Universidade de São Paulo
FEA-Ribeirão
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Segundo Semestre de 2010
Organização Industrial

Programa da Disciplina

Introdução e Objetivos da Disciplina

O objetivo deste curso é dar ao aluno da pós-graduação uma introdução ao campo da Organização Industrial, tanto teórica quanto empírica. Em especial, ele busca dar uma visão geral do campo e mostrar aos alunos técnicas mais comumente utilizadas para a pesquisa na área. Além disso, busca fazer os alunos pensarem em temas de pesquisa para dissertação na área.

Justificativa

A área de organização industrial, nas duas últimas décadas, tem crescido de importância na pesquisa em economia, por motivos de avanços teóricos e empíricos. Do ponto de vista teórico, o desenvolvimento de modelos de competição com produtos diferenciados permitiu a modelagem de situações de competição imperfeita mais próximas do mundo real. Além disso, avanços no estudo das Teorias de Organização permitiram um melhor entendimento de como os limites da empresa são determinados. Do ponto de vista empírico, avanços na modelagem de sistemas de equações simultâneas, assim como técnicas de estimação assistida por simulação.

Conteúdo Resumido

1. **Organização Industrial Teórica**
   (a) **Teoria da Firma**
   (b) **Monopólio (Bens Duráveis, Publicidade, Informação, Qualidade e Discriminação de Preços)**
   (c) **Dispersão de Preços**

(d) **Oligopólio Estático**

(e) **Diferenciação de Produto**

(f) **Entrada e Saída**

(g) **Relações Verticais**

2. **Organização Industrial Empírica**

(a) **Demanda**..

(b) **Custos.**

(c) **Conduta.**

(d) **Modelos de Entrada.**

(e) **Relações Verticais**.

Critérios de Avaliação

Avaliação	**Peso**
Listas de Exercícios	60%
Prova Final	20%
Participação	20%

Programa Aula-a-Aula

Aula	Tema	Bibliografia Obrigatória	Papers
1	Introdução	Tirole [1988], caps. 0	Alchian and Demsetz [1972],Coase [1937],Grossman and Hart [1986],Hart [1995],Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994], Holmstrom and Roberts [1998], Holmstrom and Tirole [1989], Holmstrom [1999], Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], Holmstrom [1982],Williamson [1998, 2000]

Aula	Tema	Bibliografia Obrigatória	Papers
2	Teoria da Firma	Tirole [1988], caps. 0	Alchian and Demsetz [1972],Coase [1937],Grossman and Hart [1986],Hart [1995],Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994], Holmstrom and Roberts [1998], Holmstrom and Tirole [1989], Holmstrom [1999], Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], Holmstrom [1982],Williamson [1998, 2000]
3	Teoria da Firma	Tirole [1988], caps. 0	Alchian and Demsetz [1972],Coase [1937],Grossman and Hart [1986],Hart [1995],Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994], Holmstrom and Roberts [1998], Holmstrom and Tirole [1989], Holmstrom [1999], Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], Holmstrom [1982],Williamson [1998, 2000]
4	Monopólio	Tirole [1988], caps. 1 a 3	Borenstein [1991], Bulow [1982], Fishman and Rob [2000], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998], Martin [1982], Mussa and Rosen [1978], Varian [1989]
5	Monopólio	Tirole [1988], caps. 1 a 3	Borenstein [1991], Bulow [1982], Fishman and Rob [2000], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998], Martin [1982], Mussa and Rosen [1978], Varian [1989]
6	Monopólio	Tirole [1988], caps. 1 a 3	Borenstein [1991], Bulow [1982], Fishman and Rob [2000], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998], Martin [1982], Mussa and Rosen [1978], Varian [1989]

Aula	Tema	Bibliografia Obrigatória	Papers
7	Monopólio	Tirole [1988], caps. 1 a 3	Borenstein [1991], Bulow [1982], Fishman and Rob [2000], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998], Martin [1982], Mussa and Rosen [1978], Varian [1989]
8	Dispersão de Preços	Varian [1980]	Diamond [1971], Baye and Morgan [2001], Salop and Stiglitz [1977]
9	Dispersão de Preços	Varian [1980]	Diamond [1971], Baye and Morgan [2001], Salop and Stiglitz [1977]
10	Oligopólio Estático	Tirole [1988], cap. 5	
11	Oligopólio Estático	Tirole [1988], cap. 5	
12	Diferenciação de Produto	Tirole [1988], cap. 7	
13	Diferenciação de Produto	Tirole [1988], cap. 7	
14	Entrada e Saída	Tirole [1988], cap. 8	Mankiw and Whinston [1986]
15	Entrada e Saída	Tirole [1988], cap. 8	
16	Modelos Empíricos de Entrada	Lucinda [2010], cap. 12Berry and Reiss [2007]	
17	Modelos Empíricos de Entrada	Lucinda [2010], cap. 12Bresnahan and Reiss [1991]	
18	Relações Verticais	Tirole [1988], cap. 4	Hastings [2004], Kalnins and Lafontaine [2004], Lafontaine [1992], Shepard [1993]
19	Relações Verticais	Tirole [1988], cap. 4	Hastings [2004], Kalnins and Lafontaine [2004], Lafontaine [1992], Shepard [1993]

Aula	Tema	Bibliografia Obrigatória	Papers
20	Econometria: Sistemas de Equações	Lucinda [2010], apêndice	
21	Demanda	Lucinda [2010], cap. 2	Deaton and Muellbauer [1980], Christensen et al. [1975], Pollak and Wales [1995]
22	Demanda	Lucinda [2010], cap. 3	Train [2003], cap. 3
23	Demanda	Lucinda [2010], cap. 3	Berry [1994], Berry et al. [1995]
24	Custos e Produção	Lucinda [2010], cap. 6	Griliches and Mairesse [1995], Fuss et al. [1978], Christensen et al. [1975]
25	Custos e Produção	Lucinda [2010], cap. 6	Olley and Pakes [1996], Levinsohn and Petrin [2003], Ackerberg et al. [2006]
26	Custos e Produção	Lucinda [2010], cap. 6	Murillo-Zamorano [2004]
27	Conduta	Lucinda [2010], cap. 8	Bresnahan [1982, 1981, 1989], Corts [1998]
28	Conduta	Lucinda [2010], cap. 9	Nevo [1998], Gasmi et al. [1992]
29	Conduta	Lucinda [2010], cap. 10	Baker and Bresnahan [1988], Baker and Baresnahan [1985]
30	Relações Verticais	Lucinda [2010], cap. 11	
31	Relações Verticais	Lucinda [2010], cap. 11	

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