POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA
A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries

JUAN P. LUNA
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

ELIZABETH J. ZECHMEISTER
University of California, Davis

The authors combine elite and mass survey data to create indicators of representation for nine nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. For the first time, a quantified measure of the extent to which political parties represent voters' policy preferences in these countries is offered. The authors then examine the political, social, and economic correlates of representation. Consistent with extant literature and theory, they find that party system institutionalization and socioeconomic development are positively related to representation. On the other hand, drastic liberalization efforts seem to be associated with lower levels of representation. Furthermore, the authors find that leftist parties contribute to the representative structures of political systems. They also find that perceptions of fraud in an electoral system are correlated at a fairly high level with the indicator of representation: Citizens' subjective perceptions of a system are consistent with its reality.

Keywords: *Latin America; representation; democracy; issue congruence; ideology; clientelism*

In its modern republican manifestation, democracy is the process of channeling a great amount and variety of public opinion into a smaller, more homogeneous number of elected representatives charged with carrying out the plurality's preferences. This perspective is consistent with that of "responsible party government," in which voters (principals) choose between parties (agents) offering alternative policy packages (Adams, 2001; Converse & Pierce, 1986; Dalton, 1985; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999). From

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 38 No. 4, May 2005 388-416
DOI: 10.1177/0010414004273205

such a perspective, the quality of a democracy should be judged, at least in part, by the extent to which party elites and party supporters correspond across issue and ideological divides or, in other words, by the degree of representation that exists within the system. Yet although the core of democratic processes ideally consists of this type of elite-mass interaction, lacking in current research on the quality of democracy in Latin America are cross-national studies that investigate political representation using both micro (survey) and macro (national-level) data.[1]

The purpose of this article is to fill that gap by exploring the quality of representation in nine young democracies in Latin America. The study makes two original contributions. First, we combine elite and mass survey data to create indicators of representation for each of the nine countries we examine. For the first time, we offer a quantified measure of the extent to which political parties represent voters' policy preferences in these countries. Second, we investigate the correlates of these measures to draw some conclusions about the contexts in which we are more or less likely to find representation. We find that the institutionalization of the party system and levels of socioeconomic development are positively related to levels of representation. On the other hand, drastic liberalization efforts appear associated with lower levels of representation. Our results thus fit nicely into the scholarship at the aggregate and institutional levels on the development of democratic party systems in Latin America as well as various works on the relationship between economic and political change (Coppedge, 2001; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). Furthermore, we find that the strength of leftist parties is positively correlated with levels of representation. Leftist parties help structure the political system, despite the potentially debilitating effects that the region's turn toward

1. Recently, as Powell (2004) put it, the issue congruence research program witnessed an "explosion of comparative representation studies," most all of which focus on Europe (Esaiasson & Heidar, 2000; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999; Miller et al., 1999; Powell, 2000; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999). Cross-national studies of issue congruence outside Europe's boundaries have been hindered by a lack of data and by concern with other important research topics.

AUTHORS' NOTE: *This project would not have been possible without Herbert Kitschelt's continuous support, encouragement, and insight, and for this we are truly thankful. We are also very grateful to Manuel Alcántara and his team at Universidad de Salamanca for providing us the elite data set and for feedback on the project. And we thank Corporación Latinobarómetro and Marta Lagos in particular for providing a data set of variables matching those of the Salamanca questionnaire to our broader research team. Finally, for helpful comments at various stages along the way, we thank Jonathan Hartlyn, Kirk Hawkins, Evelyne Huber, Robert Jackman, Mona Lyne, Scott Morgenstern, Guillermo Rosas, Steve Wuhs, and two anonymous reviewers. The errors that remain are ours.*

neoliberalism should have had on these parties' ability to offer clear and distinct policy platforms and to mobilize support. Finally, perceptions of fraud in the electoral system are also correlated at a fairly high negative level with our indicator of representation: Citizens' subjective perceptions of a system are consistent with its reality.

The data we use are elite and mass survey data as well as political, social, and economic indicators from nine Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we briefly expand our argument on the importance of representation to the study of democratic quality in Latin America. Second, we identify some expectations concerning the correlates of representation. Third, we discuss our data and methods; in particular, we explain how we create our measure of political representation. Fourth, we present representation scores for each of the countries in our study. Fifth, we describe the results of our analyses that concern the correlates of political representation in Latin America. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and of potential extensions to this research project.

REPRESENTATION AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The nature of political representation has not received much scholarly attention in the focus on democratic quality in Latin America. O'Donnell's (1994) description of "delegative democracies" as regimes in which neo-Hobbesian patterns of representation arose and Stokes's (1999, 2001) accounts of the "policy switches" pursued by the likes of Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru are notable exceptions and also highlight the importance of examining this subject in greater detail. Among the small group of exceptions are also important studies by Hagopian (1998), Moreno (1999), and Roberts (2000). In addition, a relatively small number of single-case studies of different parties or party systems have been performed across Latin America (e.g., Coppedge, 1996; González, 1991; Hartlyn, 1988; Levitsky, 2001; Mainwaring, 1999). These studies provide important insights into the study of political representation in contemporary Latin America. However, their exclusive single-case focuses limit the chances for cross-national hypothesis testing and generalization.

It is critical to the study of the young democracies in Latin America that we understand the nature of representation and its determinants. In the first place, and essentially by definition, representation affects the quality of

democracy by ensuring that political elites' policy preferences reflect those of their electors.[2] Such programmatic linking does not guarantee positive substantive outcomes, of course, but it does typically facilitate such results. As Kitschelt et al. (1999) note, when elites and citizens are linked by ideological commitments, cycles of responsiveness and accountability are created. In the long run, such cycles are key to establishing a coherent and stable policy-making environment and long-standing institutional frameworks with the capacity to foster socioeconomic development (North, 1990). Moreover, scholars have shown that the presence of ideologically committed and differentiated political parties affects the capacity of the subordinated classes to pursue their interests (Rueschemeyer, Huber, & Stephens, 1992). Other things being equal, we should expect more progressive distributive outcomes in those party systems in which the main actors have ideological commitments that are structured and stable and that at the same time are the basis for both (a) competition among parties and (b) coherent and well-rooted links between parties and their constituencies. In other words, political representation is not only a crucial determinant of the procedural quality of democracy in a given polity but also a significant factor capable of shaping its substantive yields (e.g., distributive outcomes).

If democratic consolidation is defined as a significant decrease in the probability of reversal to an authoritarian system, then the degree of representation may also contribute to this aspect of a young democracy.[3] The relationships among regime durability and stability, representation, and democratic quality are quite subtle and hinge on the interaction between the former and a set of contextual factors such as the salience of distributive conflicts. As such, it is not necessarily the case that representation will always contribute to the longevity of democracy. In fact, some authors point to representational failures in the context of widespread poverty and inequality as making democracy faulty and therefore durable in modern Latin America (Huber & Stephens, 1999). According to this view, democracy is consolidated precisely because subordinated classes lack effective channels of political representation, thereby keeping elite interests secure and threat perception low.

Nevertheless, to the extent that representation fosters perceptions of regime legitimacy, a lack of representation may threaten democratic consoli-

2. This is because the focus of this article is mandate representation, which is concerned with the degree to which parties' policy stances correspond to those of their constituencies.

3. Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela (1992) state that transitional democracies are distinguished from consolidated ones according to the degree to which all actors commit to the rules of the game and, related, the degree to which the democracy's permanence appears certain.

dation.[4] There is strong reason to believe that the level of representation affects citizens' support for a system and therefore contributes to its durability. The shallower the connections between elites and the mass public, the less committed the mass public will be to the democratic regime and, at worst, the more open the public will be to a reversal to a more authoritarian system (Diamond, 1996). Thus, although high levels of representation could potentially threaten a fragile democracy in which the masses possess a polarized or highly redistributive agenda, countries in which this is a possibility would seem to be caught in a difficult situation: Increasing representation may make the regime susceptible to democratic breakdown at the elite level, yet if significant portions of the mass public are left underrepresented by parties, they may withdraw support from the regime, resort to unconventional forms of participation, and/or be increasingly open to nondemocratic forms of government. In either case, the recent breakdown of previously institutionalized party systems (e.g., Venezuela), the growing stress that parties and party leaders are subjected to elsewhere in the region, and Latin Americans' increasing distrust in parties and elections suggest that the nature of representation is one of the most important fault lines undermining the quality, and potentially even the durability, of these young democracies (Hagopian, 1998).

CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS

Because of the region's short and discontinuous experience with democracy and the fluidity of its party systems (Coppedge, 2001), we are skeptical about the overall quality of mandate representation in Latin America (i.e., relative to that in advanced systems). Nevertheless, we certainly expect to find substantial variation in levels of representation across party systems. Consequently, in addition to creating a measure of the general level of representation in each country, our goal in this article is to examine cross-national variance in levels of representation among the nine Latin American countries that constitute our study. Extant works suggest a number of possible political, social, and economic correlates of representation levels.

Three basic political factors would appear relevant to the degree of representation in a system: whether a particular party system has experienced suf-

4. Diamond (1996) argues that democratic consolidation is "the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation such that all significant actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine" (p. 33).

ficient time and stability for strong representative linkages to develop, the rules of the electoral game, and the presence of a strong ideological left. With respect to the first type, party system institu- tionalization and policy switches capture instances of party system stability and duration and instances of disruption, respectively. On one hand, the greater the institutionalization of a party system (as defined by Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), the more capacity there is for representation and therefore the more likely it is that individuals will link to parties on the basis of issues.[5] On the other hand, significant political disruptions should negatively affect levels of representation. Stokes (1999) has documented a phenomenon she terms "policy switches," whereby candidates and sometimes parties campaign on one set of issues and then reverse that platform after taking office. Our hypotheses should be clear: Levels of representation will be higher in those systems with high levels of institutionalization and lower in those that have experienced recent policy switches.[6]

The second type of political factor we consider concerns electoral rules assumed to foster personalism. Here, our expectations are less certain. On one hand, there is strong empirical evidence that certain electoral rules increase the likelihood of party-system fragmentation and provide incentives for politicians to cultivate a personal vote (Carey & Shugart, 1995).When electoral competition is centered on individual candidates' qualities, politicians may rely less on their political parties' programmatic stances to compete for electoral support. As a result, they lack incentives for developing

5. It is important to recognize that some institutionalized party systems relied (particularly during state-led development) on clientelistic linkages between parties and constituents. In those cases, although stable and well-entrenched parties are available as potential carriers of policy representation, we cannot be certain ex ante about the quality of representation in the 1990s. Such cases that registered high levels of party-system institutionalization followed somewhat different trajectories. For instance, whereas Venezuela's traditional party-system broke down, Uruguay's traditional clientelistic party system managed to incorporate an ideological leftist party that has apparently shifted the nature of party competition in the country from one centered on patronage and clientelism to one progressively structured on the opposition between liberal reformers (both traditional parties) and the Left. For this reason, although we examine the correlation between our representation measure and institutionalization, another option would be to consider our representation measure a complementary assessment that looks into one neglected dimension of Mainwaring and Scully's index and/or as a temporal extension of their effort to map some key features of Latin American party systems.

6. Interesting, there is not a strong correlation between party system institutionalization and recent policy switches. The correlation is –.32 if we use Mainwaring and Scully's original codings for institutionalization; it is –.12 if we recode Colombia from an institutionalization score of 10.5 to a score of 5 (see the footnote to Table 6 for more on this recoding). Given that they are distinct variables (one capturing long-term and one more recent effects), we think that it is an interesting question to see which of these is more highly correlated with representation.

coherent and well-structured party platforms on which to compete. From this perspective, personalism in the electoral system would seem to create an incentive structure that is detrimental to representation.

On the other hand, Hawkins and Morgenstern (2004), who also classify Latin American electoral formulas in terms of the incentives to seek a personal vote, find that the effect of electoral laws in shaping the cohesiveness of Latin American parties is rather weak and limited. Party cohesiveness is typically a key component of representation, as it is in our study (as we explain in detail later). Therefore if electoral formulas do not significantly shape the cohesiveness of parties, they may have little effect on representation: Parties will offer voters a clear choice, or not, regardless of the electoral rules of the game. Because extant arguments and evidence point us in these two different directions, we begin our study without clear expectations for the relationship between system-level measures of personalism and representation.

The third type of political factor we examine concerns the strength of leftist parties in the system. We expect that the presence of political organizations that promote horizontal linkages and class-based ideological appeals helps structure party systems by clarifying the political alternatives, helping citizens link to parties along substantive lines. There are of course reasons to suspect this effect to be weak in modern Latin America. Given the collapse of communism and the now ubiquitous presence of neoliberalism, leftist parties may have difficulty presenting distinct and attractive platforms. Nevertheless, in other recent studies, we have found evidence that leftist parties (particularly those in the opposition) in Latin America are still managing to communicate clearly and efficiently with the masses and are offering them well-defined policy options (Luna & Zechmeister, in press; Zechmeister, 2004). For example, we found that most leftist parties act clearly as representative vehicles for sociodemocratic policy agendas (emphasizing active state intervention in the economy and government provision of social goods) and secular ideologies (Luna & Zechmeister, in press). All other things being equal, we therefore hypothesize that the presence of a strong political Left will be associated with higher levels of policy representation.

We call social factors two elements that, first, tap into how society is organized and, second, how a party system is perceived by its citizens. In the first case, social organizations should also facilitate party-citizen linkages by making ideological and class-based appeals (Roberts, 1996). In particular, unions should help structure society such that it is easier for politicians to target and collect the support of large groups of collectively minded individuals. We therefore hypothesize that union density will be positively associated with representation.

In the second case, we believe that levels of confidence in a party system among the mass public are likely correlates of representation levels. A lack of confidence is a possible proxy for previous representation failures and general disenchantment with a system. Where politicians are not meeting their responsibilities as representatives of voters' interests, voters should be more distrustful of the electoral system. Our measure of system confidence is the percentage of survey respondents who believe that elections are fraudulent. We expect that lower levels of confidence will be correlated with lower levels of representation and vice versa.

Our final set of factors is socioeconomic in nature. From Marxist political economy to modernization theories, and those influenced by these, extant literature has both argued and found that a country's experience with democracy is related to its level of socioeconomic development. Gross domestic product rates, education levels (literacy), urbanization figures, poverty rates, and indicators of social inequality have been applied elsewhere as proxies for the different dimensions encompassed by the conceptual definition of socioeconomic development. We assert the possibility that a country's general level of socioeconomic development is positively correlated not only with democracy but also with its level of representation.

