# Chapter 7 Post World War Disappointment

At the end of the war relations between the two countries, and especially their two military establishments could not have been closer. Unfortunately American demobilization was so deep and rapid that succeeding American governments lost sight of the importance of the relationship. Changes in presidents, cabinet officials, and department level staffs resulted in a loss of institutional memory. The documents on the relationship lay undigested in the archives for years. Brazil’s war role faded under archival dust. It is worth noting that the voluminous documents in the American archives about the construction of the air bases, the intense military negotiations, improvement of ports, and diplomatic relations generally, and particularly about the *FEB* were still classified “Secret” as late as 1964.[[1]](#endnote-1) The histories of World War II gave priority to relations among the Big Three – U.S., Britain, and Russia -- and only slowly turned to the secondary powers. Historians emphasized United States combat operations, not how the supply and support networks had been created and functioned. Brazil rarely entered the American world view.

American officials had implied that Brazil would have a privileged position after the war. Even before the Brazilian troops reached Italy, the two governments signed an agreement that would have allowed the American military to have use of air bases at Natal, Recife, and Belém for ten years after the war ended. It appeared as if the two countries would remain close allies in the post-war period.

On August 1, 1944, the Department of State alerted diplomatic missions in Latin America that they were to propose that bilateral staff conversations lay “the foundations for continued military collaboration between [sic] the American Republics in the post-war period.”[[2]](#endnote-2) A little later in August, Cordell Hull wrote to the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, saying that the conversations with Brazil and Mexico should be held before they were initiated with any other republic.[[3]](#endnote-3) The objective was to standardize the weaponry, training and organization of the Latin American armed forces so that if there was another attack on the hemisphere there would be a massive defense force ready. Also the idea was to prevent European countries from selling arms or placing military missions in the region. The difficulty was that the Brazilians were not interested in standardization, but in establishing their predominance in South America. They wanted to insure that Argentina would never be able to attack Brazil successfully. So that Brazil and the United States entered into these discussions with different objectives. A further problem was that Americans were not united in their own estimate of the situation.

On October 10, 1944 the staff conversations were officially begun with fanfare presided over by Getúlio Vargas in Rio’s Catete Palace**.** The President commented that what they were doing “for all practical purposes amounted to a military alliance” and recalled that their “highly satisfactory military collaboration” had begun “even before Pearl Harbor.”[[4]](#endnote-4)With this auspicious beginning the two militaries held detailed staff discussions about the structures, armaments and equipping, stationing, missions, and cooperative arrangements of the Brazilian armed forces after the war. Similar conversations were to be held with other Latin American countries.[[5]](#endnote-5) The discussions were conducted between Brazilian and American officers without any involvement of civilian diplomats. The resulting ‘papers’ or studies were the official views of the Brazilian armed forces and had been approved by President Vargas. The American officers assumed that the United States wished Brazil to have “a strong and cooperative role in the maintenance of hemispherical defense as a component of post-war world order, thereby relieving the United States of the military burden and political embarrassment of playing this role directly in South America.”[[6]](#endnote-6) The Americans believed that “Brazil was willing and anxious to become a southern partner of the United States in a military sense,” that they wanted assistance to become self-sufficient, rather than having “continued help.” The army “program was scaled to cover defense of Brazil from attack within or from without South America, in conjunction with possible United States help.”[[7]](#endnote-7)

The Brazilian navy hoped for the transfer of some 32 warships that included two battleships, two light aircraft carriers, four cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and nine submarines, which would “make the Brazilian Navy incontestably the strongest naval force in South America….” However, Ambassador Adolf A. Berle doubted that the Brazilian navy could maintain such “complicated and formidable” machinery.[[8]](#endnote-8) He argued that “The money and effort used in organizing a naval force at this point in Brazilian history would be infinitely better spent on putting in an internal transport system, and building and maintaining public schools.” [[9]](#endnote-9) He may have been correct, but apparently he forgot that such policy decisions were for Brazilian leaders to make and were not the purview of the American ambassador. The Staff conversations raised the expectations of the Brazilian navy, which were stimulated even higher due to comments that Admiral Jonas Ingram, commander of the 4th U.S. Fleet based at Recife, made to reporters in early July 1945 in which he said that a number of American ships would be ceded to Brazil.[[10]](#endnote-10) Ingram’s comments and the promise of ships were “unauthorized” but that did not reduce their impact.[[11]](#endnote-11) Somewhat frustrated, Berle observed that “we have to cope with the results. To throw overboard the Naval Conversations now would undoubtedly create a very considerable crisis.” He recommended keeping “the program as *an ideal*, propose measures designed to make progress toward realizing it *without commitments as to time*.”[[12]](#endnote-12) [Italics added]

The proposal for the army, at least in the American view, emphasized instruction and training. It called for the insertion of American instructors at every level of training of officers and enlisted specialists. American officers would be assigned to the “tactical schools, the military academy, and officers pre-military schools”. Although the document did not mention the French Military Mission’s long attempt to reshape the Brazilian army, the considerable American insertion into Brazilian army institutions would be more profound than what the French had done. Within two years of the proposal’s approval the Brazilians wanted to receive “sufficient war materiel with which to equip … [a] peace-time Army of 180,000 and … a reserve sufficient to equip the 26 divisions contemplated in … initial mobilization plan.” Ambassador Berle doubted that within the specified two years the army would be ready to receive so much equipment and arms. He thought it would involve “an extremely large factor of waste.” He asserted that “the Brazilian record for maintenance is not good; and there is always a tendency to ask for new equipment as a solution.” However, he observed that “the capacity for maintenance is there if it can be developed.” [[13]](#endnote-13)

The Staff Conversations also proposed the expansion of the Brazilian air force from 14,000 officers and men to 25,654 by 1948, with a like increase in aircraft from the current 60 fighter bombers to 200 by 1949.[[14]](#endnote-14) If adopted, Berle believed that “Brazil would have unquestioned air supremacy so that no nation or group of nations in South America could oppose her. Technically she would have the continent at her mercy. Given her pacific tendencies, this is not of itself a danger.” Indeed underlying the three sets of staff talks was the belief that “Brazil if armed would be a force for peace and defense, and not for war and expansion; and on the historical and psychological record of Brazil,” Berle concurred that “this assumption seems warranted.”[[15]](#endnote-15)

The reports resulting from the staff conversations, which had been approved at the highest levels of the Brazilian government, were sent to Washington with Brazilian expectations soaring, but then nothing happened. Rio was not even notified of their receipt. Some nine months later at the end of December, Colonel José Bina Machado, who had been Brazil’s first military attaché in Washington from 1938 to November 1941 and was considered a friend of the United States, paid an unsettling visit to the American embassy. During the previous months he had been chief of Minister of War Dutra’s office, and was close to Generals Dutra, Góes Monteiro, and other high officers.[[16]](#endnote-16) He said he was alarmed at the “recent growth of anti-American sentiment in high Brazilian army circles, gravely threatening the future of Brazilian–American military cooperation.” He declared that Brazilian officers were thinking that the United States “was inclined to treat Brazil as a small brother rather than an important nation” and doubted American sincerity about “a wholehearted policy of cooperation with Brazil.” The chargé d’affaires quickly reported Bina Machado’s comments warning that it was “obvious that immediate action must be taken … to produce concrete results pursuant to the staff conversations.” If action was not taken, he predicted that it would “prejudice the standing of our military personnel in Brazil, and gravely threaten the whole future of American-Brazilian military cooperation.”[[17]](#endnote-17) And it would, he emphasized, have “effects far transcending the immediate military necessity.” Secretary of State James F. Byrnes replied that there had been no change in Washington’s policy of “full cooperation with Brazil” and that it was “our most earnest desire to keep our relations with Brazil on the same intimately friendly basis that has existed traditionally….” He was concerned that “certain elements” might be trying to stir up trouble.[[18]](#endnote-18)

Also of concern was the appearance in Rio of an agent of the British company Vickers Armstrong with offers to sell to the Brazilian navy at scrap prices a large number of fully equipped combat vessels. The agent was making the rounds of South American capitals seeking prospective buyers. Minister of Navy Jorge Dodsworth Martins told the American Naval Attaché that he was worried that such sales could be the start of an arms race. He questioned the status of the staff conversations’ recommendations. Ambassador Berle urged the State Department to act, but he seems to have immediately tried to restrain the British, rather than to pressure Washington for the implementation of the staff proposals.

The Brazilians could not understand the American attitude, Truman and his team said the right things, but failed to act on the recommendations.[[19]](#endnote-19) What was going on? In 1945 there were two sets of opposing attitudes in Washington regarding Brazil’s military status and relationship with the United States. From 1938 onward the War and Navy Departments had gradually eclipsed the State Department in the realm of foreign policy making, particularly in the Americas. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had not favored the idea of a special relationship with Brazil and after President Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945; Truman’s team had little familiarity with Brazilian-American relations and even less sympathy for Brazilian ambitions. And that view eventually spread to the army staff. Perhaps because so much of what had happened in Brazil was in the shadows, Brazilian contributions were not well known, even in the War Department.[[20]](#endnote-20)

**American Military Views**

The Army General Staff was divided between those with direct experience with the Brazilians and those who had more theoretical views on how to deal with the American Republics. The two groups of officers saw things very differently. Those in Brazil recommended recognizing Brazil’s emergence “as the dominant military power in South America.” Referring to “Brazil’s contribution, in the present conflict, to Hemispheric Defense,” they advised building “Brazil into a power in the South American continent comparable to that of the United States in the North American continent….” [[21]](#endnote-21) The problem was that such a policy collided with the fault line between the Spanish-American republics and Portuguese-speaking Brazil, and the desire of Washington’s bureaucracies to craft policies that engaged all of Latin America. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a statement (JSC 629) that provided “for an integration of all Latin American armed forces into a hemisphere defense force equipped with United States material and organized and trained in accordance with United States standards.” The War Department’s intelligence section candidly admitted that “one of the main purposes of the integration policy was “to prevent European powers from providing arms and military missions to Latin American republics. If Brazil alone were provided with substantial American arms and equipment it would be “inevitable that European powers” would move into the breach with arms and military missions, particularly in Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The G-2 critics asserted that “a reversal of the policy would have a disastrous effect upon United States relations with Latin America … [and] would lead to a Spanish-speaking bloc which would be hostile to both the United States and Brazil.” Pan American unity “would be destroyed and Inter-American military cooperation disrupted.” The negative evaluation concluded acidly: “The friendship of Brazil for the United States … is a recent development and there is no assurance of its permanence.”[[22]](#endnote-22) On June 9, 1945 the Army staff’s Operations Division (OPD) agreed with the foregoing assessment and recommendation against a pro-Brazil policy. OPD, showing lamentable ignorance of reality, reduced Brazil’s wartime contributions to allowing American personnel in northeast Brazil to construct strategic air bases and to participate in the defense of the region. The author’s final line caught the mood in Washington by saying: “Assurance of Brazil’s friendship for the United States is no less than that of other Latin American countries.”[[23]](#endnote-23)

How different in tone was OPD’s assessment from that of officials more aware of the importance of those very same air bases. In an August 1943 report to the Senate investigation of the airfield projects, a special assistant to the Secretary of War declared that without the Brazilian route to Africa “the entire course of the war might have been changed.” For Brazilian aspirations it was most unfortunate that “the entire project has from the beginning been treated as a secret one.”[[24]](#endnote-24) Obviously, secret projects are not widely known and can be easily forgotten.

Brazilian leaders in the second half of 1945 were slow to realize that their “blood sacrifice” was lost from view in the rivers of blood shed on the world’s battlefields. Historians have not been inquisitive as to Brazil’s immediate post-war role in world affairs. They have concentrated on the fall of Vargas, the successor Eurico Dutra government and Brazilian activity in the new United Nations.[[25]](#endnote-25) For example, no one has asked why Brazil did not participate in the occupation of the defeated Axis countries.

**No Occupation Role**

While the above was going on in Rio de Janeiro and Washington, a different dialogue had taken place in Italy. At some point in February 1945, likely after the victory at Monte Castello, General Mark Clark, former Commander of U.S. Fifth Army, asked General João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes about contributing troops to the occupation. Clark would eventually head the occupation of Austria and apparently had the idea of transferring the *FEB* there. It is significant that little is known about this inquiry, sources such as the *Foreign Relations* papers are silent and I have not found anything in the military files in the National Archives.

