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Latin America in a Rapidly Changing World¹

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Latin America's relations with the rest of the world are strikingly different today from those in the 1960s and 70s, the 1980s and 90s, and even those at the turn of the twenty-first century. This is so for several reasons.

- Many Latin American and Caribbean nations have undergone profound transformations that permit and indeed may compel them to be more globally involved.
- The global diffusion of power and wealth, and the international policies and relative world influence of the United States, have changed significantly.
- Many nations from beyond the western hemisphere that had never, or not for many years, been substantially engaged with Latin America have developed a strong presence there, while the influence of the US government and in some countries of the US economy has been declining, especially in South America.
- The number and impact of internationally relevant Latin American and Caribbean actors, many of them non-governmental, have radically increased outside their countries and beyond the hemisphere, while international non-governmental organizations and transnational enterprises have become much more active in the region.

This chapter discusses all these changes.

LATIN AMERICA'S CHANGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the 1960s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (Cuba excepted) were generally marginal outside the western hemisphere; several were actually less engaged in international affairs than they had been earlier. In most

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cases, their international relationships – economic, political and diplomatic – were largely governmental, and were primarily with the United States and with international financial institutions that were greatly influenced by the United States. Many countries, especially those geographically closest to Washington, followed the US lead on most issues in regional and world affairs. They often found ways to exercise their sovereignty and influence, but operated within structures dominated by Washington. From the late 1940s into the 1960s, most Latin American countries comprised a virtual voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly, almost always supporting US positions. In the Cold War context, only three Latin American countries—Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay—still maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1960, for example.

Today, by contrast, many Latin American countries have highly diverse international ties, not only elsewhere in the Americas but also in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. They are attracting attention and material resources from many extra-hemispheric governments and non-governmental actors. Many now take international positions and influence global issues in ways that earlier would have seemed threatening to US foreign policymakers, subject as they were to the “hegemonic presumption,” and that might well have led to US interventions.¹

Most Latin American countries today, with very few exceptions, can no longer be presumed to support the international policies of the United States, at the United Nations, the Organization of American States or elsewhere. Despite strong US pressures, only four of thirty-four Latin American countries sent troops in support of US military action in Iraq in 2003, for example: three Central American nations (El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua), and the Dominican Republic, where the foreign minister resigned in protest of his government’s decision. Colombia (then the fifth largest recipient of US foreign assistance in the world and by far the largest in the Americas) was the only South American nation to support the US decision to go to war in Iraq.² The two Latin American countries then serving on the UN Security Council, Chile and Mexico, were crucial in blocking the US effort to gain Security Council approval for military action in Iraq.³

Rather than continue to concentrate their regional relationships within the Organization of American States (OAS), headquartered in Washington and largely financed by the United States, Latin American countries have been launching new

regional institutions, based in South America and excluding US participation. These include the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), the incipient South American Bank (BANCOSUR) and SUCRE, a regional arrangement that financed more than \$1 billion in commerce among ALBA countries in 2012.⁴ Some of these efforts have not yet developed much traction or concrete significance, but both ALBA and UNASUR have been active and sometimes effective on several regional issues. All these initiatives represent important indications of intent and direction.

The political, diplomatic and commercial relationships of many South American nations have been diversifying away from close ties with Washington. At the same time, however, many concrete and human connections between the United States and Latin America, especially with the northern countries of the region, have been growing much stronger, mainly because of migration, trade, investment, education, tourism, and transnational business and professional networks. Although formal and diplomatic relations between the United States and several South American countries have become more distant and sometimes strained in recent years, in many countries the influences of US society and culture, as well as of the US economy, remain high. And the number and intensity of US linkages with Mexico and also with some of the countries of Central America and the Caribbean are unprecedented.

FROM THE 1960S TO THE 21ST CENTURY

In the 1960s, the US government had a paramount position throughout almost all of Latin America and the Caribbean, except in revolutionary Cuba, where Fidel Castro had decisively taken his country out of the US orbit. Battered by World War II, the countries of Western Europe had lost much of their presence in the Americas, except in the small colonial territories in and around the Caribbean. European military advisors in South America had been largely replaced by US military missions and by an inter-American defense system designed and led by Washington, though this alliance system never attained the strategic and operational importance that NATO attained in Europe.⁵ By the early 1960s, almost all military weapons in the region came from the United States.⁶ European business enterprises had been displaced by US companies and by nationalizations of public utilities and mining enterprises.⁷ US foundations were expanding their

influence on Latin American agricultural development, public health, and higher education, especially in the basic sciences, the social sciences, law and economics.⁸ US-based religious organizations were growing in numbers and influence.⁹ South America was still significantly shaped by European culture and higher education, but US music, literature, cinema and universities were fast gaining prominence, even then.¹⁰

The United States was then the main trading partner of most Latin American nations. The share of Latin American exports going to the United States had climbed from 12% in 1910 to 45% in 1958. The share of US imports coming from Latin America had reached 37% in 1950, a 50% increase over pre-World War II levels, and remained nearly as high in the 1960s. US private investment in Latin America quintupled in the twenty years after World War II, eclipsing other sources of foreign investment

The United States was also providing substantial economic assistance to Latin America, especially through the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), established in 1959, and the Alliance for Progress, launched in 1961.¹¹ For several Latin American countries, the main sources of foreign exchange in the 1960s were US bilateral economic assistance, and flows from multilateral institutions, such as the IADB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD), where the US government had disproportionate influence. Exports of primary commodities (especially sugar and coffee that were subject to quotas) were also significantly affected by US political decisions. It was therefore vital for Latin American governments and elites to maintain good political relations with US authorities.

The US government was then also deeply involved in the internal affairs of many Latin American nations. To shape political developments in the region, Washington used diplomatic and economic pressures and inducements, public diplomacy and media manipulation, police and military training and equipment, intelligence penetration, trade union development, electoral campaign financing, the provision or suspension of economic and technical assistance, covert intervention and sometimes (but not often) overt military action.¹² The main aim was to thwart leftist movements that might be, or might become, linked with the Soviet Union.¹³ A second goal, compatible and sometimes intertwined with the first, was to advance the economic interests of US corporations. The US

government had local supporters and even partners, but the main impetus in most cases came from Washington.

The apogee of US interventionism in the Americas after World War II was the unilateral military intervention in the Dominican Republic in April-May, 1965. Reversing Franklin D. Roosevelt's pledge in the 1930s that the United States would henceforth eschew unilateral intervention in the Americas, more than 22,000 US troops landed to forestall what President Lyndon B. Johnson and some of his advisers feared would become a "second Cuba," i.e. a Communist takeover. The United States quickly secured an OAS vote to establish an "Inter-American Peace Force" in Santo Domingo, into which the US contingent could be incorporated under the nominal command of a Brazilian general, although it required the vote of the ambassador from the ousted Dominican Republic government to secure the required two thirds to approve a military action.¹⁴

Ten years later the US Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee) documented extensive overt and covert involvement by the United States in Chile's domestic affairs during the 1960s and 1970s. These included repeated efforts over many years to thwart the election, and then in 1970 to derail the constitutional accession to the presidency, of the ultimately elected Chilean Socialist leader Salvador Allende, and subsequently to weaken his government until its overthrow by the Chilean armed forces in 1973.¹⁵ For many people throughout Latin America and across the world, the bloody ouster of Allende and the installation of a repressive military regime in Chile was a formative political event.

By that time, however, the underlying economic and political bases of US preponderance in South America had actually already begun to decline. The US share of Latin America's exports and imports decreased. US investment in the region dropped significantly as a share of all US private foreign investment, and the Alliance for Progress was petered out. Washington could and did contribute to Allende's fall, but could not shape Chile's course under the Pinochet dictatorship. Nor could the United States get the OAS to establish a multilateral force to negotiate a political transition in Nicaragua from the crumbling Somoza dictatorship to a moderate democratic government.¹⁶ Washington failed to prevent the leftist Sandinista takeover in 1979, and then could not oust the Sandinista government, despite strong attempts to do so that included mining

Nicaragua's harbors, acts of economic sabotage, and the organization, training and arming of the Contras, an anti-Sandinista insurgency.

Washington could not secure the support of fifteen Latin American nations for the US-led boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. Nor could it dissuade Argentina from invading the Malvinas/Falklands Islands in 1982. The diversification of weapons purchases by Latin American countries caused arms sales to the region from the Soviet Union, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Israel, *each of which* exceeded those from the United States by the mid-1980s. The economic, political and cultural presence in the Americas of West Germany and other European countries, the Soviet Union and Japan were all rising in the 1970s and 1980s, and US predominance was diminishing.

These trends were reinforced as the increasingly autonomous Latin American nations, especially those in South America, pursued their own international interests, even when those were directly opposed to Washington's policies. This was illustrated by Brazil's recognition of the Soviet and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and by its efforts to obtain advanced nuclear technology from West Germany, against the express policies of the US government.¹⁷ It was also evident in Mexico's promotion of the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States and its activist opposition to US policies in Central America, and in Venezuela's leadership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It was clear at the United Nations, where only one country from Latin America and the Caribbean, tiny Grenada, coincided with the US position on more than half of the recorded votes in the 1985 General Assembly, and where a strong majority of Latin American countries supported the election of Nicaragua to the UN Security Council, even as Washington was trying to overthrow its Sandinista government.¹⁸

Latin America's break from easy alignment with the United States was likewise clear in the increasingly frequent efforts, mainly by South American nations, to counter US influence, both within the region and in broader South-South forums. This was true in the "Group of 77"; the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the Latin American Economic System (SELA); the four-nation Contadora initiative to seek diplomatic settlements in Central America; and the formation in the mid-

1980s of the “Rio Group” to coordinate policies on international debt negotiations with the United States and other industrial countries.¹⁹

The concerted efforts that most Latin American nations have been making in the twenty-first century to diversify their own international links and to reduce US influence are thus not new. The factors pushing Latin American nations to diversify their international relationships in the 1960s and 1970s, as in the 21st century, reflected some relative economic decline of the United States, the relative strengthening of some Latin American economies, the presence of extra-regional countries interested in engaging with Latin America, and domestic political and ideological currents in several nations.

Latin American attempts in the late 1960s and 1970s to exert autonomy and take distance from the United States eventually decreased in the late 1970s and 1980s, however, as military regimes that fervently supported US Cold War national security doctrines and clung to a bipolar alignment with the United States, came to power in several South American nations. International financial realities after the debt crisis, beginning in the early 1980s, undercut the conditions for South-South cooperation by requiring Latin American countries to accept the requirements of US-influenced international financial institutions in order to restructure their finances. And the fall of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the decade restored the United States, at least for a time, to virtually unchallenged global and regional stature. By the early 1990s, long-standing Latin American complaints of excessive US interventionism in the region gave way in several countries to complaints about US neglect in the post-Cold War world.

