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72 Charles Taylor has called attention to this in "The Politics of Recognition," esp. 67ff; see also Peters, "Understanding Multiculturalism."

73 See Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State."

74 See e.g., Frank, *Probleme einer interkulturellen Gerechtigkeitstheorie.*

75 See Axel Honneth, "Reply to Andreas Kalyvas," *European Journal of Social Theory* 2, no. 2 (1999): 249–52.

76 Considerations of this kind, already present in my *Struggle for Recognition* (esp. chs. 4 and 5), have been further developed in Honneth, "Postmodern Identity and Object-Relations Theory: On the Supposed Obsolescence of Psychoanalysis," *Philosophical Explorations* 2, no. 3 (1997).

77 Interesting references to such a concept of social legitimation, which tie the moral acceptability of a society's legal order to the opportunities for experiencing social recognition, are found in Lawrence Thomas, "Characterizing the Evil of American Slavery and the Holocaust," in David Theo Goldberg and Michel Krausz, eds, *Jewish Identity* (Philadelphia 1993), 153–76. The notion of a "social contract," as developed by Barrington Moore in *Injustice*, should of course also be understood in precisely this sense.

78 I am here naturally playing on the corresponding concept in the early Habermas (*Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston 1971)), which I believe retains its value in altered form. I find a similar orientation in Jonathan Lear's argument (*Love and its Place in Nature*, esp. ch. 7) that human love represents "a basic natural force."

79 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London 1910), 351f.

80 See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Cambridge, MA 1999), ch. 2, § 15; Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford 1986), ch. IV; G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge 1991).

81 See Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, ch. 3.

82 Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, ch. 7, § 67.

83 With this historicist reformulation, I hope to at least in part respond to the objections of Christopher Zurn, "Anthropology and Normativity: A Critique of Axel Honneth's 'Formal Conception of Ethical Life'," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 26, no. 1 (2000): 115–24.

84 David Miller, *Principles of Social Justice* (Cambridge, MA 1999).

85 For such a distinction between "first-order" and "second-order" justice that does allow appeals for an ethic of care in the name of universal justice (as impartiality) on the second level, see Brian Barry's impressive reflections in *Justice as Impartiality* (Oxford 1995), chs. 9 and 10.

86 Michael Walzer, "Liberalism and the Art of Separation," *Political Theory* 12 (1984).

87 This is of course the danger I see facing Nancy Fraser's normative-political proposals. To this extent, the one-sidedness of her social diagnosis (see section I above) would correspond to a one-sidedness on the level of the application of her normative conception of justice.

88 Maeve Cooke, "Between 'Objectivism' and 'Contextualism': The Normative Foundations of Social Philosophy," *Critical Horizons* 1, no. 2 (2000).

89 Indications of such a conception of moral progress, which takes account of an "expansion" of relations of recognition, are already to be found in my *Struggle for Recognition*, ch. 9.

90 See e.g., Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, ch. 9.

91 On such a negative procedure, see e.g., Margalit, *The Politics of Dignity*; Jonathan Allen, "Decency and the Struggle for Recognition," *Social Theory and Practice* 24, no. 3 (1998): 449–69.

92 See Kocka, "Erwerbsarbeit is nur ein kulturelles Konstrukt."

93 For arguments of this sort see in general: Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York 1989); Jeremy Waldron convincingly defends such a concept of rights in "When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights," in *Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991* (Cambridge 1993), 370–91.

Translated by Joel Golb and James Ingram

3

Distorted Beyond All Recognition: A Rejoinder to Axel Honneth

Nancy Fraser

Those who would renew the project of Critical Theory today face a daunting task.[1] Unlike earlier Frankfurt School thinkers, they cannot assume a political culture in which emancipatory hopes find focus in socialism, labor holds pride of place among social movements, and social egalitarianism enjoys broad support. Rather, they face an "exhaustion of [left-wing] utopian energies" and a decentered proliferation of social movements, many of which seek recognition of group difference, not economic equality.[2] Unlike their predecessors, too, today's exponents of Critical Theory cannot treat orthodox Marxism as an influential foil against which to assert the claims of culture and psychology. Rather, thanks to the confluence of neoliberalism and "the cultural turn," they must theorize the relation of culture and capitalism in a climate that conspires to repress the critique of political economy. Unlike earlier left-Hegelians, moreover, they cannot conceive society as a culturally homogeneous bounded whole, in which political claims can be adjudicated ethically, by appeal to a single shared value horizon. Rather, thanks to the complex processes that go under the shorthand term "globalization," they must address contexts in which value horizons are pluralized, fractured, and cross-cutting. Unlike their predecessors, finally, today's critical theorists cannot assume that all normatively justified claims will converge on a single program for institutional change. Rather, they must take on the hard cases – those, for example, in which claims for minority cultural recognition conflict with claims for gender equality – and tell us how to resolve them.