The Brazilian sources tell us more but in shadowy fashion. Without any prompting Mascarenhas wrote Minister of War Dutra that he did not favor an occupation role because it would necessarily involve Brazilian troops in an uncomfortable disciplinary function that could easily turn violent. As the least powerful force in that theater of operations under the control of one of the strongest nations, he did not think his troops cut a figure of sufficient authority for such a role. He noted that the poor quality of their uniforms compared unfavorably with those of the Americans and English, and worse, he regarded their discipline and military instruction as deficient. He concluded by writing that “It seems to me [to be] contra-indicated to employ the *Força Expedicionária Brasileira* as occupation troops in any country of this continent.”[[26]](#endnote-26)

The *FEB*’s chief of staff Colonel Floriano de Lima Brayner argued against participating in the occupation. He apparently thought that Brazil was paying the full cost of the *FEB*, and so “staying in Italy,” he observed bitterly, “would cost incalculable and onerous fortunes of our public moneys.” He complained that “The only thing the Americans did not charge for was the air we breathed because the banks could not measure it.”[[27]](#endnote-27) Sadly, he was unaware that in early April 1945 the Lend-Lease agreement between the two governments was modified to include the *FEB* operations. Decades later he still believed that the Americans did not appreciate them.[[28]](#endnote-28) General Willis D. Crittenberger, commander of the Fourth Corps of the U.S. Fifth Army, met with *FEB* staff officer (G-3) Humberto de Castello Branco in Milan on May 10, 1945. He asked Castello why the Brazilians were in such a hurry to go home. Castello replied that Brazil was not represented on the allied council for governing Italy and so it should not contribute troops. He said that Brazil had no political interest in Europe. Castello and Brayner believed that the *FEB* had completed its mission and there was no reason for it to be part of the occupation of Italy or anywhere else.[[29]](#endnote-29) But, of course, this was not a decision for field officers to make. Exactly who made the decision and why is not known. It is possible that the missing 1945 and 1946 *Relatórios* of the Minister of War might shed some light on why Brazil did not participate in the occupation. It could be that there are documents in some archive and we have just missed them.[[30]](#endnote-30)

If the Brazilian army had taken part in the occupation it likely would have given Brazil a louder voice in post-war diplomacy and likely would have strengthened its relationship with the United States. Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha in his oral history testimony observed that British General Harold R. L. G. Alexander, commander of the 15th Group of Armies had said to him: “The Brazilian is a fine soldier. I’m sorry to hear they want to go home and not go to Austria.” Leitão da Cunha was in Rome at the time and immediately telegraphed the Brazilian foreign ministry saying “that the *FEB* ought to stay.” Apparently in the Itamaraty the diplomats were not looking to expand Brazilian influence and prestige; one of them responded: “This is a sneaky way for them to earn gold.” [“*Isso é cavação deles para ganhar ouro*.”] As if the war-weary veterans were thinking only of lining their pockets! The Ambassador summarized his reaction by saying “we give up conquered gains.” [“*Nós abdicamos das vantagens conquistadas*.”] “And we did not know how to take advantage of what we had done; we stay with intrigues, lesser things, when we had a natural ally. We stayed out of step with the United States.” He concluded by saying that “the Germanophiles [in the War Ministry] did not lose their Germanophilia. They fought without enthusiasm.” Because of its role in the war “Brazil stopped being an adolescent country and became a serious country.” “We do not know how to take advantage of the things that we do well. We ought to celebrate [them], but Brazilians don’t know what the *pracinhas* did.”[[31]](#endnote-31) If Brazil had participated in the occupation its visibility and, perhaps, status in the post-war world would have been different.

Even before World War II ended the United States negotiated a ten-year extension of its access to air bases at Belém, Natal, and Recife. American policy aimed at excluding all other foreign military influences from the Western Hemisphere and to solidify American leadership in military matters. Brazil was to be the model for the other American republics of the value of such an arrangement of hemispheric defense. The United States which before the war had not been interested in training and supplying Latin American forces now made this the core of its relations with the region.[[32]](#endnote-32)

**The Pacific War**

When Brazil entered the war in August 1942, it recognized that a state of war existed with Germany and Italy, but it did not include Japan. The other two Axis powers had sunk Brazilian ships, in effect attacking Brazil. Japan had attacked another American republic, so Brazil broke relations with the three, but did not recognize war with Japan because the Empire had not attacked it. Brazil’s tradition was to go to war only if attacked. There was a large Japanese immigrant population in the country dating from 1906, with communities in the southern states and in Pará in the Amazon. The government imposed harsh repressive controls on the Japanese. With the end of the war in Europe in early May 1945, all eyes turned toward the Pacific. Peace in Europe also meant the end of Brazilian participation in the Lend-Lease program. The exact thinking of the Vargas government is not clear, but it must have seen advantages to joining the fight in the Pacific. Especially because Argentina still maintained its neutrality.

The Vargas government let it be known that it would respond favorably to an American request that it enter the war with Japan. Washington demurred saying it would welcome a Brazilian declaration, but it would be up to Brazil to act without an invitation. On May 8, Vargas, rejoicing in the victory in Europe, told journalists that Brazil was standing with the United Nations and that the bases in the north would continue to serve the war effort until Japan was defeated. He emphasized that if the United Nations needed Brazilian troops in the Pacific, “the country was ready to supply them.”[[33]](#endnote-33) So he was ready to set aside the tradition of declaring war only if attacked. Meanwhile some American troops in Italy were being shipped to the Pacific theater.[[34]](#endnote-34) And Brazil’s troops would soon be heading home.

At that time the United Nations was being organized in San Francisco. Brazil was angling for a seat on the Security Council, but faced resistance from the British and the Russians and lack of enthusiasm from the Americans. The chief Brazilian representative at the conference Pedro Leão Veloso met with President Truman to discuss Lend-Lease issues and possible Brazilian entry into the war with Japan.[[35]](#endnote-35) The Department of State opined that “it would be politically advantageous to have Brazil declare war on Japan.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved “a token participation of the Brazilian Air Force in the Pacific,” but because of transportation and retraining difficulties they could not make use of Brazilian ground troops. On June 6, 1945 Brazil announced that “having for some time considered the aggression of Japan against the United States of America as though it were directed against Brazil itself and desiring to cooperate for the final victory of the United Nations…” it declared that a state of war existed with the Empire of Japan.[[36]](#endnote-36) President Truman telegraphed to Vargas his “deep satisfaction” that Brazil “will be solidly at our side until the total defeat of the one remaining Axis aggressor.” He noted that the action was “an additional bond in the historic friendship” that had its “roots in the beginnings of our respective histories as independent nations.”[[37]](#endnote-37) However, it may be that the Brazilian declaration and offer of troops were more related to a desire to keep Lend-Lease arms and equipment flowing than to a real desire to see action in the Pacific.

It is worth noting that historians have paid little attention to Brazil’s entry into the war against Japan. The many thousands of Japanese immigrants in Brazil suffered discrimination and severe repression in the late 1930s nationalist campaigns, and even worse after the 1942 break in relations. Because of their extreme cultural and physical isolation most of them did not believe that Japan had lost the war.[[38]](#endnote-38) Recently, one team of Brazilian historians has questioned why Brazil delayed including Japan in the recognition of a state of war from 1942 to 1945. Their continuing research may provide answers. They noted that even without such action Brazilian authorities treated the resident Japanese as harshly as they did the Germans and Italians.[[39]](#endnote-39)The intense political agitation that led to the deposition of President Vargas at the end of October 1945 likely distracted and deflected historians’ attention to other questions such as the formation of the United Nations.

By the end of December 1945 a significant number of Brazilian officers had doubts about American sincerity regarding their relationship. Such officers thought that the Americans were “inclined to treat Brazil as a small brother rather than an important nation pledged to full military cooperation.” Secretary of State James F. Byrnes tried to counter such feelings by saying that it was the Truman administration’s “most earnest desire to keep our relations with Brazil on the same intimately friendly basis that has existed traditionally and particularly throughout the war….”[[40]](#endnote-40)

## The Cold War

When peace turned into tension and then into harsh relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Brazilian military easily adhered to the Cold War, after all, they had confronted the communist menace head on in 1935[[41]](#endnote-41), and so were willing to back the Americans against the Russians. The U.S. Army’s plans for Latin America in 1945 aimed at standardizing arms, equipment and training. Military planners envisioned a multimillion dollar aid program that would integrate the region’s armies and would stimulate broad development of its societies. Such thinking relied on the continuation of the wartime levels of funding. The U.S. Congress wanted to reduce spending and had little interest in Latin American economic and military development. The perception of American civilian leaders was that Brazil, indeed, Latin America was safe from the communist threat, and that Washington should focus on the hot spots. It soon became clear to Brazilian leaders that Brazil would not receive the extensive economic development assistance that they had been led to expect for wartime support.

American policies and Brazilian expectations proceeded at odds. The Americans wanted to continue using their wartime bases and by the early 1950s would be seeking missile tracking and radio stations seemingly under the cover of the supposedly special relationship between the two countries. The prospects had been bright back in February 1944 when President Roosevelt suggested a joint Brazilian-American air base in either West Africa or in the Cape Verde Islands and Vargas had said that “he would gladly participate” in such a venture. It should be said that the United States did not have any rights to such bases and so the offer to Vargas was being made on a “if and when” basis.[[42]](#endnote-42) It is likely that this joint base idea provoked him to say to Ambassador Caffery: “Well , you may tell President Roosevelt that I am willing to make an agreement with you permitting some sort of continuing military use of those fields [in the northeast].”[[43]](#endnote-43) In conversations with Caffery, Vargas repeatedly sought assurances of support in case Argentina attacked, and the Americans understood that they had to “ at least go through motions sympathetic to Vargas’ desires” if they wanted to conclude an agreement on the use of the bases. Throughout the resulting secret negotiations, there was concern by those involved about opposition from Brazilian air force officers, who were suspicious of American intentions.[[44]](#endnote-44) All of the foregoing unraveled when Aranha, Roosevelt, and then Vargas were no longer managing the relationship.

At the same time Washington’s policy, as expressed in the Chapultepec resolution, called for equal treatment for all Latin American countries. Washington seemed to want both a strong bilateral relationship with Brazil and a multilateral relationship with all of Latin America. This contradiction resulted from a deep divide in the American government between the State Department, which favored multilateralism and the War (then later Defense) Department that was more, if not completely, inclined toward a bilateral relationship with Brazil. As a result the messages the Brazilians received from Americans were often confusing.

Although Brazil, particularly its military, wanted close friendship with the United States, the Brazilian attitude was not subservience, the Brazilians wanted a relationship of equals that enhanced rather than diminished their nationalism. In 1948 the new CIA correctly warned that in any choice between cooperation and national sovereignty the Brazilian leadership would follow an independent course. Washington “should not assume Brazil would make concessions incompatible with its national goals.”[[45]](#endnote-45)

After the war the United States did not provide the arms the Brazilians expected and, more worrisome from the perspective of Rio de Janeiro, it sought a rapprochement with Argentina. This aspect of American multilateralism deeply disturbed the Brazilians who still had a third of their military forces permanently arrayed in defensive positions in the south against a long-expected Argentine invasion. Brazilian strategic planning was based on the premise of war with Argentina.[[46]](#endnote-46) In 1947 they were somewhat mollified by the arrival of enough “surplus” American equipment to outfit a division of infantry and an airborne combat team. But surplus items were not new and recalled the used French equipment they had obtained after the First World War. The Brazilians felt inferior and had a sense that somehow they were being cheated. This was especially so because the Truman administration was working hard to prevent the Brazilian congress from passing laws that would shut out foreign participation in Brazilian petroleum development. Most of the American pressure came from the State Department, but that did not prevent Brazilian officers from feeling suspicious.

The Pentagon regarded Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela as the Latin American countries whose interests appeared “to be most closely allied to the U.S. national interest or which for other reasons should be granted the highest priority of training assistance.” The basic idea was that “training and education were tools for maintaining influence.” [[47]](#endnote-47) Not surprisingly, the Pentagon was enthusiastic about helping the Brazilians create their new *Escola Superior de Guerra*, loosely modeled on the American “National War College” to prepare their military and civilian elites to find solutions for Brazil’s development problems.[[48]](#endnote-48)

While the American government, at the level of the presidency, always said soothing words of friendship, outside the White House its actions gave the impression of hardness vis-à-vis Brazilian development, indeed American officials had little interest in or knowledge of Latin America. George F. Kennan, then in the State Department, who would be influential in shaping the policy of containment of the Soviet Union, saw the region’s racially mixed populations as “unhappy and hopeless” and he judged Brazil by the “noisy, wildly competitive traffic” in Rio de Janeiro and was repulsed by the “unbelievable contrasts between luxury and poverty.”[[49]](#endnote-49) He viewed the region as insignificant: “we have really no vital interests in that part of the world,” and should “not be greatly concerned for their opinion of us.” [[50]](#endnote-50) Of course, he had spent all of a month in the region and was innocent of knowledge of its languages and histories.

