


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Chapter 2

Dividing Europe

The Cold War and European Integration

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Summary

The conflict known as the cold war originated in Europe after World War II as the United States and the Soviet Union reached radically different conclusions about the requirements of their own national security. The need to foster the security of the United States and its partners in Europe fostered the Marshall Plan, strengthened the appeal of economic and political integration, and ensured that membership in the ensuing institutions would be limited to the western part of the continent. Countries that opted not to participate in European integration (such as Britain) or were not invited to do so (such as Spain) nevertheless fit into the overarching North Atlantic security framework. The intensification of the cold war in the early 1950s led to American demands for German rearmament, which prompted the French to propose the European Defence Community (EDC). The failure of the EDC was not a serious setback for European integration; nor did it

prevent German rearmament (Germany rearmed instead through the Western European Union). The cold war lost much of its salience for European integration later in the 1950s and hardly impinged on the emergence of the European Economic Community.

Introduction

The division of Europe into two spheres, the Western linked to the United States and the Eastern to the Soviet Union, was a gradual process that occurred in the late 1940s. Each of the three major wartime allies—Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States—sought to influence postwar arrangements in such a way as to guarantee their own security. The United States and the Soviet Union soon emerged as the dominant powers, whose interactions, debates and disputes over the reconstruction of domestic and international order in Europe led to the emergence by 1947–8 of a new kind of non-military conflict: the cold war. Ideological differences between Communism and liberal democracy played a part in these disputes, as did traditional rivalries and historical enmities. Yet it was the idea of ‘national security’ that was most significant in breaking up the wartime alliance and generating the cold war conflict, thereby affecting a range of developments in Europe after 1945, including the course of political and economic integration.

Within Western Europe, the integration of political, economic and perhaps even military institutions became one method of organizing the national security of the United States, France, and other states. The cold war itself was not responsible for integration, as a number of proposals involving the sharing of sovereignty had already been made. However, the cold war’s emphasis on new policies to foster the national security of the United States and its allies led a number of leaders in Western Europe to embrace integration as a viable means of enhancing protection against the Soviet Union. This chapter traces the relationship between the cold war and the process of integration from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. During that time, the cold war encouraged a number of governments to support integrationist schemes in economic and military matters, and ensured that membership in successful integrationist institutions would be limited to Western European countries. Indeed, between 1945 and 1952 the cold war was a decisive factor in promoting the creation of European institutions. However, there were limits to its impact. Integration was not the only manner in which states could affiliate with the Western Alliance, as the cases of Britain and Spain demonstrate. Nor was the cold war the most significant motivation behind the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.

The origins of the cold war in Europe

The Big Three

The Soviet Union under Josef Stalin had one major goal in the immediate aftermath of World War II: territorial security against future attacks, especially from Germany. Stalin was convinced that a number of pro-Soviet buffer states in Eastern Europe and a disabled Germany would provide such security. The most significant buffer state was Poland, through which Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 and in which Stalin now insisted on the imposition of Communist rule (Mastny 1996: 20). Stalin wanted a series of pro-Soviet states elsewhere in Eastern Europe, even if their governments included non-Communist as well as Communist parties. Finally, Stalin sought the ‘disablement’ of occupied Germany through the imposition of severe reparations payments together with economic and military restrictions that would halt German recovery for at least ten to fifteen years.

Like the Soviet Union, the United States pursued a number of goals in Europe as the war came to an end in 1945. In general, the United States wanted to consolidate peace and prosperity in a new European–American relationship. Washington’s vision of a Europe that was peaceful, democratic and capitalist was part and parcel of America’s efforts to create a ‘political economy of freedom’ around the world (Leffler 1992: 13).

These differing views of Europe’s future were reflected in the agreements reached at the two tripartite (American–British–Soviet) conferences held in 1945, the first at Yalta in February and the second at Potsdam in July–August. At Yalta, Stalin pushed for the establishment of governments in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe that would be friendly towards the Soviet Union. The United States and Britain agreed that the Soviet Union should have a ‘sphere of influence’ in Eastern Europe, which the existence of the so-called Lublin Poles, a Communist faction loyal to Stalin that had formed a government in liberated Poland, would help to achieve. The two Western allies even agreed that the Soviet Union should gain territory in eastern Poland. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt nonetheless insisted on holding elections in which the non-Communist Polish government-in-exile could run against the Lublin Poles. Roosevelt would accept a Soviet-friendly Poland under some form of Soviet influence as long as the government was not a Soviet puppet and had considerable independence in domestic policy (Trachtenberg 1999: 10–11).

The Yalta conference produced the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which outlined how states freed from German control would return to normal political life and included a statement about the necessity of holding free elections. Despite a general reference to ‘Europe’, it was understood that the Declaration referred mostly to Eastern Europe, and particularly to Poland. As for occupied Germany, the conference concluded with the creation of the Allied Control Commission as a vehicle for cooperation between the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union in the running

of the country. The Western allies agreed to key Soviet demands, including the right to reparations.

Despite the existence of seemingly clear-cut agreements, in reality multiple interpretations of those agreements existed. Whereas Stalin thought that he had support from the West to treat Poland as a satellite state, many in the US government expected elections almost immediately. The new American administration of Harry S. Truman acquiesced in Roosevelt's acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it acknowledged in May 1945 that elections were not going to be held in Poland. Yet many in the administration argued that future Soviet actions in Eastern Europe needed to be viewed as a series of 'litmus tests'—opportunities to read Soviet intentions and assess whether cooperation was really compatible with American national security goals (Leffler 1992: 35). Stalin's absolutist interpretation of just what security meant, described by one historian as an 'insatiable craving' for complete control over territory and states, soon undermined his desire for cooperation (Mastny 1996: 23). The decision in December 1945 by US Secretary of State James Byrnes to recognize the Bulgarian and Romanian Communist governments, established by the Soviet Union without elections, led an influential Republican senator to charge Byrnes with following a policy of 'appeasement'. Truman himself concluded that Byrnes had given away too much. The incident illustrated a growing sense within the United States that the Soviet Union was failing the 'litmus tests' implicit in the Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Still, the conflict that became the cold war was not inevitable. Even if the Soviets had failed to live up to their Yalta promises, the nature of the agreements made there, and later at Potsdam, gave considerable leeway to each side to carry out policy in its respective sphere of influence and zone of occupation in Germany. The Potsdam agreements, despite being based supposedly on the principle of Four-Power cooperation, could just as easily have worked on the basis of division. Certain decisions, like the one giving each of the occupying powers complete independence to act as it saw fit within its own zone, suggested an awareness on their parts that the potential for cooperation was limited, especially in Germany (Trachtenberg 1999: 26). The question was whether intra-Allied differences would lead to a peaceful division of Europe or a sense of distrust and insecurity between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The criticism of Byrnes at the end of 1945 and early 1946 suggested that real distrust of Soviet intentions in Europe was becoming more prominent in the United States. Suitably chastened, Byrnes was very hesitant to seek any accommodation with the Soviet Union (Eisenberg 1996: 202). Clearly, the threat perception of both sides was changing.