NEW US INITIATIVES

It was in this new context that US President George H.W. Bush proposed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in June, 1990, offering “free trade” agreements to all Latin American countries, beginning with Mexico. His administration then negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada.²⁰ President Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, finished the NAFTA negotiations and got them approved by Congress. In 1994, Clinton convened a Summit of the Americas in Miami and proposed multilateral negotiation of a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a goal

adopted in Miami with an announced target date of 2005. All these initiatives, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, attempted to reenergize a central US role in the Americas.

Largely driven by US domestic politics, the US government also forcibly reinstated the overthrown, democratically-elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 1994; tightened the commercial embargo against and increased political distance from Cuba that same year; provided a \$50 billion rescue package to Mexico to help resolve its financial crisis early in 1995; and mobilized Latin American support for US-led anti-narcotics programs, first through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, launched in 1989, and then through Plan Colombia, approved by the US Congress in 2000.

US efforts to become more involved with Latin America were reciprocated in many cases during this period. Argentina, for instance, long the South American country most resistant to cooperation with the United States, changed its approach in the early 1990s, working closely with Washington in Central America and at the United Nations. Argentina successfully sought to be recognized as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States; its ambassador in Washington, later foreign minister, famously called for “carnal relations,” not “Platonic ones,” with the United States. Colombia’s government worked closely with Washington to develop and implement Plan Colombia to combat the narcotics cartels and the leftist insurgencies. Mexico, too, turned toward closer relations with the United States after the Cold War’s end caused Western European countries to focus their attention eastward.

From the early 1980s into the 1990s, many Latin American countries undertook successful transitions from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance driven by domestic pressures that were reinforced by events beyond the Americas, especially the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Elected governments were restored in all the South American countries, and most moved toward consensual international policies geared toward protecting democratic regimes. By the early 1990s, most Latin American and Caribbean nations had freely and fairly elected governments, which were generally aligned with each other and with the US government in support of democracy and human rights.²¹

At the same time, most Latin American nations adopted market-oriented economic reforms. Most Latin American governments adopted balanced macroeconomic policies; undertook privatization, deregulation and lowered tariffs; and welcomed foreign investment. These policies were prescribed by the so-called “Washington Consensus” that had already become the orthodox canon of the international financial institutions and of most Latin American finance ministers and their key advisers.²²

Latin American and Caribbean countries, led by Chile, seemed for a time to be moving at different speeds in the same direction along a common path, aligned with the United States in ideological terms and in both political and economic orientation. The Pan-American Idea seemed to be reborn and robust, illustrated by the Santiago Declaration of 1998 on the issues of democracy and human rights and by the Washington Consensus on economic policy.

TWO TRAJECTORIES

From the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century, however, the diverse countries of Latin America actually embarked instead on two broadly different trajectories.

Venezuela took the lead, led by charismatic soldier-politician Hugo Chávez and encouraged by Fidel Castro in Cuba, in establishing the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) that included Venezuela and Cuba from the start, and eventually Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras (for a time) and a few small Caribbean island states with a combined population of less than half a million.²³ The governments of the ALBA nations, and to some extent the Argentine government under Néstor Kirchner and then Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, his wife and successor, have been profoundly suspicious of international capitalism, and of US power and policies. They also prefer plebiscitary “direct” democracy to representative liberal institutions and favor extraordinary executive power rather than checks and balances and horizontal accountability.

The ALBA governments advocate redistributive economic approaches, a dominant role for the state in the economy, and, to varying degrees, policies of resource nationalism. In specific circumstances, various ALBA countries have attempted to attract international investment in the mining and energy sectors.

But their past defaults on international debt, their aggressive rewriting of oil and gas contracts and, in some cases, their nationalization of companies have on the whole discouraged international investors, with the important exception of resource-hungry China, which has extended ample credits to precisely those countries that have been having the most trouble accessing international loans: Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina.

The ALBA leaders are all skeptical of region-wide economic integration schemes led by the United States. They have been able to mount redistributive social policies due in large part to the commodities boom, and in the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, persistently high prices for oil until the downturns of 2014-2015. Despite their vocally expressed commitment to indigenous rights, these governments have in practice mostly resisted efforts by indigenous groups to halt oil exploration and limit mining.

The non-ALBA countries, by contrast, have avidly sought to attract international capital and they continue to favor market-oriented growth, while implementing social welfare programs of various kinds to soften global capitalism's adverse effects on equity and social cohesion. They invite foreign investment to develop extractive industries, despite opposition by local, often indigenous, communities, environmental advocates and anti-globalization movements. On the whole they seek to strengthen the institutional checks and balances needed to achieve effective democratic governance rather than to concentrate executive authority. They maintain limits on presidential terms and have experienced transfers of power from ruling to opposition parties.

These two clusters are in practice more works in progress than settled models. Countries in each group work eclectically and in diverse ways to combine pragmatic and ideological elements in order to improve the terms of their insertion into the global capitalist economy. A few countries—Brazil, Argentina in particular—engage in selective import substitution and rely in part on protected domestic markets to spur growth, but without adopting the outright statist orientation of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba—the “21st Century Socialist” economies; Ecuador pursues a hybrid mix.

The ALBA governments base their domestic appeal and international legitimacy in large part on confronting the United States, on countering US

influence and eschewing inter-American cooperation. They seek to strengthen ties with each other and with such international rivals of the United States as China, Russia and Iran, and in some cases, with Syria, Libya, Palestine and Belarus.

The other governments—including those of Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and most of the nations of Central America and the Caribbean—have their differences, but have generally sought to build pragmatic cooperation with the United States on specific issues. At the same time, most are also developing stronger links with many other governments, in and beyond the hemisphere, and with global corporations. These governments want to diversify their ties and trade and to exercise their international autonomy, but without systematically confronting, rejecting or ignoring the United States—or being taken for granted by Washington.

As this fundamental division of Latin America emerged, the notion of a continent-wide free trade agreement faded and then virtually disappeared. The ALBA governments and Argentina resisted it mainly for ideological reasons. Brazil was unenthusiastic for commercial, domestic political, and geostrategic motives. Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay preferred separate bilateral agreements with the United States, with each other, and with other countries, and have negotiated countless such accords.²⁴

The traditional “Western Hemisphere Idea,” that the countries of the Americas stand together and apart from the rest of the world, has been replaced by complex patterns of differing Latin American relationships with each other, with the United States and with the rest of the world.²⁵ Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have formed the Pacific Alliance, for example, aimed at strengthening economic ties with the dynamic Asian economies, building upon earlier relationships developed through APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), and also with the rest of the globe. Other regional constellations include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)²⁴ and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), among other commercial and political integration regimes.

Neither “Latin America” as a unified bloc, juxtaposed with or explicitly opposed to the United States, nor an “Inter-American community” that includes both North and Latin America in broad and ongoing cooperation, is today a

useful construct for understanding or for managing the diverse international relationships that have emerged in the Americas. Neither organizations based mainly on confronting the United States nor those premised on underlying Pan-American harmony are likely to be dominant in future years. The patterns of intra-American relations will be more varied and eclectic, and will depend in part on how the US government responds to the complex patterns emerging in Latin America.

LATIN AMERICA'S TRANSFORMATIONS: FIVE DECADES OF CHANGE

Underlying Latin America's changing international relations have been major transformations over time of demographic, economic, social, political and institutional conditions throughout most of the region, as well as major, accelerating shifts in the international distribution of power.

Continuing trends that were evident already in the 1940s and in some cases even earlier, most Latin American countries in the past fifty years have become much more populous, urbanized, healthy and literate. Demographic transitions, educational and social programs and improved social mobility, together with expanded participation in the global economy, have produced significant economic growth in many countries of the region. That growth, in turn, has rapidly expanded middle classes that are reshaping economies, society and politics in many countries.²⁶ In Brazil, for example, the middle class (i.e. those who have a formal job, access to credit, and own either a car or a motorbike) is now estimated to include at least 53% of the country's population, creating a market for consumer products—from cell phones and kitchen appliances to automobiles, motorcycles and apartments—of more than 100 million persons, a dramatic expansion over the past fifteen years.²⁷ Similar socioeconomic changes, albeit on a smaller scale, have been occurring in many countries, as evidenced by the mushrooming of housing developments, shopping malls and cinema multiplexes, not only in national capitals but in many provincial centers.

Many Latin American countries had several years of robust growth beginning in the 1990s, as liberal, market-opening policies took hold, global markets and credit became more accessible and considerable international investment entered. Although there was a temporary downturn at the end of the 1990s, the increasing global prosperity after the turn of the twenty-first century,

much of it driven by rapid growth in China and in Asia more generally, and expanded demand for South America's commodity exports. The costs in some countries of doctrinaire or exaggerated adherence to the "Washington Consensus" approach—extreme openness to foreign investment and trade, unregulated privatization, excessive deregulation and indiscriminate reduction of the state—also became evident. Latin Americans, including many in the ALBA nations, increasingly came to recognize that active and efficient states, strong and independent judicial institutions, effective regulation and the rule of law are all needed to make markets work well, although many have found it difficult fully to implement the necessary reforms.²⁸

Impressive economic growth has taken place in this century, especially in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, El Salvador, Panama and the Dominican Republic. At the heart of this growth in most cases has been modernized agriculture, focused on both traditional and nontraditional products, participation in global value chains, and the development of niche agricultural, manufacturing and related service sectors. Many exports from South America have been aimed at the voracious demand from China and other Asian countries for agricultural products and raw materials (especially soy, iron, petroleum and copper).

Aggressive development of natural resource endowments has attracted major international investment from Asia, Europe, North America and the Middle East. Significant (but still insufficient) investment has occurred in infrastructure, and some countries export not only commodities but also manufactured goods and services. Latin America-based multinational firms (*multilatinas*) now operate throughout Latin America and across the globe. Some countries still export mostly primary products to a few select markets, especially China in the past decade, and are therefore vulnerable to a decline or stagnation in demand, but several have significantly diversified their exports, both by sector and by destination, compared with the past.²⁹ Most of South America's economies, bolstered by the commodities bonanza and with financial institutions strengthened by earlier reforms, were able to weather the international financial crisis that began in the United States in 2008 and to accumulate and protect large hard currency reserves as a buffer against future shortfalls.³⁰

Underlying many of these achievements has been the emergence in a number of countries—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay foremost among these—of a high level of *previsibilidad*, that is, stability of

expectations about the rules of the game and about the procedures by which these rules can be gradually altered. This stability of expectations has unleashed creative energies of all sorts: not only that of investors, foreign and domestic, but also of students, parents, non-governmental organizations and governments. Confidence in the operating framework facilitates longer-term decisions by all, and permits the building of policies and institutions for the medium and long-term, including counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies by governments and investment in education, housing and automobiles by individuals. In many Latin American countries, the traditional alliance on *cortoplacismo* (short-termedness) is being overcome, though savings rates remain below what the countries of the region need to grow robustly.