Kennan’s 1950 report on the region was shelved and did not influence Washington’s policies toward Latin America.[[51]](#endnote-51) But his attitudes were not far removed from those of other officials who used more diplomatic language.

**Petroleum Development and Korean War**

Oil was a central issue that was viewed differently in the two countries. The United States position was that Brazil should allow American companies to search for, develop, and basically to own the resulting oil. Free trade and free investment were the American mantras of the era. The Brazilian military was divided as to the best way to develop the crucial resource. Some absolutely opposed foreign corporate involvement, while others thought that foreign money and know-how was necessary. The resulting argument within the armed forces weakened and delayed the development of a concerted national policy.

The division of military opinion regarding oil development was embroiled further by the outbreak of war in Korea. Those officers who opposed American involvement in petroleum tended to blame the United States for the Korean crisis and, hence, opposed any suggestion that Brazil should send troops. The lack of American economic assistance since World War II and a sense of unfulfilled wartime promises was the backdrop for a heated debate over Korea. Anti-American sentiment was notable and growing. Ardent pro-American Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura believed that Brazil should not make the mistake it had in 1942 by going to war without guarantees that it would benefit. Naturally Brazil would cooperate with the United States but the cooperation should be reciprocal, after all a modern, functional Brazil would be a bulwark for the defense of the United States. During the world war American analysts, such as the Cooke Mission, had recommended massive investments in infrastructure to allow more exports and to expand the internal market. The Mission reasoned that trade increased between rich nations, not between rich and poor ones, and so creation of a prosperous Brazil was in the national interest of the United States. The objective should be to build up the purchasing power of Brazilians.[[52]](#endnote-52) The Brazilian press heralded such views as prelude to the dawning of a new era for the country hand-in-hand with their American allies. It was a euphoric rising of expectations.[[53]](#endnote-53) Encouraging belief that industrialization, education, housing, electrification, and trade would be the results of allied victory appeared to have been a ploy to hold Brazil at the side of the United States. Post-war requests for assistance were sidelined; for example, in 1946 when Brazil requested $200 million in loans or grants to build and modernize its railways, Washington’s bureaucracies could not agree and the cold response confused and disillusioned Brazilian officials.[[54]](#endnote-54) Americans were more interested in rebuilding their defeated enemies than in helping their friends, which may have been economically logical but it cut deeply. Even worse, the Americans were too willing to treat Argentina as equal to Brazil in distributing war surplus arms and equipment. Juan Perón’s unrepentant German partisanship was seemingly unimportant.[[55]](#endnote-55)

Since 1945 Washington had not cooperated with Brazil, during the Dutra government it had not given (loaned) a cent to Brazil, nor to the rest of Latin America. However, on the surface relations appeared quite friendly and positive, Truman went to Rio for the closing of the Inter-American Conference that produced the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (Commonly called the Rio Treaty) in 1947 and Dutra repaid the honor with a 12-day visit to the United States in September 1949. It seemed that the Americans would support Brazilian economic development. The so-called Abbink Mission (1947-48) updated the wartime Cooke Mission’s recommendations with yet another diagnosis of Brazilian necessities.[[56]](#endnote-56) Dutra told the Brazilian congress that Truman had emphasized that the United States was interested in collaborating in Brazil’s economic development and social progress. And he noted that the two governments would soon be negotiating a treaty to stimulate American investment in Brazil.[[57]](#endnote-57) But it did not turn out that way.

The elections of October 3, 1950 returned former dictator Getúlio Vargas to the presidency. Vargas was not the same as he had been when deposed in 1945. He was the wartime ally and understood the benefits of close ties with the United States. But he also understood that American promises, real and implied, were not always realized. And he nursed a gnawing wound from Ambassador Berle’s interventionist role in his deposition in 1945. Also, he had less mental and physical energy to deal with a hugely complicated political scene with many more turbulent actors and issues than had been the case earlier. The task of creating a supportive legislative collation was not in his skillset. He wanted to continue Brazil on the road to national development. He was particularly desirous of creating a program of planned industrialization by means of government intervention exercised in such fashion so as not to alarm private initiative, but to attract it and foreign investment as partners in the economic development of the country. [[58]](#endnote-58) Truman gave the impression of favoring support of such development efforts by sending as his representative to Getúlio’s inauguration, Nelson Rockefeller, head of the American government’s International Development Advisory Board, charged with implementing a program of technical assistance for Latin America. A year earlier, while Dutra was president, the two countries had agreed to establish a bi-national commission to organize how to establish basic industries and end Brazil’s status as a dependent nation simply exporting natural resources. Rockefeller and Vargas discussed how to make the commission a reality. [[59]](#endnote-59)

Now with the crisis in the Far East the United States wanted Latin America to send troops to fight in Korea. The signing of an alliance between China and the Soviet Union in February 1950 had caused Washington to fear the spread of communism in Asia and to embrace the idea that the world was again under threat. The North Korean invasion of the south had made the threat all too real. Washington made repeated overtures to Brazil to send an infantry division. In the first half of 1951, the Brazilians did not quite say no, but they never said yes. In April Truman made a direct appeal to Vargas for troops, saying that after nine months of combat the American forces needed relief and could only get it if capable troops such as Brazil’s took their place.[[60]](#endnote-60) In June 1951, when the secretary-general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, requested Brazilian troops, the Brazilian National Security Council discussed the matter and decided the country could not afford the costs of organizing and maintaining an expeditionary force in Asia, but it could furnish, in return for military and financial aid, strategic materials for war industry, including minerals related to producing atomic energy. The Americans offered to train Brazilian forces in Brazil and to pay for arms, equipment, and transportation. Truman wrote Vargas pleading that it would be a “great help to the United Nations effort in Korea if Brazil could send an Infantry Division....”[[61]](#endnote-61) The Truman administration sought Organization of American States (OAS) approval to invoke the recent Rio Treaty, which would oblige the Latin Americans to enter the conflict. But the Latin Americans pointed out that the treaty related to hemispheric security and Korea was far away. Washington was beset by fear that the fighting in Korea was preparation for a Soviet attack in Europe, but could not convince the Latin Americans to adopt its world view.[[62]](#endnote-62)

It is worth noting that it was the Korean crisis that led the United States to expand its facilities to train Latin American officers in hopes that their countries might “respond increasingly to United Nations requests for assistance in Korea.” Several Latin American countries had requested training in joint staff planning and operations for their senior officers, and because security restrictions, limited capacity, and language difficulties made such training in existing installations impractical, the Joint Chiefs took steps to create an appropriate school in the Canal Zone.[[63]](#endnote-63) That institution eventually became the infamous School of the Americas.

For Brazil the question of sending troops to Korea was intimately linked to economic assistance. Even Oswaldo Aranha, who had been chiefly responsible for the World War II alliance and, who continued to be a major exponent of “supporting the United States in the world in return for its support of our political, economic and military preeminence in South America,” was opposed to committing troops. To show solidarity with the Americans he suggested sending a division to Germany to free United States troops for Korea.[[64]](#endnote-64) An important army general and commander of the *FEB* artillery in Italy, Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, thought that the United States was in the Korean War to “maintain its authority in the [Far East] region.”[[65]](#endnote-65)

The Brazilians wanted assistance signed and delivered before they made a decision about sending troops. General Pedro de Góes Monteiro[[66]](#endnote-66) was sent to Washington with the goal of obtaining that type of agreement. But his instructions specified delaying matters until the fighting ended or until World War III broke out. The Brazilian government did not have domestic political support for a war role, indeed, Vargas’s own party, the PTB opposed such a role, yet Vargas did not want to say no to the American request and so delay was the response. Góes found that Brazilian prestige in Washington had declined conspicuously and that there was uneasiness about the Vargas government. As a result he and the Americans talked past each other; even so the Americans drafted the text of an agreement aimed at refurbishing the wartime alliance. That draft was what Góes brought back to Rio de Janeiro. [[67]](#endnote-67)

**1952 Political-Military Accord**

In the United States the McCarthy anti-communist campaign was on, and in Brazil suspicion of American “imperialism” infected politics and any discussion related to foreign affairs. Calm and reason were often absent. Brazil was still adjusting to electoral democracy after many years of dictatorship and censorship. Remarkably, it was in this tense climate that the two governments successfully negotiated a military accord along the lines of their 1942 agreement. Its purpose was to keep the military alliance alive by promising the supply of arms and training, but it muddied that intent by committing Brazil to export monazite and radio-active sands to the United States for its atomic program. Brazil was rich in uranium deposits and very interested in developing atomic technology, which the Americans blocked at every turn. It appeared that Washington wanted to obtain Brazil’s minerals while keeping it underdeveloped. It took the Brazilian congress a year of fierce debates to approve the military accord. The fallout from obtaining approval was such that it forced the resignation of Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura, who had favored its passage, and the deposition of War Minister Newton Estillac Leal, who had opposed it. The accord appeared to contradict Vargas’s efforts to nationalize protectively key natural resources.[[68]](#endnote-68)

Within the army all of this caused a wave of dismissals and punishments of officers regarded as ultranationalists, who questioned continued close ties with the United States. This purge had the effect of making Brazilian military opinion more homogenous and less questioning of American motives. Petroleum continued as an irritant in relations because Brazil’s requests for funds to develop it were met by the Eisenhower administration’s insistence that the Brazilian government open its development to private American investment. Potential American investors attacked the *Petrobras* law as Communist-inspired. President Vargas responded by denouncing their intent to sabotage Brazilian development. Ronald Schneider commented on those turbulent years saying that “Polemics largely replaced dialogue as radicalizers on both extremes played upon class interests and the tensions and insecurity engendered by the process of modernization.” [[69]](#endnote-69)

Brazilian politics, with the military actively participating, descended into a struggle between nationalists and internationalists that was poorly understood in a Washington infected with McCarthyism. Opposition to American views was easily labeled as Communist. From the perspective of the Brazilian government Eisenhower was the creature of Wall Street. Pro-American Oswaldo Aranha wrote Vargas that the Eisenhower administration would be a Republican and military government, with Wall Street serving as the General Staff. He predicted that “capitalism in power will not respect limitations, especially those of international order.”[[70]](#endnote-70) With the Americans insisting on private investment, which the Brazilian government did not want to accept, Brazil would have to develop itself. On October 3, 1953, the Brazilian congress approved the *Petrobras* law placing petroleum development under state control. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded by reducing drastically the amount of an already agreed upon loan from the Export-Import Bank. Considering that 55% of Brazilian trade was then with the United States Dulles’ action was as hurtful as it was ill-considered. Brazil responded with a decree limiting the repatriation of profits of American firms operating in Brazil.

It should have been clear that “military” relations cannot be isolated from the overall relations between countries. And in the Brazilian case military relations with the United States contributed negatively to the political climate. In February 1954 Brazilian officers issued a manifesto protesting low salaries and lack of proper arms and equipment and asserted that there was a “crisis of authority” in the army. Vargas became even more defensive against American trade controls and lack of development assistance. In April he sent congress the bill that created *Electrobrás* nationalizing the electric power grid, at the expense of Canadian and American companies.[[71]](#endnote-71) Former Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura turned up the political heat with a press interview charging that Vargas had been negotiating with Juan Perón to create an Argentine-Brazilian-Chilean alliance against the United States. The reality of what Vargas had in mind was complicated, but seemed to hold the possibility of increasing bargaining power with Washington; even so it infuriated his enemies, who used it to argue that he wanted to stay in power.[[72]](#endnote-72) Anti-Vargas plotting commenced in the officer corps, especially in the air force. These political tensions mixed with economic ones as wages could not keep pace with inflation, credit demands outpaced availability and currency exchange was unfavorable. At the time Brazil, heavily dependent on coffee exports, watched demand in the American market fall as the Brazilian government tried to keep the price above market levels.

In a mis-guided attempt to help the beleaguered president his body guard arranged the murder of his most vociferous enemy, Carlos Lacerda, but the shots missed their target and killed an accompanying air force officer. The resulting indignant reaction led to the military demanding Vargas’s resignation, but ended in his dramatic suicide on August 24, 1954.[[73]](#endnote-73)

## Post Vargas Era Relations

Vargas’s tragic death ushered in a decade that began with a political-military crisis over the outcome of the 1955 elections, and then happily entered a period of relative peace and achievement during the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960). Those years were marked by the building of Brasília, massive road construction, the establishment of the automotive industry, and the beginning of Brazil as an industrial power. Throughout Kubitschek was a major voice calling for serious American investment in Latin American development that would eventually lead to the Alliance for Progress in 1961. But Washington did not support Brazilian industrialization, and American private enterprise gave it a cold shoulder. Ford and General Motors refused to set up factories and so Volkswagen became the leading Brazilian automotive producer. The United States actively undermined Brazilian efforts to create capability in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.[[74]](#endnote-74) Even at that stage Brazil was turning to Germany for assistance in developing its atomic capacity.

