
Gendering World Politics

*Issues and Approaches
in the Post-Cold War Era*

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2 Gendered Dimensions of War, Peace, and Security

War and conflict have been fundamental to a discipline whose founding texts include Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* and Machiavelli's *Prince*. Motivated by the devastation of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, the contemporary discipline of international relations was founded by scholars searching for explanations for the causes of war and prescriptions for its avoidance. During the Cold War, the predominance of the realist paradigm was due to its focus on U.S./Soviet rivalry; national-security studies, which was based on a realist worldview and studied the strategic implications of this rivalry, became an important sub-field in the discipline. With the end of the Cold War, however, the centrality of national-security studies and the predominance of realism began to be questioned. Scholars skeptical of realism's claim that the future would soon look like the past began to introduce new security issues, new definitions of security, and new ways to analyze them. At a more fundamental level, critical-security studies, a new approach situated on the critical side of the third debate, began to question the "scientific" foundations of the field that had been first applied in security studies. It was within the context of these debates about ontology and epistemology that feminist perspectives on security began to be articulated.¹

Security specialists in universities and research institutions played an important role in designing U.S. security policy during the Cold War. For this reason their work was aimed at policymakers and military experts, an audience that traditionally included very few women and one that has not been

particularly concerned with the kind of security issues important to many women. While national security has been a privileged category both in the discipline of international relations and in international "high" politics, the term *woman* is antithetical to our stereotypical image of a national-security specialist. Women have rarely been security providers in the conventional sense of the term, as soldiers or policymakers; in the U.S. Department of Defense in August 1999, women occupied only 14.6 percent of all officer ranks and only 5 percent of the top four positions in these ranks.² It is only recently that women have begun to enter the IR security field in significant numbers.³ Yet women have been writing about security from a variety of perspectives for a long time; their voices, however, have rarely been heard. For these reasons, feminist perspectives on security are quite different from those of conventional security studies. To the mainstream, they often appear to be outside traditional disciplinary boundaries.

I begin this chapter by overviewing traditional thinking on security, most of which is situated in the realist paradigm. Then I review some of the recent attempts to broaden the security agenda as well as some of the critical-security literature that, besides raising new issues, is challenging realism's epistemological and ontological foundations. After examining some feminist literature that is documenting women's activities in war as well as the ways in which war is impacting on women, I elaborate on some feminist critiques of realist understandings of security as well as some feminist contributions to understanding issues of state and national identities and their similarities with, and differences from, critical-security studies. War and peace are frequently portrayed as gendered concepts; while women's voices have rarely been granted legitimacy in matters of war and national security, they have been stereotypically associated with idealized versions of peace. Having analyzed these relationships (war and masculinity; peace and femininity—relationships that are, as I will suggest, quite problematic) I conclude by offering some feminist redefinitions of security that attempt to get beyond these unhelpful dichotomies and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of security issues.

Realist Perspectives on Security

Following World War II, an emergent, self-named "realist" school of international relations claimed that the lack of military preparedness on the

part of the Allied powers, as well as what it saw as a naive faith in the possibility of international law and institutions on the part of those it termed "idealists," contributed to the war's outbreak. Realists believe that, in an anarchical world of sovereign, self-interested states, war is always a possibility; therefore, states must rely on their own power and capabilities rather than international agreements to enhance their national security. Although their portrayal of IR in the interwar period, which they claimed was captured by "idealist" thinking, was probably more of a move to legitimate realism than an accurate portrayal of so-called idealist thinking, realists questioned idealists' belief in human progress and the possibility of an international society; realists see only an anarchy, characterized by repetitive competition and conflict.⁴

The realist/idealist debate in IR comes out of these conflicting worldviews that differ over their belief in the possibility for peace and cooperation. Since 1945, the realist side of the debate has predominated, particularly with respect to analyses of issues related to conflict and security. Peace research, which has attempted to specify conditions necessary for a less conflictual world, has proceeded as a separate field on the edges of the discipline. While neorealism and neoliberalism, more recent iterations of these contending positions, are closer together than earlier realist and idealist positions, neorealism has been the predominant approach in security studies, while neoliberals have been primarily, but not exclusively, concerned with matters related to economic relations between states.⁵ Neorealists and neoliberals agree that both national security and economic welfare are important, but they differ in the relative emphasis they place on these goals. These tendencies have had the effect of further reinforcing realism's predominance in security studies.

Realists define security in political/military terms as the protection of the boundaries and integrity of the state and its values against the dangers of a hostile international environment. Neorealists emphasize the anarchical structure of the system, which they liken to the Hobbesian state of nature, rather than domestic determinants as being the primary contributor to states' insecurities. Skeptical of the neoliberal claim that international institutions can mitigate the dangerous consequences of anarchy where there are no restraints on the self-interested behavior of sovereign states, realists claim that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.⁶ States, therefore, must rely on their own capabilities to ensure their security. As realists have acknowledged, this self-help system often results in what they describe as a

"security dilemma"; measures that are justified by one state as part of a legitimate, security-enhancing policy are likely to be perceived by others as a threatening military buildup.⁷ Seeking more scientific rigor, neorealists have used game-theoretic models to explain the security dilemma, which is often characterized as a prisoners-dilemma game.⁸ States are postulated as unitary actors whose internal characteristics, beyond an assessment of their relative capabilities, are not seen as necessary for understanding their vulnerabilities or security-enhancing behavior—a behavior in which states have been engaged for centuries.⁹

In an often-cited 1991 review of the literature in the security field—a field that he suggested had recently undergone a welcome resurgence—realist Stephen Walt claimed that the main focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war: it may be defined as the study of threat, the use and control of military force, and the conditions that make the use of force more likely.¹⁰ During what Walt termed the "golden age" of security studies (which he suggested ended in the mid 1960s), the central question was how states could use weapons of mass destruction as instruments of policy given the risks of nuclear exchange. Heavily dominated by U.S. strategic thinking about nuclear weapons and the security problems of the United States and its NATO allies, the field of national security was based on the assumption that, since nuclear wars were too dangerous to fight, security was synonymous with nuclear deterrence and power balancing. Power balancing is seen by realists as the primary mechanism for enhancing stability. During the Cold War, the balance of power was bipolar, rather than multipolar; certain realists saw this balance as one that afforded increased stability.¹¹

The turn toward science in IR, which ushered in the second debate between those who believed in the possibilities of methods drawn from the natural sciences and those who preferred more historical interpretive methods, was strongly associated with security studies. Walt's, *Theory of International Politics*, which offered a structural explanation of the security-seeking behavior of states, was an important articulation of the scientific method. In his review, Walt was enthusiastic about this move to what he termed a more "scientific," less "political," security studies based on systematic social-scientific research. Defending rationalist methods, Walt applauded realism's scientific turn; he claimed that the resurgence of security studies was facilitated by its adoption of the norms and objectives of social science. Advocating a positivist research agenda, Walt argued that security studies should engage in three main theoretical activities: theory creation,

or the development of logically related causal propositions; theory testing according to standards of verification and falsification; and theory application, or the use of existing knowledge to illuminate specific policy problems.¹² He noted approvingly that peace researchers were also beginning to address issues of military strategy and defense policy in a more sophisticated way, thus leading to a convergence of the two perspectives.