Changing threat perceptions

Germany was at the heart of the changing threat perception of American policymakers. What might have been seen as an 'amicable divorce' between the United States and the Soviet Union over German policy now became a fear that the Soviets would seek to expand their influence beyond their existing sphere (Trachtenberg 1999: 35–40). The best expression of the new threat perception came in February 1946 when George F. Kennan sent his famous 'Long Telegram' from Moscow to the State Department in Washington. Kennan, a long-time critic of cooperation with

the Soviet Union, focused on the insecurity of Soviet leaders, which, combined with the ideology of communism, he argued, set Soviet policy on an expansionist course. Soon afterwards, Truman seemed to suggest that he too was increasingly distrustful of Soviet intentions in Europe when, in March 1946, he introduced former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Here Churchill delivered perhaps his best-known speech, which Truman had read in advance, denouncing the Soviet Union for imposing an 'Iron Curtain' across the continent, behind which it controlled the Eastern European states. By implication, the West now had to act to prevent the Soviet sphere from growing.

A new American policy gradually emerged in the course of 1946 to try to stop the Soviet Union's supposed expansion (Leffler 1992: 96). The United States would assist Western Europe in order to bolster America's allies against Soviet incursion or subversion. The first significant opportunity to act came in February 1947 when Britain, pleading economic weakness, implored the United States to take over financial and military support of Turkey and Greece, then in the throes of a communist insurgency. The State Department, enthralled by Kennan's analysis, wanted the United States to step into Britain's shoes. In March 1947 Truman asked a reluctant Congress, dominated by fiscal conservatives wary of taking the government into debt so soon after the war, for the financial means to aid Turkey and Greece. Arguing that more than the security of these two states was at stake and that the world faced a choice 'between alternative ways of life', Truman claimed that the United States had an obligation to defend democracy wherever it was threatened by Soviet and Communist expansion. The ensuing Truman Doctrine, and the money spent under its auspices in Greece and Turkey, represented the principle of Kennan's policy of containment in action.

In response to the Truman Doctrine, in September 1947 the Soviet Union convened a conference of primarily Eastern European communist parties and created an organization known as the Cominform. This symbolized the Soviet Union's acceptance of the division of Europe into two irreconcilable 'camps'. A speech by Cominform leader Andrei Zhdanov mirrored Truman's in suggesting that a high level of distrust, suspicion and ideological conflict existed between the superpowers (Nation 1992: 174). In order to prevent the spread of American influence the Soviet Union adopted a policy of 'retrenchment' in Eastern Europe, expelling non-Communist parties from government and purging party leaders who would not follow Stalin's lead (Nation 1992: 177).

Despite the Communist insurgency in Greece, which had triggered the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Union did not have the military capacity to overwhelm Europe at that time. Instead, the Soviet Union was still in the process of consolidating control and influence throughout Eastern Europe. Few believed that the Soviets wanted to attack Western Europe or take over all of Germany, but many in the West feared that if it co-opted German power, the Soviet Union would acquire the potential to move beyond its existing sphere of influence and perhaps threaten Western Europe in the future (Leffler 1992: 97). The immediate challenge presented by the Soviet Union was a growth in the influence of local Communist parties in Central and Western Europe, eager to exploit internal political crises and economic dislocation. In other words, Western statesmen feared that the policy of retrenchment in Eastern Europe was only the start, not the end, of Soviet efforts to influence and control other states in order to enhance the security of the Soviet Union.

The coup by Czechoslovakia's Communists against their coalition partners in February 1948 reinforced the view that Soviet expansion would not take the form of a military attack, but would happen by other means. Stalin's support for the Czech coup was, in his mind, a continuation of retrenchment, a clearing up of confusion over the composition of each camp, not an attack on the West (Nation 1992: 179). Yet for the United States, the implications of the Czech coup were quite different and led to a recasting of the American policy of containment in more overt military terms. The United States would have to stabilize Western Europe economically and politically in order to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of future political crises, similar to Czechoslovakia's, in states with large Communist parties.

One consequence of this was increased American involvement in the Italian election of April 1948. The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and US military intelligence feared the possibility of communist mobilization or even a *coup d'état*. As a result, the newly formed National Security Council, in its first report ever, called for active US intervention before and during the election campaign (Ventresca 2004: 69). Yet the success of the American-backed Italian Christian Democratic Party did little to quell fears about possible Soviet expansion into Central and Western Europe.

Germany and European integration

As seen in Chapter 3, Germany was where policies of reconstruction and revitalization, particularly on the part of the Western allies, ultimately became connected with the conduct of the cold war and the pursuit of European integration. Even without the emergence of the cold war, the four occupying powers had fundamental disagreements about the future status of their former enemy. Once again, threat perception was key. France and the Soviet Union shared the view that Germany posed the greatest threat to the security of both states. Wanting to eliminate the possibility of Germany ever being reconstituted as a single country, as early as September 1945 France opposed the development of central German agencies to assist reconstruction (Eisenberg 1996: 170). The Soviets, by contrast, continued to push for a unified German state, but wanted one that would be friendly towards Moscow and severely weakened economically and militarily. Within their zone of occupation, the Soviets took most of the factories, plants, and equipment while setting up German socialists and communists to administer local government.

Different views in the British and American zones about Germany's future led to very different policies. The Americans soon concluded that economic growth in Western Europe required Germany's resources and industry. The economic recovery of Germany was deemed crucial to establishing the system of free trade and democratic constitutionalism that the United States wanted to see across Europe, or at least in Western Europe (Eisenberg 1996: 234). Thus the national security goals of the United States required the creation of a revitalized and strong state.

By 1946, conflict over the nature of Germany's reconstruction coincided with the emergence of the cold war. Secretary of State Byrnes argued that Germany needed to be restored quickly, that its economic resources were necessary for the reconstruction of Western Europe as a whole, and that a reconstructed Western Europe was necessary to limit the influence of local Communist parties and the Soviet Union.

Byrnes made it clear that the United States was willing to risk the loss of Soviet cooperation in Germany in order to achieve its goals. Indeed, the United States now publicly identified the Soviet Union as the primary threat to the implementation of American policy in Germany and Western Europe (Eisenberg 1996: 248). Plans were soon afoot for the unification of the British and American zones in order to improve economic development in Germany. The French initially remained aloof while the Soviets responded by leaving the Allied Control Commission in March 1948.

In June 1948, the United States, Britain and France cleared the way for a constitutional convention that would create the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). They also introduced a new currency, the Deutsche Mark, in their now unified zones, and permitted its use in West Berlin, which, although divided among the Western powers, was located within the Soviet zone of eastern Germany. The Soviets quickly retaliated by introducing an East German mark in East Berlin and, more consequentially, by blocking all road and rail access to West Berlin. This led the United States to airlift supplies into West Berlin, thereby triggering an operation that began in July 1948 and continued until March 1949. The so-called Berlin blockade represented the first overt conflict of the cold war. While it took place, West Germany continued moving towards statehood, with the new Federal Republic coming into being in May 1949. This prompted the Soviet Union to create the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) the following October.

