THE
LATIN
AMERICAN
VOTER

PURSUING REPRESENTATION
and ACCOUNTABILITY in
CHALLENGING CONTEXTS

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[T]he act of voting requires the citizen to make not a single choice but two. He must choose between rival parties or candidates. He must also decide whether to vote at all.

Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, 89

From 2000 to 2012, more than 71% of the voting-age population participated in the average first-round presidential election in Latin America (figure 2.1).[1] Our goal is to understand why some people participate while others stay home. Despite the staying power of elections since the third wave of democracy, most of what we know about turnout in the region relies on aggregate data and is related to the electoral and institutional context (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Lavezzolo 2008; Ochoa 1987; Pérez-Liñán 2001; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Schraufnagel and Sgouraki 2005). But who are Latin America's voters? And how does context influence their decision to vote? Answering these questions is a necessary and analytically prior step to understanding voter choice in the region, the subject of the rest of this volume.

Our approach is two-pronged. First, we outline a causal sequence in which voting results from individuals' demographics, resources, mobilization, and psychological engagement with politics. Then we compare the explanatory value-added of each block of predictors to an overall accounting of individual-level turnout in Latin America. Our results indicate that voting is most heavily influenced by demographics, then psychological factors, with mobilization and resources mattering least. Second, and in line with the theoretical framework set forth in the introduction, we propose two contextual factors that condition the role individual factors play in Latin

Figure 2.1   Presidential Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections by Country.
Source: International IDEA.

Americans' vote decisions. One is compulsory voting—laws are on the books of many countries in the region but unevenly enforced. The other is party system polarization, which varies mightily in Latin America. We then assess how compulsory voting and polarization condition the effects of each block of individual-level predictors in our causal sequence. Here we pay special attention to two of the most proximate drivers of voter turnout:

partisanship and political interest. We find that compulsory voting and party system polarization mainly moderate the roles of demographics and psychological engagement—especially partisanship—in the decision to vote. As such, our comparative analysis of Latin America helps identify the mechanisms by which electoral and institutional contexts condition voter turnout in the region and, perhaps, beyond.

Electoral Participation at the Individual Level: A Hybrid Framework

Why some citizens take part in elections and others do not is a fundamental political inquiry. To address this question we graft demographics onto the central tenet of the "civic voluntarism" model: that people do not participate in the political process "because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 269). The civic voluntarism model assumes demographic links to participation via citizens' *resources*, networks of *recruitment and mobilization*, and *psychological involvement* with politics. Resources refer to the cognitive, monetary, and time-related facilitators of participation. Our theoretical framework supplements traditional networks of voter mobilization and recruitment found in Western democracies with the clientelistic networks widespread in Latin America. Finally, we expect psychological orientations and attachments to act as the most proximate motivators of electoral participation.

As depicted in the hybrid theoretical framework in figure 2.2, and in line with the Columbia (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) and Michigan (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008) schools, we assume that demographics shape individuals' initial priors for electoral participation. Whether demographics wield a direct influence or their effects are mediated by factors more proximate to the decision to vote, as the civic voluntarism model assumes, is an empirical question with real theoretical implications. Because these four blocks of predictors may be interrelated, gauging their total effects on the likelihood of voting requires consideration of their causal ordering.

Demographics

Demographics serve as the starting point for our causal story of voting in Latin America. By demographics, we mean largely descriptive characteristics that are either fixed or slow changing. Since voting is largely a habitual act, new entrants to the electorate may participate in elections at lower rates than long-enfranchised groups. At various points in time, suffrage

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          I. Demographics
   Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Religion, Married

          II. Resources
     Wealth, Education, Children

        III. Mobilization
        Group Membership,
       Religious Attendance,
      Employed, Clientelism

             IV.
        Psychological
          Engagement
       Partisanship, Interest,
        Internal & External
              Efficacy

        Turnout Decision
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
Figure 2.2   Causal Sequence of Individual-Level Determinants of Voter
Turnout.

and other political rights in Latin America have been restricted, de jure or
de facto, according to major demographic categories. Yet as new voters be-
come more socialized into politics and organize, parties attempt to mobi-
lize them and incorporate issues they care about. Eventually, these groups
become habituated to electoral participation and shrink their turnout gaps,
and in some cases, relatively rapidly. Movement between demographic cat-
egories—such as transitions into and out of marriage or religious faiths—
may speed or slow political socialization and, potentially, create or break
the habit of voting. Thus, demographics may be key inputs to the decision
to turn out in contemporary Latin America.

Three theories compete to explain how electoral participation var-
ies with age. According to the "life-cycle" theory, younger citizens vote
less because they prioritize their budding careers and families over poli-
tics. Voting increases as they integrate into their communities and gain
a stake in local affairs but decreases as they retire, withdraw socially, and

become infirm (Milbrath 1965). In the "life-experience" model, familiarity
with politics, political attachments, exposure to mobilizing agents, and the
social-network rewards of voting increase with age (Rosenstone and Han-
sen 1993, 137). "Generational" theories connect diverging rates of voting
across age cohorts to the lasting footprints of unique experiences of po-
litical socialization and highly competitive or salient elections (Miller and
Shanks 1996; Franklin 2004). Comparative studies are inconclusive as to
how age affects voting in Latin America. Seligson et al. (1995) observe life-
cycle effects in Central America with the exception of Costa Rica, where
the life-experience model is truer to data. Life-experience effects are also
found in the 1979 Mexican and Venezuelan elections (Davis and Cole-
man 1983), seventeen Latin American countries in 2000 (Bratton, Chu,
and Lagos 2010), and eighteen Latin American countries in 2010 (Carreras
and Castañeda-Angarita 2014). To help resolve this tension, we explicitly
probe life-cycle and life-experience effects for the region.

In Western democracies, women were excluded from elections for
decades. In the United States, the gender gap following the Nineteenth
Amendment (Merriam and Gosnell 1924) persisted among that cohort
until the 1980s (Firebaugh and Chen 1995) but today is all but gone (Burns,
Schlozman, and Verba 2001). The reversal of turnout gender gaps in es-
tablished democracies owes to the greater party mobilization of women
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and new resources and cultural values that
accompany economic modernization (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Ana-
lysts find that Latin American women are equally (Hinton, Moseley, and
Smith 2012; Bratton, Chu, and Lagos 2010) or more likely (Carreras and
Castañeda-Angarita 2014) to vote than men. We reexamine the relation-
ship between gender and turnout here.

