

SECRET

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[REDACTED] Limited support was also made available to private sector organizations, but because some of these groups began to try to provoke a military coup, our funding was confined to specific activities in support of the opposition coalition in the March congressional elections.

3. After the March 1973 elections, it became increasingly apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the fabric of Chilean society to the breaking point. Various U.S. policy options were considered, and on 20 August 1973 the 40 Committee approved an additional \$1,000,000 to support opposition political parties and private sector organizations through June 1974; support to the private sector, however, was made contingent on the concurrence of Ambassador Davis and the Department of State. Since this concurrence was not given, no support was provided to the private sector, whose initiative in launching and maintaining a series of crippling strikes was instrumental in provoking the military coup of 11 September 1973. Thus, while the Agency was instrumental in enabling opposition political parties and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime, the CIA played no direct role in the events which led to the establishment of the new military government.

W. E. Colby  
Director

Attachment:  
Summary of 40 Committee Approvals

SECRET

## 3

## Pinochet in Power: Building a Regime of Repression

*There are three sources of power in Chile: Pinochet, God, and DINA.*

—Chilean intelligence officer to the U.S. defense attaché,  
February 6, 1974

The advent of the Pinochet regime was both violent and vicious. In the days following the coup, the military's bloodshed was so widespread that the CIA's own sources could not accurately tally the casualties. "Thus far," the Station reported on September 20, "4,000 deaths have resulted from the 11 September 1973 coup action and subsequent clean-up operations." Four days later the Station cabled estimates of civilian "death figures from 2,000 to 10,000." The new military government admitted to only 244 killed but the U.S. intelligence community knew that number was false. "These figures will not be recorded and, therefore, there will never be an accurate tally of the total deaths," the CIA Station advised on the rampage of repression that followed the military takeover. "Only the Junta members will have a really clear idea of the correct death figures, which they will probably keep secret."<sup>1</sup>

In late October, the CIA did obtain a "highly sensitive" summary on post-coup repression prepared for the new military Junta. The document became the basis for a special secret briefing paper titled "Chilean Executions" prepared for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.<sup>2</sup> (Doc 1) In the six weeks following the coup, according to the report, the military had massacred approximately 1,500 civilians. Of those, some 320-360 were summarily executed by firing squads while in custody or shot on sight in the street.

The summary estimated that more than 13,500 Chilean citizens had been quickly rounded up through raids and mass arrests aimed at officials of the deposed Popular Unity government, political activists, labor unions, factory

workers, and shantytown dwellers. They were being held at approximately twenty detention camps scattered throughout the nation, "only a few [of which]," the CIA reported, "are known to the general public."<sup>3</sup> By far the largest and most infamous known sites were two converted sports arenas—the National Stadium and the smaller Chile Stadium in Santiago. According to statistics compiled in the secret report for the new Junta, a total of 7,612 prisoners were processed through the National Stadium between September 11 and October 20.<sup>4</sup> (Doc 2) All were held incommunicado; many subjected to intense interrogation in locker rooms and luxury skyboxes that the military had transformed into torture chambers.

After savage abuse, numerous prisoners were executed, their bodies buried in secret graves, thrown in the Mapocho River, dropped into the ocean, or dumped at night on city streets. The acclaimed Chilean folk singer, Victor Jara, met such a fate after being imprisoned at the Chile Stadium. His body, discovered in a dirty canal "with his hands and face extremely disfigured," had forty-four bullet holes," according to an inquiry conducted by the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in 1990.<sup>5</sup> Two American citizens, Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, seized by military squads at their homes following the coup and detained at the National Stadium, were similarly executed.<sup>6</sup>

During a ruthless seventeen-year dictatorship, the Chilean military would be responsible for the murder, disappearance and death by torture of some 3,197 citizens—with thousands more subjected to savage abuses such as torture, arbitrary incarceration, forced exile, and other forms of state-sponsored terror.<sup>7</sup> The majority of the killings and disappearances took place during the first several years of the regime, as it consolidated and institutionalized its repressive rule. Within weeks of the coup, Pinochet created a secret police force empowered to eliminate any and all enemies of his regime. The Junta quickly banned all political activities, closed Congress, suspended political parties, nullified electoral roles, took over the universities, and shut down all but the most right-wing, pro-putsch media outlets in a clear effort to impose a military dictatorship. "Severe repression is planned," the CIA Station bluntly reported on September 21. "There is no indication whatever that the military plans any early relinquishment of full political power in Chile."

### Pinochet Ascends

Augusto Pinochet was the last general to sign onto the coup; but after September 11 he quickly positioned himself as Chile's preeminent leader. Originally, the military Junta—formed from heads of the army, air force, navy,

and Carabineros—was intended to be a commission of equals, with a rotating presidency. Pursuant to protocol, the Junta named Pinochet, the oldest member and head of the army, as its first chief. "I was elected [Junta president] because I am the oldest," as Pinochet told the press shortly after the coup. But, "after awhile, Admiral Merino will be, then General Leigh, and so on. I am not an ambitious man," he added. "I would not want to seem to be a usurper of power."<sup>8</sup>

In fact, Pinochet moved methodically to distinguish himself from the rest of the Junta and usurp powers the coup plotters had intended to share. His dual role as army commander in chief and head of the Junta afforded him a base of institutional support and concentration of force that he wielded to an autocratic advantage. With the army behind him, Pinochet soon discarded the rotation concept. By June 1974, he had pressured the other Junta members into signing Decree Law 527 naming him "Supreme Chief of the Nation." On December 18, 1974, he assumed the mantle of "President of the Republic"—a title he held until January 1990 when his dictatorship ended.<sup>9</sup>

Both the U.S. intelligence community and the State Department appeared to underestimate Pinochet's individual ruthlessness.<sup>10</sup> A secret post-coup Defense Intelligence Agency Biographic Data report characterized the Chilean general as

quiet; mild-mannered; very businesslike. Very honest, hard working, dedicated. A devoted, tolerant husband and father; lives very modestly. Drinks scotch and pisco sours; smokes cigarettes; likes parties. (Doc 3)

In an October 12, 1973 cable to Washington, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis described a "gracious and eloquent" private conversation with the budding dictator. "If the Junta government fails, Chile's tragedy [would] be permanent," Pinochet told Davis, seeking U.S. economic and military assistance. When Davis pointed out that human rights issues—the Horman and Teruggi murders high on the list—were already creating political problems, Pinochet responded: "the Chilean government shares fully [your] concern for human rights, and is doing its best to prevent violations and loss of life."<sup>11</sup> (Doc 4)

Only three days after this conversation, Pinochet set in motion a series of massacres that came to be known as "the Caravan of Death." He dispatched General Sergio Arellano Stark, a coup leader and chief enforcer of the new regime, to "expedite" justice in the cases of political prisoners—regional representatives of the Popular Unity government, mayors, police chiefs, prominent trade unionists, and civic leaders—in the northern provinces. Between October 16 and October 19, Stark and a death squad of five officers<sup>12</sup> traveled to the provincial centers of La Serena, Copiapo, Antofagasta, and Cal-

ama in a Puma helicopter. During each stop, Stark identified prisoners, most of who had turned themselves in after an official summons. They were removed from their cells, taken away, brutalized, bayoneted and shot. In La Serena: fifteen dead; in Copiapo, sixteen. In Antofagasta, fourteen taken from their cells and executed in the middle of the night; in Calama the next day, twenty-six prisoners shot and stabbed.<sup>13</sup> Over four days, the Caravan left a death trail of sixty-eight individuals. Most of the victims were unceremoniously thrown into common graves; their families denied permission to bury them. Fourteen bodies were never recovered and are considered among the first groups of "desaparecidos" at the hands of the new military regime.

U.S. intelligence knew of these massacres, but reported on them only in vague and incomplete terms. In its biographic report on General Arellano, the DIA noted that he was "considered close to Gen. Pinochet" and part of the "hard line in months after the Sept. 1973 coup because of his summary executions of leftists." The CIA Station generously described Stark's operations as part of a campaign to "neutralize extremists"—although most victims of the Caravan of Death were upstanding civic officials and well-known members of their communities. "The military will continue to act against any person taking belligerent action against law and order," according to a heavily redacted October 25 CIA intelligence report on Pinochet's harsh measures:

As an example of this type of action General Sergio Arellano gave instructions during a recent trip to the South of Chile, to deal harshly with extremists. As a result of these instructions, six extremists who had been captured were executed. Arellano gave the same instructions in the North and already 15 have been executed there.

Stark himself was acting on instructions. Indeed, more than any other atrocity during his reign, witnesses and evidence tied Pinochet directly to this massacre. When the provincial military commander in charge of the Antofagasta region, General Joaquín Lagos (who was not told of the delegation's true mission) confronted General Arellano and denounced this "monstrous and cowardly crime," Arellano showed him a document signed by Pinochet designating him the *oficial delegado*—official delegate—to "review and accelerate" the judicial process on political prisoners in the north. When Lagos complained directly to Pinochet, he was summoned to Santiago on November 1. After turning in a report attributing dozens of deaths to "the delegate of the Army Commander-in-Chief [General Arellano]," Pinochet sent his assistant to give Lagos the following order: rewrite the report eliminating all references to Arellano's involvement.<sup>14</sup>

As an act of official savagery, these mass executions clearly defined the

character of the regime Augusto Pinochet intended to establish. The Caravan of Death reflected a decision at the highest level of the Junta to take vengeance on even nonviolent, civilian supporters of democratic governance. At the same time, it appeared designed to weed out "soft" commanders such as General Lagos—who was forced into retirement within a few months—and dramatically reconstitute Chile's traditionally law-abiding, constitutionalist officer corps for fighting a dirty war. "The official and extraordinary character of this delegation's journey to the north and its degree of authority—from the commander in chief—coupled with what it left in its wake in the form of executions without trial and the blatant impunity with which it operated," as the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation noted, could "only have given officers of the armed forces and the police one signal: there was only one command structure, and it was going to be used with severity."<sup>15</sup>

### The Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA)

The murderous mission and message of the Caravan of Death portended the creation of a Chilean secret police agency, DINA. In some respects, DINA represented the institutionalization of the Caravan—a roving instrument of repression, accountable only to Pinochet, intended to eliminate enemies of the state, circumvent civil, legal norms, and strike fear into the populace and less aggressive military services. Initial personnel derived from the caravan team. General Arellano Stark, as the U.S. intelligence learned, was appointed to an elite military commission "tasked by General Pinochet" with preparing a plan for the reorganization of Chile's intelligence agencies that resulted in DINA's creation.<sup>16</sup> Four members of his Caravan death squad were transferred to the new intelligence agency after it was secretly authorized. One, Colonel Pedro Espinoza, quickly became DINA's deputy director, overseeing repressive operations inside the country and acts of international terrorism abroad. A second member, Armando Fernández Larios, played a key role in DINA's most infamous external operation—the Washington, D.C. assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. Aside from Augusto Pinochet himself, DINA would become the main pillar of power for the military dictatorship—and its most representative and enduring symbol.