While overt and covert intervention (such as occurred in Italy) was one example of how the West responded to new threat perceptions, more notable in the long run was a series of policies that sought to shore up and expand existing democratic and capitalist institutions, with German reconstruction being the first and foremost goal. The integration of Western Europe, economically and politically, became one of the most vital tools in that process, leading to American support for a variety of initiatives that emerged over the next several years. Thus, the cold war became one of the most significant factors in the eventual creation of integrated supranationalism in Western Europe that formed the basis for the later European Union.

Marshall planning and beyond

In a speech at Harvard University in June 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall made a proposal to revitalize Europe—including Germany—economically. The basic premise was that European countries should work together to plan economic reconstruction, with the promise of American financial support if such a plan emerged. Although Marshall's offer covered the entire continent, in effect it was limited by the emerging cold war to Western Europe only. The goals of the Marshall Plan, as it came to be called, were many. First was the fundamental need to rebuild Western Europe's economy. Second was the need to diffuse nationalism, especially a revitalized German nationalism. Marshall's proposal was partially grounded on the premise that Germany's revival, essential for European economic growth, should not come at the cost of widespread political insecurity. A common, planned approach would work to diffuse German influence. Third was the need to contain possible Soviet expansion

into Western Europe. Economic recovery within a multinational framework would serve all these purposes (Hogan 1987: 90).

While the cold war can therefore be seen as one of the factors that led to Marshall's proposal, it did not eliminate all difficulties unrelated to the American-Soviet dispute. Even though the French wanted American assistance, it was not at all clear that they would agree with Washington on Germany's role in Europe. Fearing a possible revival of German nationalism, France opposed the general idea that German recovery was essential in order to lead Western Europe out of economic despair. As it was, the French plan for postwar economic recovery (the so-called Monnet Plan) called for France to supersede Germany in certain industries, notably steel (Eisenberg 1996: 331). By contrast, the Marshall proposal explicitly demanded that West European nations meet and coordinate their recoveries together instead of proposing and pursuing many different national recovery programmes. The American preference for a continental marketplace grounded in a federal system certainly inspired the Marshall Plan and its goal of creating a secure and economically liberal Europe (Hogan 1987: 27).

European officials gathered in Paris in July 1947 and eventually formed the Committee on European Economic Cooperation, which later became the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), to determine Western European requirements for assistance. The final report, released in September, disappointed many in the US government who saw it as lacking a real commitment to integrated, transnational planning for recovery. The lack of a customs union and absence of strong, central institutions indicated that the Europeans continued to look at American aid from a national, rather than continental, perspective (Lundestad 1998: 30-1). Moreover, they disagreed over Germany's role in European recovery. In short, European countries continued to think of their individual interests whereas Marshall wanted them to act collectively (Hitchcock 1998: 77). The cold war may have partially instigated Marshall's proposal but it was not enough, on its own, to convince the Europeans to act together.

France, the United States and the institutions of Western Europe

Only in the process of implementing the European Recovery Programme, as the Marshall Plan was officially called, did Europeans themselves come to embrace the idea that economic recovery and national security were more feasible in a western European framework that integrated Germany with its neighbours. Missing from the initial European meetings was a country willing to take the lead in the construction of more comprehensive institutions.

Many American policy-makers had assumed that Britain would play the part. Britain, after all, shared American fears of Soviet expansion and welcomed moves towards a West German state both as an important aspect of containment and as a means of sharing the burden of German reconstruction (Lee 2001: 20-6). Britain had hoped that the Dunkirk Treaty, signed with France in 1947, would, over time, become more than simply an anti-German defensive alliance and act instead as the catalyst for a strong Western European bloc (Bell 1997: 83). Despite rhetoric in favour

of integration, however, Britain in the end did not want to lead or even participate in the process of developing supranational ties among Western European states. Indeed, as early as the beginning of talks over Marshall aid, Britain asked the United States for a special status within the scheme, a status suggesting that Britain was aligned more with the United States than with other European nations. Had it had been granted, such a status might have killed the entire programme, not least because of French opposition (Bell 1997: 87).

Another country needed to take the lead in developing common, integrated institutions. France was the obvious contender. Immediately after the war, French policy towards Germany was not that different from the Soviet Union's. Both countries saw Germany as the most significant threat. France therefore wanted Germany to be weakened in a way that would facilitate French recovery (Hitchcock 1998: 43). Disabling Germany's economy and exploiting resources such as Ruhr coal for French reconstruction were important policy goals (Hitchcock 1998: 48). As late as December 1948 and into 1949, French officials continued to believe that institutions such as the International Authority for the Ruhr were intended to limit Germany's freedom of action (Parsons 2003: 45).

Yet signs of change were also apparent. By the time that Four-Power cooperation on Germany formally broke down with the collapse of the foreign ministers meeting in December 1947, France was willing to merge its zone with those of Britain and the United States and facilitate West German statehood. By 1948 and 1949, support for the western, European model proposed by the United States as the solution to France's concerns about security and economic development, as well as a means of containing the Soviet Union, grew within the foreign ministry and other departments (Parsons 2003: 51). Once the Americans realized that there was a willingness within the French government to adopt a European strategy, Secretary of State Dean Acheson pressed the French, in October 1949, to go further (Lundestad 1998: 34). That same month, the head of the Marshall Plan's European office told the OEEC that integration was the only way to achieve real economic recovery (Hogan 1987: 274).

Ultimately, France embraced the American model of a Western European group. This did not represent the 'collapse' of France's position. Rather, the French came to see that integration and cooperative institutions would give them the opportunity to produce 'active and constructive policies' in order to achieve their overriding goal of influencing Germany's recovery. What changed was the means, not the end. Working with the United States, France now sought the integration of Germany's recovery with its own economic plans (Hitchcock 1998: 100). In this way, France would be assured of a non-aggressive Germany, its own recovery, and assistance from the United States. Moreover, taking on the mantle of continental leadership might also extend French influence beyond the country's actual military and economic capacities (Soutou 2001: 44).

The cold war was not the only reason why the French came to accept American proposals for planned cooperation and German recovery, but it did make Franco-American agreement easier to achieve. In what some have called 'double containment'—that is, containment of both Germany and the Soviet Union—the

French and Americans came to see that 'building Europe' through an institutional architecture that tied West Germany into Western Europe was best for their own security. Certainly, double containment was far preferable to dividing Western Europe and possibly aggravating the cold war (Trachtenberg 1999: 74–6).