Walt went on to warn of "counterproductive tangents," such as the post-modern approach that, he claimed, has seduced other areas of international studies, a development that he clearly viewed as dangerous. Walt asserted that security studies had profited from its connection to real-world issues; if it were to succumb to the tendency to pursue the "trivial" or the "politically irrelevant," its practical value would decline.

In spite of Walt's positive words about conventional security studies, the end of the Cold War eroded the realist consensus and threw its agenda into disarray. The demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact ushered in a system in which major war among the great powers appeared unlikely. Some have gone as far as predicting the end of cross-border conflict as a tool of state policy.¹³ Power balancing seemed like an unlikely explanation for wars of state formation and state disintegration, which have been the predominant types of conflict in the late twentieth century. Beginning in the 1980s, but further stimulated by these changes, the field of security studies started to broaden its agenda; while certain realists continue to hold the belief that conflict between the great powers is likely to reemerge, others see a new security agenda based on ethnic conflict, failed states, and emerging North/South boundaries demarcated by stability and conflict. Other scholars, many of whom are outside the realist tradition, have begun to debate whether the definition of security should be broadened beyond its exclusive military and statist focus; in a highly interdependent world that faces multiple security threats, certain scholars are claiming that military definitions of national security, as opposed to a more comprehensive global security, may be fundamentally flawed.

Beyond the Realist Agenda

As the conflict between the great powers deescalated rapidly at the end of the 1980s and the world seemed poised on the verge of a "new international order," space opened up for broadening the security agenda to include

conflict on the periphery as well as economic and environmental issues, a move that had actually begun well before the end of the Cold War. Yet, for many security specialists in the realist tradition, this broadening was viewed negatively; claims that great-power rivalry had ended were strongly disputed. Asserting that the age-old threat of great-power conflict should remain the focus of security studies, some looked back to the Cold War with nostalgia, seeing it as an era in which nuclear, bipolar power balancing made stability more likely. John Mearsheimer saw the potential for more, rather than less, conflict in Europe; he predicted an evolution to a multipolar system in which deterrence and alliance structures are less stable.¹⁴ Likewise, Kenneth Waltz pointed to the competitive behavior of states that has existed for centuries and is likely to continue into the future. While he conceded that there are political problems associated with Germany and Japan becoming nuclear powers, he does expect these states to increase their military capabilities and begin to act like "normal" powers.¹⁵

The realist preoccupation with cross-border conflict and military power, defined in terms of the interests and security of the great powers, has come under a great deal of criticism from those who argue that its worldview is a poor fit with contemporary reality. Edward Kolodziej has faulted Walt's survey for its ethnocentric definition of the field—a definition that focuses almost exclusively on U.S. national security.¹⁶ Certain scholars have drawn attention to the fact that more than one hundred significant wars have occurred since 1945, almost all of them in the South.¹⁷ One irony of the relative stability of the Cold War world, applauded by realists, was that military conflict was removed to the peripheries of the system; in other words, the quest for systemic security may actually have increased Southern insecurity.¹⁸

These types of conflicts are less amenable to traditional realist analysis. Military conflicts in the South have rarely been cross-border; rather, they are the result of domestic challenges to the legitimacy of political regimes frequently supported by outside intervention. Security threats more often arise, not from outside aggression, but from the failure to integrate diverse social groups into the political process. Deterrence against external attack is not an adequate representation of security goals when it is internal insecurity that is the greatest threat: moreover, as Nicole Ball has pointed out, even the term *internal security* is a misnomer since its purpose is rarely to make all citizens equally secure but rather to enable ruling elites to remain in power, often at the expense of the majority of the population.¹⁹ Ethnic wars,

which often overlap international borders, are frequently the result of artificial boundaries imposed by former colonial powers—boundaries seen as illegitimate by local populations. Some scholars have even suggested that the term *state*, as it is used in the Western context, is not appropriate in certain areas of the South, where “quasi states” derive their legitimacy from the international system rather than from the support of their own people.²⁰ The arming of the South with advanced weapons, usually provided by the great powers and used primarily for internal security purposes, reinforces the claim that, in some parts of the world, it is militarization itself that is becoming the greatest threat to security.

Although most realists remain committed to a traditional security agenda, some are joining the move to consider new security issues. The most extensive reexamination of security from a realist perspective that takes into account some of these new issues is Barry Buzan’s *People, States, and Fear*. True to his realist orientation, Buzan sees progress toward greater security, not in the diminution of state power, but as a result of a systemic move toward a “mature anarchy” that, he believes, is becoming evident in relations between Western democracies. Answering the claim raised by scholars concerned with security in the South—that states can be a threat to security, rather than a source of it—Buzan argues that the evolution toward “strong states,” more typical of the West, will result in a greater degree of security for individuals. Likewise, Stephen Van Evera distinguishes between a benign nationalism, typical of West European states, and an East European nationalism that is delinked from the state and is thus more dangerous.²¹ While certain liberal scholars in the Kantian tradition are claiming that war among democratic states in the North is highly unlikely, the South is being described as a zone of turmoil that can expect to experience conflict for some time to come.²² These are a few of the many examples of a trend in the security literature that has begun to see the security environment in terms of a North/South, or West versus the rest of the world, divide. Brian Schmidt has claimed that this is not a new phenomenon, however. Drawing on some of the international-relations literature in political science at the beginning of the century, Schmidt notes a substantial body of work on colonial administration in which colonial territories were viewed as falling outside the society of nations and characterized as places plagued by internal anarchy.²³ Whether intentional or not, this North/South framework feeds into a tendency to view the world in ethnocentric and adversarial terms in which the West is seen as the locus of stability and democracy.