Latin America's picture is not all bright, to be sure. Many countries remain plagued by violence, although this is no longer caused by interstate conflict nor by internal civil wars, as it was from the 1960s through the 1980s. The remnants of insurgent movements in Peru and Colombia are mostly contained, and the principal Colombian insurgencies (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC and the National Liberation Army, ELN) have been intensely negotiating with the Colombian government to end hostilities. The violence that has been responsible for as many deaths in Central America since 1990 as during its brutal internal wars of the previous two decades arises now mainly from crime, organized and unorganized; from the response of criminal cartels to redoubled efforts by governments to destroy or badly wound them (as is also evident in Mexico); and from the incapacity of weak states to protect citizen security. The homicide rates in Central America and Venezuela are the highest in the world: 90.4 per 100,000 in Honduras; 53.7 in Venezuela; 44.7 in Belize; 41.2 in El Salvador; and 39.9 in Guatemala.³¹ Violence is also notably high in parts of Mexico and Brazil, as well as in regions of Colombia and parts of the Caribbean.³²

Although equity indicators have markedly improved since the turn of the twenty-first century, largely due to the redistribution of increased export revenues, social and subsidy programs, and conditional cash transfer programs in several countries, Latin America continues to be the world's most economically unequal region.³³ Some improved income distribution has been accomplished in a period of bounty primarily based on commodity exports, but it is uncertain whether these improvements can fully survive a prolonged downturn as commodity prices plateau or decline. Major segments of the population—

especially the indigenous, Afro-descendants, and the rural poor (particularly women and children)—remain seriously disadvantaged and may provide a constituency for populist movements.

The political leaders of the ALBA nations retain considerable popular support, despite growing inflation and loss of investor confidence in some cases. This is so primarily because they have provided great symbolic recognition as well as valued concrete material benefits to large segments of society that were previously economically, politically and culturally marginalized. It is doubtful, however, that these benefits can be sustained at recent levels in the economic circumstances of most of the ALBA countries.³⁴ In several other countries of the region, too, disapproval of governing authorities and distrust of political institutions has also been growing, as many citizens, especially the youth, are disenchanted by continuing social and economic challenges and by the perceived unresponsiveness and corruption of public officials.³⁵

The medium and long term domestic political complexions and international orientations of much of Latin America and the Caribbean therefore remain uncertain, and different countries will go in contrary directions. But the region as a whole will not go back to the international relations pattern of the 1960s. Many South American nations are now upper-middle income countries. They are mostly no longer dependent on foreign aid. Their governments are confident of their national legitimacy and are more eager to pursue, and capable of pursuing, their own national interests than was true decades ago. They are experimenting with different kinds of relations between the state and the economy, and with diverse patterns and degrees of international trade and investment. They are also moving toward greater intra-regional cooperation to improve their terms of interaction with the world economy, in part to reduce US influence. All this adds up to a new international profile for Latin America.

CHANGING LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS

While both the ALBA nations and the other countries of South America have diversified their international relations away from concentration on the United States, **Mexico and most nations in Central America and the Caribbean**

have become much more closely tied to the United States: demographically, commercially, financially, culturally and politically. Mexican exports to the United States multiplied from \$42 billion in 1993 to over \$280 billion in 2013. US exports to Mexico in that year, \$226 billion, were greater than the sum of US exports to Brazil, India, Japan, Germany and Great Britain combined.³⁶ Some 11.4 million Mexicans born in that country, about half of them unauthorized to remain in the United States, resided in the United States in 2013.³⁷ Some twenty percent of Mexico's workforce is employed in the United States and nearly fifteen percent of living persons born in the Caribbean reside on the mainland of the United States.

Remittances back to Mexico and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean amounted to nearly 70% of total remittances to all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013; in some countries they exceed the total of foreign investment and international economic assistance.³⁸ Tourism from the United States and Canada adds another important source of foreign exchange and income for many Caribbean Basin countries, where the total contribution of travel and tourism is some \$49 billion, about 14% of GDP.³⁹ The United States and Canada together sent half of the more than 25 million visitors to the Caribbean in 2013.

The borders between the United States and its closest neighbors remain porous, despite increased physical and electronic barriers, surveillance and expanded numbers of border agents. Massive and sustained migration from south to north and some from north to south, mainly by retirees; private investment and trade in both directions; the flow of remittances, tourists and deported criminals north to south; and especially integrated production systems and labor markets have all contributed to ever greater linkages of the whole region's economies and societies.

Debates continue about the impact of NAFTA on both sides of the border, but no one doubts that much greater functional integration of the Mexican and US economies and societies has occurred and will probably not be reversed. The presence and impact of so many individuals, families, businesses and non-governmental organizations on both sides of national borders are irreversibly reshaping Mexico, the United States, and many Central American and Caribbean nations. That José is the most popular first name for babies in the United States,

that salsa outsells ketchup, and that soccer (*fútbol*) now ranks second after professional US football as the most popular sport in the United States illustrate the impact these close neighbors have on US society, demography, economy, politics, culture and cuisine. By the same token, the impact of US products, popular culture, consumption patterns, modes of commerce, education, politics, non-governmental organizations and the media on the countries closest to the United States is also enormous.

The foreign policies of Mexico and most Caribbean Basin nations necessarily concentrate, therefore, mainly on relations among themselves and with the United States (and to a much lesser extent Canada), rather than on those with South America or with countries outside the hemisphere.⁴⁰ The administration of Felipe Calderon took some steps to strengthen Mexican ties in South America, but even that administration necessarily focused primarily on managing quotidian bilateral issues with the United States: border questions, immigration and the rights of migrants, labor standards, countering human and narcotics trafficking, environmental protection, access to education and to bank credit and social services, medical tourism, driver's licenses and auto insurance.

Even in the case of Cuba—subject to a commercial embargo, restraints on travel and other punitive sanctions that were imposed by the United States beginning in 1960—the pull toward functional integration with the United States became evident even before the historic announcements by Presidents Castro and Obama in December 2014 that Cuba and the United States will seek to restore mutually respectful relations. In recent years, there has been far more travel back and forth to the United States, much more tourism from North America (both from Canada and from the United States), more academic exchange, far more trade with the United States (in food and pharmaceuticals), more remittances of dollars to Cuba from emigrants, and more cooperation with the US government on practical matters (including hurricane tracking, anti-narcotics operations, immigration and humanitarian relief) than seemed possible fifteen years ago or than is generally noted today. All of this will be strongly reinforced and accelerated by the gathering US-Cuba rapprochement. Cuba's reintegration into its regional neighborhood is quietly occurring, despite rearguard resistance in the United States, mainly imposed by elements of the Cuban American community, as well as fear-mongering by some Caribbean neighbors who fear Cuba's competition.⁴¹

BRAZIL AND SOUTH AMERICA

While Mexico and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean have been more closely tied to the United States and Canada, Brazil has become less tied to the United States and far more extensively involved beyond the Americas. Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has been expanding and modernizing its agriculture and rapidly increasing its international markets for agricultural products; developing industries with continental and even worldwide reach; and building up the international competitiveness of its engineering, financial and other services. Brazil ranks first or second worldwide in the production and/or export of fifteen different agricultural products, including sugar, ethanol, coffee, tobacco, orange juice, soybeans, chicken and beef. Brazilian multinationals and investment funds in steel, cement, aluminum, iron ore, paper, meat and other products are global powerhouses, acquiring major firms in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. Petrobras, Vale, Embraer, Gerdau, Odebrecht, JBS Friboi and Natura, among other firms, have become international business leaders.⁴²

The per capita income of Brazilians has risen some 45% over twenty years, while annual inflation has been slashed from about 200% to about 5%, thanks to the policies introduced by the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) and continued by Luiz Inacio (Lula) da Silva's. These changes greatly expanded the middle class and increased its thirst for consumer goods, in turn fueling more economic expansion. Brazil has become the world's seventh largest economy, likely by 2025 to be the fifth (behind the United States, China, India and Japan); it is already one of the world's four largest manufacturers of automobiles. It accounts for more than half of all of South America's economic production, dwarfing that of any of its many neighbors. Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES) has lent more money in this century for economic projects in South America (some of them ill-considered) than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined.⁴³ Brazil's growth rate has been reduced since 2010—by slowed growth in China, the limits of consumer-based expansion, and the challenges to international competitiveness imposed by bureaucratic and infrastructure bottlenecks, overvalued currency and rampant political corruption—but the country's medium and long term prospects remain positive.⁴⁴

Brazil has developed important stakes and relationships around the world. Within the hemisphere, Brazil has maintained cordial relations with both the

ALBA countries and their market-oriented neighbors. It exerts major influence on neighboring Paraguay on both commercial and political matters. Brazil has taken a leading role in UN efforts to stabilize Haiti since 2004 (and in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2013, and other peacekeeping missions), no longer as a cat's paw of the United States, as in Santo Domingo in 1965, but for its own reasons, consistent with its regional stature and global aspirations. It has also expanded its relations with and presence in Cuba, where Odebrecht is building a deep water port at Mariel that will service the huge Panamax container ships and may help enable Cuba to become a major commercial transshipment center.

Brazil is playing several increasingly important international roles. It is one of the influential BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), now salient among many international investors and geopolitical analysts.⁴⁵ With India and South Africa, Brazil has formed a three-nation consortium (IBSA), working together on a number of issues.⁴⁶ Brazil often cooperates with China on questions relating to the international economy and governance. It has been developing many relationships in Africa, opening sixteen embassies there during Lula's presidency.⁴⁷ Brazil has become actively engaged (though not always successfully) on such questions as nuclear non-proliferation and Middle East peace processes, and is prominent in international negotiations on trade, intellectual property, climate change, the environment, public health and food security.⁴⁸ It vigorously seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Few countries are more actively engaged on a global scale than Brazil.⁴⁹ The style, content and efficacy of Brazil's international roles vary from president to president, but all three Brazilian leaders since the early 1990s—Cardoso, Lula, and Dilma Rousseff—have expanded Brazil's international profile.

Several other countries in the Americas—notably Chile, Colombia and Peru—have also strengthened the competitiveness of their economies, with private corporations taking the lead in building economic activities in other nations of the hemisphere and in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Chile's exports to Asia are larger than those to Europe, North America or the rest of Latin America, but it has substantial trade with all four regions. Chile's international diplomatic and political influence, based on its "soft power"—its strong political institutions, consolidated democratic politics and expert diplomacy—is much greater than its size, military prowess or economic strength alone would

command.⁵⁰ Peru and to some extent Colombia are also increasingly integrated into the world economy.

The countries of the Pacific Alliance are helping construct a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the United States, Canada and several Asian countries. This proposed mega-trade agreement is geared to deepen and expand commercial and investment ties between Trans-Pacific partners, and it will consider the extension of membership on an ongoing basis. The TPP may well become much more important in coming years as a model for reform in world trade regimes and negotiations.⁵¹

The ALBA countries have also been actively cultivating international relationships, but with a different animus. Venezuela has used its petroleum resources to supply energy at concessional prices to many Caribbean and Central American countries in exchange for political/diplomatic support. It has also developed international ties with China, Russia and Iran, seeking to advance both reciprocal economic interests and mutual geopolitical leverage. Venezuela has also developed links in recent years with Syria, Libya, Sudan, Belarus and North Korea, countries united by little beyond their antagonism to the United States.