These conditions frame my debate with Axel Honneth. It is in response to their challenges that each of us has proposed to reconstruct the conceptual underpinnings of Critical Theory. And it is in the hope of satisfying their imperatives that each of us has devised a framework in which the category of recognition plays a major role. In both our theories, that category responds to several needs: on one level, it helps position critique in relation to contemporary social struggles; on another, it serves to theorize the place of culture in present-day capitalism; on yet a third, it promises to supply standards of justice that can adjudicate current claims. For both of us, therefore, recognition is central to the effort to reconstruct Critical Theory in a form adequate to present conditions.

Nevertheless, Honneth and I situate recognition very differently. He proposes a monistic framework in which that concept holds exclusive sway. In his view, a properly "differentiated" account of recognition is all that is required in a Critical Theory. There is no need for a second categorial axis oriented to distributive injustice and to the economic logic of globalizing capitalism. Recognition alone suffices to capture all the normative deficits of contemporary society, all the societal processes that generate them, and all the political challenges facing those seeking emancipatory change.

My own use of recognition is entirely different. Far from comprehending the totality of moral life, recognition for me is one crucial but limited dimension of social justice. And far from single-handedly orchestrating all social subordination, the "recognition order" of capitalist society is but one aspect of a larger complex that also includes market mechanisms. For me, accordingly, an approach centered exclusively on recognition cannot suffice. Rather, Critical Theory must situate recognition

as one categorial axis in a framework that also encompasses distribution. Thus, I have proposed a "perspectival-dualist" framework of redistribution and recognition as an alternative to Honneth's monism.

Which of these approaches should critical theorists prefer? The choice depends on three issues that have become central to the present debate. The first concerns what we may call "the empirical reference point" of Critical Theory. At a time when Marxian metanarratives have lost all credibility, there can be no metaphysically designated agent of emancipation and no a prioristically identified addressee of critique. Absent such essentialist guarantees, the critic confronts decentered congeries of social movements, whose claims often concern issues of identity and are normatively ambiguous. In this context, there is no escaping the pressing question: How should Critical Theory position itself in relation to the current political conjuncture and especially to movements that seek recognition? How shall it establish both a foothold in the empirical world and a critical stance?

A second issue concerns the place of culture in the emerging new phase of capitalist society. Characterized alternatively as post-Fordism, globalization, and the information age, this phase is one in which culture has assumed a new salience – witness the growing weight of religion and ethnicity in the constitution of social identities, the heightened awareness of cultural differences, the expanding reach of global media, and the intensified cultural contestation that marks today's struggles for recognition. In this context, intellectual paradigms that posit the primacy of the economic appear deeply inadequate, while approaches that prioritize culture are attractive to many. The result is a new set of challenges for Critical Theory: How should it understand the emerging phase of capitalism, in which cultural contestation plays so prominent a role? And with what social-theoretical tools? How shall it position itself in relation to the cultural turn in social theory?

A third issue concerns the normative standards informing

critique. The background here, once again, is accelerated globalization, in which heightened economic interdependence coexists with increased transcultural interaction. In this context, there exists no shared, authoritative ideal of human flourishing. Rather, everyone lives cheek by jowl with "others," whose views of the good life diverge from their own. In this situation, Critical Theory cannot rely on any single, determinate set of ethical ideals. But neither can it embrace the cheerful anti-normativism – always in any case cryptonormative – recently fashionable in poststructuralist circles. Under these conditions, what sort of normative standards can Critical Theory lay claim to, and on the basis of what sort of justification?