Redefining Security

In *People, States, and Fear*, Buzan also broadened the meaning of security to include freedom from societal, economic, and environmental threats; a similar redefinition of security, beyond its association with military issues, has been articulated by other scholars, most of them outside the realist tradition. Even before the end of the Cold War, scholars such as Richard Ullman and Jessica Mathews were calling for an expanded definition of security to include economic and environmental issues.²⁴ Also in the 1980s, proponents of the term *common security*, many of whom were policymakers and academics outside the United States, began to argue that military-centered definitions of national security were fundamentally flawed in a highly interdependent world facing multiple security threats, many of which were not amenable to statist solutions.²⁵ Johan Galtung’s earlier use of the term *structural violence* was introduced into the security literature to describe the violence done to individuals through decreased life expectancy due to economic deprivation.²⁶ Economic dimensions of security were defined not only in terms of the security of the state, but also in terms of secure systems of food, health, money, and trade.²⁷

As with the introduction of new issues, this redefinition of security has also fueled a lively debate in the security literature. Stephen Walt has decried the move to redefine security—a move that, he claimed, threatens to destroy the intellectual coherence of the field.²⁸ This is an opinion shared by many realists, but it is not only realists who disapprove of this broadening. In a 1995 volume, the stated goal of which was to bring together a broad spectrum of security specialists, ranging from realists to postmodernists, the emphasis of many of the contributors remained on the state and issues of military security.²⁹ While defining security in constructivist terms, Ole Waever criticized the attempt to broaden the security agenda beyond a focus on the state to one on the security of individuals; as security becomes synonymous with everything good or desirable, it is emptied of content, Waever claimed—a concern shared by certain other scholars outside the realist tradition.³⁰ Simon Dalby has suggested the possibility of disposing with the term *security* altogether and replacing it with a different political language of ecology, justice, and sustainability.³¹ Yet rejecting the term *security* does nothing to end its privileged status. As Ken Booth has claimed, the word has “enormous political significance; and that to get an issue onto a state’s security agenda

is to give it priority.”³² The same might be said about the agenda of the discipline of international relations, where national-security studies have also enjoyed a privileged position.

Epistemological Debates

New issues and new definitions of security have been accompanied by calls for new ways of understanding security. Controversy about the meaning of security has been part of a more fundamental debate over broader epistemological issues that, on the critical side, has included questioning the state-centric foundations and assumptions of realism as well as challenging its positivist-rationalist methodologies. Many scholars on the critical side of these epistemological debates claim that these ontological and epistemological issues are highly interrelated. The beginning of the debate over the meaning of security and its expanding agenda, as well as over how to explain conflict and prescribe for its amelioration, was coincidental with the third debate in IR. Scholars on the critical side began to question realism's explanations for states' security behavior based on economistic, rational-choice models or natural-science equilibrium models associated with the balance of power. Many claimed that issues of culture and identity must be included in order to gain a fuller understanding of states' security interests and policies. Poststructuralist scholars began to question the foundational myths of realist worldviews upon which realist explanations of conflict depend. Claiming that theory cannot be divorced from political practice, critics pointed to realism's complicity in shaping policymakers' understandings of and prescriptions for U.S. security behavior in the Cold War world.

Walt's defense of the social-scientific foundations of security studies (mentioned earlier) and his dismissal of other approaches have drawn sharp criticism from critical-security scholars. The ethnocentrism of his review and his description of a field that appears closely allied with U.S. security interests call into question his claim about the field's ability to “rise above the political” and raises the issue of whose interest security is serving. Edward Kolodziej has claimed that Walt's philosophically restrictive notion of the social sciences confines the security scholar to testing propositions largely specified by policymakers; it is they who decide what is real and relevant.³³ Kolodziej goes on to say that Walt's definition of science bars

any possibility of an ethical or moral discourse; even the normative concerns of classical realists are deemphasized in order to put the realist perspective on scientific foundations. Challenging Walt's view of the history of the field as a gradual evolution toward an objective, scientific discipline that ultimately yields a form of knowledge beyond time and history, Keith Krause and Michael Williams have claimed that Walt has created an epistemic hierarchy that allows conventional security studies to set itself up as the authoritative judge of alternative claims;³⁴ this leads to a dismissal of alternative epistemologies in terms of their not being “scientific.”

Critics claim that issues they consider important for understanding security cannot be raised within a positivist-rationalist epistemology or an ontology based on instrumentally rational actors in a state-centric world. In addition to constraining what can be said about security, a realist-rationalist approach precludes consideration of an ethical or emancipatory politics. For example, Krause and Williams contest realism's claim that states and anarchy are essential and unproblematic facts of world politics. They suggest that this worldview is grounded in an understanding of human subjects as self-contained—as instrumentally rational actors confronting an objective external reality. This methodologically individualist premise renders questions about identity and interest formation as unimportant.³⁵ These and other critics claim that issues of identity and interest demand more interpretive modes of analysis. For this reason, critical scholars see the necessity of shifting from a focus on abstract individualism to a stress on culture and identity and the roles of norms and ideas. Such criticisms are being voiced by scholars variously identified as constructivists, critical theorists, and postmodernists. While not all of them reject realism's state-centric framework, all challenge its assumptions about states as unitary actors whose identities are unimportant for understanding their security behavior.

Although certain of these scholars see an incommensurability between rationalist and interpretive epistemologies, others are attempting to bridge this gap by staying within realism's state-centric worldview while questioning its rationalist epistemology. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein have argued for what they call “sociological institutionalism”—a view that advocates an identity-based approach, but one that stays within the traditional security agenda, a focus on states, and explanatory social science. Where this approach differs from rationalism is in its investigation of how norms, institutions, and other cultural features of domestic and international environments affect states' security interests and policies. Con-

versely, when states enact a particular identity, they have a profound effect on the international system to which they belong.³⁶

Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach also attempts to bridge the constructivist/rationalist divide. His strategy for building this bridge is to argue against the neorealist claim that self-help is given by anarchic structures. If we live in a self-help world, it is due to process rather than structure; in other words, "anarchy is what states make of it."³⁷ Constructivist social theory believes that "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."³⁸ People and states act differently toward those they perceive as friends and those they see as enemies. Therefore, we cannot understand states' security interests and behavior without considering issues of identity placed within their social context.

Claiming that realist ontology and its rationalist epistemology are interdependent, more radical versions of critical-security studies reject these bridging attempts. Their calls for broadening the security agenda are made within the context of both a rejection of rationalism and a search for emancipatory theories that can get beyond realism's skepticism about progressive change and the possibility of an ethical international politics. Poststructuralists claim that when knowledge about security is constructed in terms of the binary metaphysics of Western culture, such as inside/outside, us/them, and community/anarchy, security can be understood only within the confines of domestic community whose identity is constructed in antithesis to external threat.³⁹ This denies the possibility of talking about an international community or an amelioration of the security dilemma since it is only within the space of political community that questions about ethics can be raised. In other words, the binary distinctions of national-security discourse limit what can be said and how it can be discussed.