Cuba no longer has the hyperactive international profile it achieved from the 1960s through the 1980s. But Havana parlays its human resources (especially doctors and teachers) and its remaining political assets to stay active in Africa, parts of Latin America, China, Vietnam and some countries in Europe. It is drawing upon these multiple relationships to stabilize and begin to open its economy, to mobilize international opposition to remaining US pressures and to protect itself from the likely decrease in Venezuelan support in the post-Chávez era.⁵²

In sum, most Latin American nations are actively articulating and pursuing their interests and cultivating relationships to advance them. Their interests and perspectives differ, as do their policies and ties, but many are no longer peripheral to world affairs.

A WORLD IN FLUX

All these developments within Latin America and the Caribbean and in the international relationships of the countries of the region have been taking place against the background of significant shifts in the international distribution of wealth and power, and have been greatly affected by these shifts.

In the 1950s and 60s, the United States and the countries of Western Europe accounted between them for considerably more than two thirds of global economic production. The United States and its NATO allies had international military dominance and largely controlled the institutions of international finance and governance. As the immediate impact of World War II diminished, Western Europe's dynamism and influence began to rebound, as did Japan's. The Soviet Union began to achieve significant military power and some political influence. Most of the former colonial enclaves gained their political independence.

The presence in Latin America and the Caribbean of both Japan and the Soviet Union, and the expanded presence of some Western European countries all grew over time. Japan, with economic growth at more than 4% annually, eagerly sought trade and investment ties with Latin America, as elsewhere, but always respecting the political and security interests of the United States, its vital international partner. The Soviet Union, seeking influence in developing countries worldwide, expanded its close relationship with Cuba with a political and military presence in Nicaragua and to some extent El Salvador, as well as a brief liaison with Peru, and looked for other places to engage—until the USSR eventually dissolved. The countries of the European Union—especially Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy—rebuilt some of their presence in Latin American industrial, financial and service sectors and in expanding commerce.⁵³ Rapid growth in Spain and the limits of its national market brought a burst of Spanish investment as well as large Spanish government-sponsored economic and cultural programs in Latin America in the 1990s, facilitated by previous ties.⁵⁴ **In many ways, South America returned to the pattern of the 1920s, when many extra-hemispheric nations had a strong presence in the Americas.**

Since the end of the Cold War and especially after the international boom of the 1990s, however, a very substantial further redistribution of global economic power and political influence has occurred. Most countries of the European Union have experienced several years of very slow or negative growth. Since the financial crisis of 2008, they have had high unemployment. In most

cases, their social welfare and pension programs have become unsustainable. Growing tensions over immigration, integration, social exclusion and strengthened nationalist tendencies have begun to challenge the post-war patterns of politics in many European nations and also to reshape their international policies. Some of the Spanish and other European firms that had invested heavily in Latin America in the 1990s have been forced to divest, withdraw or retrench in the face of economic stress, although some have been able to offset setbacks in Europe with their performance in Latin America. Japan, too, has had more than a decade of economic stagnation, with growth averaging one half of 1% since 2000; it faces the rapid aging of its population and years of political gridlock, and has lowered its international profile, especially in Latin America.

The United States, meanwhile, has had economic growth rates below 2% annually for more than a decade. The financial crisis in 2008-2009 resulted in lower growth, major unemployment and decreased consumer and investor confidence, and the recovery still remains incomplete, especially in some regions and sectors. The United States still faces reduced median household income, levels of poverty higher than at any time since the 1930s, and worsening income distribution. It has experienced prolonged political dysfunction in confronting these and other challenges, or failing to do so. These issues, and related budgetary constraints, have reinforced the US government's practical inclination to lower its profile in South America, while expanding its activities in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.

With its evident internal difficulties, the United States has been less able to project national influence around the world, in Latin America as elsewhere.⁵⁵ Latin American rejection of the established US approach to the narcotics issue has been growing, for example.⁵⁶ Latin American opposition to the US commercial embargo of Cuba and to Cuba's exclusion from inter-American organizations became nearly universal until the Obama administration finally began to reverse US policy. US proposals for democracy-monitoring mechanisms in the OAS have been defeated. Washington's response to the overthrow of the Honduran government in 2009 – initially condemning the coup against president Manuel Zelaya, but then accepting the legitimacy of the new presidential elections organized by the regime that ousted Zelaya – was sharply criticized, not only by the ALBA nations, politically allied with the ousted president, but also by Brazil

and some others. The decision by Brazilian president Rousseff to put off her long-scheduled state visit to the United States late in 2013, avowedly to protest revelations that the US National Security Agency had monitored telephone conversations of senior Brazilian officials, including herself, underlined the decline of US stature.⁵⁷

International dynamism has largely shifted from the established industrial countries to the “emerging economies,” and to some extent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The share of world production accounted for by China, India, Indonesia and Korea grew from 5% in 1990 to more than 17% in 2013 and continues to rise steadily, while that of Europe, Russia and Japan together declined from 47% in 1990 to 32% in 2013 and continues to fall.⁵⁸ Continuing economic growth in Asia and prolonged stagnation in most of Europe and perhaps in North America will likely escalate these major changes in the relative economic and commercial presence of the Asian countries in Latin America. Asian countries are projected to contribute 56.4% of the growth of global GDP between 2012 and 2022, while North America and Europe combined are projected to contribute only 24.1%.⁵⁹ China and other Asian nations have been improving their effectiveness as international exporters, importers and lenders, stepping up their diplomatic influence and, in the case of China, increasing its military and naval prowess. They seek to win international recognition as rising powers and dynamic market economies.

After years of double-digit economic growth, China’s shares of world production, trade and investment have risen to significant levels. China’s exports and investments are greater in the United States, Europe and Africa than in Latin America, but China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean has exploded. China has become the third largest external investor in Latin America—mainly in Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina, countries that have cut themselves off from easy access to credit on market terms, and Chinese investments are likely to continue to grow.⁶⁰ Chinese trade with the countries of Latin America rose from \$12 billion in 2000 to some \$260 billion in 2013.⁶¹ Chinese consumer goods—computers, cell phones and other electronic goods, automobiles and motorcycles, textiles, furniture, toys and other manufactured products— have become ubiquitous in most of Latin America.

The dramatic growth of Chinese trade with Latin America has coincided with and partly accounts for the decline of the US share of Latin America’s

commerce. The US share of Latin American and Caribbean exports fell from 59.7% in 2000 to 39.8% in 2012, while the share of Latin American and Caribbean imports coming from the United States fell from 50.4% in 2000 to 30.9% in 2012. The share of Latin American and Caribbean exports going to the Asia Pacific countries rose from 5.3% to 18.6% in these same years, while the share of Latin American imports coming from the Asia Pacific economies jumped from 10.9% to 26.9%.⁶² The tides of trade have clearly been shifting.

China has also become an important source of finance for many Latin American countries and projects, supplying an amount equivalent to 40% of all funds made available from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank from 2005 to 2011; in 2010 and again in 2014, Chinese loans actually exceeded the levels provided during those years by these two major international sources.⁶³ Much of the financing from China is linked to “loans for oil” agreements, by which China has assured itself of major supplies of petroleum, mainly from Venezuela and Ecuador.⁶⁴

Senior Chinese leaders have spent more time in Latin America in the past decade than the President, Vice-President and Secretary of State of the United States. Chinese state bureaucracies, regional banks, state financial institutions, shipping enterprises, other private companies and universities have all been active. China has expanded its educational exchange programs, establishing forty-two Confucius Institutes in fourteen countries of the region. China’s overall presence in Latin America considerably exceeds that achieved by Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s, or by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.⁶⁵

Although no other extra-hemispheric nation rivals China’s presence, Latin America’s economic ties have also increased with Korea, India and other Asian countries. Korea’s trade with the region has quadrupled from \$13.4 billion in 2003 to \$54.4 billion in 2012, with minerals and agricultural products from South America exchanged for Korean manufactured goods, including automobiles, electronics, computers and heavy machinery. Latin America’s trade with Japan doubled from 2003 to 2013, reaching nearly \$60 billion. India, which had less than \$500 million in annual trade with Latin America thirty years ago, reached about \$2.1 billion in 2001, 42 billion in 2013, and has been projected to reach nearly \$70 billion in 2016, though that estimate may be overstated.⁶⁶ Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia are also increasingly important

commercial partners for various Latin American countries; in all these cases, trade was scant fifteen years ago.⁶⁷

India is also an increasingly important source of investment for Latin America. Indian firms have invested more than \$12 billion in Latin America since 2000, half of that in Brazil. Indian companies employ thousands of Latin Americans, primarily in information technology (IT) and pharmaceuticals, but also in energy, mining and manufacturing.⁶⁸ The nearly simultaneous openings both of India's economy and of many Latin American economies have created major potential for productive exchange.⁶⁹ There is considerable room for further expansion of Indian investment and trade, especially since the ruling Congress Party has been ousted, bringing to office a new prime minister, Narendra Modi, who is committed to reducing protectionism and expanding trade.

Russia has been gradually re-establishing a presence in Latin America, mainly focused on commerce and energy, but also involving military-to-military relations and arms sales as well as rhetorical solidarity with the Bolivarian Alliance nations. Russia has renewed cooperation with Cuba, its longtime ally in the region, and has invested in energy development projects in Brazil, Venezuela and the Andean countries. Russia has also initiated cooperation on space research, mainly with Brazil, and entered into agreements on nuclear energy for civil purposes with Argentina.⁷⁰ Russia has revived its attention toward Latin America and the Caribbean, partly driven by ideological affinities with the ALBA countries, but mainly to show more generally that it wants once again to be an important actor on the contemporary global stage.

Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority have strengthened ties with the Jewish and the Syrian/Lebanese/Palestinian communities respectively in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other countries, and with broader Latin American political and social movements. Israel has also expanded investment and trade ties and private enterprise.⁷¹ Latin American relations with the Arab countries of North Africa, the Middle East and West Asia are also beginning to percolate, with an annual summit meeting (Summit of South American-Arab Countries, ASPA, since 2005) and various investment missions and pilot projects.⁷²

Brazilian government agencies have developed expanding partnerships with several African countries. Under Lula, Brazil initiated the South America-Africa Summits, three of which have taken place since 2006, in Nigeria, Venezuela

and Equatorial Guinea, with Ecuador programmed to be the host in 2016. Trade between Latin America and Africa increased from \$7.2 billion in 2002 to \$39.4 billion in 2011, chiefly driven by Brazil. Cuba, actively engaged with countries of the African continent since the 1960s, continues to provide health professionals and programs to various African nations.⁷³

Latin America, in short, is now on the international radar screen. Various countries of the region, especially Brazil and Mexico, have become of considerable interest to many international players: governmental, corporate, and non-profit. Latin American initiatives to expand the region's global international engagement have been mostly successful and actively reciprocated. Latin American countries have broader, denser and more diverse international relationships than ever before.

