

The Globalization and Development Reader

Perspectives on Development and
Global Change

Edited by

J. Timmons Roberts

and

Amy Bellone Hite

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Samuel Huntington

The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics

I Political Science and Political Change

Change is a problem for social science. Sociologists, for instance, have regularly bemoaned their lack of knowledge concerning social change . . . Yet, as opposed to political scientists, the sociologists are relatively well off. Compared with past neglect of the theory of political change in political science, sociology is rich with works on the theory of social change. These more generalized treatments are supplemented by the extensive literature on group dynamics, planned change, organizational change, and the nature of innovation. Until very recently, in contrast, political theory in general has not attempted to deal directly with the problems of change. "Over the last seventy-five years," David Easton wrote in 1953, "political research has confined itself largely to the study, of given conditions to the neglect of political change."¹ . . .

II The Context of Modernization

General Theory of Modernization

The new developments in comparative politics in the 1950s involved extension of the geographical scope of concern from Western Europe and related areas to the non-Western "developing" countries. It was no longer true that political scientists ignored change. Indeed, they seemed almost overwhelmed with the immensity of the changes taking place in the modernizing societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The theory of modernization was embraced by political scientists, and comparative politics was looked at in the context of modernization. The concepts of modernity and tradition bid fair to replace many of the other typologies which had been dear to the hearts of political analysts: democracy, oligarchy, and dictatorship; liberalism and conservatism; totalitarianism and

constitutionalism; socialism, communism, and capitalism; nationalism and internationalism. Obviously, these categories were still used. But by the late 1960s, for every discussion among political scientists in which the categories "constitutional" and "totalitarian" were employed, there must have been ten others in which the categories "modern" and "traditional" were used. . . .

The essential difference between modern and traditional society, most theorists of modernization contend, lies in the greater control which modern man has over his natural and social environment. This control, in turn, is based on the expansion of scientific and technological knowledge. . . . To virtually all theorists, these differences in the extent of man's control over his environment reflect differences in his fundamental attitudes toward and expectations from his environment. The contrast between modern man and traditional man is the source of the contrast between modern society and traditional society. Traditional man is passive and acquiescent; he expects continuity in nature and society and does not believe in the capacity of man to change or to control either. Modern man, in contrast, believes in both the possibility and the desirability of change, and has confidence in the ability of man to control change so as to accomplish his purposes.

At the intellectual level, modern society is characterized by the tremendous accumulation of knowledge about man's environment and by the diffusion of this knowledge through society by means of literacy, mass communications, and education. In contrast to traditional society, modern society also involves much better health, longer life expectancy, and higher rates of occupational and geographical mobility. It is predominantly urban rather than rural. Socially, the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles are supplanted or supplemented in modern society by consciously organized secondary associations having more specific functions. Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skill and the ratio of capital to labor are much higher than in traditional society. Agriculture declines in importance compared to commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural activities, and commercial agriculture replaces subsistence agriculture. The geographical scope of economic activity is far greater in modern society than in traditional society, and there is a centralization of such activity at the national level, with the emergence of a national market, national sources of capital, and other national economic institutions . . .

The bridge across the Great Dichotomy between modern and traditional societies is the Grand Process of Modernization. The broad outlines and characteristics of this process are also generally agreed upon by scholars. Most writers on modernization implicitly or explicitly assign nine characteristics to the modernization process.

- 1 Modernization is a *revolutionary* process. This follows directly from the contrasts between modern and traditional society. The one differs fundamentally from the other, and the change from tradition to modernity consequently involves a radical and total change in patterns of human life. The shift from tradition to modernity, as Cyril Black says, is comparable to the changes from prehuman to human existence and from primitive to civilized societies. The changes in the eighteenth century, Reinhard Bendix echoes, were "Comparable in magnitude only to the transformation of nomadic peoples into settled agriculturalists some 10,000 years earlier."²