Thus, critical-security studies is not only about broadening the agenda—because, as mentioned earlier, this is possible with a realist framework. According to Ken Booth, critical-security is fundamentally different from realism because its agenda derives from a radically different political theory and methodology that question both realism's constrained view of the political and its commitment to positivism. Critical-security studies rejects conventional security theory's definition of politics based on the centrality of the state and its sovereignty. Arguing that the state is often part of the problem of insecurity rather than the solution, Booth claims that we should examine security from a bottom-up perspective that begins with individuals; however, critical-security studies should not ignore the state or the military dimensions

of world politics: "What is being challenged is not the material manifestations of the world of traditional realism, but its moral and practical status, including its naturalization of historically created theories, its ideology of necessity and limited possibility, and its propagandist common sense about this being the best of all worlds."⁴⁰

When we treat individuals as the objects of security, we open up the possibility of talking about a transcendent human community with common global concerns and allow engagement with the broadest global threats.⁴¹ The theme of emancipation is one that runs through much of the critical-security studies literature. Emancipatory critical security can be defined as freeing people as individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic, and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.⁴² A postrealist, postpositivist emancipatory notion of security offers the promise of maximizing the security and improving the lives of the whole of humankind: it is a security studies of inclusion rather than exclusion.⁴³

Yet imagining security divested of its statist connotations is problematic; the institutions of state power are not withering away. As R. B. J. Walker has claimed, the state is a political category in a way that the world or humanity is not.⁴⁴ The security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be because other forms of political community have been rendered unthinkable. Yet, as Walker goes on to say, given the dangers of nuclear weapons, we are no longer able to survive in a world predicated on an extreme logic of state sovereignty, nor one where war is an option for system change. Therefore, we must revise our understanding of the relationship between universality and particularity upon which a statist concept of security has been constructed. Security must be analyzed in terms of how contemporary insecurities are being created and by a sensitivity to the way in which people are responding to insecurities by reworking their understanding of how their own predicament fits into broader structures of violence and oppression.⁴⁵ Feminists—with their "bottom-up" approach to security, an ontology of social relations, and an emancipatory agenda—are beginning to undertake such reanalyses.

Feminist Perspectives on Security

Critical-security studies challenges realism on both ontological and epistemological grounds. Many of its adherents argue for a broader definition

of security, linked to justice and emancipation; a concept of security that starts with the individual allows for a global definition of security that moves beyond hierarchical binary distinctions between order and anarchy and inside and outside. Although not all critical-security scholars are willing to dispense with state-centric analysis, all agree that an examination of states' identities is crucial for understanding their security-seeking behavior.

Most feminist scholarship on security also employs a different ontology and epistemology from conventional security studies. Reluctant to be associated with either side of the realist/idealist debate, for reasons outlined in chapter 1, and generally skeptical of rationalist, scientific claims to universality and objectivity, most feminist scholarship on security is compatible with the critical side of the third debate. Questioning the role of states as adequate security providers, many feminists have adopted a multidimensional, multilevel approach, similar to some of the efforts to broaden the definition of security described above. Feminists' commitment to the emancipatory goal of ending women's subordination is consistent with a broad definition of security that takes the individual, situated in broader social structures, as its starting point. Feminists seek to understand how the security of individuals and groups is compromised by violence, both physical and structural, at all levels.

Feminists generally share the view of other critical scholars that culture and identity and interpretive "bottom up" modes of analysis are crucial for understanding security issues and that emancipatory visions of security must get beyond statist frameworks. They differ, however, in that they adopt gender as a central category of analysis for understanding how unequal social structures, particularly gender hierarchies, negatively impact the security of individuals and groups.

Challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others stereotypically viewed as "vulnerable," feminists point to the high level of civilian casualties in contemporary wars. Feminist scholarship has been particularly concerned with what goes on during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally. Whereas conventional security studies has tended to look at causes and consequences of wars from a top-down, or structural, perspective, feminists have generally taken a bottom-up approach, analyzing the impact of war at the microlevel. By so doing, as well as adopting gender as a category of analysis, feminists believe they can tell us something new about the causes of war that is missing from both conventional and critical perspectives. By crossing what many feminists

believe to be mutually constitutive levels of analysis, we get a better understanding of the interrelationship between all forms of violence and the extent to which unjust social relations, including gender hierarchies, contribute to insecurity, broadly defined.

Claiming that the security-seeking behavior of states is described in gendered terms, feminists have pointed to the masculinity of strategic discourse and how this may impact on understanding of and prescriptions for security; it may also help to explain why women's voices have so often been seen as inauthentic in matters of national security. Feminists have examined how states legitimate their security-seeking behavior through appeals to types of "hegemonic" masculinity. They are also investigating the extent to which state and national identities, which can lead to conflict, are based on gendered constructions. The valorization of war through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic. Since feminists believe that gender is a variable social construction, they claim that there is nothing inevitable about these gendered distinctions; thus, their analyses often include the emancipatory goal of postulating a different definition of security less dependent on binary and unequal gender hierarchies.

Casualties of War: Challenging the Myth of Protection

Despite a widespread myth that wars are fought, mostly by men, to protect "vulnerable" people—a category to which women and children are generally assigned—women and children constitute a significant proportion of casualties in recent wars. According to the United Nations' *Human Development Report*, there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of civilian casualties of war—from about 10 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century to 90 percent at its close. Although the report does not break down these casualties by sex, it claims that this increase makes women among the worst sufferers, even though they constitute only 2 percent of the world's regular army personnel.⁴⁶ The 1994 report of the Save the Children Fund reported that 1.5 million children were killed in wars and 4 million seriously injured by bombs and land mines between 1984 and 1994.⁴⁷ But there is another side to the changing pattern of war, and women should not be seen only as victims; as civilian casualties increase, women's responsibilities rise. However, war makes it harder for women to fulfill their reproductive and care-

giving tasks. For example, as mothers, family providers, and caregivers, women are particularly penalized by economic sanctions associated with military conflict, such as the boycott put in place by the United Nations against Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. In working to overcome these difficulties, women often acquire new roles and a greater degree of independence—independence that, frequently, they must relinquish when the conflict is terminated.

Women and children constitute about 75 percent of the number of persons of concern to the United Nations Commission on Refugees (about 21.5 million at the beginning of 1999). This population has increased dramatically since 1970 (when it was 3 million), mainly due to military conflict, particularly ethnic conflicts.⁴⁸ In these types of conflicts, men often disappear, victims of state oppression or “ethnic cleansing,” or go into hiding, leaving women as the sole family providers. Sometimes these women may find themselves on both sides of the conflict, due to marriage and conflicting family ties. When women are forced into refugee camps, their vulnerability increases. Distribution of resources in camps is conducted in consultation with male leaders, and women are often left out of the distribution process. These gender-biased processes are based on liberal assumptions that refugee men are both the sole wage earners in families and actors in the public sphere.⁴⁹

Feminists have also drawn attention to issues of wartime rape. In the Rwandan civil war, for example, more than 250,000 women were raped; as a result they were stigmatized and cast out of their communities, their children being labeled “devil’s children.” Not being classed as refugees, they have also been ignored by international efforts.⁵⁰ In northern Uganda, rebels abducted women to supply sexual services to fighters, resulting in a spread of AIDS; frequently, after being raped, these women have no other source of livelihood.⁵¹ As illustrated by the war in the former Yugoslavia, where it is estimated that twenty thousand to thirty-five thousand women were raped in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁵² rape is not just an accident of war but often a systematic military strategy. In ethnic wars, rape is used as a weapon to undermine the identity of entire communities.

