
Gendering World Politics

*Issues and Approaches
in the Post-Cold War Era*

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C O L U M B I A U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

N E W Y O R K

4 Democratization, the State, and the Global Order: Gendered Perspectives

Approximately thirty countries shifted from authoritarian to democratic political systems during the 1970s and 1980s; this so-called "third wave" of democratization,¹ defined as a move toward competitive electoral politics, was most successful in countries where Western influences were strongest.² Although not at the center of the conventional IR agenda in the 1990s, democratization received considerable attention from liberals, normative theorists, critical theorists, and world-order scholars; it has also had important implications for peace and security scholarship, particularly the neo-Kantian literature on the democratic peace. Coming out of the world-order tradition, new literatures on transnational movements and human rights have also focused on democracy and the possibilities for its realization at nonstate levels.

While trends toward democratization, often accompanied by a shift to open-market economies (discussed in chapter 3), have been celebrated by certain liberals, others are more qualified in their assessment. Scholars from a variety of IR approaches have noted that the spread of domestic democratic institutions has been accompanied by a democratic deficit and great power domination at the international level, where important decisions about the global economy, weapons proliferation, and environmental issues must be made. Additionally, at a time when the increase in the numbers of democratic states is being celebrated, certain scholars see the state as dysfunctional and increasingly unable to cope with an ever-larger number of transnational forces and issues that demand regulation. Some also claim that liberal de-

mocracy as opposed to social democracy is unresponsive to the needs of its most vulnerable members;³ consequently, certain scholars from world-order and other normative critical IR perspectives are investigating the potential for devolving democratic decision making, both up to the regional/international level and down to the grass roots. Indeed, as universal standards of human rights to which individuals can appeal outside the framework of the state are being articulated at the international level by transnational social movements and nongovernmental organizations, some see the beginnings of a nascent global society. Like other critical IR perspectives, feminists often work outside a statist ontology and assume mutually constituted levels of analysis; for these reasons, certain feminists are also seeking to explore models of democracy that are less focused on the state.

Issues of democratization and global governance, given their normative concern with the effects of the international system and state policies on the lives of individuals, have been central to feminist IR perspectives.⁴ Feminist scholars have generally taken a critical stance toward liberal literature that celebrates democratization, a literature that has had little to say about gender issues. While evidence suggests that democratic transitions in Latin America and Africa are opening up space for women's political participation, women's presence and influence in formal democratic political institutions has not been great; in East Europe and Russia, it has actually declined since the transitions of the early 1990s.

While the relative absence of women from political institutions has led feminists, particularly Western feminists, to be suspicious of the state, they are also questioning visions of alternative models that advocate the devolution of power up to international governmental institutions, where often there are even fewer women in decision-making positions. Universal norms, such as standards of human rights, articulated at the international level are also being examined for gender bias. Typically, women's movements, which strive for what they claim is a more genuine form of democracy, have been situated at the local level or in nongovernmental transnational social movements. As discussed in chapter 3, feminists have stressed the importance of these movements, not only in terms of their attempts to place women's issues on the international agenda, but also in terms of their success in redefining political theory and practice and thinking more deeply about oppressive gender relations and how to reconstitute them. However, certain feminists have begun to question whether women's participation in these nongovernmental arenas can have sufficient power to effect change; while they remain

skeptical of the patriarchal underpinnings of many contemporary states, certain feminists are now beginning to reexamine the potential of the state as an emancipatory institution. Particularly for women and feminists from the South, democratization has opened up some space within which to leverage the state to deal with their concerns; many of them see the state as having the potential to provide a buffer against an international system dominated by its most powerful members. However, a genuinely democratic state, devoid of gender and other oppressive social hierarchies, would require a different definition of democracy, citizenship, and human rights, as well as a different relationship with the international system.

In this chapter, having suggested some reasons why democratization has not been central to conventional IR, I begin by elaborating on the debate about democratization and global governance as articulated by liberals, scholars in the democratic peace tradition and their critics, and some normative and world-order perspectives. I then discuss some of the feminist assessments and implications of these literatures. Focusing on feminist analyses of human rights, I elaborate on what they reveal about the gendered norms that underpin international institutions; I assess the potential of international social movements and nongovernmental organizations for effecting change in these norms as well as its policy implications. Finally, I discuss some of the feminist literature that is beginning to rethink both the importance of the state and models for a more genuine democracy, and how such models might contribute to conceptualizing a world order that could lessen gender and other oppressive social hierarchies and thus promote international security and peace, broadly defined.

Democratization and the Democratic Peace

While the commitment to promote democracy around the world is, at least ostensibly, an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy, democratization has not received a great deal of attention from conventional IR. The realist tradition, with its assumptions about states as unitary actors that look alike, does not depend on the identities of political regimes for constructing explanations about state behavior in the international system. Realists postulate an international anarchy rather than a global society: the potential for political community beyond the state is minimized by what realists see as an

unbridgeable gap between domestic society and international power politics. Realists would agree with Martin Wight's claim that it is only possible to talk about society within the context of the sovereign state. Indeed, Wight was skeptical about the possibility of a progressive politics in the international system.⁵ There is also validity to the realist claim that the promotion of democracy and human rights in U.S. foreign policy is sacrificed to the national interest when it is expedient to do so.

The traditional split between international relations and comparative politics as subdisciplines of political science has further reinforced this tendency in IR to focus on the state as a unitary actor rather than the effect of its domestic political institutions and interest groups on its international behavior. Levels of analysis, popular in IR theorizing, emphasize the gap between domestic politics and international relations. James Caporaso suggests two reasons for this gap; first, an academic division of labor that has ever-more-specialized subfields; and second, that both comparative politics and international relations are intellectually autonomous, each standing on its own conceptual and theoretical foundations.⁶ An important theoretical bridge was made in 1993 when Robert Putnam introduced the concept of two-level games; Putnam attempted to explain the foreign-policy behavior of democratic states by focusing on their inward and outward behaviors and the intersecting influences that face them—that is, from both the international system and from domestic constituencies.⁷

While the liberal interdependence literature of the 1970s introduced actors other than states, contemporary neoliberalism or neoinstitutionalism has refocused attention on the state as the most important actor in international politics and on formal international governmental institutions (IGOs).⁸ Its preference for rational-choice theory has given primacy to interests, rather than identities, for understanding state and international institutional behavior. With their goal of explanation over prescription and shared assumptions about the self-interested behavior of states as well as the absence of a genuine international society, both realists and neoinstitutionalists have avoided postulating preferred world orders. Given its ideological hegemony and its claim about the durability of the state system and the ever-present likelihood of conflict, realism (and neorealism) has generally branded those who celebrate democratization or attempt to articulate alternative world orders as idealists.⁹ Challenging this label, world-order critics counter that realism's commitment to a statist ontology is a conserving move that contributes to the perpetuation of the world as it is.