Yet the process that led France to assume continental leadership was slow and laborious. Well into 1950 there was not a unified French position on how best to proceed. Moreover, it was difficult to move Europe in a new direction, beyond traditional treaties and towards greater transnational and supranational institutionalization. One of the first venues in which the French pressed for integration was the negotiations that led to the Council of Europe in 1949 (Bell 1997: 101). Eventually, in deference to the British, who desired only a cooperative organization that would mirror the Brussels Pact, the Council came into being without any supranational power (Giauque 2002: 31). Nonetheless, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and, in particular, economic adviser Jean Monnet strongly advocated the adoption of the integrationist concept as essential for French security and economic development. This provided the catalyst for France to assume a leadership role on the Continent (Gillingham 1991: 137).

The Schuman Plan

Monnet, in charge of economic planning for the French government, was committed to a programme of industrial modernization. He soon saw the benefits of taking up the American offer of aid in the context of continental-wide planning (Gillingham 1991: 144). Monnet's efforts led to a series of French initiatives after 1948 for economic cooperation that were inspired in large part by security concerns involving both Germany and the Soviet Union. His primary goal was to reconcile French efforts to contain Germany, economically and politically, with American desires for integration, using supranational management of the Ruhr's coal and steel industries as a model. Sectoral integration had already been the subject of numerous discussions at the OEEC, but no country had so far taken the lead on the issue, or connected it to other concerns (Küsters 1995: 64). That is exactly what France did in May 1950 when, at Monnet's behest, Schuman proposed integrating the French and German coal and steel industries.

Recognizing that the United States was committed to revitalizing Germany, concerned about German resurgence but also steadfast in its belief in the value of a Western Alliance that would confront the Soviet Union, France abandoned its advocacy of separating the Ruhr from Germany and proposed instead the Schuman Plan for supranational oversight of the countries' coal and steel sectors (Trachtenberg 1999: 70). Far from simply falling in line with American and British policies that favoured German revival, France embraced a leadership role that centred on a Franco-German *rapprochement*, using the tools of cooperation and integration (Gillingham 1991: 170). Sectoral integration was a logical starting point for Franco-German reconciliation. The Schuman Plan therefore represented the end of France's 'unyielding' stance against German economic revival and the beginning of an effort to join American and West German leaders in integrating West Germany into Western Europe (Küsters 1995: 65). The result, by 1952, was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The Western Alliance and German rearmament

By 1949, Germany and Europe were divided. Efforts to improve the economic security of Western Europe moved forward with the Schuman Plan. However, the question of a new system of military security for Western Europe was still unresolved. Would the United States maintain its troops on the continent? Would West Germany be permitted to develop its own army? What would be the reaction of France and other countries?

Strategic movements and American foreign policy

In March and again in June 1948, Truman offered his European allies a guarantee of continued US military presence in Germany. Yet the Berlin blockade demonstrated the real possibility that war could break out, and thus the need for a more organized and definite security system for Western Europe as a whole. In 1949, the Soviet Union ended the American monopoly of atomic weapons; a gleeful Stalin expressed renewed confidence in his ability to challenge the West (Trachtenberg 1999: 95). Clearly, the security situation in Western Europe was getting worse. Although finally embracing integration, the French insisted that West Germany should not be permitted to rearm, despite the potential for a conflict to break out on its territory. Instead, the United States should make an unequivocal commitment to the defence of Western Europe. In general, Germany's neighbours in the West came to accept the American vision for a revitalized West Germany only because they in turn demanded certain 'terms of their collaboration', including a firm commitment to European defence on the part of the US military (Leffler 1992: 235).

Despite budgetary constraints, American commanders, led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, agreed. They therefore prepared a defensive strategy that prioritized the American role in Western Europe (Leffler 1992: 274–5). By 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) was in place, on paper at least. In the eyes of US military planners, Nato would help deter the Soviets from acting aggressively, as they had in Berlin, and encourage the Western Europeans to participate in their own defence (Leffler 1992: 281). In the event that war broke out, Nato would facilitate the defence of the West.

While the formal commitment to keep US troops in Western Europe should have quelled any concerns about West German rearmament, in fact the opposite occurred. In April 1950, the National Security Council in Washington produced NSC-68, a document that reiterated the importance of containment, given the 'permanent struggle' between the United States and the Soviet Union and raised the question of how to prepare a global military response, involving more than just American forces, to counter Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression anywhere in the world (Hogan 1998: 296).

As early as 1947 and 1948, military officials in the West, including French military leaders, had raised the possibility of West German rearmament as part of a comprehensive approach to the defence of Western Europe (Large 1996: 35). By 1949, members of the United States Congress, wary of the growing cost of the

American commitment to Europe, advocated West German rearmament as a reasonable demonstration of 'burden sharing' between Europe and the United States (Large 1996: 39). Soon after, American military leaders expressed increasing scepticism about their ability to win a war in Europe with current troop levels (Trachtenberg 1999: 98). Given the emerging global commitments implied by NSC-68 and the fact that West Germany was to be integrated into the emerging Western European bloc, the question of West Germany's military contribution to the Alliance became more pressing.

Yet German rearmament was not yet a mainstream idea, even if it had been raised in a number of high-level circles. It was extremely unpopular in West Germany, although Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was supportive, seeing rearmament as a way to address a number of concerns, including the threat posed by the growth of East German security forces, the possibility that American troop levels in West Germany would be reduced, and the continued danger of a Soviet attack (Schwarz 1995: 516–18). The outbreak of the Korean war, in June 1950, changed the atmosphere entirely and made German rearmament a respectable topic for politicians, the public and military leaders alike. A consensus soon emerged within the US government that West German rearmament was imperative as the cold war became global. Korea implied a new Communist desire to expand into areas hitherto dominated by the West, or at least to test the West along the East–West divide. The consequences for Germany and Western Europe were immediately appreciated by those who advocated a policy intended to 'stymie prospective counterthrusts' in the region (Leffler 1992: 371). Seeing that West Germany had the potential to be the next South Korea, public opinion there moved much closer to this mindset (Large 1996: 62; Schwarz 1995: 531).

In September 1950, the US government gave a 'virtual ultimatum' to its European allies over the necessity of West German rearmament (Schwarz 1995: 535). Adenauer also pushed his allies on the issue, despite a revival of anti-militarism within West Germany over the course of the summer (Large 1996: 65–78). While fully embracing its role of European leader in the pursuit of Franco–German reconciliation, France was not prepared to permit West German remilitarization, however. Secretary of State Acheson challenged the French to come up with some new ideas, while pointing out that NATO was now committed to defending Western Europe along the Elbe, separating East and West Germany, and not simply along the Rhine, separating France and Germany (Large 1996: 87).