A high level of socioeconomic development provides subordinated classes with organizational capacities required for bringing about and sustaining democratic rule (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Additionally, the positive effects of education on levels of political sophistication may enhance the likelihood of ideological commitments between elites and citizens by reducing the amount of uncertainty citizens have about their own policy stances and those of political elites. In contrast, high levels of poverty and inequality, low educational levels, and weaker social organization of subordinated classes produce an ideal environment for co-optation and clientelistic practices to take hold (Kitschelt, 2000). Consequently, we expect that wealth is positively correlated with representation. Because that is a rather blunt measure, we also hypothesize, and test that levels of poverty and inequality are each negatively associated with levels of representation.

Finally, we consider the relationship between economic policies and representation. Specifically, we expect to find a negative correlation between the extent of economic liberalization efforts pursued by a country and representation. Deep economic liberalization programs typically follow economic crises, and both have the tendency to weaken horizontal linkages within a society (Roberts, 2000; Roberts & Arce, 1998) and open up new opportunities for clientelism. In addition to examining the extent of liberalization, we test a measure of the overall level of liberalization to differentiate between

change and level effects. We do not, however, have any preliminary expectation for this factor.

In sum, extant theoretical and empirical evidence suggests a number of political, social, and economic factors that could be associated with levels of representation. In the above discussion, we identified 11 specific factors: levels of institutionalization, experience with political disruption (policy switches), personalism of the electoral system, the strength of leftist parties, the presence of horizontal linkages (union density), perceptions of electoral fraud, levels of economic and social development (general, poverty, and inequality), and experience with economic disruption and change (liberalization efforts and levels). A summary of our expectations concerning these factors is presented in the first column of Table 6.[7]

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

We operationalize representation as the extent to which political parties and their constituents have clear and consistent preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions. This type of representation has been termed *mandate* or *issue* representation; it captures the degree of a party's correspondence to the preferences of its constituency (Converse & Pierce, 1986; Dalton, 1985; Iversen, 1994a, 1994b; Powell, 1982, 1989; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999; Ranney, 1962; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999). It is also called responsible party government, and three conditions are central to its description: (a) policy divergence among the parties contesting the election, (b) policy stability on the part of the parties contesting the election, and (c) policy voting on

7. Our operationalization of these indicators is the following: party system institutionalization (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), a dichotomous variable noting whether the country has experienced a policy switch in the 10 years prior to the survey (Stokes, 1999), a variable indicating the level of personalism in the party system (Hawkins & Morgenstern, 2004), a variable indicating leftist party strength during the late 1990s (parties are considered leftist if they have a mean score less than 4.5 on the 10-point left-right party placement question asked in the Salamanca survey of elites; the variable measures the percentage of congressional seats held by leftist parties weighted by the parties' mean distance from the center of that same left-right scale), union density (Roberts, 2002), a variable that measures the percentage of respondents to the Latinobarómetro survey who do not trust their countries' elections, a variable measuring the country's level of economic development (gross domestic product per capita in 1999), Comisión Económica Para América Latina y el Caribe's (1999) 1997 poverty (percentage of urban population under poverty line) and inequality (Gini coefficients) measures, and indicators of the countries' liberalization efforts from 1985 to 1995 and liberalization levels in 1995 (Morley, Machado, & Pettinato, 1999; see also Kitschelt, n.d.).

the part of the electorate (Adams, 2001).[8] In this section, we describe the data and methods we use to compare and measure the quality of representation in nine Latin American countries.

DATA

We rely on two basic types of data: individual-level survey data and macro-level political, social, and economic indicators. The survey data come from two sources: the survey of Latin American legislators administered under the leadership of Manuel Alcántara Sáez (1997) at the University of Salamanca and the 1998 Latinobarómetro survey (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 1998). Respondents' political affiliations were clearly indicated for the elite survey as the parties that the elite represents in congress. To capture party support among the masses, we use a measure of respondents' vote choices (were an election held that day).[9]

CASE SELECTION

This project analyzes elite-mass issue congruence in and across the following nine Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. To include as many party systems as possible, we included all the cases for which we had data, with two exceptions. For the most part, although young democratic contexts are quite fluid, the temporal proximity of the surveys is close enough that we are confident that we are capturing a stable snapshot of elite-mass representation in the 2 years around this time period. However, two Latin American countries, Peru and Venezuela, experienced significant changes in their party systems during these 2 years. Parties that were very prominent in 1997 had virtually disappeared and lacked significant popular support in the 1998 mass survey; these were replaced by new parties and groups that emerged and were consequently not represented in the 1997 elite survey. As a result, only a very small number of parties satisfied the conditions to be included at both levels, yielding a very limited and nonrepresentative sample of the overall system. We therefore exclude these countries from our analyses. Although

8. Because of the static nature of the data, we limit our measures to the first and third conditions.

9. In the case of Argentina, the question was asked so that Unión Cívica Radical and Frente del País Solidario were combined (as if running on an allied platform). Although we therefore cannot distinguish between preferences for these individual parties, the survey reflects the options presumed available to citizens at that time, and this fact is therefore reflected in our measure of political representation.

the loss of these two countries is unfortunate, we are still left with a wide array of countries to analyze.[10]

Another issue of case selection concerns the parties that we examine. Not surprising, we sometimes had few or no respondents who indicated affiliations with small parties. In many of these cases, we have a small set of respondents for one survey (elite or mass) and none for the other survey (mass or elite). In such cases, we had no choice but to leave these parties out of our analysis. For the remaining small parties, we exclude these parties from our analysis if we did not have more than three respondents for the elite survey and more than 15 respondents for the mass survey. By leaving these parties out, we limit the domain of our analysis to representation by main parties.[11]

10. The absence of these arguably less structured party systems should be kept in mind, because this could make our overall portrait of Latin American party systems appear too optimistic.

11. By restricting our analysis in this way, we leave untreated respondents who do not express any preference. In the Latinobarómetro data for the nine countries we examine, the percentage of nonrespondents to the vote-choice question ranges from a low of 21.5% in Mexico to a high of 69.5% in Costa Rica. For five of the countries, the percentage of nonrespondents is close to 50% (±5 percentage points). The remaining two countries, Brazil and Uruguay, both have nonresponse rates that round to 36%. Although one might be tempted to incorporate nonresponse rates into an indicator of representation, we are convinced that because the surveys were conducted at different times in each country's electoral cycle, one cannot interpret these percentages as comparable indicators of political disconnect. Factors such as the timing of the most recent election and the nature of that campaign likely have a significant effect on the number of respondents willing to indicate a party preference. Not surprising, country-specific laws also influence this number. For example, we found that using data from the Web site of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://www.idea.int) to code our nine countries as having no compulsory voting, compulsory voting that is weakly enforced, or compulsory voting that is strongly enforced, the correlation between nonrespondents and compulsory voting is in the expected direction and at least moderately strong (–.63). As another thought, we did consider that we might be able to capture the percentage of truly alienated citizens by measuring the percentage of nonrespondents to the vote-choice question who also indicate (in response to another question) that they have little or no confidence in political parties. This "alienation" measure ranges from a low of 3% in Mexico to a high of 30% in Costa Rica. However, because this measure might also be subject to electoral cycles and other such factors, we did not incorporate it into our representation measure. Therefore, our representation measure should only be interpreted as capturing the degree of programmatic linking that exists between main party representatives and party supporters. Nevertheless, as such, our measure of representation does capture whether clear opportunities and examples of programmatic linkages exist in a country. For the sake of one final exploration into the issue of nonrespondents, we examined the correlation between our measures of representation (discussed later in the text and shown in Table 5) and the percentage of nonrespondents and between representation and the percentage of alienated respondents. For nonrespondents, the correlation between that percentage and our representation scores is essentially zero (–.07 and –.04 for our "conservative" and "best" representation scores, respectively). For alienated respondents, the correlations are –.10 and .01, respectively.

