A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology

Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past

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Archaeology and the 1820 Liberal Revolution: The Past in the Independence of Greece and Latin American Nations

Nationalism did not end with Napoleon's downfall, despite the intention of those who outplayed him in 1815. Events evolved in such a way that there would be no way back. The changes in administration, legislation, and institutionalization established in many European countries, and by extension in their colonies, during the Napoleonic period brought efficiency to the state apparatus and statesmen could not afford to return to the old structures. Initially, however, the coalition of countries that defeated the French general set about reconstructing the political structures that had reigned in the period before the French Revolution. In a series of congresses starting in Vienna, the most powerful states in Europe—Russia, Prussia, and Austria, later joined by Britain and post-Napoleonic France-set about reinstating absolutist monarchies as the only acceptable political system. They also agreed to a series of alliances resulting in the domination of the monarchical system in European politics for at least three decades. These powers joined forces to fight all three consecutive liberal revolutions that raged across Europe and the Americas, in 1820, 1830, and 1848, each saturated with nationalist ideals. The events which provide the focus for this chapter belong to the first of those revolutions, that of 1820 (see also Chapter 11), and resulted in the creation of several new countries: Greece and the new Latin American states. In all, nationalism was at the rhetorical basis of the claims for independence. The past, accordingly, played an important role in the formation of the historical imagination which was crucial to the demand for self-determination.

The antiquities appropriated by the Greek and by Latin American countries were still in line with those which had been favoured during the French Revolution: those of the Great Civilizations. However, in revolutionary France this type of archaeology had resulted in an association with symbols and material culture whose provenance was to a very limited extent in their own territory (Chapter 11) or was not on French soil but in distant countries such as Italy, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire (Chapter 3). Antiquities of the

Great Civilizations had been judged as symbols of progress, emblems of the first steps on a long historical route which led to civilization and the French nation and, therefore, to freedom. Yet, when this discourse was applied to countries such as Greece, this led to a very different result. There, antiquities became a metaphor not only for civilization but also for the territory and the political rights of the nation itself. The ancient Greek past, their own past and not that of others, was evidence for the Greeks' right to self-determination. Significantly, the powers of the conservative coalition, formed to annihilate the legacy of the French Revolution which set about to repress all liberal revolts, made an exception for Greece. The Greek revolt of 1821 erupted after a decade of struggle to form, under the principles of nationalism, the first new nation-state in post-Napoleonic Europe. The internal circumstances within Greece helped the revolutionaries' ambitions. Firstly, in Greece, there was a Christian population ruled by an Islamic power, the Ottoman Empire, and from a religious perspective the allies approved of Greece's independence. Secondly, it did not appeal to the European conservative coalition that the classical roots of civilization were in non-European hands. Therefore, with their help, the coalition allowed a different type of nationalism from that of the era of the revolutions to gain importance in the European political landscape: nationalism based on the unique history and culture of the members of the nation and not on the rights of the individual and the sovereignty of the people within the nation. The ultimate justification for Greece's right to independence was its cultural essence, a combination of its religion and its unique history and culture. The Greek language was part of that culture, for the similarity of modern to ancient Greek symbolized the unbroken tradition which linked contemporary and ancient Greece.

Far from the eastern Mediterranean, in America, the rhetoric of freedom had also arrived in the central and southern parts of the continent. The independence of the United States from Britain in 1776 had not greatly affected the continuation of the other colonies. Only in 1867 would part of Canada be granted a constitution by Britain, and other Canadian territories soon were included (map 1). Decades earlier, however, half of North America and all of South America was still under the rule of the Iberian countries, Spain and Portugal. After a first attempt at independence, during the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula between 1807 and 1814, Latin America remained under the influence of both European powers for a few more years—with the exception of the southern tip, which became independent in 1816 and called the United Provinces of the Plata River. One could argue that the opposite had happened in Brazil. The Portuguese Prince Regent João (later King João VI), escaping from Napoleon, fled there and took with him a cast of aristocrats and functionaries and made Rio de Janeiro the centre of the Portuguese Empire

for a decade. This was an obvious benefit for Brazil as many of the legal monopolies Portugal had enjoyed were abolished. João remained in Brazil until the revolutions of 1820 in Portugal, when he decided it was time to return to Europe. He left his son Pedro in Brazil as Regent. The ensuing Portuguese attempts to return Brazil to its pre-nineteenth-century colonial role led to opposition and to the proclamation of independence of the country in 1822. The liberal revolutions of 1820 also brought havoc to Spain, a period which was used by Latin American revolutionaries to rise again (the first time having been timed with the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808–14) and declare independence.

