimum of –53 (Finnish National Coalition in the 1970 election), followed closely by the Portuguese Socialists in the first post-Salazar 1975 election. The sample maximum, meanwhile, is 50, for the Danish People's Party in 2001 and the Finnish Christian Union in the 1970 election. The standard deviation of 10.9 is again higher than the mean, capturing how dispersed parties are in their net *nationalist autarchy*.

Figure 2 shows the box-plot overview of the sample distribution, by country, from 2000 to 2003. As the outliers show, the sample high is for the nationalist Danish People's Party, followed by the French National Front, with *net nationalist autarchy* scores of 50 and 26, respectively. The sample low in the period is the Danish Radical Party in the early 1990s, with a score of –40. Interestingly, the parties with the highest scores are not always Nationalist (the French National Front, the Swiss 'Democrats') but sometimes Christian Democratic parties – such as the Finnish Christian Union. And the parties most actively eschewing nationalist autarchy tend to be left parties, with some liberal-party exceptions. If one considers the recent national medians, we can see that the party system in Australia has the highest average *net nationalist autarchy*, tending to be positive on the side of backlash, and the country with the lowest sample median is again Germany. Finally, the breadth of distributions per country – capturing how divided parties are on issues relevant to nationalist autarchy – shows Denmark, Switzerland and France to have the widest dispersion in nationalist autarchy across parties, also countries with among the highest

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

Figure 2 *Net nationalist autarchy* scores in party systems (median scores 2000–3).

and lowest outliers. As with the narrower autarky scores, thus, there is again some hint that parties balance.

If we compare the narrow and broader backlash measures, we can see the expected overlap in empirical patterns but also a few differences. We saw previously that more radical left parties are often the strongest supporters of autarky, though not of nationalist autarchy; and that Christian Democratic parties tend not to embrace autarky but are often 'leaders' in broader nationalist autarchy. More generally, the two measures are highly positively correlated, as Figure 3 summarizes, based on country means for the whole sample period, 1960–2003. The correlation is clear enough (correlation coefficient .71), but the clearest departures from the pattern are interesting: the party system in the US, for instance, tends to be less autarkic than nationalistic autarchic, perhaps reflecting its general hegemonic position in world politics (hence stronger interest in narrower internationalism); and Portugal and Greece appear less nationalistic autarchic than autarkic, perhaps reflecting rejection of their more recent authoritarian past.

In short, both the *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy* capture overlapping but potentially different aspects of political backlash, or rejection of internationalism and political liberalism, respectively. Such measures harbor information not captured by the object of inquiry in many studies

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

Figure 3 *Net autarky* and *Net nationalist autarchy* in party systems (mean scores 1960–2003).

of political backlash, simple electoral success of parties taken *ex ante* as extremist right-wing.[7] However, to understand better how they are affected by globalization requires a more controlled analysis of their origins.

ESTIMATING THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL POLICY

Both *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy* can be quantitatively estimated as functions of economic globalization under varying social policy conditions. Such analysis can support broadly applicable inferences about links between globalization and party position-taking, net of many factors that might obscure those links, applicable to all parties in 23 countries for several decades.

Globalization

I choose measures of economic globalization to compare different faces of globalization – *trade* and *investment and immigration*, both *portfolio* and *direct* investment and *openness to* as well as *actual* flows. The measures vary across countries and years, where parties in a given country–year face equal globalization levels. *Trade flows* are exports plus imports as a percentage of

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gross domestic product (GDP), with a sample mean of 65.6, a minimum of 9.1 (US in 1964) and a maximum of 239.8 (Luxembourg in 1999) (Heston *et al.*, 2002). *Trade openness* is the absence of trade protectionism and is measured here as 100 minus tariffs as a percentage of imports, with a mean of 97 and ranging from 78 (Iceland in 1979) to 100 (e.g., the Netherlands for most years) (Rose, 2004). *Capital flows* are the sum of portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and outflows as a proportion of GDP, with a sample mean of .022, a minimum of –.01 (Denmark in 1977) and maximum of 2.29 (Belgium in 1999) (Huber *et al.*, 2004). *Capital openness* is an ordinal measure of the absence of current and capital account restrictions, ranging from 0 (complete closure) to 14 (complete openness) but with a sample mean of 10, a minimum of 4.5 (Greece in the 1960s) and a maximum of 14 (US by the 1990s) (Quinn, 1997). Finally, *net migration* is inflow of migrants, net of outflow (expressed as number per 1000 inhabitants), providing the most temporally and cross-nationally comparable immigration estimates (OECD, 2007).