Democratization: Liberal and Critical Perspectives

Liberals, who are celebrating the recent wave of democratization, point to the positive factors associated with the realization of Western-style democratic institutions based on liberal values, such as limited government, civil and political rights, and individualism. For these liberals, an important aspect of democratization is the consequent opening up of national economies to the global market (discussed in chapter 3); this is seen as enhancing economic growth and prosperity as well as promoting human rights and political participation. Asserting that Western liberal democracy is the final form of human government, Francis Fukuyama claims that, although inequality still exists in democratic states—he uses the United States as his example—it cannot be attributed to their legal and social structures, which remain fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist.¹⁰ Liberals see the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent predominance of the United States and its liberal values as further reinforcing the belief that this trend toward the universalization of democracy will be sustained. They claim that this type of democracy both promotes and is promoted by the development of capitalist markets, as is witnessed in democratic transitions in Central and East Europe. With its roots in the political modernization literature of the 1950s and 1960s, which was avowedly anti-Communist, a related literature in comparative politics has examined the validity of the claim that democracy and development are related. Przeworski and Limongi have asserted that, although the emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic development, once democracy is established, economic constraints play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer.¹¹

The literature on democratization has generated responses from a variety of critical perspectives. These include neoclassical political theorists, world-order scholars, and critical theorists. Scholars in these traditions are generally less committed to a statist ontology; therefore, they do not assume the sharp distinction between the domestic and the international. With a normative commitment to democracy broadly defined, they see the necessity of crossing levels of analysis when postulating world orders that could foster more genuine democracy at all levels, not only that of the state. While generally supportive of democratization, many of these scholars doubt the likelihood of building a genuinely democratic world order on the foundations of Western liberal democracy in its present form.

Given the growing strength of regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), certain scholars see an emergent international society where universal norms and rules for human behavior are eroding national sovereignty.¹² Coming out of a critical-theory tradition, Andrew Linklater has postulated a cosmopolitan democracy that seeks to extend the boundaries of political community beyond the nation-state: he outlines some accounts of global citizenship that take up the idea of moral equality in the concept of obligations to the rest of humankind, such as obligations to the poor and duties to the natural environment. This form of citizenship involves rights of access to international bodies to seek redress against abuses of sovereign power. Although this vision of global citizenship is far from realized in the contemporary world, Linklater does see some evolution toward it in the European Union's conception of citizenship, which offers certain legal rights and entitlements to individuals.¹³ David Held also sees challenges to state sovereignty in the internationalization of human-rights standards to which individuals can appeal.¹⁴ But these and other critics of liberalism are quite skeptical of modern forms of citizenship, whereby citizenship for those inside boundaries is constructed through its negation for outsiders. Critics also question the emergent notion of global citizenship, celebrated by liberals such as Kenichi Ohmae, which is conferring privileged rights of citizenship and representation on corporate capital while constraining the true democratization process—a process that has involved struggles for representation over hundreds of years.¹⁵

While critics of democratization have claimed that economic and political liberalization is being accompanied by an illiberal interstate order, others have gone further, questioning whether the modern state, whatever its political form, has the capacity to cope with contemporary global problems. Richard Falk, while acknowledging the extraordinary resilience of the state and the states system, has questioned to what extent it is serving the cause of human betterment, which he defines, according to the preferred norms of his world-order approach, as demilitarization, the elimination of poverty, and the realization of basic human rights. Falk is critical not only of the normative dimensions of state viability but also of its functional capacity, particularly with respect to ecological concerns. Falk sees a "post-statist possibility" (albeit a weak one) in transnational social movements that are struggling to bring forth new conceptions of a more just world order based on global civil society and in movements from below, as seen in the transitional politics in East Europe and the former Soviet Union.¹⁶

Does Democracy Foster International Peace?

Democratization has also been heralded by a literature on the democratic peace, a literature that its neo-Kantian supporters believe has important implications for future international-security issues. The connection between Kant's ideas about the peaceful nature of democracies (which was based on the notion that citizen participation in the decision-making process predisposed against war) and the recent interest in the claim that democracies do not fight each other was introduced into IR in the early 1980s.¹⁷ In the late 1990s, certain scholars have claimed that the gender gap in voting in some democracies, with women somewhat more disposed toward peace than men, as well as greater overall political participation by women, has further reinforced the plausibility of the democratic peace.¹⁸

Limiting his definition of democracy to states with a broad franchise that hold contested elections, Bruce Russett has claimed that, while democracies may, in general, be as belligerent as nondemocracies, they do not go to war with each other. Russett defines war as interstate war with more than one thousand battle fatalities.¹⁹ His claims are supported by an extensive examination of historical and contemporary cases; explanations for the peaceful relations between democracies are framed in terms of democratic political culture and institutional constraints, particularly the constraining influence of public opinion.²⁰ Although most would agree that democracies are involved in as many wars as other types of political systems, in a world where the number of democratic states is increasing, supporters of Russett's thesis believe that this finding has important implications for the diminution of international conflict.²¹ It is also an important departure from neorealism and neoliberalism, which do not depend on the identity of states for explanations about their behavior.²²

The empirical evidence for the claim that democracies do not fight each other is quite strong, within a context of Russett's limited definitions of democracy and of war. Critics of this argument have ranged from those who claim that wars between democracies have not escalated for realist reasons, rather than liberal reasons,²³ to those who object to its overall implications.²⁴ Given that covert operations were not included in Russett's definition of war, that interstate war has comprised only a small fraction of conflict since World War II, and that democracies have been some of the largest sellers of arms, certain critics have questioned the meaning of the term *peaceful*, as well as the theory's relevance for most contemporary conflicts.²⁵ Moreover, the

"democratic peace" argument has tended to further reinforce the North/South split, which, I have argued, is becoming evident in IR more generally.

The literature on the democratic peace has also stimulated interest in a broader, more explicitly normative literature in the neo-Kantian tradition that hypothesizes emergent world orders and new forms of global governance based on a broader definition of democracy than Russett's. Also building on Kant, political theorist David Held has postulated his preferred model of "cosmopolitan democratic community," an international community of sovereign states committed to upholding public law both within and across the members' own boundaries; such a community depends on the creation of a "pacific" federation of states that have renounced war between them.²⁶ However, Held is somewhat pessimistic about the potential for this type of genuine democracy in the current world order where national democracy still prevails. In a world of regional and global interconnectedness celebrated by liberals, Held sees national, as opposed to cosmopolitan democracy, as a questionable form of political organization. Even where democracy exists within states, nondemocratic relations prevail between them. Decisions made at the regional or supranational level, where accountability is low, are diminishing the range of choices open to national democracies. For weaker states in particular, outcomes of decisions made by other states, or by international institutions dominated by more powerful states, can have far-reaching implications beyond their control. Therefore, for Held, globalization is a dialectical process, rather than the teleological one postulated by liberals; as local groups find themselves buffeted by global forces beyond their control, their demands for autonomy increase.²⁷

Feminists have expressed similar reservations, both with respect to current manifestations of democratization and the contemporary state system more generally; they also see possibilities in emergent forms of a more genuine participatory democracy and are concerned with rethinking the meaning of democracy across all levels of analysis.