Interestingly, during the Latin American revolutions of the 1820s the history of the period before the arrival of Europeans in America, the pre-Columbian past, was used as a propaganda tool, especially by those intellectuals living in areas where ancient civilizations had been located: Mexico and Peru. Importantly, similarities were drawn with the monuments of the ancient Great Civilizations. There were pyramids like in Egypt and large buildings that assisted in the material symbolization of the historical imagination. There were also documents describing mighty rulers. As in Greece, the ancient states that had developed in their national territories were no longer viewed as an abstract source of civilization to inspire the forward march of progress, but as part of their own singular history. A link between modern populations and the ancient civilizations was established, one that rooted nations in a glorious past. As civilized peoples, their claim to self-government became legitimized in the eyes of the other major nation-states.

In Greece and Latin America nationalism began to show its potential, not only to consolidate large countries such as France on a different basis from the monarchical institutions which had previously predominated, but also to create new nation-states by splitting previous imperial formations such as the Ottoman, Spanish, and Portuguese empires. Antiquities, as the embodiment of the past and symbols of the very existence of the nation, had an important, active role to play in these political changes. There was, however, a significant difference between Greece and Latin America that in later years would prove to be of crucial importance. Whereas Greek antiquity was accepted as part of the glorious origins of Europe, the American pre-Columbian civilizations were not. The latter lost their prestige around the mid nineteenth century due to the rise of racism and its significant role in ethnic nationalism (Chapter 12). During that later period antiquarians struggled to have their own antiquities considered as prestigious material remains of the primeval times of the Mexican and Peruvian nations. This change in the perceived value of race explains the unequal development of archaeology in Greece and the Latin American countries. Classical archaeology continued to enjoy a

82

 $high\ reputation\ and\ foreign\ institutes\ opened\ in\ Rome\ and\ Athens\ (Chapter\ 5).$ In contrast, the appeal to the past of the Mesoamerican and Andean civilizations by Mexican and Peruvian nationalists was momentarily eclipsed only to re-emerge later in the nineteenth century.

THE PAST IN THE STRUGGLE FOR GREEK INDEPENDENCE

We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their root in Greece. But for Greece...we might still have been savages and idolaters...The human form and the human mind attained to a perfection in Greece... The Modern Greek is the descendant of those glorious beings.

(Shelley 1821 (1965): 8) Preface to Hellas.

Mary Shelley (1797-1851), the Romantic English writer, included in this quote two of the tenets of philhellenism. First, ancient Greece was the origin of civilization-therefore, the birthplace of the Western nations. Second, modern Greeks were the direct descendants of ancient Greece. In addition, there was the conviction that ancient Greece was the cradle of political freedom and that it was increasingly unacceptable for Greece, as a Christian country, to be under the Islamic rule of the Ottoman Empire. For philhellenes Greek regeneration was only possible through independence.

Philhellenism was born in the eighteenth century. As explained in Chapter 2, the enlightened elites imagined Greece as the land of nature, genius, and freedom as opposed to their own experience of living in an artificial, overspecialized and authoritarian world. These ideas permeated the emergent Greek mercantile middle classes and contemporary Greek scholars, who laid the foundations for the later development of Greek nationalism. Through their contacts with the West, they realized the respect with which Western elites regarded ancient Greece, to the extent that archaeological collections of Greek vases and statues were exhibited in the best and most appreciated museums. They also became aware of the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire of which they were a part. Their rejection of their masters was partly instigated by the Russians as part of Russia's strategy to weaken their rival in the southwest (Kitromilides 1994: (11) 357-9). Educated Greeks became proud of the language they had inherited from their ancestors. During the last three decades of the eighteenth century and the first two of the nineteenth century, the new economic elite in Greece subsidized schoolteachers to study in Western universities where they became familiar with Western philhellenism. Europeanized Greek intellectuals began to imitate antiquity as a way of

reviving it: they began to write in the language of the ancients, to promote the use of ancient names for the new generations, and on occasions even to dress like ancient Greeks (St Clair 1972: 20).

The Enlightenment ideals of Western Europe met with opposition from the traditional Greek society and the established Orthodox Church (Kitromilides 1994: (1) 53-4). Many Greek intellectuals experienced the French Revolution first-hand and became impregnated with its philosophical background. Most importantly, they soon realized the potential of the new ideas of popular freedom and sovereignty for their own struggle (Kitromilides 1994: (1) 61). One of them was the Greek intellectual, Adamántios Koraïs, who exhorted his compatriots to revive ancient Greece by imitating political events in France, the nation which most resembled it. He tried to persuade his countrymen to draw upon the wisdom of the ancient world. He also proposed the adoption of a 'purified' language, a blend of ancient and modern Greek, and exhorted others to regenerate in order to be prepared for freedom (Dakin 1973: 24; Kitromilides 1994: (1) 62). In Greece itself the French Revolution had a direct effect at the time of the Napoleonic invasion of the Ionian Islands. Napoleon first invaded them in 1797, but they were subsequently annexed by the British and again by the French in 1808. In this political turbulence, cultural and political philhellenism had a greatest impetus in Greece. Greek antiquity was acclaimed by Frenchmen and Greeks alike. In the early years of the French occupation of the Ionian Islands, the French General Gentili appealed to Greeks to claim the freedom enjoyed in Greek antiquity in his call for enrolment into the French army (Dakin 1973: 27). On the Greek side, decisions such as that of a local school in Corfu to change its name to the Academy of Korkyra (the Greek name for Corfu) and to begin to date years with respect to the Olympiad reflected the mood of the times (St Clair 1972: 21). These examples show that, as had happened in Rome, a whole reinvention of tradition took place from the end of the eighteenth century directly connected to the French offensive, a process which, in the case of Greece, continued under British rule. In that period, the process of re-adopting the ancient island names continued. In the Hellenic University, opened in Corfu by Lord Guildford, students and professors alike wore classical attire. But in contrast to European philhellenism, largely a literary phenomenon, in Greece philhellenism took on not only a cultural character but also a political character which eventually led to revolution (Kitromilides 1994: (1) 63-4). The political process to radical republicanism unfolded from an earlier debate on the French Revolution in the 1790s, to the development of the idea of the creation of a French-oriented Hellenic republic, followed by a period in which journals such as Logios Ermis continued to promote the awakening of Greek national consciousness in the decade 1811-21 (Kitromilides 1994: (v), (XII) 8).