Welfare provision

I report two measures of social welfare provision. The one with the most coverage is *social security transfers* as percentage of GDP (OECD, various years). Such transfers include unemployment, social-security, health and other transfers of welfare states, and correlates highly with other measures of spending or generosity with narrower coverage. This measure imperfectly captures generosity, but is a very visible and concrete means by which polities might gauge welfare effort. Between 1960 and 2003, the sample mean is 13%, ranging from 3.7% (Japan in 1963) to 27.3% (the Netherlands in 1982). The second measure is a moving average of welfare *decommodification score*, based on Scruggs's (2004) update of Esping-Andersen's (1990) initial model and focused on replacement rates, waiting periods and duration of benefits of health, pension and unemployment benefits. Despite more limited coverage and less temporal variation, this more directly measures generosity than do spending measures. The sample mean is 28, ranging from 11 (Japan in 1972) to 45 (Sweden in 1988).

Substantive controls

I control for factors plausibly influencing both globalization and backlash. *Old-age population* is proportion of the population 65 and older and can be expected to influence entrance into exposed sectors and has been shown to correlate negatively with support for extreme-right parties (OECD, various years). *Seats in parliament* capture a party's proportion of seats in parliament in the previous election, measuring how much parties take positions on policies that are genuine policy-making resolutions as opposed to 'grand

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standing' (Sartori, 1976). *GDP per capita (logged)* measures general economic wealth, which might be expected to diminish tendency to support economic and political backlash (Heston *et al.*, 2002). *Unemployment rate* captures background socio-economic conditions that some studies have found to influence anti-immigrant, populist positions (OECD, various years). *Deindustrialization* measures how much employment has shifted away from manufacturing and agricultural production, a plausible source of demands for backlash (Swank and Betz, 2003). I also include dummies for party families (time-invariant, from the CMP coding of party families) – Liberal, Left, Christian Democratic and National parties – to control for how party families have histories more or less susceptible to elements of backlash.

Estimation technique

The above parameters constitute an unbalanced panel of party–country–years. The panel is unit-dominated – with some 200 parties as units and between 2 and 14 elections per party (7 on average) – and the number and spread of years per unit is uneven given the unique spread of elections in different countries. To deal with non-spherical errors in an unbalanced panel with unevenly spaced time observations, I combine Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, providing consistent coefficient estimates, with the Huber–White *robust-cluster* 'sandwich' estimator of standard errors, clustered over parties (country-specific) (see discussion in Bradley *et al.*, 2003).

The Polanyian expectation is that measures of globalization will correlate positively with both *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy* to the extent that *ex ante* social policies are modest, but will tend to be neutral or to reduce both when social policies are generous. Hence, I fit a series of models taking the following general form:

$$\begin{aligned} &Net\ Autarky_{pit}(or\ Nationalist\ Autarchy_{pit}) = \alpha + \beta_1 Globalization_{it-1} \\ &\quad + \beta_2 Social\ policy\ protection_{it} + \beta_3 Globalization_{it-1} \\ &\quad 1^{*} Social\ policy\ protection_{it} + \beta_4\ Net\ Autarky(Nationalist\ Autrachy)_{pit-1} \\ &\quad + \beta_5 Controls_{it-1} + \beta_6 Controls_{pi} + \beta_7 Controls_{pit} + u_i + \varepsilon_{pit} \end{aligned}$$

The estimations for both *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy* model the interaction between globalization and either social transfers or decommodification scores in shaping backlash. I report the models with each of the five faces of globalization separately (β_1), because the varying coverage of the different faces yields a big loss of degrees of freedom when run together and because I am interested in unraveling the possibly diverging implications of these different faces of globalization. The multiplicative

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term β_3 expresses how much the effects of globalization change with varying welfare generosity. Some right-hand factors are party–country–year (e.g. seats in parliament); others party–country (i.e. time-invariant, such as party families); and still others are country–year (e.g., globalization and welfare measures). I lag all right-hand country–year measures by 1 year to address possible endogeneity and the time it takes parties to absorb political-economic developments. Further, estimations include lagged dependent variables (levels of net autarky or net autarchy in previous election) to address possible temporal dependence, though by eating-up variation pose a harder test for the substantive factors. I include dummies for 23 countries (u_i) to address further unit-level heteroskedasticity and account for unobserved effects of parties and/or countries. Given uneven distributions of elections, yearly or period dummies are jointly insignificant (with and without the lagged dependent variable); I therefore use a year-count to account further for possible trend effects.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: POLANYI'S REVENGE OR RETREAT?