In what follows, I shall examine my differences with Honneth on these three issues. In each case, I shall assess the relative merits of his recognition monism and my perspectival dualism of redistribution and recognition. In each case, too, I shall argue that Honneth's approach is inferior. I shall claim, first, that it fails to secure a credible empirical reference point for Critical Theory; second, that it fails to furnish a tenable account of the place of culture in contemporary capitalism; and third, that it fails to supply a set of normative standards that can adjudicate today's claims for recognition. I shall also argue that the root problem in each case is the same: Honneth overextends the category of recognition to the point that it loses its critical force. Inflating that concept beyond all recognition, he transforms a limited but precise instrument of social criticism into a bloated and blunted catchall that fails to rise to the challenges of our time.

I. On the Place of Experience in Critical Theory: Against the Reduction of Political Sociology to Moral Psychology

The question of an "empirical reference point" arises in this debate because both Honneth and I endorse a defining feature

of Critical Theory: its distinctive dialectic of immanence and transcendence. Both of us reject the externalist stance of traditional theories that purport to judge social arrangements from on high, claiming a God's-eye-view wholly independent of the society in question. Rather, both of us assume that critique achieves traction only insofar as it discloses tensions and possibilities that are in some sense immanent to the configuration at hand. And we both seek to develop a language of criticism that can speak to the social subjects we aim to enlighten. At the same time, however, both Honneth and I reject the strong internalism of historicist hermeneutics. Not content merely to explicate the meanings sedimented in given traditions, both of us assume that critique can harbor a radical potential only if the gap between norm and the given is kept open. And we both assume that valid norms transcend the immediate context that generates them. Thus, far from restricting ourselves to criticism that is strictly internal, we both seek concepts with "surplus validity."

In general, then, both Honneth and I espouse Critical Theory's signature goal of accommodating immanence and transcendence simultaneously. Seeking a *via media* between positivist externalism and historicist internalism, both of us seek a foothold in the social world that simultaneously points beyond it.

Nevertheless, Honneth and I disagree as to how best to achieve this shared aim. His strategy for accommodating immanence and transcendence is to ground Critical Theory in a moral psychology of prepolitical suffering. Identifying immanence with subjective experience, he proposes to connect critique with its social context by deriving its normative concepts from the sufferings, motivations, and expectations of social subjects. This strategy is risky, however, as it threatens to collapse normativity into the given. To forestall this danger, Honneth resolves to take distance from the political disputes of the present. Thus, he determines to secure transcendence by locating an "independent" stratum of moral experience, unaffected by public-sphere claims-making. Fearing over-identification with contemporary social movements, yet still seeking an empirical reference point, he professes to find a body of pristine experience in inchoate everyday suffering that has not been politicized. Claiming to reconstruct that experience, he then purports to uncover the single basic moral expectation underlying all social discontent: that one's personal identity be adequately recognized. It follows, in his view, that the drive to secure recognition of identity represents the core of all moral experience and the deep grammar of all normativity. Critical Theory, therefore, should inscribe this imperative as the centerpiece of its categorial framework.

In general, then, Honneth grounds his recognition monism in a moral psychology of prepolitical suffering. But far from establishing a genuine dialectic of immanence and transcendence, this strategy encounters difficulties at every point. For starters, Honneth's reading of prepolitical experience is dubious. His appeals to social research notwithstanding, it is by no means clear that daily discontent is always a matter of denied recognition. In fact, the idea that one single motivation underlies all such discontent is *prima facie* implausible. A less tendentious reading of a broader range of research sources would doubtless reveal a multiplicity of motives – including resentment of unearned privilege, abhorrence of cruelty, aversion to arbitrary power, revulsion against gross disparities of income and wealth, antipathy to exploitation, dislike of supervision, and indignation at being marginalized or excluded. (The list would be far longer, of course, if it also included all those less admirable motives, such as hatred of those who are different, that also suffuse daily discontent.) If these motivations *could* be subsumed under an overarching normative rubric, the latter could not be anything so determinate as the expectation that one's personal identity be recognized. Rather, it would have to be something more general, such as the expectation that one be treated fairly. That thesis could encompass experiences that Honneth's cannot, such as the felt unfairness of social

arrangements that doom some people to stark deprivation, while others enjoy fabulous wealth – an experience documented, *inter alia*, in Michael Harrington's *The Other America*.[3] Certainly, such arrangements violate fundamental notions of the equal moral worth of human beings (an idea I shall examine in section III); and they clearly impede parity of participation in social life. But they are not best interpreted as violations of personal identity. To insist on construing them as such is to shift the focus away from society and onto the self, implanting an excessively personalized sense of injury.[4] Far from clarifying matters, the net effect is to stretch the concept of recognition to breaking point. Thus, instead of treating denied recognition as the normative kernel of all daily suffering, one would do better to construe it as one kind of felt unfairness among others.