Ethnicity may also shape electoral participation. De jure and de facto
disenfranchisement and political exclusion of ethnic and racial groups
could, like gender, hinder participation. Early work in the United States
supports this premise for southern blacks (Key 1949; Blalock 1967). Ad-
ditionally, ethnicity may define important social cleavages around which
parties form and mobilize voters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Birnir 2007).
In line with this thesis is research emphasizing social connectedness, group
identity, conflict, discrimination, and mobilization (Leighley 2001; Barreto
and Pedraza 2009). Strong political and social hierarchies across ethnic
lines have led some to dub Latin American society a "pigmentocracy" (Lip-
schutz 1944; Telles and Steele 2012). The rise of indigenous politics (Ma-
drid 2012), the increasing importance of race (Wade 1997), and ethnicity's
influence on voter choice in Latin America (Moreno, this volume) suggest

these factors could increasingly matter for turnout. A case study in Guatemala finds lower turnout in more indigenous municipalities (Lehoucq and Wall 2004). Comparative studies of voter turnout in the region have virtually ignored ethnicity and race. A lone exception, Moreno's (2013) analysis of eighteen Latin American countries, finds higher voting propensities among indigenous self-identifiers compared to whites but lower propensities among black identifiers. Against this backdrop on diverging expectations, we further probe the link between race and electoral participation.

Religious beliefs may also shape voting turnout. Verba and Nie (1972) noted "a difference in political style between Protestants and Catholics, with the latter more likely to be involved in partisan activity" and to be classified as "voting specialists" (101). In Latin America, Boas and Smith (2013) find Catholics are indeed more likely to vote than other Christians, non-Christians, and the nonreligious. And as Boas and Smith (this volume) discuss, the spread of evangelicalism and increased public debate around moral issues has raised the salience of religion as a social cleavage in Latin America (see also Hagopian 2009 and Mainwaring and Scully 2003). Hence we test how religious affiliation influences the vote decision by looking at differences across denominations. Later, as part of the mobilization block, we examine turnout gaps between religious individuals and those who do not attend church at all.

A final demographic we consider is marital status. Conventional wisdom holds that "[m]arried people are more likely to vote than those who are single, separated, divorced, or widowed" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 44). Theoretically, spouses influence electoral participation in three ways. First, marriage marks a significant step toward stabilizing one's personal life and establishing roots in the community. Second, marriages can serve as miniature social networks by which spouses mobilize each other: "The encouragement of a husband or wife might be the push necessary to get both partners to the polls" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 45; see also Teixeira 1987; Strate et al. 1989). Third, any marital transition—from single to married, from married to widowed or divorced—may alter participation patterns (Stoker and Jennings 1995; Kinder 2006). Little is known about how marital status affects voting in Latin America. Our data allow a straightforward test of whether being married encourages Latin Americans to vote.

Resources

While voting is comparatively "cheaper" in terms of time and money than other forms of political participation, it is clearly not "free" and, thus, is

more widespread among citizens of higher socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie 1972). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's (1995) civic voluntarism model reframes the mechanism in terms of resources—time, money, and civic skills. Those authors find resources mightily shape other forms of political participation, though their effects on voting are more idiosyncratic. The logic is that these classes of assets facilitate participation; without them taking part in politics is more daunting. Free time heavily depends on employment and family circumstances, especially children in the home. Money may matter marginally for turnout but is considered more crucial to non-electoral participation. Civic skills flow from education and are honed by exercising them in the workplace, nonpolitical organizations, and churches. In our analysis, we use education as a proxy for civic skills along with proxies for time (children) and money (wealth).

Recruitment and Mobilization

While resources and psychological engagement constitute individual-level traits that facilitate political activity or compel involvement, it is naïve to think that people will universally participate without an invitation. While nonpolitical "secondary institutions" (the workplace, voluntary associations, churches, etc.) are arenas for forging civic skills, they also serve as recruitment networks into which parties, candidates, activists, and peers can tap to mobilize voters. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) describe two forms of mobilization. Direct mobilization is when leaders or activists personally encourage would-be voters and, in effect, "subsidize" the information needed to vote (e.g., pamphlets about issues, Election Day reminders, discussing key issues, etc.) and the costs of voting (e.g., distributing voter registration cards, offering rides to the polls, etc.). Indirect mobilization consists of encouraging people to vote via social networks: "Leaders need not communicate with every person directly. Instead, leaders contact their associates, associates contact their colleagues, and colleagues contact their friends, families, and co-workers. Through social networks, leaders get the word out, and citizens get the word" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 27). Indirect mobilization effectively multiplies the impact of direct mobilization because it creates "social expectations about the desirable course of action" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 29). To enforce compliance, network members reward voters and sanction nonvoters. Scholars have proffered alternative logics by which social networks boost participation (e.g., Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Franklin 2004) that lead to the same prediction.

Indirect mobilization seems to function similarly in Latin America. Voting rates are higher among Latin Americans who are employed, are

active in civic groups and in churches, and live in tight-knit rural communities (Boas and Smith 2013; Bratton, Chu, and Lagos 2010; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014). Direct mobilization should also work as theorized. While our data preclude a test of direct mobilization through canvassing, we can test whether clientelistic offers—which are fairly common in Latin American party systems (Kitschelt et al. 2010)—directly mobilize Latin Americans to vote (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Nichter 2008). This proposition is less obvious than it seems given the slippage between clientelistic effort and effectiveness pointed out by Kitschelt and Altamirano (this volume).

Psychological Engagement with Politics

Lastly, the civic voluntarism model assumes resources and social networks enhance the sorts of civic attitudes and engagement that foster participation in political life. Thus, it subsumes a key insight of the Michigan model, namely, that voting is a behavioral manifestation of one's psychological engagement with politics and buttressed by attitudes and affective orientations to politics, elections, and political actors. As a recent work in this tradition concludes, "[t]urnout behavior is guided by the following rule: The stronger a person's psychological involvement in politics, the higher the propensity to participate in politics by way of voting" (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 92). Below we review the basic arguments and decidedly mixed evidence regarding the major political-psychological predictors of turnout in Latin America: party identification, political efficacy (internal and external), and political interest.