In 1956 United States had negotiated placement of a missile tracking station on Brazil’s Fernando de Noronha Island, military radio stations in the Northeast, as well as expanded facilities for its Military Air Transport System (MATS).[[75]](#endnote-75) Unfortunately American officers injured Brazilian pride by asserting that Brazilians would have limited and guarded access to such American stations. Equally irritating, as Sonny Davis observed, was the American failure “to acknowledge and treat Brazil as more important than its Spanish-speaking neighbors.”[[76]](#endnote-76) United States Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs argued that Brazil should be treated as the “first friend and ally” in Latin America. He asserted that “we should recognize [the] reality of Brazil’s emergence as [the] dominant Latin American power” and should treat it as such.[[77]](#endnote-77) Briggs warned of military dissatisfaction with the small size and slowness of arms transfers and the tendency to give Brazil and its smaller South American neighbors identical treatment. Brazil did not want to be treated the same as Uruguay or Paraguay.

Kubitschek was dependent on the military for his government’s security and so he was concerned that their needs be met. He was committed to continuing Brazil’s traditional pro-United States foreign policy, but in economic and military matters he had to defer to the congress and to the armed forces, both of which were “highly sensitive to any development which appears to infringe upon Brazilian sovereignty.”[[78]](#endnote-78)

Russia’s success in launching *Sputnik* (October 4, 1957) caused Brazilians to doubt the long heralded technological preeminence of the United States and the launch gave a certain prestige to communism. Military critics of the traditional relationship asked what value it had in a world where Soviet science was out pacing American science and technology.

The White House woke up a bit when Vice-President Richard Nixon was received with hostility in Argentina, Peru and Venezuela in May 1958. The Eisenhower administration increased its military assistance to Latin America but basically was opposed to development aid. Kubitschek took advantage of Washington’s renewed focus on the region by asking that the United States pledge $40 Billion over the next twenty years to support what he called “Operation Pan America,” which was to be a Marshall Plan for Latin America.[[79]](#endnote-79) The idea was received coldly. The Eisenhower years saw relations with Brazil in evident decline, along with American prestige in all of Latin America.

Despite the foregoing, Eisenhower personally wanted to improve relations with Brazil and the rest of Latin America. He was fascinated by the construction of Brasília as Brazil’s new capital. In February 1960 he flew to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and then Uruguay receiving great public displays of welcome.[[80]](#endnote-80) Kubitschek was charmed and honored to be in the presence of the great war hero, but Eisenhower, although appalled by the evident poverty in Brazil, was not moved to support JK’s position that economic growth was the best way to combat communism. Eisenhower could see that “the private and public capital which had flown ***bounteously*** [emphasis added] into Latin America had failed to benefit the masses….” Kubitschek argued that poverty and frustration had “far greater capacity for stirring discontent” than did communists. [[81]](#endnote-81)

The visit was marred by the collision over Rio’s bay of a Brazilian airliner with an American plane carrying members of the U.S. Navy band. The accident seemingly heightened empathy between the two presidents but nothing more. A behind the scenes incident revealed American ignorance of Brazilian history and culture. When embassy staff unwrapped Eisenhower’s official gift for Kubitschek they were aghast to see a Steuben Glass model of the Wright Brothers’ *Kitty Hawk*. The Brazilians regarded their countryman, Alberto Santos-Dumont, as the first to fly a heavier-than-air machine and so the Steuben Glass model would have been an affront.[[82]](#endnote-82) A replacement gift was quickly sought.

**Castro Era**

Fidel Castro’s victory over Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in January of 1959 changed the relative importance of Latin America to Washington. The ineptness of the Eisenhower administration helped radicalize the Castro government and pushed it into the willing arms of Moscow. The *Military Review* at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff School began publishing articles on “unconventional warfare.” And to deal with the perceived threat so close to the United States the Eisenhower team embarked on intense intervention. His 1960 trip to South America did not deter him from authorizing the CIA to overthrow Castro. Washington’s nervous attention to communists in Brazil soared to a whole new level. Latin America was perceived as an undifferentiated mass. If it could happen in Cuba, it could happen in Brazil.

The successor government of John F. Kennedy had better instincts but succumbed to the anti-communist, anti-Castro wave. The new president was fascinated by “unconventional warfare” and gave approval for the creation of the army’s green beret-adorned Special Forces. The official vision of Latin America was distorted even more as the Kennedy administration became convinced in 1961 that the Northeast of Brazil was about to erupt into a vast Cuban-style revolution. In 1962 this “Fear” was such in Washington that the government gave funds to the enemies of Brazilian President João Goulart to weaken his position.[[83]](#endnote-83)

In 1962 understanding in Brazil of how American military assistance functioned was so confused that officers on the president’s military staff (*Casa Militar*) thought that Americans officials decided which Brazilian units received American arms and equipment. Obviously that would be an “interference of a foreign country in matters of our exclusive competence.” It is noteworthy that the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (*EMFA*) felt compelled to write a long memo denying any American involvement in the distribution of material. [[84]](#endnote-84) Clearly alliances require considerable explanation to all involved.

**1964 Coup and After: Dominican Republic and Vietnam**

The Brazilian political situation deteriorated steadily and the military was drawn intimately into plotting against President João Goulart. Suffice to say that he and his government were tarnished with a communist and fellow traveler label. From the day he took over, after President Janio Quardos resigned in 1961, the American government paid close attention and tried to foretell his views and actions. He made an extensive visit to the United States in 1962, met twice with President Kennedy, and addressed the congress. He admired Kennedy and they got on well. But he faced a difficult political situation in Brazil, where the opposition had imposed a parliamentary system to weaken his power. On July 30, 1962, Kennedy and his ambassador to Brazil, Professor Lincoln Gordon, worried that Goulart was being too tolerant of the left and feared the rise of communism.[[85]](#endnote-85) In 1963 a plebiscite returned Brazil to a presidential system with Goulart holding full executive powers. The U.S. Embassy, especially the new Military Attaché Colonel Vernon Walters, followed currents and plans within the officer corps. Walters had been liaison officer and interpreter for FEB commander Mascarenhas and had been assistant attaché (1945-1948) in Rio. He had easy access throughout the Brazilian officer corps. United States officials reportedly advised Brazilian captains and majors that if the coup failed they should get out of Brazil, and reassured them that the American government would support, train, arm, and reinsert them to carry out a guerrilla war against the winners. More directly Washington assembled a naval task force called “*Operation Brother Sam*” with petroleum and arms in case the anti-Goulart forces needed them. As it turned out Goulart’s people folded immediately and *Brother Sam* steamed back north. Unhappily, President Lyndon Johnson had the bad taste to recognize the new government while Goulart was technically still president.[[86]](#endnote-86)

A purely military *coup d’état* was not part of Brazilian political culture; previous coups had been civilian-military mixes. This one was no different, but the military had the guns. Army Chief of Staff Humberto de Castello Branco had been a major player in the plotting and organizing elite opinion. The various “revolutionary” factions could not agree on a civilian politician to take the presidency, but a majority backed Castello Branco.[[87]](#endnote-87) He had been the operations officer of the *FEB* in Italy and was well regarded by the American military. He agreed to serve as president only until the end of Goulart’s term of office, and he refused to institutionalize the military’s hold on power. He wanted to reform the political-economic system by restructuring the political parties and launching a land reform program that was similar to Goulart’s. The situation was radicalized by military hard-liners seeking a complete cleansing of leftist and populist influences and by civilian politicians delaying and obstructing Castello’s reforms. The former pressed him to recess and purge the Congress, to remove questionable state governors, and to decree the expansion of presidential powers at the expense of the congress and the courts. He restrained the populist left, but in doing so created the basis for authoritarian rule by his successors.[[88]](#endnote-88) Castello tried to maintain a degree of democracy but in the end was forced to accept continued army control by agreeing to the succession of Minister of Army Artur Costa e Silva. On the positive side he maintained the tradition of presidential supremacy over the military and kept potential coup-makers in check.

It was now apparent that the armed forces officer corps was divided between those who believed that they should confine themselves to their professional duties and those who regarded politicians as scoundrels ready to betray Brazil to communism or some other menace. Many officers believed that they were upholding democracy, even as they were distorting and limiting it. The regime did not attempt to eliminate the trappings of liberal constitutionalism because it feared disapproval of international opinion and damage to the alliance with the United States. As the citadel of anticommunism, the United States provided the ideology that the Brazilian military used to justify their hold on power. But Washington also preached liberal democracy, which forced the authoritarians to assume the contradictory position of defending democracy by effectively destroying it. Their concern for appearances caused them to abstain from creating a personalist dictatorship as in Spanish-American countries by requiring each successive general-president to pass power to his replacement.[[89]](#endnote-89)

The role of the United States in these events was complex and at times contradictory. Throughout 1963 in the United States there had been an anti-Goulart press campaign and in 1964 the Johnson administration gave moral support to the conspiracy. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon later admitted that the embassy had given money to anti-Goulart candidates in the 1962 elections and had encouraged the plotters; that there were many extra CIA and American military personnel operating in Brazil; and that four U.S. Navy oil tankers and the carrier Forrestal, in “ *Operation Brother Sam*," had stood off the coast. Washington immediately had recognized the new government and joined the chorus chanting that the *coup d’état* of the "democratic forces" had restrained the hand of international communism. In retrospect it appears that the only foreign hand involved was the American one. But it would be going too far to say that Brazilian puppets were dancing to Washington's tune, the United States was not the principal actor in this play.[[90]](#endnote-90)

With the military in power one might think that military relations with the United States would greatly improve, but that would be a mistake. On the surface they certainly were friendly, but out of public view it was another matter. The American intervention in the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic under the guise of preventing another Cuba obtained the blessing of the Organization of American States (OAS), but the American request for Latin American troops was approved with the proviso that the commander be Latin American. The Latin Americans were upset that Washington sought OAS approval only after it sent troops.[[91]](#endnote-91)

President-General Humberto de Castello Branco agreed to send a Brazilian contingent partly because he opposed such unilateral intervention by any American republic, especially the United States.[[92]](#endnote-92) Effectively the Dominican intervention became a multilateral operation. The symbolism of having a Brazilian general command American troops was profound for the Brazilian military. Lt. General Bruce Palmer was not pleased being told by General Hugo Panasco Alvim that the language of his headquarters would be Portuguese and that Palmer had better find himself an interpreter. Not surprisingly Palmer and Alvim did not get along and eventually they were both relieved under guise of rotation of commanders. An important grouping of Brazilian intellectuals expressed their “vehement repulsion at the Brazilian government’s complicity in the hateful armed intervention of the United States.” Likewise there were protests within the armed forces, particularly, from hard line officers. As a result Castello Branco lost so much prestige that he was unable to fulfill his promise of turning the presidency over to an elected civilian.[[93]](#endnote-93) Brazilian participation in the Dominican affair was a factor in prolonging military control of the government.

Hard on the Dominican crisis was the Vietnam situation. This time the United States was acting without the cover of the United Nations or any other international body. In repeated letters between 1965 and 1967 President Lyndon Johnson asked Castello Branco for Brazilian troops. The request was somewhat sweetened by Johnson’s approval of a $150 million loan to Brazil. Castello Branco told Ambassador Lincoln Gordon that the military would have objections. Given the intense popular opposition to the war, and the likelihood of high casualty levels without clear recompense Castello Branco said no.[[94]](#endnote-94) Close on that decision, in an effort to control spending, the Johnson administration cut back on the military assistance that Brazil had been receiving. This had the consequence of Brazil turning to Europe for weaponry. French Mirage jets replaced American F-5s, and from 1968 to 1972 Brazil spent some $500 million on European arms.