Cynthia Enloe has described social structures in place around most U.S. Army overseas bases where women are often kidnapped and sold into prostitution; the system of militarized sexual relations has required explicit U.S. policymaking.⁵³ More than one million women have served as sex providers for U.S. military personnel since the Korean War. These women, and others

like them, are stigmatized by their own societies. In her study of prostitution around U.S. military bases in South Korea in the 1970s, Katharine Moon shows how these person-to-person relations were actually matters of security concern at the international level. Cleanup of prostitution camps by the South Korean government, through policing of the sexual health and work conduct of prostitutes, was part of its attempt to prevent withdrawal of U.S. troops that had begun under the Nixon Doctrine of 1969. Thus, prostitution as it involved the military became a matter of top-level U.S.-Korean security politics. Crossing levels of analysis, Moon demonstrates how the weakness of the Korean state in terms of its wish to influence the U.S. government resulted in a domestic policy of authoritarian, sexist control. In other words, national security translated into social insecurity for these women.⁵⁴

By looking at the effects of war on women, we can gain a better understanding of the unequal gender relations that sustain military activities. When we reveal social practices that support war and that are variable across societies, we find that war is a cultural construction that depends on myths of protection; it is not inevitable, as realists suggest. The evidence we now have about women in conflict situations severely strains the protection myth; yet, such myths have been important in upholding the legitimacy of war and the impossibility of peace. A deeper look into these gendered constructions can help us to understand not only some of the causes of war but how certain ways of thinking about security have been legitimized at the expense of others, both in the discipline of IR and in political practice.

National Security: A Gendered Discourse

Donna Haraway claims that all scientific theories are embedded in particular kinds of stories, or what she terms “fictions of science.”⁵⁵ IR feminists, like some other critical theorists, particularly those concerned with genealogy, have examined the stories on which realism and neorealism base their prescriptions for states’ national-security behavior, looking for evidence of gender bias. Feminist reanalysis of the so-called “creation myths” of international relations, on which realist assumptions about states’ behavior are built, reveals stories built on male representations of how individuals function in society. The parable of man’s amoral, self-interested behavior in the state of nature, made necessary by the lack of restraint on the behavior of others, is taken by realists to be a universal model for explaining states’

behavior in the international system. But, as Rebecca Grant asserts, this is a male, rather than a universal, model: were life to go on in the state of nature for more than one generation, other activities such as childbirth and child rearing, typically associated with women, must also have taken place. Grant also claims that Rousseau's stag hunt, which realists have used to explain the security dilemma, ignores the deeper social relations in which the activities of the hunters are embedded. When women are absent from these foundational myths, a source of gender bias is created that extends into international-relations theory.⁵⁶

Feminists are also questioning the use of more scientifically based rational-choice theory, based on the instrumentally rational behavior of individuals in the marketplace that neorealists have used to explain states' security-seeking behavior. According to this model, states are unproblematically assumed to be instrumental profit maximizers pursuing power and autonomy in an anarchic international system. Where international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community but, rather, in terms of enlightened self-interest. Feminists suggest that rational-choice theory is based on a partial representation of human behavior that, since women in the West have historically been confined to reproductive activities, has been more typical of certain men.⁵⁷ Characteristics such as self-help, autonomy, and power maximizing that are prescribed by realists as security-enhancing behavior are very similar to the hegemonic, masculine-gendered characteristics described in chapter 1. The instrumentally competitive behavior of states, which results in power balancing, is similar to equilibrium theory, or the market behavior of rational-economic man. Therefore, it tends to privilege certain types of behaviors over others. While states do indeed behave in these ways, these models offer us only a partial understanding of their behavior. As other IR scholars, too, have pointed out, states engage in cooperative as well as conflictual behavior; privileging these masculinist models tends to delegitimize other ways of behaving and make them appear less "realistic."

Does the fact that states' national-security policies are often legitimated by appealing to masculine characteristics, such as power and self-help, mean that certain types of foreign-policy behaviors—standing tall, rather than wimping out—are seen as more legitimate than others? Could it be that men who, in the role of defense experts, must employ tough "masculine" language and suppress any "feminized" thoughts when constructing strategic options, come to regard more cooperative choices as unthinkable and co-

operative behavior as unlikely?⁵⁸ Carol Cohn claims that the language we use shapes the way we view the world and thus how we act on it. Her analysis of the language of U.S. security experts, whose ideas have been important for mainstream security studies, suggests that this masculine-gendered discourse is the only permissible way of speaking about national security if one is to be taken seriously by the strategic community. This rational, disembodied language precludes discussion of the death and destruction of war, issues that can be spoken of only in emotional terms stereotypically associated with women. In other words, the limits on what can be said with the language of strategic discourse constrains our ability to think fully and well about national security.

In their analysis of U.S. policy on bombing Indochina during the Vietnam War, Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan examine the discourse of U.S. policymakers. They claim it was gendered.⁵⁹ When policymakers spoke or wrote about South Vietnam, it was portrayed as weak and feminized, its population as hysterical and childlike; the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, were characterized as brutal fanatics—as manifesting a perverted form of masculinity. The authors claim that bombing policy, responding to these gendered portrayals, was different in each case. While not denying the reality of what policymakers do, Milliken and Sylvan, like Cohn, claim that words have power and, therefore, consequences; the way in which policymakers and scholars construct reality has an effect on how they act upon and explain that reality. Gender-differentiated images are often used in foreign policy to legitimate certain options and discredit others. Therefore, Walt's aspiration for separating the "political" from the "scientific" is questionable. In other words, theories cannot be separated from political practice.

Gendering State and Nation

Most feminists would agree with constructivists that state behavior cannot be understood without analyzing issues of identity and the social relations in which identities and behaviors are embedded. The gendered identities of states and the construction of national ideologies should be examined in order to better understand their security-seeking behavior. Attention to issues of identity is particularly important for understanding the types of ethnonationalist wars that dominate the contemporary security agenda.

While critical-security studies has emphasized the importance of identity for understanding state behavior, feminist theorizing is distinctive insofar as it reveals how these identities often depend on the manipulations of gender. An examination of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men. Early states in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe were identified with the person of the sovereign king. Hobbes's depiction of the Leviathan, a man in armor wearing a crown and carrying a sword, serves as a visual representation of this early-modern form of sovereign authority. With the advent of republican forms of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the identity of the "people" remained limited; women were incorporated slowly into the political process and it is still questionable whether they have achieved a legitimate voice in the construction of foreign policy.⁶⁰ We must conclude, therefore, that the historical construction of the state, upon which the unitary-actor model in international theory is based, represents a gendered, masculine model. In the West, the image of a foreign-policymaker has been strongly associated with elite, white males and representations of hegemonic masculinity.