Because the vast majority of voters link to these parties, we believe that we still adequately capture the overall level of representation in each party system.[12]

MATCHING VARIABLES ACROSS SURVEYS

To evaluate elite-mass issue representation, we needed elite and mass survey data sets that contain a number of similar issue questions. A difficulty with any type of project that attempts to match up two survey databases is that question wordings do not always correspond exactly. The surveys that we use differ in the scope of policy dimensions that they cover and in the question wordings of variables that represent similar policy considerations. Nevertheless, both data sets did contain questions that we believe represent a total of five issue bundles, or potential ideological dimensions: general economic (three variables), foreign investment (two variables), religion (two variables), regime (two variables), and law and order and good governance (two variables). These five policy areas represent a wide array of issues that are relevant to the countries in this project. Table 1 depicts our scheme for matching questions across the surveys according to our five issue bundles.

MEASURING MANDATE REPRESENTATION

A critical decision for our analysis concerned the measurement of representation. In all studies, this decision substantially hinges on the conceptual definition of representation subscribed to by the researchers. In our case, in accord with our earlier discussion, we adhere to the "issue congruence" approach, which analyzes the correspondence between party electorates and their representatives across a set of salient policy dimensions (Powell, 2004).[13] In examining issue congruence between party electorates and party elites, two basic features of their position taking are of primary importance to

12. Appendix A, which lists the parties on which we based our analyses, the parties we excluded, and the number of respondents from each survey for all parties, is available online at http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/ejzech/.

13. It is important to recognize that our measure of representation is limited to a measure of issue congruence between party supporters and party legislators at a single point in time and does not consider policy output. We do not consider accountability representation, where the incumbent party selects policies unconstrained by party platforms or promises and voters act retrospectively, retaining the incumbent party only when that party or politician delivers good output (Alesina, 1988; Przeworski et al., 1999; Stokes, 1999). In addition, we are unable to examine whether the political elite follow or reflect citizens' preferences or engage in issue leadership (Miller & Stokes, 1963; see also Hurley & Hill, 2001; Page & Shapiro, 1983). For a very good discussion of the limitations of studies such as this one, which focus only on "comparative-static constellations of preferences," see Kitschelt (2002).

Table 1
Matched Issues by Bundle

Issue Bundle	Variable in Mass Survey	Variable in Elite Survey
Economic		
Privatization	Two questions each asked whether the electricity and telephone industries, respectively, should be privatized. These were combined into a single 3-point variable for which the highest value means most in favor of privatization.	A question asked whether industries should be privatized. It was recoded to a 3-point scale on which higher values mean in favor of privatization.
Job creation	A question asked whether it was important to create more jobs even if prices rise. The variable is dichotomous and coded so that the higher value means do not create more jobs.	A question asked whether the government should sponsor more job creation. It is coded on a 5-point scale on which higher values mean that the government should not sponsor more job creation.
Unemployment insurance	A question asked whether the government should spend more or less on insurance against unemployment. The variable is dichotomous and coded so that the higher value means spend less.	A question asked whether the government should provide more unemployment insurance. The variable is coded on a 5-point scale on which higher values mean provide less unemployment insurance.
Foreign investment		
U.S. investment/ trade	A question asked about the importance of trade with the United States. The variable is coded on a 4-point scale on which the highest value means trade with the United States is very important.	A question asked the extent to which the country should (or should not) pursue economic investment and relations with the United States. The variable is coded on a 5-point scale on which higher values mean more in favor of establishing such links.
Latin American investment/ regional integration	A question asked whether one favors economic integration in Latin America. The variable is coded on a 4-point scale on which higher values mean more in favor of integration.	A question asked the extent to which the country should (or should not) pursue economic investment and relations with Latin America. The variable is coded on a 5-point scale on which higher values mean more in favor of establishing such links.

Table 1 (continued)

Issue Bundle	Variable in Mass Survey	Variable in Elite Survey
Religion		
Religious/secular	A question asked how devout a religious practitioner is the respondent. The variable is coded on a 4-point scale on which the highest value means very devout.	A question asked how religious a practitioner is the respondent. The variable is coded on a 10-point scale on which the highest value means very religious.
Attend church	A question asked how often the respondent attends church. The variable is coded on a 5-point scale on which the highest value means more than once per week and the lowest value means never.	A question asked how often the respondent attends church. The variable is coded on a 4-point scale on which the highest value means at least once per week and the lowest value means never.
Regime		
Guns or butter	A question asked if more or less money should be spent on defense and the armed forces. The dichotomous variable is coded so that the higher value means more.	A question asked if the army budget should be transferred to social security. The 4-point variable is coded so that higher values mean that the respondent disagrees.
Democratic order best	A question asked whether democracy is always preferable, sometimes an authoritarian government is necessary, or if it does not matter to the respondent. The 3-point variable is coded so that the highest value means an antidemocratic response, and the lowest value means a prodemocratic response.	A question asked whether democracy is the best system of government. The 4-point variable is coded so that the highest value means an antidemocratic response, and the lowest value means a prodemocratic response.
Law and order/good governance		
Public security	A question asked about spending on public security. The dichotomous variable is coded so that the high value means that the respondent would prefer that his or her country spend more.	Two questions asked about a respondent's concern for the issue of security. The first asked if delinquency is a threat to democracy; the second asked if violence is a problem. The combined variable is coded so that higher values mean greater concern for security.

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Issue Bundle	Variable in Mass Survey	Variable in Elite Survey
Corruption	A question asked how serious a problem corruption is in the respondent's country. The 4-point variable is coded so that the highest value means not at all serious.	A question asked if corruption is a problem that has always existed in the country. The 5-point variable is coded so that the highest value means the respondent agrees strongly.

Note: All variables were recoded onto scales ranging from 0 to 1. We attempted to match questions as closely as possible but were limited by the data. However, differences in exact question wording and in the scales are less relevant for our study because we do not compare exact stances on these issues across the mass and elite divide. Thus at no point do we assert that a value on a variable in the mass survey can be directly compared with a value on its peer variable in the elite survey. The regression and correlation analyses do, however, take into account the relative mean positions of party voters and representatives for the two surveys.

us: First, on a given issue, do party electorates and party elites "line up" in the same order? Second, are elites offering clear and distinct alternatives and/or are party electorates distinguished from one another on that issue?

Our initial step consisted of measuring these two components (coherent ordering and significant divides) for 11 issues, for each of the nine countries. We first measured the degree of coherence in the ordering of party supporters and members by the correlation between the mean placements of the party electorates and the mean placements of party legislators on each issue.[14] We reduced the correlation results into three categories: a strong positive correlation ($r > .50$), a weak correlation ($-.50 < r < .50$), and a strong negative correlation ($r < -.50$).[15] Second, we used analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to create four potential categories for the second component: significant elite divide and significant mass divide, significant elite divide but no significant mass divide, no significant elite divide but significant mass divide, and no signifi-

14. Following Achen's (1977, 1978) methodological suggestions and the basics of Kitschelt et al.'s (1999) empirical strategy, we analyzed the consistency of elite and mass mean positions on each issue by computing correlation and regression coefficients. Given that the regression and correlation analysis results were highly consistent, we rely primarily on the latter.