BEYOND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

One of the most dramatic changes in the international relations of Latin America over the last fifty years, and especially the last twenty, has been how many more of the region's global connections are now forged *outside* government channels: by corporations, trade unions, political parties, professional associations and networks, foundations, national and transnational non-governmental organizations, religious movements and other civil society associations.

An important example is the increasing significance of *multilatinas*, Latin America-based multinational corporations operating throughout the hemisphere and in many cases around the world. No one fifty or even fifteen years ago could have imagined the global reach that has been achieved by such Latin American companies as the aforementioned (and other) Brazilian firms and by counterpart enterprises from Mexico (Pemex, Cemex, ALFA and Bimbo, to name a few) and other countries, especially from Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Peru.⁷⁴ The spectacular growth of *multilatinas* since the beginning of the twenty-first century has been facilitated by the impact of international competition in an open world economy, technological advances that nimble Latin American companies could quickly apply, a globally educated and entrepreneurial managerial class, and especially by greatly expanded access to international capital at affordable rates

of interest. These corporations comprise an ever more important part of Latin America's expanding role in a changing world.⁷⁵

Their international counterparts have large roles in Latin America as well. US, European, Chinese and other energy companies are important investors. Moody's, Microsoft, Google and Walmart are much more influential than US governmental economic assistance programs in Latin America. CNN en Español is more important in Latin America than the Voice of America, the official US government broadcaster. Companies from China, Korea, Germany, India and other countries are also significantly present in the region. These include German Volkswagen and Bosch in the automotive industry, with principal operations in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil; German Bayer chemicals and BASF pharmaceuticals operate throughout the region. Korean Hyundai Motor Company has a \$600 million production plant in Sao Paulo; Korean SK Energy has large investments in Colombian and Peruvian oil. India's largest IT company, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), operates in Uruguay and Chile, and there are seven Indian companies in the IT sector in Argentina; Indian lighting manufacturing company Havells Sylvana is regionally headquartered in Costa Rica and is expanding into Colombia and Brazil. Chinese oil companies such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Sinochem have major enterprises in Brazil and Argentina; while Chinalco operates in Peruvian mining; Sanhe Hopeful in Brazilian agricultural development; and Lenovo in the computer industry in Mexico and expanding into Argentina.⁷⁶

Civil society organizations, both Latin America-based entities operating in other countries and international organizations active in Latin America, provide a second important example of how much of Latin America's role in today's world is carried out by non-governmental actors. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Open Society Foundation and other such organizations, as well as intergovernmental organizations such as International IDEA, are influential both within Latin America and by projecting Latin American values and experiences elsewhere in the world. Local civil society organizations from Latin America are particularly recognized for building awareness and alliances, using network activism in setting international standards for the promotion of environmental protection, indigenous rights, and in recent years for pressures on local, regional, state and national governments to recognize same-sex marriage, facilitate divorce and guarantee the right to express one's sexual identity. They

have also been influential in international movements against torture, forced disappearances and domestic violence.⁷⁷

The annual World Social Forum, associated with and supported by Brazil, where it first took place in 2001, is a major vehicle for international civil society networking, providing a counterpoint to the Switzerland-based World Economic Forum (DAVOS), in which leading Latin American business executives, political leaders and public intellectuals often take part.⁷⁸ Environmental organizations—the Environmental Defense Fund, Amazon Watch, World Wildlife International, Greenpeace International, green political parties and other organizations work to protect the environment in the Amazon region and elsewhere in the Americas. Latin American environmentalists participate actively in international forums and negotiations. Humanitarian relief organizations—CARE, Caritas, the American and International Red Cross, OXFAM, Doctors Without Borders and others—played at least as large a role as official government agencies in the humanitarian crisis in Haiti after its devastating earthquake in 2010 and have an ongoing presence in much of the region.

International political party associations—especially the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal parties and their party foundations, each backed by German and other European parties—built ties with their Latin American counterparts in order to strengthen democracy and human rights in the 1980s and 1990s, and continue to have some presence and influence. They have cooperated with Latin Americans in providing advice and assistance regarding transitional justice, civil-military relations, constitution-drafting and other aspects of democratic transitions in such countries as South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt and Myanmar. The Carter Center has helped assure free and fair elections in various Latin American countries, beginning with its crucially important role in the Nicaraguan elections of 1989. Together with the National Democratic and Republican Institutes of the United States and various European-based organizations, the Carter Center has also drawn extensively upon Latin American political figures for election monitoring elsewhere in the world.⁷⁹

Religious organizations, too—especially Roman Catholic, evangelical Protestant and Mormon—have established important transnational and international linkages. So have students, athletes, musicians and artists, as well as numerous professional associations—of physicians, engineers, lawyers,

accountants, professors, and others. Latin America's presence in the world is rich and diverse. So is the participation in Latin America of organizations from outside the region; these often have more presence on the ground than the governments of their home countries, and they often shape those governments' perceptions and policies.

INDIVIDUALS ON THE MOVE

One of the biggest changes in the international connections of Latin America over the last fifty years has been the result of the individual choices of millions of Latin American emigrants, many of them vulnerable individuals, who have left their countries of origin to live and work, primarily in the United States, but also in other countries, especially Spain, Canada, Japan, Israel, Australia, and neighboring Latin American nations.⁸⁰ Latin America is also an increasingly attractive destination for international migrants, from outside the Americas, particularly from Asia and Africa, who are drawn by its recent economic growth, mainly to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.

More than 20 million people born in Latin America and the Caribbean now live in the United States, with over half from Mexico, 1.2 million from El Salvador, 1.1 million from Cuba and 3.5 million from the rest of Central America and the Caribbean.⁸¹ US politicians and the private sector are beginning to cater to the now 54 million people of Latino origin in the United States, 17% of the total US population and growing. Latinos made up only 4.5% of the US population in 1970, 16.3% in 2010, and are expected to comprise 23% percent in 2030.⁸² More than 30% of the births expected in the United States from 2012 until 2050 are expected to be persons of Latino heritage.⁸³

Latinos are strengthening their voice and visibility: in the media, cultural production and in US politics. They are beginning to influence domestic and foreign policies, particularly on immigration. In the United States and more generally, Latin American migrants are broadening and bolstering transnational economic, social and cultural networks, helped by new communications technologies that facilitate increasing access to families, friends, news and products across borders, and create new forms of connection. As Latin American immigrants from diverse backgrounds increasingly contribute to the United

States, they also face obstacles in the context of restrictionist public opinion and political gridlock on immigration reform.

Latin America is tied to the rest of the world today by much more than distant origins and contemporary commerce. The presence and power of Latin America's diaspora in the United States and other new host countries is expanding. The connections of migrants in both their countries of origin and of destination are helping to shape today's world.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Latin American governments, social movements and regional organizations have contributed importantly to the norms and practice of international human rights, the development of international law, measures to curb nuclear non-proliferation, and international standard-setting on environmental issues.⁸⁴ Latin American officials – particularly from Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Argentina – have been key leaders in global governance bodies that deal with trade, finance, human rights, labor and globalization. Roberto Azevêdo, a Brazilian, heads the World Trade Organization (WTO) at a critical juncture and Mexico's Ángel Gurría has been Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 2006.⁸⁵ Latin American economists have served in prominent roles in the IMF, the World Bank and related organizations. Lawyers and others active in the democratic transitions in Brazil, Chile and Argentina are globally recognized advocates for universal human rights.

Luis Moreno Ocampo, who prosecuted the human rights abuses of the Argentine military, became the first Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro of Brazil has served as the United Nations rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar and as chairman on the International Commission of Inquiry for Syria. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is considered an exemplary international tribunal and its decisions have pioneered the development of international indigenous rights laws. And Argentine Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, archbishop of Buenos Aires, became Pope Francis in 2013, the first non-European Pope in over a thousand years. Latin Americans bring skills, experience and new perspectives into arenas that had long been virtually monopolized by people from the advanced industrial countries. Latin American leadership in global forums is no longer an exotic rarity.

In sum, a well-informed observer of how Latin America related to the rest of the world fifty years ago would be amazed by how extraordinarily those relations have changed. A much more diverse set of Latin American and Caribbean governments and other actors are engaged in much more varied ways with far more entities beyond the region. Latin American countries are taking a much more important role in, and having considerably more effect on, a broader variety of issues. They are interconnected in multiple and different ways, with interests, ties and significance that could not have been imagined in the 1960s nor fully anticipated twenty years ago. The expanded international presence, activities and influence of Latin American countries, regional and subregional organizations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations and individuals make the region substantially more relevant than it used to be for the global interests of the United States. These new realities must be fully taken into account to craft future US policies toward and relations with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

ENDNOTES

¹ The “hegemonic presumption,” a term I coined in 1976, refers to the prevalent assumption by US foreign policymakers in the mid- to late 20th century that the United States has the right to unilaterally exclude from power any political leader or group in Latin America and the Caribbean that US officials deemed threatening or potentially threatening to US control in the countries of the region. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Ending the Hegemonic Presumption: The United States and Latin America,” *Foreign Affairs* 55, No. 1 (October 1976), 199-213. For a recent review of this concept, see Michael Dunne, “Ending the Hegemonic Presumption? Recent Writing on US-Cuban Relations.” *International Affairs* 89:1 (2013), 159-173.

² In fiscal year 2002, Colombia was the fifth top recipient of US foreign assistance, following Israel, Egypt, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Colombia remained the fifth top recipient of US foreign assistance in fiscal year 2004, following Iraq, Israel, Egypt and Afghanistan. Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policies*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (February 10, 2011), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.; and Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policies*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (April 20, 2012), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

³ See See Heraldo Muñoz, *Una guerra solitaria: La historia de EE.UU en Irak, la polémica en la ONU y el papel de Chile* (Santiago: Debate, 2005); Heraldo Muñoz, *A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and its Lessons* (Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 2008). Cf Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 201-203; Cristóbal Bywaters C., “El «NO» de Ricardo Lagos a la invasión de Irak en 2003: el proceso de toma de decisiones de política exterior en Chile,” *Estudios Internacionales* 177 (2014) Universidad de Chile; Arturo C. Sotomayor

“México y la ONU en tiempos de transición: entre activismo externo, parálisis interna y crisis internacional,” *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 48, No. 1/2 (191/192) (Jan. - Jun., 2008), 262-266.

⁴ SUCRE, the Sistema Único de Compensación Regional de Pagos, is a regional currency and trade system initiated by Venezuela in 2009, intended to displace the dominance of the US dollar in regional transactions. The sucre is used in exchanges among some ALBA countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua; Uruguay joined the exchange system in 2013. UNASUR has taken positions, for example, on the coups in Honduras and Paraguay, on regional conflict in Bolivia, and on an alleged attempted coup against President Rafael Correa in Ecuador. See Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi, “Regional multilateralism in Latin America: UNASUR, ALBA and CELAC,” Chapter 20 in Jorge I. Domínguez and Ana Covarrubias, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

⁵ John Child, *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

⁶ William H. Mott IV, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).