From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representations that are constructed and reconstructed over time. While there is a close coincidence between states and types of hegemonic masculinity, nationalist identities are more ambiguously gendered. Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. The ideology of the family has been an important metaphor on which states rely for reinforcing their legitimacy; it also provides a powerful symbol for individuals' need for community. Images of motherlands, fatherlands, and homelands evoke a shared sense of transcendental purpose and community for states and their citizens alike. Nevertheless, the sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign-policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.

For example, during the post-World War II era in the United States, these gendered images evolved over time and adapted to new understandings of

gender relations; however, they continually served as legitimators of U.S. foreign policy. In her examination of the culture of the early Cold War, Elaine Tyler May claims that the post-World War II reinstantiation of traditional gender roles served to uphold U.S. containment policy.⁶¹ The containment doctrine was articulated through the U.S. white, middle-class family consisting of a male breadwinner and a female housewife. Female domesticity was lauded as serving the nation as women were encouraged to stay at home and stock pantries and fall-out shelters in the event of nuclear war. The U.S. family was portrayed as a safe, protected space in a dangerous nuclear world; consumerism highlighted U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union. In contrast to this feminized domesticity, "real men" stood up against the Communists. The witchhunts of the McCarthy era frequently associated U.S. Communism with homosexuality and other types of behavior that did not conform with middle-class respectability.

During the 1960s and 1970s, these traditional family roles were disrupted at home by the women's movement and abroad by the Vietnam War, which shattered Americans' faith in the righteousness of the anti-Communist crusade and its strong, masculinist images. Steve Niva analyzes what he terms the remasculinization of American society during the Reagan era of the 1980s. While the return to the nuclear family of the 1950s was impossible after the upheavals and changes in social mores of the 1960s, a new form of masculinity that combined toughness with compassion emerged. Niva claims that the Gulf War of 1991 was the showcase for this new form of compassionate masculinity; its slight feminization allowed for the presence of military women in the Gulf as well as portraying a more enlightened masculinity that could be contrasted with the less-benign form in societies in the Gulf region where women suffered under the overtly repressive gender relations of Muslim societies.⁶²

Both the contrast between traditional gender roles in the United States and the Soviet Union, where working women were the norm in the early Cold War, and the distinction between an enlightened masculinity in the United States and the repressive policies against Muslim women of the Gulf serve to reinforce boundaries between self and other. Such distinctions evoke images of safe havens in a dangerous world. The construction of national identities around the notion of a safe, or civilized, space "inside" depends on the construction of an "outside" whose identity often appears strange or threatening.

Since its birth in early modern Europe, the Western state system has constructed its encounters with "uncivilized" or dangerous others in ways

that have justified expansion, conquest, and a state of military preparedness. Such rhetoric is being deployed today with respect to dangers in the South. While I would not deny the very real problem of conflict in the South, such conflicts take on particular identities that render them intractable and often incomprehensible. Newly articulated North/South boundaries between mature and immature anarchies reinforce these distinctions. Anarchy, or the state of nature, is not only a metaphor for the way in which people or states can be expected to behave in the absence of government; it also depicts an untamed natural environment in need of civilization whose wide and chaotic spaces are often described as female. Such language was frequently used during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to legitimate colonial rule over peoples who were deemed incapable of governing themselves.⁶³

It is not only threats from outside against which nationalist ideologies are created. The threats that states pose to their own citizens, issues of importance on the new security agenda, are often exacerbated by the manipulation of nationalist ideologies that pits ruling groups against "outsiders" within their own territory. Frequently, the reassertion of cultural or religious identities, in the name of national unity, may take the form of repressive measures against women. Nira Yuval-Davis suggests that the defining of women as the bearers of culture—a practice that often accompanies these movements—reinforces women's inequality. When gender relations come to be seen as the "essence" of culture, women who stray outside the definition of "good women" can be punished for bringing shame to their families; besides solidifying ethnic identities, this can be used as a way of legitimizing the control and oppression of women.⁶⁴ Such behavior is illustrated in the way women have been regulated by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

National identities are often used by domestic elites to promote state or group interests and hide race and class divisions. Defining moments in collective historical memories are frequently wars of national liberation, great victories in battles against external enemies, or the glories of former imperialist expansion. Flags and national anthems are often associated with war. Scholars who study nationalism have emphasized the importance of warfare for the creation of a sense of national community. Not only does war mobilize the national consciousness, it also provides the myths and memories that create a sense of national identity, an identity for which people have been willing to die and kill.⁶⁵ As Jean Elshtain asserts, societies are, in some sense, the "sum total" of their war stories.⁶⁶ War stories are often used to gain a society's support for a war; frequently, these stories rely on the portrayal of

a certain kind of masculinity associated with heroism and strength. These portrayals can be racialized as well as gendered; as Susan Jeffords notes, all the heroes in Hollywood's 1980s Vietnam War and action-adventure films were white men.⁶⁷ Rarely do war stories include stories about women.

Gendering War

The association between masculinity and war has been central to feminist investigations. While the manliness of war is rarely denied, militaries must work hard to turn men into soldiers, using misogynist training that is thought necessary to teach men to fight. Importantly, such training depends on the denigration of anything that could be considered feminine; to act like a soldier is not to be "womanly." "Military manhood," or a type of heroic masculinity that goes back to the Greeks, attracts recruits and maintains self-esteem in institutions where subservience and obedience are the norm.⁶⁸

Another image of a soldier is a just warrior, self-sacrificially protecting women, children, and other vulnerable people. The notion that (young) males fight wars to protect vulnerable groups, such as women and children, who cannot be expected to protect themselves, has been an important motivator for the recruitment of military forces. The concept of the "protected" is essential to the legitimation of violence; it has been an important myth that has sustained support for war and its legitimation for both women and men. In wartime, the heroic, just warrior is sometimes contrasted with a malignant, often racialized, masculinity attributed to the enemy that serves as further justification for protection.⁶⁹

These images of the masculinities of war depend on rendering women invisible. Yet women have been part of armies—as cooks, laundresses, and nurses—throughout history. Since the late nineteenth century, military nursing has involved women serving close to the front lines; such women have been vital to war efforts, although stories about their activities are rarely told, perhaps because they speak of death, injury, and vulnerability, rather than heroism.⁷⁰ More recently, in certain states, women are beginning to be incorporated into the armed forces.