15. Because we had elite data only for parties with legislative representation, we had only two parties in Colombia and Costa Rica, and therefore our analyses were overdetermined and could not be computed. In these cases, we check whether party elite and supporter mean issue positions were consistently ordered and assign a "correlation coefficient" greater than .5 when that occurs. When a crossing existed between elites' and citizens' positions, we considered the situation as one similar to the ones in which we obtained negative correlations lower than -.5. Although not an ideal solution, we feel this is the best option we have for treating these two-party systems.

Table 2
Representation Types

Significant Differences Within Elite and/or Mass Partisan Positions?	Correlations Between Elite and Mass Partisan Mean Positions		
	$r > .50$	$-.50 < r < .50$	$r < -.50$
Yes/yes	1	5	9
Yes/no	2	6	10
No/yes	3	7	11
No/no	4	8	12

cant elite nor mass divide.[16] Combining our two measures yields 12 categories with which to describe each issue. Table 2 depicts the resulting 3×4 table.

In examining the different categories identified by Table 2, we had to ask ourselves, What combination of results (described by our two measures) indicates "good" or "bad" issue representation? In other words, our next step was to assess the degree of representation indicated by each category in Table 2. We began by recognizing that the upper left and upper right corners indicate the furthest extremes. That is, where there are clear, significant divides among elite and mass positions and a strong, positive correlation between the elite and mass mean positions, we have a case of strong representation success (upper left cell [cell 1]). In contrast, where there are clear partisan divides among the elites and the masses and where there is a strong, negative correlation between the elite and mass mean positions, we have a case of strong representation failure (upper right cell [cell 9]). In other words, party elites and party supporters are taking distinct stances, but party supporters are linking to party elites that hold exactly contrary positions.

Looking at the first column, where there is a strong, positive correlation between the ordering of elite and mass mean party positions, we consider that each row is a progressively weaker case of representation. That is, if party elites and masses are arrayed in essentially the same order, but there is no significant divide among the masses, then that (cell 2) is a slightly weaker case than found in the upper left cell. On the other hand, because we believe that representation hinges significantly on clear signals sent by elites and because elites have higher levels of political sophistication and should otherwise be

16. ANOVAs and the supplemental Bonferroni tests we ran using the means and standard deviations we obtained for each party, at each level, and on each issue allow us to assess whether mean placements are significantly different. For example, if the analyses detect any significant difference of means among party supporters, we consider that a case of mass divide. Because of the small sample sizes, we use a significance cutoff of $p < .10$.

able to exhibit greater coherence on an issue, representation is a bit weaker in the case in which there is a significant mass divide but no significant elite divide (cell 3). Finally, where elite and mass partisans are arrayed in a consistent ordering, but there are no significant divides registered among the party means for either group, we consider that there is some, but very minimal, level of representation on that issue (cell 4).

The second column is less straightforward (cells 5 to 8). On one hand, if there are significant divides among elites and/or masses, but not a consistent ordering, this may indicate a state of flux in which the potential for strong representation exists. On the other hand, we cannot be certain of the direction the party system is likely to take from this middle column, that is, whether it is likely to move toward strong representation success or failure. We are therefore left with the consideration that these cells represent ambiguous representation outcomes.

Finally, the third column is close to a mirror opposite of the first column. As already indicated, the upper right cell shows a case of strong representation failure (cell 9). The lower right cell is clearly a case of poor representation (cell 12), but less so than the cells above it because neither elites nor the masses take significantly different stances on the issue. This cell might reflect issues that are simply not salient among voters or party elites. Where there is a significant divide among the masses, but not elites, and a strong, negative correlation, we consider this a relatively worse case of representation than where there is a significant divide among the elite, but not the masses, and a strong, negative correlation. Our rationale here is that it should be more difficult to detect a significant divide among the masses than elites (given the lower levels of political sophistication, e.g.). And therefore, if there are clear partisan divides among the masses, but elites are arrayed in the wrong direction and not taking clear positions, this then is a stronger case of representation failure (cell 11; the voters are expressing differences that are not matched by the elites) than when there are partisan differences among the elites that are not reflected among the masses (cell 10).

Our third step was to assign values to each cell that reflect the above assessments. We opted to have these values range from 2.0 to –2.0. Table 3 shows the values we assigned to each cell. Clearly, there is some degree of bluntness, and some room for error, in our method of assigning values to these cells. To check the robustness of our results, we considered several other scoring systems. The different schemes all considered the first column to indicate some descending level of representation success and the last column to indicate different levels of representation failure. These schemes differed mainly according to whether we assigned some nonzero value to the cells in the middle column and/or made slight changes to the lower three cells

Table 3
Representation Scheme for Scoring Issues

Significant Differences Within Elite and/or Mass Partisan Positions?	Correlations Between Elite and Mass Partisan Mean Positions		
	$r > .50$	$-.50 < r < .50$	$r < -.50$
Yes/yes	2.0 (strong representation success)	0.0	–2.0 (strong representation failure)
Yes/no	1.5 (weaker representation success)	0.0	–1.0 (potential representation failure)
No/yes	1.0 (still weaker representation success)	0.0	–1.5 (potential strong representation failure)
No/no	0.5 (weakest representation)	0.0	–0.5 (potential representation failure)

in the first and last columns. Table 4 shows the distribution of the cases (issues) across the 12 cells. As Table 4 shows, the majority of the cases fall into the first column, and relatively few cases fall into the first three cells of the second and third columns. Likely as a result of the distribution of cases, the alternative scoring schemes we attempted did not produce significantly different results (the correlation between the results of any two schemes we found reasonable and tested was above .90 in every case).

Finally, using the above scoring system (see Table 3), each issue in our study, for each country, received a score according to the above system (the specific country charts are in Appendix B, available at http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/ejzech/). Our next step was to add each country's issue scores together to create our measure of the overall level of representation in each system. Once again, we had several different options available for computing such a summary score. We decided on two methods. In the first, for each country, we summed its average scores on each of our five issue bundles, a process that emphasizes the importance of ideological dimensions to the concept of representation. To do this, we first computed a score for each policy dimension by adding up the representation scores that we obtained for each of the issues on a given bundle. Dividing that score by the number of issues in the basket, we were able to get a standardized index of the quality of representation for that policy dimension, which ranges from a minimum of –2 and a maximum of 2. We then added up the results for each of the five dimensions to create a final representation score. The advantage of this technique over the alternative of simply adding up each individual variable is that we give less weight to the specific issue questions and more to the overall dimension those questions represent.[17] The second method we used is one that seeks a

Table 4
Distribution of Issues Across Representation Chart Cells

Significant Differences Within Elite and/or Mass Partisan Positions?	Correlations Between Elite and Mass Partisan Mean Positions		
	$r > .50, b > 1.00$	$-.50 < r < .50$	$r < -.50$
Yes/yes	11	3	1
Yes/no	12	1	3
No/yes	16	6	2
No/no	15	16	12

type of "best case" scenario for each country, by noting only the highest scoring issue from each policy bundle and then adding these scores together for each country. Like the first measure, this measure theoretically ranges from –10 to 10. We call the first measure "conservative" because it averages scores within an issue dimension, and we call the second measure "best case." In the sections that follow, we report and discuss the results of these two measures of representation for the nine countries in our study, and we examine the political, social, and economic correlates of the values we assign to each case.