DINA was officially created by Junta decree no. 521 on June 14, 1974. The new law described it as a "specialized agency which can provide systematic processed information . . . in the areas of National Security and Development." Eight published articles of the decree mandated "a military agency of a professional technical nature," composed of personnel from the armed forces, and when necessary, civilian officials. Three final sections remained

secret—articles 9, 10, and 11—that provided DINA with its repressive powers to conduct raids, arrests, and secret detentions. U.S. intelligence recognized that the decree provided a statutory foundation for “a Gestapo-type police force” intended to supplant the intelligence units of each branch of the Chilean armed forces. “Taken at face value,” the U.S. naval attaché, Gerald Breschta, reported to the DIA, the decree granted

sweeping investigative powers to the DIRECTOR-DINA. In addition, and equally significant, there are no apparent restrictions to the intelligence operations that the Director can initiate. In total, the law provides legal/official blessing to an organization that is already fully active, and represents a potentially damaging blow to the efforts of the service intelligence organizations to consolidate and enhance their positions.<sup>17</sup>

By the time it was officially constituted, DINA had been operating as a brutal secret police agency for more than six months. Its origins dated back to a “DINA Commission” created after the coup and led by Lt. Col. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, a mid-level army administrator with close personal ties to General Pinochet. With Pinochet’s blessing, on November 12, 1973, Contreras presented the directors of intelligence for the army, navy, air force, and Carabineros with a blueprint for establishing a national intelligence directorate. Some military officials foresaw DINA as a personal vehicle to enhance Pinochet’s power at their expense, but Contreras’s plan was quickly approved.<sup>18</sup> On November 17, as the CIA later reported, Pinochet quietly authorized the formal creation of this new secret police force.

DINA was intended to centralize both the gathering of intelligence and the dispensing of repression—operations then being conducted by the individual services. The air force’s Servicio de Inteligencia de la Fuerza Aerea, SIFA, became renowned for torture and disappearances. The navy had its Servicio de Inteligencia Naval—SIN. The army ran SIM, the Military Intelligence Service, and DINE, the Directorate of Army Intelligence; the national police had SICAR, the Police Intelligence Service. In late 1973, the services created CECIFA, the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Center, in an effort to coordinate and strengthen their own operations; in 1975, they initiated a “joint command” to track down and eliminate members of the Chilean Communist Party. But while committing countless atrocities, the activities of these agencies paled in comparison to DINA, which, between 1974 and 1977, became the reigning intelligence service engaged in political repression.

DINA began operations as a unit hidden within the National Executive Secretariat for Detainees (SENDET)—a new administrative bureaucracy created in December 1973 ostensibly to handle the mass of civilians being

rounded up and held by the new military regime under the state of siege. Portrayed as a mechanism to provide “regular, permanent and coordinated attention” to the plight of thousands of imprisoned Chileans, in reality SENDET provided clandestine cover for DINA, which operated as its so-called “intelligence department.” This department, according to the decree establishing SENDET, would

have as its responsibilities the fixing of norms for interrogations or re-interrogations of the detained; determining the degree of danger (which they pose for the nation); maintaining a permanent coordination with the Intelligence Branches of the Armed Forces, Carabineros and Investigaciones, with the object of exchanging and maintaining current information which they are able to give about the detained.<sup>19</sup>

From the start, DINA became notorious for its brutality, even among the other violent intelligence units in the Chilean armed forces. Agents not only coordinated and conducted interrogations, but also carried out systematic clandestine raids and arrests, while building a network of secret detention and torture centers to extract information from supporters of the former Allende government, terminate and disappear them. In late January 1974, the CIA reported that DINA was committing “incidents which have been the source of embarrassment to the ministry of defense” including secret detentions that the ministry was unaware of and had denied. “[A]s originally predicted,” the U.S. defense attaché Col. William Hon reported back to Washington, “it seems as though [DINA] is developing into a KGB-type organization.” The rival services were referring to DINA as “the monster,” Hon cabled again on February 5, 1974, “reflecting their apprehension about its growing power and size.”<sup>20</sup>

At that point, DINA had an estimated 700 agents and officials drawn from ranks of the police, army, and the paramilitary legions of the civilian neo-fascist group Patria y Libertad; by April 1975, it had, in the peculiar parlance of DIA reporting, “blossomed to approximately 2,000 regular members” with an additional force of 2,100 civilian personnel deployed throughout the nation. With funds approved by Pinochet, in 1975 DINA constructed a new twenty-four-story headquarters at the end of Belgrado Street in Santiago to house its massive expansion.

The agency’s mission went beyond decimating the left in Chile. DINA also infiltrated a network of spies inside the military government to insure full loyalty to the Pinochet regime, as well as posted its own agents in policy positions to influence the direction the regime took. Operating at every level of the regime served to enhance DINA’s power of repression, which Con-

treras implemented extrajudicially, circumventing the courts and ignoring the legal rules and regulations. "No judge in any court or any minister in the government is going to question the matter further if DINA says they are handling [it]," one source told Hon in early February 1974.<sup>21</sup> The CIA characterized DINA as "an all service (military gendarmerie) intelligence organization," but with Pinochet's blessing, it would become essentially a government-within-a-government. "There are three sources of power in Chile," the informant told Col. Hon: "Pinochet, God, and DINA."<sup>22</sup>

Large as it was, the secret police personnel, organizational structure, resources, and operations remained largely unknown to the Chilean public. They were, however, known to U.S. intelligence. The CIA began collaborating with DINA soon after it was covertly created.<sup>23</sup> The DIA routinely reported on DINA's continuing institutionalization. In June 1975, a high-level source handed an officer of the U.S. Military Group—the unit of American officers at the embassy known as the MilGroup—a comprehensive organizational diagram on Chile's "largest and most influential intelligence organization." (Doc 5) The structural chart showed a vast apparatus, with numerous operational divisions both inside and outside the country. Key "brigades" included: the Metropolitan Intelligence Brigade—known as BIM—which conducted all raids, arrests, and detentions in Santiago; the Economic Brigade "responsible for field operations related to the monitoring of public and private sector business/economic activities;" and the "Citizens Brigade" of informers throughout the country. The diagram also identified a "*secreta*"—a secret brigade close to the director whose function remains unknown.

Col. Contreras devised and supervised all these operations. In late 1973, Pinochet handpicked him as DINA director; U.S. intelligence dated his appointment on February 24, 1974. Contreras had no formal military background in the field of intelligence; he had spent much of his career as a professor and administrator at Chile's military engineering academies. (From September 1966 to September 1967 he attended the U.S. Army Career Officers School at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, ostensibly taking engineering courses.) But his U.S. Department of Defense biographic report recorded that he had taught a course on "strategy and intelligence" at the Chilean Army War College in the mid-1960s, where then Lieutenant Colonel Pinochet was deputy commandant. The two apparently established a close friendship that enabled Contreras to become Pinochet's closest advisor and ally after the military coup.

A DIA biographic assessment would describe Contreras this way:

Strong character, with intense loyalty to President Pinochet. Apparent designer, and certainly implementer, of hard line policy. . . . A very intelligent, observing officer with a keen sense of humor. . . . Strongly

anti-Communist and anti-Marxist to the point that he envisions leftist plots behind every action which seems to him to be counter to Chilean best interests. . . . Extremely capable performer, who is intensely disliked by many, both superiors and peers, because of his ruthless means employed by DINA. While he has ability to achieve higher positions, he will advance only with the personal support of President Pinochet, and could be expected to fall from any position of responsibility without this support.<sup>24</sup>

At the time of the coup, Contreras headed the Military Engineer School at Tejas Verdes, near the port town of San Antonio about sixty miles from Santiago. On September 11, he transformed the engineering school into a detention center known as prison camp no. 2, which became the prototype DINA torture-execution facility.<sup>25</sup> His early success in extracting confessions and disposing of victims helped to catapult Contreras over the military hierarchy to become Pinochet's intelligence chieftain and confidant, while providing him with a reputation for viciousness that he institutionalized through the DINA.

Under Contreras's command, DINA became notorious for three defined types of gross human rights violations: a web of secret detention camps, the systematic and inhuman practice of torture, and the disappearances of hundreds of Chileans.

In addition to Tejas Verdes, DINA operated at least a dozen other secret detention and torture facilities in Santiago and throughout the country.<sup>26</sup> These included:

- **Villa Grimaldi**—a walled estate built in 1835 and located in a residential section of the Santiago foothills, which served as the headquarters of BIM, DINA's metropolitan brigade. As DINA's most important facility in the capital, Villa Grimaldi—known within the military as the Terranova barracks—operated around the clock, with hooded prisoners being trucked into the camp at all hours of the night and day, to be abused by rotating shifts of torturers. Victims were housed in small wooden rooms, some no bigger than closets. In a small water tower on the property, DINA guards constructed ten cramped spaces where prisoners were kept after torture but prior to execution. The "tower" proved to be a final station for many who disappeared at the hands of BIM agents.<sup>27</sup>
- **The Discoteque/La Venda Sexy**—a house located on Calle Iran in Santiago served as another DINA torture center. Its name derived from prisoner reports that music was played continuously while var-

ious types of abuses took place and that DINA agents used sexual torture as their preferred form of repression at this facility. Many victims were then disappeared.

- **Londres No. 38**—a facility housed in the former Socialist Party headquarters in the Santiago region. DINA maintained up to sixty prisoners at a time here, before transferring them to harsher camps.
- **Cuatro Alamos**—in a section of the Tres Alamos prison in downtown Santiago, DINA secretly controlled a series of holding cells for prisoners, many of them awaiting transfer from one torture camp to another.
- **Colonia Dignidad**—one of the most secretive facilities used by DINA outside of Santiago, Colonia Dignidad was a cultlike German enclave started by ex-Luftwaffe officials from Nazi Germany, located in the Parral province in southern Chile. DINA's regional intelligence brigade operated out of a house owned by the Colonia in Parral. According to the Rettig Commission, "a certain number of people apprehended by DINA were really taken to Colonia Dignidad, held prisoner there for some time, and some of them subjected to torture."