In the United States, the end of the draft made it imperative that women be recruited into the armed services in order to meet "manpower" needs. In 1997, women comprised 14 percent of the army, 17 percent of the air force, and 13 percent of the navy; they have been admitted to many combat po-

sitions.⁷¹ Economic opportunity and upward mobility have been important motivators for women joining the armed forces; the rate of accession for black women in the 1970s and 1980s was greater than for other women and black men.⁷² By the end of the 1980s, 430,000 women were serving as uniformed personnel in the world's regular military units, although this has not changed the masculinized culture of states' militaries. Problems of sexual harassment are unlikely to go away until this masculinized culture has diminished. In other words, the military remains largely a male institution in which the presence of women stirs deep currents, particularly with respect to combat. The image of female soldiers fighting and dying in wars, as was evidenced in the Gulf War of 1991, is deeply disturbing to public opinion. While placing women in combat is motivated by the liberal principle of equality, it is in strong tension with the culturally embedded view of what it means to be a warrior: it has been strongly resisted in some parts of the U.S. military with claims that it has negative effect on combat readiness. It has also been viewed negatively by radical feminists, who believe that women should reject fighting in men's wars. In fact, certain radical feminists have claimed that women have a special affinity with peace.

Gendering Peace

If women have been largely absent from the world's militaries, they have been well represented in a variety of peace movements. All-women peace groups have frequently drawn upon maternalist imagery to relay their message. Drawing on feminine characteristics such as caregiving and connectedness, many women in these movements see themselves as different from men. Such movements have ranged from protesting the nuclear confrontation between the great powers to organizing against the repressive activities of states on their own populations. The Women's Strike for Peace in the United States in the early 1960s (pre-dating radical feminism) drew attention to what its members believed was an alarming escalation of the Cold War. These women defended their right as mothers to influence the course of government in its support for nuclear containment, a course that they claimed threatened the American family, rather than protected it. Stressing that nuclear war was the greatest threat to families, they challenged the notion that war is waged by men to protect women.⁷³ Their use of a strategy based on maternalism contributed to their successful confrontation with the

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities in 1962.

Similarly, the Women's Peace Camp at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, a protest against the staging of U.S. cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, drew on the concept of "close friendships and woman-made culture of songs and rituals—reminiscent of preindustrial ways of living."⁷⁴ Founded on radical feminist principles of celebrating women's role as nurturers and caregivers, the women at Greenham Common lived simply in a nonhierarchical fashion and brought their principles of nonviolence to bear on their protest. In Argentina, also using maternalist imagery, Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo protested their government's brutal repression and the "disappearance" of their husbands and sons, and Russian mothers have protested the military's sending their sons to Chechnya.⁷⁵

These are but a few examples of how women peace activists have drawn explicitly on maternal or womanist imagery to craft their strategies. Feminist peace researchers have also drawn on images of motherhood and the notion of a special standpoint of women to support their claims. Feminist peace researcher Betty Reardon has argued for the need for "feminine" values, which she sees as morally superior in a nuclear world.⁷⁶ Drawing on psychoanalytic object-relations theory and influenced by the work of Carole Gilligan, Sara Ruddick has argued for the affinity of a politics of peace with maternal thinking. Ruddick is careful not to say that women are more peaceful than men, but she does claim that there is a contradiction between mothering and war. Given military "rationality," maternal thinking that arises from maternal practice and that is centered on caring labor is an alternative ideal of reason.⁷⁷

While these maternal images have often been quite successful in motivating women's peace movements, they have made many feminists uncomfortable. Lynne Segal—while seeing women's peace movements as among the strongest progressive forces of the 1980s—is troubled by the notion of an inherent pacifism in women and also by the tendency of women's peace politics to reduce analyses of militarism to a matter of individual psychology. An ideology of women's essential difference, typical of radical feminism, may encourage men to fight for fear of appearing unmanly; moreover, biological reductionism does not allow for change.⁷⁸

In a context of a male-dominated society, the association of men with war and women with peace also reinforces gender hierarchies and false dichotomies that contribute to the devaluation of both women and peace. The

association of women and peace with idealism in IR, which I have argued is a deeply gendered concept, has rendered it less legitimate in the discourse of international relations. Although peace movements that have relied on maternal images may have had some success, they do nothing to change existing gender relations; this allows men to remain in control and continue to dominate the agenda of world politics, and it continues to render women's voices as inauthentic in matters of foreign policymaking.

An example of the negative consequences of associating women with peace is Francis Fukuyama's discussion of the biological roots of human aggression and its association with war. Fukuyama claims that women are more peaceful than men—a fact that, he believes, for the most part is biologically determined. Therefore, a world run by women would be a more peaceful world. However, Fukuyama claims that only in the West is the realization of what he calls a “feminized” world likely; since areas outside the West will continue to be run by younger aggressive men, Western men, who can stand up to threats posed by dangers from outside, must remain in charge, particularly in the area of international politics.⁷⁹

Besides its implications for reinforcing a disturbing North/South split, this argument is deeply conservative; given the dangers of an aggressive world, women must be kept in their place and out of international politics.⁸⁰ The leap from aggressive men to aggressive states is also problematic. There is little evidence to suggest that men are “naturally” aggressive and women are “naturally” peaceful; as bell hooks reminds us, black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent and militaristic in their support of racism.⁸¹ Traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity that sustain war require an exercise of power: they are not inevitable.⁸²

While this essentializing association of women with peace is problematic, it is the case that women in the United States have consistently shown less support for forceful means of pursuing foreign-policy goals than men, and this gender gap continues to grow. It was widest at the time of the Gulf War of 1991—although it closed somewhat once the fighting had begun.⁸³ It has also been suggested that those who oppose military intervention are among those most likely to support feminist goals, a claim supported by an analysis of attitudes toward the peace process in the Middle East. A study of Israeli, Egyptian, Palestinian, and Kuwaiti attitudes toward the Arab/Israeli conflict, broken down by sex, found that men and women did not have different attitudes and there was no evidence of women being less militaristic. Using data collected between 1988 and 1994, the study did, however, find a strong

positive correlation between attitudes toward support for equality of women and support for diplomacy and compromise. The authors therefore saw a connection between feminism and positive attitudes about the resolution of international conflict.⁸⁴

This example is instructive; reducing unequal gender hierarchies could make a positive contribution to peace and social justice. Likewise, by moving beyond dichotomous ways of thinking about war and peace, problematizing the social construction of gender hierarchies, and exposing myths about male protection that these ways of thinking promote, we would be able to construct less-gendered and more-inclusive definitions of security. Offering a counterposition that rejects both the masculinity of war and a feminine peace, Mary Burguières has argued for building a feminist security framework on common, ungendered foundations. She has suggested a role for feminism in dismantling the imagery that underlies patriarchy and militarism and a joint effort in which both women and men would be responsible for changing existing structures.⁸⁵ Such efforts require a problematization of dichotomized constructions such as war and peace and realism and idealism in order to provide new ways of understanding these phenomena that can help us envisage a more robust notion of security.

