**Resumo do artigo de Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007).**

**“Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis.”**

The authors review the literature on non-human ape and infant social-cognitive skills and advocate for the use of a distinct hypothesis, the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis, to explain the evolution of cooperation in humans. Although it is considered that primate cognition is driven in general by social competition, the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis indicates that a more complex level of social organization is enabled by social cooperation. In order to illustrate the pertinence of this additional hypothesis, the authors mainly focus on the different social-cognitive abilities of chimpanzees and 1-to-2 years-old human infants. It is argued that chimpanzees are able to understand ‘seeing’, which means that they know what a conspecific can or cannot see in competitive situations but otherwise would lack the ability to understand cooperative communication and thus understand ‘seeing’ in cooperative situations. On the contrary, humans are expected to perform well in both kinds of situations. The authors consider that the participants in a cooperative activity have to share a joint goal, take reciprocal or complementary roles and are generally motivated and willing to help one another to accomplish their role if needed. So far, experimental results did not suggest any general ability to share a joint goal and understanding the roles of a joint activity for chimpanzees and the willingness to help remains unclear whereas the definition complies to 14-to-18-months-old humans. Chimpanzees are considered to lack a “we-intentionality”. Regarding cooperative communication, chimpanzees appear to fail to understand communicative intention and to engage in joint attention, possibly related to a more competitive and individualistic interactive environment. According to the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis, human-specific cognition evolves through interactions involving shared intentionality and creation of perspective, with evidence from 12-months of age onwards. The forms of cognitive representation developed during infancy, such as the notion of jointness and perspective, appears essential to the authors for supporting cooperative action, communication, use of symbols and of cultural artifacts. These developments are also seen as cognitive bases for collective intentionality. Whereas chimpanzees and human infants share the ability to understand others as goal-directed and to perceive actors, human infants appear to additionally display skill and motivation in tasks involving shared goals, joint attention, joint intentions and cooperative communication. The authors then conclude that the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis would have emerged in human evolution after our separation with other great apes, facilitated by interactions with tolerant and helpful partners.

**Questões sobre o artigo de HRDY, Sarah Blaffer (2009)**

**“Meet the alloparents: Shared child care may be the secret of human evolutionary success.”**

It is striking through the article choice, that scientific knowledge is ever-evolving and consequently should never be considered as final. Here we can see the contrast between the two articles were the first one, from 2007, argue, based on chimpanzees experiments, that some cooperative features are human-specific, whereas the second article, from 2009, document a literature on more genetically-distant apes that do seem to present some cooperative features previously thought exclusive to humans. Clearly, what we call knowledge, or here scientific knowledge, is just a way to look, select, and interpret current data, but in no means should be considered as an exclusive truth. What we know now may not represent the reality of the world or may only partially represent it. In such, science seems as accurate as philosophy. Maybe science should fuel philosophical theories but shouldn’t be used for characterizing the world itself? This would seem like an error-prone and very misleading representation of the world. What is not proven by science may just be not proven yet. What is considered by science may just be premature conception based on partial information. In the competition for fame, fundings and publication, we, scientists, may have forgotten to ever-strengthen our humility and modesty towards our own knowledge. In our current capitalist philosophy, the need to legitimate objects, interactions and ideas by their utility and value may have led to this current state of false-usefulness and extended use of knowledge. Grants and fundings will be attributed to most useful projects, most valuable ones, so in response, researchers may extrapolate usefulness of their research, creating additive meanings, and value, against wiseness. I wonder if this scientific way of processing money and meaning have actually been helpful to science itself. Some say that it stimulated great advances. But wouldn’t have it been more efficient to award grants relative to needs of research and not value, stimulate wise and humble debate and not run senseless in any new directions before thinking about possible dead-ends?