The European Defence Community

France therefore faced the possibility of an open break with the United States as cold-war tensions increased. Two concerns, similar to those expressed by France when the United States had insisted on German economic revival, were uppermost. First was the long-standing French fear of a revitalized and remilitarized Germany. Second, and growing more significant as the cold war intensified, was the fear that a swift German military build-up would lead to Germany, not France, being seen as the leader within Western Europe and America's closest ally on the continent. Such a development would inevitably weaken France's effort to control aspects of the European situation. It had been the intention of the Schuman Plan from the

start (Hitchcock 1998: 135). Therefore, French foreign ministry officials sought to satisfy American demands within a framework established by France itself and that included French oversight of German rearmament for the foreseeable future (Hitchcock 1998: 137).

The best model available was the integrationist one already used in the Schuman Plan for coal and steel. In this instance, the cold war, intensified by the outbreak of the Korean war, had a very direct role in pushing Western Europe to the next stage of integration. Led once again by Monnet and Schuman, the French hatched a plan to integrate Western European military forces into a single institution, what later became known as the European Defence Community (EDC). Monnet, in fact, called the proposal simply 'an enlarged Schuman Plan' (Hitchcock 1998: 141).

The so-called Plevén Plan, named after French Premier René Plevén, and launched in October 1950, called for the creation of a European army consisting of small battalions under a common military and political authority. The political institutions responsible for oversight—a European parliament and a European defence ministry—were to be created before the army itself was established. Participating states, except West Germany, would be permitted to maintain their existing defence ministries, general staffs, and certain armed forces apart from the European army. The West German army, however, would only exist as part of the continental force. Even more so than the Schuman Plan, the French believed that the Plevén Plan had been forced upon them by the United States. Support within the French government for the Plevén Plan was based upon a determination to prevent the emergence of an independent German force as much as anything else (Parsons 2003: 71). Indeed, many American observers saw the plan, which would take a long time to put in place, as a French attempt to delay German rearmament (Hitchcock 1998: 144; Large 1996: 94). Moreover, the relationship between the EDC and NATO was left unclear. Not surprisingly, the Plevén Plan met with scepticism on all fronts.

China's intervention in the Korean war, in November 1950, pushed consideration of the French proposal forward. It now seemed that Communist states intended to take advantage of perceived Western weakness and would soon extend armed intervention to other parts of the world. The impact in Western Europe was immediate: West German rearmament could no longer be delayed. Adenauer was ready to respond. He and his advisers wanted something more ambitious than the Plevén Plan, including strong German ground, air and naval forces, and a general staff. Adenauer was confident that membership in NATO would suffice to allay fears of German militarism (Large 1996: 97–8).

Global pressures and opportunities

The looming crisis in the Alliance was resolved in part due to Soviet action. In an effort to forestall the creation of a West German force, the Soviet Union offered the Western Allies a Four-Power meeting on Germany. Fearful that France would respond unilaterally, the United States made a counter-proposal to the French, suggesting that if they dropped the political components of the Plevén Plan and accepted the immediate construction of a European army, the United States would concede that German forces should be smaller in size than full infantry divisions and should exist without an independent general staff. Moreover, German units would not be placed directly

under the authority of national commanders. The French agreed to this in a revised Plevén Plan.

Talks in Paris among the Nato allies on the American proposal coincided with talks in Bonn between the three Western occupying powers and the West German government on the exact nature of Germany's contribution to the new European army. The United States welcomed this 'two-track' approach for it suggested that a West German contribution to the defence of Western Europe would be achieved in less time than outlined in the original Plevén Plan. Yet France saw in these talks an opportunity to control, limit, or even delay German rearmament, whereas West Germany saw an opportunity to propose its own ideas for rearmament and the achievement of full sovereignty (Large 1996: 107). Either way, the negotiations demonstrated the influence of the cold war on European integration, making explicit the connection between security and integration that also lay behind the Coal and Steel Community. How best to enhance security through integration was nonetheless complicated by competing concerns within the Western Alliance.

Pushed by the global implications of NSC-68, agitated by the Korean War, and wanting to create a genuine 'European group' within Nato, the United States embraced the revised Plevén Plan as a crucial aspect of its national security (Lundestad 1998: 40-3). The revised plan allowed France to balance the need for an American security guarantee, including some degree of burden sharing, with economic and security concerns about a rearmed Germany. Although the French and American positions may have been reconciled, Adenauer was far from mollified. For Adenauer, integration was the means by which West Germany could end the Occupation Statute remaining in place after 1949, rebuild economically, and become bound into the West and the emerging security system represented by Nato. Adenauer did not insist on having a separate German army, but he did see the link between revising the Occupation Statute, restoring West German sovereignty, rearmament, and integration (Küsters 1995: 66). He therefore insisted that German troops would not be used in the defence of Europe until the terms of the country's rearmament were clear and related issues were resolved. There was a risk that the two sets of negotiations could result in completely separate models for defending Europe in the deepening cold war, or, worse, that one or both could break down and collapse.

Germany's hard line led Acheson, for one, temporarily to abandon support for the integrationist solution that the United States had promoted for so long. The EDC, he insisted in July 1951, was too complicated; a permanent American commitment to placing its troops in Europe and managing the Nato system was surely easier to achieve (Trachtenberg 1999: 120). Yet at the same time, the US civilian commissioner for Germany, John McCloy, the Nato Supreme Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, and the US Ambassador to France, David Bruce, all pushed the Truman administration to embrace the EDC as the solution best suited to the concerns of both France and Germany within the Nato system. They argued that a European army was the best and quickest way to achieve the rearmament of West Germany while decreasing the cost for the United States of defending Western Europe; that the French desire to maintain control and influence over German revitalization was worth supporting; that the creation of a separate West German army would jeopardize French support; and finally that Adenauer's demands for a revision of the Occupation Statute and greater sovereignty were also worthwhile (Large 1996: 125-9; Schwarz 1995: 622-3).

Such vocal American support for the Plevén Plan helped foster Franco-German reconciliation while recognizing both France's desire to lead in Europe and West Germany's desire to move closer to full sovereignty and Nato membership as an equal. It was not an easy path; at numerous points both French and German politicians and members of the public raised doubts about the path now eagerly advocated by the Truman administration, and negotiations between France and Germany on many key points did not proceed smoothly (Hitchcock 1998: 155-68; Large 1996: 130-45). Nonetheless, by May 1952, two separate treaties were signed. On 26 May, in Bonn, a new General Agreement between the Federal Republic and France, Britain and the United States replaced the old Occupation Statute; on 27 May, in Paris, the EDC was created.

This explicitly military phase of European integration, one linked directly to the intensification of the cold war, did not last long. As seen in Chapter 5, by the autumn of 1952, French supporters of the EDC, including Schuman, had lost their pre-eminence in government. For many in France, the EDC meant that 'France lost its army [and] Germany gained one' (Hitchcock 1998: 168). Even a revival of the idea of a political assembly to oversee the European army did nothing to counter such criticism, especially by Gaullists and other French nationalists in the parliament and press. Skittish French governments refused to bring the EDC Treaty before parliament for a vote of approval, fearing certain defeat. Meanwhile the United States under President Eisenhower became increasingly hesitant to accept other models for West German rearmament besides the EDC. Adenauer, having achieved considerable success through his policy of linking rearmament with greater sovereignty, was equally determined to support the EDC. Ultimately, a new French government brought the treaty to a parliamentary vote in August 1954, but it was roundly defeated. The relationship between security policy and integration remained unresolved.