At the end of 1960s President Richard Nixon called for a careful reassessment of relations with the considerably more authoritarian Brazilian regime. The reassessment recognized the need for “a mature, friendly, and mutually beneficial relationship …because of Brazil's long-run potential” and because it had half the land and half the population of South America. Trade and investment were judged to be of prime importance, while diplomatic and military interests were secondary.[[95]](#endnote-95) The Congress had declared that “military sales should not be made if they would arm military dictators who are "denying the growth of fundamental rights or social progress to their own people unless the President determines it to be in the security interests of the U. S.” [[96]](#endnote-96) The administration decided to sidestep that “sense of Congress” because of Brazil’s “importance to the interests of the U.S.” and allow cash sales to go forward and to release $30 million in credits for helicopters and transport aircraft. To do otherwise would “be a very serious irritant causing damage to our relations out of proportion to the requests themselves.”[[97]](#endnote-97) Concurrent with these actions, President Richard Nixon told Henry Kissinger that “I want a stepped up effort for closer relations with Brazil’s government….”[[98]](#endnote-98) He said that he preferred democratically- elected governments but believed they had to be pragmatic. He strove to assure the Brazilian government and the military that “we are [not] looking down our noses at them because of their form of government.” He thought it was possible to have close relations without “embracing their form of government or condoning their internal actions.”[[99]](#endnote-99)

In theory such relations might be possible, but from a Brazilian perspective close relations were regarded as support and approval. Meanwhile 1968 saw increasing protests and street demonstrations against the military-controlled government. In March 1968 some 60,000 gathered for the burial of a high school student shot by the police during a protest against the closing of a student restaurant in Rio, then after the Seventh- Day Mass at the *Candelária* church in the city center crowds outside the church were dispersed with considerable violence. Protests and marches took place, throughout Brazil. More repression and arrests of students led to a massive march of some 100,000 through Rio’s streets. In April seventy-two university professors, some with international reputations, were summarily dismissed and forbidden to teach. Hundreds of people had been arrested, frustration and anger were widespread. One general warned that “excessive repression brings a rising radicalization of demands.” Instead of easing the tension, police and military repression intensified in August, Brazil’s darkest and tragedy-laden month, with hundreds of students arrested in São Paulo and Rio and 14,000 soldiers on the streets of the latter. The Supreme Federal Tribunal denied *habeas corpus* for an arrested student leader and the Chamber of Deputies rejected a bill of amnesty for the student demonstrators. The *Universidade de Brasília* was invaded by military police and the *Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais* was closed after a similar invasion.[[100]](#endnote-100) Throughout the country university professors and labor leaders were arrested. Overstating the reality, radical military officers saw the student unrest as sign that a “revolutionary war” was underway.

At the end of 1968, the government of Costa e Silva issued the draconian Institutional Act No. 5 taking Brazil into a dark dictatorship. Hundreds more were arrested; disappearances and “the widespread use of severe torture” became common place. The U. S. military was very reluctant to accept the truth of the reports because, according to Ambassador John Crimmins, “they did not believe that the Brazilian Army was capable of doing this.” Crimmins noted that the torture “wasn’t just electrical shocks; this was the real medieval stuff.” [[101]](#endnote-101) The years 1968 and 1969 were the worst years of the military era.

In August 1969, when President Costa e Silva was incapacitated by a cardiovascular problem, the three armed forces ministers declared themselves a ruling junta until a new president could be chosen. And the military did the choosing. The senior generals and admirals gleaned the favorite candidates by polling their subordinate flag officers, and a seven member armed forces high command ratified the choice of General Emílio Garrastazú Médici, who had headed the National Intelligence Service (*SNI*). The national congress, which had been forcibly recessed for ten months and thoroughly purged, was called into session to endorse the military’s decision.[[102]](#endnote-102)

Who was Médici? When Goulart was deposed in 1964 Médici was commander of the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras* and supported the coup more from a commitment to hierarchy and discipline and army cohesion than from a political position. Costa e Silva sent him to Washington as military attaché for just short of two years. Promoted to Major General, Costa made him head of the National Intelligence Service (*SNI*) saying he wanted someone nearby who was capable of telling him when he was wrong. Within the regime Médici argued that exceptional measures were not necessary to guarantee stability and national security. Even so the climate became steadily more repressive. In March 1969, Médici was promoted to four-star general and sent to command the Third Army in Rio Grande do Sul. So when Costa e Silva became ill, Médici was one of the small cluster of generals considered eligible to succeed him. [[103]](#endnote-103)

As Elio Gaspari observed: “To Castello Branco the dictatorship appeared an evil. For Costa e Silva it was a convenience. For Médici it was a neutral factor, an instrument of bureaucratic action, a source of power and strength.” As he said to one of his ministers: “I have the AI-5, everything is possible.”[[104]](#endnote-104)

Médici professed dismay at the reports of mistreatment and torture of prisoners. According to his head of *SNI*, General Carlos Alberto Fontoura, in two or three meetings of the armed forces chiefs and cabinet ministers Médici said that he did not “accept torture, or the mistreatment or killing of captives. There is no way that I accept this.”[[105]](#endnote-105)

But the mistreatment, torture, and murder continued beyond the control of the president of the republic.

In November 1969 a group of European clergymen and intellectuals delivered a dossier to the Pope documenting torture in Brazil and in the next month Amnesty International issued a report on Brazilian torture that gave the topic world-wide attention. On March 8, 1970, the Sunday *New York Times* carried a letter from 102 professors, most of whom had done research in Brazil, protesting against “torture, imprisonment without cause, and suppression of civil rights.” “We doubt,” they declared, “that ever in the history of Brazil has there occurred more systematic, more wide spread, and more inhuman treatment of political dissidents.” In April 1970 there was a flood of exposés: *The Washington Post* published Brady Tyson’s “Brazil Twists Thumbscrews…;” noted American academics launched a dossier entitled “Terror in Brazil”; the Catholic *Commonweal* magazine carried Ralph Della Cava’s article “Torture in Brazil.” [[106]](#endnote-106) After months of denials, in December the Minister of Education, Jarbas Passarinho admitted that ‘isolated’ cases of torture had occurred.[[107]](#endnote-107)

The reality was that state managed violence had become part of the daily political culture. Brazil was locked in a culture of fear that immobilized the population. The deep involvement of the armed forces in repression and the use of torture was something new. Mistreatment of prisoners could be traced back in Brazilian history, but earlier cases were poor, marginal people, this time the victims were middle class, even women and clerics were not immune. The personal actions of officers in the repression implicated them in crimes that could have no legal justification and thereby assured their support for the whole terrible system. Fear of the reach of justice insured their loyalty to the regime and their fierce opposition to dismantling the system. Of course, it damaged the reputation of Brazil’s military.[[108]](#endnote-108) And it hurt its effective readiness, despite having increased the number of generals from 124 in 1964 to 155 in 1974. Reportedly some 7,000 trucks had been added to the various barracks motor pools, but not a single mechanic. The army bought old American tanks for which ammunition was no longer made, and every other one did not run.[[109]](#endnote-109)

The foregoing was the situation when President General Médici visited the United States in December 1971. Nixon famously toasted him: “we know that as Brazil goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American Continent….” Médici’s response included the line “United States always knows that it will find in Brazil a loyal and independent ally.”[[110]](#endnote-110) An attuned ear would have caught the importance of the word: *independent*. Nixon’s toast would take on dark meaning in the next years as Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina fell under military dictatorships.[[111]](#endnote-111) In a meeting in the White House Médici emphasized that continued American military assistance was “essential” and that contact between the two nation’s militaries was “indispensable.” He opposed “any reduction of either.”[[112]](#endnote-112) But the nature of the military regime would ultimately produce that effect.

Médici enjoyed noticeable popular support, after all Brazil was in an impressive economic boom that seemed to be making life better, at least for the middle and upper classes. And, of course, Brazil’s team won the World Cup in 1970. Authoritarianism apparently provided benefits. Médici repeatedly said that he wanted to be followed in by a civilian president. He was thinking of his chief of staff (*Casa Civil*) João Leitão de Abreu, who would have been appointed as he himself had been, not elected. But because there was still guerrilla activity in the Araguaia region of the Amazon, he believed that another general was necessary. Médici was linked with his predecessor Costa e Silva, yet he and his closest advisers settled on General Ernesto Geisel to succeed him.[[113]](#endnote-113)

Geisel was retired from the army and was president of *Petrobrás*, but more importantly, he had been the principal military aide to Castello Branco. In the Brazilian army there was a division between those officers who adhered to Costa e Silva’s attitudes and those who were more attuned to the ideas of Castello Branco*.* The major difference between the two related to the nature of government, the *Costistas* favored long-term authoritarian military control, while the *Castellistas* leaned toward reform and preservation of constitutional structures. The latter tended to be more sophisticated and better educated, the former were found in the ranks of the hard liners. Likely Médici was somewhat deluded about Geisel. But he thought that because Geisel had been away from the army for a time and was sort of a businessman in his *Petrobrás* role, choosing him would show that the situation had evolved positively.

It should be said that Geisel’s older brother Orlando was Médici’s war minister. There were whispers that Orlando was behind his brother’s rise to the presidency, but they were not accurate. There was some hope among the *Costistas* that Médici would stay in office, but he would not hear of any continuation. He voted for Ernesto Geisel and his was the vote that counted. A recently fashioned electoral college gave its assent, but it was Médici’s decision that mattered. Geisel took office in mid-March 1974. [[114]](#endnote-114)

General João Batista Figueiredo, while briefing Geisel on the poor readiness status of the army, concluded “God help us … they are throwing money away.” Geisel had reason to observe that “the army, from a moral point of view, had fallen considerably.” And his choice for minister of the army, General Dale Coutinho lamented that in fighting subversion, they had no legal cover, there were laws for foreign war, but not for their specific type of war.[[115]](#endnote-115)

Geisel told his cabinet that the goal was “gradual, but sure democratic refinement” with increased participation of “responsible elites” aiming at the complete institutionalization of “the principles of the Revolution of 1964.” The exceptional powers would be kept, but used only as a last resort. Clearly there would be no quick return to democratic rule; instead Brazil entered a period of slow “decompression” (*distensão*). Geisel intended to set the pace for political change. He and his immediate adviser General Golbery Couto e Silva “envisioned a gradual and highly controlled opening.” Brazil could not continue as it was, even if change took a long time. [[116]](#endnote-116) Médici had urged him to keep his brother Orlando as minister of the army, but Geisel knew that he and his brother thought differently. Instead he appointed General Coutinho, with whom, despite his hardline reputation, he shared a sense of common purpose regarding the army, they agreed that the hardline officers had to be controlled, unfortunately after two months in office he took ill and died suddenly. Geisel named the chief of staff General Sylvio Coelho da Frota to replace him.

Frota was also a hard liner and did not share Geisel’s vision. Geisel had to gain control of the armed forces and to do that he had to have the army behind him. The key was to limit the autonomy of the *Centro de Informação do Exército* (*CIEx*), which had been operating throughout the country, often without the knowledge of local regional commanders. New orders specified that the *CIEx* would continue its intelligence work, but that it had to obtain the approval of regional commanders to operate in their areas. In effect this stopped clandestine operations in Rio and São Paulo, and the number of cases of reported torture declined sharply.[[117]](#endnote-117) The hard-liners fought back, according to an admitted killer, by “resolving to act on their own account outside the chain of command.”[[118]](#endnote-118) Repeated appeals for military unity had much to do with Geisel’s struggle to suppress the rogue hard-liners.

In the meantime he was re-shaping Brazilian foreign relations. He described his foreign policy as pragmatic. There would be no more automatic alignment with the United States, their foreign policy would be ecumenical. Brazil was “of the west, but not an ally of the United States.”[[119]](#endnote-119) It would act primarily in its own best interests. Partly this attitude built on evident trends in the Quadros and Goulart foreign policies, and partly was stimulated by Brazil’s dependence on imported oil. Geisel aimed at insuring good relations with the oil-rich Arab countries, and opened new embassies in the Gulf States and Iraq. Saudi Arabia provided money for a Middle Eastern study program at the Universidade de Brasília. Brazil had been a major supporter of the creation of Israel and so it was symbolic of its shift toward the Arab states when it voted for the anti-Zionist resolution in the U.N. General Assembly in November 1975. The decision on the vote resulted from some sloppiness in the foreign ministry and American quickness to criticize. Asked for his approval of a vote in favor, Geisel concurred, but then the next day thought better of it, and ordered the ministry to vote no, but in the meantime the State Department criticized their position wounding the Brazilians’ sense of dignity, making it impossible to back down.[[120]](#endnote-120) Brazil sought new markets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, not because it had changed its view of communism, rather it wanted to diversify its markets and trade partners. Recognizing that the Portuguese revolution of 1974 had cut loose the mother-country’s African colonies, Brazil recognized the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Echoing Oswaldo Aranha on seeking greater influence over Portugal and its colonial possessions, historian Jerry Dávila commented that “Africa was its natural sphere of influence … [and] Africa would help propel Brazil industrially and bring autonomy from the cold war powers.” [[121]](#endnote-121) Also in 1974 Brazil exchanged ambassadors with the People’s Republic of China and warmed up to Cuba. It was notable that Geisel made state visits to England, France, and Japan, while avoiding the United States.