REPRESENTATION SCORES

Table 5 presents the summary scores we arrive at for each of the two methods we applied. As the table shows, in accordance with our expectations, levels of representation vary significantly across our nine cases. The two sets of scores are fairly similar and highly correlated (correlation = .94). In each case, the countries with the highest levels of representation are Chile and Uruguay, followed by Argentina. Perhaps surprising, Colombia yields a score in the intermediate range, while in the first column, Costa Rica scores very low. The fact that Costa Rica assumes a more intermediate score in the second column (when only the highest ranking issue for each dimension is counted) shows that there are certain issues (if not issue bundles) on which there is at least a moderate level of issue congruence between party elites and voters in Costa Rica. Costa Rica might thus be thought of as a less robust instance of representation (though note that overall levels of representation are never high), to the extent that it shows representation on particular policies but not on coherent issue dimensions. In contrast to these cases, regard-

17. Nevertheless, that measure, and results using it, is not significantly different from what we present here.

less of the scheme used, Bolivia and Ecuador consistently display low levels of representation; Brazil just edges out Bolivia on the conservative measure but moves a small distance away from Bolivia's low position in the best-case scenario. Mexico also shows a relatively lower score in the conservative case and moves just slightly ahead of both Bolivia and Ecuador in the second column.

An obvious question at this point is, Where there is a moderate or high level of representation, what issues or issue dimensions are being represented most successfully? In our analysis of the 3×4 representation tables we created for each country, we found that of the 11 issues (recall Table 4) that fall into the upper left cell ("strong representation success"), 4 of these issues are economic (both foreign investment and trade and domestic issues), 4 are religious issues, 2 are law-and-order issues, and 1 is a regime issue.

Although there has certainly been a general convergence on the left-right economic dimension in Latin America, it appears to us that at least in some cases, elites are still offering distinct economic policy options to voters who in turn are linking to parties on those bases. To the extent that religious attitudes are well represented (i.e., appear in the upper left cell), it is worth noting that they are always joined with other issues.

Interesting, issues of law and order, despite the salience of issues of public security in Latin America, are less successfully represented in the countries we examine here. A careful look at the nine country-specific representation tables revealed that there is much more likely to be a divide among mass partisans on these issues (corruption and public security) than among the elites. Thus, not only are elites generally not taking distinct stances on these issues, but they are also not responding to the partisan divides where they exist (the exception here is in the case of Argentina, where the issue of public security is one of successful representation). A similar pattern occurs in the case of regime issues: Significant divides on these issues are found more often among the masses than the elites, which could result from either more sophisticated levels of self-censoring among elites or a true convergence to support for at least minimal democratic procedures. In contrast, on economic issues, considering the countries as a whole, there appeared about the same likelihood that one finds a mass divide with no elite divide as an elite divide with no mass divide. Clearly, elites in Latin America in general are less willing to take distinct stances on issues of law and order and regime than on other issues. To the extent that these issues concern regime type, the lack of opportunity this type of behavior provides may actually be a good thing within the context of a young democracy, that is, a sign that elite players have accepted democracy as "the only game in town" (e.g., Przeworski, 1991). On the other hand, to the extent that these issues concern trade-offs in the amount of

Table 5
Summary Representation Scores

Country	"Conservative" Score[a]	"Best-Case" Score[b]
Chile	6.9	9.0
Uruguay	6.5	9.0
Argentina	4.5	6.5
Colombia	2.3	5.5
Brazil	1.6	3.5
Bolivia	1.5	1.5
Mexico	0.0	2.0
Costa Rica	–0.1	3.5
Ecuador	–0.1	1.5

a. Sum of average scores for each policy dimension.
b. Sum of highest scores for each policy dimension.

spending and/or attention spent on matters of institutional development, these results may paint a less positive picture of representation in these systems with respect to these issues.

CORRELATES OF REPRESENTATION

Earlier in the article, we identified a number of factors that might be correlated with levels of representation.[18] We term these potential "correlates" of representation levels, because in many cases, we have no clear hypotheses about a single direction of causation. Moreover, even when we presume a causal linkage, our data only allow analysis of correlations among variables.

Table 6 shows a summary of our original set of expectations and the results of our bivariate correlation analyses for each of our two sets of representation scores. As the table shows, there is a fairly high degree of consistency in the results across the two columns. It does appear that the correlation scores in the second column are a bit "sharper" than those in the first results column, and this might lend some greater credence to that scoring scheme. Nevertheless, we examine both columns in tandem. The results meet our expectations for just about every case for which we predicted a direction (positive or negative) for the correlation coefficient; however, some of the relationships are clearly stronger than others. To further substantiate these

18. Appendix C, available online at http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/ejzech/, shows the data we use to measure these indicators.

Table 6
Political and Economic Correlates of Representation

	Expectation	Correlation With Conservative Score[a]	Correlation With Best-Case Score[a]
Institutionalization (with Colombia recoded to 5)[b]	+	.52* (.53*)	.74*** (.64**)
Policy switch	–	–.38	–.45
Personalism	?	.33	.36
Strength of leftist parties	+	.61**	.57**
Union density	+	.30	.08
Perceptions of fraud	–	–.60**	–.68**
Economic development	+	.61**	.69**
Poverty	–	–.62**	–.72**
Inequality	–	–.08	–.17
Liberalization effort	–	–.67**	–.73***
Liberalization level	?	.65*	.65*

a. Although our objective is descriptive rather than explanatory and although we have a very small *n*, we still report significance levels for each correlation coefficient. For every variable in which we had directional expectations, one-tailed significance coefficients are reported. Otherwise, we report two-tailed tests.
b. Colombia is given a high rank in Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) index of party system institutionalization, but one might argue that the Colombian party system and state have been significantly weakened in recent years because of the cumulative effects of democratizing reforms introduced by the 1991 constitution, which facilitated the emergence of new parties, and the deleterious consequences of the country's ongoing civil strife. We therefore consider both the original score given for Colombia (10.5), and we also run an additional analysis where Colombia is given a low score (5).
*$p \leq .10$. **$p \leq .05$. ***$p \leq .01$.

relationships, we took two steps: First, we note which relationships are statistically significant. Second, we looked at the actual scatterplots for each analysis and determined that none of the results appear driven by one or two outliers.

We first address variables we categorized as political factors. The results here clearly show that long periods of stability and instances of political disruption are related to levels of representation, in the expected directions. The correlation between institutionalization and representation is particularly strong when the latter is measured according to the best-case score. In systems in which parties have had time to develop clear and consistent track records, citizens and elites are more likely to link to each other on the basis of programmatic criteria. Experience with a significant political disruption, measured as a recent policy switch, is correlated negatively with representation, though the relationship is only weak to moderate in strength.[19] It does not appear, then, that a policy switch is an absolute death knell for representa-

tion; apparently, when severed by such instances, elites and masses can either fairly quickly reestablish programmatic linkages of some sort, and/or these are maintained by the other parties in the system.