The Soviet Union and European integration

Perhaps the most visible way in which the cold war became connected to European integration was the Soviet Union's reaction to various stages of the process. As with the United States, the Soviet Union eventually saw integration as a policy grounded in the different approaches taken by the two sides to the reorganization of the continent and especially to the question of German reconstruction. As the cold war gradually emerged, the Soviets saw American support for integration as a threat to their security, which inevitably coloured their views of the integration process itself. Soviet perceptions and actions therefore help explain how integration became part and parcel of the cold-war conflict.

Stalin's focus on reconstructing Europe in the name of Soviet national security gave Soviet policy in Eastern and Central Europe two significant aspects. First, security was defined territorially. Stalin's chief goal was to create pro-Soviet states between Germany and the Soviet Union. This was apparent in Poland in 1944-5, with the

formation of a Communist government, and in other Central and Eastern European states in 1946–8, including the Soviet zone of Germany. Second, as the construction of the Soviet sphere of influence progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the Soviets would determine policy there unilaterally rather than in cooperation with the national governments.

In the midst of this came the Marshall Plan, which 'put European integration on the agenda of international diplomacy' (Schwabe 2001: 19). As already seen, European recovery organized with American aid represented a form of political and economic containment of the Soviet Union. Yet the offer to participate in the initial European conference called in response to the American initiative went to all European states, including the Soviet Union and its allies. Although the State Department anticipated a Soviet rejection, the Soviet foreign minister attended the meeting in Paris in July 1947 to coordinate the European response.

American policy-makers and British and French officials alike saw the Soviet Union's ostensible inclusion in the invitation for Marshall aid as a necessary 'tactic', for in reality the plan was meant for Western Europe alone (Schwabe 1988a: 40). Indeed, the foreign ministers of Britain and France were even more committed to limiting American assistance to Western Europe than Marshall was. Ernest Bevin, the British foreign minister, was deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union. Georges Bidault, his French counterpart, felt obliged to support the offer to the Soviet Union because of the strength of the Communist party in France. Nevertheless he was primarily concerned with securing much-needed American assistance, regardless of any previous agreement with the Soviet Union over the future of Germany (Hitchcock 1998: 74–5). In any event, the proposal seemed unlikely to appeal to the Soviet Union. First, as the United States surely knew, ideological conflict and the growing atmosphere of tension that marked the onset of the cold war meant that any American proposal was bound to raise Soviet suspicions. Second, American insistence on European cooperation for a continent-wide recovery, instead of having countries submit a laundry list of individual projects, seemed to go against the emerging Soviet preference for a unilateral approach consistent with its security concerns (Mastny 1996: 27).

Nonetheless, there were equally good reasons for the Soviet Union to accept the invitation and show up in Paris. The cold war had not yet gelled. On the German question, there were signs that a resolution was possible, for the Soviets accepted the idea that the German economy could be run as a single unit if in return the Western allies would permit the Soviets to take reparations from current West German production (Trachtenberg 1999: 57). Moreover, the Marshall proposal gave the Soviets some hope that American monies might still be available for their own reconstruction. The Soviet foreign minister was well aware that a number of Western European states were concerned about the American desire to promote integrationist or cooperative planning for recovery. Indeed, American policy-makers were quite angry with the Europeans for promoting individual national interests instead of collective European ones (Hitchcock 1998: 77). If there was any possibility of obtaining American aid without having strings of cooperation attached, then the Soviets would certainly want to participate (Mastny 1996: 27). American–Soviet talks on bilateral assistance to replace wartime Lend-Lease aid had been broken off only in 1946; the Marshall proposal offered an opportunity to get money that the Soviet Union needed in order to recover from the devastation of war.

Almost immediately after arriving in Paris, the Soviet foreign minister received information from Soviet intelligence indicating that the American plan to aid Europe was motivated by the desire to create an anti-Soviet front in Western Europe and to encourage the economic revitalization of Germany at its centre (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 105). This prompted the withdrawal of the Soviet and Eastern European delegations from the conference. Although it was not the only factor in the Soviet decision to leave—after all the very idea of integration and cooperative planning for economic recovery seemed to go against Soviet conceptions of postwar reconstruction—clearly the cold war had played a crucial part.

Indeed, the reasons behind the Soviet Union's rejection of the European Recovery Programme were self-reinforcing. The Marshall Plan came to represent, for the Soviets, a 'closing of ranks' among the United States and its Western European allies. In response, Stalin secured his own sphere in the East (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 131–2). Soviet policy was reactive, one of retrenchment. As noted earlier, Stalin drew the lines tighter around his own sphere of influence, purged non-Communists in Eastern European governments, and initiated the Cominform and a 'two camps' view of Europe.

The Soviet Union's response to the American effort to create a separate West German state was similarly reactive. Thus the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Commission in March 1948 in response to talks among the Western allies aimed at forming a West German government; blockaded Berlin in June 1948 when the United States introduced a new currency in the western zones of the city; and established a separate East German state, the German Democratic Republic, in October 1949 following the declaration of the Federal Republic earlier that year.

Only when the Korean war broke out and the Soviet sphere was successfully consolidated did Stalin take a more proactive approach towards German policy. Content to accept the division of the continent, Stalin was still not prepared to accept full West German revival as part of the postwar settlement. Since 1945, the Soviet Union had wanted to create a unified, weak, and neutral German state. The emergence of the cold war did not change this. Developments since 1947 seemed to have favoured the West, which hoped to tie its part of Germany to Western Europe for reasons of economic recovery and military security. Integration was emerging as a useful means of doing so. Beginning in 1950, however, Stalin took the diplomatic offensive in hopes of ending Germany's division and thwarting the further integration of West Germany with Western Europe and the United States. Hence his call for a German peace treaty to replace the existing Occupation Statute as well as various other initiatives.

A growing perception that European integration was simply a means to perpetuate the cold-war division of the Continent and make permanent the division of Germany was the primary factor in Stalin's decision to act. Documents prepared by the Soviet foreign ministry highlighted the connection, in Soviet eyes, between integration and the strengthening of the Western Alliance. With reference to the European Coal and Steel Community, Soviet officials argued that supranational control of Germany's coal and steel industries was one way to deprive the Soviet Union of any say in the management of these resources and was contrary to the goal of a neutral, unified and demilitarized Germany (Mastny 1996: 136). The connection between integration and efforts to tie West Germany into the Western Alliance was made even more explicit in the eyes of Stalin and his advisers when the Western powers announced that

they would consider new 'contractual agreements' with West Germany, excluding the Soviet Union, and that negotiations based on the Pleven Plan to create a European army were close to reaching a successful conclusion.