- 2 Modernization is a *complex* process. It cannot be easily reduced to a single factor or to a single dimension. It involves changes in virtually all areas of human thought and behavior. At a minimum, its components include: industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, differentiation, secularization, media expansion, increasing literacy and education, expansion of political participation.
- 3 Modernization is a *systemic* process. Changes in one factor are related to and affect changes in the other factors. Modernization, as Daniel Lerner has expressed it in an oft-quoted phrase, is "a process with some distinctive *quality* of its own, which would explain why modernity is felt as a *consistent whole* among people who live by its rules." The various elements of modernization have been highly associated together "because, in some historic sense, they *had to go together*."³
- 4 Modernization is a *global* process. Modernization originated in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe, but it has now become a worldwide phenomenon. This is brought about primarily through the diffusion of modern ideas and techniques from the European center, but also in part through the endogenous development of non-Western societies. In any event, all societies were at one time traditional; all societies are now either modern or in the process of becoming modern.
- 5 Modernization is a *lengthy* process. The totality of the changes which modernization involves can only be worked out through time. Consequently, while modernization is revolutionary in the extent of the changes it brings about in traditional society, it is evolutionary in the amount of time required to bring about those changes. Western societies required several centuries to modernize. The contemporary modernizing societies will do it in less time. Rates of modernization are, in this sense, accelerating, but the time required to move from tradition to modernity will still be measured in generations.
- 6 Modernization is a *phased* process. It is possible to distinguish different levels or phases of modernization through which all societies will move. Societies obviously begin in the traditional stage and end in the modern stage. The intervening transitional phase, however, can also be broken down into sub-phases. Societies consequently can be compared and ranked in terms of the extent to which they have moved down the road from tradition to modernity. While the leadership in the process and the more detailed patterns of modernization will differ from one society to another, all societies will move through essentially the same stages.
- 7 Modernization is a *homogenizing* process. Many different types of traditional societies exist; indeed, traditional societies, some argue, have little in common except their lack of modernity. Modern societies, on the other hand, share basic similarities. Modernization produces tendencies toward convergence among societies. Modernization involves movement "toward an interdependence among politically organized societies and toward an ultimate integration of societies." The "universal imperatives of modern ideas and institutions" may lead to a stage "at which the various societies are so homogeneous as to be capable of forming a world state. . . ."⁴
- 8 Modernization is an *irreversible* process. While there may be temporary breakdowns and occasional reversals in elements of the modernizing process, modernization as a whole is an essentially secular trend. A society which has reached

certain levels of urbanization, literacy, industrialization in one decade will not decline to substantially lower levels in the next decade. The rates of change will vary significantly from one society to another, but the direction of change will not.

- 9 Modernization is a *progressive* process. The traumas of modernization are many and profound, but in the long run modernization is not only inevitable, it is also desirable. The costs and the pains of the period of transition, particularly its early phases, are great, but the achievement of a modern social, political, and economic order is worth them. Modernization in the long run enhances human well-being, culturally and materially. . . . *also Norberg*

Political Order in Changing Societies

1.1 Political Order and Political Decay

The Political Gap

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based. All three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict. These governments command the loyalties of their citizens and thus have the capacity to tax resources, to conscript manpower, and to innovate and to execute policy. If the Politburo, the Cabinet, or the President makes a decision, the probability is high that it will be implemented through the government machinery.

In all these characteristics the political systems of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union differ significantly from the governments which exist in many, if not most, of the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These countries lack many things. They suffer real shortages of food, literacy, education, wealth, income, health, and productivity, but most of them have been recognized and efforts made to do something about them. Beyond and behind these shortages, however, there is a greater

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shortage: a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government. . . .

With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'état, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties. . . .

During the 1950s and 1960s the numerical incidence of political violence and disorder increased dramatically in most countries on the world. The year 1958, according to one calculation, witnessed some 28 prolonged guerrilla insurgencies, four military uprisings, and two conventional wars. Seven years later, in 1965, 42 prolonged insurgencies were underway; ten military revolts occurred; and five conventional conflicts were being fought. Political instability also increased significantly during the 1950s and 1960s. Violence and other destabilizing events were five times more frequent between 1955 and 1962 than they were between 1948 and 1954. Sixty-four of 84 countries were less stable in the latter period than in the earlier one.⁵ Throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America there was a decline in political order, an undermining of the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of government. There was a lack of civic morale and public spirit and of political institutions capable of giving meaning and direction to the public interest. Not political development but political decay dominated the scene. . . .

What was responsible for this violence and instability? The primary thesis of this book is that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions. "Among the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville observed, "there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."⁶ The political instability in Asia, Africa, and Latin America derives precisely from the failure to meet this condition: equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than "the art of associating together." Social and economic change – urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion – extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, broaden political participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions; they enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.

For two decades after World War II American foreign policy failed to come to grips with this problem. The economic gap, in contrast to the political gap, was the target of sustained attention, analysis, and action. Aid programs and loan programs, the World Bank and

regional banks, the UN and the OECD, consortia and combines, planners and politicians, all shared in a massive effort to do something about the problem of economic development. Who, however, was concerned with the political gap? American officials recognized that the United States had a primary interest in the creation of viable political regimes in modernizing countries. But few, if any, of all the activities of the American government affecting those countries were directly concerned with the promotion of political stability and the reduction of the political gap. How can this astonishing lacuna be explained?