Party identification was originally conceived as "an affective attachment to an important group object in the environment" (Campbell et al. 1960, 143). As such, it is a "psychological identification with a party" (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 112) that contains an element of social identification (Greene 1999, 2004). Social identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (Tajfel 1978, 63). Thus, identifying with a political party can make one more likely to vote by raising the expressive benefits of voting. It also shapes people's preferences among competing candidates and gives them "a dog in the fight" (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 90). Many studies in American and comparative politics (e.g., Kittilson and Anderson 2011; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) concur: citizens with stronger party attachments vote at higher rates.

Given its prominence in a range of political systems and the variance in levels of partisanship in Latin America, the uneven attention to partisanship in voter turnout models in the region is striking. However, all studies in the region that analyze partisanship conclude that it dramatically raises the likelihood of voting. In eighteen Latin American democracies, partisanship emerges as the most robust psychological correlate of voting (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014). Moreno (2003) found that identifying with and, in most cases, leaning toward a party heightened voting intentions in the 2000 Mexican election. This suggests that Mexicans, like their counterparts elsewhere (Hinich and Munger 1997; Aarts and Wessels 2005), are driven to vote by both the directional and intensity dimensions of partisan identification. Moreover, Lupu (this volume) demonstrates that party identification in Latin America has similar correlates and predicts vote choice in line with classic theories derived from the United States and Western Europe. We have every reason to expect partisanship to bolster turnout in Latin America.

Campbell, Gurin, and Miller's (1954) foundational conception of political efficacy refers to "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process . . . the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (187). Scholars have since unpacked these motivations into *external* and *internal* political efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to the belief that one can personally influence the political process, whereas external efficacy refers to the belief that the political system is responsive to one's views (Balch 1974; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). Though both forms of efficacy are expected to boost turnout, the literature in American politics swirls with debates about their measurement. Most research in broad comparative perspective has prioritized external over internal efficacy (e.g., Kittilson and Anderson 2011; Norris 2004).

Comparative turnout studies in Latin America have employed both concepts, though rarely together and always with varied results. Starting with Davis and Coleman (1983), Mexican and Venezuelan voters were found to be more internally efficacious than nonvoters but only the Mexican voters were more externally efficacious. Seligson et al. (1995) observed a positive but nonlinear relationship between external efficacy and turnout in El Salvador, a negative relationship in Honduras, and null effects elsewhere in Central America. McCann and Domínguez's (1998) inspection of turnout in the 1988 and 1991 Mexican elections revealed a positive influence of external efficacy. Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita

(2014) showed external efficacy *lowered* voting in the region, though the effects were miniscule and reproduced in just two country analyses. Thus, political efficacy appears only weakly related to voter turnout in Latin America and possibly in unexpected ways, reflecting the conflicts seen in the U.S. literature.

Expressing an interest in politics indicates a psychological involvement that, presumably, motivates individuals to further their understanding of politics via the press, social networks, and direct participation in political processes. This logic implies that "[c]itizens who are interested in politics—who follow politics, who care about what happens, who are concerned with who wins and loses—are more politically active" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 345). Although research in the Michigan tradition is equally focused on voters' interest in the campaign and concern over its outcome (cf. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), other landmark works in American politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and most comparative studies (e.g., Aarts and Wessels 2005; Almond and Verba 1963; Powell 1986; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) incorporate *general* interest in politics into models of electoral participation along with stalwarts, partisanship, and efficacy.

Political interest has figured in Latin American turnout models in various forms and with differing degrees of success. Merging political interest and political knowledge into an "involvement in politics" index, Davis and Coleman (1983) found that it boosted turnout in Venezuela but depressed it in Mexico. Case studies of Mexico (McCann and Domínguez 1998; Lawson and Klesner 2004; Moreno 2003, 2009b) and Chile (Carlin 2006, 2011) link political interest to voting. Bivariate analyses reveal positive associations between vote intention and political interest throughout Latin America (Payne 2007). Together the evidence implies that political interest should be associated with turning out to vote in the region.

By way of summary, the first part of this chapter seeks to identify Latin American voters' demographic profiles, resource levels, degree of insertion into mobilization networks, and psychological engagement with politics. Our expectations differ little from the conventional wisdom on voter turnout in established democracies. Nevertheless, the empirical record in Latin America is quite thin and, thus, some anomalous or null results should not be surprising. Our first set of analyses seeks to build up this empirical record and provide more conclusive answers as to who votes in Latin America. With this in mind, and modest about what any model of voter turnout can hope to explain, we now describe our data, research design, and methods.

Individual-Level Research Design and Analysis

Our dependent variable is self-reported turnout in the previous presidential election. The data we use are responses to the biennial AmericasBarometer surveys of the eighteen Latin American countries that are the subject of this volume (see chapter 1, note 18). We code as having voted respondents who say they went to the polling booth in the past election,[2] regardless of whether they claim to have voted for a specific candidate or cast a blank ballot. Because voting self-reports suffer from social desirability bias and inaccurate recollection, individually validated survey data of turnout are the gold standard. No such data exist for the region. Thus, to test our expectations we rely on survey data, and make the choice to pool all AmericasBarometer surveys 2008–12[3] for all eighteen Latin American countries into one model.[4] Not surprisingly, there is over-reporting of turnout in the data (8 percentage points on average). Yet a strong correlation ($r = 0.8$) between turnout as reported by national election institutes and aggregate levels of self-reported turnout across these surveys provides some validity to our claim that the survey question is related to actual turnout.

Block I: Demographics

The first block of explanatory factors includes basic demographics and social identities. *Age* is measured in years and we include *Age* and *Age*[2] to gain leverage over life-cycle versus life-experience debate.[5] Because in some countries (e.g., Chile) common-law type marriage is widespread because of recent restrictions on divorce and other social factors, we include a dichotomous variable coded for respondents who are *Married* or living in marriage-like relationship (*unión libre*). Gender gaps in voting will be assessed with a dichotomous variable coded 1 for respondents who are *Male* and zero for *Female*. Dummies for self-identified ethnicity and religion are also included. Specifically, for ethnicity we have *Mestizo*, *Indigenous*, *Black*, and *Other* as compared to *White*, the reference category. For religion mainline *Protestant*, *Evangelical*, *Mormon/Jehovah's Witness*, *No Religion*, and *Other* are judged against the reference category *Catholic*.

Block II: Resources

We analyze three forms of theoretically relevant resources. A respondent's level of *Wealth* is measured in national quintiles and constructed from a

principal component analysis of ownership of a series of household material goods (Córdova 2009). Since many Latin Americans make their livelihoods from subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector, wealth better captures material resources than income. We gauge time resources with the respondent's *Number of Children*. According to the civic voluntarism model, having children reduces the time and money available for civic and political participation. However, children may also motivate parents to model good citizenship by voting. Finally, we proxy civic skills with *Education*: a 19-point scale running from no formal education to more than 18 years of schooling.