The misreading of prepolitical suffering is hardly the only difficulty with Honneth's strategy, however. More troubling still is his designation of such suffering as Critical Theory's privileged reference point. That designation is questionable on several levels. Empirically, it is by no means clear that such suffering is really untainted by publicly circulated vocabularies of normative judgment. Certainly, in democratic societies, no firewall insulates daily life from political contestation in the public sphere. As a result, the quotidian experiences of injustice that Honneth casts as politically innocent are in fact mediated by idioms of public claims-making – witness Jane Mansbridge's ethnography of "everyday feminism," which reveals that US women's apparently nonpolitical experiences of daily suffering are suffused with interpretative schemata drawn from political feminism.[5] Conceptually, moreover, the appeal to a stratum of experience that is simultaneously empirical and primordial is incoherent. An instance of "the myth of the given," it fails to appreciate that we can never have access to moral experience unmediated by normative discourses, as the latter necessarily infiltrate not only the experiences of social actors but also the

perspectives of those who study them.[6] Thus, to borrow an expression from Richard Rorty, there can be no "independent" moral psychology that captures "Morality's Own Language."[7] Normatively, finally, it is doubtful that prepolitical experience really constitutes a better reference point than the social-movement claims that Honneth dismisses. The latter, after all, have the advantage of being subject to critical scrutiny in open debate. Inarticulate suffering, in contrast, is by definition sheltered from public contestation. Thus, if Critical Theory's reference points should be normatively reliable – if, in other words, they should help us to conceptualize what really *merits* the title of injustice, as opposed to what is merely *experienced* as injustice – then social-movement claims are at least as plausible candidates as untested prepolitical discontent.[8]

Nevertheless, I do not intend to champion such claims as an alternative foundation for Critical Theory, Honneth's mischaracterization of my position notwithstanding. On the contrary, I object in principle to *any* proposal to ground a normative framework on one privileged set of experiences. That strategy is flawed in part because it puts all its eggs in one basket. Insisting on the necessity of one, and only one, privileged reference point, it invests the latter with too much authority, effectively treating it as an incorrigible foundation. In fact, however, no set of experiences, prepolitical or otherwise, should be insulated from critical scrutiny. The wiser course is to establish multiple points of entry into social reality, according absolute privilege to none of them, and submitting each to potential revision in light of the others. The need for such cross-checks is especially pressing in the case of subjective experiences, which Honneth, alas, takes at face value. Notoriously unreliable, such experiences need to be situated in relation to more objective, experience-distant touchstones, such as those afforded by structural analyses of social subordination and political sociologies of social movements. These latter reference points are empirical, to be sure, but they do not arise

directly from subjective experience. On the contrary, they represent indispensable benchmarks for assessing the validity of experience's claims.

Honneth, however, is unwilling to put experience to the test. For him, rather, moral psychology settles everything in advance. In his framework, moral-psychological questions of subjective motivation assume priority over questions of social explanation and normative justification. Thus, the issue of what motivates the subjective experience of injustice sets the parameters for how he approaches other key critical tasks, such as identifying the hegemonic grammars of political claims-making, the social processes that institutionalize injustice, and the normative criteria for adjudicating claims. For Honneth, in other words, once moral psychology purports to establish that misrecognition is the sole bonafide experience of injustice, then everything else follows in train: all political demands must be translated into claims for recognition; all modes of subordination must be interpreted as denied recognition and traced to the recognition order of society; and all criteria of justice must be reduced to subvarieties of recognition. The result is a surprisingly traditional theoretical edifice: a foundationalist construction in which moral psychology grounds, and unduly constrains, political sociology, social theory, and moral philosophy, illegitimately truncating those inquiries and infringing their relative autonomy.