It would appear to be rooted in two distinct aspects of the American historical experience. In confronting the modernizing countries the United States was handicapped by its happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being, and political stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal aids in the achievement of others. In American policy toward modernizing countries this experience was reflected in the belief that political stability would be the natural and inevitable result of the achievement of, first, economic development and then of social reform. Throughout the 1950s the prevailing assumption of American policy was that economic development – the elimination of poverty, disease, illiteracy – was necessary for political development and political stability. In American thinking the causal chain was: economic assistance promotes economic development, economic development promotes political stability. This dogma was enshrined in legislation and, perhaps more important, it was ingrained in the thinking of officials in AID and other agencies concerned with the foreign assistance programs.

If political decay and political instability were more rampant in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in 1965 than they were fifteen years earlier, it was in part because American policy reflected this erroneous dogma. For in fact, economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other. In some instances programs of economic development may promote political stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such stability. So also, some forms of political stability may encourage economic growth; other forms may discourage it. India was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s and had only a modest rate of economic growth. Yet through the Congress Party it achieved a high degree of political stability. Per capita incomes in Argentina and Venezuela were perhaps ten times that in India, and Venezuela had a phenomenal rate of economic growth. Yet for both countries stability remained an elusive goal.

With the Alliance for Progress in 1961, social reform – that is, the more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources – joined economic development as a conscious and explicit goal of American policy toward modernizing countries. This development was, in part, a reaction to the Cuban Revolution, and it reflected the assumption among policymakers that land and tax reforms, housing projects, and welfare programs would reduce social tensions and deactivate the fuse to Fidelismo. Once again political stability was to be the by-product of the achievement of another socially desirable goal. In fact, of course, the relationship between social reform and political stability resembles that between economic development and political stability. In some circumstances reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful rather than violent change. In other circumstances, however,

reform may well exacerbate tensions, precipitate violence, and be a catalyst of rather than a substitute for revolution.

A second reason for American indifference to political development was the absence in the American historical experience of the need to found a political order. Americans, de Tocqueville said, were born equal and hence never had to worry about creating equality; they enjoyed the fruits of a democratic revolution without having suffered one. So also, America was born with a government, with political institutions and practices imported from seventeenth-century England. Hence Americans never had to worry about creating a government. This gap in historical experience made them peculiarly blind to the problems of creating effective authority in modernizing countries. When an American thinks about the problem of government-building, he directs himself not to the creation of authority and the accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power. Asked to design a government, he comes up with a written constitution, bill of rights, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, regular elections, competitive parties – all excellent devices for limiting government. The Lockean American is so fundamentally anti-government that he identifies government with restrictions on government. Confronted with the need to design a political system which will maximize power and authority, he has no ready answer. His general formula is that governments should be based on free and fair elections.

In many modernizing societies this formula is irrelevant. Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations. In many, if not most, modernizing countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority. "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men," Madison warned in *The Federalist*, No. 51, "the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." In many modernizing countries governments are still unable to perform the first function, much less the second. The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.

It is precisely this scarcity that communist and communist-type movements are often able to overcome. History shows conclusively that communist governments are no better than free governments in alleviating famine, improving health, expanding national product, creating industry, and maximizing welfare. But the one thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority. Their ideology furnishes a basis of legitimacy, and their party organization provides the institutional mechanism for mobilizing support and executing policy. . . . The real challenge which the communists pose to modernizing countries is not that they are so good at overthrowing governments (which is easy), but that they are so good at making governments (which is a far more difficult task). They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do create governments that can govern . . .

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Political Participation: Modernization and Political Decay

Modernization and Political Consciousness

. . . Those aspects of modernization most relevant to politics can be broadly grouped into two categories. First, social mobilization, in Deutsch's formulation, is the process by which "major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."⁷ It means a change in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world. It is a consequence of literacy, education, increased communications, mass media exposure, and urbanization. Secondly, economic development refers to the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society. It may be measured by per capita gross national product, level of industrialization, and level of individual welfare gauged by such indices as life expectancy, caloric intake, supply of hospitals and doctors. Social mobilization involves changes in the aspirations of individuals, groups, and societies; economic development involves changes in their capabilities. Modernization requires both. . . . the most crucial aspects of political modernization can be roughly subsumed under three broad headings. First, political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority. This change implies that government is the product of man, not of nature or of God, and that a well-ordered society must have a determinate human source of final authority, obedience to whose positive law takes precedence over other obligations. Political modernization involves assertion of the external sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national government against local and regional powers. It means national integration and the centralization or accumulation of power in recognized national lawmaking institutions.