Block III: Mobilization and Recruitment

To test if social connectivity and civic involvement expose Latin Americans to mobilizing agents we model five potential mobilizing factors. Most are chiefly arenas of *indirect* mobilization. *Membership*, for instance, is the average level of participation in five types of social groups (religious, parent-teacher, community improvement, professional, and political). The scale ranges from zero (no participation) to 4 (weekly participation in *all* group types); the sample mean of this scale sample is 0.60, and country means vary from a high of 0.79 in Guatemala to a low of 0.32 in Uruguay.

Separate from the membership scale we include a 5-point scale measuring frequency of attendance at religious services. It ranges from never or nearly never to more than once a week. Houses of worship and the pulpit are often key loci of electoral mobilization. They also widen one's social network and provide links to the community that can increase the odds of voting. We include this *Religious Attendance* measure in addition to the *Membership* scale that counts religious groups to capture the more casual or passive effects church attendance may have on turnout. Essentially, it can test whether voters can be mobilized just by being in the pews. While frequency of religious service attendance and attending religious groups are related, they are not perfect substitutes ($r = 0.58$).

Rural indicates that the respondent resides in a rural rather than an urban setting. Rural areas may feature dense social networks and extensive associational life, which could spur electoral participation. Of course, this effect may be attenuated by the socially disruptive processes of urbanization as people leave their historic communities for cities. Moreover, urban areas are easier for parties to canvass. To see what effect, if any, geographic location has we include a dichotomous variable for rural residents. We also

use a dichotomous variable for individuals who are *Employed* to gauge the mobilizing impact of the workplace on turnout.

The final factor in our mobilization block is a measure of clientelistic targeting. In many developing democracies direct quid pro quo mobilization via a patron-client relationship is pervasive. Our *Clientelism* measure taps whether the respondent has received "gifts" from candidates or parties in exchange for his or her vote or support in recent elections on a 3-point scale from never (0) to frequently (2). Since this question was only asked broadly in the 2010 AmericasBarometer (and even then not in Honduras) we restrict our analysis of mobilization to 2010.

Block IV: Psychological Engagement

First among the psychological motivators of turnout is *Partisanship*: a dichotomous variable coded 1 if respondents identify with a party and zero if not. Ideally we could tap strength of partisanship; yet the comparative literature on partisanship strongly argues that concepts of party attachment vary extensively with the nature of party systems. In addition, survey questions about strength of partisanship may lack cross-context reliability if parties play differing social roles across polities. Thus, we employ a dichotomous measure of identification to help ensure a more reliable and valid measure of partisanship in Latin America.

Internal Efficacy is measured on a 7-point scale (linearly recoded to run 0–1) gauging respondents' subjective assessment of their understanding the most important political issues. *External Efficacy* is a 7-point scale (recoded 0–1) gauging how much respondents think national leaders are interested in people like themselves. *Political Interest* is a 4-point measure of how much interest the respondent has in politics, recoded from zero, none, to 1, a lot.

In keeping with the causal sequencing of our hybrid theoretical framework, we empirically model the influence of individual characteristics in the step-wise block approach illustrated in figure 2.2. It shows how the blocks build on each other and which variables are tested in each. Namely, we estimate the substantive effect of each block of variables (demographics, resources, mobilization, psychological) with *only those controls that theoretically precede it*. For example, the effect of gender on voting turnout is only estimated including the other demographic variables (age, married, ethnicity, and religion) that in theory should not be affected by gender itself. By the same token, the influence of resources on voting is estimated with demographics variables in the model but not the variables from the

mobilization or psychological engagement blocks. Mobilization variables, for their part, are estimated along with the demographics and resources variables that causally precede them but without the variables in the psychological engagement block. Finally, the effects of the variables in the psychological engagement block—partisanship, political interest, and external and internal political efficacy—on the decision to turn out are gauged while controlling for all the variables in the preceding three blocks. Our motivation for using this step-wise block approach is to gauge predictors' effects before they are diluted by intervening variables farther down the causal chain.

Since our dependent variable is binary, we use logistic regression along with country and year fixed effects. To ease interpretation we report logistic regression coefficients in appendix table A2.1 and in figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the change in probability of voting (and its standard error) when a particular variable's value is changed from its observed minimum value to maximum values while holding all other causally prior variables at either their mean or mode (for binary variables). We also calculate adjusted count R^2, a measure of model fit that represents the percentage of observations correctly predicted adjusted by the mean value of y. In the simple intercept model adjusted count R^2 is zero. Essentially, then, adjusted count R^2 indicates how much the model improves on the average reported turnout rate in the sample. We use this approach over competing pseudo-R^2 measures because our models' improvement over a naïve model is the characteristic of central interest to our research question. Moreover, with survey-adjusted weighting, the model does not produce a log-likelihood, which is required for all non-count-based pseudo-R^2's.

Individual-Level Results

First among the variables in the demographics block is *Age*. Breaking with previous work on Latin America (Bratton, Chu, and Lagos 2010; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Seligson et al. 1995), we find convincing evidence in favor of the life-cycle, as opposed to the life-experience, thesis—a finding echoed in well-established democracies (Smets and van Ham 2013). Because the curvilinear effects of *Age* can only be appreciated graphically, we analyze them separately in figure 2.3. It demonstrates that both the young and very old are much less likely to vote than individuals toward the middle of the age distribution. The propensity to vote rises until around the age of 56 and then starts declining. The substantive impact of these combined effects makes *Age* the most potent determinant of


Figure 2.3   Life-Cycle Effect on Voter Turnout. *Source:* Americas-Barometer 2008–2012. *Note:* Predicted probability of voting across the life cycle with 95% confidence-intervals (dotted lines). Based on estimates from a pooled model that are adjusted for complex survey design.

voter turnout under study. In a country-by-country analysis not reported here the same pattern emerges in every case.