The 1820 Liberal Revolution

The struggle for Greek independence began in 1821. Leaders of the revolution implored other nations for help with manifestos like the following:

Reduced to a condition so pitiable, deprived of every right, we have, with unanimous voice, resolved to take up arms, and struggle against the tyrants . . . In one word, we are unanimously resolved on *Liberty or Death*. Thus determined, we earnestly invite the united aid of all *civilised* nations to promote the attainment of our holy and legitimate purpose, the *recovery* of our rights, and the *revival* of our unhappy nation.

(St Clair 1972: 13, emphasis added).

European support for the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire was crucial. To begin with, only volunteers came forward, for those governments who could have given aid formed part of the conservative coalition constituted with the aim of repressing the legacy of the French Revolution in Western and Central Europe. Significantly, the general acceptance of the tenets of philhellenism created a situation by which a blind eye was turned towards those who volunteered, usually unemployed soldiers of the post-Napoleonic era and revolutionaries of the 1820s exiled after the collapse of their own causes (St Clair 1972: 29, 31). Eventually, the powers decided that it was worth providing military assistance, legitimizing this change of mind by making reference to the status of Greece as the cradle of civilization and as a Christian nation under the rule of a Muslim Empire. In 1827, the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, Muhammad Ali (Mehmed Ali in Turkish), was sent by the Ottoman Sultan against the Greeks, but his troops were defeated in the Battle of Navarino by a coalition force formed by France, England, and Russia. After four centuries of Ottoman rule, Greece gained independence in 1830. In the struggle for sovereignty, the metaphor of the past had assisted in persuading the European powers to favour the Greek cause. Greek independence entailed more than was apparent. It signified the first definitive step towards an essentialist nationalism, founded on the premise that the existence of the Greek nation—and its right to independence—was proved by its glorious past. For the Greeks the ancient civilization being discussed was not in a distant territory, but in their own, and the link between past and present was evident in the Greek language. Texts by the classical Greek authors, inscriptions, and works of art, such as sculptures and remains of great buildings, all symbolized the glorious foundations of the future Greek state.

The role the past played in Greek independence increased its symbolic value. Accordingly, the protection of the emblem of the new Greek state, the ancient past, was ensured by the creation of an administration aiming to promote everything connected with classical antiquity. Legislation was passed, societies were created and museums were opened. Documents such as the one below, a directive issued by the Commissioner of one of the

Peloponnesian islands in 1829—the year in which independence was granted, clearly reflect the importance antiquities were given at this time:

These [antiquities] awake the spirit of modern Hellenes. It reminds them [the Hellenes] of the ancestral brilliance and glory and motivates them to imitate it. These [antiquities] convey honour to the Nation. These [antiquities], honoured by wise Europe and sought after by travellers on an every-day basis, reveal their value; and they are as if they are saying to [the Hellenes] 'you should not ignore the heirlooms of your ancestors! They have assisted you and it is your duty to respect them because they are sacred and they belong to you and they offer you honour and dignity.'

(Anagnostopoulos in Hamilakis and Yalouri 2000: 116).

After Greece's independence, the strong appeal of the past assisted in the modelling of the objectification of the state. Athens, the ancient metropolis of the Greek territory where democracy was deemed to have been born, was reinstated as the capital of Greece in 1833. Its main rival in antiquity, the town associated with mighty power and the military, Sparta, was rebuilt with the intention of it becoming the second city of the kingdom (Hamilakis & Yalouri 2000: 125). A symbolic restoration of the Parthenon, the temple of the goddess Athena at the Acropolis in Athens, also began. It was there that the coronation of the King of Greece, the German, Otto I, took place in 1835 (Hamilakis 2001: 7–8). The territory of the new state was shaped to symbolize the resurrection of the new Greek nation: the towns selected to be the markers of the state, the monuments chosen to provide a landmark that objectified the new nation.