Secondly, political modernization involves the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. Areas of particular competence – legal, military, administrative, scientific – become separated from the political realm, and autonomous, specialized, but subordinate organs arise to discharge those tasks. Administrative hierarchies become more elaborate, more complex, more disciplined. Office and power are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription. Thirdly, political modernization involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society. Broadened participation in politics may enhance control of the people by the government, as in totalitarian states, or it may enhance control of the government by the people, as in some democratic ones. But in all modern states the citizens become directly involved in and affected by governmental affairs. Rationalized authority, differentiated structure, and mass participation thus distinguish modern polities from antecedent polities.

It is, however, a mistake to conclude that in practice modernization means the rationalization of authority, differentiation of structure, and expansion of political participation. A basic and frequently overlooked distinction exists between political modernization defined as movement from a traditional to a modern polity and political modernization defined as

the political aspects and political effects of social, economic, and cultural modernization. The former posits the direction in which political change theoretically should move. The latter describes the political changes which actually occur in modernizing countries. The gap between the two is often vast. Modernization in practice always involves change in and usually the disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern political system. Yet the tendency has been to assume that what is true for the broader social processes of modernization is also true for political changes. Social modernization, in some degree, is a fact in Asia, Africa, Latin America: urbanization is rapid, literacy is slowly increasing; industrialization is being pushed; per capita gross national product is inching upward; mass media circulation is expanding. All these are facts. In contrast progress toward many of the other goals which writers have identified with political modernization – democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement patterns, national integration – often is dubious at best. Yet the tendency is to think that because social modernization is taking place, political modernization also must be taking place . . .

In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept “political modernization” characterized the “modernizing” areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there was an “erosion of democracy” and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes.⁸ Instead of stability, there were repeated coups and revolts. Instead of a unifying nationalism and nation-building, there were repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalization and differentiation, there was frequently a decay of the administrative organizations inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence. Only the concept of political modernization as mobilization and participation appeared to be generally applicable to the “developing” world. Rationalization, integration, and differentiation, in contrast, seemed to have only a dim relation to reality.

More than by anything else, the modern state is distinguished from the traditional state by the broadened extent to which people participate in politics and are affected by politics in large-scale political units. . . .

The disruptive effects of social and economic modernization on politics and political institutions take many forms. Social and economic changes necessarily disrupt traditional social and political groupings and undermine loyalty to traditional authorities. . . . Modernization thus tends to produce alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and new. The new values undermine the old bases of association and of authority before new skills, motivations, and resources can be brought into existence to create new groupings.

The breakup of traditional institutions may lead to psychological disintegration and anomie, but these very conditions also create the need for new identifications and loyalties. The latter may take the form of reidentification with a group which existed in latent or actual form in traditional society or they may lead to identification with a new set of symbols or a new group which has itself evolved in the process of modernization. Industrialization, Marx argued, produces class consciousness first in the bourgeoisie and then in the proletariat. Marx focused on only one minor aspect of a much more general phenomenon. Industrialization is only one aspect of modernization and modernization induces not

just class consciousness but new group consciousness of all kinds: in tribe, region, clan, religion, and caste, as well as in class, occupation, and association. Modernization means that all groups, old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups. One of the most striking phenomena of modernization, indeed, is the increased consciousness, coherence, organization, and action which it produces in many social forces which existed on a much lower level of conscious identity and organization in traditional society. . . . The same group consciousness, however, can also be a major obstacle to the creation of effective political institutions encompassing a broader spectrum of social forces. Along with group consciousness, group prejudice also “develops when there is intensive contact between different groups, such as has accompanied the movement toward more centralized political and social organizations.”⁹ And along with group prejudice comes group conflict. Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the tensions, the inequalities generated by social and economic modernization. Modernization thus increases conflict among traditional groups, between traditional groups and modern ones, and among modern groups. The new elites based on Western or modern education come into conflict with the traditional elites whose authority rests on ascribed and inherited status. Within the modernized elites, antagonisms arise between politicians and bureaucrats, intellectuals and soldiers, labor leaders and businessmen. Many, if not most, of these conflicts at one time or another erupt into violence.

Modernization and Violence

[. . .]

The gap hypothesis. Social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development. The gap between these two forms of change furnishes some measure of the impact of modernization on political stability. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants. The ability of transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations function and the level-of-living function.¹⁰ This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.