Feminist Perspectives on Democratization

Feminist IR scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the gendered identities of political, economic, and social institutions and the interaction of these institutional structures at all levels. As Spike Peterson has claimed, if we fail to embed state politics in a global context, we neglect how glob-

alization problematizes the meaning of politics; evidence of oppressions that women face worldwide negates the claim that politics is only possible within territorially bounded states.²⁸ Motivated by an emancipatory normative agenda, IR feminists have been particularly concerned with redefining and reframing the political; to this end, they have built on the work of feminist political theorists and begun to apply their ideas to their examination of democratization as well as the meaning of democracy beyond the boundaries of the state. Confirming Cynthia Enloe's claim that the personal is international, IR feminists have investigated how households, states, international institutions, and the global economy are linked structurally and ideologically, and how gendered identities and gendered divisions of labor define and structure the building of institutions locally, nationally, and globally. They have also examined whether emerging world-order norms and principles, such as those relating to human rights, exhibit a gender bias. Given these concerns, their investigations often cross traditional boundaries between international relations and comparative politics. Drawing heavily on feminist political philosophy and paralleling some of the normative IR critiques of liberal versions of democratization discussed earlier, feminists have been concerned with rethinking the meaning of democracy and democratization at all levels, from the state up to international organizations and down to grassroots social movements.

Democratization: A Gendered Concept

As discussed in chapter 3, feminist literatures on globalization are nearly unanimous in their claim that structures of patriarchy, evidenced in a global gendered division of labor and certain international institutions, as well as within states, democratic and otherwise, can operate in various ways to constrain women's life chances. Therefore, feminists have claimed that transitions to democracy and the literature that describes and celebrates it must be treated with caution. Reexamining democratic transitions through gendered lenses reveals the extent to which definitions of democracy are constrained and limited.

Feminists are also suspicious of efforts to link the democratic peace with the gender gap in political opinion and an increased participation of women in the political process. Since there are very few states, democratic or otherwise, where women hold positions of political power anywhere close to

parity with men, this hypothesis is hard to test. Feminists are particularly skeptical about the influence of women on security policies and, as discussed in chapter 2, they are very suspicious of arguments that link women unproblematically with peace. Moreover, linking the peacefulness of democracies with women's participation does little to further more important agendas of trying to reduce oppressive gender hierarchies at all levels.²⁹

Nevertheless, since democratization does open political space for groups not previously heard and offers possibilities for political change, it has been a central focus for feminist scholars. However, the mainstream literature on democratization has rarely acknowledged this feminist literature or focused on what happens to women during democratic transitions. The orthodox political-science literature on democratization has made little mention of gender and women; its top-down focus on leadership and agency gives primacy to the actions and decisions of political leaders during democratic transitions.³⁰

Analyses of democratization are built on traditional definitions of democracy that are based on the legacy of Western liberal democracy, a legacy that has been problematic for women. Feminist political theorists have reexamined the meaning of democracy and its gendered implications by going back to the origins of Western democratic institutions. In her reevaluation of social contract theory, Carole Pateman has outlined how the story of the social contract as articulated by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European political theorists has been treated as an account of the creation of a public sphere of civil freedom in which only men were endowed with the necessary attributes for entering into contracts. Liberal definitions of citizens as nonsexed autonomous individuals outside any social context abstract from a Western male model. Evolving notions of citizenship in the West were based on male, property-owning heads of households: thus, democratic theory and practice have been built on the male-as-norm engaged in narrowly defined political activities.³¹

Women, Pateman claims, were not party to the original contract; rather, they were incorporated into the private sphere through the marriage contract as wives subservient to their husbands, rather than as individuals. The private sphere, a site of subjection, is part of civil society, but separate from the "civil" sphere; each gains meaning from the other and each is mutually dependent on the other.³² This separation of the public and private spheres has had important ramifications for the construction and evolution of political and economic institutions at all levels; feminists see them as intimately

related, however. What goes on in the public sphere of politics and the economy cannot be understood as separate from the private. Historically, therefore, terms such as *citizen* and *head of household* were not neutral but associated with men. Even in states where women have achieved formal or near-formal equality, feminists have claimed that this historical legacy still inhibits their political and economic participation on an equal basis with men. As feminists from the South have pointed out, what is "public" in one society may be "private" in another; it is true, however, that women's activities, such as reproduction and child rearing, tend to be devalued in all societies.

Nevertheless, the evolution of democratic practices and institutions and their attendant notions of individual rights have certainly had benefits for women; the concept of rights and equality were important rationales for the suffrage movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the West as well as for movements for women's liberation and human rights in various parts of the world today. But, as Pateman's analysis suggests, the liberal tradition continues to present particular problems for women; as she points out, aspiring to equality assumes that individuals can be separated from sexually differentiated bodies.³³ Deep structures, upheld by the public/private divide, have continued to keep women in positions of subordination, even after the acquisition of the vote or other legal gains; despite the fact that women have always participated in the public sphere as workers, they do not have the same civil standing as men in most societies. For example, in twentieth-century welfare laws in the West, men have generally been defined as breadwinners and women as dependents; likewise, immigration laws and rules governing refugees define women as dependents with negative implications for their legal status. In the United States, the concept of first-class citizen has frequently been tied to military service, a disadvantage for women running for political office.³⁴

Studies of democratic transitions in Russia, East Europe, and Latin America demonstrate some of the problems associated with the legacy of the Western liberal tradition.³⁵

Transitions in Russia and East Europe

That democratic transitions may actually be negative for women was most evident in the former Soviet Union and some states in East Europe: gender

relations associated with the public/private divide there became more pronounced. Because of the elimination of quota systems in legislatures in this region, the number of women in institutional politics was sharply reduced after transitions to democracy, with the proportion of women elected to representative bodies declining from an average of 33 percent to 10 percent.³⁶ This decline was especially significant given that legislative bodies began to play a real role in policymaking. It is important to note, however, that women's representation under Communist regimes was largely window dressing; women were equally marginalized from real centers of power before and after democratic transitions.³⁷