New legislation and novel institutions were created to promote the protection and the study of the past. Even before independence, in 1827, all export of antiquities had been forbidden by law and the antiquities market that had flourished at the start of the century (Chapter 2) was made illegal (Gran-Aymerich 1998: 47). Despite this, some works of art still left the country in the following years, as seems to have been the case on the occasion of the French expedition to Morea (as the Peloponnesus was then known) in 1829–30.¹ It is interesting to note that this expedition had been organized immediately after the removal of Ottoman forces from the area following the Battle of Navarino in 1827 (Bracken 1975: 178). In order to implement the legislation, the Greek Archaeological Service was created in 1834. For the first two years it was under the direction of a northern German archaeologist, Ludwig Ross (1806–59). He also held the chair of archaeology at the University of Athens until 1843. Ross was eventually compelled to leave all of his posts. He had been ousted from the

¹ In 1843–4 there was a further expedition to Greece, that of Le Bas (Gran-Aymerich 1998: 48). During the First World War, the French made further claims to tradition when they organized the Archaeological Service of the Eastern Army in Macedonia (Gran-Aymerich 1998: 306).

The 1820 Liberal Revolution

Archaeological Service because of his arrogant attitude towards his Greek colleagues—in particular towards his superior Alexander Rangabe, and his subordinate, Kyriakos Pittakis (1798–1863). After a nationalist revolt in 1843, the King of Greece, Otto I (r. 1832–62), ordered the dismissal of a number of non-Greek public officials and their posts were then given to Greek-born individuals. On this occasion Ludwig Ross lost the position of professor of archaeology. Otto I's decision represents an important event in the history of nationalism, as it is a first indication of the relevance that blood and race would take on later in the century. Hiring Germans to work in the Greek Archaeological Service seemed from then on as inappropriate. The essentialist notion of the nation was definitely gaining pace.

Rangabe and Pittakis created the first archaeological review, the *Ephemeris Archaiologiki*. In 1837, they also founded the Archaeological Society of Athens (Étienne & Étienne 1992: 91; Gran-Aymerich 1998: 47) and excavations soon started (Shanks 1995: 46), although the Archaeological Museum was not completed until 1866 (Dickenson 1994; Tsigakou 1981: 64). This was all necessary in order to construct a sense of national consciousness urgently needed in a country that was in fact characterized by ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity (Hamilakis & Yalouri 2000: 124; Just 1989). In opposition to disunity, the Megale idea of reuniting all Greeks under the same nation became increasingly important (Chapter 5).

Greece, therefore, was one of the first European countries to obtain independence in the name of nationalism. Yet, it was able to do so at least in part because the Greek cause was acceptable to the European powers through the connection of ancient Greece with the origin of civilization. For Greeks this connection had further consequences, mainly in terms of the language inherited from their ancestors, whose similarity to modern Greek provided proof of the link between past and present. As the Greek example shows, issues of history, language, birth-right, and religion began to play a crucial role in nationalism. This tendency, as we shall see in Chapter 12, became more marked in the second half of the century, when a racial component was also added. This spurred on an important change in nationalism, eventually leading to the prevalence of the ethnic and cultural components of nationalism.

THE GREAT CIVILIZATIONS OF AMERICA IN THE AGE OF INDEPENDENCE

At the outset of the nineteenth century the urban cultural life in Latin America was very similar to that of many cities in Europe and North America.

The larger cities had institutions akin to their counterparts: learned societies (such as those following the Spanish example, including the Sociedades de Amigos del País (Societies of the Friends of the Country)), botanical gardens, the press, private, and some incipient public collections on display, universities, and even astronomical observatories. Cultural life, as was the case elsewhere in the Western world, was the province of the well-off classes. These included a minority of individuals recently arrived from the Iberian Peninsula, but mainly the criollos or creoles—families who had lived in the Americas for several generations and who had intermarried with locals. Continuing the medieval practice, when family unions between Christians and Muslims (or Muslim families recently converted to Christianity) had not been unknown, in the colonies formed by Spain and Portugal racial miscegenation had been relatively common from the earliest years of their arrival in the Americas in the sixteenth century. Accordingly, the physical and racial division between the elite and the locals, so marked in the colonies formed by other northern European, Protestant countries, was much less apparent in the Latin American colonies (Pyenson & Sheets-Pyenson 1999: 352, 355-7).

