

SOCIOLOGIA DO DESENVOLVIMENTO - A INVENÇÃO DO 'TERCEIRO MUNDO'.

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USP

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[25 E 26 DE AGOSTO] AULA 4. GUERRA FRIA E DESCOLONIZAÇÃO: A ERA DO NACIONAL- DESENVOLVIMENTISMO

- *Wallerstein, Immanuel (2002) “The Concept of National Development, 1917-1989: ‘Elegy and Requiem’”. *American Behavioral Scientist* 35, no. 4 (March) (pp. 517–29).
- Manela, Erez (2007) *The Wilsonian moment: self-determination and the international origins of anticolonial nationalism*. New York, Oxford University Press. [Cap. I “Self-Determination for Whom?” (pp. 19-34)].

This tension between a basically protectionist versus a free trade stance became one of the major themes of policy-making in the various states of the world-system in the nineteenth century. It often was the most significant issue that divided the principal political forces of particular states. It was clear by then that a central ideological theme of the capitalist world-economy was that every state could, and indeed eventually probably would, reach a high level of national income and that conscious, rational action would make it so. This fit in very well with the underlying Enlightenment theme of inevitable progress and the teleological view of human history that it incarnated.

O universalismo ocidental
Desenvolvimento Nacional, Ilustração e Progresso

The year 1917 is often taken to be an ideological turning point in the history of the modern world-system. I agree that it was this, but not quite in the way it is usually argued to be. On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed the Congress of the United States and called for a declaration of war against Germany. He argued: "The world must be made safe for democracy." That same year, on November 7, the Bolsheviks assaulted the Winter Palace in the name of the workers' revolution. The great ideological antinomy of the twentieth century, Wilsonianism versus Leninism, may be said to have been born in 1917. I shall argue that it died in 1989. I shall further argue that the key issue to which both ideologies addressed themselves was the political integration of the periphery of the world-system. And finally, I shall argue that the mechanism of such integration was, both for Wilsonianism and for Leninism, "national development," and that the essential dispute between them was merely about the path to such national development.

AS UTOPIAS DO DESENVOLVIMENTO

Wilsonianism was based on classical liberal presuppositions. It was universalist, claiming that its precepts applied equally everywhere. It assumed that everyone acted on the basis of rational self-interest and that therefore everyone in the long run was reasonable. Hence peaceful and reformist practice was plausible. It placed great emphasis on legality and on form.

Of course, none of these precepts were new. In 1917, in fact, they seemed quite old-fashioned. Wilson's innovation (not invention) was to argue that these precepts applied not only to individuals within the state but to nation-states or peoples within the international arena. The principle of self-determination, the centerpiece of Wilsonianism, was nothing but the principle of individual freedom transposed to the level of the interstate system.

The transposition of a theory that had been intended to apply only at the level of individuals to the level of groups is a very tricky proposition. A harsh critic, Ivor Jennings (1956), said of Wilson's doctrine of self-determination: "On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people" (p. 56). Ay, there's the rub, indeed!

Auto
determinação
dos povos

European Colonial Empires

1492 - 2008

Lenin pursued very similar policy objectives under the quite different slogans of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. His views were no doubt based on other premises. His universalism was that of the world working class, the soon-to-be singular class that was slated to become literally identical with the “people.” Nations or peoples had no long-run place in the Marxian pantheon; they were supposed eventually to disappear, like the states. But nations or peoples did have a short-run, even middle-run reality that not only could not be ignored by Marxist parties but were potentially tactically useful to their ends.

“East.” Marxism-Leninism in effect was moving from its origins as a theory of proletarian insurrection against the bourgeoisie to a new role as a theory of anti-imperialism. This shift of emphasis would only grow with time. In

○ universalismo proletário

sumably determine the “postindependence” policies. Wilsonians saw the natural leadership of a national movement to lie in its intelligentsia and bourgeoisie—educated, respectable, and prudent. They foresaw a local movement that would persuade the more “modern” sectors of the traditional leadership to join in the political reforms and accept a sensible, parliamentary mode of organizing the newly independent state. Leninists saw the leadership to lie in a party/movement modeled on the Bolshevik party, even if it did not

As elites do III Mundo

A close look at the internal realities of the various states reveals, however, that, both in the political and in the economic arenas, there was less difference than the theory or the propaganda would suggest. In terms of the actual political structures, most of the states most of the time were either one-party states (de facto or de jure) or military dictatorships. Even when states had a multiparty system in formal terms, one party tended in reality to dominate the institutions and to be impervious to change of regime other than by military coup d'état. The corollary of such structures tended to be a low level of civil rights—a powerful police structure, arbitrary arrests of opposition figures, a government-controlled press, and a long list of intellectuals in exile. There was very little difference in this regard to be found among states employing a Wilsonian rhetoric and those employing a basically Leninist rhetoric.

Liberalismo e comunismo: tão diferentes, tão iguais.

What was most alike in all these countries was the belief in the possibility and urgent importance of “national development.” National development was operationally defined everywhere as “catching up.” Of course, it was assumed by everyone involved that this was a long and difficult task. But it was also assumed that it was doable, provided only that the right *state* policies were pursued. The state policies advocated, of course, covered the whole ideological gamut from facilitating the unrestricted flow of capital, commodities, and even labor across the national frontiers at one extreme to total state control of productive and exchange operations within largely closed frontiers at the other. There were, of course, a very large variety of in-between positions.

Desenvolvimento nacional

sally upward growth rates. Developmentalism was the order of the day; there was a worldwide consensus about its legitimacy and its inevitability.

This consensus, however, suffered two shocks from which it has not recovered and, I am arguing, will not recover. The first shock was the worldwide revolution of 1968. The second shock was the worldwide economic stagnation of the period 1970-1990, the economic failure of almost all the governments of the peripheral and semiperipheral zones, and the collapse of regimes in the so-called socialist states. 1968 broke the ideological crust. The 1970s and 1980s removed the rest of the ideological covering. The

Declínio do desenvolvimentismo?

The 1970s and 1980s removed the rest of the ideological covering. The gaping sore of the North-South polarization has been uncovered and exposed to view. At the moment, in desperation, the world is muttering incantations about the market as remedy, as though this could solve anything. But market medicine is mercurochrome and will not prevent further deterioration. It is highly unlikely that most states now abandoning “socialist” slogans in favor of “market” slogans will see a significant improvement in the 1990s in their standard of living. After all, the vast majority of noncore states who adhered to market slogans in the 1980s did quite poorly. Reference is always made to the rare “success” stories (the current hero is South Korea), neglecting the much larger number of failures, and the fading of earlier so-called success stories, such as Brazil.

A salvação pelos mercados

The prospect of national development served as the legitimization of the world-system's overall structure. In this sense, the fate of Wilsonian ideology was dependent on the fate of Leninist ideology. To put it more crudely and less kindly, Leninist ideology was the fig leaf of Wilsonian ideology.

Today the fig leaf has fallen, and the emperor is naked. All the shouting about the triumph of democracy in 1989 around the world will not long hide the absence of any serious prospect for the economic transformation of the periphery within the framework of the capitalist world-economy. Thus it will not be the Leninists who sing the requiem for Leninism but the Wilsonians. It is they who are in a quandary and who have no plausible political alternatives. This was captured in the no-win dilemmas of Mr. Bush in the Persian Gulf crisis. But the Persian Gulf crisis is only the beginning of the story.

Democracia sem desenvolvimento?