Discrete change values in predicted probabilities for all demographic factors besides *Age* are displayed in figure 2.4. We observe a small gender gap, with *Males* slightly more likely to vote. While this finding goes against the grain of trends in established democracies (Smets and van Ham 2013), it presages the traditional gender gap in vote choice that predominates in Latin America (Morgan this volume).[6] *Marriage*, an understudied correlate of voting in Latin America, raises the likelihood of voting by roughly 4.4 percentage points. Considering the historical discrimination and political exclusion of Latin America's indigenous groups it is somewhat noteworthy that, when compared to self-identified *Whites*, only self-identified *Blacks* vote at lower rates. When it comes to religion, *Evangelical* and mainline *Protestants* along with the *Nonreligious* are less likely to turn out than *Catholics*, adherents of the region's dominant faith.[7]

Figure 2.4 also displays the substantive effects of the variables in the resources block. *Wealth* has a minor but positive relationship to voting.

Figure 2.4 Predicted Substantive Effects of Individual-Level Factors on Voter Turnout. *Source:* Data come from waves 2008, 2010, and 2012 of the AmericasBarometer for all blocks *except* Mobilization. Because of data availability only the 2010 wave (excluding Honduras) was used to estimate the Mobilization block. *Note:* Point estimates were adjusted for complex survey design. Change in probability of voting going from a variable's min to max value holding all variables from the same or preceding blocks (demographics, resources, and mobilization) constant at their means or modes.

In long-standing democracies, Smets and van Ham (2013) also uncover inconsistent if moderately positive effects of wealth on turnout. Perhaps surprisingly, *Number of Children* is positively associated with voter turnout. Its effects are on par with *Wealth*, and analyses not reported here suggest that they do not vary across men, women, or housewives. So unlike wealthy democracies, where the number of children and turnout are inversely related (Smets and van Ham 2013) because it drains free time (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), the opposite holds true in Latin America. *Education*, for its part, has one of the largest overall effects on turnout. We observe an 18.6 percentage point difference in the probability of voting between those with 18 years of education and those with none. As such, the effect of education on turnout in Latin America is more in line with that of Western democracies (Smets and van Ham 2013) than democracies in Africa or

East Asia, where education and turnout do not appear to be linearly related (Bratton, Chu, and Lagos 2010).

The third block, mobilization, incorporates five measures, three of which significantly predict turnout. Being *Employed* is related to voting but its substantive effect is quite small. But group *Membership* matters a great deal. The most active group members are 10 percentage points more likely to vote than people who are not involved in any group. Although *Religious Attendance* is insignificant in this model, other analysis indicates that its effects flow entirely though religious group membership. Regarding *Clientelism*, those who were frequently targeted for vote-buying were just 2.8 percentage points more apt to turn out than those not targeted. These modest effects speak to the gulf between how much effort Latin American parties put into clientelism and its electoral yield (Kitschelt and Altamirano this volume). *Rural* residents and *Urban* dwellers appear equally likely to vote.[8] While in line with Smets and van Ham's (2013) meta-analysis of established democracies, this result contradicts previous work in Latin America (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Bratton, Chu, and Lagos 2010) and the pessimistic participatory portraits of "agrarian apathy" (Campbell et al. 1960), "farmers" (Milbrath and Goel 1977), and "farm workers" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) in the American politics literature.

In the final block, two indicators of psychological engagement are significantly and positively related to going to the polls. Identifying with a party increases the probability of voting by 12 to 13 percentage points. Thus, as observed in developed (Smets and van Ham 2013) and developing (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Bratton, Chu, and Lagos 2010) democracies alike, partisanship motivates turnout. Political interest has an effect roughly as large. Compared to the uninterested, respondents very interested in politics are around 6.7 percentage points more likely to vote. Neither internal nor external efficacy is consistently related to turning out.[9]

In sum, consistent with life-cycle theories the likelihood of Latin Americans voting varies with age and marital status. We also observe turnout gaps—with Catholics voting at higher rates than non-Catholics and some evidence suggesting men vote more consistently than women. Ethnicity has two noteworthy effects: black Latin Americans have a participation gap compared to that of whites but the indigenous—another historically excluded group—do not. Latin American voters are mobilized on the job, in civic associations, and via clientelistic parties; mobilization is not systematic vis-à-vis religious attendance or residential setting (i.e., rural or urban).

While Latin American voters indeed have more resources in the forms of wealth (financial), education (civic skills), and time (children) than their nonvoting counterparts, incorporating such factors improves very little on a basic sociological model of turnout. Those individuals who identify with a political party are much more likely to go to the polls. Similarly, those who are most interested in politics are the most likely to vote; however, in contrast to what is often observed in developed democracies, efficacy, internal or external, appears to play little if any role in turnout in Latin America.

Finally, figure 2.5 reports how well each block predicts an individual's decision to vote on models restricted to 2010 in order to include *Clientelism*.[10] Demographics play a central role.[11] The adjusted count R^2 for a demographics-only model is 0.20, meaning the demographics block improves model fit by 20% over a model with just country dummies. The addition of the resources block—wealth, education, and children—increases the model's performance to an adjusted count R^2 of 0.22 (a 10% increase). But adding the mobilization block has no effect (0.22) and neither does addition of the psychological block (0.22).


Figure 2.5 Adjusted-Count R^2 by Blocks of Individual-Level Determinants of Voter Turnout. *Note:* Because of data availability, all blocks are estimated using the 2010 wave excluding Honduras, which is missing data for the *Clientelism* variable.

Intriguingly, the civic voluntarism model only marginally improves our understanding of why Latin Americans vote over demographics. Indeed, the adjusted count R^2 of a model that includes all blocks *except* demographics is a paltry 0.08. This suggests that demographic factors like age, gender, religion, ethnicity, and marriage have effects on the vote decision that do not run through resources, mobilization, or psychological factors. This conclusion goes against the conventional wisdom in the United States (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and recent comparative research in Latin America (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014) that emphasize the roles of psychological engagement and resources, respectively. Overall, though in line with previous models of turnout in the region (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014), our model has limited ability to explain turnout. To explore why, the following section examines how variation in the political contexts of Latin American elections shapes the models' explanatory power.

Context and the Decision to Vote: Compulsory Voting and Party System Polarization

Does the explanatory power of each block of individual-level factors—demographics, resources, mobilization, and psychological—vary with institutional and political contexts? First-cut analysis by country suggests so.