In East Europe and Russia, the drop in political participation of women during the transition was accompanied by a loss of economic status. Applauded by liberals, the transition to market economies and structural adjustment associated with the opening to the global economy took disproportionate numbers of women out of the labor force because of the need to shed labor to adjust to market competition; as in other cases of structural adjustment, the state sector, where women are often employed, shrank dramatically. In the early 1990s, in all of eastern Central Europe except Hungary, women constituted 50 to 70 percent of total unemployed; in post-Soviet Russia, in 1992 they constituted 70 percent.³⁸ Where women were working, they tended to be confined to traditional, low-paying "female" occupations. Given the diminishing demand for labor and the erosion of state-provided social services such as day care and health care, women were reconstructed as dependent wives, mothers, consumers, and caregivers; with child-care and maternity leave being dismantled, women were cast as "unreliable" workers. Under socialism, the family played the role of an embryonic civil society representing antistate freedom; following democratization, the family was reconstructed, along lines consistent with the liberal tradition, as male-dominated, female-dependent. At the same time as women were reassigned to the private sphere, the public sphere was being revalued, thus accentuating the public/private divide.

Barbara Einhorn has claimed that these developments were a return to the nineteenth-century liberal version of citizenship based on property-owning males (outlined by Pateman), which reinforced a patriarchal concept of roles. Einhorn suggests that these roles are profoundly undemocratic.³⁹ In short, women's rights in East Europe and post-Communist Russia eroded; women began to be constructed as passive beings rather than mature political subjects. In the 1990s, as is often true in times of major political change,

there was also a sense that women's rights were peripheral and that working to improve them was a luxury, given the economic difficulties of transition. In a critique of feminist literature of socialist transitions, Jacqui True has questioned its emphasis on women's victimization; she claims that this literature runs the risk of creating a victimized identity for the women of East Europe that is not unlike the category *Third World women*—one that post-colonial feminists object to strongly. True's study of women in the Czech Republic suggests that they were both winners and losers in the transition. Nevertheless, she points to the masculinization of a growing high-paid private sector, with women being disproportionately located in lower-waged public-sector occupations; she concludes that women have generally been more disadvantaged than men by structural changes.⁴⁰

As small, grassroots movements—often reluctant to identify themselves as feminist—began to emerge in postsocialist societies, for many women the legacies of totalitarian regimes made political participation unattractive. Given their triple burden under state socialism, as workers, mothers, and homemakers, many women did not regret giving up paid work, particularly at a time when domestic labor was even more demanding than before. Indeed, new idioms of emancipation have emerged in postsocialist states: some women express their freedom in being able to choose traditional female roles associated with domesticity.⁴¹ Nevertheless, triple burdens, which exist in capitalist and socialist societies alike, support the assertions about the prevalence of patriarchy. Consistent with the feminist critique of liberal democracy, there is a sense that formal democratic rights are not necessarily synonymous with the representation of women's real interests; yet democracy without women's participation is not real democracy.⁴²

Democratic Transitions in Latin America

Assessments of democratic transitions in Latin America have suggested a mixed but more positive picture. The region has a long history of women's political mobilization, and the democratic transitions of the 1980s coincided with the reemergence of feminist movements. Many of them, it is true, had started under previous authoritarian governments; in any event, women's human-rights groups, feminist groups, and organizations of poor urban women were all important in the democratic transitions.⁴³ Human-rights groups became active in the late 1970s in countries campaigning against

abuses perpetrated by military regimes (e.g., Argentina and Chile). Urban-based movements were responding to the economic crises of the 1980s exacerbated by the implementation of structural-adjustment programs. Although these movements were tolerated because military governments did not see women's activities as dangerous enough to warrant their acting to suppress them, some of them actually became increasingly marginalized after the advent of democracy; the reinstatement of political rights was not accompanied by a widening of social rights.

Although civilian rule in Latin America opened up new opportunities for women to influence policy formation, the political visibility of women did not result in success at the polls. Many political parties of the center and the left put women's issues on their agenda, but there was no significant increase in electoral representation.⁴⁴ Women's groups were faced with the dilemma of autonomy versus integration: should they work within new institutions and parties and risk being co-opted? Or should they preserve their independence by remaining outside and risk marginalization?

It is clear, therefore, from both post-Soviet and Latin American cases, that in assessing gender relations in postauthoritarian rule it is necessary to distinguish between institution-level democracy, which is the focus of the literature on democratic transitions, and broader conceptions of democracy.

Rethinking Democratization with Gendered Lenses

Proponents of democratization have adopted and supported a narrow and restricted institutional definition of democracy that is focused on the political system seen as separate from the economy and civil society; this top-down definition of democracy sidesteps issues raised by feminist political theorists concerning the distribution of power, social and economic equality, and definitions of citizenship beyond a restricted political form. It ignores activities outside the conventional political arena in which women are more likely to be involved. For example, women involved in social movements that are working to improve economic redistribution and human rights and to effect social change more generally do not appear as political actors. Feminists are also analyzing the extent to which the gendering of political concepts such as rights and equality that come out of the Western liberal tradition are transposed to the international level.

When proponents of liberal democracy and marketization speak of the spread of human rights based on Western notions of individualism, feminists have cautioned that both definitions of human rights and the kinds of violations that get attention from Western states and their human-rights communities may be gender biased. Since basic needs and welfare provision so often fall to women, and since women are disproportionately economically disadvantaged, the preference by Western liberal states for political rights over economic rights may also present particular problems for women. In addition, since human-rights violations are usually defined as violations by officials of the state, domestic violence has not been a priority on the international human-rights agenda.

In order to understand the role of gender—the effects of democratic transitions on women and their activities in these transitions—we need a redefinition of democracy that starts at the bottom. Generally women are better represented in local politics; often they are working outside regular political channels. Georgina Waylen has claimed that any analysis of democratization that fails to incorporate a gendered perspective—ignoring the actions of certain groups—will be flawed.⁴⁵ Therefore, the liberal democratic state must be reexamined for its gender biases, as well as its class and racial biases; definitions of representation and citizenship in the spaces in which political life occur need to be rethought. Arguing that patriarchal structures are deeply embedded in most types of political regimes, democratic and otherwise, certain internationalist feminists have looked beyond the state to build institutions and networks that are more likely than the state to diminish gender and other social hierarchies. Given the barriers to formal political office that exist for women in most states, including democracies, women activists frequently bypass the state by working either at the grassroots level or by joining forces transnationally to work for women's rights at the global level.