We did not have a clear expectation regarding the relationship between issue representation and electoral laws that foster personalism. Table 6 shows that the correlations between such rules and representation levels are weak. These results support the contention that personalism in the electoral system is not necessarily a predictor of party behavior when it comes to establishing representative linkages with citizens. Although such laws may have other effects on, for example, the nature of campaigns and the distribution of pork, they do not appear to preclude the existence of significant mass-elite linkages along programmatic lines. Rather, in terms of political variables, clearly, what is more important is whether sufficient time and stability have allowed for elite-mass programmatic linkages to form and be maintained. Furthermore, the results show that where strong leftist parties exist, representative links are stronger. As we suggested earlier, leftist parties help structure party systems along ideological and substantive lines; their presence in the congress is correlated at a fairly strong, positive level with our representation scores.[20] This finding provides some support for other arguments that leftist parties tend to be better organized and play a substantial role in providing party systems with the ideological structure that enables representation (Janda & King, 1985).[21]

19. In our analysis, we code Mexico (a case not addressed by Stokes, 1999) as a case of no policy switch. One could possibly argue that Partido Revolucionario Institucional's turn toward neoliberalism is a similar behavior (it is interesting to note that Carlos Salinas initially told the public that he was against the North American Free Trade Agreement; his actual policies in office were exactly the opposite). If we code Mexico as a case of policy switch, the strength of the negative correlation between policy switches and representation levels increases to –.60 for the conservative case score and –.66 for the best-case score.

20. We should note that as our current measure of representation partially draws on the presence of significant left-right variance, systems having strong leftist parties will tend to present wider ranges of variance in terms of policy divergence. In other words, we run the risk of drawing a causal inference from an endogenous relationship between our empirical constructs of leftist strength and representation. Notwithstanding this methodological shortcoming, we strongly believe that the correlation we found is not tautological. Most important, policy divergence does not guarantee a high representation score. Indeed, high policy variance but inconsistent elite-citizen placements on issues draw the worst scenario for representation, according to our scheme. The high correlation we find suggests that not only do leftist parties tend to take coherent and distinct stances but for the most part, they also establish consistent ideological linkages with their party supporters and contribute positively to the overall structure of the party system.

21. We extend this argument and provide some preliminary evidence on intrasystemic variance in terms of the positioning of each party's elites and citizens along the left-right macro-ideological dimension in Luna and Zechmeister (in press). There, with the partial exception of

With respect to our "social" variables, we find only weak results for union density. It appears that it is not sufficient for representation to have strong horizontal linkages within society, perhaps particularly in the 1990s, when unions have suffered across the board the negative implications of labor-market liberalization. The subjective construction of social class and the activation of class as a competitive political divide also matter. Although unions might be organized along class lines, it is clearly important to have strong leftist parties that capitalize on these types of affinities to increase the level of representation in the system. In contrast to these weak results for union density, we find strong results, consistent with our expectations, for perceptions of fraud. Those countries in which citizens perceive the system to be fraudulent are those that have lower levels of overall representation. Although these findings do not confirm a causal story, they do suggest that representation might have an effect on citizens' attitudes, in the same critical way suggested by some of the literature on democratic consolidation and durability, as well as our own discussion at the beginning of this article. If citizens' perceptions of the system do in fact reflect its reality, then systems in which representation is low are more vulnerable to legitimacy problems and potentially more susceptible to leaders who appeal to the masses along non- or even antidemocratic lines.

Turning to the third bundle of factors, economic, we find that most of these variables are correlated with levels of representation at fairly high levels. The high correlations between our indicator of general economic development (wealth) and our representation scores (particularly for the best case, for which the correlation is .69) support our belief that the greater the level of economic development, the more capable citizens are of organizing around collective interests and selecting parties on such bases, the more salient distributive grievances (and thus policy platforms) are, and the less parties and citizens will be prone to engage in clientelistic transactions.

The results for the two more specific socioeconomic indicators are also signed according to our expectations. However, though poverty seems to be strongly and negatively correlated with the quality of representation, levels of inequality are not good predictors of either of our representation scores. It appears that, considering all cases, the presence of significant inequality is not an impediment to attaining high levels of representation; low levels of

---

the rightist Renovación Nacional in Chile, we find that the nonpopulist leftist parties Partido Socialista (Chile), Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Mexico), Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazil), and Frente Amplio (Uruguay) show greater ideological constraints (and therefore higher levels of internal ideological coherence) than populist and rightist parties.

economic development, however, are.[22] These results are consistent with the literature that would suggest that it is the presence of a significant number of poor and unorganized sectors of the population that makes a country ripe for clientelistic linking.

Finally, in general, the greater the liberalization effort, the lower the representation score for a country. Presumably, economic liberalization efforts weaken potentially issue-oriented societal linkages and open up opportunities for clientelism, as we noted earlier (Kitschelt, 2000; Roberts & Arce, 1998). Interesting, and surprising to us despite having no clear expectations, the extent of liberalization is positively correlated at .65 with representation. Taking both findings together, we assert that although drastic liberalization episodes (which are frequently linked to policy switches and weakly institutionalized party systems) correlate with low levels of representation, liberalization per se does not. There would appear to us to be at least two interpretations of these findings. The first is that some of countries with high levels of representation (e.g., Chile and Uruguay) pursued liberalization earlier under nondemocratic regimes and have since followed a gradualist path, which might even have helped provide time to "recover" from the detrimental effects these episodes had. The second is that those countries that are more representative are able to pursue liberalization reforms more gradually but over time more successfully (measured in level) than those countries with lower levels of representation.[23] We hope that future research will shed light on which of these interpretations is correct, because each clearly has its own significant implications for the relationship between programmatic linkages and policy output in this area.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we undertake a preliminary examination of the nature and correlates of political representation in Latin America. We break new ground in the study of democratic consolidation and quality in this region by com-

22. The extremely low results for inequality can be explained in part, but not entirely, by the presence of extreme cases having, first, relatively high inequality and high quality of representation (Chile) and, second, a very small Gini coefficient and low representation score (Costa Rica). If we remove these cases, we get results more in line with our expectations but still not very strong (the new correlation is –.45 and –.41 for each of our conservative and best representation scores, respectively).

23. We should also note that the amount of cross-national variance we have on the liberalization measures is limited. Therefore, these findings in particular should be confirmed in future research with a larger number of observations.

bining elite and mass survey data to create a quantified measure of the level of political representation in the nine party systems we examine. There remains, of course, much work to be done. Two tasks strike us as most important. First, our primary unit of analysis in this article is the party system as a whole; we do not examine the issue of representation within countries, across parties. Although our findings suggest that leftist parties provide their voters with higher levels of mandate representation, further analysis on intrasystemic variance is urgently needed. Second, our study is limited to the extent to which it captures only a single moment in time. Young democratic party systems are particularly fluid, and therefore as data become available, it is imperative that scholars address the diachronic evolution of political representation in Latin America.

In conclusion, let us note that our study underscores the tremendous heterogeneity within Latin America. This is true particularly with respect to the quality of democracy, to the extent it is reflected in representation. In some countries, party elites truly represent the interests of their party supporters. The voters in these countries know their own preferences, the parties offer clear and distinct choices, and the two groups are able to link to each other on these programmatic bases. Not surprising, it is in countries with the strongest histories of party competition, institutionalization, and socioeconomic development where we find the highest levels of political representation, most notably in Chile and Uruguay. On the other end of the scale, no matter which scoring scheme we use, we find representation weaker in systems with lower levels of political and socioeconomic development, most notably in Bolivia and Ecuador.