The low point in Brazilian-American military relations came in 1977. Having been blocked by the United States (1951) in obtaining centrifuges for an atomic program, Brazil had joined the American Atoms for Peace program (1955) that gave it an atomic plant powered by American supplied reactor fuel. In 1974 India’s explosion of a nuclear device so startled the United States that it told the Brazilians that it would not fulfill its agreement to provide the contracted enriched fuel. Coming on the heels of the OPEC oil embargo this put Brazil in a difficult spot. Worse, that same year, Argentina’s *Atucha* reactor came on line. With some evident desperation the Brazilians negotiated a vast contract with West Germany for the construction of enriched uranium heavy-water reactors, for extensive transfer of technology for full fabrication and processing from uranium ores to transmission of electricity via an extensive electrical grid.[[122]](#endnote-122)

It was rather startling to see atomic enrichment mix with human rights violations to create an volatile situation that ended the military alliance. But first in 1976 there was a brief interlude when it looked as if Brazil and the United States would deepen their traditional cooperation. Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, who had a friendly relationship with Secretary of State Henry Kissenger, arranged a joint memorandum that provided for regular consultation on issues of interest.[[123]](#endnote-123) The sound idea behind the consultative mechanism was that it would reduce the possibility of misunderstandings reaching the level of crisis. The Brazilians interpreted the memorandum as meaning that the United States recognized Brazil’s status as the region’s paramount economic power. Kissinger asserted that the United States welcomed “Brazil’s new role in world affairs” and that their “institution of consultation” would give “meaning and strength and permanence to our cooperation.”[[124]](#endnote-124)

In June 1976, the foreign aid bill passed the American congress with the requirement (Harkin Amendment) that the State Department make an annual report on human rights in all the countries receiving military assistance. The first report prepared before the presidential elections of that November criticized Brazil. Throughout the campaign the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter had condemned the human rights situation in Brazil as well as the Brazilian-German atomic agreement. In October the Ford White House issued a strong statement on non-proliferation, which the Brazilians appeared to shrug off. The Geisel team was betting that Gerald Ford would win the election and that the “close friendship” between Kissinger and Foreign Minister Azevedo Silveira would protect them. “The Brazilians were shocked that Carter won” and they dug in their heels on the nuclear problem. The situation was “aggravated severely” by Vice President Walter Mondale’s going to Bonn to try to convince the Germans to withdraw from the agreement. The Americans decided to work on the West Germans, as Ambassador Crimmins put it, “based on the belief that we couldn’t do anything with Brazil.”[[125]](#endnote-125)

The Brazilians felt depreciated by the American maneuver to pressure the Germans. Shortly after taking office, Carter sent Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brasília for a broad examination of the situation. There were no threats, contrary to what the Brazilian press reported. The Americans explained why they hoped that “the Brazilians would adopt comprehensive safeguards for all their nuclear activities.” And they explained the “legislative prohibitions” in the foreign assistance laws, which could be regarded as a subtle warning. The Brazilians put out the story that they had resisted strong American pressures. They believed that their national prestige required that they have nuclear technology and were determined to obtain it. The Americans were concerned that they would one day develop a bomb, which the Brazilians claimed not to want. Ambassador Crimmins observed that “the Brazilian nerves were very raw about the nuclear thing. They were worked up about it. A lot of phony stuff issued, planted by the government about this. Then the human rights question intervened.”[[126]](#endnote-126)

President Jimmy Carter emphasized dual policies of respect for human rights and non-proliferation of nuclear technology.[[127]](#endnote-127) He first tried to convince Germany to withdraw from the agreement and failing that pressured Brazil to halt its program. The stubborn, hostile reaction in Brazil was remarkable for it succeeded in unifying all sectors of society against the American intrusion into what was commonly thought to be an important element of Brazilian development.[[128]](#endnote-128) And as President Geisel later noted the program with Germany had nothing to do with the military or military objectives. “The United States, England, France, Russia, and China could have nuclear technology, but not Brazil? Are we inferior to the others?” Geisel asked.[[129]](#endnote-129) The obvious lack of trust in Brazilian intentions caused an intense rallying around the flag.

Ambassador John Crimmins took pains to deliver a copy of the report on Brazil’s human rights before it became public in Washington. The very next morning Crimmins was called to the foreign ministry to be told that they were renouncing the military accord. The report was very positive about Geisel’s efforts to reign in the security apparatus, but by then the Geisel had already decided to end American military assistance as a sign of independence. Both sides believed that the accord no longer served the relationship, but the hard- line officers especially felt that it kept the military subservient to the United States. Geisel’s act of bravado increased his prestige among those officers. Indeed it may have helped his relations with the opposition as well. It contributed to his ability to remove hard- line Minister of the Army Frota in October, strengthen his hold over the armed forces, while continuing his policy of decompression and, eventually imposing his chosen successor General João Batista Figueiredo.[[130]](#endnote-130)

While the anti-atomic energy policy of the Carter government angered Brazilians as a whole, the human rights campaign seemed two-faced to the Brazilian military.[[131]](#endnote-131) There was an intense debate going on within the armed forces regarding torture and mistreatment of political prisoners. President Ernesto Geisel had long opposed such behavior and was then engaged in an internal struggle to eliminate it from the military’s ‘suppressive apparatus,’ as it was called. By doing so Geisel would effectively weaken the influence of the hardline officers. Jimmy Carter’s moralizing confused officers involved in repression because they had learned harsh interrogation techniques from Americans. Between 1965 and 1970, 70 Brazilian officers trained at the School of the Americas in Panama, of whom 38 (63%) were in intelligence. Comparing the names of those who went to the school with those who were later accused of torture or the death of prisoners there was a ratio of one in every ten. [[132]](#endnote-132)

The effect of Carter’s dual policy of human rights and anti-nuclear development was more than the Geisel government could tolerate. Geisel said that “our foreign policy had to be realistic and, as much as possible, independent. We had walked too much in tow (subordinate) of the United States. We had to live and treat with the United States, as much as possible, as equal to equal, even though they are much stronger, much more powerful than us.” He believed that Brazilian development was tied to the Northern Hemisphere and so he intensified relations with England, France, Germany, and Japan. “We could not do more with the United States because the demands that they were making seemed to me to be improper.” [[133]](#endnote-133)

**End of Alliance and Renewal Thirty-Three Years Later**

The cancelling of the 1952 military accord and the elimination of the mixed military commission that had existed since 1942 changed the nature of Brazilian-American relations. The old intimate alliance was gone. Some might call it a more mature relationship. However, relations between the two armed forces remained cordial with officer exchanges continuing, but the close cooperation could no longer be assumed. The fading controversy over atomic energy continued until 1990, but suspicions linger.[[134]](#endnote-134) However, the two giants of the Western Hemisphere could not change the reality of their geography. They grew ever more interdependent economically, even as Brazil continued to lag behind in education and research. The collapse of the Soviet Union created new dynamics and possibilities, while the recast Russia proved a competitor in supplying Brazil with modern armaments. Partly to prevent Russian sales the United States revamped its military relations with Brazil, at a moment when the Brazilian military was concerned to enhance its research and development, logistics systems, education and training, and the acquisition of weapons and services. And so in 2010, when, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, their “common interests” made “Brazil’s growing involvement and significance in global affairs a welcome development for the United States” and the two signed a new military agreement.[[135]](#endnote-135) Time will tell how this new relationship will develop. [Amazon maneuvers in Nov.2017] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-usa-military/u-s-military-joins-brazil-army-exercises-in-amazon-idUSKBN1D8347

**19,370 words] 10/19/17**

1. **Notes on Sources**

   I applied for access to the military records in 1963, it took a year for the army to give me a “top secret” clearance to do research and it took another year for the army to return my ‘censored’ notes. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Edward R. Stettinius to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, Washington, August 1, 1944, 810.20 Defense/8-144, as in *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. VII, pp.105-106. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Cordell Hull to William D. Leahy, Washington, August 24, 1944, 810.24/5-3044, as in *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. VII, p. 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. The three Brazilian armed forces ministers, the chiefs of staff, the foreign minister, Admiral Jonas Ingram of the 4th Fleet, the commander of the 6th Air Force in the Canal Zone, and other officers were present. Chargé Donnelly, Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1944, 810.20 Defense/10-1044: Telegram as in *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. VII, pp.123-125. The possibility of staff conversations were raised with President Vargas on July 10, 1944, see Caffery’s memo of that date in *ibid*. p.125. It spoke of an agreement to guarantee collaboration in case of aggression against either country, and that the USA would “obligate itself to furnish war material to Brazil” under an agreement that would “be substituted for the present Lend-Lease agreement.” Similar conversations had taken place in the much tenser time near the end of 1940. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Interestingly the instructions for the American officers who participated were sent out in January 1945 and involved some 16 countries. See notes to “Discussions Regarding Military and Naval Cooperation between the United States and Brazil”, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 600. The army paper was signed March 31, 1945; the air force one on April 12, 1945, and the naval one on April 15, 1945. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 26, 1945, No.2186, 810.20 Defense/7-2645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 600-606 ff. Here Berle analyzed the Naval Staff Conversations document in considerable detail; the same day he did the same with the army document ( pp. 606-614),and the next day discussed the air force one (pp. 614-620). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 26, 1945, No.2187, 810.20 Defense/7-2645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 607. Argentina was then a concern. Thanks to the proposed program, Berle said that “Brazil will be able, granted the power of organization, to put an Army into the field larger than any South American state, and possibly larger than any combination of them.” [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. See Berle’s comment in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 602-603. Poor Brazilian maintenance of war materials transferred by the United States was frequently commented upon by Americans. Often this was done to criticize future transfers. Oddly World War II vehicles and ships were in service in Brazil for decades. In May 1965 I visited the navy base at Recife and found the machine shops using equipment left behind when the Americans withdrew.

   [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid, p. 603. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. “U.S. Navy to Give Vessels to Brazil,” *The New York Times*, July 5, 1945, p. 3; and “Brazil Takes Over Bases Tomorrow,” *The New York Times*, July 7, 1945, p. 6. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Berle called it “unauthorized” and “very unfortunate”’ *FRUS 1945*, IX, p. 606. He noted that Ingram was then “a Brazilian hero for having promised the Brazilians a Navy free of charge.” Oddly Berle inflated Ingram’s actual comments. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Berle as in note 20 above, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 606. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid, pp. 610-611. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. The increase in aircraft would include as well: 57 light bombers to 60; 41medium bombers to 120; 12 heavy bombers from none to 12 (1948); 9 transports to 150; 21 patrol planes to 60. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 27, 1945, No.2196, 810.20 Defense/7-2745 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 615.

    The memorandum produced by the staff conversations was entitled: “Missions and Plans of the Brazilian Air Force”, Rio de Janeiro, April 12, 1945

    [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid, 615. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. “José Bina Machado,” biographical sketch in Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds., *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro*, 1930-1983, Vol. 3, p. 1981. To make things slightly confusing his brother João Bina Machado was an army officer at the same time; see ibid. p.1980. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Daniels (Chargé), Rio de Janeiro, December 28, 1945, 711.32/12-2845: Telegram, as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 620-622. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Byrnes to Chargé Daniels, Washington, December 31, 1945, 711.32/12-2925: Telegram, as in ibid, pp. 622-623. He did not identify the “certain elements.”

    [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Back on June 12, 1945 President Truman, in a meeting with Ambassador Berle and Acting Secretary Grew, told Berle that “he was more anxious to have good relations with Brazil than any other country in Latin America.” Joseph C. Grew, Memorandum of Conversation, June 13, 1945, 711.32/6-1345, RG 59, NARA. It is noteworthy that Grew shared Truman’s statement with 26 American missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Canada, but none in Latin America; see Grew, Circular Air gram, June 27, 1945, 711.32/6-2745, RG 59, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. The senior American officer in Rio de Janeiro summarized “Brazil’s contribution, in the present conflict, to Hemisphere Defense (sic), in order of importance: Air Bases in Northeast Brazil; strategic materials; troops for overseas combat; naval and air assistance in anti-submarine warfare; and neutralization of Axis activities. To these should be added the moral value of having one South American country actively participating in the war against the Axis powers.” BG Hayes Kroner, Rio de Janeiro, May 18, 1945, “Notes on “THE PRESENT AND FUTURE POSITION OF BRAZIL (Sic)”, OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, Modern Military Branch, NARA.