Hence the famous Soviet note of March 1952, which proposed immediate talks aimed at creating a neutral and unified Germany (Large 1996: 132–45). Stalin suggested a formal peace treaty with Germany, an end to occupation within one year, and a ban on German participation in an alliance aimed against any of the four wartime allies. The note, described as a 'bombshell', received a great deal of publicity in the West (Schwarz 1995: 652). Historians have long debated whether it was a serious proposal or simply a last ditch effort to disrupt the Paris talks then in progress to establish the EDC. There is evidence to support both interpretations (Mastny 1996: 132–7; Large 1996: 146). In any event, the Western Powers rejected the Soviet overture within two weeks. When the Soviets issued a second note in April 1952, proposing talks on all-German elections, the US Secretary of State responded by urging immediate resolution of the EDC and West German treaty negotiations (Schwarz 1995: 658). Acheson's almost simultaneous suggestion that all-German elections might work in some circumstances was really designed to give the Soviets a counter-offer that 'they could not accept' (Large 1996: 147). Similarly, Adenauer, fearful that public opinion would embrace the Soviet idea, was determined to reject the initiative in order to achieve West German rearmament (Schwarz 1995: 653). In the minds of both Western and Soviet policy-makers, integration, especially as it related to Germany, had become a key method or tool in the construction of the cold-war settlement in Europe.

Alternatives to integration

The failure of the EDC in August 1954 left open the question of German rearmament. Yet soon thereafter, West Germany was rearmed outside a supranational framework. Thus the case of German rearmament after the EDC's failure, as well as the unique position of states like Great Britain and Spain, demonstrate that while the cold war might have fostered some aspects of integration, integration was not the only approach available in the West to construct its cold-war alliance. It might be said that the preferred method of building the Western Alliance was integration if possible; otherwise, the primacy of the cold war required policies in Europe that were not necessarily supranational ones.

The WEU and Nato

The immediate problem for Britain, France, and the United States after the defeat of the EDC was that the General Agreement of 1952 between them and the German Federal Republic had to be renegotiated, while the question of rearming West Germany remained unresolved. The Eisenhower administration still wanted some sort of supranational framework for rearmament but no one could come up with a plan likely to win a parliamentary majority in France. Yet the failure of the EDC did not come as a surprise to most governments on the Continent and alternatives were

proposed almost immediately. Months before the French vote, Adenauer had floated the idea that West Germany simply be admitted to Nato as an equal, an idea that squared with his interest in renegotiating the General Agreement in order to give West Germany full sovereignty (Küstners 1995: 67). A Nato solution would give Germany equality and the right to have its own national army and was, for Adenauer, preferable to the perceived anti-German or 'control' aspects of the proposed EDC. Nonetheless, the popularity of the EDC among the fairly pacifist German public, French opposition to a separate German army, and strong support for supranationalism by the United States were all significant obstacles facing Adenauer.

Britain, which had declined to participate in the EDC negotiations, suggested after the initiative collapsed that West Germany could accede to the Brussels Treaty, originally signed in 1948 by Britain, France, and other Western European states as a defensive alliance against Germany. This would end the anti-German aspects of the treaty, making it instead a mutual defensive alliance of Western European states. Moreover, the proposed new Western European Union (WEU) would be integral to Nato. Although an intergovernmental rather than a supranational organization, the WEU would satisfy Adenauer's desire for greater equality within the Western Alliance and provide the French with a measure of security as well. By October 1954 the London Agreements on WEU and West German accession into Nato were signed. Simultaneously, talks took place in Paris on revising West Germany's contractual agreements with France, Britain and the United States. The Paris Accords, signed in October 1954, granted West Germany full sovereignty by May 1955 with only the status of the city of Berlin remaining part of the peace settlement overseen by the four wartime allies. American and European troops would share the burdens of defence against possible Soviet attack, thereby enhancing Western European security. Integration certainly had contributed to the reconciliation between West Germany and its neighbours, but integration was not the only solution to security dilemmas on the continent.

Britain

It was perhaps fitting that Britain proposed the solution to German rearmament after the failure of the EDC, for the British, in contrast to the French, excelled as leaders and participants in the Western Alliance without embracing integration as the means of doing so. There were certainly individuals within the British government, such as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who saw Marshall Plan as a means of building a Western European bloc within the broader Western Alliance (Bell 1997: 83). However, Britain was consistently unwilling to take the lead in basing the Western European arm of the Alliance on integration and supranationalism. Instead, Britain wanted a special status within the proposed cooperative structure (Bell 1997: 87). As time went on, and the United States came to embrace integration more explicitly, Britain consistently backed away, leaving the door open for France to establish itself as the Western European leader.

British hesitancy flowed from a belief that Britain's commercial and military interests existed outside the continent as much as within it (Reynolds 1997: 179). Britain's priority on the continent was to secure an American commitment to the defence of Europe. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 laid the foundation for this, and the

North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 provided the superstructure. Clearly, Britain preferred intergovernmental options rather than supranational ones. Thus, when the French proposed supranationalism as a way to tie Germany into Western Europe, Britain was supportive but not interested in participating. The Schuman Plan proposed a European union based on Franco-German reconciliation; Britain was absent, and content to remain so. For the French, integration was a solution to the dilemmas raised by the cold war and German recovery. Sensitive to French concerns, the United States supported integration for similar reasons. The British did not have a German dilemma, in that they were committed to German reconstruction with or without integration. Moreover, they had strong ties to the Commonwealth and colonies outside Europe. Thus for Britain it was possible to be an active player in the cold war and a committed partner in the Atlantic Alliance without embracing integration.

Spain

The cold war division of Europe reinforced the fact that integration and other developments associated with French, British, and American policy on the continent became Western European, not continent-wide, initiatives. However, the cold war did not mean that all of Western Europe was to be integrated. As in the British case, there were alternative paths to westernization for many states. This fact alone demonstrates the primacy of the cold war in the period. If the cold war was the reason for the Western Alliance, it was not necessarily the case that all members of the Alliance were to be part of the integration project. In the British case, absence was voluntary. But the case of Spain demonstrates that the cold-war division of Europe did not necessarily mean that all non-Communist states were welcomed in the process of integration.

Spain under General Francisco Franco was a dictatorship with many fascist tendencies. Although officially neutral during the war, Franco's regime had come to power in the Spanish Civil War with the help of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Moreover, during World War II, Spain had sent 'volunteers' to fight alongside Nazi troops in the Soviet Union, as well as supplying Hitler with significant economic resources. Despite an interest in removing Franco from power as a vestige of fascism, the Truman administration concluded that the potential chaos that might ensue in Spain would only benefit the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism (Byrnes 2000: 152). By 1947, with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the United States increasingly saw Spain primarily in the context of the emerging East-West conflict (Guirao 1996: 80). Thus the maintenance of the *status quo*, which would prevent any chance of the Spanish Communists coming to power, became the overriding US goal in Madrid. British policy paralleled American policy in the aftermath of the war. If anything, Britain's desire to see Franco continue in power preceded that of the United States (Dunthorn 2000: 69).