Net autarky

Table 1 summarizes the estimates for *net autarky* scores. For each measure of economic globalization, Table 1 reports two specifications, focused on the mediating effects of social transfers and decommodification scores, respectively. All the models shown have a full complement of substantive controls, lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects. These controls fit expectation. Lagged *net autarky* is always positive and highly significant, and country dummies are highly jointly significant (results not shown). Proportion of seats going into an election tends to correlate significantly negatively with *net autarky*, suggesting that more established parties might be less prone to backlash in their platforms. Old-age population, as expected, correlates negatively though insignificantly with *net autarky*. Neither deindustrialization nor unemployment has significant effects. And party–family dummies are signed and significant in directions consistent with Figure 1: Liberal and Christian Democratic parties, and Left parties less so, tend to have lower *net autarky* scores, while National parties tend to have higher *net autarky* scores.

Consistent with expectation, across various measures globalization tends to correlate positively with *net autarky* when welfare provisions are (theoretically) zero (with the exception of trade openness) and the negatively signed coefficients for interaction terms between measures of welfare protection and globalization suggest that this positive effect goes down (becomes less positive or more negative) with more generous welfare. These patterns are not, however, always significant, with results varying across

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Table 1 *Net autarky* and economic globalization: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over parties (country-specific)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade flows$_{t-1}$	0.056**	0.087*								
	(0.023)	(0.047)								
Trade openness $_{t-1}$			−0.227	0.750*						
			(0.229)	(0.381)						
Capital flows$_{t-1}$					18.553**	2.738				
					(8.424)	(14.246)				
Capital openness$_{t-1}$							0.143†	1.090***		
							(0.192)	(0.330)		
Net migration$_{t-1}$									0.063	0.746***
									(0.106)	(0.276)
Social transfers$_{t-1}$	0.281***		−1.711		−0.010		0.322**		0.099	
	(0.103)		(1.732)		(0.100)		(0.134)		(0.061)	
Decommodification $_{t-1}$		0.073		2.969*		−0.053		0.224*		−0.067
		(0.111)		(1.608)		(0.088)		(0.133)		(0.060)
Globalization$^{\times}$ Social transfers	−0.002***		0.016		−1.260**		−0.025*		−0.003	
	(0.001)		(0.018)		(0.527)		(0.013)		(0.009)	
Globalization$^{\times}$ Decommodification		−0.003**		−0.030*		−0.128		−0.034***		−0.031***
		(0.001)		(0.016)		(0.435)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Net autarky$_{t-1}$	0.436***	0.379***	0.343***	0.319***	0.342***	0.320***	0.362***	0.328***	0.441***	0.365***
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.051)
Seats (proportion total)	−2.272***	−2.117***	−2.863***	−2.356**	−2.049**	−2.893***	−1.869**	−2.525***	−2.304***	−2.213***
	(0.785)	(0.694)	(0.906)	(0.969)	(1.025)	(0.956)	(0.813)	(0.765)	(0.784)	(0.719)
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$	1.245	−0.743	−2.511	−5.777*	1.959	−2.099	1.321	−1.317	1.669	−0.779
	(1.432)	(2.065)	(2.836)	(3.210)	(3.978)	(3.677)	(1.491)	(2.112)	(1.411)	(1.991)
Unemployment$_{t-1}$	−0.070	0.003	−0.020	−0.164	0.063	−0.093	−0.045	−0.064	−0.071	−0.047
	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.114)	(0.144)	(0.106)	(0.118)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.063)	(0.082)