The dissolution of the Spanish and Portuguese American empires overseas was the result of a chain of events starting with the French Revolution. In the Spanish territories, the creoles, like the intelligentsia everywhere else in the Western world, attentively observed the changes occurring before and during late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century France. The trouble in Europe affected them directly after the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by Napoleonic troops in 1808 (Humphreys & Lynch 1966). In Spain, Joseph Bonaparte—Napoleon's brother—was crowned king. Meanwhile the liberal opposition to the French took refuge in Cadiz, where a new constitution was approved in 1812. After the expulsion of the French, the re-establishment of an absolutist Bourbon monarchy produced a division between absolutists and liberal intellectuals, the latter keeping the flame of revolutionary ideas alive (Lorenzo 1981: 195-6). They formed two opposing camps in the peninsula and in the colonies. Meanwhile, in Brazil, the King of Portugal's son, who had been left as regent in 1821 when his father returned to Lisbon after his fourteen-year stay in the colony, proclaimed the independence of Brazil in 1822. Brazil was proclaimed as an imperial power with Pedro I as Emperor (r. 1822-abdicated 1831). He was followed by his son Pedro II (r. 1840-89).

Antiquities in the independence of Mexico and Peru

The Spanish liberal revolution of 1820 had a domino effect on the independence of the provinces of Latin America still under Spanish and Portuguese

rule (see map 1). In a colonial context, the logical result of the insurgents' liberal ideals was a rejection of the metropolis. Soon the whole of the area—except the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico—had declared its independence (Lynch 1973). In each of the new countries, national histories began to proliferate. They usually only went as far back as the European conquest. They followed the pattern established by their northern neighbours, the United States and Canada. Mexico and Peru were the exceptions to this rule. This can partly be explained by the presence in both of ancient monumental remains and works of art, but also by the existence in Mexico City and Lima of an important concentration of intellectuals. These two factors were not independent: the Spaniards had created two main provinces in America, each of them centred upon two of the main pre-Columbian ancient centres of power at the time of their arrival, the mighty Aztec and Inca empires.

In both Mexico and Peru the presence of monumental structures dating from before the Spanish conquest made it possible to include the pre-Columbian past in their national history. As in Europe, monuments (and artefacts associated with them such as statues and other artistic material culture) were the principal elements giving prestige to the history of peoples about whom written sources provided little or no information. From the sixteenth century, archaeological monuments had been described and even excavated. As a result, there was considerable knowledge about them on which separatists could draw (Chapter 2). These ideas were expressed by local historians (Phelan 1960) as well as others in Europe and the US (Patterson 1995b: 19). At the time of the first revolt against Spanish rule, in 1813, the liberal priest, José María Morelos, convened the Congress of Chilpancingo in which Mexico declared its independence for the first time and declared that 'we are about to re-establish the Mexican empire, improving its government' (in Brading 2001: 523). Independence was deemed necessary to free Mexico from three hundred years of repression. The leaders of the insurgence were identified with the last Aztec rulers, Monctezuma and Cauthémoc. This rhetoric linked the glorious pre-conquest past and the present, formed the basis of the 1820 revolt and was translated into the Act of Independence of 1821: 'The Mexican nation, which for three hundred years has neither had its own will nor free use of its voice, today leaves the oppression in which it has lived' (in Brading 2001: 523). In Peru, the mythical founder of the Inca Empire, Manco Capac, was revered as a national ancestor. Some even exalted the Quechua language, a widespread native language still spoken by a majority of locals, as that innate to the Peruvian nation (Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 371). This link between modern Peruvians and the Incas found expression in many media, including patriotic journals. In 1821, one published in Lima printed this harangue:

Where were you heroes of the fatherhood not to have taken up with fury the vengeful sword to condemn [the conquistadors of Peru]...The deposed Inca King has lifted his tombstone and...has courageously said: Peruvians, avenge me...for three hundred years now the barbarian assassins have ruled my empire.

(Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 369).

For the Peruvian insurgents, an eminent past meant a glorious future, as one of the separatists stated in 1822. As he put it, 'following the rules of analogy we can affirm that our fatherhood is rapidly heading towards an ineffable greater glory' (cited in Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 370).

The pre-Columbian Mesoamerican and Andean monuments were considered a product of civilization and nationalists were, therefore, able to integrate their makers into the national history (Bernal 1980: chs. 4 and 5; Díaz-Andreu 1999; Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 370-1; Rípodas Ardanaz 1993). However, the inadequacy of Mesoamerican monuments as compared to the classical canon made their integration into the national discourse more difficult than in the Greek and Roman cases, and consequently the process of incorporation into the national history remained far from successful completion. Despite Clavijero's and other intellectuals' efforts in late eighteenth and early nineteenthcentury Mexico and Peru, the idealization of the Mesoamerican past and its definition as a Golden Age did not imply a better appreciation of indigenous populations or a regard for their beliefs (Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 373-4). Thus, the sculpture of the goddess Coatlicue that, as explained in Chapter 2, was reburied after natives had reacted to it with religious devotion and not with national admiration, was again dug up to be placed in a very different setting, the National Museum of Mexico. This institution opened in 1825 and symbolized the initial institutionalization of the past for Mexican-Creole nationalists (Florescano 1993; Morales Moreno 1994). The first president of the Mexican Republic commissioned to 'seek out as many statues and stone sculptures...as can be collected for the museum' (in Florescano 1993: 87). The museum's aim was 'to present the most exact understanding of our country, including its primitive population and the origin and developments in the arts and sciences, religion and customs of its inhabitants, natural products and properties of its soil and climate' (ibid. 88). Lucas Alamán (1792-1853) seems to have been a key intellectual behind the success in founding the museum. On 18 March 1825, he obtained a directive from the president addressed to the rector of the university. It read:

His Excellency the President of the Republic has been pleased to resolve that with the antiquities brought from the Isla de Sacrificios and others already here in this our Capital, a national museum be founded, and that to this end one of the rooms of the University set aside, the supreme government taking upon itself the responsibility for

the cost of shelving, locks, custody of the museum, etc. With this object, His Excellency wishes Your Worship to designate the room to be set aside for this purpose at once useful and an addition to our national glory, and to advise this Ministry accordingly, so that it may commission staff and proceed with their assistance.

(in Bernal 1980: 135).

As with the museum in Copenhagen, located in a church loft (Chapter 11), the National Museum of Mexico did not have a place of its own, but borrowed premises from existing institutions. Like the Danish museum and others such as the British Museum, it only opened for limited periods (i.e., Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, from 10 am to 2 pm and by previous appointment only).

The creation of the museum was preceded by that of the Antiquities Council (Junta de Antigüedades), formed immediately after independence in 1821. This council followed the model of a failed previous attempt in all the territories of Spain, including Mexico (Bernal 1980: 134), in 1808 that had been aborted due to the Napoleonic invasion. Most notably it helped gather collections previously dispersed across several institutions and in private hands to be exhibited together. In 1827, a first publication appeared about the museum's collection of antiquities written by Isidro Ignacio de Icaza, an ex-Jesuit and member of the Provisional Government Council formed by the Act for the Independence of Mexico on 28 September 1821, and Isidro Rafael Gondra, a priest and member of the Antiquities Council. From 1831, some teaching of antiquities was initiated in the museum after the creation of a chair of ancient history. Fieldwork, however, was not initiated until 1877 in Oaxaca and later in 1890 in Cempoala (Florescano 1993: 90–2).

In Peru, the pre-Columbian past was also appropriated by the insurgents through rhetoric of creolization in which the European-Incan racial mixture of modern Peruvians was celebrated. A distinction was, however, made between the Incas and other non-civilized indigenous populations, the latter being excluded from the national history (but nonetheless integrated in the nation as citizens) (Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 369–71; 1994b: 40). Measures were immediately taken to preserve Inca archaeology. In 1822, the Congress forbade by Supreme Decree the excavation of Inca huacas implicitly putting the state in charge of the care and protection of archaeological and artistic heritage, although this was not followed by any effective measures to enforce the law (Bonavia 1984: 110). In 1826, the National Museum of Peru was organized and authorized the formation of a society in charge of uncovering archaeological remains (Chávez 1992: 45). In 1851, a first book on Peruvian archaeological monuments, Inca history and other antiquities, with the title Antigüedades Peruanas, was published by Peruvian Mariano Rivero and Swiss

Johann von Tschurdi (1818–89) (Rivero & Tschurdi 1851 (1998)). The latter visited Peru for four years in his early twenties with the aim of collecting antiquities for the Museum of Neuchâtel (Switzerland). The book marked another increase in the degree of sophistication that the pre-contact past acquired in the national imagination.

In the years following independence, the integration of the pre-Columbian past into the national histories of Mexico and Peru encountered an unexpected problem. The increasing importance of the racial factor in nationalism eventually led creole elites to de-emphasize their Indian ancestry as part of their glorious past and to stress instead the early modern period as the starting point for the Peruvian and Mexican nations and the colonial period as their civilized past (Quijada Mauriño 1994a: 376; 1994b: 44–8). Together with the political instability that characterized both countries throughout the nineteenth century, the successive attempts by European colonial powers to reappropriate them, as well as their economic underdevelopment, partly explains the unspectacular history of the institutions created both in Mexico and Peru during the early years of independence.

Antiquities in imperial Brazil

Comparison between the contemporary situations in Mexico City and Lima with that of Rio de Janeiro is revealing. Rio de Janeiro was the capital of the only Portuguese colony in America, Brazil. As in the first two cities mentioned, in Rio there lived an important contingent of individuals belonging to the political and cultural elite. They administered a huge state where no indigenous population had cultural traditions rooted in a glorious past, in contrast with the situation in the Peruvian and Mexican republics. Unlike the experience of the sixteenth-century Spaniards, the Portuguese had not found an opposing major civilization ruling in Brazil. Also, no documentary source with any credibility indicated the existence of a major civilization at any time before the arrival of the Portuguese. Despite this lack of information, and apparently in contrast to other colonies without monumental remains, such as South Africa, the elite showed an interest in the pre-Columbian past, which they associated with the contemporary indigenous populations of Brazil. Essential to this process was the relative political stability provided by the long government of the Brazilian Emperor Pedro II, and a cultural institution founded in his reign: the Historical and Geographical Institute, created in 1838.