All of these facilities shared a similar *modus operandi*: blindfolded victims were brought to them after being snatched in their homes or on the street by plainclothed agents in DINA's signature unmarked Ford Falcons. Prisoners were severely abused. One Chilean military officer told the U.S. defense attaché that DINA used a system of interrogation "straight out of the Spanish Inquisition." Each facility specialized in particular forms of torture. At Londres No. 38, for example, DINA agents often rounded up a prisoner's family members and sexually abused them with the prisoner present in order to extract information. Villa Grimaldi was known for its "Chile rooms"—wooden isolation compartments so small that prisoners could not kneel nor lay down.

Other forms of torture were commonly used at all DINA facilities. The Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation catalogued the horrific methods favored by DINA practitioners to obtain "intelligence" from prisoners:

- **The Grill:** prisoners would be tied to a metal bedspring and electrical current applied to sensitive body parts, including sexual organs.
- **La Parilla:** a bar on which victims were suspended by the wrists or by wrists and knees for long periods of time. While suspended, victims received electric shocks, and beatings.

- **The Submarine:** forced immersion in a vat of urine and excrement, or frigid water.
- **The Dry Submarine:** use of a cloth bag roped around the head to bring victims to the point of suffocation. This practice was often accompanied with burning victims with cigarettes to accelerate loss of air.
- **Beatings:** administered with gun butts, fists, and chains. In one technique, called "the telephone," according to a survivor, the torturer "slammed his open hands hard and rhythmically against the ears of the victim" leaving the prisoner deaf.<sup>28</sup>

In some camps, routine sadism was taken to extremes. At Villa Grimaldi, recalcitrant prisoners were dragged to a parking lot; DINA agents then used a car or truck to run over and crush their legs. Prisoners there recalled one young man who was beaten with chains and left to die slowly from internal injuries. Rape was also a reoccurring form of abuse. DINA officers subjected female prisoners to grotesque forms of sexual torture that included insertion of rodents and, as tactfully described in the Commission report, "unnatural acts involving dogs."

Few prisoners who were severely tortured lived to provide evidence of these atrocities. DINA agents murdered hundreds of victims. Many of them remain *desaparecidos*—disappeared. Approximately 1,100 Chileans—and one U.S. citizen—vanished during the seventeen-year Pinochet dictatorship—the majority of them at the hands of DINA. Some were killed and buried in secret graves; others were airlifted in a helicopter and thrown into the ocean by DINA agents "after first cutting their stomach open with a knife to keep the bodies from floating," states the Rettig Commission report. Making victims simply disappear was a particularly cruel method of terrorizing the opposition, inflicting psychological injuries on surviving family members, while avoiding legal constraints and evidence of responsibility and criminal accountability.<sup>29</sup>

But many families and human rights workers in Chile did hold the military regime and its secret police accountable, as did the international community. DINA's involvement in secret detention, torture, and disappearances drew strong and continuous condemnation from around the world. "The Pinochet regime moves across the world scene like a metal duck in a shooting gallery," CIA analysts lamented in a top-secret report titled, "Chile: Running the Gauntlet," dated in early 1976. "Its assailants have plenty of ammunition based on the excesses accompanying Salvador Allende's overthrow and the alleged abuses that still mark Chile's security and detention practices."<sup>30</sup> Contreras, rather than Pinochet, became a lightning rod for criticism. U.S. in-



telligence analysts declared him "the number one obstacle" to the improvement of human rights in Chile. During a private meeting with CIA officials, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William D. Rogers told his colleagues privately what no U.S. official would state publicly: The DINA chieftain had become "the most notorious symbol of repression in Chile."<sup>31</sup>

### Pinochet and DINA

The June 1974 decree that established DINA stated clearly that it would be "a military agency . . . directly subordinate to the government Junta." Pinochet would propagate this myth for years. "I could never say that I was actually running DINA," Pinochet argued in his last interview while detained in London. "[They] were under the orders, under the supervision of all of the Junta, the four members of the Junta."<sup>32</sup>

In fact, the Junta never supervised DINA operations, and from its inception to its closure, Contreras took orders only from Pinochet himself. "The DINA," as the U.S. defense attaché reported only several weeks after it was formed, "is directly subordinate to Junta President Pinochet."<sup>33</sup> Another DIA report dated in April 1975 reiterated: "Col. Contreras has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from President Pinochet." Two years later, a CIA report on DINA's responsibility for "the recent increase in torture, illegal detentions, and unexplained 'disappearances,'" stated that "Contreras answers directly to the President, and it is unlikely that he would act without the knowledge and approval of his superior." (Doc 6)

Pinochet exercised sole control over DINA because it provided him with much of his ability to consolidate his authority. Not only did Contreras's agents severely repress any opposition from the left; DINA also spied on and intimidated anyone who dared to disagree with Pinochet from within his own military. When the head of the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Center (CECIFA), Lt. Com. Raul Monsalve complained about DINA's operations and Contreras's relation with Pinochet, other high military officials warned him to "moderate" his objections or "face the possibility that DINA personnel would fabricate an incident which would destroy his career and get him out of their way," witnesses told U.S. officials. Such threats were made, and carried out, repeatedly during DINA's tenure. "One of Pinochet's major sources of power is the National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), an organization whose principal mission is internal security but which is extending its influence to ever-growing areas of activity," the U.S. embassy cabled the

State Department in mid-1975. "DINA reports directly to Pinochet and is ultimately controlled by him alone."<sup>34</sup>

Pinochet not only controlled DINA, he empowered its rapid expansion at the expense of other sectors of the military. He gave Contreras carte blanche in establishing personnel levels at the DINA and backed him as he drew agents and staff away from the other services while forcing them to foot the payroll bills. In January 1975, Contreras drafted, and Pinochet signed, an order giving DINA sole responsibility for persecuting the MIR, the regime's number-one counterinsurgency target. Pinochet also ordered the air force intelligence unit, which Contreras considered a particular rival, to disband and turn over its operations to DINA.

As international complaints about Chile's gross violations of human rights escalated, Pinochet used them in an Orwellian effort to broaden DINA's power. In September 1975, the CIA Station learned that Pinochet had "conducted a personnel investigation into human rights practices and violations by the armed forces" and determined that prisoners held by some of the intelligence units were being abused. He then ordered the interior and defense ministers "to issue a secret decree to the heads of all the services clearly stating the authorization and procedures for detentions throughout the country."

Purportedly intended to improve Chile's human rights record, Pinochet's secret decree in fact bestowed maximum latitude on the main agency responsible for the majority of atrocities. The September 22 order, obtained by CIA operatives, established DINA as the sole agency responsible for detentions, exempting it from obligation to report its activities to the courts or the other military services:

The directorate of national intelligence, DINA is authorized to conduct detentions of persons suspected of subversion or political activity throughout the country. In any case in the Santiago area in which the armed forces, carabineros or the [deleted] in the course of their patrol duties detain individuals engaged in subversive activity, the detainees must be immediately turned over to DINA. . . . DINA will act as the Central coordinator for all detention decrees.<sup>35</sup>

DINA's monolithic growth created intense rivalries and strains within the regime as other members of the military sought to assert their influence on Chile's future. Threatened by Contreras's power, and expressing concern about DINA's "barbaric" practices, a number of military officers sought out CIA and Defense Department officials and shared stories of efforts to per-

suade Pinochet to reign in DINA operations. In April 1975, several army officers tried "to convince the president that DINA should be subject to the direction and control of a National Security Council type of authority rather than just the presidency," the DIA reported. "To date, the president has not received these suggestions with enthusiasm."

Even U.S. military officers began to express concern about the implications of DINA's power. In comments attached to a detailed intelligence report on DINA's expansion, U.S. defense attaché, Capt. J.R. Switzer, described DINA's development as "a particularly disturbing phenomenon":

The apprehension of many senior Chilean military authorities regarding the possibility of DINA becoming a modern day Gestapo may very well be coming to fruition: DINA's autonomous authority is great, and increasing. Junta members are apparently unable to influence President Pinochet's decisions concerning DINA activities in any way. Regarding DINA organization, policies and operations Colonel Contreras' authority is near absolute—subject only to an unlikely Presidential veto. (Doc 7)

Until the end of 1975, the U.S. MilGroup viewed this phenomenon as evidence that Contreras had taken control—over Pinochet himself. "With the rapid growth of DINA into almost every aspect of the government, this office at times felt that the organization and its leaders had gotten out of hand and that the tail might be wagging the dog in Chile," the defense attaché cabled Washington. But during a dinner party with "a very senior DINA official"—perhaps Contreras himself—the U.S. air force attaché in Santiago, Lt. Col. Lawrence Corcoran, gathered intelligence on Pinochet's personal involvement in the operations of his secret police. Contreras met Pinochet every morning at 7:30 A.M., and privately briefed him on "the coming events and status of existing DINA activities," this official informed Corcoran. "The president issues instructions on DINA; is aware of its activities; *and in fact heads it.*" (Emphasis added.)

#### "Brigada Exterior": The External Section

As DINA advanced its effort at wiping out all opposition to the regime, Pinochet and Contreras decided to expand Chile's secret police functions. DINA's mission would not be limited to internal security but would build an extraterritorial operational capability to neutralize threats from abroad—particularly the vocal international solidarity and human-rights network

that focused worldwide attention on Pinochet's atrocities. The organizational diagram of DINA, obtained by U.S. intelligence, listed a "Brigada Exterior." This section, a Chilean source reported, was made up of "DINA operatives who conduct traditional intelligence operations in foreign countries." (See Doc 5)

The Exterior Brigade, however, did not conduct "traditional" operations. Instead of gathering intelligence on the military capabilities and attitudes of potentially hostile governments posing national security threats, the DINA's foreign branch focused on three main missions: forging alliances with other secret police forces, as well as violent anticommunist and neo-fascist groups, in the Southern Cone, United States, and Europe; tracking Pinochet's critics abroad, and organizing acts of international terrorism against prominent exiles. (See Chapter 6) To spy on exile movements and activities, DINA posted agents and assets in Chilean embassies around the world, and among the personnel serving the national airline, as well as at international airports, including those in New York. Drawing on the CIA's organizational model, Contreras ordered the creation of DINA stations abroad to facilitate these operations, with agents operating under civilian, rather than military, cover.