⁷ Robert Grosse, *Multinationals in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Ramesh Ramsaran, *US Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Issues* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985); and Albert O. Hirschman, *How to Divest in Latin America, and Why* (Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1969).

⁸ Marcos Cueto, ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).; Inderjeet Parmar, “The Major Foundations, Latin American Studies, and Chile in the Cold War,” chapter 7 in *Foundations of the American Century: the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of America Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 180-220.; and James N. Gardner, *Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980).

⁹ Brian H. Smith, *Religious Politics in Latin America, Pentecostal vs. Catholic* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998); and Daniel H. Levine, *Politics, Religion, and Society in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012).

¹⁰ There should be a good footnote reference to sources on this [US cultural influence in South America, c. 1960], especially on Hollywood’s influence, and on the turn toward US graduate education, away from Europe.

¹¹ Both the Inter-American Development Bank and the Alliance for Progress depended on Washington’s decisions and largesse, but the initial concepts and political initiative came in large part from Latin America. See Christopher Darnton, “Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol.14, No 4, (Fall 2012), 55-92.

¹² For broad reviews of the US role in Latin America during the Cold War see Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1987).; Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 4th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).; Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); and Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Other references on this period are included in the notes to Chapter _____.

¹³ Examples abound: the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala, the clandestine involvement against Cheddi Jagan in Guyana, the encouragement extended to the military coup against João Goulart in Brazil, and most notoriously the various unsuccessful US efforts to overthrow or assassinate Fidel Castro.

¹⁴ Cf. Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) and Piero Gleijeses, trans. Lawrence Lipson, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

¹⁵ Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007).; Jonathan Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile* (London: Verso, 2005).; Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2003).; Joaquin Fernandois, *Chile y el mundo, 1970-1973: La política exterior del gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el sistema internacional* (Santiago, CL: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985); and Joan Garcés, *Soberanos e intervenidos: Chile, la Guerra Fría y después* (Santiago, CL: Ediciones BAT, 1995).

¹⁶ See Robert A. Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*, revised and updated (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).; Anthony Lake, *Somoza Falling* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); and Robert Kagan, *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

¹⁷ See Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," *Foreign Policy*, No. 23 (Summer 1976): 155-201; and Joseph S. Nye, "The Diplomacy of Nuclear Nonproliferation," in *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy*, Alan K. Henrikson, ed. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986).; and Matias Spektor, *Kissinger e o Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, BR: Zahar, 2009), 109-117.

¹⁸ The government in Grenada had in effect been installed by the US military intervention of October, 1983. In addition to Cuba and Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico differed from the US position on some 84% of the recorded votes in the General Assembly in 1985. See United States Department of State, *Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations, 1985*, Submitted Pursuant to Public Law 98-151 and Public Law 98-184, June 6, 1986, in United Nations Collection of Princeton University Library, *United Nations Depository Library No. 007*.

¹⁹ The original Contadora group – named after an island off Panama's coast, where representatives of the founding countries met – included Colombia, Panama, Mexico, and Venezuela. The Support Group involved Argentina, Peru, Brazil, and Uruguay. The Rio Group eventually added a number of additional members. See Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S. Latin-America Security Relationship* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1990); Alicia

Frohmann, *De Contadora al Grupo de los Ocho: El reaprendizaje de la concertación política regional* (Santiago, CL: FLASCO, 1989).; Bruce M. Bagley and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, *Contadora: The Limits of Negotiation* (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute 1987); and Bruce M. Bagley, ed., *Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in Central America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).

²⁰ NAFTA began with an initiative of Mexico's president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, embraced by the George H.W. Bush administration.

²¹ This was enshrined by Santiago Commitment to Democracy of the OAS in 1991 and in OAS Resolution 1080, which gave the Organization new authority and means to act in defense of democracy. See Thomas Legler, Sharon F. Lean, and Dexter S. Boniface, eds., *Promoting Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); and Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society* 49:2 (Summer 2007), 1-26.

²² Economist John Williamson initially formulated the "Washington Consensus" in his essay "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," presented at a conference of the Institute of International Economics in November, 1989. Williamson's essay was then incorporated into his edited volume, *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).

²³ The small Caribbean member states of ALBA include: Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

²⁴ Indeed, the United States itself encountered domestic resistance to free trade approaches from both agricultural and manufacturing interests. See J.F. Hornbeck, "A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (August 2, 2006), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.; Pablo A. Ormachea, "Agriculture Subsidies and the Free Trade Area of the Americas" *13 Law and Business Review of the Americas* (2007), 139-54. Inter-American Dialogue, *Free Trade in the Americas: Getting There from Here*, (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, October 2004). Zuleika Arashiro, "US Foreign Trade Policy: Leadership in a Constrained System," chapter 5 in *Negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Studies of the Americas Series* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 79-108.

²⁵ Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert, *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

²⁶ Definitions and size of the middle class vary considerably depending on the socioeconomic measurements used and emphasized. Economic approaches to defining the middle class tend to rely on relative or absolute income, consumption levels or access to particular goods. Sociological orientations often consider education levels, professional status and assets in measuring the middle class. See Francis Fukuyama, "Politics of Latin America's New Middle Class," *The Americas in Motion: Looking Ahead*. (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, April 2013): 26-32.; Rolando Franco, Martín Hopenhayn y Arturo León, *Las clases medias en américa latina. Retrospectiva y cambios recientes* (México, D.F.: CEPAL, Siglo XXI editores: 2010).; and Rolando Franco, Martín Hopenhayn y Arturo León, "Crece y cambia la clase media en América Latina: Una puesta al día," *Revista Cepal* 103 (April 2011).

²⁷ The OECD estimates that Brazil's middle class, with monthly household income between 1,734 and 7,475 Brazilian reais (about \$180 to \$3375), numbered 115 million in 2013, up from 66 million in 2003. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil 2013*. OECD Publishing (2013). DOI:10.1787/eco_surveys-bra-2013-en.

²⁸ See Eduardo Lora, ed., *The State of State Reform in Latin America* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2007); Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, *Reformas para América Latina: Después del fundamentalismo neoliberal* (Buenas Aires, AR: Siglo Veintiuno Editores Argentina, 2005).; and Joan Nelson and Robert Kaufman, eds., *Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives: Social Sector Reform, Democratization, and Globalization in Latin America* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

²⁹ Some examples of Latin American export diversification include: wine, table grapes, berries, salmon and lumber from Chile, software and animal vaccines from Uruguay, high tech electronics and medical devices from Costa Rica, numerous products from aircraft to orange juice in Brazil, and television formats and blueberries from Argentina. Charles Sabel, Eduardo Fernández-Arias, Ricardo Hausmann, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, and Ernesto Stein, eds., *Export Pioneers in Latin America* (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2012).

³⁰ José De Gregori, *How Latin America Weathered the Global Financial Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2014).

³¹ For comparison, the homicide rate (per 100,000 population) is 4.7 in the United States, 1.0 in France, 0.7 in Sweden and 0.6 in Indonesia. The homicide rate is 30.8 in Colombia; 25.2 in Brazil; and 21.5 in Mexico. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *The Global Study on Homicide 2013* (Vienna: United Nations, 2014); Kevin Casas-Zamora, ed., *Dangerous Liaisons: Organized Crime and Political Finance in Latin America and Beyond* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); and Kevin Casas-Zamora, *La Polis Amenazada: (In)Seguridad Ciudadana y Democracia en América Latina y el Caribe*, report (Washington D.C.: OAS, 2012).

³² Many Latin Americans see the United States as a major cause of this violence because of the US demand for narcotics, insistence on criminalizing the drug trade (thus making it more violent), and role as a source of arms for Latin American drug cartels and youth gangs. Critiques of the US supply-side approach to reducing the harm caused by the narcotics trade provides another reason for taking distance from the United States.

³³ Economic growth and diminishing inequality in Latin America in the 2000s led to a reduction in poverty from 42 percent to 25 percent of the region's population, and an expansion of the middle class from 22 percent to 34 percent of the population. Nora Lustig, "From Macro to Micro—How Ready is Latin America for Tougher Times Ahead?" presentation at the Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C., February 25, 2015. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs originated in Brazil (Bolsa Familia) and Mexico (Oportunidades) in the late 1990s and since then have proliferated throughout the region, including major programs in Chile (Chile Solidario), Peru (Juntos) and Colombia (Familias en Acción). CCTs are contingent on factors such as children's school attendance and obtainment of vaccines. See Marco Stampini and Leopoldo Tornarolli, *The Growth of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean: Did They Go Too Far?* (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, November 2012).

³⁴ See Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press); Jorge G. Castañeda and Marco A. Morales, eds., *Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left* (New York: Routledge, 2008).; Rosario Queirolo, *The Success of the Left in Latin America. Untainted Parties, Market Reforms and Voting Behavior* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013). In 2013, the average public approval of Latin American governments was 49%. In that year 73% of citizens in Ecuador approved of their government, a 43% increase in public approval from 2002; 60% of Nicaraguans approved of their government, a decrease from 84% in 2002 but still well above the regional average for 2013. In Bolivia, public approval of the government increased from 42% in 2002 to 55% in 2013 and in Venezuela public approval of the government decreased from 51% in 2002 to 47% in 2013. 77% of citizens in Ecuador believed their country was progressing in 2013, compared to a regional average of 37%; in the same year 51% of citizens in Nicaragua believed their country was progressing; 45% in Bolivia; and 34% in Venezuela. Public approval has receded somewhat by 2015 in the face of severe economic problems, scarcities, rationing and inflation, especially in Venezuela. Corporación Latinobarómetro, *Informe 2013* (Santiago, CL: Corporación Latinobarómetro, November 2013).

³⁵ Although citizen approval of Latin American governments increased on average from 36% to 49% between 2002 and 2013, approval has declined for four consecutive years since 2009, when approval rating peaked at 60%. From 2009 to 2013, public approval of governments declined from 84% to 56% in Brazil; 85% to 29% in Chile; 72% to 53% in Colombia; 80% to 43% in Panama; and 75% to 22% in Costa Rica. *Ibid.*

³⁶ US exports in 2013 were \$65.1 billion to Japan; \$47.4 billion to Great Britain; \$47.4 billion to Germany; \$44.1 to Brazil; and \$21.9 billion to India. US exports to these five countries totalled \$225.9 billion in 2013, a bit less than US exports to Mexico alone. See United States Census Bureau Foreign Trade, "Top Trading Partners - December 2013," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1312yr.html>.

³⁷ Authoritative data on the number of Mexicans in the United States and the share of them who are unauthorized are understandably difficult to obtain. These credible estimates are from Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, *A Demographic Portrait of Mexican-Origin Hispanics in the United States*, Pew Hispanic Center Statistical Profile (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2013).