The institute has to be understood in the framework of the relative political stability brought to the Brazilian empire under Pedro I (r. 1822–31), and

especially Pedro II (r. 1840–89). During this period, the education of many members of the intellectual elite was undertaken in Europe, either in Paris or in Lisbon—where French intellectual life was closely followed (Martins 2003). The connection with Europe may explain the early date of its founding. The Historical and Geographical Institute, in 1851 renamed the Historic, Geographic and Ethnographic Institute of Brazil (IHGE, Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Etnográfico Brasileiro), was the initial focus of cultural life in nineteenth-century Brazil. From the year after its creation, it had started to publish a learned journal in which articles on Brazilian geography, history, language, geology, archaeology and ethnography were printed, contributing to the construction of the Brazilian national imagination.

Regarding archaeology, the initial intention had been to find a Great Civilization similar to those known in other parts of the continent. Civilization was invariably linked with an elite which, at least in part, was of European origin. Already in 1839, the possibility of a Phoenician character for a supposed inscription was rejected after it was concluded that the marks were not the result of scripture but were a product of nature. Around the early 1840s, the German Bavarian naturalist Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius (1794-1868),2 otherwise known for his epoch-making work on Brazilian flora—whose study had started on a three-year journey across Brazil in the late 1810s, insisted that expeditions were needed to discover the monuments that he imagined hidden beneath the vegetation (Ferreira 1999: 17). In 1845, one of the contributors to the journal explained that the institute had hopes of a good result from the attempts of one of its members, Cônego Benigno José de Carvalho, 'to discover ancient monuments in this part of the New World' (in Ferreira 1999: 12-13). It also desired to have 'a Brazilian Champollion' among its members (in Ferreira 1999: 12-13). Benigno formed part of an unsuccessful expedition to find a ruined city at Cincorá, Bahia, described in an eighteenth-century document. Increasingly, however, it was realized that the possibility of the existence of remains of ancient civilizations in Brazilian soil was remote. Some of the institute's members also echoed in the journal some literature produced at the time in Copenhagen and Paris alluding to the European presence in America before the arrival of the Spaniards and Portuguese (Ferreira 1999: 25). In 1854, at the request of Pedro II, the Brazilian poet Gonçalves Dias (1823-64) published a reasoned article attacking all the myths and unfounded hypotheses about the existence of ancient civilizations in Brazilian soil (Ferreira 1999: 23–4; Ferreira 2003b).

The lack of monuments did not prevent the emergence of an interest in the savages, the native populations of Brazil. Indianism, the Indian as the embodiment of the Brazilian nation, based on the image of the Enlightened 'good savage', became central to Romantic Brazilian literature and nationalism. The imagined native was based on a gender-biased model as warlike, heroic, strong, brave, indomitable, fair, and polite; an image that had roots in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century European models (Liebersohn 1998). Some authors have described this movement as a sort of 'invention of tradition' in a country where a natural cultural tradition was impeded by the very nature of the colonial past of the country. Others have argued that the comparison with the Spanish-American republics, where relatively few Romantic Indianists existed, converted Indianism to a historical process peculiar to the Brazilian empire (Treece 2000). The good Indian became a genre not only recreated by many Brazilian writers but also by foreigners. The Bavarian Von Martius, who has been described not only as a naturalist, but also as one of the founding fathers of Brazilian historiography and literary criticism, contended that the national identity of Brazil had to be understood as the result of the three races, the white, the Native American, and the African from the populations brought to the Americas as slaves for the Brazilian plantations. He saw the blend of whites and Indians as a catalyst of Brazilian national history, but argued that progress would be hindered if miscegenation occurred on a great scale. Another intellectual, the Brazilian historian, Francisco Adolpho de Varnhagen, proposed that the study of the native languages would be essential for the reconstruction of their history and the possible migrations they had experienced. In 1849, he published an article titled, 'Indigenous ethnography, languages, immigrations and archaeology' (Ferreira 1999: 22). For some authors, Indianism paradoxically came together with a continuation of a policy of extermination of native populations, explicitly defended by authors such as Varnhagen. He supported a ruthless use of force, with expeditions to enslave Indians as a way to appropriate their territory for use by European settlers and stop the need for importation of black slaves from Africa. Integration was invoked as an alternative by liberal thinkers such as Gonçalves Dias (Ferreira 2003b).