    [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid. Kroner admitted frankly that the pro-Brazil policy he recommended would reduce Argentina “to the relative power of Mexico or Canada.” But by way of justifying his view observed that “the attitude of Argentina during this war has demonstrated clearly that what the United States needs and must have, is, definitely, one strong friend in South America.” (Emphasis was in original) [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. MG Clayton Bissell, Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, June 1, 1945 and BG John Weckerling, Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, June 6, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, Section IV, RG 165, Records WD General and Special Staffs, MMB, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. MG J.E. Hull, Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, Washington, June 9, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, Section IV, RG 165, Records WD General and Special Staffs, MMB, NARA. This document was initialed as “Noted” by the army chief of staff on June 12, 1945. For a study of the broader debates then in progress see Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United States Military Relations, 1945-1977* (Niwot, Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1996), pp. 43-54. Davis commented (p. 51) that “The JCS members suffered from myopia.” And that “U.S. leaders saw Brazil- U.S. ties as episodic.” [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Julius H. Amberg (Special Asst. to Secretary of War) to Hugh Fulton (Chief Counsel, Truman Committee), Washington, August 13, 1943, Tab A, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), MMB, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. For example, Leslie Bethell’s well-done study of the post war stressed internal politics: “Brazil,” in Leslie Bethell & Ian Roxborough, eds. *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 33-65. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. J.B. Mascarenhas de Morais to General Eurico Dutra, Italia, 27 Feb 1945, Oficio No. 90 : Tropa de ocupação (ponderação) , Pasta *FEB* 1945, Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio). He said that no one had asked his opinion; he just wanted to give Dutra his “personal and frank opinion”. He was “trying to look ahead at the consequences and political advantages for Brazil that could result from a measure that would have a purely policing character.” What had provoked Mascarenhas to send his views to Dutra is not clear, but it indicates that the future occupation was being discussed. It is notable that this letter was written after the Brazilian victory at Monte Castello, when his confidence would likely have been very high.

    . [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. He did not understand that the American army had to account for all its expenditures, but all the accounting did not mean that Brazil would be handed a bill at the end of the war. It is a shame that he did not understand how the Lend-Lease system worked. Floriano de Lima Brayner, *A Verdade Sobre a FEB: Memórias de um chefe de estado-maior na campanha da Itália, 1943-1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1968), pp. 511-513. He described the American attitude as one of ‘ingratitude’ [“*ingratidão*”]. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. There are many documents on adjusting the Lend-Lease agreement; see for example: MG J. E. Hull (ACS, OPD) Memo for Commanding General, Army Services Forces, Washington, April 5, 1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil, Section IV, Cases 56-84, MMB, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. John W. F. Dulles, *Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), pp. 167-168. Castello thought that if the Allies abandoned Italy “it will catch fire and, moreover, Nazi-fascism will resurge a little from the ashes….” But he admitted to his wife that “*I am saturated* with all this and it is high time to return.” [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. The 1945 and 1946 *Relatórios* (annual reports) of the Minister of War are missing from the Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio de Janeiro). Dutra considered them to be so secret that he ordered them held in a special archive in his office. Even though, in 2010, the army commander ordered a search for the *Relatórios*, they continue to be missing. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. *Pracinhas* was what the FEB soldiers were called. Ambassador Vasco commented that “A razão de ser da *FEB* foi mais política que militar. Foi uma confirmação com sangue da nossa aliança com os Estados Unidos. E foi uma confirmação para os Aliados da nossa posição antinazista e antifascista.” … E nós não soubemos aproveitar essa vantagem, ficamos com fofoquinhas, coisas de somenos, quando tínhamos um aliado natural. Ficamos de pé atrás com os Estados Unidos. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, *Diplomacia em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC*  (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 104-106. CPDOC (*Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil*) holds a large number of personal archives, carries on historical research and has an academic program, is located in the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. See Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 44-45. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. “Brazil Pledges Aid for War in Pacific,” *The New York Times*, May 9, 1945, p. 16. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. “GI’s on Italian Front Go Direct to Pacific,” *The New York Times*, May 10, 1945, p. 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Correspondence relative to San Francisco Conference, GV 45.04.30, *Arquivo Getúlio Vargas*, CPDOC, *Fundação Getúlio Vargas*, Rio. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to Chargé Daniels (Rio), Washington, June 6, 1945, 740.0011 P.W./6-145: Telegram; and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Macedo Soares to Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro, June 6, 1945,740.0011 P.W./6-645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 627-627. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to Ambassador Berle, Washington, June 6, 1945, 740.0011 Pacific War/6-645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 628. This contains text of Truman’s telegram to Vargas. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. For excellent studies of Japanese immigration see Kozy K. Amemiya, “Being Japanese in Brazil and Okinawa,” Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 13, May 1998: http//www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op13.htm; and Marcia Yumi Takeuchi, *O Perigo Amarelo: imagens do mito, realidade do preconceito, 1920-1945* (São Paulo: Associação Editorial Humanista, 2005). [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. See Fábio Koifman and Humberto Manabu Oda, “A declaração brasileira de guerra ao Japão”, XXVII Simposio Nacional de História, Associação Nacional de História, Natal, RN, (22-26 Julho 2013), pp. 6-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Byrnes to Chargé Daniels, Washington, December 31, 1945, 711.32/12-2925: Telegram, as in *FRUS, 1945*, IX, pp.622-623. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. For the Moscow sponsored revolts of 1935 see McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 375-388; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da Ilusão: A Revolução Mundial e o Brasil, 1922-1935* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), pp. 287-326; and Hélio Silva, *1935 – A Revolta Vermelha* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1969). [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Walter N. Walmsley, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs, Washington, Feb. 24, 1944, 711.3227/47 as in *FRUS 1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 554-556. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 1, 1944, 711.32/206: Telegram, as in *FRUS 1944*, Vol. VII, p. 551. In June 1944 the Rio embassy and the foreign ministry exchanged texts in their respective languages of a Military Aviation Agreement that would have allowed use and maintenance of the bases for ten years by civilian clothed, unarmed American personnel. See FRUS1944, Vol. VII, pp. 561-565. Caffery had been directed by President Roosevelt to pursue continued access to the bases. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Caffery reported that Vargas wanted a strong tie to the United States, unconnected directly to the continued use of the bases and going through sympathetic motions was necessary. Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, April 25, 1944, 711.3227/79: Telegram as in *FRUS 1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 559-560. On air officers opposition see p. 559. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, p. 63. The CIA report was dated Nov. 30, 1948 and is in the Truman Library. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Frank D. McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria*, pp. 251-258; and “The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil’s Military Situation, 1900-1945”, *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 25, No.3 (August 1983), pp. 299-324. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 86-87. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. The ESG is most famous for organizing a doctrine of national security that would encourage economic development while keeping society orderly. There is a big literature on the ESG. A good starting place is Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 178-183; Wayne A. Selcher, “National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government”, Military Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (16 July 1977); Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 93-115; Antônio de Arruda, *A Escola Superior de Guerra: História de Sua Doutrina* (São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983); ; Francisco César Alves Ferraz, *Á Sombra dos Carvalhos: Escola Superior de Guerra e política no Brasil (1948-1955)* (Londrina: Editora UEL, 1997), pp. 108-120; ESG, Departamento de Estudos, *Manual* *Básico* (Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1975). [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*

    (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 315. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Quoted in Mark Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S. – Latin American Relations Since the Second World War” in Michael J. Hogan, ed. *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations* *since 1941* (University of Cambridge Press, 1995), p. 442. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan,* pp.317-318. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Morris L. Cooke, *Brazil on the March: A Study in International Cooperation* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1944). [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. See the many newspaper clippings on the Cooke Mission in the State Department files, 832.60/52, RG59, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. C. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors and Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 19-21. One of the problems in Washington was uncertainty over the respective jurisdictions of the Export-Import Bank and the “International Bank” (later World Bank). Adding to the confusion was the Brazil-United States Joint Economic Development Commission, created under the authority of the International Development Act (Section 410) and the Point Four Program, could not really get underway until the banks sorted themselves out. See Dean Acheson, Memo of Conversation: “Financial Aid for Development Projects in Brazil,” October 19, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 65, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Mo. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Vágner Camilo Alves, “Ilusão desfeita: a ‘aliança especial’ Brazil-Estados Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a Segunda Guerra Mundial”, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 48, No.1, Brasília, Jan – Junho 2005, pp. 151-177. The Brazilians could not understand Washington’s equal treatment policy. Juan Perón, who had “sympathy for Germany and everything German,” denounced the Nuremberg trials; see Ronald C. Newton, The *‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 381. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. The instructions to the mission leader, John Abbink, from Paulo H. Nitze (Deputy to Asst. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), set out the American view of such economic assistance. See Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission, *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. IX, pp. 364-366. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. *Mensagem apresentada ao Congresso Nacional por occasião da abertura da Sessão Legislativa de 1950 pelo General Eurico G. Dutra, Presidente da República*, (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), pp.101-102. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Berle gave a speech seemingly praising the scheduled elections, but it was seen in Brazil as placing the United States behind the opposition to Vargas. The ambassador did not have State Department approval and wounded Vargas and his supporters. In truth, he read the speech to Vargas in a private meeting, but later the president said he could not understand Berle’s garbled Portuguese. For the Berle affair see Stanley Hilton, *O Ditador & O Embaixador: Getúlio Vargas, Adolf Berle Jr. e a Queda do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1987), pp.75-99; and Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 122-131. On his development ideas: Lira Neto, *Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio (1945-1954)* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014), p.208. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Neto, *Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio,* p. 208. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Neto, *Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio,* p. 211*.* [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Truman to Vargas, Washington, Sept. 4,1951, Arquivo de Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC- Rio. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, p. 121; for a summary of the Rio treaty see Robert H. Holden & Eric Zolov, eds, *Latin American and the United States: A Documentary History* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 187-189. They did convince Colombia to send an infantry battalion and a warship. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Establishment of Joint School for Senior Latin American Officers”, 28 May 1951, JCS 1976/53, CCS 352 (5-25-51), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Stanley Hilton, *Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 1994), p.463, p.467; Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1973), pp. 327-332. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, eds. *Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1981), note 6, p. 440. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Góes Monteiro was then chief of the new Brazilian joint staff. He had heart problems and had slowed down noticeably. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 128-129; Memo of Conversation, “Farewell Visit by General Goes Monteiro – Brazil- U.S. Military Cooperation,” October 15, 1951, 452 S/S, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 66, Harry S Truman Library.