Since these contexts are unlikely to change between elections (or at all with institutions) we address this question by estimating the same model specifications (with the exception of *Clientelism*) as above using the AmericasBarometer survey that occurred within twenty-four months of each country's most recent presidential election. By using the surveys most closely following an election we expect the estimates to be more valid than using a survey distant from the election. Mirroring the pooled analysis, the country-by-country analysis shows that baseline demographics and the psychological factors most proximate to the vote decision wield the most explanatory power. More important, the country-by-country models highlight vast variance in the blocks' predictive abilities. Specifically, large standard deviations in the mean adjusted-count R^2's by country and block[12] indicate that context likely plays a role in shaping how well individual factors can explain the turnout decision.

If the effects of individual-level factors on voter turnout indeed vary across Latin America, a crucial theoretical question is why. Answering this question, we argue, requires an appreciation for the political milieus in which citizens vote. But which aspects should theoretically condition the link between the blocks of individual traits and turnout?

Powell's (1986) pioneering article serves as a useful starting point. It was motivated by a paradox: compared to their counterparts in other advanced industrial democracies, Americans were more psychologically inclined toward voting but voted far less. Powell concluded that voluntary voter registration was partially to blame but cautioned, "there is little doubt that adopting automatic registration or other measures to encourage turnout of the less well-off would bring to the polls a total electorate somewhat less interested, efficacious, and informed than the present voters" (37). One common "other measure" used to "encourage turnout" in Latin America is compulsory voting, and it tends to boost voter turnout substantially (Ochoa 1987; Pérez-Liñán 2001; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Schraufnagel and Sgouraki 2005; Lavezzolo 2008; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014).

A second culprit Powell identified were weak linkages between parties and differentiated social groups. Where such linkages are strong, "[p]arty choice should seem simpler to the less involved; cues from the personal environment of the individual (friends, family, and co-workers) should be more consistent; party organizers can more easily identify their potential supporters in making appeals and in helping voters to the polls on election day" (22). In Latin America, Pérez-Liñán (2001) argued that party competition incentivizes mobilization agents to turn out the vote via networks much as observed in the American case. And evidence suggests turnout is higher where ethnic parties mobilize voters around ethnic cleavages (Schraufnagel and Sgouraki 2005).

Together these findings imply that voting is less informationally and psychologically demanding where voting laws and party linkages facilitate electoral participation. Based on this premise, we deduce a set of theoretical expectations regarding how compulsory voting and party linkages should condition the relationship between individual characteristics and voter turnout.

Compulsory Voting

Perhaps the most ironclad conclusion in the comparative turnout literature is that enforced compulsory voting laws boost turnout (cf. Blais 2006; Franklin 2004; Gallego 2014). While compulsory voting regimes are the norm in Latin America they vary in degrees of enforcement. Powell's (1986) intuitions notwithstanding, the implications of compulsory voting laws for the individual basis of voting in the region are rarely explored (but see Maldonaldo 2011).

We advance a simple hypothesis: where voting is voluntary, citizens must rely more heavily on demographics, resources, mobilization, and psychological orientations to propel them to participate in elections, which are low-cost, low-benefit activities (Aldrich 1993). But compulsory voting laws backed by enforced sanctions relieve the need for such high levels of political-psychological involvement. If voting is easy, common, and legally coerced, then voters should be less dependent on the informational heuristics gained by group identity, material resources, mobilization, or psychological engagement. In short, compulsory voting regimes should weaken the civic voluntarism model's explanatory leverage vis-à-vis turnout.

Party System Polarization

Political parties can link with the electorate in several ways (Kitschelt 2000). When engaged in programmatic competition, parties craft unambiguous, consistent, and interrelated sets of policy stances on the basis of social or political cleavages, ideology, or appeals to particular issue publics (Kitschelt and Freeze 2010). To the extent parties reach polarized positions, the electorate benefits in the form of easily differentiable electoral options. A positive externality of such party polarization may be heightened voter turnout. Indeed, evidence that turnout is higher when parties are more polarized (Dalton 2008; Brockington 2009) and when lines of responsibility in the policymaking process are clear (Carlin and Love 2013) suggests that citizens are more apt to vote when their electoral options are discrete and obvious.

We expect party system polarization to weaken the influence of individual characteristics on turnout based on the following logic. Polarized party systems make voting less demanding in terms of resources and psychological involvement. Individuals with resources and motivation have comparatively smaller advantage over non-identifiers if the latter can rely on parties to highlight the unmistakable differences between themselves. Moreover, if parties are nearly indistinguishable, the cost-benefit analysis of voting (Downs 1957)[13] loses traction and affective motivations, such as psychological attachments, and informational resources, such as education or group identities, gain traction on the decision to vote. In sum, if party system polarization bolsters turnout, then it also decreases the differences between voters and nonvoters.

The alternative hypothesis, that polarization increases the influence of individual factors, is worth considering. Elections that present voters

with very distinct choices are more meaningful since the policy goals and priorities of the competing parties permit substantial change via the ballot box (Kittilson and Anderson 2011, 38). In polarized systems the resource-rich and mobilized electorate may perceive elections as high-stakes games and, thus, turn out more systematically than their nonpartisan and disinterested counterparts. Nonpolarized systems, on the other hand, could reduce elections' stakes and, thus, weaken the influence of individual factors on voting. We will test our proposed hypothesis against this alternative.

Cross-Level Empirical Approach and Analysis

To test the conditional expectations laid out above, we run a country-level analysis in which the dependent variable is adjusted count R^2 from the country-by-country analyses discussed above. Because the dependent variable is itself an estimate, we follow Lewis and Linzer's (2005) advice and estimate Efron robust standard errors to correct the sampling variance of the estimated dependent variable and the small sample size. Since using measures of model fit as dependent variables is relatively rare, we performed a validity check based on the following logic: as turnout rates increase, the purchase individual attributes grant us on the question of who votes should decrease. To test this notion, we predicted country-specific adjusted count R^2s from our models with the official turnout rates for each election under study. As expected, the coefficient on official turnout levels is negative. In other words, our individual-level model performs worse, in terms of adjusted count R^2, in high-turnout countries. So in high-turnout countries, such as Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Argentina, few if any characteristics systematically distinguish voters from nonvoters. This result helps validate our empirical approach.

To test our hypotheses concerning how context influences individual traits predictive power vis-à-vis turnout, we measure *Compulsory Voting* with a dichotomous variable scored zero where voting is not compulsory and enforced and 1 for where it is (International IDEA). Since 2000, countries in Latin America with strongly enforced compulsory voting laws have, on average, turnout rates more than 15 percentage points higher than countries that do not; we find a similar pattern in the AmericasBarometer data. Our *Party System Polarization* measure is generated by Singer (forthcoming) from the Universidad of Salamanca's Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey described in the introductory chapter of this volume. Its

scores represent the mean ideological placements of a country's parties by parliamentary elites. Polarization ranges from a low of 0.14 (Dominican Republic) to a high of 3.3 (El Salvador). Voting-age turnout in the most polarized party systems of the region since 2000 is, on average, 8 points higher than in the least polarized systems.