The reasons for this relationship between social frustration and political instability are somewhat more complicated than they may appear on the surface. The relationship is, in large part, due to the absence of two potential intervening variables: opportunities for social and economic mobility and adaptable political institutions. . . . Consequently, the extent to which social frustration produces political participation depends in large part on the nature of the economic and social structure of the traditional society. Conceivably this frustration could be removed through social and economic mobility if the traditional society is sufficiently “open” to offer opportunities for such mobility. In part, this is precisely what occurs

in rural areas, where outside opportunities for horizontal mobility (urbanization) contribute to the relative stability of the countryside in most modernizing countries. The few opportunities for vertical (occupational and income) mobility within the cities, in turn, contribute to their greater instability. Apart from urbanization, however, most modernizing countries have low levels of social-economic mobility. In relatively few societies are the traditional structures likely to encourage economic rather than political activity. Land and any other types of economic wealth in the traditional society are tightly held by a relatively small oligarchy or are controlled by foreign corporations and investors. The values of the traditional society often are hostile to entrepreneurial roles, and such roles consequently may be largely monopolized by an ethnic minority (Greeks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire; Chinese in southeast Asia; Lebanese in Africa). In addition, the modern values and ideas which are introduced into the system often stress the primacy of government (socialism, the planned economy), and consequently may also lead mobilized individuals to shy away from entrepreneurial roles.

In these conditions, political participation becomes the road for advancement of the socially mobilized individual. Social frustration leads to demands on the government and the expansion of political participation to enforce those demands. The political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionalization, moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to political instability. . . .

Political instability in modernizing countries is thus in large part a function of the gap between aspirations and expectations produced by the escalation of aspirations which particularly occurs in the early phases of modernization. . . . Modernization affects economic inequality and thus political instability in two ways. First, wealth and income are normally more unevenly distributed in poor countries than in economically developed countries.¹¹ In a traditional society this inequality is accepted as part of the natural pattern of life. Social mobilization, however, increases awareness of the inequality and presumably resentment of it. The influx of new ideas calls into question the legitimacy of the old distribution and suggests the feasibility and the desirability of a more equitable distribution of income. The obvious way of achieving a rapid change in income distribution is through government. Those who command the income, however, usually also command the government. Hence social mobilization turns the traditional economic inequality into a stimulus to rebellion.

Secondly, in the long run, economic development produces a more equitable distribution of income than existed in the traditional society. In the short run, however, the immediate impact of economic growth is often to exacerbate income inequalities. The gains of rapid economic growth are often concentrated in a few groups while the losses are diffused among many; as a result, the number of people getting poorer in the society may actually increase. Rapid growth often involves inflation; in inflation prices typically rise faster than wages with consequent tendencies toward a more unequal distribution of wealth. The impact of Western legal systems in non-Western societies often encourages the replacement of communal forms of land ownership with private ownership and thus tends to produce greater inequalities in land ownership than existed in the traditional society. In addition, in less developed societies the distribution of income in the more modern, non-agricultural sector is typically more unequal than it is in the agricultural. In rural India in 1950, for

instance, 5 per cent of the families received 28.9 per cent of the income; but in urban India 5 per cent of the families received 61.5 per cent of the income.¹² Since the overall distribution of income is more equal in the less agricultural, developed nations, the distribution of income within the nonagricultural sector of an underdeveloped country is much more unequal than it is in the same sector in a developed country. . . .

Economic development increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality. Both aspects of modernization combine to produce political instability.

NOTE

- 1 David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), p. 42.
- 2 Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1966), pp. 1-5; Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (April 1967), 292-3.
- 3 Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, 1958), p. 438.
- 4 Black, *Dynamics of Modernization*, pp. 155, 174.
- 5 Wallace W. Conroe, "A Cross-national Analysis of the Impact of Modernization Upon Political Stability" (unpublished MA thesis, San Diego State College, 1965), pp. 52-4, 60-2; Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (Sept. 1966), 253-4.
- 6 Alexis de Toqueville, *Democracy in America* (ed. Phillips Bradley, New York, Knopf, 1955), 2, 118.
- 7 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (Sept. 1961), 494.
- 8 On the "erosion of democracy" and political instability, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 5; and Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), ch. 2.
- 9 Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, "Report on Preliminary Results of Cross-Cultural Study of Ethnocentrism," *Carnegie Corporation of New York Quarterly* (Jan. 1966), 7.
- 10 These are terms employed by Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," pp. 493 ff.; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (Feb. 1952), 5 ff.; Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors," pp. 256-62; Charles Wolf, *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 296 ff.; and Manus Midlarsky and Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Instability in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research*, 4 (1967), 271 ff.
- 11 See Simon Kuznets, "Qualitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: VIII. Distribution of Income by Size," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 11 (Jan. 1963), 68; UN Social Commission, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, United Nations, 1952), pp. 132-3; Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy* (New York, Harper, 1956), p. 133.
- 12 Kuznets, "Qualitative Aspects," pp. 46-58.