If Franco provided Spain with anti-Communist stability in Western Europe, however, the potential for economic dislocation that might lead to a Communist revolution was just as great there, or even greater, than elsewhere on the continent. Thus some in the US Congress argued that Spain was a legitimate candidate for Marshall aid (Guirao 1996: 81). Moreover, as the threat of a European war grew in the minds of US military planners after the Czech coup and Berlin blockade of 1948, Spain's

strategic value also grew (Guirao 1996: 83). Because the State Department and President Truman himself opposed including the Franco dictatorship in major American aid programmes, Spain ultimately did not receive Marshall assistance (Guirao 1996: 84). More significantly, American allies such as France, itself forced by domestic opposition to Franco to impose sanctions unilaterally against Spain, encouraged the United States to exclude Spain from the Marshall Plan.

As early as 1948, once France ended its sanctions, Britain raised the possibility of allowing Spain to enter into the various arrangements being made by the Western European nations (Marquina Barrio 1986: 151). In particular, the British proposed that Spain be admitted to the Brussels Treaty. France refused even to consider such a request. Although the United States accepted this situation, the National Security Council in Washington concluded by mid-1948 that ideally Spain should to be a part of Western Europe's military arrangements if not its economic ones (Marquina Barrio 1986: 180).

As the rearmament crisis developed in the aftermath of the Korean war—the crisis not only of German rearmament but also of the slow pace of rearmament in other European countries—the possibility of involving Spain as part of the Western European system was again raised. By January 1951 the Truman administration decided that it could no longer ignore the potential that Spanish territory held for the military defence of Europe. Aware that inclusion of the Franco regime in the NATO alliance was still unpalatable to its European partners, the United States decided to pursue a bilateral military agreement with Spain outside both NATO and the integrationist EDC (Guirao 1996: 86). The primacy of the cold war was again demonstrated: integration if possible, security at any cost.

The Western Europeans, particularly the British and French, welcomed a bilateral US-Spanish deal as the best way for the United States to achieve its goals while allowing its European allies to avoid another contentious issue. Negotiations between the United States and Spain, opened in March 1951, culminated in the Bases Agreement of September 1953. The United States received land for military bases on Spanish soil in return for a financial commitment to assist Spain's military through a \$465 million programme of aid and cooperation, from 1954 to 1957 (Guirao 1996: 90). Soon after, Spain was admitted to the OEEC, the United Nations and eventually NATO. Nevertheless, Spain remained outside the purview of European integration led by the Europeans themselves until after Franco's death in 1975, despite its desire to be included. In the Spanish case, paths to the Western Alliance were opened up even as the doors of integration remained closed.

Conclusion

Without a doubt, the conflict known as the cold war fostered important moments in the history of integration and directly contributed to certain stages in the development of European institutions. The connection made by American and French officials—notably Jean Monnet—between economic development, national security and the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union was of great significance.

The model of the Marshall Plan, intended to further security through economic growth, encouraged intra-European cooperation and led to a number of initiatives culminating in the Schuman Plan for coal and steel integration and the birth of supranationalism. The cold war also shaped integration by making it a preserve of Western European states, for the politics of the cold war created and cemented the division of Europe in the immediate postwar era.

The EDC, a proposed supranational solution to a military challenge on the border between East and West, suggested that rising cold-war tensions might lead to another round of integration. Yet the failure of the EDC did not mean the failure of the United States and its allies to solve the problem of German remilitarization. The accession of Germany to Nato in 1955, in response to which the Soviet Union established a rival military organization, the Warsaw Pact, deepened the cold-war division of the continent. The failure of the EDC raised the possibility that the West might abandon integration as a viable tool in the creation of its cold-war institutions and structures.

For a variety of reasons, however, Western European countries continued to embrace integration and supranationalism. The economic imperative had always been present. The desire of the Adenauer government to pursue integration as part of a general policy of achieving German equality within the West, despite the EDC experience, was another factor (Giauque 2002: 12–13). In the case of France, the defeat of the EDC coincided with the bloody loss of its colony in Indochina (Vietnam). In 1956, France experienced another humiliating failure following its military intervention in the Suez Canal zone. For France, leadership in Europe, first linked to the German question, now became bound up in a more general search for prominence, and thus became the most important aspect of the country's foreign policy (Giauque 2002: 17–18). Continued integration represented France's best chance to lead the European wing of the Western Alliance.

Nevertheless, the cold war became less significant as a driver of European integration in the second half of the 1950s. President Eisenhower and his influential Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, recognized this. The two continued to support the idea of integration, but increasingly believed that the Europeans themselves had to take the lead (Giauque 2002: 14–15). Eventually, the Western European desire to press forward for economic reasons led to the Messina conference of June 1955 that resulted in a series of negotiations on a customs union and atomic energy cooperation. The ensuing Rome Treaties of March 1957 established the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community.

Although the cold war had less to do with the emerging EEC than it did with the Marshall Plan and the EDC, it was not irrelevant to integration in the latter part of the 1950s. American support for the negotiations that culminated in the Rome Treaties, particularly the negotiations on atomic cooperation, was grounded in a perception that any strengthening of Western Europe generally would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance in particular. The EEC required the United States to adjust the structure of its economic relationship with its allies, and led to the Dillon Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1958, but it did not require a new conception of European integration as something separate from the Atlantic Alliance and thus the cold war. Indeed, the EEC was seen as a new and important pillar in the Atlantic Alliance, an economic arm that complemented Nato's military one (Giauque 2002: 32; Lundestad 1998: 53–4). As seen in Chapter 12, only the end of the cold war,

a seemingly remote possibility as the EEC got off the ground, would make possible the conception of integration as something that went beyond Western Europe and the real and artificial borders created by the protracted East–West conflict.

Further reading

Understanding the various dimensions of the German question, its relationship to the origins of the cold war, and the later significance of the German rearmament debate is a good place to start further investigation of the question of the impact of the cold war on European integration. Eisenberg (1996) and Hogan (1987) provide detailed analysis of the political and economic underpinnings of American policy towards Germany, while Large (1996) offers a highly readable account of how German and American officials came to focus on rearmament in the 1950s. Hitchcock (1998) provides an important argument concerning France's commitment to the Western Alliance that centres on the German question. Lundestad (1998) specifically addresses the question of European integration in an analysis of how economic reconstruction led to greater political and military ties with the United States and ultimately within Western Europe itself. Trachtenberg (1999) makes an argument about the emergence of American support for integration and subsequent Western European leadership on the same issue not only for the late 1940s, but through the rearmament debates of the 1950s. He, like Giauque (2002), develops important ideas about the 'Nato system' that emerged at that time. Although not focused on integration at any specific point, Mastny (1996) provides one of the best accounts of Stalin's policy towards Europe and the emerging cold war after 1945.

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