Gender Issues in Global Governance

Women in International Organizations

Although women have a long history of organizing internationally, their presence in formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has not been high. During the time of the League of Nations, which operated from 1920

to 1946, no woman ever served on the League Council or sat on the World Court. In the early years of the United Nations, which took the place of the League after World War II, the presence of women was minimal; women comprised fewer than 5 percent of delegates to the United Nations General Assembly in 1946.⁴⁶ In fact, women's representation in intergovernmental organizations has generally been lower than in state institutions. Some women were included in the 1945 Conference in San Francisco to draw up plans for the founding of the United Nations, but they were channeled into committees that dealt specifically with the equality of women or other social issues. Although there was some commitment to gender equality in the UN Charter, this had little effect on the early United Nations. Where women had the most success was in the establishment of the Committee on the Status of Women in 1947, a committee responsible to the Economic and Social Council, but UN members ensured that the committee had a narrow scope within which to work. The target of 25 percent of professional women in the UN Secretariat was not met, and representation of women in senior positions has continued to prove difficult since states are reluctant to put forward women for top posts.

By the 1990s, the position of women in the UN Secretariat had improved somewhat. In 1998, the percentage of women at the professional level subject to geographical distribution had reached 36.8 percent; nevertheless, women were generally concentrated at lower staff levels and it has proved difficult for women to break into upper management.⁴⁷ In both the UN General Assembly and Security Council, women have remained almost invisible; in 1997, women headed the delegations of only 7 of the 185 member countries. Because so few women have served on the Security Council, women's voices and perspectives have been virtually excluded from the major political and security decisions of the last fifty years, even though women have a strong history of organizing around issues of war and peace.⁴⁸ Where women have been granted a role in the diplomatic branch of the United Nations, it has tended to be in what are perceived as traditional women's activities, thus reinforcing established gender roles; for example, the highest concentration of women diplomats has been on the Commission on the Status of Women, where only a few men have served.

Women's low rate of participation in the United Nations, particularly in states' diplomatic missions—a pattern that has been replicated in many other IGOs—suggests that women's attempts to gain leverage at this level has, in many cases, been less successful than at the national level. As Anne Runyan

warns, there is a danger of trading gendered nationalism for gendered internationalism.⁴⁹ Since intergovernmental organizations represent the views of governments of their member states rather than their populations, this lack of transparency compounds the underrepresentation of women's voices, as well as those of men from excluded or marginalized groups. As the United Nations has begun to pledge to "mainstream a gender perspective," the question becomes: Whose perspective will be represented, when groups with the most resources are the most likely to gain access?⁵⁰

International organizations such as the United Nations have played an important role in promulgating universal norms and standards of conduct that, as discussed earlier, have been seen by certain world-order scholars as indicating the beginnings of a global society or an extension of the boundaries of political community beyond the nation-state.⁵¹ While feminists also assume the possibility of community beyond statist boundaries, they question the extent to which these universalizing norms are based on male experiences. Both feminist theorists and women organizing through social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have worked hard to bring these gender biases to light and to try to reframe norms and rules in ways that get beyond them. One such example has been the reformulation of the meaning of human rights.

Women's Rights as Human Rights

The spread of a Western concept of human rights that focuses on civil and political rights has been applauded by liberals. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has also been an important concept for normative political theorists, who see, in the promulgation of universal norms of human behavior, possibilities for a nascent world community. David Held has claimed that the UN Charter system has provided a vision of a new world order—that of a supranational presence championing individual human rights over the exclusivity of state sovereignty.⁵² Since human rights is one of the few concepts that articulates a transnational concern about the lives of people beyond the confines of the state, it would seem like a useful framework for dealing with gender abuse and one that connects the global and the local. Indeed, human rights have been a central concern for feminist IR scholars and activists; they have also been important for feminist legal

perspectives that began to be introduced into the field of international law in the mid 1980s.⁵³

Article 2 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declared that all individuals, without distinction of race or sex, are entitled to equal rights; for its time, it was a progressive document (it included calls for universal suffrage and equal rights for men and women in marriage). There are contradictions in the document, however: for example, in Articles 23.1 and 25.1, men are defined as heads of families.⁵⁴ Women from Latin America, along with Eleanor Roosevelt, fought hard for the inclusion in the declaration of the term *sex*, in the hope that it would address women's subordination. In spite of these early efforts, the inclusion of women's rights within the human-rights framework has proved difficult. Given the privileging of the Western liberal definition of human rights favored by advocates of democratization, the rights that have received the most attention from the international community have been the abuse of individuals' civil and political rights by government agents. The right to liberty and security in Article 9 of the Civil and Political Covenant operates only in the context of direct action by the state; it has not been interpreted to take account of gender-specific harm.

By definition, the term *civil and political rights* applies to the public sphere and thus tends to reinforce the public/private divide. Although the Declaration of Human Rights described the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society entitled to protection, what goes on inside families has generally been deemed a private matter beyond the reach of law. Thus family violence, even though it is the most pervasive human-rights violation against women, was not included in the definition of human-rights abuses. Claiming that states must be held accountable for actions of private individuals, feminists have argued that violence against women is not a "private" issue but one that must be understood as a structural problem associated with patriarchy.

Hilary Charlesworth, a feminist international lawyer, has suggested that being a woman is life-threatening in special ways due to social practices that put women at risk by virtue of their sex.⁵⁵ Assault, female infanticide, denial of access to health and nutrition, rape, forced marriage, and trafficking are rights violations that women suffer because of their sex. Moreover, the privileging of civil and political rights over economic rights relegates abuses such as poverty and economic deprivation to lesser importance—abuses from which, in many countries, women suffer disproportionately due to their subordinate status. Further reinforcing this gender bias, the definition of

economic rights in the Economic and Social Covenant is confined to work in the public sphere, thus ignoring women's unpaid labor. The belief that cultural rights are a private matter further reinforces the public/private distinction.

Given that mainstream definitions and implementation of human rights have tended to ignore these and other issues relating to women's human rights, women and feminists, many of them outside formal governmental institutions, began taking up these issues during the UN Decade for Women (1975–85). Due to these women's lobbying efforts, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979; by 1993, 120 states had ratified the convention. Unlike the Human Rights Covenants that separate economic and political rights, CEDAW draws together civil, political, economic, and social rights as a single instrument. CEDAW defined discrimination on the basis of sex internationally for the first time, giving women an important legal instrument.⁵⁶ However, while CEDAW made reference to trafficking in women, it made no explicit references to violence against women.