In the spring of 1974, DINA established its first station in Buenos Aires. There, according to the Rettig Commission report, Chilean agents engaged in the "investigation, surveillance, apprehension, and even elimination of opposition Chileans who had taken refuge [in Argentina]." Subsequently, an undercover agent was based at the Chilean embassy in Madrid, Spain with responsibility for Western Europe. Contreras also tried to insert DINA representatives in France, England, and West Germany to help track the movements of exiled Chilean politicians and more militant groups working across the continent. In 1976, DINA, in collaboration with the secret police services in Argentina and Uruguay, apparently attempted to open a station in Miami, Florida.<sup>36</sup>

In their contacts and secret calls, DINA agents used a code name, "Luis Gutierrez," to refer to the international division. The division had a unique communications and computer system, separate from the rest of the directorate. Army Maj. Raúl Iturriaga Neumann oversaw the operations of Brigada Exterior, although Contreras exercised close control of this special unit through his deputy, Pedro Espinoza. The Brigade drew its staff from Chilean military personnel, and recruited a number of civilians from the ranks of violent rightist groups such as Patria y Libertad.

But the most famous member of DINA's foreign branch was not Chilean: he was an American, born in Waterloo, Iowa, named Michael Vernon Townley. Townley was the son of a Ford Motor Company overseas manager. He had moved with his family to Chile at age fourteen and, only four years



later, married a twenty-six-year old Chilean woman, Inés Mariana Callejas, with three small children. His first job in Chile in the early 1960s was an encyclopedia salesman. In 1967, Townley and his family moved to Miami, Florida where he became both familiar and friendly with the hard-line, and often violent, anti-Castro Cuban exile community. After Salvador Allende was elected in Chile in September 1970, Townley's anticommunist Cuban friends urged him to contact the CIA and return to Chile to play an undercover role in efforts to undermine the new Chilean government.<sup>37</sup>

As he prepared to return to Chile, Townley did approach the CIA in December 1970 to offer his services as a covert asset against the Allende government. Two months later, according to records of the Agency's Office of Security, the Directorate of Operations (DO) requested "preliminary security approval to use Mr. Townley in an operational capacity." It is not clear how, or if, the CIA employed Townley over the next year, but on December 21, 1971, the DO alerted the Office of Security that the Station had cancelled its interest in him as an agent.<sup>38</sup>

By then Townley was a fixture at the Santiago embassy—an "embassy barnacle" as one diplomat characterized him. (Townley's handwritten name, telephone number, and address at 1454 Oxford St. appear on the inside flap of one 1971 embassy telephone directory.) He spent considerable time hanging out with various U.S. attachés and officials—Frederick Purdy, David Stebbing, Jeffrey Davidow among them—passing on information about his anti-Allende activities.

He had stories to share. Townley was now an operative with Patria y Libertad (PL), the avowedly pro-fascist paramilitary group that modeled itself after Hitler's Brownshirts. He headed a commando unit responsible for bombings and acts of economic sabotage using Molotov cocktails. Townley also applied his self-taught skills as an electronics expert to design electronic surveillance equipment that allowed Patria y Libertad to intercept radio transmissions between Allende, his guards and party officials—tapes of which were then provided to the U.S. embassy. He became renowned in the extremist opposition community for building and deploying mobile radio transmitters and illicit, anti-Allende television stations. When the government tried to scramble those transmissions, Townley led a PL raid in March 1973 to disable a jamming device at a TV station in the city of Concepcion. During the operation, Townley gagged and hog-tied a homeless man who was using the station as shelter. He was found dead of asphyxiation the next day. Now a fugitive, Townley fled Chile to Miami.

Wanted for murder in Chile, Townley simply waited until the Allende government had been overthrown to return to his adopted country and rejoin his colleagues from Patria y Libertad to celebrate their anticommunist victory.

On October 3, he obtained a fake Florida driver's license under the alias Kenneth Enyart. On October 5, he received a new U.S. passport using that name. Five weeks after the coup, Townley flew back to Santiago.

Before leaving Miami, however, he met with an old friend from the U.S. embassy, David Stebbing, and provided him with significant information. In a letter to the State Department's Chile desk officer, Stebbing provided a debriefing of Townley that covered coup plotting, Patria y Libertad, and the murder in Concepcion. Prior to the coup, Townley reported, "an assassination squad had been formed by Chilean exiles" to kill up to twenty-five members of Allende's government.

If there had been no intervening coup, they would have acted in October. The plan was for 6 or 8 people to enter Chile no more than 2 or 3 days before the target date and to pick off as many of their unbodyguarded targets as possible within a space of 3 or 4 hours.

Now that the coup had been completed Patria y Libertad members were "showing up as key officials or advisors throughout the new government," Townley advised. "Many of his friends are not at all bothered by the term 'Fascist,'" Stebbing reported. "Mike" expected to return to Chile within a few days, and "will probably be in contact with the embassy again." As Stebbing presciently predicted, "he may someday be in trouble again."

Indeed, Townley returned to Santiago and immediately resumed his quest to work with the United States as an operative or informant. Embassy files record numerous contacts between him and U.S. personnel. Aware that Townley was a fugitive in the Concepcion murder case, the American consul, Fred Purdy, nevertheless welcomed him back and provided him with a new, clean, passport in his real name. In December 1973, Townley called attaché Jeffrey Davidow to report that he was "working with the same Patria y Libertad types he knew prior to the coup, and that the group is accepting assignments from military intelligence." Townley told Davidow that he was "eager to establish an intelligence relationship with the embassy." In a biographic memorandum drafted in June 1974, Davidow described Townley as an "AMCIT [American citizen] with rather unsavory past with crypto-fascist Chilean groups . . . suggest keeping him at arms length."<sup>39</sup> But just two months later another embassy officer, Michael Lyons, accepted a dinner invitation with Townley and his wife, Ines, and reported that the expatriate American was still interested in being a "conduit for information" for the United States.

By then, Townley was a DINA agent. In the late spring of 1974, Contreras's deputy, Col. Pedro Espinoza, recruited him into the service of the

secret police; within several months Contreras had provided Townley with an alias, Juan Andres Wilson, a large home to use as a base, and a four-member team for operations.<sup>40</sup> As a committed, rabid, anticommunist U.S. citizen, Townley provided DINA with multiple skills and opportunities. "My husband was [not] an imitation James Bond," his wife would write in a lengthy handwritten account of Townley's DINA career:

But I certainly can state that DINA found his knowledge of electronics, English, and purchasing extremely useful. Add to that the fact that as an American he had free access to the United States at any moment without having the need for hard-to-get visas. My husband, moreover, had qualities that made him especially effective in the intelligence community: a bright mind, an incredible memory, and a fail-safe determination and loyalty. And he was absolutely convinced that the military government and Señor Pinochet were the best things that ever could have happened to Chile.<sup>41</sup>

Townley became the Brigada Exterior's leading assassin. In September 1974 he carried out his first major mission—the cold-blooded car bomb attack that killed former Chilean commander in chief Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos Aires. In the spring of 1975, his DINA superiors sent him to Mexico City in a failed effort to blow up a convention center filled with exiled former members of the Allende government. That September, he arranged an assassination plot in Rome, Italy, that left the exiled leader of the Christian Democratic party, Bernardo Leighton, and his wife critically wounded. And in September 1976, he organized and implemented DINA's most infamous operation: the car bomb assassination of former Chilean minister Orlando Letelier and his American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt in downtown Washington, D.C. Although his name was not known at the time, in the mid-1970s Michael Townley ranked among the world's most active—and dangerous—international terrorists.

### Project Andrea

From the laboratory basement of his DINA-owned mansion in the Lo Curro district of Santiago, Townley directed another top-secret DINA operation with tremendous terrorist potential: the creation of a biological weapon of mass destruction. Code-named "ANDREA," the project reflected the Pinochet regime's desire to possess a secret weapon that could be used in the event of war against Chile's neighbors, Peru or Argentina. Townley, and a

team of chemists, developed, manufactured, and stored a nerve gas with the scientific name *Isopropylmethylphosphonofluoridate*—commonly known as Sarin.

Sarin is extremely lethal. Even a few drops can bring the quick and painful death of hundreds of people; a military delivery system would kill thousands. The gas, according to an FBI memorandum on Project ANDREA distributed by then director William Webster, "vaporizes on being exposed to the atmosphere, producing droplets that enter the body through the skin or lungs to interdict the neurochemistry that permits the respiratory muscles to function." The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo used Sarin in the Tokyo subway gas attack that killed twelve people and wounded 500 in March 1995. The Bush administration also believed Sarin to be part of Saddam Hussein's alleged arsenal of chemical warfare weapons in Iraq.

Townley's mission, as Taylor Branch and Eugene Propper wrote in their book *Labyrinth*, was to "develop a weapon that [would] be extremely lethal to large masses of people but whose effects [could] be localized within a relatively small area."<sup>42</sup> After studying the chemical work of German scientists during operations in Europe in the summer of 1975, Townley procured laboratory equipment and compounds from a British chemical engineering company, Gallenkamp; he also purchased a large microwave oven and rented gas storage canisters in Miami. The equipment was paid for out of a special DINA account, under the fictitious company Prosin Ltd., at the Southeast First National Bank in Miami, Florida.

By the time of the mission to kill Letelier in Washington, D.C., DINA had manufactured significant amounts of Sarin and Townley was working on a military delivery system that would allow the gas to be deployed in a wartime setting. But he had also opened his nerve gas laboratory to representatives of the Cuban National Movement, a violent anti-Castro organization that collaborated in various DINA assassination missions including the Letelier bombing. The CNM members, as Townley later told his FBI interrogators, "requested that the Cuban Nationalist Movement be furnished a supply of nerve gas to utilize in their terrorist activities." (Doc 8)<sup>43</sup>

Townley himself considered the possibility that Sarin could be utilized in a terrorist mission. In preparation for the assassination of Orlando Letelier, he took a small quantity of the nerve gas, put it into a Chanel No. 5 perfume bottle and transported it aboard a LAN-Chile flight to the United States. As Townley would later admit, he considered the possibility that a female DINA agent could get close enough to Letelier to deploy the gas, or that he could toss the Chanel bottle into Letelier's car at a stop sign or red light. Once in Washington, however, he resorted to his signature weapon—a car bomb—and eventually returned the gas to a secure DINA storage facility in Santiago.<sup>44</sup>

## The National Center for Information (CNI)

The Letelier mission, while accomplishing Contreras's objectives, brought about DINA's dissolution. The shadow cast over Chile's military as an institution strengthened the hand of the Contreras's enemies in the high command to the point where they convinced General Pinochet to dissolve DINA and reorganize the intelligence service. On August 13, 1977, the Junta issued decree law No. 1876 abolishing DINA, citing the need to restructure "in accord with present circumstances the functions of an agency created during a situation of internal conflict that has now been surpassed." A second decree, No. 1878, issued the same day, established the National Center for Information, CNI, and authorized it to take over DINA's staff, properties, and budgets. Whereas DINA reported to Pinochet, U.S. military intelligence advised in a cable, "DINA Dissolved," the CNI supposedly would report to the Ministry of Interior and would not have the power of arrest and detention of its predecessor. (Doc g) But Contreras remained as director, meaning that this change in the structure of the secret police was in name only.