The Indianism movement directed more attention towards anthropology and archaeology. Earlier, in the days of the empire, a Danish naturalist, Peter Wilhelm Lund (1801–80), studied the palaeontology of Lagoa Santa, in Minas Gerais province. He stayed in Brazil from 1825–8 and 1833–44, surveyed some 800 caves, and found many fossils of extinct fauna as well as some related human remains, that his pupil Georges Cuvier interpreted as being the

² Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius arrived in Brazil with the Austrian expedition that accompanied the future Brazilian Empress Leopoldina. A professor at the University of Munich from 1826 and the curator of Bavaria's royal botanical garden in 1832, he also gained a reputation as a Brazilian historian and as an ethno-linguist.

result of a deluge (Funari 1999: 18).3 Lund argued that skulls such as those he found in Lapa do Sumidouro had a defective anatomy and therefore they indicated lesser intelligence than that of other ancient peoples such as the Egyptians. Their descendants had stagnated, becoming the indigenous populations of South America. In 1847 Francisco Freire Allemão (1797-1874), the director of the archaeology section of the institute, proposed to elaborate a General Map of the Brazilian State in Primitive Times (Carta Geral do Estado Primitivo do Brasil). He sent a letter to the provinces asking for information regarding the cultural practices and customs of the indigenous societies living in the area as well as requesting that some artefacts be sent. The increasing importance of archaeology led to the creation in 1851 of a specialized branch to study the archaeology and ethnography of Brazil. The institute was even renamed as the Historic, Geographic, and Ethnographic Institute of Brazil (IHGE, Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Etnográfico Brasileiro). From 1858 to 1861 a Scientific Commission was sent to explore the provinces and obtain data on flora, fauna, geology and minerals, astronomy, geography, and ethnography. Some archaeological material was collected as a result of this expedition.

CONCLUSION: THE NATIONAL PAST AS THE CIVILIZED PAST OF OTHERS

Allusion to ancient, monumental ruins was an essential part of the independent rhetoric of the countries which were successful in obtaining political independence as a result of the 1820s revolutions. They were an exception. The liberal revolts of the early 1820s, 1830s, and 1848, which affected most European countries (Chapter 12) and their colonies, were in most cases defeated by the European conservative coalitions first formed in Vienna in 1815 during the fight against Napoleon and which were temporarily successful in their efforts to repress the legacy of the French Revolution. In the early 1820s, therefore, Greek and Latin American intellectuals were not alone in rebelling in the name of liberal and national ideologies, but they were the only ones whose independence looked acceptable to the conservative coalition. The reasons why an exception was made in the case of Greece were twofold. Firstly, Greece was mainly a Christian country ruled by an Islamic power, the Ottoman Empire, and it seemed right that it should be independent. Secondly, Greece was perceived as the modern descendant of the world that the

intellectual elite held as the ultimate origin of civilization. Civilization meant freedom and, as such, Greece did not deserve to be subjected to the rule of a foreign power. Its independence also represented a further blow to the once mighty Ottoman Empire, and its weakness brought obvious gains to the powers of Western Europe. For its part, the independence of Latin America brought to a close three centuries of colonial venture led by the Iberian countries, Spain and Portugal, and opened their markets to the European trade directed by the emerging powers. A new political map of the Western world was being drafted, reflecting a condition in which new colonial powers were in the ascendancy. These were Britain and France, followed later on in the century by Germany, Italy, and the US. How the discourse of the past affected the novel situation of Latin America will be discussed in Chapter 7, and in more general terms in Parts II and III of this book (Chapters 5 to 9).

The independence of Greece and the Latin American countries assisted in weakening the ideological foundations of the conservative coalitions. It confirmed nationalism as a valid discourse. Moreover, it changed the character of nationalism itself as it defined a different type of nation, one not based on the rights of individuals and their sovereignty but on the singular past and culture of the members of the nation. This change of character has been labelled by experts in the field of nationalism studies as the transition from civic nationalism to ethnic or cultural nationalism (see for example Hobsbawm 1990: 22; Kohn 1967; Smith 1991a: 9–11). Change in the balance of civic nationalism towards ethnic nationalism in the nineteenth century had a dramatic effect on the perception of and the discourses based on the past. The growth of language and race as key features of a nation made the national past indispensable to its definition. In 1860, John Stuart Mill (1806–73), the political philosopher, discussing the origin of the nation said that:

[The feeling of nationality sometimes] is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.

(in Woolf 1996b: 40).

This development whereby language and race became crucial components of the new nation will be further discussed in Chapter 12, and has already been alluded to in several examples given in this chapter.

Revolutions in Greece and Latin America embodied a very different understanding of the past; one in which ideas of national autonomy, unity and identity predominated. Their examples show, first, how the discourse on

³ For Lund's influence on Scandinavian archaeology see Klindt-Jensen (1976: 45).

antiquity was reconfigured to construct a national imagination, not following a single line, but creating competing voices that changed over time in composition and even in tone. Second, the account provided in this chapter reveals how intellectuals coming from the main European powers felt compelled to embrace the study of the Greek and Latin American past as a way of understanding them better. They contributed to the process of national identity formation not only by publishing in their countries of origin, but also in local journals. Their thoughts were taken into account and brought into the local discourses about antiquity. The study of how the formation of the national past in Europe—the economic heart of the nineteenth-century Western world—will be the focus of the chapters in Part IV of this book. The chapters that follow, however, will focus on the issues of imperialism and colonialism. Both strands are key to the exploration of how the past was appropriated and how this affected the development of archaeology in the nineteenth century.

Part II

The Archaeology of Informal Imperialism