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Table 1 *Net autarky* and economic globalization: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over parties (country-specific) *(Continued)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Old-age population$_{t-1}$	−5.396	−6.325	−35.503	−56.978	−24.208	−5.144	−20.808	−20.506	−6.678	−8.206
	(15.625)	(15.844)	(27.331)	(36.761)	(24.425)	(25.750)	(17.363)	(19.308)	(14.410)	(16.449)
Deindustrial-ization$_{t-1}$	3.477	0.141	5.922	9.508	−4.407	6.872	−1.776	8.935	5.241	1.994
	(6.110)	(9.589)	(12.587)	(17.312)	(11.965)	(14.835)	(6.676)	(10.887)	(6.000)	(10.094)
Left party	−0.533	−0.980***	−0.786	−0.924*	−1.209**	−1.006**	−0.687*	−0.858**	−0.532	−0.970**
	(0.358)	(0.363)	(0.489)	(0.505)	(0.496)	(0.494)	(0.373)	(0.419)	(0.361)	(0.380)
Christian-democratic party	−1.191***	−1.594***	−1.574**	−1.773***	−1.656***	−1.650***	−1.296***	−1.668***	−1.146***	−1.592***
	(0.406)	(0.418)	(0.616)	(0.669)	(0.616)	(0.622)	(0.440)	(0.495)	(0.406)	(0.442)
Right party	−1.042***	−1.298***	−1.118**	−1.367**	−1.444***	−1.336**	−1.215***	−1.253***	−1.025***	−1.309***
	(0.362)	(0.380)	(0.515)	(0.554)	(0.522)	(0.528)	(0.381)	(0.430)	(0.364)	(0.398)
National party	2.497***	2.759***	3.019***	3.259***	2.665**	2.791**	2.482**	2.918**	2.484***	2.803***
	(0.841)	(0.955)	(1.140)	(1.216)	(1.213)	(1.229)	(0.996)	(1.154)	(0.843)	(0.988)
Year	−0.123**	−0.030	−0.026	0.054	−0.052	−0.043	−0.036	−0.071	−0.115**	−0.028
	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.099)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.067)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1274	970	801	679	725	707	1152	861	1274	959
R-squared	0.37	0.40	0.36	0.37	0.34	0.36	0.34	0.39	0.37	0.40

Notes: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% or lower; †joint significance of interaction term and components at 5% or lower.

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the two measures of welfare provision and five measures of globalization. In any event, understanding the results requires more explicit analysis of the interaction and of substantive effects.

Figure 4 overviews such interaction, based on regressions in Table 1 where both the globalization parameter and the interaction term are statistically significant. Figure 4 summarizes how the marginal effects of trade flows and openness, capital flows and openness and net migration (on the y-axis in each panel) are mediated by *in-sample* variation in either social transfers or decommodification (the x-axis) (Brambor *et al.*, 2005). The solid lines capture un-standardized coefficients under varying *social transfers* or



Figure 4 Marginal effects of globalization on *Net autarky.*

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decommodification and the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals. Where the solid line is above 0, rising globalization spurs *net autarky* and where it falls below 0, globalization diminishes support for *net autarky*. Where both upper and lower schedules of the confidence-interval are above (below) 0 on the y-axis, the positive (negative) coefficients are significant with 95% confidence. The vertical line marks the sample's fiftieth percentile in transfers and *decommodification*.

The upper panels show that trade flows more positively affect *net autarky* as *social transfers* and *decommodification* rise, but do so significantly at the 95% level only when *transfers* are between the first and the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution. Beyond that, and for the whole distribution of *decommodification* scores (right-upper panel), trade flows have either no significant positive effect or become negative in their effect – significantly so in interaction with *decommodification*. The remaining panels show that capital flows significantly (at the 95% level) spur *net autarky* when *social transfers* are below the twenty-fourth percentile (9.4% of GDP); that capital openness does so when *decommodification* is below the fortieth percentile (a *decommodification* score of 26.8); and that net migration does so when *decommodification* is below the thirty-third percentile (23.5 *decommodification* score). In short, the investment- and immigration-related globalization significantly positively affect *net autarky* when welfare protection is low but significantly negative affect it when welfare is generous.