Taken together, these difficulties doom Honneth's attempt to establish a viable dialectic of immanence and transcendence. Far from constituting a genuinely immanent empirical reference point, his invocation of prepolitical suffering serves as a pretext for introducing a quasi-transcendental moral psychology, which purports to establish once and for all that recognition is always and everywhere the sole and sufficient category of morality. The effect is to entrench the primacy of recognition anthropologically, below the level of historical contingency, and thus to belie the pretension to immanence. To be sure, Honneth admits some scope for historical development, as he allows that

recognition becomes "differentiated" as society progresses. But instead of leading to genuine historical thinking, this approach predetermines the course of history: historical developments can only ever differentiate recognition into various "spheres"; they can never generate new moral categories that are not variants of recognition. His historicizing gesture notwithstanding, then, Honneth ends up subordinating the moment of immanence to that of transcendence. And yet the transcendence, too, proves illusory in the end. Recognition monism does not, after all, provide a critical vantage point on contemporary political culture. On the contrary, it uncritically reflects today's one-sided fascination with the politics of recognition. As a result, it functions more to ratify the current fashion than to interrogate the latter's adequacy. And so the overall conclusion is clear: Honneth fails to establish a foothold in the existing social world that can also point beyond it.

What, then, is the alternative to his strategy? The approach I have proposed begins not with subjective experience, but with *decentered discourses of social criticism*. Thus, it does not seek to mirror the perspective of any social subject, whether individual or collective, prepolitical or political. Rather, I connect critique with its social context by focusing initially on the *folk paradigms of social justice* that constitute a society's hegemonic grammars of contestation and deliberation. Far from reflecting unmediated experience, these folk paradigms constitute depersonalized discursive formations that mediate moral disagreement and social protest. As such, they represent a nonsubjective reference point for Critical Theory. The effect is to detach the theory from the subject-centered philosophy assumed by Honneth and to resituate it within the linguistic turn.

Let me explain. Folk paradigms of justice do not express the perspective of any determinate set of social subjects. Nor do they belong exclusively to any one societal domain. Rather, they are transpersonal normative discourses that are widely diffused throughout democratic societies, permeating not only political public spheres, but also workplaces, households, and

civil-society associations. Thus, they constitute a moral grammar that social actors can (and do) draw on in *any* sphere to evaluate social arrangements. As I explained in chapter one, today's principal folk paradigms of justice are recognition and redistribution. *Pace* Honneth, they are invoked not only by organized movements, but also by unorganized individuals in everyday contexts.[9]

In my approach, then, folk paradigms serve as an initial empirical reference point. But they do not enjoy any absolute privilege. Unlike Honneth's prepolitical suffering, they do not constitute an incorrigible foundation from which to derive the normative framework of Critical Theory. On the contrary, the critical theorist must evaluate their adequacy – from at least two independent perspectives. She or he must determine, first, from the perspective of social theory, whether a society's hegemonic grammars of contestation are adequate to its social structure, and second, from the perspective of moral philosophy, whether the norms to which they appeal are morally valid.

Evaluated in these ways, today's folk paradigms of justice get mixed reviews. On the one hand, social-theoretic examination discloses that both redistribution and recognition correspond to modes of societal integration and social subordination that are integral to contemporary society. Thus, it establishes their *prima facie* plausibility as categories for critical reflection on present conditions. On the other hand, social theory also discloses that distribution and recognition are inextricably intertwined in social reality. Thus, it reveals the inadequacy of a political culture that decouples them from each other and casts them as mutually incompatible. Similarly, moral-philosophical examination yields mixed results. On the one hand, it discloses that both distribution and recognition are bonafide dimensions of justice, thus establishing that both can generate principles with normative validity. On the other hand, it also establishes their mutual irreducibility and co-implication, thus revealing not only the inadequacy of any monism, whether distributive or

recognition-based, but also the shortcomings of a political culture that fails to integrate both dimensions within a broader overarching moral framework. The upshot is that today's folk paradigms of justice are neither wholly misguided nor wholly satisfactory. At once plausible and in need of reconstruction, the current grammar of contestation represents an empirical reference point whose full and adequate development points beyond the present constellation.