Feminist Redefinitions of Security

At the International Congress of Women at The Hague during World War I, a meeting called to protest the war, Jane Addams spoke of the need for a new internationalism that could replace the kind of nationalism that was fostering such a devastating war. She claimed that, since civilians could no longer be protected during war, war was becoming an obsolete instrument of national policy; the congress passed a resolution to end warfare.⁸⁶ After the congress, Addams met with Woodrow Wilson; as is frequently the case when women write about security issues or offer policy advice, the president never cited Addams, but there was a remarkable similarity between Wilson's Fourteen Points and the congress's proposals.⁸⁷ Although Addams was branded at the time as a hysterical woman, her proposals were actually quite similar to the “common security” proposals of the 1980s that defined security as interdependent rather than zero-sum.

Feminists are suspicious of statist ontologies that define security in zero-sum terms associated with binary distinctions between anarchy and order; they are also aware of the dangers of identities that, in their quest for unifying

symbols that can themselves be a source of conflict, mask social relations of inequality and insecurity. Many feminists, therefore, like certain critical-security scholars, define security broadly in multidimensional and multilevel terms—as the diminution of all forms of violence, including physical, structural, and ecological.⁸⁸ Since women have been marginal to the power structures of most states, and since feminist perspectives on security take human security as their central concern, most of these definitions start at the bottom, with the individual or community rather than the state or the international system. According to Christine Sylvester, security is elusive and partial and involves struggle and contention; it is a process, rather than an ideal in which women must act as agents in the provision of their own security.⁸⁹ It is important to emphasize that women must be (and are) involved in providing for their own security; notions of security that rely on protection reinforce gender hierarchies that, in turn, diminish women's (and certain men's) real security. Speaking from the margins, feminists are sensitive to the various ways in which social hierarchies manifest themselves across societies and history. Striving for an emancipatory type of security involves exposing these different social hierarchies, understanding how they construct and are constructed by the international order, and working to denaturalize and dismantle them.

Questioning the role of states as adequate security providers, but being aware of their continuing importance as the political category within which security is defined by policymakers and scholars alike, leads feminists to analyze power and military capabilities differently from conventional security studies. Rather than seeing military capability as an assurance against outside threats to the state, militaries are seen as frequently antithetical to individuals' (particularly women's) security—as winners in the competition for resources, as definers of an ideal type of militarized citizenship, usually denied to women,⁹⁰ and as legitimators of a kind of social order that can sometimes even valorize state violence. Simona Sharoni has suggested that, in states torn by conflict, the more government is preoccupied with national security, the less its citizens, especially women, experience physical security.⁹¹ State violence is a particular problem in certain states, but it must also be emphasized that many states, although formally at peace, sustain huge military budgets at the same time as social spending is being cut; this, too, can be a form of violence.

These feminist definitions of security grow out of the centrality of social relations, particularly gender relations, for feminist theorizing. Feminists

claim that structural inequalities, which are central contributors to the insecurity of individuals, are built into the historical legacy of the modern state and the international system of which it is a part. Calling into question realist boundaries between anarchy and danger on the outside and order and security on the inside, feminists point out that state-centric and structural analyses miss the interrelation of insecurity across levels of analysis. Since "women's space" inside households has also been beyond the reach of law in most states, feminists are often quite suspicious of boundaries that mark states as security providers. Although, in nationalist ideologies, family metaphors are used to evoke a safe space or sense of belonging, families are not always considered a safe space for women. In most societies, families, frequently beyond the reach of law, have too often been the site of unsanctioned violence against women and children.⁹² Violence, therefore, runs across levels of analysis. While these types of issues have not normally been considered within the subject matter of security studies, feminists are beginning to show how all of these issues and levels are interrelated.

In this chapter, I have shown how feminist perspectives on security come out of different ontologies and epistemologies from those in conventional security studies. Believing that the culture and identity of states is important for understanding their security-seeking behavior, feminists are closer to some of the work in critical-security studies than to the mainstream; their goal of thinking about security as emancipation is also closer to certain critical perspectives. Questioning state-centric frameworks of conventional security analysis, feminists have tried to get beyond boundaries between inside and outside to construct a more comprehensive definition of security. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that states are fundamental to the way we think about security. Feminists have pointed out how often the security-seeking behavior of states is legitimated by its association with certain types of hegemonic masculinity. Besides narrowing the range of permissible or legitimate ways for states to act, this can also contribute to the subordination of women and the perceived inauthenticity of their voices in matters of policymaking. Claiming that the personal cannot be separated from the political and the international, feminists have suggested that issues of personal and international insecurity are not unrelated. This is a question that deserves further empirical investigation.

Feminists have generally rejected rationalist models when seeking to understand states' security-seeking behavior. They believe that the claim to

universality and objectivity made by these models is problematic since it is based on male models of human behavior. Such a search for universalistic laws may miss the ways in which gender hierarchies manifest themselves in a variety of ways across time and culture. Claiming that theory cannot be separate from practice, feminists have investigated strategic language and foreign-policy discourse to see how they shape, legitimate, and constrain certain policy options. Starting at the microlevel and listening to the experiences of women, feminists base their understanding of security on situated knowledge, rather than knowledge that is decontextualized and universalized. Speaking from the experiences of those on the margins of national security, feminists are sensitive to the various ways in which social hierarchies are variably constructed. Striving for security involves exposing these different social hierarchies, understanding how they construct and are constructed by the international order, and working to denaturalize and dismantle them. Gender and other social hierarchies have effects, not only on issues of national security but also on the workings of the global economy and the uneven distribution of economic rewards that, in turn, also affect human security. These issues are taken up in chapter 3.

3 Gender in the Global Economy

Whereas conflict and security issues motivated the founding of international relations at the beginning of the century, economic issues, now defined as the separate subdiscipline of international political economy (IPE), became visible in the discipline only in the 1970s, when liberal interdependence and Marxist approaches began to challenge the primacy of state-centric realism and its focus on national security. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of an international system in which relations between the great powers are defined largely in terms of trade and investment, the importance of economic relations between states has been further reinforced. With the demise of the socialist alternative, as represented by the former Soviet Union and states of the Eastern bloc, the focus of conventional IPE in the United States, although not elsewhere, has narrowed to a debate between neorealists and neoliberals. The socialist decline has generated another literature, outside mainstream IR but also centered in the United States, which is celebrating the triumph of liberal capitalism and the spread of Western-style democracy. This celebratory response to the end of the Cold War has stimulated a debate over the pros and cons of "globalization"—a phenomenon that has not been central to neorealism or neoliberalism.

It is mostly within this debate about globalization, which has been joined on the critical side by a broad range of scholars both inside and outside the United States, that feminist perspectives on IPE are being articulated. Although, as Sandra Whitworth has claimed, it is within the subfield of IPE that feminist questions can most successfully be raised, it has proved difficult