The substantive sizes of such effects are, in any event, modest in general and vary across globalization measures. Figure 5 illustrates how in-sample variation in capital openness and immigration (parameters with the strongest conditional effects) affect *net autarky* at low and high levels of *decommodification*. The predicted effects are generated with simulations based on Table 1, using Tomz *et al.*'s *Clarify* (Tomz *et al.*, 2001; King *et al.*, 2000). The panels map predicted *net autarky* (vertical axis) across the sample range of capital openness (left-hand panel) and immigration (right-hand panel) at low *decommodification* (tenth percentile in the sample, score 18.7) versus at high *decommodification* (ninetieth percentile, 37). The solid lines are the predicted schedules and the dashed lines the lower and upper schedules of the 95% confidence interval. The predicted relationship is positive with 95% confidence when both the upper and lower intervals have a positive slope and negative with 95% confidence when both have negative slopes; if the signs of the slopes of the upper and lower schedules differ, we cannot rule out that the relationship is zero.

Focusing first on capital openness, at the sample's tenth percentile of *decommodification* (18.7, roughly Italy in its 1976 election) moving from relatively closed capital markets (6.5, the sample's tenth percentile) to moderately open ones (11.5, the sample's seventy-fifth percentile) predicts an increase in a party's *net autarky* score from −4.1 to −1.8. This is a statistically significant shift (both the upper and lower schedules are positively sloped

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

Figure 5 *Net autarky* as a function of capital openness and net migration.

throughout) and is comparable to moving from the sample's thirty-fifth to the sixty-fifth percentile of *net autarky*. In contrast, the same rise in capital openness under generous welfare protection (ninetieth percentile in *decommodification*) predicts a modest but statistically significant *decrease* in *net autarky* from −3.9 to −4.2. Although the variation experienced in most countries is more modest – where welfare provision and capital openness

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change less dramatically – the basic pattern holds. For instance, moving from Belgium's 1972 level of capital openness (7.5) to its more liberalized 1991 level (12) when Belgium's *decommodification* level is 24.8 (its 1972 level) it predicts a statistically significant increase in *net autarky* from −3.4 to −2.2; yet the same shift in capital openness under Belgium's higher *decommodification* level in the 1980's (32.5) predicts a *decrease* in *net autarky*, albeit statistically and substantively insignificant, from −3.56 to −3.62.

The story with respect to immigration (right-hand panel) follows the same general pattern. The upward-sloping schedule shows how at low *decommodification*, increasing net migration predicts statistically significant increases in *net autarky* throughout the sample distribution. But the increase is substantively modest, as going from the sample's tenth to the seventy-fifth percentile in net migration (from −1.42 to 2.9 per thousand inhabitants) predicts an increase from −2.64 to −1.92 in *net autarky* – roughly from the forty-eighth through the fifty-fifth percentile in the sample's distribution. When decommodification is at the ninetieth percentile, however, the same increase net migration predicts substantively and statistically significant reduction in *net autarky* from −3.1 to −4.9 (from the forty-third to the twenty-eighth percentile). Hence, net migration tends to have a more negative than positive effect on *net autarky* as welfare protection rises – more so than does capital openness, but also more so than trade or capital flows (see Figure 4).

Net nationalist autarchy

Table 2 summarizes the results for the broader measure of backlash – *net nationalist autarchy.* The specifications are otherwise identical to those in Table 1. Controls perform similarly as with the *net autarky*, though proportion of legislative seats is no longer consistently significantly negative and though old-age proportion is significantly negative. The only exception in sign is the effect of Christian Democratic party types, where such parties tend to be more supportive of *net nationalist autarchy* than Left or Liberal parties.

The main results show patterns in line with those for *net autarky*, though with weaker conditional effects for trade and stronger conditional effects for capital openness and flows and net migration. Neither trade flows nor trade openness significantly affect *net nationalist autarchy*, regardless of extant social protection. On the other hand, capital flows and openness and net migration *do* have significant implications for *net nationalist autarchy*, more consistently so than for narrower *net autarky.* This is immediately apparent by the larger and often more significant coefficients for capital flows (in interaction with social transfers) and for both capital openness and net migration (in interaction with both transfers and *decommodification*) and by the significantly negative coefficients for the respective interaction terms.