The level-2 results reported in table 2.1 show strong support for our contention that electoral and institutional contexts condition the importance of individual traits on the decision to vote. *Compulsory Voting* has its largest effect by far on the links between demographics and voting. Where enforced compulsory voting laws do not exist, such as in Colombia, Nicaragua, or Mexico, demographic characteristics are much stronger predictors of who votes than in places with enforced compulsory voting laws, like Bolivia and Uruguay. And as each additional block of individual characteristics enters the model, the difference in predictive power of the model between compulsory and noncompulsory systems tends to increase. After demographics, *Compulsory Voting* most significantly conditions the power of the psychological engagement block. In sum, enforcing compulsory voting laws dramatically reduces the ability of individual-level factors to distinguish voters from nonvoters.

Party System Polarization has similar if slightly more nuanced effects. Like compulsory voting, the explanatory purchase of individual-level predictors diverge between polarized and nonpolarized party systems. A unit increase in the polarization scale (range 0.14 to 3.3) cuts in half the adjusted count R^2 (0.05) for the demographics block alone. However, *Party System*

TABLE 2.1

Blocks	I	I+II	I+II+III	I+II+III+IV
Compulsory Voting	−0.082**	−0.107**	−0.106**	−0.115**
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Party System Polarization	−0.053*	−0.055*	−0.057**	−0.052*
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Constant	0.175**	0.196**	0.198**	0.205**
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Observations	18	18	18	18
R-squared	0.404	0.43	0.511	0.425

Source: Because of data availability all blocks are estimated using the 2010 AmericasBarometer excluding Honduras.

Note: Dependent variable is adjusted count R^2 after each block is added to logistic regression analysis. Blocks: I, Demographics; II, Resources; III, Mobilization; IV, Psychological Orientations. Efron robust standard errors in parentheses. ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, two-tailed.

What would have been the alternative model that could have been tested here?

Polarization seems to have much smaller, if any, effects on the other blocks of the model. To delve more deeply into this result, we consider whether compulsory voting and polarization have differential effects across the four measures of psychological engagement, the most proximate predictors of voting choice affected by context.

We begin by visually inspecting the effect sizes—measured as the change in predicted probabilities of voting for a discrete change (minimum to maximum)—of the four psychological variables across the eighteen countries. The results, reported in figure 2.6, indicate heterogeneity in

Figure 2.6   Predicted Effects of Psychological Motivations on Voter Turnout: Discrete Change Probabilities and Standard Errors from Country-by-Country Logit Models. *Source:* Only the AmericasBarometer surveys that most closely followed the most recent presidential elections were used. The 2008 wave is used for: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela; 2010 wave for: El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Dominican Republic; 2012 wave for: Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, Brazil, Argentina.

the depth of the psychological roots of turnout across Latin America. Yet only *Partisanship* and *Political Interest* vary significantly across the region. While *Partisanship* has significant positive effects in a majority of cases, they are much greater in some cases than others. A similar pattern is observed for *Political Interest*. However, *External Efficacy* and *Internal Efficacy* appear completely unrelated to turnout in nearly all country-level models (and the pooled ones above).

Following on the theory and method outlined above, we test whether *Compulsory Voting* and *Party System Polarization* moderate, that is, reduce, the degree to which *Partisanship* and *Political Interest* predict the decision to vote. As table 2.2 shows, our expectations are generally upheld. In countries without well-enforced compulsory voting laws, having a partisan attachment makes citizens much more likely to vote. On average, *Partisanship* boosts the probability of turning out by 9% in such contexts. Furthermore, the more polarized a party system becomes, the less determinant of voting partisanship becomes, even controlling for differences in compulsory voting regimes. Across the roughly 3-point range of *Party System Polarization* in our sample, then, its reductive effects on the influence of *Partisanship* on voting are on par with, if not slightly larger than, that of *Compulsory Voting*. When it comes to *Political Interest* the results are more mixed. Whereas enforced compulsory voting laws systematically diminish its influence on voter turnout, the degree of polarization in the party system has no effect. The coefficient is, however, signed in the expected, negative, direction,

TABLE 2.2   Conditional Effects of Context on Psychological Foundation of Voter Turnout

	DV. Effect of Partisanship	DV. Effect of Political Interest
Compulsory Voting	−0.09**	−0.06*
	(0.017)	(0.029)
Party System Polarization	−0.035*	−0.031
	(0.013)	(0.026)
Intercept	0.15**	0.13*
	(0.023)	(0.052)
R^2	0.62	0.30
N	18	18

Source: Only the AmericasBarometer surveys that most closely followed the most recent presidential elections were used. The 2008 wave is used for: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela; 2010 wave for: El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Dominican Republic; 2012 wave for: Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, Brazil, Argentina.

Note: Dependent variables are the effects of partisanship and political interest, respectively, on voting measured as the change in predicted probabilities for a discrete change (minimum to maximum) of these variables. Efron robust standard errors are in parentheses. **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, two-tailed.

which is suggestive given the fact that these effects are estimated from a relatively small national-level sample ($n = 18$).

Overall, compulsory voting regimes and party system polarization combine for a parsimonious yet relatively powerful explanation of the power of our demographics cum civic voluntarism model and its most proximate (psychological) factors on voter turnout in Latin America. Working through distinct mechanisms, these features of the electoral and institutional context reduce the demographic bias within and the psychological demands on the electorate.

Conclusion

From this attempt to paint a portrait of the Latin American voter, we offer several preliminary conclusions. According to our individual-level analysis, Latin American voters and nonvoters are chiefly distinguished by their demographic characteristics and psychological orientations and, to a lesser extent, by their resources and exposure to mobilizing agents. The average Latin American voter is, in order of substantive significance, in the middle of his or her life-cycle, educated, civically active, married, wealthy, employed, partisan, and interested in politics. Painted in those terms, Latin American voters bear a striking resemblance to their cousins in Western democracies. At the same time, our analysis suggests that Latin American voters are more likely to be, again in order of effect size, a parent with multiple children, Catholic, mobilized by selective clientelistic benefits, and male. Considered this way, the Latin American voter takes on a more unique profile.