Between August and November, Chilean intelligence agents at Contreras's direction conducted a string of bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and killings, all of which the CNI blamed on "extremists." In fact, as U.S. intelligence quickly reported, Chilean military agents were attempting to orchestrate a climate of chaos and terrorism, to exaggerate the leftist threat. In one coordinated operation, the Chilean secret police blew up two suspected safe houses, killing several people, and then blamed the explosions on the left. "Arrests and prosecutions would 'take months,'" one Chilean official explained to the U.S. military attaché, but "an explosion would produce speedy justice."<sup>45</sup>

In early November, high-ranking military commanders met with Pinochet again and demanded that Contreras be relieved of his duties as CNI director. Chile's international image on human rights, they argued, would never improve as long as he remained. On November 4, Pinochet abruptly removed Contreras—he was promoted from colonel to brigadier general and given a post at the Army Engineering School—and appointed one of DINA's critics, General Odlanier Mena, as new CNI director. According to a CIA intelligence report filed on November 9, Pinochet realized "that as long as the leadership of the CNI remains basically the same as its predecessor organization, DINA, many critics of the Chilean government will insist that no real change has taken place." CIA informants claimed that Contreras was "completely shocked" at his ouster. One source compared Contreras, once the most feared and loathed individual in Chile, to "a cuckolded husband who is the last to realize his wife was being unfaithful."<sup>46</sup>

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Mena would "probably improve Chile's claims of housecleaning within the security community." But CNI proved to be qualitatively, if not quantitatively, as repressive as its predecessor. The levels of political killings abated between 1978 and 1980, but as organized protests against the regime escalated so did CNI's acts of repression. CNI agents would eventually be charged in several of the most gruesome atrocities committed toward the end of the dictatorship, including the killing of trade union leader Tucapel Jiménez in February 1982 and the decapitation murders of three Chilean professors in March 1985. Between 1978 and 1985, the Chilean Commission on Truth and Reconciliation estimated, fatal human rights violations committed by the regime totaled 160 people. "Most of them are attributed to the CNI."<sup>47</sup>



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

7321744

SECRET - NODIS

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: ARA - Jack B. Kubisch

Chilean Executions

You requested by cable from Tokyo a report on this subject.

On October 24 the Junta announced that summary, on-the-spot executions would no longer be carried out and that persons caught in the act of resisting the government would henceforth be held for military courts. Since that date 17 executions following military trials have been announced. Publicly acknowledged executions, both summary and in compliance with court martial sentences, now total approximately 100, with an additional 40 prisoners shot while "trying to escape". An internal, confidential report prepared for the Junta puts the number of executions for the period September 11-30 at 320. The latter figure is probably a more accurate indication of the extent of this practice.

Our best estimate is that the military and police units in the field are generally complying with the order to desist from summary executions. At least the rather frequent use of random violence that marked the operations of these units in the early post-coup days has clearly abated for the time being. However, there are no indications as yet of a disposition to forego executions after military trial.

The Chilean leaders justify these executions as entirely legal in the application of martial law

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under that they have declared to be a "state of siege in time of war". Their code of military justice permits death by firing squad for a range of offenses, including treason, armed resistance, illegal possession of arms and auto theft. Sentences handed down by military tribunals during a state of siege are not reviewable by civilian courts.

The purpose of the executions is in part to discourage by example those who seek to organize armed opposition to the Junta. The Chilean military, persuaded to some degree by years of Communist Party propaganda, expected to be confronted by heavy resistance when they overthrew Allende. Fear of civil war was an important factor in their decision to employ a heavy hand from the outset. Also present is a puritanical, crusading spirit -- a determination to cleanse and rejuvenate Chile. (A number of those executed seem to have been petty criminals.)

The Junta now has more confidence in the security situation and more awareness of the pressure of international opinion. It may be a hopeful sign that the Junta continues to stall on bringing to trial former cabinet ministers and other prominent Marxists -- people the military initially had every intention of standing up before firing squads. How the military leaders proceed in this area from now on will be influenced to some degree by outside opinion, and particularly by ours, but the major consideration will continue to be their assessment of the security situation.

At Tab A is a Chile situation report and at Tab B a fact sheet on human rights in Chile.

Attachments:

Tab A - Situation Report  
Tab B - Fact Sheet

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Drafted: ARA:HWSHlaudemman:mph  
Ext. 23542:11/16/73

FACT SHEET -- HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE  
(Prepared November 15, 1973)

By SY NARA Date 1/2/74

Figures without asterisk are from public sources.

Total arrested in Chile since September 11	13,500*
Arrested originally and held in National Stadium in Santiago	7-8,000
Released from Stadium	6,500
Presently held in Stadium	0
Detained in Santiago jails	550
Detained outside Santiago	2,000
Estimated number serving sentence or pending trial	1,500*
Executions acknowledged	100 (approx)
Executions according to intelligence source	320*
Number killed attempting to escape military custody	40
American citizens detained (27 detainees had been released by October 17)	0
American citizens dead since coup	2
Safeconducts issued to asylees in Embassies	1,791
Safeconducts issued to others	3,100
Safeconduct requests not yet acted upon	408
Departed from Chile (Chileans and foreigners)	2,000 (approx)
Foreigners registered with UNHCR for permanent resettlement	
In safe havens (refugee camps, etc.)	820
At home (possibly some under house arrest)	824
In diplomatic missions	172
In GOC detention centers	203
Total number still in foreign Embassies	N.A. (368 a/o mid-Oct)
Total dead: According to Chilean authorities	600 (approx)
According to Barnes article in October 8 Newsweek	2,796
According to October 21 Washington Post article on CIA Director Colby's statement to Congressional Committee	2-3,000
Recent SRF source estimate	1,500*

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1. ACCORDING TO

HIGHLY SENSITIVE FIGURES PREPARED FOR THE JUNTA INDICATE THAT A TOTAL OF 1,020 DEATHS OF CIVILIANS AND ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD 11 THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1973 AS THE RESULT OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP. DURING THIS PERIOD IN SANTIAGO, 22 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND 624 CIVILIANS DIED AS A RESULT OF MILITARY ACTIONS. IN ADDITION, A TOTAL OF 240 CIVILIANS WERE EITHER EXECUTED BY FIRING SQUADS AFTER SUMMARY MILITARY TRIALS OR EXECUTED ON THE SPOT FOR ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST MILITARY FORCES. DURING THE SAME PERIOD OUTSIDE OF SANTIAGO, AT TOTAL OF EIGHT ARMED FORCES MEN WERE KILLED; 46 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED DURING MILITARY ACTIONS; AND 80 CIVILIANS WERE EITHER EXECUTED ON THE SPOT OR KILLED BY FIRING SQUADS AFTER MILITARY TRIALS. ~~COMMENT:~~ THESE FIGURES DO NOT REFLECT THE NUMBER OF CARABINEROS (UNIFORMED NATIONAL POLICE) KILLED DURING THIS TIME PERIOD NOR DO THE FIGURES REFLECT THE EXECUTION OF KNOWN CRIMINALS AND DELINQUENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF IN-

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VESTIGATIONS (DI, CHILEAN CIVIL POLICE), BECAUSE FIGURES ARE NOT BEING KEPT ON THESE LATTER CATEGORIES. COMMENT:

A.

[REDACTED] AN UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATE THAT ABOUT 1,600 CIVILIAN DEATHS OCCURRED BETWEEN 11 SEPTEMBER AND 10 OCTOBER. WITH NO ESTIMATE OF MILITARY AND POLICE CASUALTIES. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THE 1,600 FIGURE INCLUDED COMMON CRIMINALS. ALSO, IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME PERIODS COVERED IN THESE TWO REPORTS.

1.5 (c)

B. ON 10 OCTOBER,

[REDACTED] THAT AT HIGH LEVELS IN THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT THERE IS A REALIZATION THAT THE OFFICIAL DEATH FIGURES WILL HAVE TO BE RAISED, BECAUSE THE PUBLIC DOES NOT BELIEVE THE FIGURE (ABOUT 600) USUALLY QUOTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF A DECISION IS MADE TO RAISE THE NUMBER, IT WILL BE PLACED AT SLIGHTLY OVER 1000. THE MOST ACCURATE NUMBER, HOWEVER, IS APPROXIMATELY 1,500.)

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2.

BETWEEN 11 SEPTEMBER

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AND 10 OCTOBER A TOTAL OF 13,500 PRISONERS HAD BEEN REGISTERED AS DETAINED BY THE ARMED FORCES, CARABINEROS AND THE DI THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. AS OF 10 OCTOBER A TOTAL OF 2,300 PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD IN ARMED FORCES DETENTION CENTERS THROUGHOUT CHILE, BUT NOT INCLUDING SANTIAGO. 600 PRISONERS HAD BEEN SENTENCED UNDER THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WERE SERVING TERMS IN PRISON CAMPS. IN ADDITION, A TOTAL OF 2,360 PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD IN CARABINERO AND DI FACILITIES WHILE THEIR CASES WERE BEING TRIED. A TOTAL OF 360 COMMON CRIMINALS HAD ALSO BEEN DETAINED, TRIED AND SENTENCED BETWEEN 11 SEPTEMBER AND 10 OCTOBER.

3. [REDACTED] THAT AS OF 20 OCTOBER, A TOTAL OF 7,812 PRISONERS HAD BEEN PROCESSED THROUGH THE DETENTION CENTER 1.5 (c) AT THE NATIONAL STADIUM IN SANTIAGO. OF THIS NUMBER, 2,112 HAD BEEN GIVEN UNCONDITIONAL LIBERTY AND HAD NO FURTHER CHARGES AGAINST THEM; 2,400 HAD BEEN PLACED IN CONDITIONAL LIBERTY AND CONTINUED UNDER INVESTIGATION; 1,840 INDIVIDUALS CHARGED WITH MINOR CRIMES HAD BEEN PLACED IN LIBERTY FOLLOWING PAYMENT OF A BAIL; 522 DETAINEES HAD BEEN SENT TO PUBLIC JAILS AFTER MILITARY TRIALS; AND 600 HAD BEEN SENT TO PRISON CAMPS CONTROLLED BY THE ARMED FORCES. AN ADDITIONAL 250 CASES WERE PENDING. ONCE THE

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PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

NATIONAL STADIUM IS CLOSED AS A DETENTION CENTER. ALL FUTURE DETAINEES ARE TO BE SENT TO CARABINERO AND DI FACILITIES FOR PROCESSING AND CONTROL. [REDACTED] THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE NATIONAL STADIUM IS BEING CLEARED OF PRISONERS TO ALLOW TIME FOR PREPARATIONS FOR THE WORLD CUP SOCCER MATCH BETWEEN CHILE AND THE USSR TO BE HELD THERE IN LATE NOVEMBER.)