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Table 2 *Net nationalist autarchy* and economic globalization: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over parties (country-specific)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade flows$_{t-1}$	0.024	0.103								
	(0.042)	(0.091)								
Trade openness$_{t-1}$			−0.225	0.466						
			(0.234)	(0.816)						
Capital flows$_{t-1}$					44.359**	−4.057				
					(20.282)	(25.910)				
Capital openness$_{t-1}$							0.940**	2.221***		
							(0.431)	(0.565)		
Net migration$_{t-1}$									0.702***	1.565***
									(0.264)	(0.569)
Social transfers$_{t-1}$	0.309		−1.457		0.283		1.101***		0.344***	
	(0.187)		(2.457)		(0.175)		(0.291)		(0.102)	
Decommodification$_{t-1}$		−0.030		2.311		−0.359*		0.572**		−0.096
		(0.201)		(3.785)		(0.192)		(0.235)		(0.127)
Globalization× Social transfers	0.000		0.016		−2.779**		−0.084***		−0.040**	
	(0.002)		(0.025)		(1.259)		(0.028)		(0.020)	
Globalization× Decommodification		−0.003		−0.024		0.102		−0.084***		−0.060***
		(0.003)		(0.038)		(0.787)		(0.017)		(0.022)
Net Autarchy$_{t-1}$	0.437***	0.459***	0.415***	0.441***	0.456***	0.448***	0.420***	0.434***	0.439***	0.453***
	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Seats (proportion total)	0.599	−0.067	0.171	−0.240	−0.420	−0.216	0.988	−0.629	0.514	−0.182
	(1.461)	(1.638)	(1.702)	(1.771)	(1.825)	(1.902)	(1.562)	(1.764)	(1.446)	(1.637)
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$	−2.333	−6.328*	−7.698	−13.245**	−4.693	−4.935	−4.341	−5.719	−4.152	−5.362
	(2.803)	(3.524)	(5.479)	(5.852)	(6.949)	(6.652)	(2.910)	(3.822)	(3.004)	(3.486)
Unemployment$_{t-1}$	−0.135	0.070	−0.069	−0.255	−0.042	−0.109	−0.107	−0.049	−0.105	0.088
	(0.127)	(0.155)	(0.213)	(0.269)	(0.220)	(0.254)	(0.136)	(0.164)	(0.131)	(0.175)

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Table 2 *Net nationalist autarchy* and economic globalization: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over parties (country-specific) *(Continued)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Old-age population$_{t-1}$	−36.502	−57.499**	−123.04***	−135.91**	−88.272**	−57.859	−79.966**	−117.8***	−40.109	−80.415 * *
	(27.675)	(27.468)	(45.469)	(59.468)	(38.254)	(41.325)	(31.187)	(34.769)	(28.769)	(31.460)
Deindustrial-ization$_{t-1}$	0.270	8.912	18.059	51.417	21.750	52.800	−4.357	35.270	−1.102	3.168
	(16.900)	(20.486)	(25.486)	(36.388)	(27.792)	(34.911)	(18.156)	(23.234)	(16.509)	(20.860)
Left party	−1.032	−1.725**	−1.399*	−1.826**	−1.723**	−1.736**	−0.994	−1.505*	−1.006	−1.717**
	(0.715)	(0.782)	(0.793)	(0.825)	(0.819)	(0.855)	(0.792)	(0.889)	(0.706)	(0.793)
Christian-democratic party	3.036**	2.842**	2.970**	2.317*	2.565*	2.569*	3.101**	3.059**	3.019***	2.951**
	(1.185)	(1.211)	(1.273)	(1.335)	(1.335)	(1.391)	(1.242)	(1.355)	(1.156)	(1.244)
Right party	−0.835	−1.122	−0.932	−1.510*	−1.601*	−1.575*	−0.845	−0.934	−0.803	−1.129
	(0.720)	(0.811)	(0.781)	(0.813)	(0.815)	(0.849)	(0.751)	(0.862)	(0.714)	(0.824)
National party	15.213***	15.551***	16.211***	15.090***	14.131***	14.254***	15.079***	15.709***	15.571***	15.686***
	(3.429)	(3.269)	(3.881)	(3.995)	(3.783)	(3.794)	(3.606)	(3.939)	(3.493)	(3.283)
Year	0.059	0.189	0.164	0.213	0.100	0.034	0.207*	0.194	0.106	0.231*
	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.154)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.122)	(0.123)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1274	970	801	679	725	707	1152	861	1274	959
R-squared	0.45	0.51	0.46	0.47	0.48	0.48	0.45	0.50	0.45	0.51

Notes: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% or lower.