Theoretically, the individual-level analysis shows the potential limits or scope conditions of the civic voluntarism model. In contrast to the United States, in Latin America the influence of the fundamental demographics of age, gender, religion, and race are not realized solely, or even mostly, through factors farther down the causal sequence. Rather, they have strong independent effects on turnout that are not mediated by factors associated with resources, mobilization, and psychological engagement. Together these micro-level findings foreshadow a motif of this volume: there is no single Latin American voter.

At the contextual level we encounter another incarnation of this motif: the profile of the Latin American voter changes from context to context. Distinctive, yet decontextualized, profiles of voters and nonvoters based on demographic attributes and psychological engagement fade away under certain electoral and institutional conditions. Specifically, well-enforced

sanctions for not voting and high degrees of polarization in the party system iron out voting differentials across demographic and social groups. Such findings resonate with Powell's (1986) theorizing about the centrality of electoral laws and partisan linkages for fostering electoral participation. Our results also provide evidence to support Lijphart's (1997) normative argument that compulsory voting should be used as a tool for raising electoral and, in turn, political equality.

Yet a critical reflection on the findings reported in this chapter also reveals some tensions among basic democratic ideals. If we take seriously Lijphart's insistence that a broad and active electorate is a public good, then how we reach such an equilibrium has normative implications. The easiest and swiftest approach to increase turnout in Latin America is almost certainly to introduce compulsory voting laws with strict sanctions and to enforce more effectively such laws already on the books.[14] Yet this solution carries a potentially high price tag. Responsive and accountable government requires voters who are engaged enough in politics to articulate their demands to parties, to monitor party performance with respect to those demands, and to vote on that basis. If compulsory voting can bring this about, as Lijphart claims, then such laws would potentially advance the democratic ideal. However, experimental evidence casts doubt on this supposition (Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2008), and, indeed, we find no significant differences between the system types with regards to political interest or internal efficacy levels. So if compulsory voting means the politically involved and those weakly invested in politics vote at roughly the same rates, it introduces a greater potential for moral hazard among elites and, thus, slippage on these democratic ideals. Even though strong and clear party competition also diminishes the weight of partisanship in the voting calculus, it encourages turnout by making it easier to distinguish which parties to reward and which to punish. So, like compulsory voting, polarized party systems may facilitate higher electoral participation—along with greater accountability—without the coercion. Perhaps this is why Powell (1986) rejected tinkering with registration and voting laws and, instead, prescribed tighter party-group linkages.

Chapter 2 Appendix

TABLE A2.1 Pooled Block Model of Voter Turnout in Latin America

		Logit Coefficient (std. err.)
Demographics	Male	0.096***
		(0.018)
	Age	0.210***
		(0.004)
	Age-squared	−0.002***
		(0.000)
	Married	0.296***
		(0.020)
	Ethnicity: Mestizo	−0.012
		(0.026)
	Ethnicity: Indigenous	−0.085
		(0.054)
	Ethnicity: Black	−0.105***
		(0.040)
	Ethnicity: Other	−0.006
		(0.077)
	Protestant	−0.179***
		(0.045)
	Other Religion	−0.491***
		(0.110)
	No Religion	−0.377***
		(0.033)
	Evangelical	−0.193***
		(0.029)
	Mormon/Jehovah's Witness	−0.909***
		(0.076)
Resources	Wealth	0.037***
		(0.008)
	Number of Children	0.026***
		(0.007)
	Education	0.077***
		(0.003)
Mobilization	Membership	0.455***
		(0.047)
	Rural	0.060
		(0.049)
	Religious Attendance	0.008
		(0.017)
	Employed	0.131***
		(0.042)
	Clientelism	0.144***
		(0.042)
Psychological Engagement	Partisanship	0.720***
		(0.028)
	Political Interest	0.504***
		(0.041)
	External Efficacy	0.039
		(0.036)
	Internal Efficacy	0.081**
		(0.040)

Source: AmericasBarometer surveys 2008–2012.

NOTES

1. Only presidential elections held during democratic periods (Polity score > 5) are displayed.

2. With the exception of Peru in 2010, in countries with a two-round presidential election system, the question asked about turnout for the first round of the election.

3. We use all countries and surveys during the five-year period to estimate an average effect of individual traits across the region and for the time period. Including multiple surveys for each country also helps estimate tighter confidence intervals. In a sample that includes only one survey per country (the one most closely following a presidential election), results are largely similar, with the main difference being church attendance has significant positive relationship with voting.

4. For the mobilization set we are restricted to the 2010 wave because it is the only one that systematically includes a question on vote-buying, Honduras being the lone exception.

5. Our models cannot properly address generational theories because we lack longitudinal data.

6. If we restrict the data to 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys, there is no gender gap, which may indicate that the gender gap is closing.

7. *Mormons* and *Jehovah's Witnesses* as a combined group are significantly less likely to vote than any other group, but the number of identifiers for these two religions is much smaller.

8. This finding holds even if we remove from the equation the wealth variable, whose aggregation method incorporates the urban/rural distinction.

9. In a sample with those surveys conducted within twenty-four months of an election, *External Efficacy* shows a significant yet small correlation with turnout.

10. As noted above, the sample includes all countries except for Honduras.

11. The adjusted count R^2s for each block are estimated on the same sample. Non-survey weighted models produce McFadden pseudo-R^2s that follow a similar pattern (see replication code).

12. After each model we calculate adjusted count R^2 after each block is added for each country and analyze its distribution. For the demographics block the mean adjusted count R^2 is 0.077 with a large standard deviation (0.087). After adding the resources block, the mean adjusted count R^2 rises to 0.089 (s.d. = 0.097); the addition of the mobilization block (without clientelism) adds no explanatory value on average (mean = 0.088; s.d. = 0.09). A final block of psychological variables brings the country-by-country average adjusted count R^2 to 0.1 (s.d. = 0.1). See online appendix figure OA2.1 for a graphical distribution by country and block.

13. Downs argued that when parties have identical platforms, one receives the same utility regardless of who is elected; thus, it is rational to abstain to avoid wasting resources on voting.

14. While some may suspect increasing baseline levels of democracy would be helpful, the level of democracy as measured by Freedom House (average of *Political Rights* and *Civil Liberties* scores) is not significantly correlated with turnout in our sample or as measured at the aggregate level by International IDEA, nor does it condition the effects of our individual predictors of turnout.