    . [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Interesting analysis of the accord and its passage in Vasco Leitão da Cunha, *Diplomacia em Alto-mar*: *Depoimento ao CPDOC* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 186-187, 214-215; for a discussion of the impact of the accord on the ideological debates, especially in officer ranks see Maria Celina Soares D’Araújo, *O Segunda Governo Vargas, 1951-54* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), pp. 148-159; for text and memos commenting on the “Mutual Defense Assistance” agreement which entered into force May 19, 1953: Joint Chiefs of Staff File, 092.2 Brazil, Modern Military Branch, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Ronald M. Schneider, *“Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 178. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Aranha to Vargas, Washington, Feb. 2, 1952, Aranha Archive, CPDOC-Rio. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 132. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. The best documented study of Vargas and Perón is Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos:* *Conflito e Integração na América do Sul* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003), pp. 251-259. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. The crisis leading to the president’s suicide is carefully documented in Hélio Silva, *1954: Um Tiro no Coração* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1978). Ronaldo Conde Aguiar raised serious questions about the reality of the attack on Carlos Lacerda in his *Vitória na Derrota: A Morte de Getúlio Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: Casa da Palavra, 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Dense documentation on the topic can be found in Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,* pp. 354-376. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. The tracking station agreement text is in J. F. Dulles, Washington, December 22, 1956, Telegram 512, *FRUS, 1955-1957,* pp. 732-734*.* [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, p. 150. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Briggs, Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1956, Telegram 619, FRUS*, 1955-1957*, Vol. VII, pp.731-732. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. National Intelligence Estimate 93-57, Washington, January 8, 1957: Probable Developments in Brazil,” as in *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. VII, pp. 737-746. Quotation is from p.738. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Stephan G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp.100-110. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. V, 267-286. For analysis of Eisenhower’s Latin American policies see Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 64-69, 94-99,135-137. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Ibid. pp. 136-137. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. Ambassador John Crimmins as a junior foreign service officer in the Rio embassy had witnessed the scene. He told me about this in 1976, when he was chief of mission in Brasília. On Santos-Dumont see <http://www.smithsonianeducation.org/scitech/impacto/graphic/aviation/alberto.html> . [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. W. Michael Weis, Cold *Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 161-166. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. BG Albino Silva (Chief of Casa Militar) to Chefe do Estado-Maior das Fórcas Armadas, Oficio # 76-2s, Rio, 22 Outubro 1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC -Rio and response E.M. No.337-c/57. Rio, 30 Novembro 1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC- Rio. Both documents were stamped SECRET. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. “Meeting on Brazil on 30 July 1962,” Tape 1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [The Great Crises, vol. 1, ed. Timothy Naftali] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8010002> [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. My principal source for American promises to the younger officers was Col. Luiz Paulo Macedo de Carvalho; for the coup see Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 179-183; Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of* *Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 3-17; Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil-Estados Unidos: A Rivalidade Emergente, 1950-1988* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileiro, 1989), pp. 103-138. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. The best studies of Castello’s role are Lira Neto, *Castello, A Marcha para a ditadura* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto,2004), especially pp. 218-245; and Elio Gaspari, *A ditadura envergonhada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp.45-125. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. The Institutional Act #2 of October 1965 expanded arbitrary powers of the executive and Castello had no choice but to accept the succession of Minister of the Army, General Arturo Costa e Silva (1967-69) [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. This did not happen according to a prior plan, but from a process of evolution. Symbolic of this attitude was that they wore civilian clothes rather than military uniforms. Costa e Silva had a heart attack and died in 1969. He was succeeded by General Emilio Garrastazu Médici (1969-74), General Ernesto Geisel (1974-79), General João Batista Figueiredo (1979-85). [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. See the Editorial Note (summarizing actions), *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 431-432; John W.F. Dulles, *President Castello Branco: Brazilian Reformer* (Texas A & M University Press, 1981); Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention*, 1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). Hélio Silva, *1964: Golpe ou Contragolpe?* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975); René A. Dreifuss, *1964: A Conquista do Estado: Ação Política, Poder e Golpe de Classe* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1981); Edgard Carone, *A Quarta República (1945-1964): Documentos* (São Paulo: Difel/Difusão, 1980); Daniel Drosdoff, *Linha dura no Brasil: O governo Médici, 1969-1974* (São Paulo: Global, 1986); Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990). [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. Ambassador John Hugh Crimmins, Interview, May 10, 1989, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress, pp. 27-28. <Http://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mssmisc/mfdip/2004/2004cri01/2004cri01.pdf> Lingering irritation undid American efforts to organize a similar intervention in Nicaragua years later. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Luís Vianna Filho, *O Governo Castelo Branco* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 433-435. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Lira Neto, *Castello: A marcha para a ditadura* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2004), pp. 330-331. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. The Americans apparently used several routes to request Brazilian participation. A news story had General Maxwell Taylor asking for Brazilian paratroopers. “Taylor Pede Tropas do Brasil para o Vietnã,” *Folha de São Paulo*, 12 de Março de 1965. Ambassador Gordon made an official plea: Geneton Moraes Neto, Entervista: “O Dia em Lincoln Falou… ,” *O Globo*, Rio, 21/12/09 : [**http://g1.globo.com/platb/geneton/2009/12/21/o-dia-em-lincoln-gordon-falou-sobre-dois-temas-explosivos-primeiro-os-estados-unidos-queriam-que-o-brasil-participasse-da-guerra-do-vietnam-segundo-a-cia-financiou-a-campanha-de-candidatos-simpati/**](http://g1.globo.com/platb/geneton/2009/12/21/o-dia-em-lincoln-gordon-falou-sobre-dois-temas-explosivos-primeiro-os-estados-unidos-queriam-que-o-brasil-participasse-da-guerra-do-vietnam-segundo-a-cia-financiou-a-campanha-de-candidatos-simpati/) **.** The Navy minister was ready to send his marines, but army minister Costa e Silva opposed sending any troops. See Orivaldo Leme Biagi, “O (Quasi) Envolvimento Militar do Brasil na Guerra do Vietnã,” <http://www.historica.arquivoestado.sp.gov.br/materias/anteriores/edicao05/materia03/militar.pdf>. On the Johnson-Castello correspondence see Luís Vianna Filho, *O Governo Castelo Branco* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 442-443. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. Brazil Program Analysis, Washington, November 1, 1969, National Security Council, Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–49, Senior Review Group, NSC Files 12–1–70, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. The study set out three policy objectives regarding Brazil: “a pro-United States Government, economic growth, and helping to promote a more modern social structure.” [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. This was done in the so-called Reuss amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act as an expression of the sense of Congress. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. Viron P. Vaky, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, National Security Council, May 19, 1970, Subject: Brazil and Reuss Amendment to Foreign Military Sales Act; NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 1, Through August 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
98. He wrote that instruction on a memo from Kissinger: NSC Files., Box 29, Country Files, Brazil, President’s Daily Briefing, Chronological File, December 1–15, 1970, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
99. Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, Dec 14, 1970, Nixon, Ambassador William Rountree and Arnold Nachmanoff (NSC), Subject: Brazil;, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Brazil, Volume 2, September 1970–31 July 31 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
100. “Passeata dos Cem Mil,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930-1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2616-2619. The cautioning general was Carlos de Meira Mattos, who did a report noting numerous problems in the universities. Meira Mattos had been Mascarenhas’ aide-de-camp during the FEB. [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
101. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p. 37. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247> . [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
102. Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 261-262. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
103. “Emílio Garrastazu Médici,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930-1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2159-2172. [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
104. Elio Gaspari, *As Ilusções Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada* (São Paulo; Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 129-130. [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
105. “Mas não aceito tortura, nem que se maltrate o preso, nem que se mate preso. Não aceito de jeito nenhum isso”. Oral History Interview, FONTOURA, Carlos Alberto da. *Carlos Alberto da Fontoura (depoimento, 1993).* Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2005. 128 p. [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
106. Richard Morse, Thomas Skidmore, Stanley Stein, Charles Wagley, and 97 others, “A Protest to the Brazilian Government,” *The New York Times*, March 8, 1970 (I was one of the 97);William L. Wipfler, “Repression and Terror, The Price of “Progress” in Brazil, *Christianity and Crisis* (NY), March 16, 1970, pp. 44-48; Brady Tyson, “Brazil Twists Thumbscrews…” *The Washington Post*, April 5, 1970; American Committee for Information on Brazil, “Terror in Brazil: A Dossier,” April 1970: reported that there were nearly 12,000 political prisoners; Ralph Della Cava, “Torture in Brazil”, *Commonweal*, Vol. XCII, No. 6, April 24, 1970, pp. 135-141. [↑](#endnote-ref-106)
107. Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-107)
108. Many officers opposed such behavior and made attempts within the armed forces to resist it. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *Estado e Oposição no Brasil (1964-1984)*, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1984), pp.166-181. In later years those opposed would publicly defend their colleagues behavior as lamentable but necessary. While doing research in the army headquarters in Brasília in 1976-77 a number of field-grade officers without prompting told me they opposed the repression. [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
109. Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287-288.

     [↑](#endnote-ref-109)
110. Richard Nixon: "Toasts of the President and President Medici of Brazil," December 7, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3247>. [↑](#endnote-ref-110)
111. The Brazilian Truth Commission uncovered considerable evidence of Brazilian support for the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende’s government to the extent of providing training in torture, and military equipment. The Brazilian embassy was fully behind the Chilean coup. See the report: “ Memória das trevas : Arquivos revelam como o Brasil ajudou a ditadura chilena,” *Diário do Poder,* 27 de abril de 2014. <http://www.diariodopoder.com.br/noticias/arquivos-revelam-como-o-brasil-ajudou-a-ditadura-chilena/> [↑](#endnote-ref-111)
112. Nixon- Médici meeting in White House, Dec 7, 1971 *FRUS, 1969–1976,*Vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 141 <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d141> . [↑](#endnote-ref-112)
113. “Ernesto Geisel,” ,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930-1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 1450-1459.

     General João Batista Figueiredo was Médici’s close aide, but he also had long ties to Geisel and his close advisers. He played a role in Médici’s decision for Geisel and he would succeed Geisel as the last general president of the military regime. [↑](#endnote-ref-113)
114. Because of intense press censorship the selection process was hidden from the Brazilian public. There are excellent reconstructions in Ronald M. Schneider, *“Order and Progress” A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 262-266; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 149-154; Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 215-228. [↑](#endnote-ref-114)
115. Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287-288. On page 322: “Os comandantes do exército estão sem um respaldo legal para esse problema. A verdade é essa. … Para a guerra externa a gente tem legislação, mas para a nossa guerra específica, não temos.” [↑](#endnote-ref-115)
116. Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 167 and 364, note 18. In an interview in 1974 Geisel told Alfred Stepan that “not only did he not have a mandate for *distensão* but significant militar y opinion … opposed *distensão*.” Namely the “security apparatus” was opposed. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 35-39. [↑](#endnote-ref-116)
117. Between 1965 and 1968, reported cases averaged 71 per year. In Médici’s last year there had been 736; in 1974 there were 67 reported cases of torture or death. See Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003),p. 403. It seems that the hard- liners tried to avoid detection and record keeping by simply eliminating suspects instead of arresting them; *Brazil: Nunca Mais* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1985), p. 64. According to this report, at the time Geisel took office, some 20 individuals simply disappeared after being detained. [↑](#endnote-ref-117)
118. Cládio Guerra, *Memórias de um guerra suja* (Rio de Janeiro: Top books Editora, 2012), pp.151-152. Some former torturers testified about their crimes before the national truth commission. [↑](#endnote-ref-118)
119. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p. 49. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247> . [↑](#endnote-ref-119)
120. Walder de Góes, *O Brasil do General Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1978), p. 30.

     [↑](#endnote-ref-120)
121. Jerry Dávila, *Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950-1980* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p.51 and James G. Hershberg, “‘No Longer Anyone’s Sacristan’: New Evidence on Brazil’s Surprise Recognition of the MPLA Government in Angola” (Paper at the “Southern Africa in the Cold War Era Conference” in Lisbon, Portugal, May 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-121)
122. Dani K. Nedal & Tatiana Coutto, “Brazil’s 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany,” Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Wilson Center: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/brazils-1975-nuclear-agreement-west-germany> . "Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian Responses" February 25, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Azeredo da Silveira Archive, 1974.08.15 pp.544-549. [↑](#endnote-ref-122)
123. They signed the memo in Brasilia on February 21, 1976. Frank D. McCann, “The Value of U.S.-Brazilian Consultation,” Op-Ed Page, *The New York Times*, March 6, 1976. [↑](#endnote-ref-123)
124. Quotes from *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916, March 15, 1976, text of agreement, pp.337-338. Brazil negotiated similar consultative agreements with France, Britain, and Germany. Hopeful observers saw it as reinforcing the traditional alliance. For more analysis Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 95-196. [↑](#endnote-ref-124)
125. The whole paragraph is based upon Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp.44-45. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247> . [↑](#endnote-ref-125)
126. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp.45-46. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247>

     [↑](#endnote-ref-126)
127. For an internal State Department analysis of U.S. human rights policy there is Human Rights S/P Study—Policy Planning Vol. II, L/HR Files: Lot 80 D 275, RG 59, NARA. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve03/d264> . [↑](#endnote-ref-127)
128. Robert Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence* (NY: Praeger, 1981), pp.75-89. I was then resident in Brasília and observed these events closely. [↑](#endnote-ref-128)
129. Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. *Ernesto Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp. 305; 340-341; Dani K. Nedal, “U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil’s Nuclear Program in 1970s,” <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-efforts-stalled-brazils-nuclear-program-1970s> . [↑](#endnote-ref-129)
130. See Andre Gustavo Stumpf & Merval Pereira Filho, *A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979). For Frota’s views see Sylvio Frota, *Ideais Traídos: A Mais Grave Crise dos Governos Militares* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006) , especially pp. 499-536. [↑](#endnote-ref-130)
131. Brazilian reaction was discussed in “Impact of the US Stand on Human Rights,” Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, May 11, 1977, *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 42

     <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v02/d42> [↑](#endnote-ref-131)
132. Elio Gaspari, *As Ilusões Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 305-306; for an extensive study see Martha K. Huggins, *Political Policing: the United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). Of course police mistreatment of prisoners had been common place, what was unusual was its institutionalization by the armed forces.

     [↑](#endnote-ref-132)
133. Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. *Ernesto Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp. 336-337 [↑](#endnote-ref-133)
134. “O programa nuclear secreto brasileiro (Programa nuclear paralelo)” *Gamevicio*, 17 Dez 2011.

     <http://www.gamevicio.com/i/noticias/106/106426-o-programa-nuclear-secreto-brasileiro-programa-nuclear-paralelo/> [↑](#endnote-ref-134)
135. “Why Brazil signed a military agreement with the US,” *The Christian Science Monitor,* April 13, 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-135)