In 1993, the UN Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted by the UN General Assembly—a convention that finally acknowledged the structural roots of violence against women. This declaration was an important advance in that it required the state to regulate behavior in the private sphere. Associated with specific practices in both the public and private spheres, violence against women is an issue that crosses societies and cultures and is global in nature; it ranges from the United States (where, for example, there is rape and domestic battering) to India (dowry deaths) and from Latin America (torture of political prisoners) to Europe and Asia (sexual slavery) and to Africa (female genital mutilation). There is evidence that a number of national governments have taken initiatives to decrease gender violence since the issue was put on the international agenda.⁵⁷

Despite these important advances, women's human rights have continued to face discrimination. As long as they are dealt with in special conventions and institutions, they tend to be labeled as "women's issues" and, consequently, be marginalized, allowing the mainstream to ignore them. Women's voices are still struggling to be heard by mainstream human-rights organizations, and the prioritizing of civil and political rights, reinforced by the liberal agenda, tends to obscure the discriminatory practices faced by women. The institutions that deal with women's human rights are more

fragile than those in the mainstream; they are underfunded and have weaker implementation possibilities. For example, when ratifying CEDAW states have attached more reservations than they have to any other UN convention.⁵⁸ Charlesworth has argued that even CEDAW is based on a male measure of equality since it focuses on women's rights in public life, such as in the formal economy, the law, and education.⁵⁹ Indeed, certain feminists have claimed that the whole notion of rights is based on a Western male norm and male experience; typically, rights do not respond to the risks that women face by virtue of being women. With certain exceptions, rights-based discourse has generally ignored oppression in the private sphere, thus tending to reinforce the public/private distinction that, while it is defined differently in different societal contexts, is consistent in its devaluation of women's rights. In other words, the definition of *human* manifests a male bias.

Following the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, where women's human rights was recognized as an issue, the focus on human rights at the UN Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995 demonstrated an increasing concern with women's rights, as well as an ongoing controversy among women and feminists about how to define these rights. Tensions between notions of universal rights and respect for cultural difference abound among women. Non-Western feminists have rightly questioned the whole notion of rights as being based on Western standards and Western liberal political discourse. Non-Western women may well be ambivalent about the rejection of cultural practices that they see as useful for fighting Western domination. This is an area of considerable disagreement, however. Many women from all parts of the world share the view that the language of rights gives them leverage to fight a variety of oppressions; and, although women are divided by race, class, and culture, women share an exclusion from decision making at all levels.⁶⁰

The recognition of women's rights as human rights demonstrates that the international community has responded to a certain extent to calls for amelioration of women's subordination. Discourse around women's human rights has revealed the gendered distinction between public and private and the gender biases of definitions of human rights, as well as the selective enforcement of violations more generally. But, while some steps have been taken toward integrating gender into the UN treaty system on rights, very few institutionalized advances have taken place. Alice Miller claims that this is because there is still very little concrete understanding of exactly what gender analysis is with regard to rights. She goes on to suggest that better

understandings of these issues will come from NGOs.⁶¹ Indeed, much of the success that has already occurred with respect to women's human rights, as well as the increased visibility of other gender issues in international organizations, must be credited to women organizing in arenas outside formal governmental institutions. This lack of initiative on the part of states suggests that transitions to formal democracy within states does not necessarily translate into articulating gender issues at the international level.⁶²

Women in Social Movements and Nongovernmental Organizations

Given women's relative absence in formal political institutions at both the national and international level, their political organizing has tended to take place in social movements or in international nongovernmental organizations.⁶³ The growth of these activities has been coincidental with a more general increase in transnational movements that Falk has termed "globalization from below." According to Falk, these movements began to articulate a new meaning of democracy that included cultural and social practices. Transnational social movements are animated by environmental concerns, human rights, and hostility to patriarchy; they are articulating a new vision of human community that includes diverse cultures seeking an end to poverty, oppression, and violence. Falk sees this as the emergence of a global politics that is producing a kind of transnational political consciousness starting at the grassroots level; it may be intensely local in concern, but it is not tied specifically to one country.⁶⁴ Many of these movements are beginning to articulate opposition to globalization and the negative effects of global market processes on sustainability, democracy, and the environment.⁶⁵

This vision, as well as these global concerns, have much in common with the concerns of women's social movements and NGOs that have grown up outside formal political channels but that are making transnational linkages around issues related to women's subordination. While many of these movements focus on women's practical daily needs, they are coming to see themselves as feminist in that they are focusing on women's subordination more generally, as well as on strategies for its elimination.⁶⁶ Motivated by these wider concerns, these movements are attempting to bridge the domestic/international and public/private divides and are redefining the meaning of the political to include noninstitutional politics at the global and local levels. For these movements, politics includes people's everyday experiences of sub-

ordination and attempts to change power relationships at all institutional levels.

Women have a long history of nongovernmental political engagement at the international level. In the nineteenth century, women began to organize internationally over a broad range of issues such as antislavery, temperance, peace, and women's suffrage. The first formal international women's organization, the International Congress of Women, was established in 1888. It brought together middle- and upper-class women engaged in moral and social reform, but avoided confrontational issues. The International Women's Suffrage Association, founded in 1904, was intended as an organization working specifically for women's suffrage. Subsequently, the International Congress of Women at The Hague in 1915 provided an important foundation for an international women's peace movement, the roots of which extend well back into the nineteenth century.⁶⁷ All these movements were comprised of elite women from the North, thus setting a precedent that international women's movements have tended to reflect the priorities of those in Western liberal states; this has given rise to legitimate claims from women from the South that their concerns have been ignored or misunderstood. The concerns from which these movements grew tended to reinforce the separation of public and private spheres at the international level; women's activities, both governmental and nongovernmental, were seen as an extension of their roles as wives and mothers, while the politics of international affairs and war were the purview of men, a pattern that still exists today.

While women's international organizing continued throughout the twentieth century, there was an increase in the activities of women's social movements associated with the UN Decade for Women. At the first UN women's conference in Mexico City in 1975 (the first year of the Decade), the United Nations International Women's Year was proclaimed; governments agreed on a global public policy to end discrimination against women. However, the exclusively statist form of the meeting motivated representatives from NGOs to organize separately, a pattern that has continued and grown at subsequent women's conferences.

Women in NGOs from all parts of the world played a large role in organizing the Women's Conference in Nairobi in 1985, the meeting that came at the end of the Decade; in Nairobi, there were fifteen thousand nongovernmental participants. In NGO circles, there was an increasing recognition of the multiple experiences of women depending on their class,

race, and nationality; feminist concerns with difference and cautions about universalism were articulated by the activist community. A wide variety of issues was raised, including women's participation in informal labor markets, environmental issues, and violence against women. At the formal intergovernmental meeting, the Forward Looking Strategies on the Advancement of Women were adopted; this document was intended to express women's views on world affairs, ranging from peace and war to family and children. The themes of equality, development, and peace, similar to the norms articulated by world-order scholars, were declared to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The definition of peace was tied to a broad conception of security that included not only the absence of war but the achievement of social and economic justice.⁶⁸ There was not much attention to gender or women's empowerment in the official government document, however; amelioration of women's lives was framed in terms of liberal feminism's goal of achieving equality within existing structures.