³⁸ In Honduras, Guyana, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Guatemala, remittances account for more than 10% of GDP, and in Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Belize, they are 6-9%. After a 12% decrease in remittances during the major US and international recession of 2009, remittance flows to the region grew modestly, stabilized, and are rising again, mainly due to economic recovery in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in some countries of Europe. René Maldonado and Maria Luisa Hayem, "Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013: Still Below pre-Crisis Levels," Multilateral Investment Fund, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (Washington, D.C.: IADB, 2014), 19.; and International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Migratory Routes and Dynamics Between Latin America and the Caribbean countries (LAC) and between LAC and the European Union* (Brussels: IOM, 2012), 36.

³⁹ World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTTC), *Travel & Tourism: Economic Impact 2014 Caribbean*. London UK: WTTTC, 2014.

⁴⁰ Guadalupe González González, "México ante América Latina: Mirando de reojo a Estados Unidos" (México, D.F.: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), noviembre 2005); Guadalupe González González, "América Latina en la política exterior: De la importancia simbólica a la oportunidad real," in *La política exterior de México: metas y obstáculos*, eds. Guadalupe González González and Olga Pellicer (México, ITAM-SXXI, 2013), 358--375.; Guadalupe González González y Rafael Velázquez Flores, "La política exterior de México hacia América Latina en el sexenio de Felipe Calderón (2006-2012): Entre la prudencia política y el pragmatismo económico," *Foro Internacional* 213-214, LIII, 2013 (3-4), 572-618.; and Guillermo Guajardo Soto, "Viejos puentes y nuevos acervos. La relación de México con América Latina y el Caribe durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox," *Foro Internacional* 191-192, XLVII, 2008 (1-2), 268-296.

⁴¹ Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation" *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999), 241-61. Guillermo J. Grenier and Lisandro Pérez, *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States* (New York: Allyn and Bacon, 2003).; Cuba Research Institute, *2014 FIU Cuba Poll: How Cuban Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba* (Miami, FL: FIU Cuba Research Institute, 2014); and Damián Fernández, "The New Cuban American Politics: Passion, Affection, Dollars, and the Emergence of MiHavana," chapter 16 in *Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World*, eds., Soraya M. Castro Mariño and Ronald W. Pruessen (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2012), 333-346.

⁴² Odebrecht, for example, began in the 1960s as a construction firm in one of Brazil's poorest states, and became the country's largest construction company by the 1990s. In 2013 it had 175,000 employees in twenty-six countries of the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, with revenues of \$41 billion annually, more than the GDP of Panama, and plans to invest \$20 billion outside Brazil in the next three years. Odebrecht is in charge of the major improvements at Miami International Airport and of projects of similar magnitude in the Middle East, Africa, China, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and elsewhere. In Angola alone Odebrecht operates 28 projects. It is a Brazilian asset internationally, and its particular interests, in turn, affect Brazilian foreign policy. For more on the other Brazilian companies mentioned, see Afonso Fleury and Maria Tereza Leme Fleury, "Cases of Outstanding Brazilian Multinationals," chapter 8 in *Brazilian Multinationals: Competences for Internationalization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 226-300, (pages 281-85 for Odebrecht specifically).

⁴³ See Steen Fryba Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," *Third World Quarterly* 34 (2) (2013): 271-86.

⁴⁴ For useful recent appraisals see Michael Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).; and Lourdes Casanova and Julian Kassum, *The Political Economy of an Emerging Global Power: In Search of the Brazil Dream* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

⁴⁵ Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill coined the acronym BRIC in 2001, signaling the current and potential impact of Brazil, Russia, India, and China on the global economy and international economic policy-making. In 2010, South Africa joined the group of salient emerging economies, creating BRICS. See Jim O'Neill, "Building Better Global Economic BRICs," Global Economic Paper 66 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2001).

⁴⁶ Oliver Stuenkel, *India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA): The Rise of the Global South* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

⁴⁷ Brazil maintains 141 embassies, 61 consulates, 11 vice-consulates, and 13 missions with international organizations (counted in June, 2012). During Lula's two terms in office (2003-2010), Brazil opened 52 new embassies, 22 consulates, and a number of missions with international organizations. See Raoni Fonseca Duarte, "Novos eixos das relações diplomáticas brasileiras: as relações do Brasil com a Ásia Central e com o Cáucaso no século XXI," *Integração Regional e Cooperação Sul-Sul no Século XXI, Seminário Brasileiro de Estudos Estratégicos na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande Do Sul*. Porto Alegre/RS, Brasil (20 a 22 de junho, 2012).

⁴⁸ Brazil successfully defended its affordable AIDS treatment initiative and received international acclaim in 2001 in a trade dispute with the United States over AIDS medicine patents in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The leaders of the BRICS now meet regularly to discuss shared challenges and common strategies. At their 6th summit meeting in Fortaleza, Brazil, the BRICS countries announced the formation of a BRICS development bank (the New Development Bank or NDB), to be headquartered in Shanghai with \$50 billion in initial capital and an Indian official was its first president. The creation of a BRICS-led development bank represents a significant institutionalization of relations among the five BRICS countries. It should provide more international funding for development and also signals to leading international institutions the need for reform in global financial governance. See Leslie Elliott Armijo and Cynthia Roberts, "The Emerging Powers and Global Governance: Why the BRICS Matter" chapter 26 in *Handbook of Emerging Economies*, Robert E. Looney, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 503-524.; Molly Elgin-Cossart, "What to Watch at the BRICS Summit in Brazil," *Center for American Progress*, July 14, 2014; and Vikram Nehru, "The BRICS Bank: Now Comes the Hard Part" (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7/7/2014).

⁴⁹ See Monica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, "Re-thinking Global and Domestic Challenges in Brazilian Foreign Policy," chapter 9 in Jorge I. Domínguez and Ana Covarrubias, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (New York: Routledge, 2014); João Augusto de Castro Neves and Matias Spektor, "Obama and Brazil," chapter 3 in *Shifting the Balance: Obama and the Americas*, Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011); Harold Trinkunas, "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance" (Washington D.C.: Brookings, Latin America Initiative, April 2014).

⁵⁰ See Jorge Heine, "Between a rock and a hard place: Latin America and multilateralism after 9/11", in Ramesh Thakur, Edward Newman and John Tirman, eds., *Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), 481-503.; and Claudio Fuentes, "La apuesta por el "poder blando": política exterior de la concertación 2000-2006," en *El gobierno de Ricardo Lagos: la nueva vía chilena hacia el socialismo*, Robert L. Funk, ed. (Santiago, CL: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2006).

⁵¹ The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a preferential trade agreement under negotiation by twelve countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, all members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Brazil, not party to the TPP negotiations, currently favors bilateral trade agreements with Asian nations. See Barbara Kotschwar and Jeffery J. Schott, "The Next Big Thing? The Trans-Pacific Partnership & Latin America," *Americas Quarterly*, issue *Latin America Goes Global* (Spring 2013); and C.L. Lim, Deborah Kay Elms, and Patrick Low, eds., *The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-first Century Trade Agreement* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁵² Richard E. Feinberg, *Reaching Out: Cuba's New Economy and the International Response* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, November 2011) and *The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment?* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, December 2012).; and Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *Cuban Economic and Social Development: Policy Reforms and Challenges in the 21st century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

⁵³ See Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America*, revised edition (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).; Barbara Stallings and Gabriel Székely, eds. *Japan, the United States, and Latin America: Toward a Trilateral Relationship in the Western Hemisphere* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, ed., *Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).; ECLAC, *The Economic Relations of Latin America with Europe* (Santiago, CL: CEPAL/ILPES Documents Reproduction Services, 1980).; and Esperanza Durán, *European Interests in Latin America* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985). ALSO BOOK BY EUROPEAN WOMAN, EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA; I MUST LOOK FOR THIS.

⁵⁴ See Ramón Casilda, *La Década Dorada, Economía e Inversiones Españolas en América Latina, 1990-2000*, (Madrid: Universidad de Alcalá, 2002); and William Chislett, *La Inversión Española Directa en América Latina: Retos y Oportunidades* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003).

⁵⁵ See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The US in the Early Twenty-first Century: Decline or Renewal?" Analysis of the Royal Institute (ARI) 43, (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, November 2013).

⁵⁶ See "Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work," Global Commission on Drug Policy (September 2014); "Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift," Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (February 2009).

⁵⁷ See Mark Eric Williams, "The United States and Latin America," Chapter 13 in Jorge I. Domínguez and Ana Covarrubias, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (New York: Routledge, 2014)., for a general discussion of declining US influence. More attention should be accorded, however, to the many ongoing programs of consultation and cooperation between Brazil and the United States, such as the Brazil Scientific Mobility Program educational exchange. Edward Monks, "The Brazil Scientific Mobility Undergraduate Program in the United States: A New Phase in U.S.-Brazil Educational Exchange" (New York: IIE, October 2012).

⁵⁸ Author's calculations based on *World Bank Data GDP by country* for 1990 and 2013. The figures for Europe are for the member countries of the European Union as of 2013.

⁵⁹ ECLAC, *Strengthening Biregional Cooperation between Latin America and Asia-Pacific* (Santiago, CL: United Nations, 2013), 17.

⁶⁰ Taotao Chen and Miguel Pérez Ludeña, *Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 195 Production Development Series (Santiago, CL: United Nations, January 2014).; ECLAC, *Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean*, (Santiago, CL: United Nations, 2014).; Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, *The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America* (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, March 2012); Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers (2014) "China-Latin America Finance Database," Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.

⁶¹ China is already the largest importer of goods from Brazil and Chile, and the second largest importer from Costa Rica, Cuba and Peru. Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, together with all the aforementioned countries, take at least 10% of their imports from China, in most cases starting from a very low base at the turn of this century.

⁶² ECLAC, *Strengthening Biregional Cooperation*, 31.

⁶³ In 2014, China lent \$22 billion to Latin America, and over the past decade has lent \$119 billion to the region. See Inter-American Dialogue, "Latin American Advisor," March 17, 2015.

⁶⁴ Venezuela alone has borrowed more than \$45 billion from China since 2005 and has pledged oil exports to China of a million barrels per day (bpd) by 2015, up from just 49,000 bpd in 2005. Ecuador has borrowed some \$13 billion from China, enabling Ecuador to grow despite negative international credit ratings and lack of domestic and international investor confidence. China has helped finance and launch Bolivia's first communications satellite, and has reportedly offered to fund half the cost of developing its iron ore deposits.

⁶⁵ See R. Evan Ellis, *China and Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009); Margaret Myers, "Shaping Chinese Engagement in Latin America," Chapter 14 in Jorge I. Domínguez and Ana Covarrubias, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (New York: Routledge, 2014); and R. Evan Ellis, *China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

⁶⁶ Jorge Heine, "La Nueva India: Time for a New Impetus," *The Diplomatist Magazine* (June 2014); Jorge Heine, *La Nueva India* (Santiago, CL: El Mercurio/Aguilar, 2012); and Soraya Caro Vargas, *India-Latin America: An Alliance for the Future* (New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing Pvt Ltd, 2013).