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

Figure 6 Marginal effects of globalization on *Net nationalist autarchy.*

Figure 6 clarifies the substantive interaction, using the same method as Figure 4. As with *net autarky*, at lower levels of welfare protection, rising investment and immigration predict increases in *net nationalist autarchy*, while at lower protection these globalization measures predict decreases. The positive marginal coefficients, further, are significant for a larger swath of the sample distribution of welfare protection than was true for *net autarky.* Again, however, at higher levels of social protection (as one moves well above the sample mean) investment and immigration tend to decrease *net nationalist autarchy* – significantly so in all cases except net migration in interaction with social transfers (the upper confidence interval remains above zero).

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

Figure 7 *Net nationalist autarchy* as a function of capital openness and net migration.

Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the size of these conditional effects. The left panel illustrates how going from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile in capital openness under low *decommodification* (again, tenth percentile) predicts an increase from −7.6 to −4.06 in *net nationalist autarchy* (from the fifty-first to the sixty-sixth percentile). This is meaningful, but more modest than the same counterfactual for *net autarky*. At high *decommodification* (ninetieth percentile), however, the same rising capital openness predicts a statistically significant drop from −6.3 to −11.1 (from the fifty-seventh to the thirty-third percentile). The interaction is meaningful given varying

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welfare and capital openness as experienced by a given country in the sample. For instance, Belgium's 1972 *decommodification* score of 24.8 going from 7.5 to 12 in capital openness, which it has experienced in recent decades, predicts an increase in *net nationalist autarchy* from −7 to −6.3 (from the fifty-fourth to the fifty-seventh percentile); but at its later 32.5 *decommodification* score, the same rise in capital openness predicts a statistically significant decrease from −7.4 to −9.6 (fifty-second to forty-first percentile).

The substantive effects for capital flows and for net migration are somewhat more positive when welfare is modest and less negative when welfare is generous. The right-hand panel in Figure 7 illustrates this for net migration. At low social transfers of 7% of GDP – roughly the level obtaining in Canada in 1972 – moving from low net migration (−1.42 at the tenth percentile in the OECD sample) to high net inflow (6.34, the sample's ninetieth percentile) predicts an increased *net nationalist autarchy* score from about −10.7 to about −7.5 (roughly from the thirty-seventh to the fifty-fourth percentile). This is substantively comparable to moving from the Belgian Liberal Progress party in the 1999 election to the Belgian Christian Social Party in 1968. In contrast, the same shift in net migration under conditions of very generous social transfers – 18% of GDP, the ninetieth percentile of the distribution – has essentially no effect on *net nationalist autarchy*, shown by the lightly positive schedule that is statistically insignificant throughout the sample (the lower and upper schedules always have different signs).

In summary, investment and immigration, more than trade flows or openness, may spur both *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy* when welfare protection is weak, but are actually forces reducing both measures of backlash in generous welfare settings. Although other interpretations are possible, moving to openness while mitigating its incumbent economic risks may well unleash increasing returns to further openness and remind polities of the rising importance of remaining tied to political and economic liberal-internationalism (e.g., Garrett, 1998; Swank and Betz, 2003). As an econometric matter, the results shown in both Tables 1 and 2 hold up when removing various right-hand controls; removing outliers based on globalization and backlash measures; removing (step-wise) any one country from the sample; focusing on a composite measure of economic globalization; considering other estimators such as Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), panel-corrected standard errors and running fixed effects for all parties or party groups.

CONCLUSION

These findings provide new evidence into the patterns and international-economic origins of backlash – not just measured by electoral votes for particular party types but by platforms of all parties throughout the OECD between 1960 and 2003. Particularly, capital openness and flows and net migration tend to increase modestly the extent to which party platforms

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take positions that constitute *net autarky* or *net nationalist autarchy* – but only when social protection is very modest. When social protection is more substantial, these same faces of globalization tend to actually diminish the backlash in party platforms. Such patterns suggest that generous social policies and open international economic policies may work together to keep *autarky* and *autarchy* at bay. Put more in the language of Polanyi, the embedding of political-economic liberalism may help sustain and deepen it.