The end of the Cold War provided new opportunities for attention to issues on feminist agendas.⁶⁹ Less preoccupied with traditional security concerns, the United Nations held conferences in the early 1990s on the environment (1992), human rights (1993), and population (1994); women's voices were strong at all these conferences. At the international women's conference in Beijing in 1995, thirty thousand women attended the NGO forum; in terms of numbers, representation, and a broad agenda, Beijing was a success. Although the conference witnessed a backlash from male-dominated groups that ranged from conservative Christian groups in the United States to the Vatican and fundamentalist Muslim governments, the platform of the governmental meeting included an acceptance on the part of the United Nations that gender perspectives are essential to all its programs and issues.⁷⁰ This position was reinforced at the "Beijing plus five" meeting in New York in 2000.

Women's NGOs and social movements more generally have, therefore, played a crucial role in developing feminist agendas at the international level. Fears of cultural imperialism due to the predominance of white Western women in leadership positions have abated somewhat as women from the South have increasingly begun to organize and define feminism for themselves. Using women's human-rights groups as an example, Brooke Ackerly and Susan Okin claim that feminist activists have become agents for social change by developing a method of social criticism that is inclusive of diverse perspectives but has critical teeth. Working at the grassroots level,

NGOs promote what Ackerly and Okin call "deliberative inquiry" and self-knowledge; this allows local people to speak for themselves, while international networks can convey this knowledge across the world.⁷¹ At the NGO meeting in Beijing, the openness of the forum and a sense of participatory democracy challenged the hierarchical structures of the masculinized tradition fostered by governmental conferences.⁷²

Yet, for many feminists, there is a sense that Falk's optimistic assessment of the potential in social movements for a new global democracy must be tempered. Even though women from the South have succeeded in broadening the agendas and representation of women's social movements, they are still led by what Elise Boulding has called an elite of the powerless.⁷³ Existing power relations often determine leadership within social movements. Women based in the North, who are primarily white and middle-class, have more available resources and thus have moved into leadership roles.⁷⁴ Deborah Stienstra has pointed to the interconnections between social movements and states that produce "norms" and "standards" of social practice that reflect dominant power relationships. Because liberalism of privilege was one of the most influential norms of the 1990s, when women's groups outline their proposals they do so in response to the framing of the agenda in liberal terms; this influences the way they are able to respond. Because globalization and liberalization have relied heavily on existing unequal gender and race relations, Stienstra concludes that, unless unequal power relations are changed, there will not be any fundamental change in global governance.⁷⁵

The tensions and contradictions to which Stienstra has pointed are evident in the successes and failures of women's organizing. While the internationalization of feminism has been very successful in raising issues of discrimination and has made considerable strides in getting gender issues recognized by international organizations, in concrete terms women are doing less well than men in all societies. There was a recognition at the Beijing Conference that, in spite of the attention to these issues over the twenty years since the beginning of the UN Decade for Women, women's global status was not improving significantly. A significant reason for these inequalities, which continue, is that women must operate within "masculinized" organizations and structures.⁷⁶ Since global organizing is far removed from the realities of many women's lives, there is a sense that, although social movements are used to promote solutions that criticize the state, a return to the state is probably necessary to meet the dislocations and

poverty generated by the economic globalization of the late twentieth century.⁷⁷

Rosi Braidotti has claimed that the feminist vision of women as citizens of the world articulated by Virginia Woolf and first adopted by women in international movements at the beginning of the twentieth century is a white, ethnocentric one, far removed from the lives of most women. She sees dangers in Woolf's metaphor of exile from the state; the reality of exile, given the large numbers of refugees and migrants from war-torn homelands, is too urgent an issue to be taken as metaphor.⁷⁸ Likewise, Katharine Moon has suggested that Woolf's assertion that "the whole world is our country" is irrelevant when applied to prostitutes serving U.S. military bases in Korea. Those who challenge the tradition of sovereignty, including transnationalists, feminists, and world-order advocates, usually live in wealthy states and are empowered enough to call sovereignty a myth. Poor women do not have this power; for them, the fate of their lives is tied to the economic and political fate of their own state.⁷⁹ For these reasons, certain feminists have begun to explore the potential for emancipatory politics within the state itself. Similar to other critics of liberalism of privilege (see chapter 3), they are articulating a very different kind of democratic state.

Rethinking the State

Given the enormous distance between the local and the international, feminists from various parts of the world have begun to rethink women's relationships to the state. While they are quite critical of most contemporary states, feminists are increasingly looking to the state as a potential buffer against the detrimental effects of global capitalism. While some feminists believe that capitalism has the potential to improve women's welfare, the majority see dangers in global markets that tend toward inequality and a lack of democratic accountability. Drude Dahlerup has suggested that women are more dependent on the state than men, particularly in industrialized countries, where women have greater need of the state's redistributive functions. Dahlerup has claimed that women can gain more power through the state than through the market.⁸⁰ Although they would agree with critics of globalization that states and international institutions are often working in the interests of global capital, feminists are beginning to explore the possibilities of a different kind of state—one that, since it does have the potential

for democratic accountability, may be the most likely institution within which to articulate new visions of global security and less-hierarchical social relations.

Although democratization has not been universally beneficial for women, in certain parts of the world democratic transitions have been heralded as opening up space for leveraging the state in women's interests. Maria Nzomo has reported that, while it is premature to speak of women's roles in institutional politics, the 1980s and 1990s in Africa witnessed a phenomenal increase in women's associations that were responding to economic, social, and political crises within the region. Whereas African governments previously discouraged women's involvement in political activities, it was with the beginning of political pluralism and liberalization at the end of the 1980s that women's movements began to emerge and lobby the state over human rights and gender-sensitive political agendas.⁸¹

There are in Africa many women's groups that do not engage the state directly but that grew up during the era of democratization. In Tanzania, programs for training, education, and raising the consciousness of women and men on gender issues were set up after the return of political pluralism. Women have been operating primarily outside the centers of power: their strategy to influence public decision making has depended on first empowering themselves, using the openings in political space offered by democratization. However, women are aware that incursions at the formal level of politics does not mean that women's issues will be placed on "man-made" agendas. But certain feminists believe that with democratization and increased opportunities for women in the economy, states are more likely to create new institutions based on gender equality. April Gordon has claimed that state intervention is necessary to the promotion of gender equality by breaking down institutionalized patriarchy and creating new institutions based on gender equity. She has also suggested that the state cannot achieve gender equality without the improvement of the overall economic development of society. Clearly, this type of strategy involves a much more interventionist state than liberals would envisage.⁸²

While liberalization may allow space for women's organizing, the issue then becomes: What kind of state will best serve not only women's interests but peace and security, broadly defined? The liberal state, which is characterized by market democracy rather than social democracy, is clearly not the kind of state that feminists have in mind. Liberal democracy has not inspired feminists who work outside the liberal tradition because of deep structures

of gender inequality; these deep structures, they claim, have kept women unequal even after they received the vote and other formal rights. An important issue for feminist theorists, therefore, is whether inequality can be addressed within a liberal-democratic framework or whether the model is fundamentally flawed, given the structural problems of the public/private divide.⁸³

As suggested by Pateman's analysis, certain feminist political theorists see a deep gender bias in democratic theory. For them, seeking equality in a man's world is problematic because it assumes a standard of normality that is male; in the West, this standard is that of white, privileged males.⁸⁴ The model of the abstract individual, behind which this gendered representation is hidden, is a powerful impediment to the recognition of gender as a salient political factor. The association of citizenship with masculine characteristics such as rationality and autonomy is problematic for women's citizenship; women cannot be included in categories associated with public-sphere activities that are themselves defined by the exclusion of female traits and identities.⁸⁵ For women to be equal political actors, this must be recognized.