4. THE ARMED FORCES IS ADMINISTERING OVER 20 DETENTION SITES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. OF THIS NUMBER ONLY A FEW, SUCH AS DANSON ISLAND, ARE KNOWN TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

5. [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

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## BIOGRAPHIC DATA

CHILE  
Gen Augusto PINOCHET Ugarte  
January 1975

(U) NAME: Gen Augusto Pinochet Ugarte  
(pee-noh-CHET), Army.

(U) POSITION: President (chief of state since 12 Sept 1973; position officially named President of the Government Junta, 12 Sept 1973-June 1974; Supreme Chief of the Nation and Head of the Executive Branch June-Dec 1974; President since 18 Dec 1974); and Commander in Chief of the Army (since 24 Aug 1973).



(S/M/D) SIGNIFICANCE: Gen Pinochet, an intelligent, ambitious, professionally competent and experienced Infantry officer, is widely admired and respected by fellow officers. He became President and the strongest member of the Government Junta (composed of the four service commanders) following the 11 Sept 1973 military coup, the first in Chile since 1931, which overthrew the government of Marxist-Socialist Salvador Allende Gossens (President, 1970-1973). In June 1974, the Junta structure changed and Pinochet became head of the executive branch of the government, while continuing as head of the Junta, which became the legislative branch. Gen Pinochet would have preferred that the Armed Forces, and particularly the Army, remain in their traditional role as a professional, apolitical force that does not involve itself with partisan politics. The deteriorating economic and political situation, however, forced Pinochet reluctantly to join in the military intervention. The Junta abolished Congress and all political parties but claims to be moving towards a return to democracy. It is most concerned with rebuilding Chile, especially the economy; obtaining foreign arms purchases and making other preparations against the threat of war with Peru; and improving Chile's world image regarding human rights.

## (S/M/D) POLITICS:

(U/M/D) International: Anti-Communist and anti-Cuban, Gen Pinochet has always spoken favorably of, and desires to keep close ties with, the United States. He has twice travelled to the U.S. He favors the acquisition of U.S. equipment and the training of Chilean military personnel in U.S. service schools. He shares the common concern of most Chilean Army officers over the threat of a possible invasion of Chile by Peru. Pinochet has served as an Instructor at the Ecuadorian Army War College and has travelled to Mexico and the Canal Zone.

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CLASSIFIED BY DI  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5  
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2005

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CHILE  
Gen Augusto PINOCHET Ugarte  
January 1975

(S/NFD) Internal: Gen Pinochet is conservative in his political thinking. It is believed that he remained basically apolitical during the administration of President Allende, viewing the government as legally and constitutionally elected. Pinochet enjoyed the complete confidence of Eduardo Frei Montalva (President, 1964-1970).

(C/NFD) PERSONAL DATA:

(U) Birth: 25 Nov 1915 in Valparaíso, Chile.

(C/NFD) Family: Wife, Lucia Hierriart Rodríguez de Pinochet (born about 1926; of French ancestry; Roman Catholic; married about 1943; charming, attractive; socially at ease; family is very close; has long been interested in and directed a Catholic assistance program for illegitimate children; in 1973 allegedly strongly denounced the then Army Commander in Chief, Carlos Prats González, for his "lackey" relationship with President Allende). Children (5): Lucia (f), born about 1944 (married; is an infant-welfare specialist); Augusto (m), born about 1946 (a military officer); María Verónica (f), born about 1950 (married; is a computer programmer); Marco Antonio (m), born about 1957; Jacqueline Marie (f), born about 1959. One daughter lived with her husband, an engineer, in Panama.

(C/NFD) Description: Caucasian. Large build (5'10", 180 lbs); dark brown hair, green eyes, oval face; fair complexion; has a mustache; wears glasses for reading; quiet; mild-mannered; very businesslike. Very honest, hard working, dedicated. A devoted, tolerant husband and father; lives very modestly. Drinks scotch and pisco sours; smokes cigarettes; likes parties. Sports interests are fencing, boxing, and horseback riding. Member of Geographic Society of Chile. He is well known as a military geographer and has authored three geography books, at least one of which is used as a secondary-school textbook. Enjoys discussing world military problems and would respond to a frank, man-to-man approach.

(U) Languages: Native Spanish, some French and English.

(U) Religion: Roman Catholic.

(U) Decorations: Colombian Order of Merit General José María Córdoba. Ecuadorean Abdón Calderón Star (Gold). Peruvian Military Order of Ayacucho. Chilean Military Star of the Armed Forces (Grand Star for Military Merit, for 30 years' service); Goddess Minerva Medal; Minerva Medal.

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CHILE  
Gen Augusto PINOCHET Ugarte  
January 1975

(U) CIVIL EDUCATION: Secondary school presumably in Chile. Attended courses on judicial and social sciences at the University of Chile for 2 years (dates not known).

(U) CAREER:

1933-1937 -Cadet, Military Academy, Santiago, Mar 1933-Jan 1937.  
Commissioned Probationary 2d Lt in Infantry, 1 Jan 1937.  
1937-1938 -Assigned to 6th "Chacabuco" Infantry Regiment. Promoted to 2d Lt, 1937; to 1st Lt, 1938.  
1939 -Assigned to 2d "Maipo" Infantry Regiment.  
1940-1941 -Student, Infantry School, San Bernardo.  
1942-1946 -Instructor, Army War College, Santiago. Promoted to Capt, 1946.  
1947 -Assigned to 5th "Carampangue" Infantry Regiment, Iquique.  
1948 -Government Delegate to the Schwager Coal Mines (merged with Lota Coal Mines in 1963), located near Concepción.  
1948 -Assigned to 9th Infantry Regiment.  
1949-1951 -Student, Command and General Staff Course, Army War College.  
1952 -Assigned to the Military Academy. Promoted to Maj, 1952.  
1953 -Operations Officer, 4th "Rancagua" Infantry Regiment, Arica.  
1954 -Instructor, Army War College.  
1955 -Aide to Subsecretary for Army, Ministry of National Defense.  
1956-1959 -Instructor, Military Geography, Ecuadorean Army War College, Quito.  
1960 -Staff Officer, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Antofagasta. Promoted to Lt Col, 23 Jan 1960.  
1961-1963 -Commander, 7th "Esmeralda" Infantry Regiment, Antofagasta.  
1964-1968 -Deputy Commandant, Chilean Army War College, Jan 1964-Jan 1968. Member, orientation tour of U.S. and Canal Zone, Jan-Feb 1965. Promoted to Col, 23 Jan 1966.  
1968 -Chief of Staff, 2d Army Division, Santiago. Official visit to U.S. and Canal Zone, Jan-Feb. Promoted to Brig Gen, 31 Dec 1968.  
1969-1971 -Commander, 6th Army Division, Iquique. Promoted to Maj Gen, 30 Dec 1970.  
1971-1972 -Commander, Santiago Garrison, Mar 1971-Jan 1972.  
1972-1973 -Chief of the Army General Staff, Jan 1972-Aug 1973. Concurrently served as Acting Commander in Chief of the Army, Nov 1972-Mar 1973, Apr-June 1973, and Aug 1973. Official visit to Mexico for Independence Day celebrations and to the Canal Zone, Sept 1972.

3  
UNCLASSIFIED  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
~~SECRET~~

O 122330Z OCT. 73  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6158

SANTIAGO 4992

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: CI, PINT  
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PINOCHET

Chile Project (#S199900006)  
U.S. Department of State  
✓ Release \_\_\_\_\_ Excise \_\_\_\_\_ Deny \_\_\_\_\_ Decla-  
Exemption(s) \_\_\_\_\_

1. AT COLOMBUS DAY RECEPTION TODAY JUNTA PRESIDENT PINOCHET SAID HE WOULD LIKE A QUIET MOMENT TO TALK - SO I WENT BY HIS OFFICE AT 7 P.M. TONIGHT.

2. PINOCHET WAS GRACIOUS AND ELOQUENT IN EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT AT MY TRANSFER. HE SAID CHILE GREATLY NEEDED OUR HELP, BOTH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE ADDED THAT IF THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT FAILS, CHILE'S TRAGEDY WILL BE PERMANENT. I TOOK THE OCCASION TO POINT OUT THAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS WE ARE ENCOUNTERING AT THIS TIME. A DISCUSSION OF THE KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TERUGGI AND HORMAN CASES, AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM ENSUED. PINOCHET INDICATED THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SHARES FULLY OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IS DOING ITS BEST TO PREVENT VIOLATIONS AND LOSS OF LIFE. HE ADDED THAT THIS IS NOT EASY, AS THE LEFT EXTREMISTS CONTINUE TO ATTACK OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS, ENGAGE IN SNIPING AND ATTEMPT ACTS OF SABOTAGE. HALF OF THE EXTREMISTS' ARMS, PINOCHET SAID, ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO THEM, AND MOTOR AND BAZOOKA FACTORIES AND ALL MATTER OF OTHER ILLICIT ARMS MANUFACTURING CONTINUE TO BE UNCOVERED. IF THE ARMY SHOULD LET THIS PROBLEM GET OUT OF HAND, THE RESULT WOULD BE FAR GREATER BLOODSHED THAN CHILE IS PRESENTLY EXPERIENCING. IF THE LEFT EXTREMISTS HAD HAD THEIR WAY, AND HAD CARRIED OUT THEIR OWN AUTOGOLPE PLAN,

PAGE 02 SANTIAGO 04992 122347Z

THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A MILLION DEAD. NEVERTHELESS, CHILE SHARES OUR CONCERN AND IS DOING ITS BEST. (THE FOREGOING CONVERSATION WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY PINOCHET TO BE PRIVATE AND IN CONFIDENCE).