Of course, such conclusions deserve more scrutiny. In addition to further analysis of party platforms, further research should consider micro and aggregate political developments via surveys of individuals, party representatives and other political elites and via case studies – so long as they canvass *parties of varying ideological stripes,* not just extremist outliers. Further research should also consider which aspects of social policy and other aspects of political-economic regulation – such as international regulations – are most important to mediating globalization's effects. In the meantime, this study reveals enough parallels to the troubled history of the last great wave of globalization to warrant giving Polanyi his due – but mainly in clarifying how and why the current wave of globalization has so far avoided that troubled history.

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NOTES

1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
2 See Appendix for a detailed wording of these platform elements.
3 Appendix Table 1 provides the summary statistics.
4 The sample mean in the decade 1960–69 is 34% higher than the mean between 2000 and 2003, excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain which were not in the sample until the mid-1970s.
5 The Appendix gives detailed wording of these platform elements.
6 Appendix Table 1 provides the summary statistics for both of these measures.
7 For instance, the means shown in Figures 1 and 2 do not significantly correlate with Betz and Swank's data on post-1990 electoral support for 'radical right-wing populist parties'.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR

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APPENDIX

Measuring *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarchy* in party platforms

Net autarky and *Net nationalist autarchy* as measured as composite scores for additive elements of a party platform (measured as relevant sentences or sentence fragments, as a % of total sentences in platform).

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Net autarky} &= (per109 + per110 + per406) - (per107 + per108 \\ &\quad + per407) \\ \textit{Net nationalist autarchy} &= (per109 + per110 + per406 + per601 + per608 \\ &\quad + per603 + per204) - (per107 + per108 + per407 \\ &\quad + per602 + per604 + per607 + per201 + per202 \\ &\quad + per203) \end{aligned}$$

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The Comparative Manifesto Project codebook words the parameters as follows (preceded, in parentheses, with the sign of whether the element is counted in the above composite as support for or opposition to nationalist autarchy).

(–) per107. *Internationalism: Positive*

Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for UN.

(+) per109. *Internationalism: Negative*

Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative.

(–) per108. *European Community: Positive*

Favourable mentions of European Community/European Union in general; desirability of expanding the European Community/European Union and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining or remaining a member.

(+) per110. *European Community: Negative*

Hostile mentions of the European Community/European Union; opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as 108, but negative.

(+) per406. *Protectionism: Positive*

Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions.

(–) per407. *Protectionism: Negative*

Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative.

(+) per601. *National Way of Life: Positive*

Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas.

(–) per602. *National Way of Life: Negative*

Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; otherwise as 601, but negative.

(–) per607. *Multiculturalism: Positive*

Cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarization; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions.

(+) per608. *Multiculturalism: Negative*

Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; otherwise as 607, but negative.

(+) per603. *Traditional Morality: Positive*

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Favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; religion.

(–) per604. *Traditional Morality: Negative*

Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; otherwise as 603, but negative.

(–) per201. *Freedom and Human Rights*

Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and in other countries.

(–) per202. *Democracy*

Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organisations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country's democracy.

(–) per203. *Constitutionalism: Positive*

Support for specific aspects of the constitution; use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things.

(+) per204. *Constitutionalism: Negative*

Opposition to the constitution in general or to specific aspects; otherwise as 203, but negative.

Appendix Table 1 Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Net autarky	1657	−3.07	5.05	−28.49	40.30
Net nationalist autarchy	1657	−7.89	10.83	−53.19	50.00
Trade flows	1626	65.63	35.24	9.31	239.78
Trade openness	946	97.35	3.93	78.74	100.00
Capital flows	832	0.08	0.25	0.00	2.26
Capital openness	1362	9.13	2.27	4.50	12.00
Net migration	1638	1.88	−4.11	10.57	38.16
Social-security transfers	1490	13.13	4.58	3.70	27.29
Decommodification scores	1094	28.14	7.14	11.35	45.13
Seats (proportion total)	1464	0.18	0.17	0.00	0.75
GDP per capita (logged)	1645	9.75	0.34	8.44	10.71
Unemployment	1646	5.83	4.54	0.00	22.78
Old-age population	1595	0.13	0.03	0.06	0.19
Deindustrialization	1635	0.72	0.07	0.50	0.85
Left party dummy	1657	0.37	0.48	0	1
Christian Democratic dummy	1657	0.13	0.33	0	1
Liberal party dummy	1657	0.28	0.45	0	1
National party dummy	1657	0.03	0.16	0	1

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