Many feminists have, therefore, been suspicious of what they have claimed are "gendered states," a term used to convey their belief that political, economic, and social structures work in the interests of certain groups over others. However, the reasons they give for the gender—and class and racial—biases caused by state policies differ according to their perspective. Liberal feminists have argued that equal rights could put an end to discriminatory policies, but the more-radical feminists of the 1960s and 1970s saw states, democratic and otherwise, as patriarchal institutions; states, they claimed, are part of an overall structure of male repression institutionalized through the public/private divide. Socialist feminists have asserted that states represent dominant-class interests as well as gender interests. Feminists have also investigated the extent to which women of different races have differential access to the state.⁸⁶

Drawing on the experience of British colonial rule, Chandra Mohanty, a postcolonial scholar, has argued that the Western colonial state created racially and sexually differentiated classes conducive to a ruling process grounded in economic-surplus extraction. Although the colonial state often transformed existing patriarchies, it instituted new ones; one important example is the colonial regulation of agrarian relations through the granting of property rights to men—a policy that aggravated existing gender inequal-

ities. In contrast to the colonial state, Mohanty contends that the contemporary liberal state operates through "unmarked discourses" of citizenship and individual rights that mask patriarchal policies.⁸⁷

More recently, certain feminists undertaking empirical studies in a variety of states have challenged these structural accounts of states' gendered and racialized policies and drawn more nuanced conclusions. Some see states as contingent and historically variable. R. W. Connell has claimed that, while states have historically been patriarchal, they are not essentially so; since they are constantly changing and dynamic, there is room for new political possibilities. States are active players in gender politics, regulating gender relations in various ways—through family policies, population policies, child care, and education. These policies have different implications for different groups inside states; the way states regulate gender and race also filters up into international institutions such as the United Nations and the International Labor Organization. While it is true that, in most liberal states, gender policies have reinforced the public/private divide that has worked in the interests of men, Connell believes that variability allows room for change.⁸⁸ He hypothesizes replacing the liberal state with a demilitarized and participatory democracy; however, this would not be possible until the gender distinctions between public and private are abolished. Clearly, this would mean a very different kind of state, one with an expansion of the realm to which democracy applied.⁸⁹

A different kind of democracy would demand a different concept of citizenship and one that is not dependent on public-sphere masculine characteristics. Anne Phillips rejects the notion that citizens must leave their bodies behind when they enter public life; democracy must be reconceptualized with gender difference (as well as other differences) in mind.⁹⁰ Suspicious of dichotomies that have served to reinforce gender hierarchies, most feminists prefer a form of citizenship that is not based on the notion of insiders versus outsiders; however, they are wary of concepts of global citizenship that hide difference and bypass local politics. For example, writing in the European context, Rosi Braidotti has cautioned against thinking about citizenship in the European Community before women come to terms with national politics and local realities. She claims that such notions of citizenship need not be nationalistic or ethnocentric; following Donna Haraway, she suggests that women are best thought of as being locally situated and multiply located in ways that allow for cultural diversity without losing sight of commonalities and universal notions of humanity.⁹¹

Acknowledging that prospects for the realization of new models of democracy are still far away, can these feminist models offer any guidance for conceptualizing new or emergent world orders? L. H. M. Ling has cautioned against focusing on internal sources of gender discrimination without taking the international context into account. Ling believes that sexism, racism, and classism are deeply embedded in international institutions that influence local institutions through internationalization. She argues for what she calls an “interstitial” approach that focuses on the intersection of domestic institutions and the international context and that is aware of the need to build gender-sensitive institutions under conditions of internationalization.⁹² In other words, any attempt to postulate a more democratic state must acknowledge that local and national politics are embedded in the norms and practices of the international system and global politics.

World-order and normative IR theorists have challenged us to think about the meaning of democracy beyond its narrow statist form. They have argued that a true “democratic peace” cannot be built on exclusive forms of national democracy but must be conceptualized in global terms. Drawing on feminist literatures in democratic theory and empirical examinations of the experiences of states that have recently undergone democratic transitions, IR feminists have reanalyzed democratization and exposed its gender biases. They have also pointed out that the norms and rules upon which Western democracy has been built and that have been carried up into international organizations are gendered.

Universalist claims embodied in such international norms as human rights are based on male definitions of rights. Although not normally included in conventional IR agendas, democratization at all levels, from the local to the global, has been central to IR feminist analyses. In calling for a form of democracy that dismantles oppressive social hierarchies, feminists have begun to build models of democracy that rethink the state and its international security policies.

5 Conclusions and Beginnings: Some Pathways for IR Feminist Futures

As the preceding chapters have shown, feminist perspectives on IR take us on paths that venture far from the conventional discipline. The topics with which IR feminists have been centrally concerned during the last ten years—security, broadly defined; economic globalization; and democratization—do not readily fit into conventional statist boundaries. Many of them have to do with human security, economic inequality, democracy, and human rights. All these issues have been investigated using gender analysis; many analyses show feminists in critical dialogue with liberalism, defined as an ideology with a strong belief in the benefits of a global capitalist economy and minimal state intervention. Asking how feminism and gender analysis can offer new understandings of these issues, IR feminists are generally working within the context of global politics, rather than international relations. Frequently, they have found many more points of engagement with world-order, critical, normative, and postmodern literatures than with conventional IR. Feminists and conventional IR scholars see very different worlds, they ask different questions about these worlds, and use different methods to go about answering them.

Drawing on but going beyond previous chapters, I now summarize these various differences and their implications for feminist research agendas and their methodological choices, as well as for the future of feminist inquiry within IR. I elaborate on my claim that conventional IR and feminist IR come out of very different knowledge traditions and disciplinary perspectives, with feminism being transdisciplinary, rather than situated primarily within