Interesting, we find that leftist parties are associated with higher levels of representation. Despite the potentially debilitating effects of the turn toward neoliberalism for leftist party platforms and strategies, these parties are still making programmatic linkages with citizens and possibly compelling other parties in those systems to do the same. In addition, we find that whereas the incentives to cultivate a personal vote introduced by the electoral system do not seem to correlate with the quality of representation, the extent of social and economic development is a very good predictor of representation. In other words, it appears that when interacting with poor and unorganized sectors of the population, politicians have strong incentives to cultivate a personal nonprogrammatic link with constituents, independent of the formal electoral rules. A growing body of literature has recently stressed the crucial impact of formal electoral rules on the nature of elite-citizen linkages. If confirmed by future analyses, our findings have important implications for the scope with which scholars apply expectations about the effects of electoral laws on political behavior. On the substantive side, this finding unfortunately

also has negative implications in terms of the likelihood of institutionalizing good-quality democracies in the poorer parts of the developing world.

Finally, it is quite interesting to note the strong correlation we found between citizens' perceptions of their electoral systems and levels of representation. Citizens' subjective assessments neatly match their objective realities. We believe that this finding certainly provides fuel to the presumed causal links between the quality of democracy in these systems and the systems' chances for longevity and stability in the long run.

REFERENCES

Adams, J. (2001). *Party competition and responsible party government*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Achen, C. (1977). Measuring representation: Perils of the correlation coefficient. *American Journal of Political Science*, *21*, 805-815.

Achen, C. (1978). Measuring representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, *22*, 477-510.

Alcántara Sáez, M. (1997). [Encuesta de elites parlamentarias 1997 (1997 congressional elite survey)]. Unpublished raw data, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain.

Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. *American Economic Review*, *78*, 796-805.

Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, *14*, 417-439.

Comisión Económica Para América Latina y el Caribe. (1999). *Panorama social de América Latina 1999* [1999 Latin American social overview]. Santiago, Chile: Author.

Converse, P., & Pierce, R. (1986). *Political representation in France*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Coppedge, M. (1996). The rise and fall of partyarchy in Venezuela. In J. Domínguez & A. F. Lowenthal (Eds.), *Constructing democratic governance in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, part III* (pp. 3-19). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Coppedge, M. (2001). Latin American parties: Political darwinism in the lost decade." In L. Diamond & R. Gunther (Eds.), *Political parties and democracy* (pp. 173-205). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Corporación Latinobarómetro. (1998). [Latinobarómetro 1998 (1998 Latinbarometer)]. Unpublished raw data, Corporación Latinobarómetro, Santiago, Chile.

Dalton, R. (1985). Political parties and political representation: Party supporters and party elites in nine nations. *Comparative Political Studies*, *18*, 267-299.

Diamond, L. (1996). Is the third wave over? *Journal of Democracy*, *7*, 20-37.

Esaiasson, P., & Heidar, K. (2000). *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic experience*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

González, L. (1991). *Political structures and democracy in Uruguay*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Hagopian, F. (1998). Democracy and political representation in Latin America in the 1990s: Pause, reorganization, or decline? In F. Agüero & J. Stark (Eds.), *Fault lines of democracy in post-transitional Latin America* (pp. 99-143). Miami, FL: North-South Center Press.

Hartlyn, J. (1988). *The politics of coalition rule in Colombia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, K., & Morgenstern, S. (2004). *Cohesion of legislators in Latin America: Patterns and explanations.* Working paper, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT.

Huber, E., & Stephens, J. (1999). The bourgeoisie and democracy: Historical and comparative perspectives. *Social Research*, *66*, 759-788.

Hurley, P. A., & Hill, K. Q. (2001, April). *Beyond the demand-input model: A theory of representational linkages*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Iversen, T. (1994a). The logics of electoral politics: Spatial, directional and mobilizational effects. *Comparative Political Studies*, *27*, 155-189.

Iversen, T. (1994b). Political leadership and representation in West European democracies: A test of three models of voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, *38*, 45-74.

Janda, K., & King, A. (1985). Formalizing and testing Duverger's theories on political parties. *Comparative Political Studies*, *18*, 139-169.

Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. *Comparative Political Studies*, *33*, 845-879.

Kitschelt, H. (2002). *New challenges in the study of political representation: Comment on G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Citizens, elected policymakers and democratic representation: Two contributions from comparative politics."* Working paper, Duke University, Durham, NC.

Kitschelt, H. (n.d.). *Latin American party systems project.* Working paper, Duke University, Durham, NC.

Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R., & Tóka, G. (1999). *Post-communist party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, S. (2001). An "organized disorganisation": Informal organisation and the persistence of local party structures in Argentine peronism. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *33*, 29-65.

Luna, J. P., & Zechmeister, E. J. (in press). Estructuración ideológica e izquierda en los sistemas de partidos Latinoamericanos circa 1996-1998. In J. Lanzaro (Ed.), *La izquierda latinoamericana.* Buenos Aires, Argentina: CLACSO.

Mainwaring, S. (1999). *Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., & Valenzuela, J. S. (Eds.). (1992). *Issues in democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Mainwaring, S., & Scully, T. (Eds.). (1995). *Building democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Miller, W. E., Pierce, R., Thomassen, J., Herrera, R., Holmberg, S., Esaiasson, P., et al. (1999). *Policy representation in Western democracies*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. (1963). Constituency influence in congress. *American Political Science Review*, *57*, 165-177.

Moreno, A. (1999). *Political cleavage: Issues, parties, and the consolidation of democracy.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Morley, S. A., Machado, R., & Pettinato, S. (1999). Indexes of structural reform in Latin America. *Serie Reformas Económicas*, *12*, ECLAC, Economic Development Division (Table A1).

North, D. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

O'Donnell, G. (1994). Delegative democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, *5*, 55-69.

Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1983). Effects of public opinion on policy. *The American Political Science Review*, *77*, 175-190.
Powell, G. B., Jr. (1982). *Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability, and violence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Powell, G. B., Jr. (1989). Constitutional design and citizen electoral control. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *1*, 107-130.
Powell, G. B., Jr. (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Powell, G. B., Jr. (2004). Political representation in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *7*, 273-296.
Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., & Manin, B. (Eds.). (1999). *Democracy, accountability, and representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ranney, A. (1962). *The doctrine of responsible party government*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Roberts, K. M. (1996). Economic crisis and the demise of the legal Left in Peru. *Comparative Politics*, *29*, 69-92.
Roberts, K. M. (2000). *Party-society linkages and democratic representation in Latin America*. Paper presented at the Conference on Threats to Democracy in Latin America, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
Roberts, K. M. (2002). Social inequalities without class cleavages in Latin America's neoliberal era. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *36*, 3-33.
Roberts, K. M., & Arce, M. (1998). Neoliberalism and lower-class voting behavior in Peru. *Comparative Political Studies*, *31*, 217-246.
Rueschemeyer, D., Huber, E., & Stephens, J. (1992). *Capitalist development and democracy.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Schmitt, H., & Thomassen, J. (1999). *Political representation and legitimacy in the European Union*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Stokes, S. (1999). What do policy switches tell us about democracy? In A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, & B. Manin (Eds.), *Democracy, accountability, and representation* (pp. 98-130). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, S. (2001). *Mandates and democracy: Neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zechmeister, E. J. (2004). *The political significance of "left" and "right" in Latin America.* Working paper, University of California, Davis.

Juan P. Luna is a doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an assistant professor at Pontíficia Universidad Católica de Chile. His research interests include the political economy of Latin America and the study of political representation.

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister is an assistant professor at the University of California, Davis. Her research interests include political behavior and the politics of Latin America. She has published an article on risk propensity and economic voting (with Scott Morgenstern) in the Journal of Politics.