3. I REITERATED ASSURANCES OF THE GOOD WILL OF THE USG AND OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL. I NOTED THAT WE HAD SOME PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD OBLIGE US TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF CHILEAN REQUESTS IN SOME AREAS. SO FAR AS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID ARE CONCERNED, I SAID WE WOULD WANT TO WAIT BEFORE ADDRESSING THIS QUESTION UNTIL THE KENNEDY AMENDMENT WAS CLARIFIED THROUGH A SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE. REGARDING COPPER, PINOCHET SAID CHILE REALIZES IT SHOULD PAY COMPENSATION. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT CHILE IS BROKE, AND WILL NEED SOME HELP GETTING ON ITS FEET IF IT IS TO BE ABLE TO MEET THESE AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS. HE ASSERTED THAT A LARGE PART OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AID HAD BEEN "A FRAUD", AS CHILE HAD HAD TO PAY FOR IT IN COPPER.

4. IN CONCLUSION PINOCHET SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GET TOGETHER AGAIN AFTER HUERTA'S RETURN, WHEN HUERTA AND THE JUNTA HAD HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SORT OUT THE RESULTS OF HUERTA'S U.S. TRIP. DAVIS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT	
<p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM</p>	
<p><b>UNCLASSIFIED</b></p>	
1. COUNTRY: CHILE	2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 817 0135 75
SUBJECT: (U) Organizational Diagram of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA)	3. DATE OF REPORT: 17 June 1975
4. NO. OF PAGES: 4	5. REFERENCES: A. IR 6 817 0088 75; B. IR 6 817 0130 75; C. DIOP PG2400; PD2420; D. DIRM III Control No. CI750
6. DATE OF INFORMATION: 16 June 1975	7. ORIGINATOR: USDAO Santiago, Chile
8. PLACE AND DATE OF: Santiago, Chile 16 June 1975	9. LGDR GERALD T. USN Assistant Naval Attaché J. R. SWITZER, Captain, U.S. Navy U.S. Defense
10. SOURCE: b 817 0034	11. SUMMARY:
<p>(C/NED) This report forwards an diagram of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) with brief explanatory comments included regarding the components of the whole. (Comment: This updates that provided in paragraph D. of reference (a).)</p>	
<p>"NO DISSEM" caveat utilized to avoid possibility of compromising source.</p>	
<p>1. (C/NED) enclosed diagram of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA). He indicated that the organizational relationships illustrated in the diagram reflect the current status of Chile's largest and most influential intelligence organization. The data included in this report amplifies that included in reference (b).</p>	
<p>2. (U) The blocks included in the diagram have been numbered 1 through 25 to correspond the brief comments made in paragraph 4.</p>	
<p>3. (C/NED) The organizational structure of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) is as follows:</p>	
12. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	13. DOWNGRADING DATA:
USCINCSO CDR INF BDE CZ USAFSO USNAVSOC ACSI/DOI AFOSI COMNAVINTCOM DIRNAVINTSERV	Classified by U. S. Defense Attaché, Santiago, Chile EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2005
<p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM</p>	
<p>DD FORM 1396</p>	
<p>DIA with, redaction per EO 12958</p>	

## UNCLASSIFIED

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~


(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 817 0135 75

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

USDAO Santiago, Chile

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c 10-1988

REPLACES DA FORM 1396c, 1 AUG 88  
AND DA FORM 805, 1 AUG 88 WHICH  
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 89

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 817 0135 75

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

USDAO Santiago, Chile

4. (C/INT)

1. Director of DINA
2. Aide to the Director
3. Intelligence Committee - called into being by the Director to discuss specific intelligence problems or operations. Membership varies depending on the nature of the problem under discussion
4. General Secretary for administrative matters within the Director's office
5. Telecommunications Brigade - manages record correspondence distribution and filing and controls distribution of electronic sensors
6. Secret Brigade - function unknown
7. Subdirector of the Interior - responsible for intelligence operations within Chile
8. Economic Section - responsible for monitoring the activities of public and private business/economic interests to insure compliance with government economic policy
9. Economic Brigade - responsible for field operations related to the monitoring of public and private sector business/economic activities
10. Interior Section - responsible for combating real or perceived internal subversion
11. Interior Sub-sections - place special emphasis on subversive activities within the fields of Labor, Education, Agriculture, Political Activity, Resistance, Infiltration of the Armed Forces and Internal Security
12. National Brigade - field operatives who are full time DINA employees both military and civilian who usually work outside of Santiago
13. Citizen's Brigade - civilians, some of which work full or part time without pay, or part time with pay. They usually act as informers. They normally work outside of Santiago.
14. Metropolitan Brigade - Full and part time DINA operatives working only in Santiago
15. Interior Brigade - mobile units that deploy from Santiago to outlying areas
16. Subdirector of the Exterior - responsible for intelligence operations outside of Chile
17. Foreign Relations Section - plans traditional intelligence operations to be conducted outside of Chile
18. Exterior Brigade - DINA operatives who conduct traditional intelligence operations in foreign countries

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c 10-1988

REPLACES DA FORM 1396c, 1 AUG 88  
AND DA FORM 805, 1 AUG 88 WHICH  
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 89

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b> CONTINUATION SHEET		<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> NO FOREIGN DISSEM (Classification and Control Markings)
REPORT NO. 6 817 0135 75 PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES ORIGINATOR USDAO Santiago, Chile		
19.	Psychological Section - plans psychological operations to be conducted outside of Chile (such as influencing the information published by foreign media)	(Leave Blank)
20.	Psychological Brigade - DINA operatives who conduct psychological operations in foreign countries (not necessarily different than the operatives discussed in item 19)	
21.	Subdirector for Logistics - responsible for ensuring that DINA logistical requirements are satisfied	
22.	Logistics Section - maintains physical control of and provides for supplies used by DINA	
23.	Administrative Section - provides administrative services to all sections and subsections within the DINA	
24.	Legal Section - provides legal services and advice to DINA plans and policy makers	
25.	Computer Section - provides computer services (such as biographic records)	
<b>COMMENT (C/NED)</b> This report is the third in a series initiated by reference (b), and tends to confirm the continuing institutionalization of the Directorate of National Intelligence.		
<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM (Classification and Control Markings)		

DD FORM 1396c 10-66

REPLACES DA FORM 1396-1, 1 AUG 66 AND DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 66 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 68.

SECRET  
 NOFORN//NOINTEL//NOCONTRACT

### Chile: Violations of Human Rights

Reports of gross violations of human rights in Chile, which had nearly ceased earlier this year, are again on the rise.

15C

the Pinochet government is reverting to the practices that have jeopardized its international standing since the 1973 coup.

This backsliding comes at a particularly bad time for Chile, since apparent improvement in the human rights situation was helping improve its image abroad. Critics will now have additional ammunition for their attacks on the Chilean regime and their appeals to boycott it.

Chile's National Intelligence Directorate is apparently behind the recent increase in torture, illegal detentions, and unexplained "disappearances." The Directorate's chief, Colonel Manuel Contreras, is a close confidant of Pinochet, who claimed the organization in a recent press interview for its "decisive role" in bringing extremism under control. Contreras answers directly to the President, and it is unlikely that he would act without the knowledge and approval of his superior.



Colonel Manuel Contreras

24 May 1977

1/  
 SECRET



CPD:1046 O-268-111REPLACES DA FORM 1948-1, 1 AUG 61



## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification and Control Markings)REPORT NO. 6 817 0094 75  
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR  
USDAO Santiago, Chile  
(Leave Blank)

was given a secondary position under the Director of Air Force Intelligence.

4. ~~(S)~~ Junta relations with DINA have changed considerably since the early days of the intelligence organizations establishment. When Colonel CONTRERAS was building DINA, he was quick to ensure that the rapport between himself and the Junta was maintained at a high level. It was during the early days that the Colonel was calling for considerable support from the various services in the form of personnel assets. But since the promulgation of Decree Law No. 521, officially establishing DINA as the national intelligence arm of the government (ref (b) refers), Colonel CONTRERAS has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from President PINOCHET. A facade of politeness is maintained with the other three members of the Junta, but their opinions and/or advice is neither sought nor desired by DINA's Director. This situation has prompted several Army officers to try and convince the President that DINA should be subject to the direction and control of a National Security Council type of authority rather than just the Presidency (ref (c) refers). To date, the President has not received these suggestions with enthusiasm. The original concept that DINA would be an intelligence body to support all of the Junta members no longer exists.

5. ~~(S)~~ When DINA was first setting-up operations, their headquarters were located in three houses on Belgrado Street in Santiago (near the intersection of Vicuña McKenna and Rancagua). Presently, however, they have been authorized funds by the President, and are building a 24 story building at the end of Belgrado Street to serve as their national headquarters. The expected completion date of this new headquarters is as yet unknown.

COMMENT: ~~(S)~~ DINA's current pattern of growth is not consistent with any form of democratic control or management of its activities. The apprehensions of many senior Chilean military authorities regarding the possibility of DINA becoming a modern day Gestapo may very well be coming to fruition. DINA's autonomous authority is great, and increasing. Junta members are apparently unable to influence President PINOCHET's decisions concerning DINA activities in any way. Regarding DINA organization, policies and operations, Colonel CONTRERAS' authority is near absolute - subject only to an unlikely Presidential veto. DINA's development is a particularly disturbing phenomenon in view of the Chilean government's desire to enhance their international image. Any advantage gained by humanitarian practices can easily be offset by terror tactics (even if on a relatively small scale) on the part of poorly trained and supervised DINA operatives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DD FORM 1396c 12-4446

REPLACES DA FORM 1396-1, 1 AUG 60



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

Date: December 9, 1981

To: Administrator  
Federal Aviation Administration  
800 Independence Avenue, SW  
Washington, D. C. 20591

From: *WVW* William H. Webster  
Director

Subject: GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL; ALVIN ROSS DIAZ; VIRGILIO PABLO PAZ ROMERO; JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL; IGNACIO ROBERTO NOVO SAMPOL; MICHAEL VERNON TOWNLEY; JUAN MANUEL CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA; ARMANDO FERNANDEZ LARIOS; PEDRO ESPINOSA BRAVO; VICTIMS - ORLANDO LETELIER; RONNI KARPEN MOFFITT; PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - MURDER; EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES; CONSPIRACY; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE; PERJURY

Enclosed for each recipient are two copies of a self-explanatory memorandum which contains information concerning the manufacture and projected utilization of nerve gas by components of the Chilean Government. The enclosed memorandum discloses that the nerve gas, which had been manufactured by DINA, the Chilean Intelligence Service, was transported to the United States during September, 1976, by DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley in connection with the assassination of Orlando Letelier. The nerve gas was not used in the Letelier assassination and, according to Townley, it was returned to Chile.