⁶⁷ See Cynthia J. Arnson and Jorge Heine, with Christine Zaino, eds., *Reaching Across the Pacific: Latin America and Asia in the New Century* (Washington D.C.: Wilson Center, 2014). See also Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), "New Biregional Trade and Investment Relations in a Changing World Economic Environment" (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 2011).

⁶⁸ Jorge Heine and R. Viswanathan, "The Other BRIC in Latin America: India," *Americas Quarterly* (Spring 2011).

⁶⁹ India's election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a strong proponent of market and trade liberalization, augurs expanded India-Latin America trade and investment. See R. Viswanathan, "Gujarat-Latin America: friends & benefits," *Gateway House: Indian Council on Foreign Relations*, May 12th, 2014.; and "Agenda for India-Latin America," *Gateway House: Indian Council on Foreign Relations*, June 6th, 2014.

⁷⁰ Russia has forgiven 90% or some \$30 billion of Cuba's Soviet-era debt, and seeks to re-establish military and technological presence in the country, as well as to cooperate on offshore hydrocarbon exploration. Though bilateral commerce remains a small share of total commerce for both Russia and Latin America, trade is also expanding. Trade between Russia and Latin America and the Caribbean increased from \$2.2 billion in 2000 to \$18.7 billion in 2013, according to the World Bank. Russia sells defense equipment to various Latin American countries and mineral fertilizers predominantly to Brazil,

and mainly purchases sugar, meats, and fruits; it has also increased imports of machinery and industrial equipment from Brazil, Mexico and Argentina in the past decade. Diana Negrofonte, "What's Putin's Game in the Western Hemisphere?," *America's Quarterly* (Winter 2015); SELA, "Informe Final de la Reunión Regional la evolución reciente de las relaciones económicas entre la Federación de Rusia y América Latina y el Caribe," *XXXVIII Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo Latinoamericano (Caracas, VE: SELA 17 al 19 de octubre de 2012)*.; SELA, "La evolución reciente de las relaciones económicas entre la Federación de Rusia y América Latina y el Caribe. Mecanismos institucionales y de cooperación para su fortalecimiento," *Secretaría Permanente del SELA, (Caracas, VE: SELA agosto 2011)*.; and SELA, "Economic relations between the Russian Federation and Latin America and the Caribbean: Current situation and prospects," *Regional Meetings on the Economic Relations between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India and the Russian Federation with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean* (Caracas, Venezuela: SELA 20, 21 and 22 July 2009).

⁷¹ See "Peru's president arrives as Israel pays more attention to Latin America," *Jerusalem Post*, February 16th, 2014.

⁷² Dubai Ports (DP) World has invested heavily in the expansion of the Port of Callao in Peru. Brazilian iron ore giant Vale has two pelletizing plants in Oman, and Itaú Bank has opened offices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Daily flights connect Sao Paulo to Dubai, and Doha to Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires, with weekly flights between Sao Paulo and Tel-Aviv. Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic have the most diverse Latin American diplomatic missions in the Middle East, while the governments of Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Turkey and more recently Iran have significant diplomatic representation in Latin America. Following Brazil's lead in 2010, nine other South American nations recognized Palestine as a state in early 2011. Venezuela had recognized Palestine as a state in 2009. See Alejandra Galindo Marines, ed., *The Gulf and Latin America: Assessment of Expectations and Challenges* (Cambridge, UK: Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2013); Economic System of Latin America (SELA), *Relations between Latin America and the Middle East: Status and Areas of Opportunity* (Caracas, Venezuela: Permanent Secretariat of SELA, June 2012). Since 2005, Iran has opened six new embassies in the region, in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, complementing those in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela.

⁷³ See Economic System of Latin America (SELA), *Nuevas modalidades de relacionamiento económico y cooperación entre América Latina y el Caribe y África* (Caracas, Venezuela: Permanent Secretariat of SELA, November 2013); Gladys Lechini, "América Latina y África. Entre la solidaridad sur-sur y los propios intereses," *Estudios Internacionales* 179 (2014), Universidad de Chile; and Kevin Funk, "The Political Economy of South America's Global South Relations: States, Transnational Capital, and Social Movements," *SECOLAS/LAS Annual Conference March 29-31, 2012*, University of Florida Gainesville, FL.

⁷⁴ Additional prominent multilatinas include: América Móvil, TELMEX, Televisa, and FEMSA from Mexico; Sigdo Koppers, Fallabella, Cencosud, Concha y Toro, and Latam Airlines Group, from Chile; Techint and ARCOR from Argentina; ISA energy, Grupo Nutresa, and Grupo Argos from Colombia; Ajegroup, Grupo Belcor, and Alicorp from Peru; and several additional companies in other countries. LATAM airlines, resulting from the merger of LAN Chile with Tam of Brazil, has the highest total market capitalization of any global airline at \$13 billion and is just below the top ten airlines in number of passengers. "LAN, TAM, Merger Plan," *The Economist*, June 26, 2012.

⁷⁵ See Javier Santiso, *La década de las multilatinas* (Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2011).; and Lourdes Casanova, *Global Latinas: Latin America's Emerging Multinationals* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009). See also *América Economía* news articles on and rankings of *multilatinas*, americaeconomia.com.

⁷⁶ Other companies from Germany, Korea, India and China with significant presence in Latin America and the Caribbean include German logistics company Deutsche Post (DHL), Henkel chemical products, Siemens electronics and ThyssenKrupp steel; Korean LG International corporation, Korea National Oil Corporation, Korea Resource Corporation, Posco steel-making company and Korea Electric Power Corporation; Indian Dr. Reddy's Laboratories and Glenmark in pharmaceuticals, Jindal Steel & Power and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh; China State Construction and Engineering Corporation, Sinohydro, Sinopec national power company, Chery in the automotive industry, China National Petroleum Corporation, and Huawei and ZTE in telecommunications, among others. Santiso 2011.; Heine and Viswanathan 2011.; ECLAC, *Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and Caribbean* (Santiago, CL: United Nations, 2011).; and Evan Ellis, "The Expanding Chinese Footprint in Latin America: New Challenges for China, and Dilemmas for the US," *Asie Visions* 49, Center for Asian Studies (Paris, France: Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), February 2012).

⁷⁷ See Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011).; Jordi Díez, "Explaining Policy Outcomes: The Adoption of Same-Sex Unions in Buenos Aires and Mexico City," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 46, Issue 2, (2013) 212-235; Félix Reátegui, ed., *Transitional Justice: Handbook for Latin America* (Brasília: Brazilian Ministry of Justice Amnesty Commission, 2011).; Jo-Marie Burt, "The Torture Report: Latin America's Lessons for the United States," *The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)*, 12/10/ 2014. I NEED Sources for local civil society organizing and international activism on indigenous rights, against torture, disappearance, and domestic violence.

⁷⁸ See Geoffrey Allen Pigman, *World Economic Forum: A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global Governance* (New York: Routledge, 2007); and Janet M. Conway, *Edges of Global Justice: The World Social Forum and its "Others"* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

⁷⁹ NEED SOURCE FOR Carter Center's "drawing extensively upon Latin American political figures for election monitoring elsewhere in the world."

⁸⁰ There are approximately 2 million persons from Latin America and the Caribbean living in Europe, more than half a million in Canada and nearly half a million in Japan (the last being mainly Japanese-origin immigrants to Brazil, now repatriating back to Japan). See Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey, "New World Orders: Continuities and Changes in Latin American Migration," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol.630 (July 2010): 20-52. There are approximately 2 million people of Japanese descent living in Brazil (Brazilian Nikkeijin), representing the greatest number of people with Japanese ancestry living in any one country outside of Japan. Japanese immigration law revised in 1990 began to permit third-generation Brazilian Nikkeijin and their spouses (irrespective of Japanese descent) to work in Japan. The number of Brazilian Nikkeijin working in Japan increased from under 15,000 in 1989 to over 300,000 in 2006. David McKenzie and Alejandrina Salcedo, "Japanese-Brazilians and the Future of Brazilian Migration to Japan," *International Migration*, 52 (2014), 66-83. About ten percent of Latin American migrants have moved within the region, principally Paraguayans and Bolivians to Argentina, Peruvians to Argentina and Chile, Colombians to Venezuela, Nicaraguans to Costa Rica, and Haitians to the Dominican Republic. Some regional integration processes as the Central

America Border Control Agreement (CA-4), the Andean Community (CAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and MERCOSUR have established the free movement of peoples among their respective member countries. International Organization for Migration, *Migratory Routes and Dynamics Between Latin America and the Caribbean countries (LAC) and between LAC and the European Union* (Brussels: IOM, 2012), 22.

⁸¹ Organization of American States (OAS), *International Migration in the Americas: Second Report of the Continuous Report System on International Migration in the Americas* (SICREMI) (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 2012), 253.

⁸² United States Census Bureau, "Table 1. United States - Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990," <http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab01.pdf> and "Who's Hispanic in America?" June 6th, 2012, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/hispanic/2012.06.22_cspan_hispanics.pdf.

⁸³ Author's calculations based on data from United States Census Bureau, "Table 2. Projected Births by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: 2012 to 2060," Middle Series from 2012 National Population Projections: Downloadable Files, <http://www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2012/downloadablefiles.html>.

⁸⁴ See Diego García-Sayán, "The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Its Decisive Impact on Latin American Rights"; Kathryn Sikkink, "Latin America and the Idea of International Human Rights"; and Kathryn Hochstetler, "Latin America in Global Environmental Governance" chapters 22, 23 and 26 in Jorge I. Domínguez and Ana Covarrubias, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (New York: Routledge, 2014). See also Kathryn Hochstetler & Margaret E. Keck, *Greening Brazil: Environmental Activism in State and Society* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). See also Kathryn Hochstetler, "South-South Trade and the Environment: A Brazilian Case Study," *Global Environmental Politics*, 2013, Vol.13(1) (2013): 30-48.; Diego García-Sayán, "The Future of the Democratic Charter" *Latin American Policy* Vol.3(1) (2012): 127-134 and "The Inter-American Court and constitutionalism in Latin America," *Texas Law Review* Vol.89(7) (June 2011): 1835-1862 and Kathryn Sikkink and Véronica Michel, "Human Rights Prosecutions and the Participation Rights of Victims in Latin America," *Law & Society Review* Vol.47(4) (2013): 873-907; Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi and Ana Covarrubias Velasco, eds., *Derechos humanos en política exterior: Seis casos latinoamericanos* (Ciudad de México, D.F.: ITAM, 2011).

⁸⁵ José Graziano da Silva of Brazil heads the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Chilean Juan Somavía headed the International Labor Organization (ILO) from 1999 to 2012 and made important contributions on the social impacts of globalization. Rubens Ricupero, also from Brazil, led the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) from 1995 to 2004. The late Sérgio Vieira de Mello, another Brazilian diplomat, had a variety of important international peace-keeping roles until his death in Iraq in 2003, killed by a bomb attack while he was serving as the special representative of the UN Secretary-General.