In general, then, my approach, unlike Honneth's, is nonfoundational. As a result, its internal structure diverges from his. In particular, the shift in focus from experience to discourse decenters moral psychology, thus opening space for the study of political culture, which now joins social theory, moral philosophy, and political theory as a constitutive element of Critical Theory. Yet none of these inquiries is the ground of the others in Honneth's sense. None is immune from revision. Rather, each is responsive to the others, which provide checks and correctives where necessary. And the results of the process cut both ways: on the one hand, today's emphasis on recognition spurs a critical look at social theories and moral philosophies that neglect culturally rooted injustices of status; on the other hand, as I just noted, that emphasis is itself subject to correction by the latter disciplines. The result is a hermeneutical circle in which a plurality of nonfoundational elements is brought into a decentered process of mutual correction aimed at achieving reflective equilibrium. Thus, in my approach Critical Theory simultaneously learns from contemporary political culture and preserves its critical independence.

It follows that my conception of Critical Theory differs from Honneth's. As we saw, he assumed a foundationalist edifice in which moral psychology grounded, and constrained, social theory and moral philosophy. For me, in contrast, Critical Theory is polycentric and multilateral. After all, once we reject the idea that experience can serve as the theory's foundation, then moral psychology loses its privileged place. Questions of subjective motivation lose their primacy over questions of social

explanation and normative justification, ceasing to limit reflection on the causes of injustice and the criteria for justifying claims. Instead, both of those inquiries regain their relative autonomy. In social theory, we are freed to conceptualize types of injustice, their causes and their remedies, independently of how they are experienced. In moral theory, likewise, we may identify norms for adjudicating justice claims, unconstrained by the dictates of a flawed psychology. And in political sociology, we can analyze the hegemonic normative grammars that structure conflict and contestation. The effect is to free Critical Theory from the artificial restrictions of an *a priori* monism, which inflates the idea of recognition to the point of unrecognizability, thereby draining it of critical force.

At the same time, the polycentric alternative I have proposed provides a structure within which the demands of both immanence and transcendence can be met. Clearly, folk paradigms of justice occupy a position of immanence in the social world, as do the folk norms embedded within them. But they are not static repositories of fixed normativity. Far from being inevitably mired in the given, under modern conditions they are open to historical extension, radicalization, and transformation. Under pressure to confront new problems, and subject to creative reappropriation, the norms contained within folk grammars transcend the social world in which they originate. The idea of participatory parity is a case in point. As I shall explain in section III, this idea is a radicalization of widely held folk norms of equality, whose scope and substance have greatly expanded in the course of history. Thus, the principle of participatory parity has a foothold in the existing social world. At the same time, however, it points beyond that world, as its thoroughgoing implementation would require major social-structural change. Thus, participatory parity, like the folk norms from which it descends, represents an important reference point for Critical Theory – a nonsubjective reference point on which the demands of immanence and transcendence converge. And so the conclusion here, too, is clear: it is not the case, *contra*

Honneth, that, absent an "independent" foundation in moral psychology, my approach remains mired in the given. On the contrary, it allows for – indeed fosters – a radical critique of contemporary society.

Axel Honneth has suggested that the core difference between us is that his approach is oriented to deep philosophical issues, whereas mine is motivated by political opportunism. Thus, he disparages my approach as a form of "shortsighted presentism," which seeks only to mirror the claims of contemporary social movements. Nothing, it should now be clear, could be further from the truth. Far from insulating such claims from critical scrutiny, the entire thrust of my theory is to question their adequacy. Moreover, the irony of Honneth's charge is painfully clear. Failing to problematize current discourses, and so drawing unselfconsciously on hegemonic paradigms, his recognition monism is a far less critical mirror of the present *Zeitgeist* than my perspectival dualism of redistribution and recognition.

II. On the Cultural Turn in Social Theory: Against the Reduction of Capitalist Society to its Recognition Order

The second major focus of this debate is the place of culture in contemporary society. At issue here is the question of how critical theorists should understand the social structure of present-day capitalism. Within that structure, how far down does cultural ordering extend? What is its relation to market mechanisms, on the one hand, and to distributive outcomes, on the other? Is misrecognition the root cause of all subordination in capitalist society, and is recognition alone sufficient to redress it? Should Critical Theory unreservedly embrace "the cultural turn"? Should it replace an economistic paradigm that privileged production with one that privileges culture?

Such questions are by no means new. They have been