- 1 - Managing Director  
Civil Aeronautics Board - Enclosure
- 1 - Assistant Secretary of State  
for Latin American Affairs - Enclosure
- 1 - Assistant Attorney General  
Criminal Division - Enclosure
- 1 - Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency - Enclosure
- 1 - Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - Enclosure
- 1 - Director, U. S. Secret Service - Enclosure
- 1 - Honorable Charles Ruff, U. S. Attorney, Washington, D.C.  
Attention: Mr. E. Lawrence Barcella  
Major Crimes Unit - Enclosure



## U.S. Department of Justice

## Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

December 9, 1981

GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL; ALVIN ROSS DIAZ; VIRGILIO PABLO PAZ ROMERO; JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL; IGNACIO ROBERTO NOVO SAMPOL; MICHAEL VERNON TOWNLEY; JUAN MANUEL CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA; ARMANDO FERNANDEZ LARIOS; PEDRO ESPINOSA BRAVO; VICTIMS - ORLANDO LETELIER; RONNI KARPEN MOFFITT; PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - MURDER; EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES; CONSPIRACY; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, PERJURY

Eugene M. Propper, the former Chief United States Prosecutor in the Letelier assassination, and author Taylor Branch are collaborating in writing a book detailing the United States investigation of captioned matter, which book is to be published in early 1982. In connection with extensive research to develop material for their book, Propper and Branch interviewed numerous individuals connected with captioned matter, including former officials of DINA, the Chilean Intelligence Service. They traveled extensively and Branch visited several foreign countries, including Chile. Propper and Branch advised that they secured a number of

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FBI/DOJ

GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL, ET AL

letters which were sent from the United States by self-admitted DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley to his DINA "cut-out" Gustavo Etchepare in Chile. According to Propper and Branch, Townley made references in several of his letters to a highly secret DINA undertaking known as "Project Andrea." Propper and Branch advised that in his letters, Townley expressed concern that the United States Government would ascertain details of "Project Andrea," which would be highly embarrassing to the Chilean Government. Propper and Branch indicated that Townley also expressed apprehension that the United States Government would be able to determine details related to "Project Andrea" through the Gallenkamp Company in London, England, and through companies in Miami, Florida, that sold a microwave oven to Townley and rented a number of gas storage cylinders to Townley. Propper and Branch also indicated that Townley, in his letters, expressed concern that the United States Government would be able to ascertain details concerning "Project Andrea" through an individual in Miami, Florida, identified as Sam McIntoch, who sold Townley unidentified electronic components bearing the brand name "Sierra." Propper and Branch reported that Townley's father, J. Vernon Townley, also assisted his son and Etchepare in liquidating outstanding bills in the respective amounts of 350 pounds sterling, \$525.00, \$160.00 and \$325.00 to the Gallenkamp Company, the company which sold the microwave oven to Townley and the company which rented the gas storage cylinders to Townley and to Sam McIntoch. Propper and Branch noted that Townley also expressed concern in his letters that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would trace payments to the aforementioned companies and McIntoch through a checking account in the name of Prosin Limited at the Southeast First National Bank, Miami, Florida, which Townley utilized in connection with his official DINA responsibilities.

According to Propper and Branch, "Project Andrea" involved the manufacture of nerve gas by DINA, which was to be utilized against Argentina and Peru in the event of hostilities between these countries and Chile. Propper and Branch advised that Townley, acting as a DINA agent, manufactured and stored a quantity of nerve gas at a laboratory located at Townley's residence in Santiago, Chile, during 1975 and 1976 and utilized chemicals purchased through the Gallenkamp Company, the microwave oven and the rented gas cylinders in the process. Propper and Branch advised that Townley created a substance known as isopropylmethylphosphonofluoridate, a clear liquid organophosphate commonly known

## GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL, ET AL

as sarin, which vaporizes on being exposed to the atmosphere, producing droplets that enter the body through the skin or lungs to interdict the neurochemistry that permits the respiratory muscles to function. Propper and Branch advised that Eugenio Berrios, a chemical engineer who was known by his DINA code name "Hermes," worked with Townley and also was involved in a parallel project on behalf of the Chilean Army for the manufacture of the same nerve gas. Propper and Branch advised that when Townley traveled to the United States in September, 1976, via LAN-Chile on his mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier, he carried a quantity of the nerve gas with him on board the aircraft in his shirt pocket in a Chanel No. 5 perfume atomizer. Propper and Branch advised that Townley was considering the utilization of this nerve gas to assassinate Letelier, but decided against using this method. Propper and Branch advised that, according to Townley, Guillermo Novo Sampol and Virgilio Pablo Paz Romero, leaders of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, an anti-Castro terrorist organization, who assisted Townley in the planning and execution of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, were aware of Townley's possession of the nerve gas in the United States and also had witnessed the preparation of the nerve gas at Townley's laboratory at his residence in Santiago, Chile, during the period April, 1976, through June, 1976, when both Novo and Paz visited Townley in Chile.

According to Propper and Branch, the following LAN-Chile personnel assisted Townley and DINA in transporting materials between Chile and the United States:

Ronnie Berger	Bernardo Lacasia
Alejandro Fornes	Ronnie Lowery
Eugenio Herrera	Pocho Acevedo
Guillermo Neira	Jorge Nordenflycht

Subsequent to the receipt of the above information from Propper and Branch, arrangements were made to have Townley brought to Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters from the place of his incarceration in a Federal penitentiary, where he was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Townley confirmed Propper's and Branch's information regarding the manufacture and intended use of the nerve gas by the Chilean Government. Townley, however, denied that he personally carried the nerve gas with him from Chile to the United States on a LAN-Chile aircraft. Townley claimed to have had the nerve gas sent from Chile to the United States through LAN-Chile flight personnel who were unaware that they were transporting nerve gas. Townley did confirm that the nerve gas was transported

## GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL ET AL

to the United States by LAN-Chile flight personnel in a Chanel No. 5 perfume atomizer. Townley advised that Novo and Paz requested that the Cuban Nationalist Movement be furnished a supply of nerve gas to utilize in their terrorist activities; however, Townley claimed that because of the unstable nature of Novo and Paz and other members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, he refused their request. Townley advised that he insured that the nerve gas transported to the United States by LAN-Chile flight personnel was returned to Chile to the custody of DINA by the same method.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
MESSAGE CENTER

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MULT

4930

ACTION

INFO: CJCS(04) DJS(01) JX(14) J4(08) J5(07) SAGA(04) J3:NMCC  
J3:JRC USRMLO(01) SECDEF(10) ASD:ISA(10) ASD:PA(03) DDREC(02)  
ARPA(06) AEC(01) DIA(195) ASD:PA(03) IADB(01) NSC(01) MRAL(02)  
(273)

TRANSIT/132150Z/132200Z/000102GRP0545  
DE RUEKJCS #3607 225200

ZNY CCCCC

RULYSCC T USS ALAMO USS ANCHORAGE USS CAYUGA USS SCHENECTADY  
RULYSCC T USS JOHN F KENNEDY USS NEW ORLEANS USS RANGER  
RULYSCC T USS CONSTELLATION USS CORAL SEA USS BLUE RIDGE  
RULYSCC T USS ST LOUIS USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER USS MIDWAY  
RULYSCC T USS JUNEAU USS KITTY HAWK  
RULYSCC T USS ENTERPRISE USS MOUNT WHITNEY USS TUSCALOOSA  
RULYSCC T USS PT DEFIANCE USS SARATOGA USS TARAWA  
RULYSCC T CTG77PT6 CTG78PT4 CTG78PT5 CTG79PT4 CTG77PT5 CTG77PT9  
RULYSCC T CTG77PT3 CTG79PT5 CTG79PT1 CTG82PT1 CTU79PT4PT1  
RULYSCC T AIRANTISUBRON THREE SEVEN  
RULYSCC T HELANTISUBRON LIGHT THREE ONE  
RULYSCC T COMCRUDESGRU TWO  
RULYSCC T HELANTISUBRON TWO  
RULYSCC T FITRON ONE  
R 132150Z AUG 77 ZEX  
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC  
TO DIACURINTEL  
AIG 7011  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN 4930  
FROM DN-26

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 225-6A (AS OF: 152R EDT 13 AUG 77)

CHILE: DINA DISSOLVED. (U)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE HAS ABOLISHED ITS  
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA) EFFECTIVE 6

PAGE 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00000001

Declassified by DIA

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UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4930

AUGUST. DINA WAS IN EFFECT A POLITICAL POLICE FORCE  
OPERATING UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT.  
IT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARREST, INTERROGATION, AND  
DETENTION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ANTI-JUNTA ELEMENTS IN  
THE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE COUP AGAINST THE ALLENDE  
GOVERNMENT AND HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF WIDESPREAD IN-  
TERNATIONAL CRITICISM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

2. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A NEW ENTITY, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION  
CENTER (CNI), HAS BEEN CREATED BY THE JUNTA AND PLACED  
UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR. THE  
CNI WILL INHERIT DINA'S INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FUNCTION  
AND WILL PROBABLY ABSORB MUCH OF THE DISSOLVED AGENCY'S  
PERSONNEL RESOURCES. UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, HOWEVER,  
THE CNI WILL NOT HAVE THE POWER OF ARREST AND DETENTION.  
THOSE FUNCTIONS, ACCORDING TO CHILEAN OFFICIALS, WILL NOW  
BE TURNED OVER TO THE JUDICIAL POLICE AND THE CARABINIEROS,  
BOTH CONVENTIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES UNDER THE MINI-  
STRY OF DEFENSE.

3. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THROUGH THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES OF ITS SECU-  
RITY SERVICES, THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT OF CHILE HAS ELIMINATED  
VIRTUALLY ALL POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO ITS RULE. THE DIS-  
SOLUTION OF DINA DOES NOT LESSEN THE GOVERNMENT'S CAPABILITY  
TO CONTINUE TO SUPPRESS POLITICAL OPPOSITION, ALTHOUGH THE  
SEPARATION OF THE ARREST AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FUNC-  
TIONS DOES INDICATE A MORE BUREAUCRATIC AND PERHAPS MEASURED  
APPROACH FOR RESPONDING TO PERCEIVED SUBVERSIVE THREATS.  
MOREOVER, THE SECURITY REORGANIZATION DOES DEMONSTRATE THE  
GOVERNMENT'S SENSITIVITY TO INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM AND A  
DESIRE TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE US - FACTORS  
WHICH COULD PORTEND AT LEAST SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN  
RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN CHILE.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] ALERT CENTER  
(DGS-31 DEC 83)

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